

The policy is O.K. in principle. The problem is to get it to work. The problem is to get 3 to 4 chaps on each side of the Atlantic to sit down and work out some statement of principles or objectives to be ready by October, to be signed by the Great Ones of the Earth.

An ad hoc forum would be better.

Kissinger: Yes, because each existing forum has its drawbacks. Then we could spin off each problem to each forum. It is easy to get 3 to 4 on our side.

Trend: On ours perhaps Dunnett. Do you know him?

Kissinger: I don't think so.

Trend: Nairne is his number two. Do you think these characters should be officials or politicians?

Kissinger: On our side, probably officials, but I don't preclude politicians on your side. I do not know what politician we could field.

Trend: If it were done this way, somebody has got to take the first step and propose it.

Kissinger: I had thought that in any event, the President would write a letter next week to the heads of government of the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Why shouldn't he make this proposal?

Trend: That would be one way.

Kissinger: He could say this is one way of doing it, but we are flexible. Then you would not be the ones who were organizing the European response.

Trend: But we will move it along.

Kissinger: Yes. Why don't we do that?

Let us get our agenda straight. On the nuclear thing, and your own nuclear thing [SLBMs].

Trend: Yes. What is the status of that document? It is pretty much settled, that document?

Kissinger: Pretty much.

Trend: Will it emerge from the Summit?

Kissinger: Well, we may still refuse to sign it. But if anything is signed it will be that text.

The Prime Minister said you want to sell military aircraft to China. We favor it.

Trend: We want to, but we have not heard anything more on that from them. The Prime Minister sent a letter. [Tab A]

They are now interested only in a Rolls Royce Spey engines. But there is a COCOM difficulty.

Kissinger: What do we have to do to get it approved?

Trend: Answer the letter. We are reviewing COCOM now.

Kissinger: I have not studied it. But I can tell you we will approach it with the attitude of making it possible. We will answer the letter within two weeks. Is that all right?

Trend: It would be very kind. It is in our interest and in yours to give Rolls an order.

When Schlesinger was here, he said we should talk about intelligence cooperation. Should I see him?

Kissinger: No, see Casey [leading candidate to be Schlesinger's successor at CIA]. He is a different type. An able administrator, but untested in the intelligence field. He is a friend of ours at the White House, so he will be subject to direction.

Trend: I must see him.

Kissinger: Why don't you come the first week of June?

Trend: There are several things that Schlesinger mentioned to me -- about the Gulf and economic intelligence as opposed to purely political intelligence.

[Greenhill, Dunnott, Sonnenfeldt, and Hyland joined the meeting at this point]

Trend: We were discussing the follow-up to the talk with the Prime Minister last night. There is the problem of forum for planning for the year of Europe.

Henry Kissinger's idea was to have 3 to 4 chaps on each side of the Atlantic to draft a statement of principles. How do we do it? Do we use a new forum or an old one?

Greenhill: An existing one looks better. A new one arouses terrible suspicions among Europeans. Every one looks under the bed.

Kissinger: Do you think the Europeans realize that we do not have time to be that devious? [laughter]

Greenhill: I actually think the better method is to have a meeting of NATO with a high-faluting communique, and another meeting of the Nine with a communique. I do not know what the Germans said to you, but the key is the French attitude. I think there is less strain on you if you can take it in two stages. If you have one meeting, who comes? All members of NATO? And all members of the Nine? If you use the existing forums, there is no problem.

Kissinger: I will meet with Jobert next week. It will be the first extensive meeting with them. We gave them our general considerations before the speech. They were receptive -- though it is not reflected in anything they have said since!

I had lunch with the French Ambassador before the speech. I told him our approach, though not about the speech. He went to Paris, told Pompidou, and told me afterwards that they were interested.

Greenhill: After your speech, the next day there was a meeting of the political directorate of the Nine, and Arnaud gave an initial negative reaction. We were later told not to take it too seriously.

The problem is how to get the Nine together in a way that the French will accept. The logic of it is one thing; the practice is another.

Kissinger: Brandt had a similar idea: A NATO meeting, then an informal meeting of some group in the EC context. Why is that inconsistent with Burke's idea? Can't we have 3 to 4 working on it whatever forum is chosen?

Greenhill: If you say there is an European-American steering committee, you may run into problems.

Kissinger: With whom?

Greenhill: With the French.

Kissinger: Why don't we wait with the letter until I have talked to the French?

I have no doubt we can come up with some souped-up NATO communique. The risk is that we only perpetuate the malaise we are trying to eliminate.

Greenhill: Why don't we see if, from your talks and our s, we can do it at a quicker pace, or ease into it?

Kissinger: I do not understand.

Dunnett: If one set up a special group, what would it consist of? How many countries?

Kissinger: It is as much a British as an American idea. I did not come here with such an idea. The Europeans would get together and nominate 3 to 4 people.

Greenhill: It is terribly difficult to reduce the number of people. It is all or nothing, I think.

My idea is to have a group preparing a souped-up NATO communique -- and not a routine NATO group. And also a group doing the same for the Nine. This gets into all sorts of questions: Is it ad hoc group, or part of the machinery of the Nine?

Kissinger: What do you think?

Greenhill: If the French accept the idea of an ad hoc group of the Nine to meet with the President... We could ease into an informal group and then try to merge it with the NATO group.

As far as we would be concerned, they would be the same individuals.

Trend: Yes, if somehow the Americans can say to Bonn that this has to be organized.

Greenhill: It should be as formal as the traffic will bear.

Kissinger: We can conduct our policy without this being the Year of Europe. It is not imposed on us by necessity. There are three ways of seeing it: as an American design imposed on Europe which they must at all costs thwart. The second, a variant of the first, is that every decade there must be some American palaver about Europe, that must be endured. Frankly, this is the consequence of your approach. The third way is to take it seriously and recognize that we are facing a profound crisis.

This will give us nothing but trouble domestically. Unless we can anchor the Atlantic Alliance and give it a new emotional basis, erosion is inevitable. Europe will drift.

We have practically no domestic support for it. We want to create it. We won't get criticized for not doing it. But if the problem is serious, it must be faced. I can write a communique that will impress the New York Times. But it won't affect the situation of the Soviet weapons programs, the strategic situation we face, and the general malaise. We are not in the Kennedy phase of palaver. Frankly, if we face obstacles that are too difficult we will shift it to a more conventional approach.

Greenhill: Our analysis of the situation is the same as yours.

Kissinger: That is why I speak frankly.

Greenhill: The Europeans don't see things so clearly. So if you go at too sharp a pace you will scare the birds away. When you finish the next series of talks, say mid-June, we can say more about the pace.

We share your view of the economic and defense discussions.

Kissinger: I am frankly not so worried about the economic side. It will sort itself out, unless we have totally lost our minds.

Dunnett: I am surprised about that remark. I thought you thought that trade, defense, etc., were all a part of it.

Kissinger: I do.

Dunnett: I think if we deal with defense separately we won't solve it.

Kissinger: I agree.

Greenhill: We have to reconcile what we all want with what we know the traffic will bear.

Kissinger: But how can we determine what the Europeans are willing to bear until we have a proposition?

Greenhill: I have felt for some time that European defense arrangements are unsatisfactory. One of the causes is the attitude of the French. If they show any readiness, we can get down to this and have substance in the NATO communique.

Kissinger: If we approach this as a means of getting France back into NATO, we will repeat the 1962 debate.

Greenhill: We have got to talk to the French and see if they will make a contribution to the realistic defense of Europe. It is not the same as getting them back into NATO.

Kissinger: Shouldn't we have a concrete idea of the defense of Europe first?

Trend: Before NATO will say anything concrete in the communique, there has to be a paper before them that stimulates it.

Kissinger: A bigger framework permits more generous economic solutions and a wider perspective on defense. If we do it in NATO framework, the liturgy will be the traditional one. There are vested interests, if it is done in MBFR context, in trying to keep U.S. troops there and therefore overstating the danger. If it is done in the NATO defense context there is vested interest in not spending any more on defense, therefore understating the risks.

We have four years in this administration, and we have to give our people some reason to believe, to understand why we are in Europe.

There probably will be a brawl somewhere at some stage.

Greenhill: I understand about liturgies, but it has to get into the NATO machinery somehow.

Kissinger: But we can have a group report to NATO, which is different from having NATO draft it itself.

Dunnett: I am in a slight quandary. I have a lot of sympathy with what Dr. Kissinger said. In the NATO machinery, everybody will just start by saying there is no more money.

Trend: The need now is to see the French attitude. We will know more when you see Jobert.

Kissinger: I will see Pompidou too, probably.

Dunnett: The German attitude is important too.

Kissinger: Precision of thought is not Brandt's forte. He thought of a heads of government meeting in the NATO context, followed by some informal meeting of the Nine. He accepted the idea that there should be some formal study, but did not address it.

If we all talk separately, we will get nowhere. I think Brandt would go along with what Trend said, with what Greenhill said, and with a souped-up communique. If you and we agree, I think he will go along.

Greenhill: We have a really open mind on machinery. Because people are what they are, it is sometimes better to use established machinery than to create new machinery. If you create a new group, outside of NATO, a whole group of people are on the defensive.

Trend: Yes, but Henry's concern is that there be 3 to 4 people just to see that the established machinery will run.

Greenhill: Yes.

Kissinger: The trouble with the NATO machinery is that people always go along two rounds and then need new instructions. And it is also hard to cover the issues comprehensively. The Nine will also be ad hoc.

Trend: Sound out the French.

Kissinger: When we send out letter, we won't make a formal proposal. Before the President meets Pompidou.

Greenhill: Much depends on what Jobert says.

Trend: If it is done in the NATO machinery, how much are the French involved?

Greenhill: Not at all, really. They can exercise their option to participate or not.

Trend: This is one drawback of the NATO machinery.

Dunnett: It seems to me if one is going to make progress one has to be dealing across the board. From the defense point of view, it is clear that every European country has money trouble in defense and progress will require a wider framework.

Kissinger: We have to say we are not seeking just more burdensharing -- but we are trying to get a concept of defense so we can protect ourselves against the pressures we will be facing over the next few years.

Trend: Who can Henry talk to?

Greenhill: On the defense side, supposing the French say they are ready to talk about defense? We will never be able to escape the membership problem.

Sonnenfeldt: It is the old NPG problem, the problem of who draws the lots.

Greenhill: Yes.

Kissinger: We could have a group of wise men. It has been done before. Like the Harmel Group?

Sonnenfeldt: They had everybody in it!

Hockaday: But they had subgroups chaired by individual rapporteurs.

Trend: We could use that Harmel procedure.

Kissinger: Here, we can deal with this group. In France, there is no focal point.

Trend: Jobert will be it.

Kissinger: Yes.

Trend: And in Germany?

Kissinger: Bahr has nominated himself. But we have not heard from Scheel.

Trend: Those chaps should get together informally.

Should we talk about submarines now?

[Clive Rose and Patrick Nairne are brought into the meeting]

SLBMs

Trend: We are probably left now with the choice between Superantelope -- the Polaris missile with a hardened warhead -- or the thing you have very generously offered us -- Poseidon with Mark III warheads.

The Ministers have considered this, bearing in mind that you want us to maintain an independent deterrent.

Kissinger: Right.

Trend: And we want to maintain the technology.

Kissinger: Yes.

Trend: We have the usual problem of deciding our defense expenditures now, and the problem of also trying to engage the French somehow.

Weighing these four criteria, there are still problems: the question of the Russians possibly introducing a system of terminal defense, and the question, whichever system we get, of whether the in-service life of your systems will assure us that we can rely on you for assistance for as long as we need.

We have spelled this out in a paper here. [Tab B]

We would like to get on with it. These are not questions of fact, but of probability.

Nairne: It is based on our own analysis of ourselves.

Kissinger: You should have an authoritative answer. But I can give you an initial impression. Can we get Odeen in?

[Odeen is brought in]

The Soviets are now testing a new transferrable ABM radar and there is concern about their trying a new terminal defense.

Odeen: So far it is just a version of the Soviet Galosh missile. There is no hardsite yet.

Kissinger: But we are inferring from the transferrable radar that it could get hooked up to a Sprint-type missile. Your concern is that Superantelope has too few warheads and that Mark III provides better insurance against that.

As to your second point, about the Polaris, their lives -- Our intention is to phase out Polaris A-3 by sometime in the early 80's. Whether it is possible to continue a contractual arrangement after we have phased it out, I have not looked into it. We do intend to keep Poseidon in service.

Odeen: Indefinitely.

Kissinger: There is no possibility of our replacing all our Poseidons with Tridents. There will always be some Poseidon boats.

Nairne: Our time assessments seem right.

Kissinger: Yes. We will get you an answer.

Our people's estimate was that, aside from the cost, the most effective for you was to go to the Poseidon.

Trend: Could you deal with the argument that this won't be effectively de-MIRVed?

Kissinger: But we won't give you the MIRV bus.

Trend: Your latest SALT principles had some language about MIRVs.

Kissinger: But that is between us and them, and not in the context of non-transfer.

Hockaday: Nonetheless, there might be some carping from them about the spirit of this.

Kissinger: It is more of a reason than for us to reach some understanding between us before the principles emerge.

Trend: Yes.

Kissinger: The governing principle of their clause was non-transfer. And we rejected that.

Trend: We want to be absolutely sure if we go down the Poseidon path that there won't be a last-minute hitch on MIRV or non-transfer.

Kissinger: On MIRV, Schlesinger thinks this can be handled convincingly. As for the impact of these principles, these are for guiding the U.S. -Soviet negotiators, not principles that guide action.

The worst that could happen would be that the Soviets might ask for compensation for your forces.

Trend: Yes, but that would be tiresome.

Kissinger: It would not stop the program, but might affect aggregate numbers.

"Qualitative improvement" is a codeword for MIRVs. We used language about MIRV to avoid a focus on our programs like the Trident and B-1. And these are not principles for action.

If we have an understanding with you to go ahead, it would be the height of bad faith for us to reach a bilateral agreement with them to prevent what we agreed with you to do. We will protect our bilateral relationship with you in any SALT agreement.

Odeen: The kind of constraint we might want to put on the Soviet dispensing system on SS-9s might cause us a problem.

Kissinger: I had not thought of that. But it won't be affected by this principle. One possible deal is that we promise not to put missiles on our aircraft,

if they limit SS-9 MIRVs. There would be a collateral constraint that they cannot test in any new mode they have not tested in before.

Odeen: That would apply on both sides.

Kissinger: Not necessarily -- not if it is planes for missiles. Another possibility is that the only constraints for us would be on land-based MIRVs.

Any constraint on all MIRVs would affect this program because any constraint on MIRVs would cover sea-based systems, because it would have to include a test ban. But we would never accept a constraint on sea-based systems. It would be a major change in our position.

Nairne: The no-transfer provision is separate.

Kissinger: Yes. But if we had a non-circumvention no-transfer clause, if the ban doesn't cover SLBMs, this won't block you.

Nairne: It would have no bite.

Kissinger: The State Department is passionately backing a total MIRV ban. But based on my conversations in Zavidovo, there is no possibility of it surviving two weeks. Based on my conversation in the U.S. Government, there is no possibility of its ever surfacing as a proposal. We won't offer it even to put it on the record. State wanted to make a spectacular record.

The problem is making it would have the domestic consequences of putting MIRVs in a special category and would generate pressures against it in Congress. It is certain that the Soviets will reject it. But they could make a counter proposal that might stimulate domestic pressures.

So you are safe.

Nairne: What would be the time scale for Presidential determination?

Rose: Does convincing the Russians depend on your refraining from sea-based systems, or on making the distinction between MRVs and MIRVs?

Kissinger: The former. I am convinced that they won't accept any MIRV ban. The more comprehensive the proposal, the more certain they will reject it.

The reason we put it in terms of MRVs was because they in their presentations don't make any distinction between MRV and MIRV. And we also wanted to get a handle on their Mod-4 dispenser on the SS-9.

There are two distinctions: MRV-MIRV, and SLBMs and ICBMs. The former is irrelevant to your project. Candidly, if the SLBMs were included, it would have to include a test ban. But we are not likely to make such a proposal.

Sonnenfeldt: We could always block it even if there were a bureaucratic consensus -- but there won't be.

Kissinger: The whole purpose of this is to keep you in the nuclear business. Therefore there is no reason for us to undertake an international agreement inconsistent with this.

Trend: We have to consider the cost of Poseidon.

Kissinger: We estimate \$700 million.

Trend: Yes. Over the whole life span the cost doesn't differ significantly. But in the first few years it would be a much heavier cost.

If we took the Poseidon Mark III, presumably we would call off our own Superantelope program. Then there is the problem of how we maintain the necessary research and development. We would have to maintain a program.

Then there is our last question, that the Prime Minister mentioned to you last night, cooperation with the French. We would be talking presumably about a successor system to the Superantelope. If it becomes feasible to open discussions with them, it would be sensible to talk about the successor. What that would be, there would be all to play for.

Kissinger: If you talk to the French, you should first find out what they are interested in. It would cause a massive domestic problem in the United States, and it would require very thoughtful management.

Nairne: To put it crudely, it would depend on having similar boats, and the time schedule of ours and theirs would not come into phase until 1994.

Greenhill: They won't abandon their present program.

Kissinger: We frankly don't know what they want.

Trend: So we will certainly come up against the question of how much of the cooperation we got from you can be shared with them.

Kissinger: We have not faced it. But first, we are in favor of independent deterrents. Second, if so, there is no sense in having them unless they are effective. So it won't affect our relationship. Third, we will do what we can in principle. We will handle the domestic reaction -- except for the limits of legislation. We will do all we can.

Trend: I got the impression that you told the Prime Minister we will have your good will.

Trend: We don't have to face the decision now. It is not a problem until the 1990s.

Kissinger: A great deal will depend on the state of our relationship then. If the French are absolutely obnoxious, and are not only anti-European but anti-American, it would be different. But assuming a continuation of the present political constellation, you would count on our good-will. And we have the impression their next two boats will be Poseidon-type boats.

Trend: Obviously, that issue is relevant to our choice now.

Kissinger: In so far as this Administration can set a course for the future, we favor independent deterrents.

Trend: This is a perennial problem.

Kissinger: These programs tend to develop their own momentum.

Trend: This has to be tri-partite, basically.

Kissinger: Yes.

Nairne: But a 15-year lead time means if you are talking about 1994, you have to start about 1980.

Kissinger: You can count on this Administration. I hate to keep coming back to our opening subject, but this underlies the importance of maintaining an American emotional investment.

Trend: Yes.

Kissinger: There is no penalty for Europeans to compete with the United States economically. There is no penalty for Europeans relying on the United States. Therefore, we look at the nuclear field as a way of realistic cooperation. It gives Europe a hedge in desperate situations. Those are the two arguments. On the other hand, we will have the most massive opposition from the arms controllers and the systems analysts, who believe in central control and don't believe in independent deterrents.

One could make a good case that the most difficult countries to deal with are those who are totally impotent. They can't resist you but they can't help you. And they know they can rely on your protection anyway.

Nairne: It would be helpful to know now the time scale between the request by the British Government and Congressional approval.

Kissinger: It doesn't require any Congressional approval.

Nairne: The design information about warhead technology?

Kissinger: I will check. I am not sure. But I think the MacMahon Act requires only a finding that you have reached a certain stage of technology, and we therefore can help you up to that stage. That applies to the nuclear part, and not the delivery systems.

Nairne: Our research shows Committee approval is needed.

Kissinger: I don't think it is a formal requirement. I think it is generally helpful to have them not be in total rebellion. We will check and let you know. It won't take too long. And my impression is that if it concerns only Britain, it would be manageable. If it also includes France, it would be a brawl.

Trend: If you are right, and it is fairly rapid, how relevant is that date of July 1st?

Kissinger: If it is only Congressional consultation, that in any event is not a formal requirement. It would seem desirable to settle the commitment

before the Brezhnev visit. Consultations could be later. His visit will be June 11th.

Once we have an agreement, there will clearly have to be technical discussions.

Trend: Is it [July 1] a cutoff date?

Kissinger: The only advantage was that it might avoid a Soviet brawl.

Odeen: There might be some production problem on the Poseidon. But I don't think that we are so far along that the line would not still be open.

Trend: It would help tremendously if we could substitute July 31st.

Kissinger: The determination would apply to the Mark III warhead. The Poseidon could be a Presidential decision.

How public does this have to be?

Trend: It is a problem for both.

Kissinger: There is too little so far to worry about leaks.

The Soviets have asked us, and we told them it did not concern them.

As soon as the new Secretary of Defense is confirmed, we can very easily handle the discussions.

Nairne: Should we amend the Polaris Sales Agreement?

Kissinger: I think we should keep new formal agreements to a minimum.

Trend: Yes. To sum up: Our paper included two questions, which you will answer. The third question you have already answered.

Kissinger: No SALT agreement will block you.

Trend: We have told you our worries about money and the French.

You have also promised to let us know the drill on the Presidential determination; whether there is a time limitation in production terms; and

whether any new contractual obligation is called for. And you will let us know within two weeks.

Kissinger: Yes.

Trend: Good. Any other questions?

Greenhill: Before Brezhnev comes you want to have an understanding?

Kissinger: It would be helpful. It is not essential.

Greenhill: But highly desirable.

Kissinger: It is not in your interest if they launch a campaign against your program. Even if there is no decision from you on that yet, it would still be helpful if the Prime Minister could write a letter to the President giving the direction. This would meet our necessities.

Trend: Our people want to talk about MBFR and SALT.

SALT Principles

Kissinger: Can we talk about SALT first?

We have given you the various principles that have passed back and forth [Tab C]. We took your suggestions on FBS and non-transfer in our earlier draft. They have come back to us with another proposal. They took more or less all of our language except on FBS, and put in a softened non-transfer clause.

Rose: In disguise.

Kissinger: Those are the only problems you have, IV and X?

Rose: Also VIII.

Kissinger: We would rather drop VIII too.

Rose: We thought it might affect us, or FBS. We did not know how you interpreted it.

Kissinger: On IV, we thought we could live with something like IV if we interpreted it to include their non-central systems.

Rose: "Equal security" is in Article II.

Kissinger: That we won't accept in any case. We got on into a theological debate with them on whether we should use the language in the Moscow Communiqué or the language in the Principles.

Aside from that, is the concept of their IV acceptable to you if we interpret it to include their non-central systems?

Rose: If "account should be taken of" is taken not to mean "included in the agreement."

Kissinger: I have the impression that if we could accept something like their IV, they would certainly be prepared to drop their X.

Rose: IV has two problems: it doesn't clearly define the subject and leaves the whole thing wide open to discussion.

Kissinger: I am assuming this is like UNSC Resolution 242!

Rose: And it commits you for the first time to discuss FBS, which you have never done before.

Kissinger: They laid such stress on IV, that we could almost certainly trade it for X.

Trend: What compromise could you envision for IV?

Kissinger: Until breakfast this morning [with Alex Johnson] I had no interest in IV. We would be using the phrase from the U.S. -Soviet Principles in place of "equal security."

Rose: It is important that you should never agree to anything which is interpreted as an FBS limitation.

Kissinger: We told NATO we would never go beyond non-circumvention. Alex Johnson on Tuesday will tell the Soviets we won't go beyond non-circumvention unless they agree to discuss non-central systems.

Rose: "Types of such arms" in their IV is not a happy phrase.

Kissinger: We would not use their text. We would redraft it to avoid Soviet trips. But I think for bureaucratic reasons if they could show we had accepted some of their language, they could make concessions on others. They took it ill that they accepted our language on seven clauses and we still were not satisfied.

Trend: What if you said: "in accordance with the principles of Article II, " once Article II is fixed to eliminate "equal security"?

Kissinger: That is good. We have no intention to include FBS in the equal aggregates. The most we might do, as I told you, is that way down the road we might include the 80 F-111s in the United Kingdom in the aggregates. That in turn would depend on where we stand on freedom to mix and bomber limitations. This in our internal discussion is the only European-based system we have ever discussed.

Rose: We can live with their IV as you formulate it: You will discuss FBS only in the context of non-circumvention, unless it includes the Soviet non-central systems, and if they drop Article X.

Kissinger: Our preference is to handle FBS through non-circumvention. If we must, we will do it only in the context of Soviet non-central systems. The only way it might cover would be that, once the aggregates are determined, we might consider including 80 F-111s in it.

Our aggregate proposed is 2,350. We now have 2250 deployed. So it would change nothing.

Trend: You would still want to change the formulation.

Rose: It would work.

Kissinger: That is our position. As for the rest of SALT position, we will present it this afternoon in the NAC:

- We are proposing equal aggregates of 2,350, which is below their figure now but which they can easily go to be scrapping SS-7 and 8s. Which they are doing anyway.

- Non-circumvention on FBS. If we go beyond that, it will include their non-central systems. Johnson will propose it next Tuesday.
- A land-based MIRV freeze. We could stop further deployment of Minuteman. This has no chance of being accepted, based on my discussion there.
- Then collateral things: No Skybolt-type missiles of range more than 1,500 miles. No intercontinental-range cruise missiles.

Those are the main things.

Rose: How do you interpret the last phrase in VIII?

Kissinger: We will consider FBS covered by IV. "Mutual restraint" is a Soviet scheme. This was our attempt to take care of it in two ways: Restraint in deployment of weapons permitted by the agreement, which is a handle on too-rapid deployment of SS-17 and 18. And restraint on new systems. We can use it, but so can they, against B-1. We are included to want to drop this. They will do what they want anyway; we will only open ourselves to Congressional pressure. FBS we can say is covered by IV. This clause can only be trouble.

Rose: What would be the content of any "supplementary agreement"?

Kissinger: My present feeling is there won't be any. We had thought there might be a basis for a provisional separate MIRV agreement. Now, we don't think so. If there is no MIRV agreement, we really don't see the importance of any supplementary SALT agreement. We could make some nonsense agreement, like not putting missiles in riverbeds -- which might not even be desirable.

Sonnenfeldt: Banning it might not be desirable.

Kissinger: In a MIRVed world, why require visibility? Because this only adds to vulnerability. The hidden mode would add to deterrence.

Trend: "Qualitative improvement is to be limited."

Kissinger: They say SS-17 is "modernization" but the Trident is a "qualitative improvement"! It used to be a codeword for MIRV. If MIRV is out, the distinction is elusive.

If we don't get MIRV under control this year, there is no security basis for a SALT agreement. This will happen once they get a few tests. Because the Chiefs will never accept a MIRV ban then.

We don't know what kind of delivery system they will use. We use a bus. There is no reason why they necessarily will.

MBFR

Trend: Now you can blow your top on MBFR.

Kissinger: We object to the British attitude. We see it as being suspicious always of American naivete, secret deals, etc. and marked by attempts to enmesh us in procedures.

Our impression is, the only way we can prevent Congress from pressing us out of Europe is to get the discussion onto a level of such complexity that they can not compete with us, and second, to get the discussion in the context of NATO's security needs. It is not an excuse to get out elegantly. Why should we start such a discussion of security if our motive is to get out?

Take the Hungary question. Our approach is to have a common ceiling. If Hungary is included, we have to get a Soviet cut of five or six to one. That is impossible. If we don't have a common ceiling, it has to be percentage cuts: This would mean 8,000 Soviet troops. How can that affect European security? Some say they would pull them out of Central Europe and put them into Hungary. But why? Brest is closer, and the problem can easily be covered by a non-circumvention clause in any case.

We want to use MBFR to strengthen the alliance. But we get these constant criticisms, which we can only find wounding. It is one thing if the Belgians say they know there is a secret deal; they have two people in their Foreign Office working on this. But we have given you our papers, and explained our strategy, and it is reported to me you are satisfied. Then we read in the newspapers this grudging reaction.

I have spoken frankly. We want to use it for NATO's security. The last thing we want is to pull troops out, which would make it impossible to maintain a NATO defense.

Nairne: Everything you say calls for very high quality discussions.

Kissinger: We thought the paper we submitted to NATO was a good basis.

Trend: I would be remiss in my social obligation if we did not break for lunch now. You are seeing Sir Alec at 3:00?

Kissinger: Yes.

Trend: Do you want to resume at 4:00?

Kissinger: Why don't we? I can leave at 7:30 instead of 6:00.

C01491808

SANITIZED COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

10 May 1973

E.R.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs

BRITISH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Russian ABM Defence

1. The British Government wish to be clear that there is no difference

SANITIZED
per 3.3(b)(1)(v)

[redacted]
of the relative effectiveness of British Mark II and United States Mark III warheads against such a defence.

2. The British Government have so far been informed that there is no evidence that the Russians are developing terminal (endo-atmospheric) defences around Moscow. Dr Schlesinger is, however, understood to have said that he feared the configuration of the STAG or SUPER ANTELOPE warhead would lack credibility in three to four years and that he was impressed by the superiority of the United States Mark III warhead, [redacted]

SANITIZED
per 3.3(b)(2)(X)(S)

[redacted] His remarks have been taken to imply that, in his opinion, Russian terminal ABM defences with a missile of the capability of the United States SPRINT [redacted]

3. [redacted]

4. It is understood that the United States has taken 12 years to progress from the first test firing of the missile to the current stage where the SPRINT system is only nearing completion around one of the United States MINUTEMAN silo locations. It is believed that, if the Russians were to develop a similar system, they would be unlikely to be able to do so in a significantly shorter time. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
per 3.3(b)(1)(2)(4)(5)(6) HP. 3/23/16

E.R.

~~TOP SECRET~~


10 May 1973

BRITISH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Russian ABM Defence

SANITIZED

per 3.3(b)(1) & 3.3(b)(4)



4. It is understood that the United States has taken 12 years to progress from the first test firing of the missile to the current stage where the SPRINT system is only nearing completion around one of the United States MINUTEMAN silo locations. It is believed that, if the Russians were to develop a similar system, they would be unlikely to be able to do so in a significantly shorter time. [redacted]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLR 87-04/15 Rev. 01 1.1(b)(1) 1.1(b)(6) per do. 4/1/04
By JMR NARA Date 5/4/11
[initials]

E.R.

SANITIZED
per 3.3(b)(1)(b)

It is believed, therefore, that the earliest that such a system could appear would be around 1980, though this would require the Russians to have taken a decision some time ago to deploy and develop it; and that a more realistic date might be several years later.

5. Even within the constraints of the ABM Treaty future Russian development of the present ABM area defences centred on Moscow is a matter of speculation. On the one hand the Russians could rest entirely on improvements to the present system to extend its coverage to nearly all the cities of Western Russia including Leningrad and Kiev. On the other hand, they could partially replace the present system by a terminal defence, which would only protect a very limited area around central Moscow. There is no basis for reaching a judgment on what the Russians will actually do.

6. [Redacted]

7. [Redacted]

SANITIZED
per 3.3(b)(2)(4)(5)
(b)

the reason being that for not very much greater cost than for STAG POSEIDON/Mark III provides an automatic insurance against possible future Russian terminal defences, whereas to provide such a capability in STAG would require a costly and time consuming extra development programme.

E.R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted] It is believed, therefore, that the earliest that such a system could appear would be around 1980, though this would require the Russians to have taken a decision some time ago to deploy and develop it; and that a more realistic date might be several years later.

5. Even within the constraints of the ABM Treaty future Russian development of the present ABM area defences centred on Moscow is a matter of speculation. On the one hand the Russians could rest entirely on improvements to the present system to extend its coverage to nearly all the cities of Western Russia including Leningrad and Kiev. On the other hand, they could partially replace the present system by a terminal defence, which would only protect a very limited area around central Moscow. There is no basis for reaching a judgment on what the Russians will actually do.

[Redacted]

SANITIZED
Re Sec. 3.3(b)(1)(b)
3.3(b)(4)

7. Neither the configuration of the United Kingdom warheads nor the higher speed during re-entry of the United States Mark III warhead are believed to be relevant. [Redacted] experts agree that the only way to be sure of penetrating defences is by exhaustion; that is, by providing more incoming warheads than the number of available defensive missiles. [Redacted]

[Redacted] that two SPRINT type missiles could counter any incoming warhead whether it was SUPER ANTELOPE, STAG or United States Mark III. The superiority of the Mark III against SPRINT type terminal defences derives from the fact that within the atmosphere the incoming missile has ten warheads rather than two in the case of SUPER ANTELOPE and STAG. This is the background to the British understanding that the American side consider the United States Mark III warhead on a de-MIRVed POSEIDON missile to be a much more cost effective solution for the United Kingdom than STAG (i.e. a SUPER ANTELOPE warhead on a de-MIRVed POSEIDON missile); the reason being that for not very much greater cost than for STAG POSEIDON/Mark III provides an automatic insurance against possible future Russian terminal defences, whereas to provide such a capability in STAG would require a costly and time consuming extra development programme.

SANITIZED COPY

E.R.

Maintenance Support for POLARIS and POSEIDON Missiles

8. An important factor in assessing the relative costs of SUPER ANTELOPE and POSEIDON/Mark III has been the question of logistic support for American missiles. In the case of SUPER ANTELOPE we have assumed that the POLARIS A3T missile will be phased out of United States Navy service by about 1983, but that thereafter we shall be able to obtain, with United States help, continuing logistic support for the missile at a cost which would naturally be increased by the fact that the necessary facilities would be kept going uniquely for our purposes. In the case of POSEIDON/Mark III, we have assumed that we can rely on keeping POSEIDON C3 in service up till about 1994 without having to incur any special costs on account of uniqueness. It would be very helpful for us to know whether these assumptions are broadly consistent with current American plans for the in-service life in the United States Navy of POLARIS A3T and POSEIDON C3 respectively.

SANITIZED
per 3.3(b)(1)(v)

9. [redacted] British officials raised the question of the contractual arrangements under which the British Government might purchase POSEIDON C3 missiles. [redacted] indicated that it would be wholly consistent with the manner in which the President had asked for the discussions with the White House to be handled that he should prefer to avoid a new Sales Agreement, and thus to use the existing PSA (which the British Government would also prefer). It would be helpful if this could be confirmed.

SANITIZED COPY

E.R.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Maintenance Support for POLARIS and POSEIDON Missiles

8. An important factor in assessing the relative costs of SUPER ANTELOPE and POSEIDON/Mark III has been the question of logistic support for American missiles. In the case of SUPER ANTELOPE we have assumed that the POLARIS A3T missile will be phased out of United States Navy service by about 1983, but that thereafter we shall be able to obtain, with United States help, continuing logistic support for the missile at a cost which would naturally be increased by the fact that the necessary facilities would be kept going uniquely for our purposes. In the case of POSEIDON/Mark III, we have assumed that we can rely on keeping POSEIDON C3 in service up till about 1994 without having to incur any special costs on account of uniqueness. It would be very helpful for us to know whether these assumptions are broadly consistent with current American plans for the in-service life in the United States Navy of POLARIS A3T and POSEIDON C3 respectively.

SANITIZED
per Sec. 3.3(b)(1)(v)
3.3(b)(2)

9. [redacted] British officials raised the question of the contractual arrangements under which the British Government might purchase POSEIDON C3 missiles. [redacted] indicated that it would be wholly consistent with the manner in which the President had asked for the discussions with the White House to be handled that he should prefer to avoid a new Sales Agreement, and thus to use the existing PSA (which the British Government would also prefer). It would be helpful if this could be confirmed.