

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS-HOA-75-42

HISTORY OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

FY 1974



HISTORICAL STUDY NO. 142 (U)

VOLUME I

NARRATIVE

CLASSIFIED BY: CINCSAC

RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY, GENERAL, USAF
Commander in Chief

- L005928-1 Chap 1
- L005928-2 " 2
- L005928-3 " 3
- L005928-4 " 4 OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
- L005928-5 " 5 HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

orig. copy
OK 416.01-142

28 JANUARY 1974

~~01 D03A-09~~
~~98 SA 20 F000006~~
47 SCBP 036
Act of 5
07 AEXP-CCI

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

HA-1794
CY 1 OF 4 CYS

98SA 20 F000006
~~98SA 20 F000006~~

L005928

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

GENERAL RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
1 AUGUST 1974 - PRESENT

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

6005928-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

CHAPTER I

MISSION, RESOURCES, AND ORGANIZATION

Introduction

(U) (S) While the war was winding down and the end of the conflict was in sight, a sizable part of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber and tanker force was still committed to the U.S. military effort in Southeast Asia at the beginning of FY 74. With the conflict's termination, SAC expected to receive more definite directives from Headquarters USAF regarding the disposition of excess B-52D and B-52F bombers. The decision had already been made as to how many of the B-52Ds would be retained and modified to extend their service life, but Congress had not yet authorized funds for this program. With two bases scheduled to be transferred out of the command and another programmed to reach the final closure stage, extensive reorganization and realignment of aircraft forces were being planned. At the same time, SAC's two numbered air forces in the continental United States (CONUS) were deeply involved in a major program to realign subordinate units and thereby diversify the weapon systems assigned to the Second and Fifteenth Air Forces as well as those assigned to air divisions under their jurisdiction. In sharp contrast to the changing situation in the manned aircraft force, SAC's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force was programmed to remain stable from an organizational standpoint. There was, however, a significant change being effected within the ICBM force through the continuing Minuteman force modernization program in which older missiles were being replaced with newer models.

Mission

(U) (S) The Strategic Air Command was both a major command of the United States Air Force (USAF) and a specified command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In its capacity as a major USAF command, SAC performed its mission responsibilities under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, USAF, while as a specified command, it received

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

direction from the JCS. In accordance with directives issued by Headquarters USAF and the JCS, SAC's overall mission was to "organize, train, equip, administer, and prepare strategic forces for aerospace combat including offensive strikes, reconnaissance, and special missions."¹ The JCS further specified that SAC "be prepared to attack SIOP [Single Integrated Operational Plan] targets as directed" and to "support the unified commands by conducting attacks with nuclear/nonnuclear weapons in contingencies."²

Basic Resources

(U)(S) As in FY 73, the Minuteman modernization program and the outfitting of B-52 and FB-111 bombers with the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) continued to bring about significant changes in the primary weapon systems assigned to SAC. The sharp decrease in personnel strength was primarily attributed to fewer airmen inputs from USAF resources, the transfer of two bases, and the impending closure of another base. The following chart shows the basic resources assigned to SAC at the end of FY 73 and at the end of FY 74:³

<u>Resources Assigned</u> *	<u>End FY 73</u>	<u>End FY 74</u>
ICBMs	1,025	1,029
Bombers	463	495
Tankers	622	642
Reconnaissance Aircraft	45	55
Command and Control Aircraft	27	29
Hound Dog Missiles	331	328
Quail Missiles	417	417
SRAM Missiles	454	889
Personnel	163,385	155,434
Active Bases, SAC Owned	32	30

* (U) End of FY 73 statistics do not include aircraft involved in special modification and maintenance programs (28 B-52s, 5 FB-111s, 2 EC-135s, 20 KC-135s, 2 RC-135s, 4 U2s) which were assigned to Air Force Logistics Command under USAF policy (AFR 27-15 (U), USAF (PRPL), "Aerospace Vehicle Assignment and Distribution," 7 Apr 69). In mid-FY 74, this policy was revised (AFR 27-15(U), USAF(PRPL), "Aerospace Vehicle Assignment and Distribution," 7 Jan 74) so that aircraft involved in these programs were not reassigned from one command to another. Therefore, end of FY 74 statistics reflect these aircraft as being assigned to SAC, thus accounting for the seeming increase in assigned aircraft.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(U) Major General John W. Pauly became Commander of the 1st Strategic Aerospace Division on 3 September 1973,⁷ replacing Major General Salvador E. Felices. Located at Vandenberg AFB, California, the 1st Strategic Aerospace Division was concerned primarily with the execution and support evaluations of ICBM operational tests conducted by SAC's missile units.

(U) Fifteenth Air Force, with headquarters at March AFB, California, was commanded by Lieutenant General William F. Pitts. The Fifteenth, in addition to a sizable ICBM responsibility, had control of all SAC's strategic reconnaissance forces and some of its bomber and tanker units.

(U) Second Air Force, with headquarters at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, was charged with command of most of SAC's bomber and tanker units and three ICBM wings, two of which it acquired from the Fifteenth Air Force on 1 July 1973.* It was under the command of Lieutenant General Keck until he became the Vice Commander in Chief of SAC on 1 October 1973. Effective 3 October 1973, Lieutenant General Richard M. Hoban became Commander of the Second Air Force.⁸

(U) Eighth Air Force, headquartered at Andersen AFB, Guam, had control over all SAC forces in the Western Pacific. Lieutenant General McKee replaced Lieutenant General Gerald W. Johnson as the Eighth's Commander on 10 October 1973.⁹

Continuity of Operations Plan

(U) (S) Headquarters SAC continued to maintain a continuity of operations plan during FY 74.¹⁰ As in the past, the plan provided means of directing the combat forces should a sudden attack seriously damage or destroy the headquarters building and its collocated underground command post at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Following a practice

* (U) For more details on this subject, see "Numbered Air Force and Air Division Realignment," this chapter.

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

set up in early 1961, an EC-135 flying out of Offutt was airborne on a 24-hour-a-day basis. A general officer carrying the title of Airborne Emergency Action Officer (AEAO), aided by a small battle staff and using sophisticated communications equipment, manned this airborne command post which was called "Looking Glass." This aircraft would serve as the primary alternate command center should it become impossible for command to emanate from the CINCSAC or VCINCSAC at Headquarters SAC or from aboard an Auxiliary Airborne Command Post (AUXCP).^{*} The period of responsibility was designed to be brief, however, for after taking the emergency actions necessary to insure survival of the SAC force and if necessary to implement the JCS execution directives, the AEAO was to locate a successor to command -- either the commander of Fifteenth or Second Air Force, with the senior of the two being first in line of succession. In the event neither of these two could take command, the senior surviving SAC line-rated officer would do so. The myriad of situations encompassed by the plan insured that SAC's forces would be utilized properly and fully (see Table 1).¹¹

(S) During the Middle East Crisis of October 1973, when the JCS placed SAC and other U.S. military forces on a Defense Condition (DEFCON) THREE alert, Headquarters SAC encountered problems in operating under its Continuity of Operations Plan. In accordance with the plan, upon declaration of DEFCON THREE, Major General James R. Allen, Chief of Staff, in coordination with Brigadier General Robert R. Scott, DCS/Personnel, were required to designate five Headquarters SAC general officers for AEAO duty on alternate airborne command post aircraft stationed at Offutt. These officers were to report to the 2d Airborne Command and Control Squadron (ACCS) for instructions.¹² Three additional general officers from field units were

^{*} (S) The Auxiliary Airborne Command Post, one of Offutt's fleet of EC-135s, would be manned with a small battle staff and put on ground alert upon declaration of a DEFCON THREE. Its effectiveness would depend upon whether or not there was enough warning time to allow the aircraft to become airborne prior to a nuclear attack.

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SUCCESSION OF COMMAND¹³

Table 1
RESPONSIBLE FOR LAUNCH AND EXECUTION
OF SAC FORCE

CINCSAC
VCINCSAC

Airborne Emergency Action Officer, the general officer on Looking Glass. Alternate Airborne Emergency Action Officer, the general officer aboard the Auxiliary Airborne Command Post aircraft launched from either Ellsworth AFB, S.D., or Grissom AFB, IN.

Commander, Second Air Force *
Commander of Fifteenth Air Force *
SAC line rated officers (in accordance with AFR 35-54) who are in position to command.

DCS/Operations, Hq SAC, after taking action to insure survival of the force, determines who is ranking SAC line rated officer on station at Offutt and informs him that he is responsible for acting in the name of CINCSAC until CINCSAC/Vice CINCSAC or BRAVO successor arrives on duty. Successor as outlined under CONDITION BRAVO.

SITUATION

CIRCUMSTANCES

Normal

Everyday peacetime operation.

CONDITION ALFA

". . . exists when the AEAO is 'in position' and loses specific communications with CINCSAC. This condition requires immediate reaction by the AEAO acting as CINCSAC airborne."

CONDITION BRAVO

". . . exists when it has been positively determined that command of SAC and direction of the SAC forces cannot emanate from . . . CINCSAC or . . . Vice CINCSAC and initial emergency actions for survival of the SAC forces have been completed. Additional actions include polling of the SAC force, and submission of the initial Blue Report. This condition permits (effective 1 January 1974, "permits" changed to read "requires") extensive and time consuming efforts prior to succession of command."

CONDITION BRAVO
MODIFIED

". . . exists when CONDITION ALFA has not occurred and either . . . CINCSAC or . . . Vice CINCSAC is off station and the one that is performing CINCSAC responsibility at Headquarters SAC becomes incapacitated to the point that command of SAC units cannot emanate from him."

* (U) Based upon seniority principle; positions reversed after October 1973, at which time Lieutenant General William F. Pitts, Commander of Fifteenth Air Force became senior to Lieutenant General Richard M. Hoban, who succeeded Lieutenant General James M. Keck as commander of Second Air Force.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

to be similarly designated to report immediately to Ellsworth to assume ground alert duty with a battle staff and be ready to serve as alternate AEAO on the Auxiliary Airborne Command Post.¹⁴

(U) (S) These requirements caused problems during the alert because the overall requirement for general officers to serve in various capacities, including AEAO, senior staff, and other specified jobs, exceeded the number of general officers available. Sufficient general officers were finally designated to fill these positions, but they were allowed to remain at their normal duty stations on telephone alert rather than being required to report to the 2d ACCS and Ellsworth. While this modified procedure worked satisfactorily for the Offutt requirement due to the collocation of Headquarters SAC, it was unsatisfactory for the Ellsworth mission. According to Major General Ray B. Sitton, SAC's DCS/Operations, the lack of general officers at Ellsworth "would have inhibited a Positive Control Launch, PACCS launch, or PACCS dispersal" if these operations had been ordered.¹⁵

(U) (S) Based upon the problems encountered during the crisis, General Sitton concluded that "the current procedures require an over-commitment of headquarters generals to fulfill AEAO positions." He recommended to General Allen that the procedure be changed so as to commit by specific duty position only six general officers (three from Headquarters SAC and three from subordinate units) to perform the AEAO functions at Offutt and Ellsworth as follows:¹⁶

<u>Duty Position</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>AEAO Assignment</u>
Asst DCS/Plans, Hq SAC	Offutt	ABNCP, Offutt
Inspector General, Hq SAC	Offutt	ABNCP, Offutt
DCS/Plans, Hq SAC	Offutt	ABNCP, Offutt
Comdr 4th Air Div	F. E. Warren	AUXCP, Ellsworth
Chief of Staff, Hq 2AF	Barksdale	AUXCP, Ellsworth
Chief of Staff, Hq 15AF	March	AUXCP, Ellsworth

(U) (S) General Sitton also proposed that upon declaration of DEFCON THREE, the airborne command post AEAO flying schedule be canceled and the three Headquarters SAC general officers designated above be used to assume the daily flying schedule. He further emphasized the need

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

for the other three general officers to proceed immediately to Ellsworth upon declaration of DEFCON THREE.¹⁷ General Allen approved these changes on 4 December 1973;¹⁸ they became effective two days later¹⁹ and remained so throughout FY 74.²⁰

ICBM Force

(U) (S) During FY 74, SAC's ICBM force remained unchanged as to the overall UE of 1,054 missiles, but the number assigned rose from 966 at the start of FY 74 to 972 on 26 June 1974. This force was composed of three Titan II wings, each consisting of two operational squadrons of nine UE strength, and six Minuteman wings of twenty 50 UE squadrons. The Minuteman portion of the SAC ICBM force was being modernized by replacing older model missiles with newer ones. As FY 74 started, the 90th Strategic Missile Wing, Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, was in the process of replacing its Minuteman Is with Minuteman IIIs. On 1 July 1973, the 90th SMW had 150 Minuteman Is and 10 Minuteman IIIs assigned. By the end of FY 74, the composition of this force had been reversed sharply with 120 Minuteman IIIs and only 40 Minuteman Is being assigned. The Francis E. Warren conversion effort was scheduled to be completed in February 1975. The entire force modernization program* would be completed in June 1975, when the fourth squadron at Malmstrom converted from Minuteman IIs to IIIs. The SAC Minuteman force would then reach its programmed goal of 550 Minuteman IIIs and 450 Minuteman IIs. The exact composition and location of the ICBM force at the ends of FY 73 and FY 74 are shown in Table 2.

Bomber and Tanker Forces

(U) (S) After having remained stable for years, the SAC bomber and tanker forces underwent several changes in FY 74. In line with the Department of Defense's April 1973 decision to transfer Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts, to the Air Force Reserve, Headquarters USAF had directed that the 99th Bomb Wing, a 25 UE B-52D unit, be

* (U) For more details on the Minuteman force modernization program, see "Force Improvements," Chapter V, this history.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

evolve expanded operational concepts that required air refueling. MAC experience in the Israeli airlift operation in October 1973 showed that C-5 and C-141 aircraft could have transported an additional 30 percent of cargo if air refueling had been utilized. Therefore, each of these commands supported the need for an advanced tanker.¹³⁰

(U) (S) Consequently, on 15 December 1973, Headquarters SAC stated a requirement for an Advanced Multi-Purpose Tanker (AMPT).^{*} The AMPT was envisioned as a derivative of one of the available wide-bodied civilian transport aircraft. Candidates included the Boeing 747 and the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10. The Lockheed Company was assessing the C-5B as a potential candidate. Depending upon the aircraft selected, the AMPT could offer an approximate 2:1 to 4:1 improvement in fuel offload delivery over that available with the KC-135.¹³¹ On 8 March 1974, Headquarters USAF reviewed and validated the SAC proposal for the AMPT, contingent on resubmission of the proposal as a multi-command document with further clarification of MAC's air refueling and airlift requirements. The nomenclature, Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft (ATCA), was adopted to reflect more accurately the cargo capabilities of the proposed aircraft.¹³² Contracts were scheduled to be issued to Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas, and Lockheed in FY 75 for a six month, four phase competitive effort. Following the FY 75 effort, one contractor would be selected.¹³³ The House approved the full budget request of \$20 million for FY 75, but the Senate allowed only \$4.5 million. The House-Senate Conference Committee then authorized \$8.0 million for the ATCA.¹³⁴

Manned Aircraft Survivability

(U) United States defense policy was based on deterrence. A prime factor of deterrence was credibility. One of the important features of SAC's bomber force credibility was that it would survive a surprise attack.

^{*}(U) (S) This SAC requirement was a revival of earlier efforts by SAC to develop an advanced tanker (Hist of SAC (TS), FY 72, pp 296-297).

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(U)(S) To obtain the highest level of pre-launch survivability (PLS), SAC relied on warning systems operated by the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). At the center of bomber survivability was SAC's alert program. It maintained a percentage of aircraft on a day-to day alert. The intent was to improve reaction time and effectiveness of a SAC retaliatory strike. SAC also scattered its bomber and tanker alert forces in smaller units by means of satellite basing and dispersal programs. In certain readiness conditions or circumstances, SAC could launch a portion of the bomber and tanker force into an airborne alert posture through the use of Selective Employment of Air/Ground Alert (SEAGA). Once launched, probability of destruction of this portion of the aircraft force from a surprise attack was minimal.

(U)(S) The SAC bomber and tanker alert force included all aircraft, at home bases, at dispersed and satellite bases, and at forward bases in oversea areas that had completed generation.¹³⁵

U ~~(S)~~ SAC's aircraft force was divided into three categories, depending upon the ability to launch: ALFA, CHARLIE, and FOXTROT. The ALFA ("A" CAP) aircraft were required to be maintained in a state of constant readiness at all times. The number of aircraft in this category was determined by the JCS-established JCS (b)(1). This category also included all SIOP-required alert sorties which were not on alert that could be reinstated upon declaration of a DEFCON 3 or higher.¹³⁶ The alert force was expansible depending upon generation time available. Category CHARLIE ("C" CAP) and Category FOXTROT ("F" CAP) sorties and the Tanker Task Force (TTF) would be included in the alert force when generated. Formerly, the difference between the "C" and "F" CAP sorties was based on timing. For FY 74, aircraft that generated earlier than planned generation rates would be placed on alert as soon as generated. The "C" and "F" CAP sorties were those parts of the aircraft force identified by the letters on the SIOP assignment and timing sheet. For FY 74, these

Rf
JCS

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

sheets normally reflected the breakdown based on type of aircraft and the unit's authorized unit equipage (UE), as follows:¹³⁷

Ref JCS

<u>UE</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>"C" CAP Force</u>
15 UE	B-52G/H	5 sorties
15 UE	B-52D	4 sorties
20 UE	B-52D	5 sorties
25 UE	B-52D	6 sorties
30 UE	B-52G	10 sorties
30 UE	B-52D	8 sorties
43d SW		16 sorties
93d BW	B-52F	10 sorties
FB-111 units		6 sorties

Giant Lance (Selected Employment of Air/Ground Alert - SEAGA) backup sorties were included in the Category "C" force.¹³⁸

(U)(S) FOXTROT aircraft were those identified by the letter "F" on the SIOP assignment and timing sheet. They consisted of the remaining UE aircraft that had effective SIOP missions assigned other than those designated ALFA or CHARLIE.¹³⁹

(U)(S) Expansion to include the "C" CAP and "F" CAP was based on the Force Generation Levels (FGL). A generated aircraft was one that was EWO-configured and the generated force was that portion of the SAC aircraft force EWO-configured and ready for launch. All generated bombers and tankers became part of the expanded alert force and assumed lines of alert as soon as generated. Timing for such action was pre-determined, but it was SAC policy that aircraft generated earlier than planned would be placed on alert as soon as generated. The alert force at whatever FGL, was the maximum force available for launch depending upon the conditions of warning. Longer warning times permitted more preparation time and thus additional SIOP forces. The intent was to improve reaction time and effectiveness of the SAC strike.¹⁴⁰

(U)(S) In almost all circumstances, the bomber would launch direct to the target. Rather than staging at advanced bases for pre-strike, air refueling provided extended range for the bomber, allowed it to carry an increased payload, and use EWO tactics to enhance penetration and survival. Tanker alert was maintained along with the bomber in the

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

same categories. SAC had planned the Air Refueling Control Points and Times (ARCP/ARCT) to give maximum offload to the receiver and still enable the tanker to arrive over its post refueling base with adequate reserves. ¹⁴¹

(U) (S) With the proven capabilities of bombardment aircraft, actual alert, planned operational procedures, and the proficiency of the bomber crews verified the ~~credibility~~ credibility of the bomber forces.

Pre-Launch Survivability

JCS (b)(1)

JCS (b)(1) Inclusion of SLBMs in the USSR's force severely decreased warning time further. NORAD's JCS (b) systems--Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), Over-The-Horizon (OTH) radars.

JCS (b)(1)

SAC's dispersal program and satellite basing provided improved reaction time in response. The combination was a credible deterrent posture. ¹⁴²

U (S) The PLS factors for SAC's bomber and tanker forces

JCS (b)(1)

By TCS

~~TOP SECRET~~

PL
JCS

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS (b)(1)

Ref
JCS

U ~~(S)~~ All SAC's bombers and tankers were committed to the SIOP and divided into two groups: alert and non-alert. On 1 July 1967, the JCS had reduced SAC's ground alert requirement from JCS (b)(1) percent of its total UE aircraft.* This requirement continued throughout FY 74.¹⁴⁵

(U) Intense Southeast Asia operations with increased B-52 commitments had resulted in a degraded SIOP alert posture since 1965. The urgency of the commitments took precedence over the important alert posture and caused acceptance of SIOP degradation as a temporary measure. A conditioning factor was that the temporary reduction could be reversed in a matter of hours if the international situation changed adversely. Furthermore, the potential regeneration was supplemented by the continued full alert of the missiles--ICBMs and SLBMs.¹⁴⁶

Ref
JCS

U ~~(S)~~ Bombers. Individual bomb wing alert requirements were the products of the wing's UE and the JCS (b)(1) authorization. The JCS alert directive required the standard 15 UE B-52 or FB-111 squadron to keep JCS (b)(1)ers and crews always on alert. The crew had to be close by and ready to start engines in time to take off no later than the assigned sortie generation time. There was also an alert requirement for the mated KC-135 tankers and crews to support SIOP refueling. Only the 93d Bomb Wing, Castle AFB, California, was exempted from an active ground alert commitment because of its B-52/KC-135 training mission.

Ref
JCS

Though exempt from "A" CAP sorties, it was, however, committed to 25 "C" and "F" CAP sorties--equivalent to its B-52 UE. An identical requirement applied to the six FB-111A aircraft assigned to the 380th Bomb Wing for CCTS training at Plattsburgh AFB, New York.¹⁴⁷

* (U) Some units, because of their mission, were specifically exempted.

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(U)(S) Extensive changes in both required and actual alert occurred in FY 74. Reduction of UE authorized B-52 aircraft changed the alert commitments and requirements. On 1 October 1973, the UE dropped from 397 to 387 with the inactivation of one 10 UE squadron of the 99th Bomb Wing, Westover AFB, Massachusetts. Six months later--1 April 1974--the UE dropped further with the inactivation of the 99th's other squadron--a 15 UE organization. Since the UE was SAC's SIOP commitment, the reduction of UE caused the SIOP-committed sorties to drop from 400 to 390 to 375 on those dates. The SIOP ground alert requirements also dropped on those dates from 150 to 146 and then again to 140.¹⁴⁸

(U)(S) At the close of FY 73, (30 June 1973), SAC's aircraft alert force consisted of 17 FB-111s, 25 B-52Hs, two B-52Gs at Loring AFB, Maine, and JCS (b)(1). There were also 57 KC-135s on alert. During the first half of FY 73, Headquarters SAC had reassigned 14 top priority B-52G sorties to B-52H wings and increased it to 15 in the latter half of the year.¹⁴⁹

(U)(S) The B-52 alert force changed during FY 74. Ground alert aircraft increased and aircraft off alert by JCS direction declined. Redeployment from Southeast Asia to home stations caused the improved alert status. As the units were reconstituted, alert was reinstated as follows:¹⁵⁰

	<u>1973</u>						<u>1974</u>					
	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
Ground Alert	34	44	49	57	82	102	103	98	105	104	100	104
Auth Off	<u>116</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>46*</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>40*</u>	<u>36</u>
Total	150	150	150	146	146	146	144	144	146	140	140	140

(U)(S) Giant Lance was the official nickname for an improved airborne alert operation--Selective Employment of Air/Ground Alert (SEAGA). SEAGA provided flexibility to use a part of the day-to-day ground alert force

* (U) Feb--ORI, 42 BW; May--ORI, 320 BW.

~~SECRET~~

in an airborne alert posture. Airborne alert of SAC bombers and mated tanker support served as a visual deterrent during periods of international tension and assured survival of that part of the bomber force.¹⁵¹

(u)(s) The Giant Lance force consisted of the first two "A" CAP sorties of the CONUS-based 15 UE B-52 D/G/H bombardment wings, and the first four "A" CAP sorties, 2d BW, a 30 UE unit. Twelve sorties of

jcs (b)(1)

The 99th Bomb Wing and the 306th Bomb Wing were exempted because of phase down toward inactivation. The 93d Bomb Wing was also exempted from any Giant Lance sorties, as it had the mission of combat crew training.¹⁵² FB-111A aircraft from the 380th Bomb Wing and the 509th Bomb Wing were not assigned to Giant Lance because of the aircraft's physical limitations. The bomber force was supported in air refueling requirements by KC-135 tanker task forces.¹⁵³

U ~~(S)~~ SAC's normal day-to-day ground alert readiness posture was DEFCON 4. A JCS declaration of DEFCON 3--or higher--readiness posture would normally precede activation of the Giant Lance operation. Giant Lance provided an airborne alert which assured that selected B-52 sorties with high priority targets would survive and strike those targets under all circumstances. One option was an As Soon As Possible (ASAP) Launch. Under this option, the designated part of the ground alert force would assume an airborne alert posture where its predicted survival was highest. This was a limited operation restricted to one cycle and intended for use in an extreme national emergency. Operations would be terminated at the end of the cycle unless the JCS recalled the force or directed a continuous operation with follow-on launches. In the second option --Scheduled Launch--the Giant Lance ground alert force would be employed in a sustained airborne alert posture. The B-52s would launch at 24-hour intervals with mated KC-135s for refueling support being supplied by pre-positioned and augmented tanker task forces.¹⁵⁴

Ref JCS

U ~~(S)~~ Giant Lance options employed a "universal EWO sortie," tailored for range, refueling, and targets specifically selected for

~~SECRET~~

12/ JCS

each participating unit. The wing's location, its weapon systems, and normal SIOP target commitments were evaluated in assigning orbit commitments which in turn affected the design of each unit's special sortie. The vast majority of Giant Lance targets were urban-industrial area targets but there were a few nuclear force targets.¹⁵⁵

U ~~(S)~~ There were nine Giant Lance bomber orbits. Available tanker task force bases and air traffic control requirements contributed to the selection of the orbit locations. One or more of seven tanker task forces supported the orbits. Distribution was as follows:¹⁵⁶

<u>Orbit</u>	<u>Tanker Task Force</u>
Arctic -- East	Eielson AFB
Arctic -- West	Eielson AFB
Pacific	Eielson/Kadena
Atlantic -- East	Torrejon AB/Loring AFB/ Plattsburgh AFB
Atlantic -- South	Torrejon AB/Loring AFB. Plattsburgh AFB
Atlantic -- North #1	Goose Bay
Atlantic -- North #2	Goose Bay
Polar	Thule
Far East	Eielson/Kadena

U ~~(S)~~ During FY 74, several changes re-oriented the orbit assignments. Two bomb wings--the 99th and the 306th--were scheduled to inactivate and their commitments were excepted. This resulted in a reduction in the CONUS commitment from 44 sorties to 40.¹⁵⁷ The Far East requirement for the 43d SW had been 16 sorties through FY 73.¹⁵⁸ In FY 74, the number was reduced to 12 sorties, sortie numbers Ø1 through Ø12.¹⁵⁹ Toward the end of the year, this distribution was shifted to sorties Ø1, Ø2, Ø7 through Ø16.¹⁶⁰

U ~~(S)~~ There were also several changes in bomber unit assignments to Giant Lance orbits. In FY 73, the 449th BW was assigned to the Atlantic East orbit and the 97th BW was assigned to the Polar orbit.¹⁶¹ Effective with Rev N on 1 July 1973 and remaining throughout the year,


UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

these two switched assignments.¹⁶² In FY 73, the Ø3 and Ø4 sorties of the 2d BW were assigned to the Polar orbit while the two sorties of the 379th BW were assigned to Atlantic South.¹⁶³ For FY 74, these also changed assignments.¹⁶⁴ Although Headquarters SAC had scheduled four training exercises for Giant Lance in FY 74, they were all cancelled because of the fuel crisis.¹⁶⁵

(U)(TS) Reconstitution. Redeployment of aircraft from Southeast Asia produced extensive changes in the bomber alert force. As the bombers returned from Southeast Asia, the number of aircraft on ground alert increased significantly. On 1 July 1973, there were 34 B-52 aircraft on alert and by 31 December, this had tripled to 102.¹⁶⁶

(U)(TS) When redeployment of the SAC force in Southeast Asia began, there were more than 200 B-52D and B-52G models involved. With the aircraft were 92 B-52D crews and 189 B-52G crews. JCS (b)(1)



(U)(TS) Headquarters SAC prepared a redeployment plan in conformity with the JCS force withdrawal plan. The JCS had envisioned returning the B-52s to home bases in two increments. The first increment would return approximately 99 B-52s and the second would draw the force down to pre-Bullet Shot levels, approximately 50. The JCS had previously considered only B-52G models in the first increment. Later changes called for a mixed force of D and G models in the first increment.¹⁶⁸ Headquarters SAC's plan of February 1973 had as its purpose to permit all affected units sufficient time to prepare orderly programs to support redeployment when directed. The plan of February 1973 was to redeploy either the entire force as a mass movement or in increments. JCS (b)(1)



~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Force reconstitution priorities centered on bringing back aircraft and crews to combat readiness and to reinstate SIOP alert sorties. From the time of notification of redeployment (A-hour), the aircraft and crews would launch within 72 hours. Actually, the first days (A + 6) were devoted to physical redeployment. From A + 6 to A + 12, flight training and EWO study and certification would concentrate on the initial alert sortie aircrews. And the initial alert sortie would be assumed on A + 12. The next 33 days were allotted to bringing the alert sorties up to those required. After 105 days, the unit would become vulnerable for an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI).¹⁶⁹

(U)(TS) Before this plan could take effect, the JCS had noted in June 1973, that it appeared prudent to modify the schedule established earlier. Specifically, the JCS recommended that the first withdrawal include 47 B-52Gs and 52 B-52Ds in place of the originally-planned 99 B-52Gs.¹⁷⁰ SAC concurred in this suggestion.¹⁷¹ Others did not.

(U)(TS) The United States Special Activities Group (USSAG), successor to U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) protested the JCS specific consideration on two points. In the first place, the B-52G models were limited in tonnage capacity. The B-52Ds, in contrast, had been modified to increase the total bomb bay tonnage capacity. Hence, they were more effective in Southeast Asia. In the second place, USSAG pointed out that any withdrawal program would have to be event-phased rather than time-phased because the unknown quantity of cease-fire adherence was more important than a certain date.¹⁷²

(U)(TS) On 10 July 1973, the JCS authorized SAC to redeploy the first 15 B-52Gs from Andersen AFB to the home station. SAC directed that they be sent to the 68th Bomb Wing at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina. "A" hour for the move was 12/0001Z July 1973. The 15 aircraft flew in five three-aircraft cells in redeployment. The last B-52G landed at Seymour Johnson AFB at 17/2026Z July 1973.¹⁷³ This redeployment left 86 B-52Gs at Andersen.

(U)(S) On 1 August 1973, the JCS ordered SAC to stop B-52 operations--Arc Light--in Cambodia, effective 15 August.¹⁷⁴ This action

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

terminated Arc Light combat activity and ended 98 months of operations. The next month--21 September--JCS authorized SAC to redeploy an additional 15 B-52Gs to the CONUS. Only 71 B-52Gs remained at this point [JCS] after the 97th Bomb Wing aircraft went home to Blytheville AFB, Arkansas, on 24 September. This wing was designated to serve as a contingency training unit. This particular deployment also transported the B-52G aircrews TDY [JCS] from Loring and Ellsworth back to the CONUS. [JCS (b)(1)]

Ref
JCS

[JCS (b)(1)]

U (TS) In the latter part of October 1973, the crisis in the Middle East resulted in all U.S. military activities being placed in DEFCON 3 alert status.¹⁷⁶ [JCS (b)(1)]



(U) (S) Three days after the execution order for the B-52Gs, JCS directed redeployment of 16 B-52Ds, 28 October 1973.¹⁸⁰ SAC subsequently ordered departure of these aircraft along with associated personnel. Eight were sent to the 96th Bomb Wing at Dyess AFB, Texas, and eight were sent to the 22d Bomb Wing at March AFB, California. Departure of these 16 aircraft left 75 B-52Ds in Southeast Asia.¹⁸¹ The redeployment plan had directed that the units would assume the initial alert sortie at A+ 12 days.

(U) (S) The 68th Bomb Wing, the first unit to return from [JCS (b)(1)] [] reinstated its first alert bomber on 24 July. This replaced one of the two B-52G high priority sorties that had been covered by the B-52Gs from the 379th Bomb Wing, Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan.¹⁸³ The

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

second of these high priority sorties was assumed by the 68th Bomb Wing on 3 August 1973.¹⁸⁴ By the end of August 1973, the 68th Bomb Wing had five B-52Gs on alert along with five KC-135s.¹⁸⁵ Similar reconstitution and reinstatement programs were followed by the other B-52G units.

(u) (s) The B-52G wings at Loring and Ellsworth had operated as contingency training units (CTU). When crews for those units returned in late September (A - Hour, 27 September), reconstitution to normal SIOP and training began and phase down of the CTUs was started. The 28th Bomb Wing had reinstated one B-52G aircraft on alert by 9 October. The 42d Bomb Wing, which had maintained two aircraft on alert through FY 73, reinstated a third alert sortie on 14 October.¹⁸⁶ The 456th Bomb Wing at Beale AFB, California, and the 416th Bomb Wing at Griffiss AFB, New York, continued as CTUs after redeployment of all B-52Gs. Headquarters SAC had established an adjusted D-day (1 December 1973) for these two units to permit completion of training of individuals from other units at these bases. Nevertheless, when the seven remaining B-52G units returned from Southeast Asia, the reinstatement of alert sorties was accelerated. A-hour was 26/1900Z October 1973.¹⁸⁷ Each of these units (2d, 19th, 92d, 97th, 320th, 416th, and 456th) had returned sorties to full alert status by 8 November 1973.¹⁸⁸

(u) (s) Headquarters SAC established A-hour for the 96th and 22d Bomb Wings (B-52D units) as 24/0001Z November 1973. Reconstitution and reinstatement proceeded without difficulty. Both units placed one B-52D each on alert by the first week in December.¹⁸⁹

(u) (s) Reinstatement of the B-52G sorties alert requirement which had been assumed by the B-52H wings received first priority. For those seven units responsible for the 15 high priority sorties, resumption was achieved by the required time--12 days after notification. Reinstatement overall was as follows:¹⁹⁰

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

B-52 High Sortie Rate						Table 4
B-52G Wing	Sortie Number	B-52H Wing	Rev N Sortie	Date Reinstated	Rpt, B4H2 DTG	
68 BW	Ø1	379 BW	Ø3	24 Jul 73	27/1420Z	Jul 73
	Ø2	379 BW	Ø4	3 Aug 73	03/1100Z	Aug 73
28 BW	Ø1	319 BW	Ø3	9 Oct 73	12/1353Z	Oct 73
	Ø2	319 BW	Ø4	1 Nov 73	01/1118Z	Nov 73
2 BW	Ø1	17 BW	Ø5	8 Nov 73	09/1038Z	Nov 73
	Ø3	379 BW	Ø5	8 Nov 73	09/1038Z	Nov 73
	Ø4	449 BW	Ø6	22 Nov 73	23/1035Z	Nov 73
19 BW	Ø1*	17 BW	Ø3	8 Nov 73	09/1038Z	Nov 73
	Ø2*	17 BW	Ø4	15 Nov 73	16/1140Z	Nov 73
97 BW	Ø1	410 BW	Ø6	8 Nov 73	09/1038Z	Nov 73
	Ø2	410 BW	Ø5	15 Nov 73	16/1140Z	Nov 73
416 BW	Ø1	449 BW	Ø4	8 Nov 73	09/1038Z	Nov 73
	Ø2	449 BW	Ø3	29 Nov 73	30/1111Z	Nov 73
456 BW	Ø1	5 BW	Ø5	8 Nov 73	09/1038Z	Nov 73
	Ø2	5 BW	Ø6	29 Nov 73	30/1111Z	Nov 73

High priority sorties of the other B-52G wings--those not assumed by the B-52H units--were placed back on alert as scheduled. The 42d Bomb Wing at Loring AFB was back to its full alert requirement of six B-52s and 12 KC-135s by the end of the month. The 320th Bomb Wing at Mather AFB re-established its first alert line on 8 November and its second on 22 November 1973. The 92d Bomb Wing at Fairchild AFB re-established its Ø1 sortie on 8 November and its Ø2 sortie on 15 November 1973.¹⁹¹

(S) When the two B-52D alert lines were reinstated by the 22d and 96th Bomb Wings in early December 1973, this was the first time B-52Ds had been on alert in the CONUS since April 1972.¹⁹² Shortly after the first of the year, two B-52Ds from the third B-52D unit, the 7th Bomb Wing, Carswell AFB, Texas, assumed alert.¹⁹³ During the rest of the fiscal year, the B-52D alert lines grew slightly. By the end of June 1974, the 7th Bomb Wing had two B-52Ds on alert, the 22d Bomb Wing had four, and the 96th Bomb Wing had two on alert at Dyess AFB and one on satellite alert at Bergstrom AFB.¹⁹⁴

(S) B-52H aircraft from 17 BW assumed 19 BW satellite alert requirement at MacDill AFB, Florida.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(U)(S) When 105 days had passed, the units were vulnerable for SNOW TIME, AMALGAM MUTE, and Operational Readiness Inspections. By that time, Headquarters SAC felt that the EWO transition period would be fully completed.¹⁹⁵ In the case of the 22d and 96th Bomb Wings, D-day was set at 1 April 1974. Thus these two wings became vulnerable on 15 July 1974. D-day for the 7th Bomb Wing was set at 1 July 1974 and its vulnerability period began on 14 October.¹⁹⁶ The reason for this delay was that the D-series combat crew training squadron was being assigned to the 7th BW. The additional time granted to the 7th BW was to permit resource management flexibility during the organization and activation of the B-52D series CCTS.¹⁹⁷

(U)(S) In January 1974, the Secretary of Defense promulgated the FY 74-80 Planning Guidance for Southeast Asia Force and Activity Levels. In the document, the guidance reflected the greater potential threat from the North Vietnamese offensives during the November-April dry season. On this basis, FY 74-75 planning used the intervals between dry seasons for force reduction periods.¹⁹⁸ SAC's B-52s were to be able to fly 1,200 sorties per month through 31 October 1974, drop off to 1,000 sorties per month through 31 March 1975, and then drop to 300 sorties per month through the end of FY 75.¹⁹⁹ In addition, B-52 surge capability was retained at 1,800 sorties per month with no more than a week's notice.²⁰⁰

(U)(S) In May 1974, the Acting Chairman of the JCS notified SAC that higher authority had approved further withdrawal of B-52 assets from Thailand. This approval released 14 KC-135s and 33 B-52Ds. Execution would begin on 15 May and run through August. The B-52Ds would be redeployed in four groups: three of nine aircraft each and one of six. The first increment of nine B-52Ds would depart during the month of May, the second nine during June, the third nine during July, and the last six during August. For the nine B-52D aircraft leaving on 15-17 May, four were assigned to Carswell AFB, two were assigned to Dyess AFB, one to March AFB, one to Barksdale AFB, and


~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~SECRET~~

Ref
JCS

~~TOP SECRET~~

one to Kelly AFB. The second group of nine flying on 1-3 June, had three assigned to Carswell AFB, three to Dyess, two to Barksdale, and one to March.²⁰¹ At the end of these redeployments, SAC would retain 42 B-52Ds in the Western Pacific: JCS (b)(1)

U ~~(S)~~ The 1973 Middle East Crisis grew out of the Arab-Israeli War. This war, which began on 6 October (therefore identified as the Yom Kippur War) was the fourth and largest Arab-Israeli war in 25 years. On 22 October 1973, the United Nations had passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire. It took effect, but lasted only for 12 hours. A second cease-fire took place on 24 October.²⁰² The JCS had reported on a Soviet Union suggestion that the United States join in a dual enforcement of the cease-fire by both introducing forces. The Soviet Union had also suggested that it might act unilaterally should the United States decline. As a precaution, the United States, through the JCS, JCS (b)(1)



~~SECRET~~

JCS (b)(1) [redacted]

[redacted] ²⁰⁸ By 27/1300Z October 1973, the B-52 ground alert force had gone down to 90 aircraft, the FB-111 ground alert force had gone down to 24, and the KC-135s to 127. ²⁰⁹ By the end of the month of October, there were 57 B-52s, 23 FB-111s, and 82 KC-135s on alert. ²¹⁰

SAC Support of Arab-Israeli War

(U) (S) One outstanding feature of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 was the high number of losses of Israeli jet fighter-bombers to the Arab surface-to-air missiles, SA-6s. The United States agreed to replace aircraft lost to hostile fire. Consequently, U.S. Air Force and Navy pilots transferred 78 F-4E and A-4 (USN) fighter-bombers from U.S. resources to Israel. Deployments began on 12 October 1973 and ended on 23 October. SAC's KC-135 tankers provided refueling support enroute for these aircraft. The standard route for the fighters was from a CONUS base to [redacted] JCS (b)(1) [redacted]. Only one group of eight F-4s went all the way from Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, to Lod Airport, Israel. This mission (14 October 1973) required 12 tankers from Pease AFB, New Hampshire, and [redacted] JCS (b)(1) [redacted].

[redacted] JCS (b)(1) [redacted]. All others deployed to [redacted] JCS (b)(1) [redacted]. From there, the F-4s flew directly to Israeli airports and the A-4s flew to the USN CVA, Franklin D. Roosevelt, stationed in the Mediterranean Sea as part of the Sixth Fleet. From the carrier, they flew direct to Israeli airports. The F-4s got refueling support from [redacted] JCS (b)(1) [redacted].

[redacted] JCS (b)(1) [redacted] B and Israeli airports.

There, the aircraft were assigned to Israel. In total, SAC tankers flew 122 sorties, and offloaded 2,882,000 pounds of fuel. ²¹¹

(U) (S) [redacted] JCS (b)(1) [redacted]

[redacted] The [redacted] sorties

there prior to 1 July 1973. ²¹² The July 1973 requirement was for 10 B-52Ds and six B-52Gs on ground alert. Arc Light operations in Cambodia prevented the D models from being on ground alert and only the B-52Gs

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

stood at 1,012, Those launchers not possessed by SAC were undergoing testing and/or modification by the Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) of the Air Force Systems Command. Among the 1,012 SAC possessed ICBM launchers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff exempted certain LFs from the alert requirement for such things as maintenance training, testing, and the Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS). Thus the required alert force at the end of FY 74 stood at 989. With 4 Titan II and 22 Minute-man launchers off alert for repairs and/or modifications, the actual SIOP alert force totaled 963.¹³ This compared quite favorably with the 966 ICBMs on actual SIOP alert at the end of FY 73.¹⁴ Of equal importance was the increased number of weapons on alert during the fiscal year. This was due primarily to the continued deployment of Minuteman III ICBMs equipped with the Mark 12 Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV). At the beginning of FY 74, the number of alert weapons totaled DOE (b)(3) the number slowly DOE (b)(3) during the year until it stood at DOE (b)(3) June 1974.¹⁵

DOE
b(3)

DOE
b(3)

U ~~(S)~~ The Middle East Crisis. At 0430 Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time) on 25 October 1973, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered U.S. forces worldwide to assume a Defense Condition (DEFCON) 3 alert posture.¹⁶ This action was taken in response to the threat of Soviet intervention in the Yom Kippur War between Arab and Israeli forces that had broken out on 6 October.¹⁷ One day prior to the JCS-directed DEFCON 3 alert, the number of SAC ICBMs on alert stood at 98.9 percent of the required force (978 out of 989, with 11 ICBMs temporarily off alert). At the same time, SAC possessed 32 "L" CAP missile sorties -- inactive sorties that could become SIOP-required sorties ("A" CAP) during the life of the plan. An additional 45 launchers were "contractor-owned" and therefore not available for alert.¹⁸

(u)(s) Immediately following notification of the JCS-directed increase in force readiness, Headquarters SAC instituted various pre-planned Emergency War Order (EWO) procedures. Among these was the establishment of a "Preparation" or "P" hour, the reference time for the generation of any missile sortie temporarily off-alert and all SAC-owned "L" CAP sorties.¹⁹ During the entire course of the alert, which lasted from 0430Z on 25 October to 1704Z on 26 October when the JCS

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET FRD~~

directed SAC JCS (b)(1), the men and women of the Strategic Air Command conducted themselves with distinction.* By 2111Z on 26 October, the number of ICBMs on alert had increased to 995, fully 99.5 percent of the required force of 1,000 missiles.²⁰ Thus, in the short space of twenty-four and one-half hours, SAC's missile maintenance and combat crew personnel had succeeded in generating 6 "A" CAP sorties temporarily off-alert and 11 "L" CAP missile sorties to full alert status.²¹ Such an achievement was an admirable reflection on the professionalism, expertise, and esprit de corps of all SAC personnel.

U ~~(S FRD)~~ SIOP 4, Revision N and O. As part of the U.S. strategic forces, SAC's ICBMs were committed to the SIOP. In the SIOP and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Joint Chiefs of Staff defined the Emergency War Order (EWO) duties and responsibilities of the Strategic Air Command.²² Responsibility for preparing the SIOP rested with the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), located at Headquarters SAC. | |

JCS (b)(1)

* (U) For a more complete treatment of the Middle East Crisis and SAC's participation in it, see SAC STUDY #139 (TS), SAC(HO), "Chronology, Middle East Crisis (U)," 12 Dec 73 (HA-1644).

** (U) Circular Error Probable (CEP) -- A measurement of weapon system accuracy; the radius of a circle within which 50 percent of the reentry vehicles of an ICBM weapon system can be expected to land. (Manual (TS-FRD), JSTPS, "Planning Manual for SIOP 4N (U)," 1 Jun 73, p. ²⁸ (73-B-1627)).

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED