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By J NARA Date 1/6/99 FILES



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

NODIS REVIEW
Cat. A - Section removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
with administrative changes
Cat. C
Reviewed by: [Signature]
Date: 14 Jan 78

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NODIS REVIEW
Cat. A - Section removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
with administrative changes
Cat. B
November 23, 1972
[Signature]
16/30 78

To: The Deputy Secretary
J - Ambassador Johnson

From: PM [Signature] Ronald I. Spiers

Refs: NSDM 185; Kissinger Memorandum to Deputy Secretary
of Defense Rush, dated July 31 (S/S 7212730)

US/UK Nuclear Cooperation:
POLARIS Modernization Program (Super Antelope)

Early in the summer, the President approved the additional Project Definition assistance the British Government had requested the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission to provide, including British participation in underground effects tests and the testing at the Nevada Test Site of three or four British designed and fabricated nuclear devices. HMG and the JCAE staff were told informally that the USG had made an affirmative decision on the additional assistance.

With the firming up of some of the schedule planning and the completion of the required legal determinations and other documentation, AEC has now moved to inform HMG and the Joint Committee formally of the President's decision. AEC Commissioner Larson notified Dr. Herman Bondi, Chief Scientific Adviser of the British Ministry of Defence by letter on October 18 that the USG had agreed to test three British nuclear devices, and outlined certain conditions and procedures for the projected underground experiments. AEC Chairman Schlesinger, in accordance with NSDM 185, has now formally notified JCAE Chairman Pastore of the White House decision to provide further assistance to the British POLARIS modernization program. Schlesinger took care to stress that each UK test would be thoroughly examined by the Executive Branch to insure both that US safety standards will be met and that our commitments under the Limited Test Ban Treaty will be carried out.

DEF 1 UK-US
NR DEF 12 US

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Copies of both letters are attached. Both emphasize the precautions that will be taken to minimize the visibility of UK personnel present in the US for the projected Nevada tests.

Attachments:

- A. AEC letter to Prof. Bondi, dated Oct 18
- B. AEC letter to JCAE Chairman Pastore, dated Nov 3
- C. NSDM 185
- D. Kissinger Memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense Rush

*TLS memo - Mr. Burns
72-2730*

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Drafted: PM/AE:Col. ABWitko:bpw
11/13/72 x21835

Clearance: EUR/NE - Mr. Burns (draft)

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UNITED STATES
 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

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 No. 4 of 9 Copies, Series A

OCT 18 1972

CLASSIFIED BY:
 Ralph G. Shull
 Chief, Liaison Branch, DMA

DATE RECLASSIFIED October 18 1972
 BY Frank A. Cannon / T. H. Gilbert
 DOCUMENT NO. LXI 8198 - 111

Professor Herman Bondi
 Chief Scientific Adviser
 Ministry of Defence
 Main Building
 Whitehall, London, S.W.1.A.
 2HB England

Dear Professor Bondi:

It is a pleasure to reply to your letter of June 8, 1972, concerning possible underground tests of a new United Kingdom POLARIS warhead. The Commission has reviewed this request with other interested U.S. Government agencies.

I am happy to inform you that our government has approved in principle the testing of up to three U.K.-furnished nuclear devices for the U.K. Super Antelope missile improvement program at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This assumes that your government will make a decision early in Calendar Year 1973 to continue the program looking toward hardening the U.K. POLARIS warhead and system.

The Atomic Energy Commission will arrange for the testing of the U.K. devices. Our general understandings concerning this cooperation include the following, most of which were given in your letter of June 8. The U.K. will pay the U.S. the full costs for the tests and related services, as provided in the 1958 Agreement. The conduct of any test will be contingent on the U.S. satisfying itself on safety and test ban treaty aspects. To that end, the U.S. will make an independent assessment of the safety of the devices and the test conditions, just as it does for any proposed U.S. test. Regarding public relations, it is expected that the tests will be arranged and conducted without publicity, but the U.K. should be prepared to acknowledge that U.K. nuclear devices were tested underground at NTS, if circumstances make such an admission necessary and desirable.

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Professor Herman Bondi

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However, it is our desire to minimize the public visibility of this project. For your information, it is our practice to make a public announcement after a test if the yield was over 10 KT or if radio-activity is present outside the test site. As part of the preparations for the tests, a mutually agreed public information plan will have to be developed.

We wish to point out that we may, on a case-by-case basis, review any particularly sensitive aspect of this cooperation that might become publicized or which may have broader international implications. Furthermore, please recognize that our willingness to cooperate in this phase of the Super Antelope project does not imply any assurances regarding the successful outcome of the project nor subsequent U.S. cooperation in the Super Antelope missile improvement program.

We have designated the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) to be responsible for the tests. The LLL, in cooperation with the U.K. representatives, will arrange to make the measurements and attempt to gather the data that is desired. The U.K. tests will, as mentioned earlier, be subject to the same safety and containment review to which we subject our own.

Actual authorization to fire a test is given only a few days prior to the event, after a review of all factors including international political developments which might influence the timing. In addition, a test may be delayed waiting for suitable weather conditions.

I wish you success in your program and in the conduct of the tests. The necessary implementing arrangements for your tests can be developed through the Division of Military Application.

Sincerely,

signed
*C. E. Larson*C. E. Larson
Commissioner

my ↘
bcc: Mr. Ronald I. Spiers
Director of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
LXI-8198-4A

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UNITED STATES

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

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By J NARA Date 1/6/94

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NOV 3 1972

CLASSIFIED BY:
Ralph G. Shull
Chief, Liaison Branch, DMA

Honorable John O. Pastore
Chairman, Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy
Congress of the United States

AUTHORIZED BY: James R. Clark for FA Com Oct 27 1972
8222

Dear Senator Pastore:

This advises the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy further on the subject of Major General Edward B. Giller's letter of March 14, 1972, concerning the British interest in participating in two types of underground tests -- effects tests and design proof tests -- both of which are related to hardening the United Kingdom POLARIS warhead. As you may recall, this interest was expressed during the U.S./U.K. Stocktake meeting of February this year.

As a follow-up action, the U.K. has formally requested that we conduct possibly two or three tests of U.K. nuclear devices at the Nevada Test Site. The yields would be in the region of a few tens of kilotons. The President has given his approval in principle of the U.K. request for U.S. assistance in conducting underground nuclear tests of a U.K. warhead design for the U.K. Super Antelope missile improvement program.

As was the case with previous underground tests of U.K. devices conducted by the U.S., arrangements for providing this cooperation will include provisions for the U.K. to pay the U.S. the full costs of the tests and related services as provided in the 1958 Agreement. Also, the arrangements will include provisions for the U.S. to satisfy itself on the safety and test ban treaty aspects of each test, just as it does for any proposed U.S. test.

While the presence of the necessary U.K. personnel to participate in the tests has been approved, appropriate precautions will be taken to minimize the likelihood of public notice of their participation and our cooperation in this project. The tests will be arranged and conducted without publicity.

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Honorable John O. Pastore

- 2 -

The U.K. is being informed of the President's decision and that the U.S. may, on a case-by-case basis, review any particularly sensitive aspect of this cooperation that might become publicized or which may have broader international implications. Furthermore, the U.K. is being informed that our willingness to cooperate in this phase of the Super Antelope project does not imply any assurances regarding the successful outcome of the project, nor subsequent U.S. cooperation in the Super Antelope missile improvement program.

The Lawrence Livermore Laboratory has been named as the responsible laboratory for the tests.

We will continue to keep the Joint Committee informed of developments in this area.

Sincerely,

(Signed)

James R. Schlesinger

Chairman

bcc: Honorable Carl Walske
Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Atomic Energy)
Department of Defense
Cy-2A

→ Mr. Ronald I. Spiers
Director of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
Cy 3A

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By J NARA Date 1/6/99

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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NO DISSEMINATION

to: TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

August 15, 1972

(Action)

National Security Decision Memorandum 185

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Assistance to the UK Missile Program

The President has approved in principle U. S. assistance in conducting a series of up to three underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site of a U. K. warhead design for the U. K. Super Antelope missile improvement program. Arrangements for providing this cooperation will include provisions that:

- U. K. provides the nuclear devices and their safe transport.
- U. K. pays the U. S. the full costs of the tests and related services, as provided in the 1958 Agreement.
- U. S. makes an independent assessment of the safety of the nuclear devices and the test conditions, and will insure that the underground tests meet U. S. standards with respect to safety and the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
- U. S. provides the test facilities and conducts the tests.
- U. S. provides the U. K. the information and sample materials obtained from the tests.
- Tests be arranged and conducted without publicity.
- The U. K. will be prepared to acknowledge that U. K. nuclear devices were tested, if circumstances make such an admission necessary or desirable.

The presence of the necessary U. K. personnel to participate in the tests is approved; however, appropriate precautions will be taken to minimize the public visibility of their participation and our cooperation in this highly sensitive project.

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
By 15 NARA Date 1/6/99TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

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The U. K. should be informed through appropriate channels of our decision and the considerations above concerning our cooperation. Moreover, the U. K. should understand that we reserve the right to review, on a case by case basis, any particularly sensitive aspects of this cooperation that might become publicized or which may have broader international implications. Furthermore, our willingness to cooperate in this phase of the Super Antelope project does not imply any assurances regarding the successful outcome of the project nor subsequent U. S. cooperation in the Super Antelope missile improvement program.

The NSC Senior Review Group will continue to exercise its responsibilities for coordinating our assistance to the U. K. on the Super Antelope project as provided in NSDM 124. All agencies involved in our support of the Super Antelope project will provide periodic status reports to the President as appropriate and no less than annually. Decisions on particularly sensitive aspects of this cooperation that might become publicized or have serious international implications will be referred to the President by the SRG.

The Atomic Energy Commission, in coordination with the Departments of State and Defense, will inform the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of our proposed cooperation with the U. K. on this project.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

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