**OVERT/COVERT STUDY**

TRIAL SOLUTION

- Purpose: Send up "trial balloon" solution as means of receiving program and staff feedback

- Background:

    - Incorporates feedback from DNRO and DDNRO to December 1991 SSS
    - Includes results of "lessons learned" from F-117A and B-2

    - Addresses two key issues of NRO declassification:

        - How do we keep the good aspects of the NRO intact?

            - Streamlined management
            - Ability to compartment

        - How far do we reveal our organization

- Premises:

    - A covert NRO in today's world is inappropriate because:

        - Military support is significantly hindered
        - Liaison and credibility with Congress is difficult
        - The NRO lacks credibility within government

    - **Support to military is most complicated overt interface to establish; hence, solution concentrates on this problem**

        - Military can handle SECRET easier than TK

    - A correctly managed overt NRO will not hinder its anility to collect unaltered intelligence

- **Big Issue # 1: How do we keep the good aspects of the NRO?**

    - Discussion:

        - Different organizational concepts define overt NRO as an organization tied to either DCI or OSD

        - Each has its drawbacks and potential biases

            - DoD procurement oversight difficult to avoid if NRO becomes DoD organization
            - DCI organization distances NRO from military and creates negative perception

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- Overt NRO must' be chartered as national organization to avoid biases and pitfalls

- Such documents already exist (e.g. 1965 charter)

    - Directs streamlined management
    - Places security under DCI sources and methods protection auspices

- SOLUTION: CHARTER NRO USING A NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE

    - **Essentially ratify 1965 charter with updates**
    - **Specify streamlined management and DCI security**
    - **Outline special procurement waivers or general methods to obtain them**
    - **Direct DoD and intelligence agencies to support as they do now**
    - **Outlines how DNRO and DDNRO are appointed**
    - **Would keep everything "good"; anything less could tamper with our modus operandi**

- ACTION REQUIRED:

    - **Staff draft NSD to implement overt NRO**
    - **Program Offices develop their own drafts**

- Big Issue # 2: How far down do we reveal the NRO structure?

    - Discussion: Return to three problem areas

        - **Commonality: All three dictate revealing:**
            - **"Fact of"** NRO with an unclassified mission statement
            - Director, deputy, small support staff Pentagon office and phone number

    - Differences: Military support requires more complicated revelations including:

        - More organizational details about NRO
        - Facts about systems required for spectrum of military plans from JCS to unit level

- Military hampered by compartmented facts and details

    - Desire certain system and organizational facts to be released at collateral SECRET level vs TK
    - Plans can't receive adequate staffing and distribution in SCI channels
    - NRO capabilities to support forces can't be fully exploited

- **SOLUTION: DESIGN NRO STRUCTURE TO DECLASSIFY MINIMAL FACTS TO ADDRESS THREE PROBLEM AREAS AND TO DECOMPARTMENT TO SECRET LEVEL ADDITIONAL FACTS REQUIRED FOR MILITARY SUPPORT**

- Proposed unclassified facts common to all three situations:

    - Description of NRO as national agency responsible to conduct overhead reconnaissance to support various national security objectives such as arms control verification and to support military commanders in the areas of battlefield surveillance, force employment, and battle damage assessment

    - The NRO is directed by Mr Martin C. Faga; his deputies are Mr. Jimmie D. Hill, and RADM Vacant

    - Mr Faga has a staff comprised of individuals from the services and intelligence community agencies

    - The senior officials on Mr Faga's staff are:

    ███████████████████
    ███████████████████
    ███████████████████

    - A plans directorate exists to consolidate and analyze user requirements and is the focal point for official interaction with the NRO

    - All other details are classified

Sub-Issue # 1: Revealing Mr. Hill as DDNRO

    - Pro: Mr Faga should have a deputy

    - Con: Mr Hill's ███████

    ███████████████████████████████
    - 1965 charter provision dictates DDNRO appointed by DCI
    ███████████████████████

    - Resolution:

    ███████████████████████████████
    ███████████████████████████████
    ███████████████████████████████

Sub-Issue # 2: Revealing 4 program directors at UNCLASSIFIED level

- Pro:
    - Mr Faga should have a staff made up of flag officers
    - Enhances personnel management function of military: more explicit OPRs, FITREPs, etc
    - Allows credible interaction inside own service ██████████ with AFSPACECOM, for example
    - Allows open residence of intelligence agency people in ██████████ facilities

- Con:

    - Creates more "windows" into NRO secrets and organizations
    - Could tie in ground stations with NRO by association (██████ for example)
    - No real perceived credibility advantage for ██████████

- Discussion:

    - More credibility advantages for flag officers within own service (i.e. AFSPACECOM)
    - Services can interact directly with SPOs under rules

        - Visit program offices for meetings, etc
        - Keep them out of factories and MGSs

    - B-2 experience: contractor revelation more significant than SPO

        - **Jobs, dollars, salesmanship**
        - Nobody cared about the SPO

- Recommended resolution:

    - Recommend revealing people as senior staff members without "portfolio" to increase NRO credibility
    - Have Program Offices focus on quantifying real advantages to revealing their organizations

Sub-Issue # 3: What should be composition of Pentagon office?

- Discussion: [B-2 lesson learned]

    ██████████████████████████████

    - Advantage for military support problem: somewhere the DoD can call or visit
    - Doesn't expose larger organization or locations at UNCLASSIFIED level

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- Recommended resolution:

    - Create NRO storefront in 9th corridor side of Suite
        - Office space for DNRO and DDNRO
   - Staff with small military staff and admin people
        - 0-5/0-6 military assistant
        - 0-3 administrative assistant; civilian secretary
    - Flag officer desirable, but dilutes effectiveness
    - Staff handles all calls, relays information to ▓▓▓ and arranges meetings in Suite
   - Small sign on door with phone number

Big Issue # 3: How far do we decompartment ▓▓ TK facts for military support?

- Discussion: Use Airplane Recce classification guides as examples of decompartmented facts

    - Airborne recce info generally divided as follows:

        - "What" classified collateral SECRET
            - Sensor type, technology, capabilities, coverage, availability

        - "How" classified at least SECRET ▓▓▓
            - Ops procedures, true capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc

    - Services can adequately handle SECRET information

    - **Downgraded ▓▓ TK information could closely resemble SECRET airborne recce information**

        - General purpose of satellite: SIGINT, photo, ▓▓
        - Generic capabilities: ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ generic resolution capability
        - Some schedule information: launch, block updates
        - Some ops details: ground coverage, tasking

    - Identify needed for assets at SECRET level; could decompartment TK mission number

    - All other information kept at TK minimum (airplane data is ▓▓▓▓)

- Recommended resolution:

    - Program offices comment on approach
    - DSPO quantify information needed at SECRET level

- **Big Issue # 4:** **FOIAs and other public releases**

    - Discussion: [B-2 lesson learned]

        - Should be prepared for historical FOIAs

            - What did you do for DESERT STORM, Grenada, Panama, Ollie North, Soviet coup, ██████████████ etc
            - Did you spy on ███████████
            - Won't get many FOIAs relating to future plans

        - Every name released subject to interview requests

            - Can they handle it?
            - Should rehearse interviews through murder board

        - Should have dedicated PAO (lives in Suite)

        - Should have designated FOIA respondents

    - Public releases

        - Get word out to all NRO players in advance (retirees?)
        - Don't correct obvious media mistakes just because NRO is now overt
            - Contractors and Congress will be heavily tempted (e.g. ██████████████████████

    - Recommended resolution:

        - **Feedback and validation from program offices**
        - **Staff Security outline potential message to NRO world**

- **Next steps:**

    - Send this, more polished, to participants in working group (I could accompany written work to make sure participants understand tasking and ground rules)

    - Tell them to address specific actions

    - Ask them to validate basic premises

    - Give them a couple of weeks; hold another working group immediately after comments received

    - Compile comments, prepare follow-up package to DNRO
        - This is how we'd do it
        - This is what you would have to do from here

    - 15 March +/- to front office?