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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Henry A. Kissinger
 Lord Cromer
 Charles Powell
 Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

DATE: June 30, 1973

PLACE: San Clemente

1. Jobert Visit

Kissinger: Jobert said that he would do some drafting on the declaration. Then, if the US, the UK, France and the FRG agree that we are in the same ballpark we can have a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting. Except Jobert said they don't have a Deputy Foreign Minister and would send somebody called Puaux.

Cromer: That's not too good. But we have a problem of a different character with our Deputy Foreign Minister (Minister of State).

Kissinger: Jobert says very privately that Pompidou prefers a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting in the NATO framework but Jobert himself prefers an ad hoc framework. He said he would talk to Pompidou to see if he can turn him around. I myself did not express a preference but we actually prefer an ad hoc framework. The NATO machinery is a nightmare.

Now, I gave Jobert two documents -- two drafts for a declaration. One is from State and the other is ours.

Cromer: You should know that Rogers told Alec Home that there were four State versions.

Kissinger: Well, I don't know what he was referring to.

Cromer: Can we tell the French that you gave us these texts?

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Kissinger: No, don't tell Jobert that you have them. He is supposed to come back to us first with some reactions. He said he would do it very soon. Also, we have another problem. Stoessel has seen our draft but Rogers has not. So could you keep this in our channel.

Now, as you know I told Jobert that everything he was doing was consistent with talking this whole thing to death. But he said he really would act quickly. He told me while we were walking that he had a massive problem in the Assembly and also at the Quai. But he again mentioned that he would not filibuster.

Cromer: Well, it seems to be moving. I will get these back to Burke Trend when I get back to Washington.

2. Poseidon

Cromer: Is this a difficult one for you?

Kissinger: Schlessinger does not see why you want it. The only advantage is greater accuracy. The main disadvantage is lower yield. And of course accuracy is only useful for hard target kill. So the question is why with only five boats you want to get this?

Cromer: Well, this is a good question. But I think in the discussions at home when this was considered the conclusion was that if we do this thing we should go the whole way, and get the best.

Kissinger: But it is a major problem for us. And we would prefer not to face it in our present position. Of course if the Prime Minister really wants to take this up with the President we will try our best.

Cromer: Does it have to go to Congress?

Kissinger: I don't think technically it does, but under present political circumstances it would be unavoidable. If Heath were to appeal to the President the chances of our agreeing would be fifty/fifty. Of course the other program is a certainty. If you wanted to go to the MARK III we could give you warheads for MIRV retrofit.

Cromer: Well, as I understand it, we actually have the warheads but not the technology.

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Kissinger: Schlessinger really thinks you would be better off with the other one because you would lose so much in yield. If you would like to send some technicians we could discuss it with them and we would be very sympathetic. Then if you really wanted the MIRV we would see what we could do. But it would create Congressional and Soviet problems, although we made no agreements with the Soviets at all, as you know.

Cromer: Yes, we understand that. Is this your reply to Burke Trend's message to you?

Kissinger: Yes, it is.

Cromer: OK, that's fine. I will get this back to him.

3. Spey Engine

Kissinger: My suggestion would be that you stay cool on this. I am going to China in August and then after that we can overrule the bureaucracy. Can you wait that long? I'll talk to the Chinese.

Cromer: Well, I don't know. I hear rumblings from London that if the reply in COCOM is negative our people will go ahead anyway.

Kissinger: Well, could you wait two weeks?

Cromer: I'll see what London says.

4. Brezhnev Visit

Cromer: I wanted you to know very confidentially that we had a report from Paris that Gromyko told Jobert the US was not very serious on the Middle East. I just wanted you to have this.

Kissinger: Well, we are trying to get an ambiguous agreement which could then be subject to interpretation. The Soviets tried to get us to agree ahead of time on the whole package and we refused. This came up directly between the President and Brezhnev.

Cromer: Did you give them any hope that progress can be made?

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Kissinger: We are prepared to make a maximum effort to bring the parties together and get a general statement that would leave open a return to the '67 borders. But to debate abstractly, making all the issues an entrance price for negotiations, will never work.

Cromer: The UN Security Council debate will certainly be frustrating.

Kissinger: You know the last night that Brezhnev was here he asked for an early dinner and then went to bed at 8:00 and took a nap. Then he got up at 10:00 and asked to see the President. He beat on him for 3 1/2 hours to get us to accept the total package. He stamped and screamed and really made himself obnoxious. We continued to talk about the principles but they wanted a private understanding from us on the total package. As you know, our principles fall far short of what the Israelis want and we are not the lawyers of the Israelis. When Brezhnev continued his ranting I finally told Dobrynin that this should stop. Whatever Brezhnev managed to gain this way wouldn't hold anyway. Then Brezhnev tried to get the President to take just one element and accept it -- the 1967 borders. The President didn't even reject this; he just said Gromyko and I should continue to work on the principles. It really was a rough session.

5. Burke Trend's Trip

Kissinger: Is Burke going to be able to come?

Cromer: Well, I don't know, when would it be convenient?

Kissinger: Maybe July 10th.

Cromer: I'll check with him.

6. Cambodia

Cromer: Can we be of any help?

Kissinger: Well, there is some reason to believe that the Chinese and maybe even Hanoi are working on it. But with our Congress, who knows what will happen. Maybe one argument to use with the Chinese is the bad effect on Europe if the whole US position in Southeast Asia were to collapse.

Cromer: There is no question that Congressional actions are very inhibiting to you. Well, if there is something we could do please let us know.

Summary of a meeting between National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and British Ambassador Rowland Baring, third Earl of Cromer, at President Richard M. Nixon's California home at San Clemente. Discussion centered on the following: French foreign policy; POSEIDON submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); U.S.-Soviet relations. White House, 30 June 1973. U.S. Declassified Documents Online, link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349623388/USDD?u=wash74137&sid=USDD&xid=fcef0376&pg=1. Accessed 20 Apr. 2021.