

~~EYES ONLY~~
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

25 March 1971

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Management Advisory Group

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
THROUGH : The Executive Director
SUBJECT : CIA Domestic Activities

MAG is concerned that CIA avoid involvement in the current expose of the domestic intelligence activities of the Army and other federal agencies. We believe that there are CIA activities similar to those now under scrutiny which could cause great embarrassment to the Agency because they appear to exceed the scope of the CIA charter. Except for the Agency's statutory CE/CI responsibilities, MAG opposes any Agency activity which could be construed as targeted against any person who enjoys the protection of the US Constitution -- whether or not he resides in the United States. Except in those cases clearly related to national security, no US citizen should be the object of CIA operations. We realize that on occasion the Agency will develop information about some citizen who is engaged in activities inimical to the interests of the United States. Such information should quickly be turned over to the proper agencies of government for further action, even if it means that sometimes an essentially home-oriented agency may be asked to perform in a limited operational capacity overseas.

If we do not pursue such a course, one day the public and the Congress will come to have grave doubts about our role in government, and may severely restrict our ability to perform those tasks properly assigned to CIA.

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21 APR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Support
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Heads of Independent Offices

(For Distribution to Office/Division Chief
Level Only)

SUBJECT : CIA Activities in the United States

1. From time to time some of our employees express concern over various allegations or rumors of CIA activities in the United States. The attached memorandum is designed to clarify this subject so that supervisors can authoritatively reply to any employees indicating such concern. It is a statement of the facts of the situation. If incidents or activities are reported which appear to conflict with this statement, they should be reported to appropriate senior authority for resolution (or correction if unauthorized activities might have occurred).

2. Because of the possible sensitivity of this description of the Agency's methodology, this memorandum is not being given the usual broad circulation of the "FYI -- Allegations and Answers" series. Office and Division Chiefs are urged, however, to use it to inform Branch Chiefs so that its points can be readily available to supervisors to react to expressions of employee concern.

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Executive Director-Comptroller

Attachment

WEC

Distribution:

0 - DDI

1 - Each Other Addressee:

DDP	D/DCI/IC	A/DCI (Thuermer)
DDS	D/PPB	SAVA
DDS&T	ONE	USIB Secretary
OGC	OLC	IG

EXDIR

00444

~~SECRET~~ALLEGATION:

In a variety of ways it has been alleged that CIA is working within the United States, with particular attention to extremist groups.

FACTS:

1. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, subparagraph D3, states, "The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

In his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 14 April 1971, the Director stated:

"I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens."

In the Director's "State of the Agency" speech to employees on 17 September 1971, he said:

"I gave a talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors last winter, as you know, and I did it for only one purpose. That was to try and put in the record a few of these denials that we've all wanted to see put in the public record for some time. And you can rely on those denials. They're true, and you can use that as any text that you may need to demonstrate that we're not in the drug traffic, and that we're not trying to do espionage on American citizens in the United States, and we're not tapping telephone lines, and that we're not doing a lot of other things which we're accused of doing. One of the things that tends to perpetuate some of these silly ideas are jokes that are made about them, particularly about domestic espionage. Although the jokes have no basis in fact they nevertheless give us a name which we don't deserve. I don't say that that makes all that much difference, but it does make some difference, and this tends to spill over, so I would like to suggest that if you have it in your hearts to do so that you speak up when the occasion arises and try and set the facts straight."

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2. From time to time some employees have been concerned that Agency activities might conflict with these statements. They can be assured that Agency activities do not. For clarification, some activities which may have been subject to misunderstanding are listed as follows:

a. Domestic Contacts. The Domestic Contact Service establishes discreet but overt relationships with American private citizens, commercial, academic and other organizations and resident aliens for the purposes of collecting on a voluntary basis foreign intelligence information or soliciting their cooperation in assisting the Agency to perform its mission overseas. Records of the individuals and organizations cooperating with the Agency are maintained as a necessary practical element of this process.

b. Security Investigations. Security investigations are conducted on prospective employees, contractors, and consultants, and on security problems which arise. These investigations involve a wide range of investigative procedures, including neighborhood inquiries, checks with other Government agencies, review of credit reports, and interviews with former employers and business associates. This is essential to assure that our personnel possess a high degree of personal integrity, sense of responsibility, and competence and to protect classified information and sensitive intelligence sources and methods. The resulting files are held separately by the Office of Security and are not merged with other Agency files.

c. Foreign Resources. On some occasions, foreign citizens of interest to CIA are contacted and recruited in America for work abroad. The purpose of this activity is entirely restricted to the Agency's foreign operations.

d. Recruitment. CIA recruiters maintain a wide variety of contacts within the United States, assisting individuals interested in employment with CIA to learn more about it and to join its employee force.

e. Contracting. In the course of CIA business and operations, a number of contracts for procurement, research, or analysis are made with a variety of U.S. companies and individuals. This in no way constitutes operations in the U.S. but rather secures the assistance of these groups in carrying out the CIA mission against foreign targets.

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f. Operations. The 1967 Katzenbach Committee report was approved by the Director in March 1967 and is binding on any of our relations with American organizations today. It specifically prohibits covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any U. S. educational or private voluntary organization. Any relationship or operation the Agency has with an American organization must be and is within these guidelines.

g. Details or Loans. On rare occasions, details of technically qualified CIA personnel, technical advice, or loans of CIA equipment have been made available to other U. S. agencies at their request to assist them to carry out their responsibilities. An example is the skymarshall program, in which some CIA personnel were temporarily detailed to the FAA in order to assist in a rapid initiation of that program. Such personnel and equipment are under the operational control of the receiving agency. Assistance of this nature in no way constitutes an assumption of responsibility or authority by CIA for the program.

h. Counterintelligence and Drugs. To carry out its responsibilities for counterintelligence, CIA is interested in the activities of foreign nations or intelligence services aimed at the U. S. To the extent that these activities lie outside the U. S., including activities aimed at the U. S. utilizing U. S. citizens or others, they fall within CIA's responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the activities within the U. S. lies with the FBI, as an internal security function. CIA's responsibility and authority are limited to the foreign intelligence aspect of the problem, and any action of a law enforcement or internal security nature lies with the FBI or local police forces. (CIA's assistance to the U. S. Government program against narcotics and drugs is handled in the same fashion.)

i. Operational Support. To support CIA operations, arrangements are made with various U. S. business or other entities to provide cover or other support for CIA personnel or activities abroad. This can include proprietaries formed or controlled by CIA. While these may exist within the U. S., their purpose is to conduct or support operations abroad.

j. Defectors. As provided by law, CIA occasionally resettles in the U. S. defectors and other foreign individuals of operational interest. This resettlement may involve a new identity, relocation, employment, etc. Although this activity takes place in this country, its purpose is the support of operations abroad.

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	MAG Co-Chairmen		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

For MAG review and return. Please
do not reproduce.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
O/Executive Director	May 72

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
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FEB 22

22-1032

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Intelligence
 Deputy Director for Plans
 Deputy Director for Support
 Deputy Director for Science and Technology
 General Counsel
 Inspector General
 Assistant to the Director

SUBJECT : Allegation of Agency Involvement in the U. S.

1. The Management Advisory Group, among others, has reported on the concerns of some employees that the Agency is vulnerable to the charge of having an operational interest in U. S. citizens or organizations in violation of the National Security Act. Attached is my best understanding of the facts. If it is in error or incomplete, I ask that you let me know orally or in writing.

2. I have drafted the attached with two purposes in mind: First, as a basis for some type of issuance that would advise the command line and senior supervisors of policy and facts and, second, as a future issue of "FYI -- Allegations and Answers." I look forward to your comment in the not-too-distant future before it is formally distributed.

WEC

W. E. Colby
 Executive Director-Comptroller

Attachment
 O/EXDIR/BEvans

Distribution:

O-DDI

1 - Each other addressee

① - ExDir

1 - ER

Note: Attachment
 revised and
 issued in final
 form on
 21 April 1978.

00449

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FYI -- ALLEGATIONS AND ANSWERS

March 1972

ALLEGATION:

In a variety of ways it has been alleged that CIA is working within the United States, with particular attention to extremist groups. A recent example was in the Quicksilver Times of 20 January 1972 (attached)*.

FACTS:

1. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, subparagraph D3, states, "The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

In his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 14 April 1971, the Director stated:

"I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens."

In the Director's "State of the Agency" Speech to employees on 17 September 1971, he said:

"I gave a talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors last winter, as you know, and I did it for only one purpose. That was to try and put in the record a few of these denials that we've all wanted to see put in the public record for some time. And you can rely on those denials. They're true, and you can use that as any text that you may need to demonstrate that we're not in the drug traffic, and that we're not trying to do espionage on American citizens in the United States, and we're not tapping telephone lines, and that we're not doing a lot of other things which we're accused of doing. One of the things that tends to perpetuate some of these

*COMMENT: The two gentlemen cited are former CIA employees. Neither they nor the organizations with which they are currently associated have any operational connection with the Agency.

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silly ideas are jokes that are made about them, particularly about domestic espionage. Although the jokes have no basis in fact they nevertheless give us a name which we don't deserve. I don't say that that makes all that much difference, but it does make some difference, and this tends to spill over, so I would like to suggest that if you have it in your hearts to do so that you speak up when the occasion arises and try and set the facts straight."

2. From time to time some employees have been concerned that Agency activities might conflict with the National Security Act and the Agency's statements. They can be assured that Agency activities do not. For clarification, some activities which may have been subject to misunderstanding are listed as follows:

a) Security Investigations. Security investigations are conducted on prospective employees, contractors, and consultants. They involve neighborhood checks on the background of these individuals. This is essential to meet the security requirements of the Agency. The resulting information is held in separate security office files and not merged in other Agency files.

b) Domestic Contacts. On an overt basis the Domestic Contact Service makes visits to American private citizens, firms, and other organizations, soliciting transmission to the Government of information they have learned abroad. The purpose and content of the information are restricted to foreign intelligence, i. e., intelligence on developments abroad. The records of the firms and individuals as sources are maintained as a purely practical element of this collection process.

c) Foreign Resources. A variety of foreign citizens of interest to CIA visit or on occasion reside in America. Occasionally they are contacted and recruited for work abroad in the course of travels to their homeland or for continuing collaboration with the Agency in their homeland after their return from the U. S. The purpose of this activity is entirely restricted to the collection of foreign intelligence.

d) Recruitment. CIA recruiters maintain a wide variety of contacts within the United States endeavoring to assist individuals interested in employment with CIA to learn more about it and to join its employce force.

e) Contracting. In the course of CIA business and operations, a number of contracts for procurement, research, or analysis are made with a variety of U. S. companies and individuals. This in no way constitutes operations in the U. S. but rather secures the assistance of these groups in carrying out the CIA mission of foreign intelligence.

f) Operations. The 1967 Katzenbach Committee report was approved by the Director in March 1967 and is binding on any of our relations with American organizations today. It specifically prohibits covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any U. S. educational or private voluntary organization. Any relationship or operation the Agency has with an American organization must be and is within these guidelines.


g) Details or Loans. On rare occasions, details of technically qualified CIA personnel or loans of CIA equipment have been made to other U. S. agencies to assist in the carrying out of their responsibilities. An example is the skymarshel program to which some CIA personnel were detailed in order to assist in a rapid initiation of that program. Assistance of this nature in no way constitutes an assumption of responsibility or authority by CIA for the program.

h) Counterintelligence. To carry out its responsibilities for counterintelligence, CIA is interested in the activities of foreign nations or intelligence services aimed at the U. S. To the extent that the activities lie outside the U. S., including activities aimed at the U. S. utilizing U. S. citizens or others, it falls within CIA's responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the activities within the U. S. lies with the FBI, as it involves an internal security function. CIA's responsibility and authority are limited to the foreign intelligence aspect of the problem and any action of a law enforcement or internal security nature lies with the FBI or local police forces.

i) Defectors. As provided by law, CIA occasionally resettles in the U. S. defectors and other foreign individuals of operational interest. This resettlement may involve their assumption of a new identity, location of employment, etc. Although this activity takes place in this country, its purpose is the support of operations abroad.

j) Cover. As a part of CIA operations abroad, arrangements are made with a number of U. S. entities to serve as the ostensible sponsor of individuals abroad. This can include business entities controlled by CIA, or proprietaries. While they may exist within the U. S., their purpose is to conduct or support operations abroad.

20 Jan 1972



CIA Headquarters in Virginia

Back yard CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency always insists its men aren't involved in domestic police work. But in Chicago CIA agents have been working with the FBI and Treasury men in an effort to pin the bank bombings on radical groups.

Heretofore, clandestine CIA police work within the US was centered around counter espionage efforts aimed at the

Soviet KGB. CIA maintains secret bases in all major US cities. The agency also has training camps in Virginia and the Carolinas. These are masked as regular military bases. Spooks are trained for duty at Williamsburg, Va.

Two years ago CIA employees were recruited when members of the Chicago

They met there with Helms, were shown around, and taken to the secret training camps. That was the beginning of rumors within the agency that the CIA had been given the go ahead to move into domestic police operations. While everyone denied it, the theory was that the CIA was told to get the radicals.

Two recent personnel changes increased speculation. One involved resignation of Helms's special assistant, Robert Kiley. Kiley handled the student operations through National Student Association facades. He recently turned up as associate director of the Police Foundation, a new group launched with a \$50 million Ford Foundation grant. The money is meant to be used to improve local police. The second personnel shift involved Draxel Godfrey, who was head of the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. He quit this high ranking job, turned up in the narcotics bureau of the Justice Commission at Harrisburg, Pa. The commission is another new

police. Both personnel shifts are cited by agency people to bolster fronts in the US, this time, now into was given a new title recognizing making him head of all intelligence and presumably providing him with legitimate interest in internal operations. But such suggestion is bitterly denied all around.

00454

~~SECRET~~TABLE OF CONTENTS

East Asia Division	Placing Agents in Leftist Milieu - Cleared with FBI
Central Cover Staff	Statistics on Alias Documentation and Other Cover Support
European Division	Research on Vesco Case
Soviet Bloc Division	Relations with FBI and Local Police
NARCOG	Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Including Information on American Citizens
Division D	International Telephone Links
Foreign Intelligence Staff	Security and Exchange Commission and Vesco Case
Counterintelligence Staff	Agency Funds Made Available to FBI Vesco Case Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff MHCHAOS
CI/Police Group	International Police Academy
Foreign Resources Division	Locations, Recruitments, Use Alias Documents

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1 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby

SUBJECT: Special Activities

1. Following our recent conversation, I have searched my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples of activities which to hostile observers or to someone without complete knowledge and with a special kind of motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities exceeding CIA's charter.

2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962, DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify their sources for classified information which was appearing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA, orally, which I did. I understand more complete information on this operation is available from the Director of Security. I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of what precise actions were taken, what information was gained, what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.

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
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4. Although certain activities never got beyond the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation. One involved chemical warfare operations against [redacted]. A second involved a paramilitary strike against [redacted]. Outside the United States Government, General Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign installations in this country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected

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exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy, and generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting taking place in the presence of the Attorney General. It is clear that the FBI was opposed to any such proposal then, as now, and the plan never went forward.

5. During the period when Des Fitzgerald was in charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office learned, quite by accident, that Fitzgerald had secured the cooperation of several prominent US business firms in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but knowledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.

6.

[REDACTED]

in connection with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of American business could not be accepted, it being neither a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business. This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations and private business.

7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy, McCone injected the Agency, and particularly Cord Meyer,

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into the US labor situation, and particularly to try to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and Walter Reuther. Cord Meyer steered a very skillful course in this connection, but the Agency could be vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back, or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's wishes.

8. There are three examples of using Agency funds which I know to be controversial. One was the expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike Miskovsky, George MacManus, and James Smith. Second, as you well know, when Lou Conein received his summons to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on 1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him. My impression is that the accounting for this and its use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at one of the early Special Group meetings attended by McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His general position was that such expenditures were not within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow such spending only on the direct personal request of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or the White House.

9. I raise these issues of funding because I remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent \$3,000 for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.

10. Under the heading of old business, I know that any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried about the fact that conversations within the offices and over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's

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tenure, there were microphones in his regular office, his inner office, his dining room, his office in East Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven Street. I do not know who would be willing to raise such an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this score.

11. Also under the heading of old business,

Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs, and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced with surprisingly little excitement at the time.

12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was a special arrangement with the Office of Communications whereby the Director's office gained access to non-CIA traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball, Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did. Ben Read in the Secretary of State's office and I spent several weeks putting this one to rest.

13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know, operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of his activities could be misunderstood. One example was his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and Maria Callas flown from Rome to Athens on Air Force KC 135. Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John

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
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
Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety of this action.

14.



15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift and a luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps indicative of the press's relations with him. However, in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher and the authors to change things. They did not change a comma, and I doubt that this old saw will ever sing again.

16.



17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that allegations from any quarter which cast these things in the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention, and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight. If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point

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
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out that I was very much in the position of the enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers were aware of these activities and better able to judge their propriety and possible impact or misinterpretation.


WALTER ELDER

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
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00463

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
14 February 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

In November 1962 Mr. [redacted] advised Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick that he had, at one time, been directed by Mr. Richard Bissell to assume responsibility for a project involving the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, then Premier, Republic of Congo. According to [redacted] poison was to have been the vehicle as he made reference to having been instructed to see Dr. Sidney Gottlieb in order procure the appropriate vehicle.



00464

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN

12 APR 1973



JOHN P. ROCHE

The CIA and Allende

The current imbroglio over the role that the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Telephone and Telegraph Co. played (or considered playing) in trying to block the election of Chilean President Allende has its tantalizing and perplexing aspects. Was the CIA's cash balance so low it needed a million dollars from IT&T? Did the CIA and IT&T really think they could pull off some of the stunts contemplated without the word getting out and working massively in favor of Allende? But underlying this brawl are a series of very difficult questions of principle, to say nothing of definition.

First of all, what constitutes American (public or private) intervention in the internal affairs of another state? Obviously, sponsoring a revolution (as Teddy Roosevelt did to break Panama loose from Colombia) is at one pole. But between sponsoring revolutions and totally eliminating any American activity outside of the United States, there is a long line on the spectrum, a line that gets fuzzier and fuzzier the further you go.

Moreover, even doing nothing can be construed as intervention: Egypt's President Nasser thought that Secretary Dulles' refusal to help finance the Aswan Dam was a form of intervention, and some years ago six coffee-producing nations in Latin America protested to the Organization of American States that our refusal to rig coffee prices intervened in their internal affairs.

I would argue that the very existence of the United States as the most powerful nation in the world automatically intervenes in the affairs of every other state. Nasser and the coffee producers were right: Inaction on our part can have as great an impact as action. To take a vivid instance, if we had not shipped military equipment to Britain before Pearl Harbor, the war for Europe could have been lost.

If we accept that proposition, the futile argument over whether we should intervene automatically goes by the boards. Then we turn to the hard one: To what ends should we (publicly and privately) intervene?

Should we protect democratic (or even undemocratic) nations from totalitarian invasion or subversion? Should we utilize our foreign aid to nourish democratic political development — as is provided in the Fraser Amendment to the foreign aid bill — or should we take a strictly hands-off approach?

It is at this point that the IT&T fracas comes back into focus, and as illogical shambles occurs. Let us suppose for a moment that the Chase Manhattan Bank, influenced by the World Council of Churches and black militants, decided to provide a conduit to black-liberation movements in South Africa, using its business connections to provide arms and other aid to the revolutionaries. Would this be a "bad" thing? Was it a "bad" thing when the CIA, using a business cover, shipped into Santo Domingo the weapons used to kill the brutal dictator Trujillo? (I don't know how he feels about it today, but in 1961 the Dominican statesman Juan Bosch thought that intervention was the greatest thing since the discovery of America.)

What this comes down to is that intervention is a "good" thing when you happen to favor the cause involved, but is wicked and immoral if you disapprove of the goals. A perfectly human response; but hardly one on which sound public policy can be formulated. The thought of IT&T losing its Chilean assets does not bring tears to my eyes or lead me to wish we still had a supply of gunboats in stock. Capitalism, I'm told, involves taking risks, and the corporation may in the end be reimbursed by a federal agency set up to provide insurance for such contingencies.

No, what bothers me is the wholly ad hoc reaction of the Senate committee investigating the matter. We would be far better served by Sen. Church and his colleagues if they spent less time being outraged and a little more trying to formulate general guidelines, guidelines which would apply to South America and South Africa, to the just and the unjust alike, however defined.

Colby!
→ true?

00465

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

~~EYES ONLY~~

FROM:

DC/WHD

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

2 April 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. IG.

Allen

2.

3.

4.

Jewel file

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

2 April 74

Per our conversation

~~BY HAND & EYES ONLY~~

This material was forwarded by DC/WH as a late discovery re the Jewels exercise last summer. He did not know if they had been submitted at the time. Comments as follows:

1. Re Vescon we don't have this piece, but some material related.

2. Chilean question re Jewels and reported re Wapensbe

3. Health matter covered in Wapensbe

00466

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Robert L. Vesco

1. On 31 July 1972 [C/WH] was contacted by Mr. Jorden, Latin American referent at the NSC, by telephone in order to determine if [BKHERALD] had any information on Vesco. Mr. Jorden was advised that a check would be made. A file review uncovered [redacted] [C/WH] called Mr. Jorden (31 July 1972) and informed him of the following:

a) Vesco was known to us as head of IOS, had recently visited Costa Rica and expressed a desire to settle there. In addition, it was known that Vesco [redacted]

b) [C/WH] also advised Mr. Jorden that Vesco had come to the attention of [redacted] and they were aware that he was President of the International Control Corporation of Fairfield, N.J. [Subsequently, [redacted] was advised that the NSC was making inquiries about Vesco.

2. [redacted]

3. [redacted]


[redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

00467


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00468

~~SECRET~~




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00469

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~~SENSITIVE~~


-3-



~~SENSITIVE~~
~~SECRET~~

00470

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~




00471


7 September 1973
DATE

CHAMBERLAIN

BRECKINRIDGE



GILLARD



A sample of a short, to-the-point special study, approved by WEC and now the subject of activity by DDO, DDMBS and DDSBT to do new regulation.




RETURN TO:

SDR.

Sett:

Is there any control, or need for such, courses?



00472





21 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Inspector General
SUBJECT : Use and Control of Disguise and Alias Documents

Action Requested:

1. The attached report resulted from our general inquiries into Watergate-related issues and contains recommendations in paragraph 9 for your approval.

Background:

2. In the course of collecting information on various activities of the Agency with flap potential, we received a number of reports on issuance and use of disguise and alias documentation. The Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee noted on the face of the summary submitted by the Office of Technical Services (OTS) on materials issued by it that it would be interesting to check the reports of other components to see if they matched with OTS issuances. In fact, OTS is not the only component to issue alias documentation, and the review was broadened to include the other issuing components and their procedures for controlling the materials. The attached report summarizes the findings.



Donald F. Chamberlain
Inspector General

Attachment
As Stated Above

APPROVED: W.F. Collins

DATE: 24 AUG 1973

DISAPPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

00473



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USE AND CONTROL OF DISGUISE AND ALIAS DOCUMENTS

General

1. The policy, responsibilities, and procedures concerning U.S. documentation issued to authenticate a false identity used in the Directorate of Operations are set forth in CSI (now DOI) 240-4 dated 23 August 1972. This instruction, a revision of CSI 220-7 dated 12 May 1959, represents an extensive upgrading in the definition of responsibilities and in establishing procedures ensuring that each request has the approval of a designated senior official in the component. The current instruction, furthermore, requires that each request be routed through Cover and Commercial Staff, Official Cover Branch (CCS/OCB) for concurrence, which, in effect, makes CCS/OCB the one component retaining complete records and details of every request. There are no other regulations applying to this subject, but it currently is observed by all components.

Issuing Responsibilities and Procedures

2. Three major components are responsible for issuing alias documentation and/or disguise. The specific responsibilities are:

[redacted] this office issues non-backstopped documents in alias which are used exclusively for flash identification purposes. Birth certificates in alias are considered to be a special document and require a uniquely prescribed approval procedure and control. This Branch also responds to requests for disguises.

b. [redacted] issues driver's licenses which are fully backstopped as well as fully backstopped investigative credentials [redacted]

c. [redacted]

00474

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3. All requests to any of the above three components for alias documentation or disguise must be by memorandum and must be signed by one of two authorized officers designated by the requesting component. The instruction requires that this approval authority be confined to the chief of the division or staff, or to a senior operations officer specifically designated by the division or staff chief to exercise this function. The request is routed through CCS/OCB for concurrence at which time the requesting signature is verified as being on the approved list and all of the documents requested are recorded in the OCB file. All requests for documents to be used in COMUS are then routed to Office of Security, Operational Support Division, Special Activities Branch for approval and then are forwarded to the component which is to issue the documents. Issuing components are required to maintain controls on accountability and establish conditions for use of documents that they issue. OTS is developing a new computerized system which is scheduled to become operational in November 1973. Every six months each component will be given a complete listing of all documentation and disguises issued to them and they will be required to either justify the continued retention of the documents or return them.

Component Controls

4. There is no established procedure prescribing how each component is to control the documents issued to it. The instructions do require, however, that the documents will be handled as controlled documents from the time of issue until their ultimate disposition. The general practice is to maintain a record of all documents received within the component, but to issue the documents to the appropriate officers who assume responsibility for handling them properly. There is no evidence of periodic spot checking. At least one area division of the Directorate of Operations follows a procedure which requires that the documents be retained in the front office until needed for an operation, being returned after the operation is completed. On the surface this may appear to be a strict control, but in actuality the documents are retained in individual packages for each senior officer, and are never inspected before they are issued nor after they are returned; in effect, no record accountability by the officer is required.

Ultimate Document Retrieval

5. Every employee using alias documents is now required to process through CCS as part of his exit-out process for either resignation or retirement. It is at this time that he is given a list of all alias documentation issued to him and is requested to return all such documents. If there are any of these documents

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which he is unable to produce, the employee must submit a signed written statement describing, to the best of his ability, the conditions under which the document or documents were either lost or destroyed. The controls that now exist were not in operation when Howard Hunt was an employee, which may explain how he was able to retain documents issued in the 1960s. Nor do these controls apply effectively to non-employees over whom the Agency has no control. Most disguise material -- other than documents -- is regarded as perishable and non-sensitive and OTS is not too concerned if disguise material is not returned.

6. A new computerized system is being readied called CENBAD (Central Badge and Credential System). Initially this system will include all of the issuances of the badge office, CCS, Central Processing and the motor pool. The system will provide a monthly listing to these four components of all credentials issued and could be used to request outstanding credentials at the time of checkout. As a follow-up the system will provide a weekly credential status of all employees who have separated but for whom CENBAD still shows outstanding credentials.

Conclusions

7. Since the issuance of DOI 240-4 there has been a very definite improvement in the controls exercised over alias documentation. By requiring that every request be routed through CCS/OCB for concurrence, a very complete file of all alias documents issued has been compiled. The probability is slight that an Agency employee could resign or retire without having been queried about all the alias documents which had been issued to him. This procedure, while currently observed in the Agency, has no standing as a general requirement and exists only as an administrative instruction in one of the Agency's directorates.

8. The OTS computerized system, when operational, should tend to reduce the number of outstanding documents since a justification every six months will be required for their retention. The CENBAD system will not only make the CCS/OCB control even more effective by mechanizing the up-to-date listing but in the rare instances when an officer might depart without turning in his documents, CENBAD will provide this data weekly to allow for a follow-up.

~~SECRET~~9. Recommendations:

a. That an Agency Headquarters Regulation be issued formalizing the requirement for a central Agency control over issuance, accountability and recovery of alias documentation.

b. That each component designate an alias documentation control officer who would retain all documents, issuing them only for specific operations and institute a policy of signed receipts and return of documents upon the completion of the operation.

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00477

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

ACTIVITIES OF POSSIBLE INTEREST TO THE DIRECTOR

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE
25 May 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

NO.	TO:	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1.	[Redacted]		5/26	[Redacted]
2.				
3.				
4.	ADDO	30 MAY 1973	31 MAY 1973	[Handwritten mark]
5.				
6.				
7.	16	5/31		B
8.	[Redacted]	31 May		[Handwritten mark]
9.	[Redacted] 'Jewels'			[Handwritten mark]
10.	[Redacted] (chrom)			
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

1-2: [Redacted] bring to
 attn of whom ever is
 handling this and
 getting for DDO.

[Redacted]

sent this to you
 as a skeleton in
 the closet that
 you should know
 of for background
 purposes. [Redacted]
 does not foresee
 any real problems
 with sub [Redacted].
 by [Redacted]

This was also reported
 by ORD/DSBT and called to
 attention of WEC.
 [Redacted]

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~~SECRET~~
SECRET

00478

10 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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DD/OB-2790

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

24 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, [redacted]

SUBJECT: Activities of Possible Interest to the Director

1. A few years ago the [redacted] Branch was asked to support a test program and feasibility study being conducted by DD/S&T/ORD.

[redacted]

When this project concluded, the [redacted] Branch was given permission by DD/S&T/ORD to retain the camera and TV image transmission system for further experimentation.

[redacted]

2. In early June 1972 [redacted] DD/S&T/ORD, who had been the Project Officer in evaluating this TV data link system, phoned the [redacted] Branch. He stated that the U.S. Secret Service had a requirement for this TV camera and data link system. It was our understanding that the camera would be carried in a helicopter and would be used for crowd surveillance during the Democratic and Republican Conventions at Miami Beach, Florida. Mr. [redacted] asked that we make the equipment available for the period desired by the Secret Service and indicated that the equipment would be returned to us when no longer needed. On 19 June 1972, Mr. Michael T. Casey, accompanied by Mr. [redacted] visited [redacted] to pick up the equipment. Mr. Casey of the Secret Service was not made witting of the fact that [redacted] is an Agency facility.

[redacted]

3. On 13 November 1972, the equipment, as a result of a phone call from [redacted] was picked up at Secret Service Headquarters by [redacted]. A few of the system's

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~~SENSITIVE~~
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[redacted]

00479

~~SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

components were missing when it was returned. These components were the handle, tripod and electrical adapter. Later the missing components were returned to us by the Secret Service.

4. A few months ago, Mr. [redacted] called me about this equipment and said that S&T would like to get the equipment off its books since none of it would be needed in the future by S&T. He offered to transfer the equipment at no cost to [redacted] Branch. A short time later the necessary paper work was performed to reflect the receipt of this equipment into the [redacted] Branch inventory.

[redacted]

Chief, [redacted] Branch
Special Operations Division

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~~SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

00480

East Asia Division

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~SUBJECT:

Project is a Headquarters initiated program which has as its fundamental objective the long term manipulations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist, and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwing, radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embarrassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each case is cleared with the FBI and through CI/SO the Bureau is kept informed on a regular basis.

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

00482


Central Cover Staff

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ALONE~~


Subject: Cover Support

Bill:

1. In addition to the matters listed in the CCS memorandum on CCS Cover Support Within the United States the following bigoted cases should be noted:



2. We have no indications that either of these cases might create problems. As I told you on 5 March 1973, I don't feel the same way in regard to the cover situation of the personnel in [redacted] projects.



7 May 1973

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ALONE~~

00484

UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Alias Passports

FROM:

CHIEF, CCS

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

8 MAY 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

	TO:	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1.	Mr. Colby, [redacted]			
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				


BY HAND

00485


8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Alias Passports



Chief, Central Cover Staff



~~FULL TEXT COPY DO NOT RELEASE~~

00486


~~SECRET~~

COUNT 1
DO-10


8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Alias Passports



Chief, Central Cover Staff



~~FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE~~

00487

~~SECRET~~

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)

Count 1

FROM:

[Redacted]

C/CCS

EXTENSION

[Redacted]

NO.

DO-11

DATE

2 MAY 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from to whom. Draw a line across column after each com.)

1.	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
DDO	<i>[Handwritten marks]</i>		
2.	<i>[Handwritten mark]</i>		
3.			
4.			
5.			<i>[Handwritten mark]</i>
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

~~488 Not a travel~~

*Deny 488-516
(b)(1) (b)(3)*

00488

~~SECRET~~


7 May 1973 (Revised)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations


SUBJECT : CCS Cover Support Provided Within
the United States

1. The following specific information regarding domestic cover support provided by Central Cover Staff is submitted in response to your request:


a. Aliases Used in Conjunction with Documentation.



NOTE: The above figures are based on the CCS record-keeping system initiated in April 1972.




~~SECRET~~




00489


~~SECRET~~



c. Alias U.S. Birth Certificates.




d. Alias Credit Cards.




~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

e. Alias Social Security Cards.



~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

1. Support to BNDD Activities.

[Redacted]

2. The following general information pertains to domestic cover support activities outside the purview of CCS:

a. Alias U.S. drivers licenses

[Redacted]

b. Alias CIA credentials

[Redacted]

Chief, Central Cover Staff

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~~SECRET~~


7 May 1973 (Revised)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : CCS Cover Support Provided Within
the United States

1. The following specific information regarding domestic cover support provided by Central Cover Staff is submitted in response to your request:

a. Aliases Used in Conjunction with Documentation.



NOTE: The above figures are based on the CCS record-keeping system initiated in April 1972.



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


00494


~~SECRET~~



c. Alias U.S. Birth Certificates.




d. Alias Credit Cards.



~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

e. Alias Social Security Cards.



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



-4-
~~SECRET~~

00497

~~SECRET~~

1. Support to BNDD Activities.

[Redacted]

2. The following general information pertains to domestic cover support activities outside the purview of CCS:

a. Alias U.S. drivers licenses

[Redacted]

b. Alias CIA credentials

[Redacted]

Chief, Central Cover Staff

~~SECRET~~

Ce/AB

~~SECRET~~




CSI 240-4



CLANDESTINE SERVICE
INSTRUCTION 240-4

COVER
23 August 1972

ALIAS U.S. DOCUMENTATION



~~SECRET~~


00499

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CSI 240-4

CLANDESTINE SERVICE
INSTRUCTION 240-4

COVER
23 August 1972



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
00500

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CSI 240-4

CLANDESTINE SERVICE
INSTRUCTION 240-4

COVER
23 August 1972



3
~~SECRET~~


00501

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CSI 240-4

CLANDESTINE SERVICE
INSTRUCTION 240-4

COVER
23 August 1972



Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans


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CSI 240-4

Attachment 1
23 August 1972




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~~SECRET~~

00503

~~SECRET~~

CSI 240-4

Attachment 1
23 August 1972



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SECRET~~

00504


~~SECRET~~

CSI NO. 220-7

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 220-7

TECHNICAL SUPPORT
12 May 1959

U. S. DOCUMENTATION
IN CLANDESTINE SERVICES OPERATIONS




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CSI NO. 220-7

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 220-7

TECHNICAL SUPPORT
12 May 1959



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CSI NO. 220-7

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 220-7

TECHNICAL SUPPORT
12 May 1959



RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Released by:
Richard Helms
Chief of Operations

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

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : CCS Cover Support Provided Within
the United States

1. The following specific information regarding domestic cover support provided by Central Cover Staff is submitted in response to your request:

a. Aliases Used in Conjunction with Documentation.




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


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
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
b.



c. Alias U.S. Birth Certificates.



d. Alias Credit Cards.



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e. Alias Social Security Cards.

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f.

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g.

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
h.

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~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

k. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

1. Other Special Arrangements.

(1) Alias U.S. drivers licenses [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(5) Alias CIA credentials

[Redacted]


Chief, Central Cover Staff

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
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CORPORATE COVER




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00514

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DEvised FACILITIES COVER




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PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER



00516

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European Division

00517

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7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Research Project on Robert L. Vesco

1. In mid-October 1972 [redacted] of the Office of Economic Research asked [redacted] to participate in a meeting with a number of OER officers. During the meeting, [redacted] explained that the Director of Central Intelligence had levied a crash project on Dr. Edward Proctor, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, to produce a paper on international financier Robert L. Vesco. Since the Director had specifically requested contributions from the field, [redacted] asked our Division to help in procuring them.

2. We thereupon cabled various questions suggested by OER to [redacted] and asked for replies by 19 October. Relevant answers were turned over to OER in memorandum form. In the case of a brief reference in one of the field messages to an earlier high-level American intercession on behalf of Mr. Vesco, we asked Mr. Helms through his secretary whether this was relevant information. The response, again received through the secretary, was that it was not relevant.

3. Soon after our memoranda had been submitted, [redacted] advised [redacted] that the Director wanted everyone to forget the Vesco project. This was communicated to all DDP Headquarters personnel who had had a hand in the project or had been made aware of it.

[redacted]

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
00518

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- 2 -

4. We never had any indication as to the reason for or the purpose of the project.

5. We understand that OER has recently written a memorandum on this matter for the DCI.


Archibald B. Roosevelt
Chief, European Division

~~SECRET~~

00519

Soviet Bloc Division

DO 48

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing
the DCI

1. This Memorandum is submitted in order to identify to you for possible briefing of the Director activities which in certain contexts could be construed as delicate or inappropriate.

2. At the request of the Director of Security, from approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January 1973 safesite [redacted] was made available to the U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was under threat of assassination by organized criminal elements.

3. [redacted]

4. [redacted]

5. Since late 1972 CIA has taken part in seven FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in response to requests from the FBI. We have shared with them through lectures and discussions lessons we have learned which are relevant to their counter-espionage responsibilities.

[redacted]
00521

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

6. As a means of sharing more fully our operational experience we have invited three FBI officers to be students in our Course from 14 to 25 May 1973.

7. The Soviet defector Yuriy NOSENKO was confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to September 1967 while efforts were being made to establish whether he was a bona fide defector. Although his present attitude toward the Agency is quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the press could cause undesirable publicity if it were to uncover the story.


David H. Blee
Chief
Soviet Bloc Division

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
00522

NARCOG

00523



00524



7 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: CIA Narcotics Activities Having
Domestic Implications

1. This memorandum is in response to your request for a review of activities and relationships that might have domestic implications.

2. We occasionally report on the activities of American citizens involved in narcotics trafficking abroad. This information is normally disseminated to U.S. law enforcement agencies and other recipients of our reports. We also occasionally request U.S. law enforcement agencies for name traces on U.S. citizens who are known or suspected to be involved in narcotics trafficking abroad.

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7 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: CIA Narcotics Activities Having
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3. We have occasionally received requests for alias documentation for U.S. narcotics law enforcement

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00525a

officials working abroad on foreign narcotics investigations. The present method of handling such requests is for us to request the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations prior to asking the Technical Services Division to comply. We insist on knowing the true identity of the persons to use such documentation and limit them to staff officers of the U.S. law enforcement agencies. We also require that we know the purpose and intended use of the documents. Finally, we require receipts from the headquarters of the agency involved and the individual, and also require these documents to be returned to us for destruction after they have fulfilled their use. We have turned down requests from BNDD for alias documentation for domestic use. There are some indications in the files that there have been requests from BNDD for domestic documentation in connection with their domestic investigations. These predate NARCOG, and we are unable to determine how these requests were handled.

6. We periodically receive requests for technical assistance in the form of photographic and audio devices or guidance for use of such items by U.S. law enforcement agencies in connection with their foreign investigations of illicit narcotics activities. We require these agencies to adhere to the same procedures we require in our own operations. From time-to-time we have honored these requests and have provided sterile equipment when the requests have been properly presented and approved. Our records show evidence that several such requests were made prior to the existence of NARCOG in connection with narcotics law enforcement investigations in the United States. We are unable to determine whether the requests were fulfilled.

Chief, DDO/NARCOG

Division D

00527



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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: <u>C/Div. D.</u>	CONTROL NUMBER:
DATE OF DOCUMENT: <u>29 May 1973.</u>	DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED: <u>5/29/73</u>
COPY NUMBER (S): <u>142</u>	LOGGED BY:
NUMBER OF PAGES: <u>2</u> DOCUMENT NUMBER: 	
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS: <u>none</u>	

FROM: <u>Division D/CIB</u>		DATE: <u>29 May 1973</u>		
 <u>Headquarters</u>				
	TO OFFICE	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE
1	<u>Inspector General Room</u>	<u>W V BAOE</u>	<u>Seen -</u>	<u>5/29</u>
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- Approval
- Action
- Comment
- Concurrences
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- Recommendation
- Signature
- Return
- Dispatch
- File

REMARKS

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
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
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29 May 1973






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00529

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29 May 1973

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
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29 May 1973



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NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS: _____	

FROM: Chief, Division D - 7B44 Hqs - Red [] DATE: 7 May 1973

	TO OFFICE	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE
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- Approval
- Action
- Comment
- Concurrences
- Information
- Direct Reply
- Preparation of Reply
- Recommendation
- Signature
- Return
- Dispatch
- File

REMARKS

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Do 71

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM : Chief, Division D

SUBJECT : Potentially Embarrassing Activities
Conducted by Division D

REFERENCE : Your staff meeting, 7 May 1973

1. There is one instance of an activity by Division D, with which you are already familiar, which the Agency General Counsel has ruled to be barred to this Agency by statute: the collection [REDACTED] of international commercial radio telephone conversations between several Latin American cities and New York, aimed at the interception of drug-related communications. The background on this is briefly as follows:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Therefore on 29 September 1972 NSA asked if Division D would take over the coverage, and on 12 October 1972 we agreed to do so. On 14 October a team of intercept operators from the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] began the coverage experimentally. On 13 January 1973, NSA wrote to say that the test results were good, and that it was hoped this coverage could continue.

Because a question had arisen within Division D as to the legality of this activity, a query was addressed to the General Counsel on this score (Attachment A hereto). With the receipt of his reply (Attachment B), the intercept activity was immediately terminated. There has been a subsequent series of exchanges between Division D and the General Counsel as to the legality of radio intercepts made outside the U.S., but with one terminal being in the U.S., and the General Counsel

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[REDACTED]

00534

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

has ruled that such intercept is also in violation of CIA's statutory responsibilities.

2. We are carrying out at present one intercept activity which falls within this technical limitation--i.e., of having one terminal in the U.S. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Since the [REDACTED] link being monitored carries a large number of totally unrelated conversations, the operators do intercept other traffic, frequently involving U.S. citizens--for example, BNDD staffers talking to their agents. I have described this situation to the General Counsel, and his informal judgment was that, as long as the primary purpose of the coverage is a foreign target, this is acceptable. He suggests, however, that it might be desirable to inform the Attorney General of the occasional incidental intercept of the conversations of U.S. citizens, and thus legalize this activity. We will pursue this with Mr. Houston.

[REDACTED]

4. An incident which was entirely innocent but is certainly subject to misinterpretation has to do with an equipment test run by CIA [REDACTED] technicians in Miami in August 1971. At that time we were working jointly to develop short-range agent DF equipment for use against a Soviet agent in South Vietnam. [REDACTED] and a field test was agreed upon. The Miami area was chosen, and a team consisting of Division D, Commo, [REDACTED] personnel went to Miami during the second week of August. Contact was made with a Detective Sergeant [REDACTED] of the Miami Beach Police Department, and tests were made from four different hotels, one a block away from the Miami Beach Auditorium and Convention Hall. A desk clerk in this hotel volunteered the comment that the team was part of the official security checking process of all hotels prior to the convention. (The Secret Service had already been checking for possible sniper sites.) As the team's report notes, "The cover for the use of the hotel is a natural."

2

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5. Another subject worthy of mention is the following:

In February 1972, [redacted]

[redacted] contacts in U.S. telecommunications companies [redacted]

[redacted] for copies of the telephone call slips pertaining to U.S.-China calls. These were then obtained regularly by Domestic Contact Service in New York, pouched to DCS Washington, and turned over to Division D for passage to FE/China Operations. The DDP was apprised of this activity by Division D in March 1972, and on 28 April 1972 Division D told DCS to forward the call slips to CI Staff, Mr. Richard Ober. Soon thereafter, the source of these slips dried up, and they have ceased to come to Mr. Ober. In an advisory opinion, the Office of General Counsel stated its belief that the collection of these slips did not violate the Communications Act, inasmuch as they are a part of a normal record-keeping function of the telephone company, which does not in any way involve eavesdropping.

Atts:

A. DivD memo to OGC 26 Jan 73

B. OGC memo to DivD 29 Jan 73

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

26 January 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Intercept of Communications in the U. S.

1. CIA is intercepting at our communications site [Redacted] high frequency, international radio telephone calls originating [Redacted] in New York and being broadcast to South America or being directed to New York from South America. Some calls are relay calls through New York but not originating or terminating there. The calls involve both U. S. citizens and foreign nationals.

2. [Redacted] the intercept team screens the telephone calls for drug-related matters. NSA receives the traffic from CIA in the form of magnetic tape. [Redacted]

3. I would appreciate your very early views as to where this intercept activity falls with respect to U. S. law. Even if it is legal or we can secure the necessary authorizations, it seems to me there is extra flap potential associated with reports going into the BNDD mechanism, particularly since they may well become the basis for executive action.

[Redacted]

(Signed), [Redacted]

Acting Chief, [Redacted]

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee

[Redacted]

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00537

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Copy 1 of 2

[Redacted]

29 January 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Division D

SUBJECT: Intercept of Communications in the U. S.

REFERENCE: 26 Jan 73 Memo for GC fr AC/Division D,
Same Subject

1. In referent you request our views as to the legal aspects of a radio telephone intercept activity carried on at our communications site [Redacted]

2. The basic law is contained in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. 605, which prohibits interception of any radio communication without the authorization of the sender and also prohibits divulging the substance thereof to any person. Chapter 119 of Title 18, U. S. C., makes the interception of any wire or oral communication a crime punishable by \$10,000 or five years' imprisonment, or both. There are two exceptions to these prohibitions:

a. The first provides for application through the Department of Justice to a Federal court for a court order authorizing such interception for specific purposes in connection with law-enforcement duties. Since this Agency is prohibited by statute from any police or law-enforcement activities, obviously we cannot operate under this exception.

b. The other exception is contained in section 2511 of Title 18, U. S. C., at subsection (3). This provides that the prohibition cited above on interception shall not

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

00528

limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect against attack, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States or to protect such information, and to protect the United States against overthrow by force or other unlawful means or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.

3. The type of information you describe in your memorandum does not appear to fall within any of these categories and since its ultimate destination is BNDD, it appears to be collection for law-enforcement purposes, which as noted above is barred to this Agency by statute.

4. For your information, in most cases where there is a criminal prosecution for violation of the narcotics laws, the Department of Justice queries us as to whether we have engaged in any interception in connection with the defendants. If a case should involve the interception being made [redacted] it would be deemed to be unauthorized and in all probability the prosecution would have to be dropped by the Government. It is our view, therefore, that such interception should be carried on by appropriate law-enforcement agencies in accordance with the authority of chapter 119 of Title 18, U. S. C.



LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

Distribution:

Copy 1-Addressee

Copy 2-General Counsel

00539

Foreign Intelligence
Staff

00540

~~SECRET~~

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Item for the List of Delicate Matters

The Securities and Exchange Commission has asked CIA to provide information on any foreign connections with organized crime in the United States. The record indicates that Mr. David Young, of the White House Staff, asked Mr. Colby to set up a contact for Mr. T. C. Barreaux, of SEC. Mr. Barreaux discussed the matter with Mr. Paul V. Walsh, of DDI, and on 4 April 1973, Mr. Barreaux and Mr. Timmeny came to a meeting at CIA with Mr. Lawrence Houston (General Counsel) [redacted] (Chief, FI Staff, DDO).

Since that meeting, we have received no specific requirements from Mr. Barreaux, but have provided him with one piece of information involving a banking transaction of a [redacted] associate of Robert Vesco.

[redacted]
Chief
Foreign Intelligence Staff

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00541

Counterintelligence
Staff

00542

	SE/ R WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AN	OTTOM
	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL
		SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP		
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE
1	Inspector General	
2	 "Jewels"	
3		
4		
5		
6		
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:		
<i>Mr. Colby has not answered</i>		
		00543
FOLD	URN TO SENDER	
FROM: NAME	PHONE NO.	DATE
O/ES/CIA MC/L		6 June 73
UNCLASSIFIED	CON	SECRET

~~EYES ONLY~~

15 May 1973

Executive Registry
73 27 35

Dear Bill,

Prior to my assignment to Nha Trang I was assigned to the CI Staff for approximately 20 months. While I was with the Staff I was led to believe that one of their "Groups" on the ground floor, [redacted] was involved in domestic operations. I believe their target (s) were minority group (s). The Chief and Deputy Chief of the Group at that time were Dick Ober and [redacted] respectively. One of their Case Officers, [redacted] spent over 50% of his time TDY within the United States. It was my understanding they reported only to the White House and to Dick Helms. Other members of the Staff, including myself, had limited access to the [redacted] area, only when necessary and escorted at all times. Perhaps you were or are now aware of what the operations are. However, I believe I would be remiss in not responding to the book cable (407190). And perhaps their operations might have been outside the legislative charter.

Also, during my tour with the CI Staff I accidentally learned they launched someone into Vietnam while you and [redacted] were there. I believe this was without the knowledge or approval of Chief, [redacted] (If I recall, the Case Officer was [redacted] I mention the latter only because of the following: When they learned that [redacted] was being reassigned from Saigon to Chief, Operations, FE, they also learned that I was a friend of [redacted] and from the same area [redacted]. As a result they cautioned me not to discuss any of their operations with [redacted]. This I did not do.

00544

Sincerely,

[redacted signature box]

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

Attached is the material we requested of Di Ober:

A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to Secret Service for Democratic and Republican Conventions


Ober advises that the only American we report on to the IEC is Rennie Davis

(14 May 73)

DATE

00546

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.



Nota record

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Inspector General		
2			
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6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Mr. Broe:

Dick Ober has been advised that this package is being sent to you. Since knowledge of the existence of this Committee has been strictly limited, I've asked that it be delivered to you unopened. Although it has an ER number on it, it has not been sent through that office -- I gave them only the day, subject, and originator.

[Signature Box]

00547

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
O/ES/MC/ []		15 May 73
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Richard Ober		
		DATE 14 May 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Mr. Evans O/DCI	14 May	14 May		Attached are: 1. Background note on the Committee per your request of this morning. 2. Copies of memoranda concerning Agency support to Secret Service (7 April and 23 June 1972). EYES ONLY <u>Not to go through any registries</u>
2. Mr. Colby	5/14	5/15		
3.				
4. LG -				
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Not to go through registries

~~SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY~~

Count 1

14 MAY 1973

Do-25


SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

1. Background: Formed December 1970 to produce fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies, including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremism and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice (Chairman); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of other Departments or Agencies (following have participated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES, Executive Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later William Olson. IES has received requirements directly from and delivered reports directly to John Dean of the White House. The White House has insisted that the existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness of its existence within this Agency has been limited to DCI, DDO (DDP), JC/CI and four officers of this office.

2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or attribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representative on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff and as the alternate to the Agency representative on the Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).

3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, November 1971. This study was initiated in July 1971 by the White House as a consequence of the President's concern about the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation was editorial review.

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SENSITIVE
SECRET~~



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~~EYES ONLY~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

4. Republican National Convention (21-24 August 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from February through August 1972 periodic contributions for these estimates concerning foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention (copies attached).

15

5. Democratic National Convention (10-13 July 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided between March and July 1972 contributions on foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention (copies attached).

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Attachments: a/s

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~~EVER ONLY~~

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~~SECRET~~Cont 1
Do 26

23 FEB 1972

SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

1. There are only limited indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972.

2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held 11-13 February 1972 in Paris/Versailles, attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican National Convention. A representative of the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Convention, requested the American Delegations' Steering Committee at the World Assembly to include a specific call for international support of activities against the Republican convention in their proposal to the Action Commission of the World Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indications that the proposal would be taken to the floor of the Assembly.

3. John LENNON, a British subject, has provided financial support to Project "YES", which in turn paid the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representative of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS' representative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.) Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNON-supported project, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC), of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to direct New Left protest activities at the Republican National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' representative to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; it is not known if the Republican National Convention was discussed.

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~~SECRET~~

4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its harassment of the Republican convention. A working draft plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations.

00553

Count 1
 DO-27
 21 MAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
 or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

Indications remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:


At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

"In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."


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DEVELOPMENTS:

The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Convention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a "large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72, which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles of people all over the world." Plans for activities at Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations. In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to "outflank NIXON domestically and internationally," international opposition can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demonstrations."

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24 APR 1972

Count 1

Do-21

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There is little new evidence of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San Diego, 21 to 23 August 1972. The Students for a Democratic Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in a demonstration in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targeting on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity from the North Vietnamese. The letter is of interest as an indication of North Vietnamese contact with the SDCC; such contact will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-reported plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the Convention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris.

DEVELOPMENTS:

At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts, held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) adopted a proposal to hold demonstrations at the San Diego-Tijuana border during the Republican National Convention. The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be entertained.

The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972, expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SDCC, and conveys the Committee's "best wishes of militant solidarity and friendship." The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC write often and "send us materials you have."

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Count 1
DO-29
23 MAY 197

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972.

The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Republican Convention.


DEVELOPMENTS:

The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:

August 21-23 Republican Convention, San Diego.
Demonstrations organized by the San
Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267,
San Diego, Ca. 92103.


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The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.

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14 JUN 1972

Count 1

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

D0-30

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972, is an expression of interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

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
28 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no additional indications of any substantial foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

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Excluded

-Count/

26 JUL 1972

DO-31

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A leader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to take place at United States and allied military installations abroad during the period immediately before and during the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will participate in activities in connection with the Convention. The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic organization which has been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the Republican National Convention, has sent a delegation to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed at these meetings.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In an early July 1972 meeting with prominent members of foreign antiwar organizations, a representative of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an important position within that organization, discussed the plans of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that during the period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities involved in the manufacture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and that similar actions will be organized at United States and allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representative further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest

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of the bombing in Vietnam are being organized by the "Republican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on 21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will speak on the subject of the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. (Comment: We have no present information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to travel to the United States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to participate in activities connected with the Republican Convention.)

The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic group engaged in organizing counter-activities at the Republican National Convention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). An advance party has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss the agenda for meetings with the full AWU delegation. Although no information is presently available indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are scheduled to be discussed at meetings between the AWU delegation and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the AWU advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials regarding the stance the AWU should take on certain questions relating to the presidential elections. It is also known that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party about the political mood in the United States. One of the AWU delegation members has stated that upon their return to the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television, to "educate the American people about the consequences of voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat Nixon." The delegation member added that the demonstrations at the Republican Convention will be "unique."

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2 AUG 1972

Count 1

DO-32

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire American delegation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG officials; at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private exchanges. A second group of activists, considered more important than the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972 for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American delegation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to discussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnamese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Republican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen Van TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention." TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part, refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demonstrators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.

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Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation, the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation. Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there is no information available concerning the substance of these private exchanges.

A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972 for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second group is scheduled to be led by Rennie DAVIS, founder and leader of the AWU. This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within recent months for discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon his return from his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's chief target would be the Republican Convention.

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Count 1
DO-33



9 AUG 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

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
Count 1
D8-34
16 AUG 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention


There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

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DO-35

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00567

06 MAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
Or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

There are no direct indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

"In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly,

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under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."

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[REDACTED]

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09 MAY 1972

Count 1
Do-36

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-13 July 1972, are limited to a reiteration by a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam of a statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international support to a campaign of anti-Vietnam War activities in the United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican Conventions, but made no specific call for support of disruptive actions at the conventions themselves.

DEVELOPMENTS:

The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was a major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's "Action Commission." The appendix called for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972; and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

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23 MAY 1972

Count 1
DO-37

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972.

The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Democratic Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS:

The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:

July 9 - 12 Democratic Convention, Miami Beach.
Demonstrations organized by Florida
People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa,
Florida 33612.


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The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.

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Count 11
DO-38
? JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972, is an expression of interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and National Conventions.

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


Count 1
DO-39
21 JUN 1972

**Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention**

There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972.

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