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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

May 2, 1969

MEMO FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In accordance with your request of Wednesday, 30 April 1969, attached are two copies of the new contingency plans for strikes on North Korea.

I would like to reserve my comments until I have had time to study these proposals.

Attachments

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-270-69
2 MAY 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Contingency Plans for Strikes on North Korea ~~(S)~~

1. ~~(S)~~ Reference is made to a Memorandum of Conversation on 30 April 1969 between the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Tentative plans were requested for strikes on North Korea. The requested plans are desired by 2 May 1969.
2. ~~(S)~~ Contingency plans covering the strike options contained in the reference are contained in Tabs A, B, C, D, E, and F to the Annex hereto, together with a brief assessment of their relative merit and a discussion of related considerations.
3. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum substantially the same as that contained in the Annex be approved and forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Attachments

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Copy 2 of 30 Copies each
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ANNEX AND TABS A THROUGH I

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Annex and Tab
A through I

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ANNEX

1

DRAFT

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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Subject: Contingency Plans for Strikes on North Korea (TS)

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1. ~~(TS)~~ In response to your request on 30 April 1969, the
contingency plans for strikes on North Korean targets are
forwarded herewith. An assessment by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the utility and feasibility of these plans is included.
Plans described in the attachments are concept plans. Details
would be subject to development by operational commanders and
will be influenced by force dispositions and other operational
considerations at the time.

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2. ~~(TS)~~ Plan for a Strike on One North Korean Airfield
Using B-52 Aircraft (Tab A): This plan can be mounted on short
notice, entails limited disruption to Southeast Asia operations,
and achieves a significant element of surprise and the highest
level of damage against a single airfield.

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3. ~~(TS)~~ Plan for a Strike on One North Korean Airfield Using
US Land-Based Tactical Aircraft in the Republic of Korea (ROK)
(Tab B): This plan erodes the air defense capability in the
ROK unless the number of strike aircraft is reduced or addi-
tional aircraft are redeployed to the ROK (either of which is
feasible). This plan will achieve a reasonable level of damage
but less than that of the B-52 option, and, being conducted in
daylight, has less chance of surprise. Since aircraft presently
based in Northeast Asia are utilized, there is no effect on
Southeast Asia operations.

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4. ~~(S)~~ Plan for a Strike on One North Korean Airfield Using Carrier-Based Aircraft (Tab C): This plan (one CVA) will achieve a reasonable level of damage but less than that of the B-52 option. If only one CVA were used, it would have no significant effect on Southeast Asia operations. A night attack would achieve a significant element of surprise. US land-based tactical aircraft in the ROK could be used to defend the ROK against an attack by North Korea.

5. ~~(S)~~ Plans for attacks against two or three airfields are not provided herewith (except as an alternative in Tab F) as it is considered that if any attack is to be conducted against more than one target, attack against at least four targets is advisable in order to inflict the maximum feasible attrition against the enemy air order of battle.

6. ~~(S)~~ Plan for a Strike on Four North Korean Airfields Using B-52 Aircraft (Tab D): This plan offers a good possibility of surprise, and, while incurring the risk of higher losses than with an attack on one airfield, achieves a high level of damage to a significant portion of the North Korean air order of battle. This strike can be mounted rapidly and has a major effect on Southeast Asia operations for only a short time.

7. ~~(S)~~ Plan for a Strike on Four North Korean Airfields Using US Land-Based Tactical Aircraft in the ROK (Tab E): This plan reduces the air defense capability in the ROK below that needed to meet a North Korean retaliatory attack and does not achieve a damage level commensurate with the risk.

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- 8. ~~(TS)~~ Plan for a Strike on Four North Korean Airfields Using Carrier-Based Tactical Aircraft (Tab F): This plan would require most of the carrier forces available in the western Pacific and would require time for deployment to Northeast Asia. The presence of a large carrier task force in Korean waters would, however, provide a significant increase in US Forces available in the event of a North Korean counterattack. 1
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- 9. ~~(TS)~~ Plan for a Strike on Four North Korean Remunerative Military Targets (Other Than Airfields) (Tab G): This plan is not considered militarily desirable as an initial attack. Such an attack would incur a very high risk of substantial friendly losses and would not damage the North Korean short-term capability to attack the ROK. It would permit the full North Korean air order of battle to attack the strike force and to be available for a retaliatory strike against the ROK. Further, although estimated civilian casualties are low, some would result. In other respects, this attack is similar to an attack on four airfields previously discussed. 8
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- 10. ~~(TS)~~ Any air attack on North Korea, including those described in the foregoing contingency plans, entails a substantial risk of a major attack on the ROK by North Korea. If the North Koreans were to retaliate, the major immediate threat to US and ROK Forces would be posed by the residual North Korean air order of battle. Attacks on up to four North Korean airfields or on other remunerative military targets could leave a major portion of the North Korean air order of battle intact. Accordingly, a military assessment would indicate an attack of sufficient size to neutralize the entire North Korean air order of battle. A contingency plan has been developed for this purpose, utilizing B-52s, and land-based and carrier-based tactical aircraft. 19
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11. ~~(S)~~ The threat of a North Korean attack on the ROK following a US air strike on North Korea makes it desirable that US and ROK Forces in the Korean area achieve a force and readiness posture sufficient to cope with such an attack. Certain additional preparatory actions in the Korean area should be initiated. These include corrections of previously recognized shortages of US Army personnel, logistic and communications deficiencies, weaknesses in the Tactical Air Control System, and lack of a sufficient low-altitude early warning and control capability. In addition, some augmentation of naval forces and US Air Force tactical and air defense aircraft should be provided to afford a capability to cope with a North Korean attack. These previously recognized deficiencies should be addressed regardless of the type attack against North Korea and particularly if an attack is executed of less than the intensity required to neutralize the North Korean air order of battle.

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12. ~~(S)~~ It is concluded that:

a. While these plans entail a significant risk of triggering a major North Korean attack on the ROK, there is also a reasonable chance that a night attack against a single target, executed quickly and with surprise so as to present a fait accompli, might not provoke the North Koreans into a retaliatory action against the ROK of such magnitude as to involve a major conflict.

b. A military assessment would indicate that it would be preferable to conduct the attack with combined B-52, land-based, and carrier-based forces of sufficient size to neutralize the North Korean air order of battle.

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- c. There may be some risk of CHICOM and/or Soviet reaction to US attacks against North Korea. The nature and timing of such reaction cannot be predicted with any certainty. 1
 - d. Preparatory actions to improve the force and readiness posture of US and ROK Forces in the Republic of Korea should be continued on a priority basis. This is particularly important if an attack is executed of less than the intensity required to neutralize the North Korean air order of battle. 2
13. ~~(S)~~ It is recommended that: 3
- a. Consideration be given to executing a coordinated strike to neutralize the North Korean air order of battle as a response to further North Korean provocations or, alternatively, conducting a night attack against one airfield. 4
 - b. Selected preparatory actions should be continued on a priority basis to improve the force and readiness posture of US and ROK Forces in the ROK. 5

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TAB A

PLAN FOR A STRIKE ON ONE NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELD USING B-52 AIRCRAFT

Purpose: To provide a plan to attack a single airfield complex in North Korea.

Target: Wonsan Airfield. For description and significance, see Tab H.

Task Organization:

a. Strike Force:

Fourteen B-52s.

b. Support Forces:

(1) Fourteen KC-135 tankers in direct support of strike B-52s.

(2) SAR forces in Sea of Japan:

(a) 1 HC-130

2 Destroyers.

(b) The additional resources available on call in Korea and Japan are considered adequate reserve.

Concept of Operations: Fourteen B-52s operating from Andersen

AFB, Guam, will execute strikes against the selected airfield

(Wonsan). Pretarget refueling support will be provided by

14 KC-135 tankers from Kadena AB, Okinawa. Normally, bomber

penetration will be at low level during hours of darkness

and/or adverse weather to provide surprise and cover. This

can best be accomplished by selecting target strike times

between 1500Z and 1800Z. Aircraft will be loaded as follows:

8 Acft BLU-26

6 Acft HE.

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Four desired mean points of impact (DMPI) have been selected 1
 for attack with the BLU weapons. Two aircraft will be 2
 scheduled against each DMPI to provide a 70 percent probability 3
 of damage to parked and revetted enemy air order of battle. In 4
 addition, a single DMPI has been selected for attack by the six HE 5
 carriers. This will provide a 32 percent probability of damage to 6
 the air defense sector control center. Time for launch to first 7
 strike will be 5-30 hours, with a 17 minute elapsed time between 8
 first and last aircraft. All B-52s will recover to Andersen at 9
 approximately launch plus 11 hours. 10

Timing: 11

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place of Event</u>	<u>Washington Time (EIT)</u>	<u>Korean Time (I)</u>	<u>Greenwich Time (Z)</u>	
ARC LIGHT Decision ^{1/}	Washington	1100 D-day	2400 D-day	1500 D-day	12 13 1/2
Launch	Guam	0530 D+1	1830 D+1	0930 D+1	14
Recall Decision ^{2/}	Washington	0800 D+1	2100 D+1	1200 D+1	15 16
Time on Target ^{3/} Target		1100 D+1	2400 D+1	1500 D+1	17 1/2
Recovery	Guam	1630 D+1	0530 D+1	2030 D+1	18 19

- 1/ In order to generate aircraft to meet the optimum time on target (TOT), it is necessary to discontinue an equal number of ARC LIGHT sorties from Guam at this time. 20
17/2
- 2/ Recall decision by the National Command Authorities would be required not later than this time. 21
17/2
- 3/ The optimum TOT is considered to be 2400-0300 local Korean time. Seventeen minutes elapse between first and last aircraft. 22
17/2
23
1/2

Estimated Losses: 24

- a. Friendly Forces: Less than 10 percent loss to B-52 strike force, 1 - 2 aircraft. 25
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- b. Civilian Casualties: Confined to civilians on the airfield. 27

Effects on Southeast Asia Operations: Execution of this plan would result in a loss of approximately 12 ARC LIGHT sorties. 28
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TAB B

PLAN FOR A STRIKE ON ONE NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELD
USING US LAND-BASED TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

	<u>1</u>
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	<u>3</u>
<u>Purpose:</u> To provide a plan to strike a North Korean Airfield using tactical fighter aircraft based in the Republic of Korea (ROK).	<u>4</u>
	<u>5</u>
<u>Target:</u> Wonsan Airfield. For description and significance, see Tab H.	<u>6</u>
	<u>7</u>
<u>Strike Force Composition:</u>	<u>8</u>
	<u>9</u>
a. Strike aircraft: 48 tactical fighters (F-4 aircraft).	<u>10</u>
b. Support forces: 24 F-4 aircraft for Combat Air Patrol (CAP); 12 F-4 aircraft for flak suppression; 12 F-105/F-4 aircraft for SAM suppression; available SAR, COLLEGE EYE, EB-66 (ECM) aircraft, and six KC-135s for emergency post-strike/battle damage/RESCAP support.	<u>11</u>
	<u>12</u>
	<u>13</u>
	<u>14</u>
<u>Concept of Operations:</u> Strike forces would launch in three waves, one each from Kunsan, Osan, and Taegu. Launch timing will provide no more than 5 minutes between each wave TOT. First wave profile would be low level with a TOT of first light. Ingress and egress would be over the water. Strike forces would be configured for maximum air-to-ground capability (each aircraft: 6 x M117s (750 lb) and four CBU 24/49)(cluster bombs)	<u>15</u>
	<u>16</u>
	<u>17</u>
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	<u>19</u>
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	<u>22</u>
<u>Timing:</u> Reaction time with no prior planning--48 hours; with prior notification and planning--24 hours. Time en route to target--approximately 30 minutes.	<u>23</u>
	<u>24</u>
	<u>25</u>
<u>Estimated Losses:</u> See Tab H.	<u>26</u>
	<u>27</u>
<u>Effect on Southeast Asia Operations:</u> None.	<u>27</u>

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Tab B

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Advantages:

- a. Strike can be conducted with minimum time en route and warning to the enemy. 1
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- b. Strike can be conducted with minimum use of tanker aircraft. 4

Disadvantages:

- a. Lack of immediate second strike capability. 5
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- b. Strike must be accomplished in daylight with probable resultant increase in friendly losses. 7
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- c. Dilutes the air defense capability in the Republic of Korea unless aircraft from other locations in Northeast Asia are redeployed to the ROK. 9
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Tab B

PLAN FOR A STRIKE ON ONE NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELD
USING CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT

Purpose: To provide a plan to strike a North Korean Airfield
using carrier-based aircraft. 1

Target: Wonsan Airfield. For description and significance,
see Tab H. 2

Single CVA Strike Force Composition: 3

a. One CVA, with protective screen. 4

b. One guided missile ship to provide air defense. 5

c. One cruiser in CVA task group for force protection. 6

d. The Exhibit contains a detailed task organization for a three
CVA contingency. A single CVA task group organization is
designated therein. 7

e. Strike Aircraft: 8

(1) Night Attack: Maximum available operational (full
system) A-6 aircraft (approximately eight). Six additional
A-6 aircraft could be flown aboard within 12-24 hours. 9

(2) Day Attack: Eight A-6, 12 A-7/A-4 aircraft. 10

f. Support Aircraft: Maximum available operational F-4 air-
craft for Combat Air Patrol (CAP), two EKA-3B/KA-3B tankers, 11

two A-4/A-7 rescue support, one EC-121, and one EKA-3B/E-2A
ECM and early warning for both day and night strikes. Day 12

strikes will require, in addition to the above, remaining
operational A-6/A-4/A-7 aircraft for AAA and SAM suppression. 13

Concept of Operations: 14

a. Night Attack (one CVA only with A-6 aircraft): Launching
from a point 200 miles form Wonsan in the Sea of Japan (or from
south of Tsushima Straits), the A-6s would proceed individually to 15

attack the target at 1 minute intervals. The F-4 CAP, supported
by a surface ship and an airborne early warning and ground 16

controlled intercept (GCI) capability, would be positioned to
afford maximum coverage for the A-6s. First TOT would be 17

approximately 40 minutes after launch. Each A-6 aircraft would 18

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carry 12 MK83 (1000 lb) or 22 MK82 (500 lb) bombs. Time over target from first to last A-6 would be 7 minutes for eight A-6 and 13 minutes for 14 A-6. Alternatively, launches could be made from south of the Tsushima Straits. This would involve longer flight times.

b. Day Attack (one CVA): F-4 CAP, air defense suppression, and other support aircraft would proceed to station, while attack aircraft would rendezvous and then proceed to the target. Time to target would be about fifty minutes from launch time. The strike force would require approximately 2 to 3 minutes over the target.

Effects on Southeast Asia Operations: The extended deployment of any naval unit from the Southeast Asia area of operations would cause a proportionate reduction in Southeast Asia forces. CVAs are stringently scheduled for near maximum on station time in the Gulf of Tonkin with rotation for required upkeep. By surge employment techniques and by temporarily halting all upkeep, up to two CVAs could be employed in Korean waters for a short period with limited drawdown in Southeast Asia.

Timing.

a. Time en route from the points listed below to the launch point is based on a speed of advance (SOA) of 22 knots:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Distance (NM)</u>	<u>ETE to Launch Point</u>
(1) SUBIC BAY	1501	68 hrs
(2) HONG KONG	1310	60 hrs
(3) YANKEE STATION	1848	84 hrs
(4) SASEBO	265	12 hrs

b. Ships in port will require 12 - 24 hours to get underway from time of receipt of orders.

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c. Providing all strike crew briefings have been conducted, the time required for a CVA to prepare for a strike launch, irrespective of locality, is 2 hours if not engaged in flight operations, and four hours if engaged in flight operations.

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Estimated Losses: See Tab H.

3 CVA Day Attack Option:

As an option, a day attack using aircraft from up to three carriers could be conducted in basically the same manner as for one CVA. The time required for strike coordination, and attack interval would be greater due to the larger number of forces involved. Time over target for a larger strike force would be 10-15 minutes.

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Tab C

EXHIBIT TO TAB C
TASK ORGANIZATION

CTF 71/CTG 71.0		COMMANDER SPECIAL STRIKING FORCE SEVENTH FLEET, COMCARDIV	1 1/2 4
*TU 71.0.1	SAR UNIT	EMB AS ASSIGNED	1/2 5
*CTU 71.0.2		CO, _____	1/2
*TU 71.0.2	PIRAZ UNIT	AS ASSIGNED	6
*CTU 71.0.4		AS ASSIGNED	1/2
*TU 71.0.4	AAW UNIT		7
*CTE 71.0.4.1		CO, _____	1/2
*TE 71.0.4.1	TALOS UNIT	AS ASSIGNED	8
*CTE 71.0.4.2			1/2
*TE 71.0.4.2			9
*CTU 71.0.5		SEN OFF NAVAL SECTION TACC OSAN	12
*TU 71.0.5	TACC OSAN	NAVAL SECTION TACC OSAN AM KOREA	10
*CTG 71.1/CTU 71.1.0		CO, _____	1/2
*TG 71.1	SURFACE ACTION GROUP	AS ASSIGNED	11
*CTG 71.		CO, _____	1/2
*TG 71.		AS ASSIGNED	12
*TU 71.-.1	CVA STRIKING GROUP		1/2
*TU 71.-.2	CVA SCREEN		13
CTG 71.		CO, _____	1/2
TG 71.-	CVA STRIKING GROUP	AS ASSIGNED	14
TU 71.-.1	CVA SCREEN		1/2
TU 71.-.2			15
CTG 71.		CO, _____	1/2
TG 71.-	CVA STRIKING GROUP		16
TU 71.-.1	CVA SCREEN		1/2
TU 71.-.2			17
CTG 71.9/CTG 70.4		COMASWGRU EMB _____	1/2
TG 71.9/TG 70.4		AS ASSIGNED	18
TU 70.4.1	CVS		1/2
CTU 70.4.2			19
TU 70.4.2	SCREEN/SAU		1/2 20

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NOTE: Single carrier task organization includes those tasks marked by asterisk. Total number of ships would be proportionately reduced.

PLAN FOR A STRIKE ON FOUR NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELDS USING B-52 AIRCRAFT 2

Purpose: To provide a plan to attack four designated airfields 3
in North Korea. 4

Targets: 5

- a. Wonsan 6
- b. Songdong-Ni 7
- c. Pyongyang East 8
- d. Saancham. 9

See Tab H for description and significance. 10

Task Organization: 11

- a. Strike Forces: 12
 - (1) Wonsan - 12 B-52s 13
 - (2) Songdong-Ni - 16 B-52s 14
 - (3) Pyongyang East - 18 B-52s 15
 - (4) Saancham - 4 B-52s. 16
- b. Support Forces: 17
 - (1) Thirty-eight KC-135 tankers in direct support of 18
strike B-52s. 19
 - (2) SAR forces: 20
 - (a) 2 KC-130s 21
4 Destroyers. 22
 - (b) The additional resources available on call in 23
Korea and Japan are considered adequate reserve. 24
 - (3) Maximum available fighters on ground alert. 25

Concept of Operations: 26

- a. Thirty-four B-52s operating from Andersen AFB, Guam, and 27
16 B-52s operating from Kadena AB, Okinawa, will strike the 28
four selected airfields. If Kadena AB, Okinawa, is not available, 29
the entire strike force can be launched from Andersen AFB, Guam. 30

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Additional tanker support would also be required. Pretarget refueling support will be provided by 22 KC-135 tankers from Kadena and 16 KC-135 tankers from Ching Chuan Kang (CCK), Taiwan. Normally bomber penetration will be at low level during hours of darkness and/or adverse weather to provide surprise and cover. This can best be accomplished by selecting target strike times at approximately 1800Z.

- b. Aircraft will be loaded as follows:
 - Wonsan - 4 acft BLU-26
 - 8 acft HE
 - Songdong-Ni - 16 acft HE
 - Pyongyang East - 18 acft HE
 - Saamcham - 4 acft BLU-26

c. Three DMPIs have been selected for the attack against Wonsan. This will provide a 70 percent probability of 70 percent damage to parked and revetted air order of battle and 31 percent damage to the air defense control facility.

d. One DMPI at Songdong-Ni will provide 70 percent probability of 62 percent damage to the air defense control facility.

e. Two DMPIs have been selected for the attack against Pyongyang East. This will provide a 70 percent probability of 60 percent damage to the air defense control facility.

f. One DMPI at Saamcham will provide 70 percent probability of 70 percent damage to parked and revetted air order of battle.

g. Time from launch at Andersen to first strike will be 6+00 hours, and, from Kadena, the time will be 3+00 hours. Elapsed time between first and last TOT for Wonsan will be 15 minutes; for Songdong-Ni, 19 minutes; for Pyongyang East, 21 minutes; and for Saamcham, 3 minutes.

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Timing:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place of Event</u>	<u>Washington Time (EDT)</u>	<u>Korean Time (Y)</u>	<u>Greenwich Time (Z)</u>	
ARC LIGHT					<u>1</u>
Decision ^{1/}	Washington	1400 D-day	0300 D-day	1800 D-day	<u>2</u> 172
Launch	Guam	0800 D+2	2100 D+1	1200 D+2	<u>3</u> 172
	Okinawa	1100 D+2	2400 D+1	1500 D+2	<u>4</u> 172
Recall					<u>5</u> 172
Decision ^{2/}	Washington	1100 D+2	2400 D+1	1500 D+2	<u>6</u> 172
Time on ^{3/}	Target	1400 D+2	0300 D+2	1800 D+2	<u>7</u> 172
Recovery	Guam	2000 D+2	0900 D+2	2400 D+2	<u>8</u> 172
	Okinawa	1700 D+2	0600 D+2	2100 D+2	<u>9</u> 172

- 1/ In order to generate aircraft to meet the optimum TOT, it is necessary to discontinue an equal number of ARC LIGHT sorties at this time. 10
172
- 2/ Recall decision by the National Command Authorities would be required not later than this time. 11
172
- 3/ The optimum TOT is considered to be 0300 local Korean time. Timing has been planned to provide for TOTs between 0300 and 0332 local Korean time. 12
172

Estimated Losses:

- a. Friendly Forces: Less than 10 percent loss to B-52 strike force, approximately five aircraft. 13
172
 - b. Civilian Casualties: Expected to be very light and confined to civilians on the airfields. 14
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- Effects on Southeast Asia Operations: 15
- a. Execution of this plan would result in a loss of approximately 42 ARC LIGHT sorties from Guam and 18 ARC LIGHT sorties from Okinawa. 16
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 - b. BURNING PIPE would standdown for 48 hours. 17
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 - c. GIANT BEAR would fly single route only for 48 hours. 18
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TAB E

PLAN FOR A STRIKE ON FOUR NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELDS USING
US LAND-BASED TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

Purpose: To provide a plan to strike four North Korea
airfields using US land-based tactical fighter aircraft.

Targets:

Wonsan Airfield, Pyongyang East, Saamcham Airfield,
Songdong-Ni Airfield. For target descriptions and signifi-
cance, see Tab H.

Strike Force Composition/Concept of Operations:

a. Strikes would be conducted against the four selected
airfields with simultaneous TOTs utilizing available ROK
based tactical fighters.

b. The strike against Wonsan Airfield would be conducted
utilizing 16 F-4 strike aircraft, four F-4 combat air patrol
aircraft, four F-4 aircraft for flak suppression, and two F-105
aircraft for SAM suppression, for a total of 26 tactical
aircraft. Associated support aircraft including two KC-135
tankers would be required. The strike force would
utilize a low-level, over-the-water profile for target area
ingress/egress. Strike forces would be configured for
maximum air-to-ground capability (each aircraft: 6 x M117 &
4 x CBU 24/49).

c. The strike against Pyongyang East would be conducted
utilizing eight F-4 strike aircraft, four F-4 combat air patrol
aircraft, four F-4 aircraft for flak suppression, and two F-105
aircraft for SAM suppression, for a total of 18 tactical
aircraft. Associated support aircraft including two KC-135
tankers would be required. The strike force would utilize

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a low-level, over-the-water profile for target area ingress/ egress. Strike forces would be configured for maximum air-to-ground capability (each aircraft: 6 x M117 & four CBU 24/49).

d. The strike against Saaneham Airfield would be conducted utilizing eight F-4 strike aircraft, four F-4 combat air patrol aircraft, four F-4 aircraft for flak suppression, and two F-105 aircraft for SAM suppression, for a total of 18 tactical aircraft. Associated support aircraft including two KC-135 tankers would be required. The strike force would utilize a low-level, over-the-water profile for target area ingress/ egress. Strike forces would be configured for maximum air-to-ground capability (each aircraft: 6 x M117 & four CBU 24/49).

e. The strike against Songdong-N1 Airfield would be conducted utilizing 16 F-4 strike aircraft, eight F-4 combat air patrol aircraft, four F-4 aircraft for flak suppression, and two F-105 aircraft for SAM suppression, for a total of 30 tactical aircraft. Associated support aircraft including two KC-135 tanker aircraft would be required. The strike force would utilize a low-level, over-the-water profile for target area ingress/egress. Strike forces would be configured for maximum air-to-ground capability (each aircraft: 6 x M117 & four CBU 24/49).

Timing:

- a. Reaction time with no prior planning would be 48 hours.
- b. With prior notification and planning, reaction time would be 24 hours. Time en route to targets varies from 30-40 minutes.

Estimated Losses: See Tab H.

Effect on Southeast Asia Operations: None.

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TAB F

PLAN FOR A STRIKE ON FOUR NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELDS USING CARRIER-BASED TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

	<u>1</u>
	<u>2</u>
	<u>3</u>
<u>Purpose:</u> To provide a plan to strike four North Korean Airfields using aircraft from 3 aircraft carriers.	<u>4</u>
	<u>5</u>
<u>Targets:</u> Wonsan, Songdong-Ni, Pyongyang East, and Saamcham airfields. For descriptions and significance see TAB H.	<u>6</u>
	<u>7</u>
<u>Strike Force Composition:</u>	<u>8</u>
a. Three CVAs with protective screen for each carrier.	<u>9</u>
b. Two guided missile ships for air defense.	<u>10</u>
c. One cruiser or guided missile ship for protection of each CVA task group.	<u>11</u>
	<u>12</u>
d. The Exhibit contains a detailed task organization.	<u>13</u>
e. Strike aircraft:	<u>14</u>
(1) Night attack: Maximum available operational (full system) A-6 aircraft (8-24).	<u>15</u>
	<u>16</u>
(2) Day attack: 72 A-4/A-6/A-7 aircraft.	<u>17</u>
f. Support aircraft: Maximum available operational F-4s for Combat Air Patrol (CAP), 4 EKA-3B/KA-3B tankers, 4 A-4/A-7 Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP). One EC-121, 1 EKA-3B, and 1 E-2A to provide ECM and early warning for both day and night strikes.	<u>18</u>
	<u>19</u>
	<u>20</u>
	<u>21</u>
	<u>22</u>
<u>Concept of Operations:</u>	<u>23</u>
a. Night attack: The A-6 is the only carrier-based aircraft which is equipped to conduct strikes against defended targets at night and in weather. Of the airfields considered for a carrier strike, Wonsan is the preferable one. Launching from a point	<u>24</u>
	<u>25</u>
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200 miles from Wonsan, in the Sea of Japan (or from south of
Tsushima Straits), the A-6s would proceed individually to attack
the target at one minute intervals. The F-4 CAP, supported by a
surface ship and an airborne early warning GCI capability, would
be positioned to afford maximum coverage for the A-6s. First
time on target (TOT) would be approximately 40 minutes (or
2 hours) after launch. Each A-6 would carry 12 MK83 (1000 lb)
or 22 MK82 (500 lb) bombs.

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b. Day attack (3 CVAs): A day attack, using up to 72
strike aircraft from 3 aircraft carriers, would be conducted
in basically the same manner as for one CVA. The attack
forces could be proportioned among the three carriers to attack
the two airfields (Wonsan and Songdong-Ni). The TOT would
be approximately 50-55 minutes from launch in the Sea of Japan
and longer from south of the Tsushima Straits. The strike
forces would require about four to five minutes from launch.
The strike forces could require about four to five minutes
over the target.

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c. The advantage of striking with only one carrier rather
than with two or more carriers is greatly reduced reaction
time. Disadvantages, however, are no backup force and a
limitation on how many targets can be hit.

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Estimated Losses: See TAB H. 23

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Effects on Southeast Asia Operations: The extended deployment 1
of any naval unit from the Southeast Asia area of operations would 2
cause a proportionate reduction in Southeast Asia forces. CVAs 3
are stringently scheduled for near maximum on station time in the 4
Gulf of Tonkin with rotation for required upkeep. By surge employ- 5
ment techniques and by temporarily halting all upkeep, up to two 6
CVAs could be employed in Korean waters for a short period with 7
limited drawdown in Southeast Asia. 8

Timing: 9

a. Times en route from the points listed below to the launch 10
point are based on a Speed of Advance (SOA) of 22 knots: 11

<u>Location</u>	<u>Distance (NM)</u>	<u>ETE to Launch Point</u>	<u>12</u>
(1) SUBIC BAY	1501	68 hours	<u>13</u>
(2) HONG KONG	1310	60 hours	<u>14</u>
(3) YANKEE STATION	1848	84 hours	<u>15</u>
(4) SASEBO	265	12 hours	<u>16</u>

b. Ships in port will require 12 hours to get underway from 17
time of receipt of orders. 18

c. Providing all strike crew briefings have been conducted, 19
the time required for a CVA to prepare for a strike launch, 20
irrespective of locality, is two hours if not engaged in flight 21
operations, and four hours if engaged in flight operations. 22

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EXHIBIT TO TAB F

TASK ORGANIZATION

CTF 71/CTG 71.0		COMMANDER SPECIAL STRIKING FORCE SEVENTH FLEET, COMCARDIV EMB	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
TU 71.0.1	SAR UNIT	AS ASSIGNED	
CTU 71.0.2		CO, _____	
TU 71.0.2	PIRAZ UNIT	AS ASSIGNED	
CTU 71.0.4		AS ASSIGNED	
TU 71.0.4	AAW UNIT		
CTE 71.0.4.1		CO, _____	
TE 71.0.4.1	TALOS UNIT	AS ASSIGNED	
CTE 71.0.4.2			
TE 71.0.4.2			
CTU 71.0.5		SEN OFF NAVAL SECTION TACC OSAN	
TU 71.0.5	TACC OSAN	NAVAL SECTION TACC OSAN AM KOREA	
CTG 71.1/CTU 71.1.0		CO, _____	
TG 71.1	SURFACE ACTION GROUP	AS ASSIGNED	
CTG 71.		CO, _____	
TG 71.	CVA STRIKING GROUP	AS ASSIGNED	
TU 71.-.1	CVA		
TU 71.-.2	SCREEN		
CTG 71.		CO, _____	
TG 71.	CVA STRIKING GROUP	AS ASSIGNED	
TU 71.-.1	CVA		
TU 71.-.2	SCREEN		
CTG 71.		CO, _____	
TG 71.	CVA STRIKING GROUP		
TU 71.-.1	CVA		
TU 71.-.2	SCREEN		
CTG 71.9/CTG 70.4		COMASWORU EMB _____	
TG 71.9/TG 70.4		AS ASSIGNED	
TU 70.4.1	CVS		
CTU 70.4.2			
TU 70.4.2	SCREEN/SAU		

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PLAN FOR A STRIKE ON FOUR NORTH KOREAN REMUNERATIVE MILITARY TARGETS (OTHER THAN AIRFIELDS) USING B-52, CARRIER-BASED, OR LAND-BASED TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

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Purpose: To provide a plan to strike remunerative North Korean military targets using B-52, carrier-based, or land-based aircraft.

Targets: Munchon Naval Base, Mayang Do Submarine Base, Hamhung PUL, and Songjon Pando Missile Support. For description and significance, see TAB I. These targets were chosen because they are remunerative, are in coastal areas for ease of attack, and would result in minimum civilian casualties.

Strike Force Composition: The strike force composition for the four selected military targets would be essentially the same as those for the four airfields chosen for attack as listed in TABs D, E, and F.

Concept of Operations: Essentially the same as those listed in TABs D, E, and F.

Timing: Essentially the same as those listed in TABs D, E, and F.

Estimated Losses: Attacking aircraft losses would be substantially greater than if the attack were against airfield targets. Losses would range up to 15 percent.

Effects on Southeast Asia Operations: Essentially the same as those listed in TABs D, E, and F.

General Assessment of Plan: The factors requiring consideration in this plan are essentially the same as those involved in the planning for the attacks on the four airfields. The plan is not considered feasible as an initial attack, however, whether using B-52s or carrier-based or land-based aircraft. Without a significant degradation to the North Korean air order of battle, such an attack would incur a very high risk of substantial friendly losses and would not damage the North Korean short-term capability to attack the ROK.

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SELECTED NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELD TARGETS


TGT #	NAME/SIGNIFICANCE	STK A/C	AAA DEF ELR ^{1/}	CIV CAS	
380-8004	<u>Wonsan Airfield</u> 6,600' concrete runway. Major support facility. AOB: 80 jet fighter aircraft. 2 NM E of Wonsan.	48	Moderate 2.5%	Minimal	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
380-8005	<u>Songdong-Ni Airfield</u> 6,600' concrete runway. Major support facility, air defense sector headquarters. AOB: 34 jet fighter aircraft. 34 NM N of Wonsan.	44	Light 1-2%	Minimal	13 14 15 16 17 18 19
380-8009	<u>Pyongyang East Airfield</u> 6,600' concrete runway. National air defense head- quarters. Minor support facility. 4 NM E of Pyongyang.	16	Moderate 2.5%	Minimal	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
380-8016	<u>Saamcham Airfield</u> 8,200' concrete runway. Major support facility. AOB: 106 jet fighter aircraft. In Central North Korea 44 NM N of Pyongyang.	24	Light 1-2%	Minimal	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

^{1/} Estimated loss rate

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TAB I

SELECTED NORTH KOREAN MILITARY TARGETS


<u>TGT #</u>		<u>STK</u>	<u>AAA DEF</u>	<u>CIV</u>	
		<u>A/C</u>	<u>ELR</u> ^{1/}	<u>CAS</u>	
380-0410	<u>Munchon Naval Base</u>	20	Moderate 2.5%	Minimal	<u>1</u> <u>2</u> <u>3</u> <u>4</u> <u>5</u> <u>6</u> <u>7</u> <u>8</u> <u>9</u>
	Maritime port, 30% national naval support capacity. Main structures: wharf, pier, quay, graving dock, 25 storage, 50 support. Sustains torpedo/ patrol boat operations. 9 NM N of Wonsan.				<u>10</u> <u>11</u> <u>12</u> <u>13</u> <u>14</u>
380-0822	<u>Mayang Do Sub Base</u>	28	Light 1-2%	Minimal	<u>15</u> <u>16</u> <u>17</u> <u>18</u> <u>19</u> <u>20</u> <u>21</u> <u>22</u>
	Maritime port, 15% national naval support capacity. Main structures: wharf, 5 piers, ship repair yard, graving dock, 32 warehouses, 2 admin, support. Sustains submarine/patrol boat operations. On Mayang Island 28 NM ENE of Hungnam.				
380-1494	<u>Hamhung POL</u>	10	Light 1-2%	Minimal	
	8000 MT, 4% national capacity. Main structures: motor pool, 120 POL tanks, POL drums. In Hamhung 5 NM NW of Hungnam.				
380-2238	<u>Songjon Pando Missile Support</u>	6	Moderate 2.5%	Minimal	
	STYX missile assembly check out. Main structures: missile handling, 2 assembly, 10 storage/ support. Missile support for KOMAR/OSA patrol boats. 12 NM N of Wonsan.				

^{1/} Estimated Loss Rate

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