


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EEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25 Yrs



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)>25 Yrs.

July 11, 1973

Dr. Schlesinger

UK MATTER - MEETING AT BRITISH EMBASSY, JULY 10, 1973

Those present:

- D. R. Cotter, DOD
- V. Macklin, MOD, UK
- C. [redacted] **SANITIZED** D. Janisch, British Embassy,
- E. Giller, AEC **per 3.3(b)(1)(b)** Washington

The visit of Mr. V. Macklin, UK, was prompted by questions on their part as a result of conversations between Dr. Kissinger and Sir Burke Trend. The US remarks on not providing a full POSEIDON (MIRV) capability to the UK ended up somewhat garbled by the time the information got to the MOD technical and operational people.

You recall that the UK question was primarily political - has anything in the international or domestic climate changed which would allow the US to consider making a fully MIRV'd POSEIDON available to the UK? Our answer was "no" and we cited the potential problems of a high probability of congressional, executive branch and public debate if we provide MIRV technology at this time. The option of doing this at some later time, if necessary and desirable, was left open and we cited the US position in SALT of not foreclosing SLBM MIRV or strategic technology transfer. The garble involved some technical details on accuracy requirements and RV/warhead details which led Macklin to believe that the option on MK III/W-68 assistance had changed. This was cleared up.

Regarding full MIRV POSEIDON capability, Macklin again stated that they have no strategic or military requirement for MIRV. He mentioned that their "political people" and "navy logistic people" wanted the full

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5  
**per 3.3(b)(1)(2)(4)(5)(6)(8)** HP 3/23/16  
By MIH NARA, Date 12/12/17  
NIN 05-A-46/1322 [20 PGS]

-----/E  
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

POSEIDON capability in order to reduce their costs (they estimate a new dispenser will ultimately cost them \$200+ million), assure reliability by buying a proven system and to accrue the logistic benefits resulting from the US Navy having the same system in the inventory.

The real purpose of Macklin's trip could have been one or all of the following:

1. Another low-key attempt to raise the acquisition of full MIRV capability POSEIDON for reasons mentioned above.
2. Genuine confusion over the MK III RV/warhead general characteristics.
3. Acquiring more information on the MK III/W-68 (prior to formalizing a request for disclosure).

In response to my question on when the UK is likely to decide on its course, he said their ministers will meet on the subject by the end of July.



D. R. Cotter