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CLASSIFICATION

GDS 12/14/87 (NEGROFONTE; John D.) OR-M

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INDICATE
COLLECT
CHARGE TO

CN: 9271

TSIA

PEPR, PINT, CAS, CS, NU, ES, HO TAGS: SUBJECT: Monge Plan for Neutrality Vis-a-vis Central American Conflicts ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC INFO: Amembassy CARACAS Amembassy GUATEMALA Amembassy MANAGUA Amembassy PANAMA Amembassy SAN JOSE Amembassy SAN SALVADOR USCINCSO QUARRY NEIGHTS PANAMA USINT HAVANA USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TEGUCIGALPA 9271 LIMDIS REF: SAN JOSE 7731 L - ENTIRE TEXT SUMMARY: Monge plan strikes this Embassy as a bit of a It explicitly professes Costa Rican "defenselessness" despite obvious perils of current situation; goes even one further than the Mexicans by downgrading Salvadoran government AMB DCM to "a group" or a "faction"; and by implication looks to POL-2 others to pull all their chestnuts out of fire. certain we understand positive elements of this neutrality DRAFTED BY: DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

50153-101

CLEARANCES:

AMB: JDNegroponte: kjl



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AMB: JDNegroponte

12-14-81

OPTIONAL FORM 153
· (Formerly FS-413)
January 1975
Dept. of State

Depr. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir. (9 Release) (1 Excise (1) Deny (2) Declassify Date 1 Grafeld Exemption


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scheme and believe it would be construed by Havana/Managua as Costa Rican green light to do what they please in Salvador and Honduras. A case can be made that if Monge plan were to become declaratory Costa Rican policy, it would hasten rather than postpone the day that Costa Rica is shoved into the Central American cauldron. END SUMMARY.

- 3. Embassy Tegucigalpa believes neutrality memorandum prepared by Costa Rican Liberation Party members (reftel) could have disturbing implications for United States policy in Central America for a number of reasons. First is tone of utter defenselessness in memorandum's second paragraph (para four reftel). No mention is made of subversive threat facing region; nor is there an intimation that if Salvador and Honduras fall into communist hands that it could happen to Costa Rica next.
- 4. Reference to 'Salvadoran "factions" and "groups" in second part of memorandum (para five reftel) can, in current Central American context, only be construed as intended to undermine legitimacy of Salvadoran government and cover bets against possible communist victory there.
- 5. Next paragraph (para six reftel) at least acknowledges that there are conflicts among Central American countries; but then proceeds to profess total non-involvement. Since Cuba/Nicaragua are already actively subverting El Salvador and laying groundwork for doing it here next, this



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paragraph could easily be construed in Havana and Managua as a Costa Rican green light to do what they please in Salvador and Honduras.

- 6. Next paragraph (para seven reftel), by referring to the eventuality of a conflict breaking out endangering "the survival of the system of representative democracy", can be taken to mean that there is no such struggle going on at the moment. In fact, if the document has one major conceptual, and we would suspect intentional, deficiency is that it does not deal with form of conflict being pursued at this very moment and most likely to continue to be pursued in the region, namely externally supported subversion.
- 7. Finally, we take apologetic tone of first sentence of final paragraph of memorandum to be almost a conscious admission by the authors of the inadequacy of their formula as a way of dealing with the current crisis.

NECEOPONTE

