## UZSZEKÚLÚ


INDICATE
COLLECT
CHARGE TO

A141

	F	41961
	AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA CLASSIFICATION	R
E.O. XXXXX TAGS: SUBJECT:	12356: DECL: OADR PREL, MOPS, HO, NU SANDINISTAS SEND THREATENING MESSAGE TO HONDURAS	٦
ACTION:	SECSTATE WASHDC	
INFO:	AMEMBASSY BOGOTA AMEMBASSY CARACAS AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA AMEMBASSY MANAGUA AMEMBASSY MEXICO AMEMBASSY PANAMA AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE	
	AMEMBASSY, SAN SALVADOR AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK	
THE PARTY OF THE P	EXDIS  (NOTAL)  (A) MANAGUA 2146; (B) TEGUCIGALPA 5070 (NOTAL)	,
-	1. SHOWS - ENTIRE TEXT	
	2. We find Managua analysis contained reftel persuadive	
AMB DCM	and right on the mark. We would add that, from this	
POL_2 DAO	vantage point, Honduran army incursions into Nicaragua	
MILGP	would appear most unlikely; nor have we noted any signs	
	of Honduran army joining insurgents in cross-border	
	activities.	

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:		
AMB:JDNegroponte:kjl	5-21-83	211	AMB:JDNegroponte		
CLEADANCES					

CLEARANCES:



OPTIONAL FORM 153 (Formerly FS-413) January 1975 Dept. of State

50153-101

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(V) Release ( ) Exoise ( ) Deny ( V) Declassify
Date ( ) Exemption

- 3. Having said that, we suspect that the greater the FDN/ARDE successes inside Nicaragua, the greater the Nicaraguan efforts will be to portray their country as a victim of external aggression. There will be an even further rise in level of rhetoric; renewed Security Council meetings; etc.
- 4. What some Hondurans fear, although admittedly not on the basis of any profound analysis of the Nicaraguan scene, is that if things start going really badly for the Nicaraguans internally, then they may launch a conventional attack on Honduras.

NEGROPONTE

