

October 11, 1969

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with Elliot Richardson at  
Breakfast, 8:00 a. m.

The following items have been gleaned from Presidential feedback which you have indicated that you wish to take up with Elliot Richardson:

1. The President has indicated that we should put some heat on the International Committee of the Red Cross concerning the Prisoners of War question. You indicated that you wish to take this up with Richardson (memorandum at Tab A).
2. The President has indicated that passport restrictions on travel to Mainland China, North Korea and North Vietnam should be eliminated soon but not at present. There will be no reduction in restrictions on travel to Cuba, however, unless the President approves it. The President's comment on this item was made on your memorandum to him of September 25 which is at Tab B.
3. The President has authorized you to ask State to prepare instructions to the field setting forth guidance for deploying reports on a Soviet plan to make a preemptive military strike against Communist China. The President's comments are at Tab C.
4. Ken Cole, on October 3d, sent you a memorandum expressing the President's desire that State cut anything we can with Sweden. This resulted from Olaf Palma's recent announcement to the effect that he would institute a \$40 million aid program to North Vietnam (memorandum at Tab D). We received a second memorandum from the President on Sweden on October 6 which is at Tab E.
5. On September 22d, the President asked you to have Elliot Richardson see what he could do to cut down the massive amount of reports which have been required within the bureaucracy. He asked

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you to discuss this with Richardson but also wants to include USIA, AID, Defense, etc. You indicated you wanted to take this up with Elliot Richardson (memorandum at Tab F). I would recommend that as soon as we do so we assign this job to Larry Lynn's people to prepare a directive to all the departments, perhaps using the language suggested by Richardson which would get the project underway and then ask Larry's people to monitor the progress through periodic reports from the agency.

6. Larry Lynn reports that there are rumblings appearing in the bureaucracy concerning the work of the Verification Committee and believes it would be helpful if you could discuss the problem with Elliot Richardson (his memorandum to you is at Tab G).

7. The President sent you a memorandum on October 7 commenting on a Cleveland Plain Dealer article to the effect that draft dodgers in Canada may soon be able to return home. The President is opposed to such amnesty and I suggest you raise this with Elliot today and with the Attorney General at your next meeting with him (Tab H).

8. We should get the Vietnam Project moving and resolve it finally with Elliot. The memorandum at Tab I, prepared by Larry Lynn, basically recommends that we follow the Verification Panel precedent, that we do not have a permanent staff but rather a working committee convened as necessary to meet on the various problem areas. On balance, Tony and I support this view.

9. Raise with Elliot the tone of our exchanges in Paris. It would appear that over the next few weeks, certainly until the President gives his speech on November 3, it is essential that we maintain a stiff line at the negotiating table and perhaps consider even a walkout in the face of continuing invective from the other side.

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10. Hal Sonnenfeldt has raised two issues in his area which are at Tab J. The first is a recommendation that you mention to Elliot your interest in the preparations for the NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers' and Foreign Ministers' meetings. The second deals with Hal's report that the French transistor deal with Poland is on dead center with Nutter having taken an intransigent position and your credibility with the French at stake.

Attachments

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September 29, 1969

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: The US Role in Soviet Maneuvering Against China

In the last two months, the increase in Sino-Soviet tensions has led the Soviets to sound out numerous American contacts on their attitude toward a possible Soviet air strike against China's nuclear/missile facilities or toward other Soviet military actions. These probes have varied in character from point-blank questioning of our reaction to provocative musings by Soviets over what they might be forced to do against the Chinese, including the use of nuclear weapons. Some of these contacts have featured adamant denials that the Soviets were planning any military moves -- thereby keeping the entire issue alive. (Secretary Rogers' Memorandum on this subject is at Tab A.)

Our contingency planning for major Sino-Soviet hostilities is well along, and NSC consideration of a basic policy paper on the Sino-Soviet dispute is scheduled for October 8.

Meanwhile, I am concerned about our response to these probes. The Soviets may be quite uncertain over their China policy, and our reactions could figure in their calculations. Second, the Soviets may be using us to generate an impression in China and the world that we are being consulted in secret and would look with equanimity on their military actions.

A related issue is the shifting Soviet attitude on Chinese representation in the UN. We have had two indications that the Soviets, in an effort to keep the Chinese Communists out of the UN through indirection, are dangling the prospect before us of cooperation on the representation issue. Gromyko, in his UN speech, of course failed to mention Peking's admission for the first time.

I believe we should make clear that we are not playing along with these tactics, in pursuance of your policy of avoiding the appearance of siding with the Soviets.

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The principal gain in making our position clear would be in our stance with respect to China. The benefits would be long rather than short-term, but they may be none the less real. Behavior of Chinese Communist diplomats in recent months strongly suggests the existence of a body of opinion, presently submerged by Mao's doctrinal views, which might wish to put US/Chinese relations on a more rational and less ideological basis than has been true for the past two decades.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize me to ask the Department of State to prepare instructions to the field setting forth guidance to be used with the USSR and others, deploring reports of a Soviet plan to make a pre-emptive military strike against Communist China.

Approve: *mm*

Disapprove:   "  

*Base it on  
" reports which  
have come from - etc*