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United States Department of State

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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OCT 27 1986

THE SECRETARY'S POST-REYKJAVIK
MEDIA EVENTS

October 17 and 19, 1986

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OCT 27 1986

I. BRIEFING SCENARIOS

1. National Press Club Luncheon
2. "MacNeil/Lehrer Show"
3. "Meet the Press"

II. PRESS GUIDANCE

1. Reykjavik Update
2. Nicaragua
3. El Salvador Earthquake
4. Middle East Developments

III. BACKUP MATERIAL ON REYKJAVIK MEETING

1. Results of Reykjavik
2. Reykjavik Checklist
3. Lessons of Reyjavik
4. Gorbachev's Commentary

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Date: 10/9/86

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1. Think Big

Ambitious agreements have several advantages over marginal constraints:

- Sticky points become much more manageable, such as sublimits in START, proportionality of Asian reductions in INF. (A few, like shorter-range, become more important.)
- They convey major benefits, which can more than offset the costs.
- Ambitious agreements need not be harder to negotiate than marginal agreements.
- While I have been pointing out these advantages in a theoretical sense for some time, the Reykjavik experience is the first experimental evidence that there is something to this idea.

2. Benefits of Engagement

It is probably not a coincidence that the principal stumbling block today was a subject that we have been reluctant to address in detail in Geneva. The discussion of the meaning of the ABM Treaty was also poor in last night's session, on a "Dick and Jane" level. (E.g., "Agreed Statement D cannot remove Article V.") Other subjects were addressed in a much more sophisticated way. Reluctance to engage with the Soviets on question does not generally make problems go away; more frequently the position senses weakness, which it tries to exploit.

3. Inability to Anticipate Soviet Moves

Reykjavik demonstrated once again how poor we are at guessing what the Soviets will do. The widespread prediction was that the Soviets would concentrate on INF and shun START, would hit hard on interim restraint, and press testing. Gorbachev was said to need a summit, and have trouble controlling his military. None of this was much in evidence. Arms control is an experimental science, and needs to be pursued by making suggestions that would be in our interest and observing the response.

4. Value of Less Formal Summitry

Reykjavik and Vladivostok had much in common:

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- short notice -- out-of-the-way place -- working format -- small team -- low expectations -- Vladivostok was an unexpected success -- Reykjavik came unexpectedly close to an unexpectedly ambitious agreement | DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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The short notice did not hurt the preparation at all.

5. Value of Engaging New Players

Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Akhromeyev were all more useful

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