

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

DICTABELT FROM MR. SMITH
Rec'd 3/5/63

3 copies only
#1 - GCS file
#2 - S/P - Mr. Owen
#3 - S/MF - Mr. Furnas

S/MF - Mr. Howard Furnas

Howard:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3

NW 29571
By JDS, NARA, Date 1-17-20

I wish you'd tell Fred Wyle how useful I am finding the memoranda on "Control" which he wrote. They are very helpful in disciplining my thinking about this Control question. And I hope he is continuing to think about it and to write about it.

Howard, I think it'd be useful, perhaps for background press purposes or other purposes, to see if we can get a rather comprehensive paper on what the advantages would be to Europeans of an MLF. I have in mind an argument such as the following:

1. It would be an additional nuclear force in Allied Command Europe at a time when Europeans fear United States strategy changes are tending to de-emphasize nuclear weapons.
2. The MLF would tend to eliminate the chance of a U.S. nuclear withdrawal from Europe. It would increase the moral responsibility on the United States to retaliate with nuclear weapons if a fellow-MLF member is attacked. (Obviously this one has to be played with care, since it could be taken as meaning that the present guarantees are infirm.)
4. It would be a much more effective force than the UK force in 1969 and therefore it would be a significant force.
5. It would tend to keep down pressure for additional national forces in Europe -- a contingency which most sensible men abhor.

6. It could

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

- 2 -

6. It could be a forerunner of even more important nuclear ventures, both trans-Atlantic and European. It would be an economical means for Europeans to learn the techniques of operating a strategic missile system.
7. A share in this force would be an important national asset for each participant. It would give new worldwide power and prestige to the European participants.
8. Other than firing, decisions could be made by less than unanimity. For example, production, deployment, targetting, and even an unanimity role could be reopened as we gain experience. Under These conditions it would seem that the force members will have achieved a fair degree of parity.

Unanimity role, far from being a United States advantage, is insurance of the United States' involvement in European affairs. If the United States were to renounce its veto, all sorts of motions would start tending to push Americans out of Europe, which presumably sensible Europeans would not like to see.

I wish you would talk to Henry Owen about trying to get some new life into the thought that a repeal of the 1958 legislation as a part of any package we send to Congress. How do you think a deal would sound if it had three parts: (1) The MLF Treaty; (2) The Repealer of the 1958 Legislation; and (3) Assurances by the MLF participants in Europe that while they continue to participate, they would not engage in nuclear weapons manufacturing. Perhaps to float this it would be necessary to have a side deal with the Germans assuring them that as long as they did not manufacture nuclear weapons, we would continue to deploy a strike aircraft weapons and other tactical weapons in the Federal Republic -- but not a day longer.

Henry, I hope

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

- 3 -

Henry, I hope that when the fellows talk to people like Scoop Jackson, they point out that the mixed manning concept has been passed on by the greatest expert in modern days in alliance operations, the first SACEUR President Eisenhower, and that if he thought it was good enough to present to the North Atlantic Council, who are certain non-informed militarists in Congress to test his judgment, or at least if they do contest it they should do it with a little more respect.

We saw Seydoux this afternoon and he was very bland and spent most of the time trying to find out what Couve had told Livie. He said that certainly France wouldn't block the proposal; that he tried to suggest that there might be some French interest in para. 6 forces in spite of their negative on the multilateral force. He pointed out how difficult it was for him to be without any instructions except the press conference of January 14. He wryly said something about surface ships being a switch from Nassau. At this point I said that as far as I knew surface ships had never been considered at Nassau. That the British wanted a Polaris system and they had good advance in nuclear propulsion of submarines and that was the logical platform and that there had been no comparison with any decision against surface ships at Nassau. I hope I am right on that.

I noticed, Henry, in reading the von Hassel discussion, that the President is reported to have said the Berlin problem is the principal factor in U.S. insistence on increased conventional capability. Were it not for Berlin, the United States would probably use fewer conventional forces than even now. It seems to me that this is very bad stuff from the point of view of trying to sell an over-all long-term strategy to the Alliance based on increased nuclear power. If I were the Germans, this would indicate to me that we are really not thinking of this ~~inter~~ in terms of a long-term strategy, but this is a rather short-term swing. I

hope

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 979156

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

- 4 -

hope that something could be done to erase this impression. On this record I don't think you have a Chinaman's chance of selling a real strategic doctrine change. I also noticed, Henry, the President said if the MLF did not work out, we would then have to find some other means of reassuring the FRG and meeting Europe's desires. I think anything that is said about if MLF does not work out is most counter-productive and if you can get a word in the right place about that it would be useful in case other potentates are going to pass through Washington.

Gerard C. Smith
(Dictabelt)

Received March 5, 1963

GCS:m11

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~