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E.R.

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PRIME MINISTER

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*I find an important - see to make it open to discussion but I would like to be a danger - possible - after reports - 11/18*

Anglo-American Nuclear Relations

I attach copies of two records, by Sir Thomas Brimelow and Mr. Nairne respectively, of their discussions in Washington yesterday.

Sir Thomas Brimelow's record deals with the projected United States/Soviet "Declaration" renouncing the use of nuclear weapons. (Our own code name for this enterprise is "Hullabaloo". But this is not known to Dr. Kissinger). It makes very interesting reading; and I think that, so far as it goes, it confirms our initial impression that there is no deliberate intention on the part of the United States to relax the pressure on the Soviet Union in Europe or to jeopardise the interests of the Alliance. But that is not to say that it would not have this effect in practice; and we shall clearly need to look very carefully indeed at the draft of the Declaration (Annex 3) which Sir T. Brimelow has brought back with him. If we are to meet Dr. Kissinger's timetable, we ought to try to send him considered comments on this text not later than the end of next week. I have therefore agreed with Sir T. Brimelow that he will now initiate a careful study of the document, with a view to submitting recommendations about our reply to yourself, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence by about the middle of the week. It will then be necessary to consider whether Ministers will need to meet to settle the precise wording of the reply.

Mr. Nairne's record suggests that, on the separate issue of our own deterrent, we are continuing to make gradual progress; and the United States disposition to help us so far as possible is clearly confirmed. The various options which Mr. Nairne has brought back will now be further examined; and I think that we can leave this process to take its course on the basis that, when we wish to carry matters a stage further with the White House, the door will be open to us.

On the other matters which arose during my own visit - SALT II, MBFRs, the CSCE and so forth - Sir T. Brimelow confirmed that, provided that the channel of communication continues to be initially confined to Dr. Kissinger himself, appropriate British teams would be welcomed in Washington in the near future for bilateral discussions before any of these matters is carried further in the NATO context. The FCO and the Ministry of Defence will ensure that this offer is followed up.

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**E.R.**

I am sending copies of this minute and of the two records (in formal breach of Dr. Kissinger's stipulation at (c) on page 6 of Sir T. Brimelow's record!) to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence; and I am sending copies of the minute only to Sir T. Brimelow and Mr. Nairne.

*David Hunt*

11th August, 1972

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HULLABALOO

CONVERSATION WITH DR KISSINGER

WASHINGTON, 10 AUGUST, 1972

A/H/a

1. Dr Kissinger, accompanied by Mr Sonnenfeld and Mr Rodman, received Mr Tebbit, Mr Nairne and myself at 10am for a discussion of the Soviet proposal for a Soviet/US renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons.
2. He made it clear that the US Government would not contemplate an unqualified renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. He explained that during President Nixon's visit to Moscow, the Russians had produced a draft suggesting such a renunciation (Annex I). He had explained the objections, and had not agreed that the question be discussed by President Nixon and Mr Brezhnev. Subsequently, and after Sir Burke Trend's visit to Washington, the Russians had produced a second draft (Annex II). This was designed to protect the interests of the allies of the two principals, but one of its important effects, like that of the first Soviet draft, would have been to leave the Soviet Government greater freedom of action with regard to China. No reply had yet been returned by the White House to the second Soviet proposal; but the President did not wish to rebuff Mr Brezhnev, and Dr Kissinger wished to have a counter-proposal ready within the next seven or ten days. His staff had prepared two drafts, with neither of which he was satisfied. He wished to take advantage of our

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presence to prepare jointly a third draft, which would be entirely without commitment by either side, but in which account could be taken of the preliminary views formed by United Kingdom Ministers after consideration of Sir Burke Trend's report. We worked on such a draft with Mr Sonnenfeld after leaving Dr Kissinger at 12.10, and we discussed it with him at 16.30. This discussion led to the text at Annex III, which I agreed to submit to Ministers. Dr Kissinger emphasized that this text had no status other than that of a White House staff paper. The earlier drafts had not been seen by the President. No US official outside the White House knew of the Soviet proposals. No other NATO Government had been consulted. No reply to the second Soviet proposal would be returned until he had received, through Mr Tebbit, the comments of United Kingdom Ministers. ~~He thought that the draft which we had agreed with his officials would have little, if any, appeal to the Soviet Government.~~ He went on to express the view that the substance of the draft which we had prepared was unlikely to appeal to the Soviet Government (though he acknowledged that they might be attracted by the further demonstration of "Super-power partnership" in the nuclear field). He appeared to accept that it might, nonetheless, be the basis for the US response; and he did not rule out that the Soviet Union would then drop the whole idea. Alternatively, they might make a counter-proposal. He did

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not think it would be prudent to consult NATO until it had become clear that there was a prospect of agreeing with the Soviet Government a text which might be adopted without harm to the Alliance.

3. The foregoing represents the outcome of a discussion which lasted over two hours. Mr Rodman took a record, of which a copy will be sent to us through Mr Tebbit. In the course of the discussion, I was able to raise most of the points covered in the paper attached to your minute to the Prime Minister, the principal omission being any mention of Japan. In the discussion I took the line that we regarded the original Soviet proposal as disadvantageous, and that before United Kingdom Ministers could form any further judgment, we needed to know what qualifications Dr Kissinger had in mind. His remarks in the discussion can be summarized as follows:

- (a) In the current political situation in the USA, the Administration did not wish to be classified as either hawks or doves;
- (b) The condition for their being able to act firmly as occasion demanded was that they should be seen to be ready to work for détente;
- (c) It was for this reason that they did not wish to rebuff Mr Brezhnev;
- (d) They had found, from their experience of dealing with the

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Russians, that in the first place the Russians advanced an extreme bargaining position. If this was dealt with coolly, they retreated to their instructions regarding their bargaining stance; if this too was dealt with coolly, there was a chance of getting into talks in which their teeth could be drawn; this was what the Administration hoped to achieve with regard to the Soviet proposal for the renunciation of nuclear weapons. Their experience of discussing the Middle East with the Soviet Government had convinced them that the process of negotiating with the Soviet Government was like that of peeling an onion. You have to take off one layer after another. They wished, therefore, to continue the discussion which the Russians had begun.

4. I regard the foregoing paragraph as the kernel of our talk. In my opinion, the President and Dr Kissinger are not going to be dissuaded from going ahead with their exploration of what may be agreed with the Soviet Government, and for us the main problem is how to avert or minimize the potential damage to NATO (a problem to which Dr Kissinger is fully alive). My conclusion is that if the Soviet Government decide to drop the question, the United States will acquiesce. But if the Soviet Government return to the charge with another draft, the White House will keep the ball in play.

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5. Our own contribution to the two White House drafts which Dr Kissinger had rejected (and of which we were shown but not given copies) was:
- (a) to make clear the continuing loyalty of the US Government to their obligations under the United Nations Charter and their other treaty commitments;
  - (b) thereby to minimize the harm which would result from any doubts, amongst the European members of NATO, about the intentions of the US Administration.
6. Dr Kissinger's reaction to the third draft which we have prepared with Mr Sonnenfeld was phlegmatic. He saw at once that the draft we have prepared would have no attraction (apart from its obeisance to the status of the two super powers) to the Soviet Government. But he agreed, after certain amendments, that it should be accepted as a working document for submission to United Kingdom Ministers and to the President.
7. In the course of the two sessions we had with him, he made the following points with particular emphasis:
- (a) the White House had never contemplated the acceptance of any agreement which would have the effect of weakening the US nuclear deterrent or the US commitment to the defence of its allies;

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- (b) he agreed with our view that the Soviet Government was still trying to change the balance of power in the world, and that the two Soviet proposals should be interpreted against this background;
- (c) he could only let me have copies of the two Soviet proposals on the understanding that they were kept in Sir Burke Trend's office and that no copies would be made and distributed. The same restriction would apply to Mr Rodman's record when it was sent to us;
- (d) he would like our comments on the latest US draft reply as soon as possible;
- (e) the United States Government could not contemplate the conclusion of an alliance with China; but the White House had no intention of freeing the hands of the Soviet Government with regard to China.

8. My general comment is that any text which is to stand a chance of being accepted by the Soviet Government is likely to weaken confidence in the US deterrent and to give rise to additional doubts in NATO. From this point of view, it would be better not to follow up the Soviet proposals. But I doubt whether the White House can be dissuaded at this stage; and we should concentrate on ensuring that their next message to Mr Brezhnev is made as harmless as possible.

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*Thomas Brimelow*

THOMAS BRIMELOW

11 August 1972



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Copy No. 1

SIR BURKE TREND

*Loked*  
*AA 11/8*

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY OPTIONS

I accompanied Sir Thomas Brimelow to Washington for talks with Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Sonnenfelt (the subject of a separate report by Sir Thomas Brimelow). At the end of the morning meeting I raised with Dr. Kissinger the possibility of the follow-up discussions about the further information we sought in the strategic nuclear field which he had discussed with you on 28th July last.

Political considerations

2. Dr. Kissinger repeated, with some emphasis, that the present US Administration wished to be as helpful as possible as regards the British objective of maintaining an effective strategic nuclear deterrent. He stressed, however, that the Presidential Election would be bound to create political difficulties (hinting, at the same time, that we should face an entirely different situation in the nuclear sphere if Mr. McGovern were elected President); and that there were questions which could not be answered now. He indicated, in particular, that nothing further could be added before the Election to what he had already said about the political problems posed by a British Poseidon option. He did not refer directly to SALT II, but he made clear that much would turn on the strength of a new Nixon Government and on the position in Congress. If Mr. Nixon were returned to the White House, and the British Government wished to pursue the possibility of buying Poseidon, the US Administration would wish to do what it could to help.

3. Dr. Kissinger went on to say that, for the purpose of following up his talk with yourself, he had arranged for certain cost estimates to be prepared. He seemed unwilling (or unable) to make clear to what precisely the estimates would relate; but he offered to arrange for me to see Mr. Schlesinger, Chairman of the AEC, later in the day.

Meeting with Mr. Schlesinger

4. I met Mr. Schlesinger during the afternoon in a conference room at the White House. He was accompanied by Colonel Duff of the AEC; General Haig and Mr. Rodman of the White House were also present. Dr. Kissinger himself opened the meeting by emphasising to me, in the strongest possible terms, that

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the strictest security must be applied, and that any follow-up by ourselves of the information to be provided by Mr. Schlesinger must only be through him or General Haig and should not be the subject of discussion with any other person (including any member of the White House staff) or agency in Washington; he then left the meeting.

5. Mr. Schlesinger outlined - at considerable speed and with no preliminary explanation - four possible options which we might care to consider for the modernisation or improvement of the British strategic nuclear deterrent. I noted what was said, but I also enquired whether the options could be set out in writing. This was agreed; and, later in the day, the note at Annex was handed to me.

6. The note sets out four options: one relating to Super Antelope; and the other three involving Poseidon or its successor (ULMS-1) in some form. In answer to questions, Mr. Schlesinger made the following additional points:-

a. Option 1 - relating to Super Antelope (involving support going significantly beyond the degree of support which the US are providing now) - would, in the US view involve a greater hardening of the warheads and thus a more effective deterrent. This option had not been examined with us before; it could, as the US saw it, offer a solution which, in the event, would turn out to be no more expensive than the current British solution (even though the dollar cost quoted is about double the size of the present dollar element of Super Antelope).

b. Option 2 had not, as I understood it, been the subject of any development work by the US, though it was judged to be a technically viable possibility.

c. Options 3 and 4 are, in effect, variants - one involving the C3 (Poseidon) missile, and the other the C4 (ULMS-1 or TRIDENT). Mr. Schlesinger left me with the clear impression that under both options the MIRV capability would not be made available to us; but, when I came to examine the note (at Annex), I found under Option 4 the phrase: "Acquisition of ULMS-1 with Poseidon bus". This will need to be clarified.

7. Mr. Schlesinger also made clear two further general points:-

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a. Warhead design and non-nuclear components

Under the three relevant options (all except Option 1) we should assume that the US would be ready to give us access to the design information of their warheads, and to sell us the non-nuclear components of the warheads and the re-entry body shells in the same way as had been done in respect of the Polaris A3 missile.

b. Costs

The cost estimates quoted (which could not be explored in detail at the meeting) were based on US analogues. When I mentioned the possibility that we might later wish to continue to keep the Super Antelope option open - but at minimum cost and with the minimum loss of momentum - while continuing to explore other options and awaiting a new US Administration, Mr. Schlesinger responded that, should we approach the appropriate authorities in that situation, the US side would wish to do what they could to be helpful.

Next steps

8. Dr. Kissinger has been most helpful in arranging for the ABC to put on the table, so soon after his meeting with you, a range of possible options for us to consider - in a situation in which the main Poseidon option cannot be taken further, for the time being, with the US authorities. I expressed appreciation in suitable terms. It is clear, however, that the new options will now require careful scrutiny, and they may have to be the subject of further discussion with the ABC experts, before we can reach any conclusion about their potential value to ourselves. This process can best be carried out by the Ministry of Defence as part of the current programme of reviewing the strategic nuclear options to be submitted to Ministers in the Autumn.

9. I have reported to the Defence Secretary, and am arranging to set this work in hand. In the light, for example, of the point of doubt mentioned in paragraph 6 c. above, I expect that we shall need to take early action, through the Kissinger channel, to clarify aspects of the information provided.

10. I suggest that the Prime Minister and his colleagues may wish to take note of the position, and of the further action indicated in paragraphs 8 and 9 above.

*P. D. Nairne*  
P. D. NAIRNE

11th August, 1972.

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