The National Security Archive at George Washington University
today published declassified U.S. documents showing that "the
Argentines received mixed signals from us on human rights,
in effect giving the [Government of Argentina] the impression
that it had carte blanche to pursue terrorism," in the
mid 1970's, and that in order to convince the Argentine military
of Washington's commitment to human rights, "there must
be cooperation from DOD and CIA."
The revelations are contained in a series of 15 documents
made public by the National Security Archive at a panel featuring
former Assistant Secretary of State Patricia Derian and U.S.
and Argentine researchers at the Latin America Studies Association
(LASA) conference in Dallas, Texas. The panel, "Declassification
on Argentina: A Contribution to Truth and Justice," looked
at how the 4,677 documents declassified by the Department
of State in August 2002 shed new light on key U.S. policy
decisions and critical information on the chain of command
and responsibility for gross human rights violations under
the military dictatorship in Argentina.
Telegrams included in the selection report how Patricia Derian
both confronted and tried to reason with the Argentine Generals.
"You and I both know that as we speak, people are being
tortured in the next floors," Derian told Admiral Massera
in 1977. To Interior Minister Haguindeguy, "Mrs. Derian
said that the instinctive reaction to terrorism is to do what
the GOA [Government of Argentina] had done and that it makes
the people victims of the state."
The documents are complemented by Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights, Patricia Derian's striking notes of the time
when she wrote, "Through these [U.S. military and
intelligence] agencies the United States government is sending
a dangerous and double message. If this continues, it will
subvert our entire human rights policy." [previously cited
in Martin Andersen's Dossier Secreto. See below.]
The documents also show how, despite strong language and
action on human rights, the Carter Administration entered
into secret negotiations with Junta President Rafael Videla
and Army Chief Roberto Viola trading U.S. military transfers
for human rights improvements. In September 1978, after Vice-President
Walter Mondale met Videla in Rome, U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro
reported that
"General Viola received me smiling broadly and immediately
volunteered the observation that he believed the Rome meeting
had gone very well... Viola clearly indicated he had received
some positive signals from the USG [U.S. government] referring
to the release of FMS [Foreign Military Sales] purchases."
A 1979 telegram reveals how U.S. policy placed U.S.
officials in a moral and political predicament while dealing
with those responsible for human rights atrocities. At a meeting
with General Viola, then-U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro asked
him to help clarify the fate of two recent disappeared Montonero
insurgents, Mendizabal and Croatto. Viola responded without
hesitation, "Mendizabal and Croatto were terrorists
... who were eliminated ... with my authorization."
Finally, the present selection includes U.S. Embassy reports
showing early military efforts to preclude civil courts and
avoid accountability for the thousands of disappeared during
the military regime. In 1983, the U.S. Embassy received a
document from an intelligence source that emanated from the
Staff of the Commander-in-Chief outlining its policy towards
the issue of the disappeared during the dirty war. The document
states that "[u]nder no circumstances will a review of
what was then done be allowed, since it is the competence
of military justice to investigate infractions that may have
been perpetrated."
Organized by the National Security Archive and sponsored
by the LASA Southern Cone Section, the panel "Declassification
on Argentina: A Contribution to Truth and Justice" gathered
Assistant Secretary Derian; professor and journalist John
Dinges, who described his findings about the double message
sent by the Kissinger Department of State [See
Argentine Military Believed U.S. Gave Go-ahead for Dirty War
]; researcher Valeria Barbuto of the Center for
Legal and Social Studies (CELS) in Buenos Aires, who talked
about CELS' work to provide selections of declassified documents
to judges and ongoing judicial cases defying current amnesty
laws in Argentina; journalist Noga Tarnopolsky, whose cousins,
uncle and aunt disappeared in 1976 and who worked with her
surviving cousin to win a $1 million suit against Junta member
Admiral Emilio Massera; and the Archive's director of
the Southern Cone Documentation Project, Carlos Osorio, who
has published numerous briefing books and prepared analyses
of declassified documents on behalf of judges and human rights
groups in Argentina, Uruguay and Europe.
The Documents
Document 1
Early April 1977
[Notes from U.S. State
Department Human Rights Coordinator Patricia Derian *]
Returning from a week-long visit to Argentina where she was
to impress on Argentine officials the seriousness of the Carter
Administration's human rights policy, recently appointed Coordinator
for Human Rights Patricia Derian realized there was work to
be done at home too, for "[i]t is widely believed
by our military and intelligence services that the human rights
policy emanates only from the Department of State..."
Furthermore, she noted that "[t]hrough these agencies
the United States government is sending a dangerous and double
message. If this continues, it will subvert our entire human
rights policy."
In Buenos Aires, Derian met with Argentine human rights
activists, journalists, businessmen and government officials,
and the U.S. Embassy Country Team. These are some excerpts
from Derian’s conclusions:
"The [Argentine] government method is to pick people
up and take them to military installations. There the detainees
are tortured with water, electricity and psychological disintegration
methods. Those thought to be salvageable are sent to regular
jails and prisons where the psychological process is continued
on a more subtle level. Those found to be incorrigible are
murdered and dumped on garbage heaps or street corners,
but more often are given arms with live ammunition, grenades,
bombs and put into automobiles and sent out of the compound
to be killed on the road in what is then reported publicly
to be a shootout or response to an attack on some military
installation.
...
THE U.S MILITARY & OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
Through these agencies the United States government is
sending a dangerous and double message. If this continues,
it will subvert our entire human rights policy.
It is widely believed by our military and intelligence
services that the human rights policy emanates only from
the Department of State, is a political device and one with
a short life due to its wide impracticality, the naiveté
and ignorance of individuals in the Administration and to
the irresponsible headline grabbing of members of Congress.
This is the signal problem our government has in human
rights. The only hope we have to gain support for our initiatives
and to advance the cause of human rights is to make sure
that governments understand that we are serious, and committed
to our human rights policies.
If they believe and are told by U.S. government officials
that we are not serious and committed, they are going to
try to wait us out.
...
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1- That the President as Commander in Chief
send a message to all branches of the armed forces stating
unequivocally the human rights policy of the U.S. government,
which outlines the duty of the military in this regard.
2-That the President instruct the C.I.A., the F.B.I,
and all other intelligence agencies on the human rights
policy of the U.S. government.
3-That courses in Human Rights be designed and implemented
at once in all service academies, military training institutes
and intelligence schools, including all purely domestic
as well as those with international participants.
4-That those members of the armed forces and intelligence
services who cannot comply with U.S. government policies
on human rights be immediately separated from their services.”
* Derian's notes were donated to the National Security
Archive by Martin Edwin Andersen who first published excerpts
from them in his 1993 book "Dossier Secreto: Argentina's
Desaparecidos and the Myth of the Dirty War," (Westview Press).
The notes and other documents from the "Martin Edwin
Andersen Collection" may be consulted at the Archive’s
reading room.
Document 2
May 4, 1977
Human Rights: The Key to
Our Relations
For Assistant Secretary Terence Todman’s trip to Argentina
In preparation for a trip to Argentina by the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs, this memorandum outlines
the U.S. government's stand on the human rights issue and
echoes Derian's concerns about past "mixed signals
from us on human rights." The following are some excerpts:
"The human rights situation in Argentina
bedevils our relations, with the possibility that we may soon
have to treat Argentina like Chile or Uruguay. The GOA refuses
to acknowledge the names of thousands of political prisoners
under detention; disappearances, prolonged periods of incommunication,
intimidation of lawyers, instances of anti-Semitism, and the
harassment of foreign refugees are undeniable. Summary executions
of prisoners were reported as recently as early 1977; torture
has been brutal, wide-spread and generally unpunished.
Earlier, the Argentines received mixed signals from us
on human rights, in effect giving the GOA the impression that
it had carte blanche to pursue terrorism. Repeated representations
on behalf of human rights were, therefore, not taken very
seriously. It is important to persuade the GOA that the USG
is serious about such rights - and there must be cooperation
from DOD and CIA."
Document 3
August 11, 1977
First Corps Officers Involved
With PEN and Disappeared Cases
Note by Political Officer Tex Harris
As he arrived in Buenos Aires, Embassy political officer Franklyn
Allen (Tex) Harris launchds an aggressive research effort
to inform the Department of State of the scale of human rights
violations in Argentina. For the next two years, Harris' human
rights office would report on thousands of victims, as well
as on the structure of the repressive apparatus and the perpetrators.
"The following are among the officers of
the First Army Corps located in Palermo with responsibilities
for PEN detainees and missing persons: Lt. Col. Roarte, Lt.
Col. Gatica, and Padre Monson, Chaplain of the First Army
Corps. Does anyone know or have any information on these persons?"
Document 4
August 15, 1977
Derian Meeting with Minister
of Interior Harguindeguy
During a high-level trip to Argentina in early August that
included Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Terence
Todman and Human Rights Coordinator Patricia Derian, Derian
met top Argentine military and security officials. On August
10, in separate meetings, Derian confronted Minister of the
Interior Harguindeguy and Junta Member and Navy Commander
Emilio Massera, on the situation of human rights in Argentina.
"Mrs. Derian started by explaining to the
Minister [Harguindeguy] that she was very concerned with the
enormous number of people who had disappeared, the number
in jail without charges, the number who are simply lost and
the number found innocent who remain in jail... She explained
that the chief obstacle for returning to normal relations
with the US is our concern for the mass of people caught in
the system."
"Mrs. Derian said that the instinctive reaction to
terrorism is to do what the GOA [Government of Argentina]
had done and that it makes the people victims of the state."
Document 5
August 15, 1977
Derian Visit with Admiral
Massera
"Mrs. Derian said that many people in the
Argentine government had told USG representatives that the
Navy is responsible for abuses which occur when people are
taken into custody and interrogated…Mrs. Derian said
that on her prior visit she had been told that one of the
worst interrogation centers was the Navy Mechanical School
in Buenos Aires."
In a personal interview with the Archive, Ms. Derian recalls
telling Massera, "You and I both know that as we speak,
people are being tortured in the next floors." According
to Derian, the U.S. note-taker missed this in the memo of
the conversation.
Document 6
September 27, 1977
A Time to Support Argentina's
Videla
From Assistant Secretary Terence Todman to Secretary Vance
In early September, President Carter met with Junta President
Videla in Washington and initiated secret negotiations on
the human rights issue. Videla would release most of the 4000
prisoners held under executive order by Christmas 1977, but
it is not known what the U.S. would give the Argentines in
return. The minutes of the meeting are still classified. A
few days later, this heavily excised memo written by Assistant
Secretary Todman recommends supporting Videla and scribbled
on the side has the words "File Arms Transfers"
and the acronym for the Defense Attaché, "DAO"
suggesting that the U.S. was considering supplying Argentina
with military equipment. At about this time, the U.S. quietly
approved "export licenses for submarine periscopes
and advisory opinions for the sale of three Chinook helicopters
and two Lockheed KC-130 tanker aircraft" to the Argentine
military [ Department of
State Document, November 3, 1977]
Document 7
December 7, 1977
Ambassador Castro's Meeting
With General Viola
From Ambassador Raul Castro to Secretary of State
During their first meeting, on December 5, Army Chief of Staff
General Viola suggested to recently appointed U.S. Ambassador
Raul Castro that he [Viola] could serve as a direct access
channel to Junta President Videla. In the future, Ambassador
Castro would seek this high-level access regularly to solve
critical diplomatic issues. The Ambassador wrote:
"Looking back on the meeting, it appears
that his main objective was to impress upon me the close relationship
which he enjoys with president Videla and to offer himself
as a conduit to the president. This channel will be
useful for expressing many of our concerns, beginning of course
with human rights."
Document 8
August 9, 1978
[Testimony of Assistant Secretary
Derian ]
For the Subcommittee on Inter American Affairs, Committee
on International Relations, House of Representatives
By the Summer of 1978, the Argentine Junta had not complied
with releasing thousands of prisoners, stopping the disappearances,
and inviting the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
as promised in secret negotiations with the Carter Administration
in exchange for a discreet relaxation of the military transfers’
embargo against the Argentine military. Assistant Secretary
Derian testified on the subject before Congress as the Department
of State decided to withhold a credit of more than $200 million
for the Yacyreta dam project in Argentina.
"The reason for our advice was the continuing
violation of basic human rights by Argentina. The systematic
use of torture, summary execution of political dissidents,
the disappearance and the imprisonment of thousands of individuals
without charge, including mothers, churchmen, nuns, labor
leaders, journalists, professors and members of human rights
organizations, and the failure of the government of Argentina
to fulfill its commitment to allow [a] visit by the Inter
American Commission on human rights."
Document 9
September 8, 1978
Meeting between the vice
president and president Videla
Secret, "Eyes Only" cable from Ambassador
Castro to Secretary of State Vance
In early September 1978, Vice-President Walter Mondale and
Argentine Junta PresidentVidela met privately in Rome
and reached a new agreement whereby Argentina would make substantial
steps toward decreasing the number of prisoners held without
charge (then at almost 3,000), stopping the disappearances
and allowing an inspection visit by the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights in 1979. For its part, the U.S. agreed to
release hundreds of millions of dollars in credits to finance
the Yacyreta dam project and ease its embargo on military
transfers to the Argentine military. In this memo, U.S. Ambassador
Raul Castro reports on his exchange of impressions on the
Rome meeting with Argentine Army Chief Roberto Viola.
"General viola received me smiling broadly
and immediately volunteered the observation that he believed
the Rome meeting had gone very well and that he now believed
that the US does value its relations with Argentina. I assured
him that this has always been the case but that our efforts
had not always been well understood. I assured him that we
also were delighted with the Rome meeting.”
Viola clearly indicated he had received some positive
signals from the USG [U.S. government] referring to the release
of FMS [Foreign Military Sales] purchases. He said that this
was some indication that the US was serious about wishing
better ties with Argentina. He then observed that we would
definitely see changes and improvements in the human rights
field soon. (We understand another list of about 65 prisoner
releases is scheduled for this weekend and that Viola is personally
clamping down on counter- terrorist operations in the 1st
corps.)"
Document 10
September 26, 1978
Army outlines new anti-subversive
procedures
From Ambassador Raul Castro to Secretary of State
According to this cable, Argentine Army Chief Viola reportedly
ordered orally that “independent operations, unless
specially authorized, were to end.” The ambiguity of
the oral orders reveals a key mechanism used later on by commanders
and subordinates to deny responsibility for human rights violations
during the dirty war. Several declassified documents mention
this characteristic of counterinsurgency in Argentina where
intelligence and security units were officially granted ample
autonomy, thus clouding authorities' and individuals' responsibility
for operations.
"A senior Army intelligence source (protect) confidentially
informed emboffs that army commander-in-chief Viola orally
instructed Army corps commanders and intelligence services
that henceforth all arrests of non-terrorist subversives were
to be carried out in accordance with existing laws and that
"independent" operations, unless specifically authorized,
were to end."
Document 11
April 18, 1979
The Mothers of the Plaza
de Mayo
From Patrick Flood to Assistant Secretary Patricia
Derian
Assitant Secretary Derian’s up-front stand before the
Generals gained her the respect and affection of many Argentines.
In this memo, Patrick Flood, an official in Derian’s
Human Rights Bureau visiting Argentina, describes how after
joining a march of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, he struggled
to explain who he worked for, he said "'I work with Patricia
Derian.' That did it. Everyone suddenly smiled, repeated your
name, said 'she is our saint, she is our hope', and burst
into applause." Here are some extracts from this document.
"Each Thursday afternoon, the Mothers gather
in a different church, say the Rosary, and march briefly around
the nearest plaza or park. They met in a church near the Embassy
during my stay in Buenos Aires. I was told that they had chosen
it because of my presence in town. (I had planned to join
them anyway, and this made it convenient.) I broke free from
an Embassy meeting just in time to see them streaming out
of the church. I introduced myself to some of the marchers,
and all at once they gathered around me asking questions and
telling me about the agony they and thousands of other Argentines
are experiencing as a result of the disappearances. Pretty
soon all 120-150 marchers (including a few men) had surrounded
me, everyone talking at once. Some people assumed I was from
the IAHRC, or from the Embassy.
...
I said, no, I am from the Department of State in Washington;
I work in the human rights office. Some still seemed to have
a little trouble placing me, so I said ‘I work with
Patricia Derian.’ That did it. Everyone suddenly smiled,
repeated your name, said ‘she is our saint, she is our
hope’, and burst into applause
...
I told them I had not come with answers to all of their questions,
but had come to express in this public way our solidarity
with their cause and our sharing of their grief, and our commitment
to do all in our power to advance the cause for which they
marched and prayed every week."
Document 12
September 11, 1979
Human Rights - Military View
Memorandum for the Files by U.S. Embassy Political Officer
Towsend Freeman
The visit in September 1979 by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights had a tremendous impact within the Argentine
military. The visit was seen as a step towards bringing Argentina
under democratic rule of law. But the process stirred fears
among those involved in the dirty war that the rule of law
might bring accountability for human rights violations. In
this memo, an Argentine intelligence source informs a U.S.
Embassy official that "those most deeply involved
in the 'dirty war' are terribly frightened that as the climate
returns to normality, they are being moved closer to the time
when they must account for their acts and suffer retribution,"
and that there was talk “about the institution of
some sort of amnesty for the security forces--a 'ley de olvidos,'"
(a law to forget). The following are some excerpts from that
memo.
"The source of the following report is
a fairly senior member of a major Argentine military intelligence
organization…
The Fundamental Problems:
My source said that he had little hope for Argentina getting
permanently out of its current mess barring some major changes
in what he affirmed were three fundamental, and in effect
structural, problems: a) the police and security forces are
untrained in sophisticated investigative practices and think
only brutality gets results ; b) the courts are ineffective,
corruptible and mediocre. The security forces – like
the general public – have no confidence in the rule
of law; c) the military has a grossly simplistic attitude
towards Marxism. Anybody who criticizes the government is
a Marxist
…
At least as important, he said, is that some of those
most deeply involved in the ‘dirty war’ are terribly
frightened that as the climate returns to normality, they
are being moved closer to the time when they must account
for their acts and suffer retribution. On the other hand,
if the ‘dirty war’ can be kept going they are
protected--and besides, he said" in some cases doing what
they like best.
…
[M]y source was talking about the institution of some
sort of amnesty for the security forces--a 'ley de olvidos.'
We know that several old-time politicians have discussed the
need for a 'ley de olvidos' to help open the road for the
eventual return to democracy. In addition reported that some
military men are speaking about '1ey de olvidos' as a condition
precedent for the military's withdrawal from power."
Document 13
October 1, 1979
Ambassador’s Conversation
with Viola, Human Rights Topics
From Ambassador Raul Castro to Secretary of State
Meeting Army Chief Viola on September 25, the Ambassador asked
about a recent spate of disappearances, in particular one
involving two Montoneros, Mendizabal and Croatto. Viola responded,
"Mendizabal and Croatto were terrorists... who were
eliminated – ‘with my authorization." The
visit in September 1979 by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights marked the culmination of a series of steps in
the human rights arena that the Argentine military had promised
to the U.S. The Embassy and Department of State congratulated
themselves for this accomplishment. In addition to the visit,
the U.S. Embassy reported that great numbers of prisoners
had been released through the year and that disappearances
had practically stopped. But as the Commission visit proceeded,
disappearances erupted again. This document shows the moral
and political predicament in which Ambassador Castro is placed
in dealing with the Argentine military hierarchy. There are
no other declassified documents showing the Department
of State's response to Viola's revelation.
"Disappearances: The ambassador tackled
Viola on the remarkable number of disappearances in the past
six weeks. Viola responded directly to only three cases. Mendizabal
and Croatto were terrorists, he said, who were eliminated
– ‘with my authorization,’ Viola added --
in the course of their attempts to carry out ten assassinations
in Argentina. Others of this ilk could expect the same treatment."
Document 14
April 28, 1983
Argentine Government's Report
on the Dirty War [English Summary]
Cable from U.S. Ambassador Harry Schlaudeman to the Secretary
of State
Documento Final de la Junta Militar Sobre la Guerra Contra
la Subversión y el Terrorismo [Full original
in Spanish]
"Summary: the junta released its ‘final’
report on the ‘dirty war’ against subversion on
April 28. The report was less than most people expected, being
unremorseful in tone and providing no new material. Of course,
it also ducked important issues such as who was responsible
for the admitted excesses committed while combating terrorism.
The report also stated that the armed forces would not give
out any more information, that the actions of members of the
armed forces during operations conducted in the war shall
be considered as ‘acts of service’ and that ‘it
was the constitutional government of former president Maria
Estela Martinez de Peron that in 1975 granted the military
the power to carry out whatever action was necessary in order
to annihilate subversive elements nationwide.’ Reaction
to the report was overwhelmingly negative… Human rights
organizations, other politicians, and trade unionists also
harshly criticized the report. We believe that the report
was issued now in an attempt to calm concern in military ranks,
where there is considerable fear of possible punishment under
a civilian government. To take care of such concern, an "institutional
act" was also issued on April 28 that may be used to make
case for giving military courts exclusive jurisdiction over
all military personnel accused of crimes committed during
the ‘dirty war’.”
Document 15
May 9, 1983
Army Views on Foreign
Policy and Accounting for the Disappeared
U.S. Embassy for the Secretary of State. Excerpts of internal
Argentine Army document "Temas Políticos"
Temas Políticos
[Full original in Spanish]
U.S. Embassy Cover
Memo
A few months before handing over power to a civilian government
in December 1983, the Army high command had decided that there
would be no accountability for thousands of human rights violations
during the dirty war. “Under no circumstances will a
review of what was then done be allowed” says this internal
Argentine Army memo obtained by the U.S. Embassy through an
intelligence source. While acknowledging institutional responsibility,
the document shows the military's attempt to exculpate and
rationalize the actions of hundreds of perpetrators. The military
decided to lay responsibility on the previous Junta Chiefs
and high command of the armed forces: "Operations carried
out in the struggle against subversion and terrorism were
executed in conformity with plans approved and supervised
by the chain of command of the armed forces and the military
junta." In the years to come, Argentina prosecuted, condemned
and pardoned former Junta leaders and passed laws shielding
perpetrators for having received orders and proscribing further
prosecutions on the dirty war.
"A regular contact of this mission who
has proven reliable in the past provided us with a document
which he claims was prepared by the army. We think it is probably
the work of the Army Secretary General’s office, the
political advisory staff of the Commander-in-Chief.
...…
Excerpts of the report, which is a schematic outline,
follow: quote:
Sequel to the struggle against terrorism--the disappeared…
The stance of the institution is clear:
-- Operations carried out in the struggle against subversion
and terrorism were executed in conformity with plans
approved and supervised by the chain of command of the armed
forces and the military junta,
-- Under no circumstances will a review of what was then
done be allowed, since it is the competence of military justice
to investigate infractions that may have been perpetrated
in this struggle by military, security, police or penitentiary
personnel
-- Insisting on the issue of the disappeared will disturb
the normal evolution of the institutionalization process"