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Refer to: I-25977/62

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MEETING OF MILITARY SUBGROUP, WASHINGTON AMBASSADORIAL GROUP 3:30 P.M., 12 September 1962

Participants

DUCCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

United States

Admiral Lee, Acting Chairman General Gray, JCS Colonel Armstrong, ISA Colonel Meacham, ISA Colonel Crist, JCS Mr. Sargent, ISA Mr. Kranich, State Colonel Magathan, State Mr. Maurer, State Mr. Klein, White House

United Kingdom

Lord Hood Mr. Brooke

France

M. Winckler M. Pelen Colonel Hounau

Germany

Dr. Wieck Captain Guggenberger Mr. Von Magnus

Discussion of Final Draft of Preferred Sequence Paper

Admiral Lee opened the meeting at 3:30 with the statement that he believed everyone was instructed and that the group was operating under considerable pressure of time. He expressed the hope of getting the paper to Ambassador Finletter by Friday. There would be an Ambassadorial Group meeting tomorrow. For its final position the U.S. had four proposed changes, two of which were completely minor. The first change he spoke of dealt with the question of air access. Even though the new wording was less clear than the original he felt that if the paper were ever to fall under Mr. Khrushchev's eyes we should not be in a position to give him the opportunity to "challenge" our air access, knowing we planned to stop flights temporarily. There is danger in stating the fact with "certainty." He stressed the fact that this was not in any way a change in substance.


Lord Hood said that he did have an amendment to that paragraph which was a change in substance.

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Admiral Lee asked if there were other changes, suggesting that if there were then it might be best to proceed on a page-by-page basis.

Lord Hood answered that he only had the one change and that it dealt with the paragraph which Admiral Lee had discussed. He said that his amendment related to an earlier text. The U.S. had chosen the words LIVE OAK instead of JACK PINE III, because the latter would be NATO's responsibility. The U.K. position was that the words should be open for possible tripartite action. He felt that the governments seated at the table should have the ability to make necessary decisions and that the word "deliberately" should be inserted before "extended outside the corridors."

Admiral Lee stated that he was in agreement.

General Gray asked for clarification, commenting that there was a certain point where operations under JACK PINE had to come under NATO.

Lord Hood commented that it would come under NATO if accompanied by ground suppression action.

Admiral Lee said that this could be done tripertitely.

General Gray said that action following the first action would come under NATO.

Admiral Lee said that that point was covered in the NATO-Tripartite paper and referred to the French point that we might want to try another tripartite probe.

M. Winckler said, yes, that they had discussed that in the last meeting.

Admiral Lee thought that the U.K. wording adequately reflected the U.S. position.

Lord Hood asked Admiral Lee to repeat the reasoning behind the U.S. changes.

Admiral Lee said that he realized the first version was much clearer, and that the second implicitly presented a new problem of possible misinterpretation. But, he explained, this was preferable to the possibility of the enemy's predicting our actions with certainty.


M. Winckler said the change was acceptable to him.

Admiral Lee confirmed with Lord Hood that the U.K. had no more suggestions at that point. He then added that the Phase II language regarding air access as he understood it indicated that other NATO nations -- not all nations -- should participate if they so desired, but that the tripartite powers should in no way be hindered by a reluctance on the part of others.

Lord Hood and M. Winckler both expressed agreement.

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Admiral Lee turned to the proposed change on page 5, saying that "the initiation of" has aggressive connotations and that the U.S. was therefore suggesting "to resort to." He said that there was no change in meaning. In making this suggestion the U.S. had considered M. Winckler's suggestion of leaving out the phrase altogether.

Lord Hood accepted the change.

Admiral Lee said of the final U.S. proposed change, to delete the conclusion, that it was not substantive and there was no reason not to delete it.

M. Winckler said that he could live with it.

Dr. Wieck preferred to have it out.

Admiral Lee commented that the U.S. had no more changes.

M. Winckler expressed the French feeling that Phase IV was extremely short as expressed. As it stood it seemed to state that in Phase IV we had reached the end of the road, but in doing so it seemed a bit weak. The second point was that the French preferred deleting the conclusion. And thirdly he said that, as the others knew, they had something to say about the U.N. possibility; his instructions from Paris were to put the language under brackets with French reservations.

Admiral Lee asked if he had any specific formulation on Phase IV.

M. Winckler said no, that it was just a feeling they wanted to express.

Dr. Wieck said that the Germans had somewhat the same feeling.

Admiral Lee, referring to the U.N. question, asked if it would be better to show it as a "for instance" with a French reservation or to delete it.

M. Winckler said that the French agreed that the question would arise and that he could accept either alternative.


Mr. Kranich asked if there was consensus on how the paper was to be introduced, as a U.S. or quadripartite paper? If as a U.S. paper, then he suggested that inclusion of the reservation would indicate that the U.S. had worked in consultation with the others, and hence, we might not want to accept that alternative. The French would have an opportunity to make their reservation in the Council.

Admiral Lee wondered if it wouldn't be better to delete the phrase and allow it to come out in the Council. He said that mentally he was voting for an unsplit paper, but if others thought it better, the French could indicate their reservation in the paper.

Lord Hood said that the U.K. preferred to have the point kept in, that it was one of the actions bound to be introduced.

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Dr. Wieck suggested that it would perhaps be better if the point were introduced orally instead of formally as a French reservation. The point would certainly come up. It was, he felt, only a technical consideration.

Admiral Lee was concerned that this might result in focusing attention on a relatively minor point.

Lord Hood said that the French were making it an important one.

M. Winckler said that we couldn't really say what "other actions" would be and that it was not the French intention to exclude possible U.N. action. But this, he said, was a military paper and there was no reason to stress this form of political action.

(Pause)

Admiral Lee suggested changing "would seem" to "may be" but on second thought added that it was the reference to the U.N. to which the French objected.

M. Winckler said that that was the case.

Admiral Lee said that this was a problem which would face the Permanent Representative in Paris. For the present he suggested leaving in the French reservation and letting the Ambassadors iron out that problem.

Dr. Wieck said that as he had indicated already the Germans had reservations about the Phase IV language. He said that his purpose in offering a change was to stress the framework. He proposed the addition: "Vital NATO aims will then be achieved only by NATO nations being ready to face general war." He continued that he realized that reference to general war already existed, but nonetheless felt that it would be appropriate to add this sentence to Phase IV.

Lord Hood asked for the opinion of the "NATO experts." Did that seem a suitable note to close on?

(Pause)

Admiral Lee said that he was concerned about the weakness not the strength of the statement. To him it seemed to be a plug for deterrence. But when we get to the nuclear stage we are not just "ready to face." He added that his idea of a grand finale might be something like, "dominated by the nuclear equation." "Too late to bello, time to charge," he added. Use of the words "vital interests" seemed weak; it would be a question of survival.

M. Winckler asked for Admiral Lee's language. Could he find language like that for the text?

Admiral Lee repeated his "dominated by the nuclear equation" phrase and added "dominated by nuclear action." He said that his purpose was to underline the point without saying anything too definitive.

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Lord Hood said the addition was alright with him.

Dr. Wieck said that he wanted to convey the idea that we must face nuclear war. Demonstrative use does not mean an all out strike. This is what we want to bring to NATO's attention. "Dominated by the nuclear equation," what does it mean? That control is no longer possible? We would attempt to avoid general war with demonstrative use and proper phasing. The other formulation implies that there is no way of avoiding general war.

Admiral Lee suggested that Dr. Wieck's point was covered by the British sentence, "General war is imminent."

(Pause)

M. Winckler liked Admiral Lee's formula. By that time, he said, it's not just Berlin; it's the global picture.

Lord Hood said that the group was not attempting to define action, that we want to say: if and when nuclears might be used you would be moving into a realm where different values will predominate. He liked Admiral Lee's wording, although he was perfectly happy with the wording as it stood at the beginning of the meeting. This is what London had approved.

(Pause)

Admiral Lee remarked to Dr. Wieck that anything of substance is already in the last paragraph of Phase III.

(Pause)

Lord Hood asked M. Winkler how he would translate Admiral Lee's proposal? (Pause)

Dr. Wieck felt that the problem was that in the preceding paragraph the "last remaining pressure" was not stated clearly enough. He wanted the idea that now nuclear action would be resorted to. This is Phase IV.

Lord Hood answered that as soon as we take some form of nuclear action general war is imminent. That idea is in Phase III also.

(Pause)

Lord Hood thought the group could go no further.

<u>Dr. Wieck</u> asked if the group would prefer, "dominated by the nuclear equation?" He said that he would prefer to leave the question to the Ambassadorial Group.

M. Winckler commented that we couldn't do that.

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(Pause)

Dr. Wieck suggested that maybe his Ambassador would have new instructions.

Lord Hood suggested that in the meantime they put in the words as suggested.


(Pause)

Mr, Kranick, at Admiral Lee's invitation, commented that it would be useful if members of the group could now exchange views about procedures for introducing the paper in the NAC. An Ambassadorial Group meeting would probably occur the next day at 3:30 or 5:00. Also it would be useful to exchange views on whether they were agreed on the role of the Permanent Representatives from here on out and of Stikker. The U.S. concept was that the Permanent Representatives would carry on from here, making any necessary changes in language. He asked if the others were in agreement. The U.S. would so instruct its Permanent Representative. Also, in view of possible difficulties arising from asking NAC to consider the three papers all at once -- preferred sequence, HERCON/MARCON plans, and NATO-Tripartite relationships -- he hoped that two or three principles might apply in NAC. In addition to thorough consultations with Stikker, he said that the U.S. felt it useful if it and the others could send experts to Paris to participate with the Permreps and Stikker. They would be there also to provide data and information on the broader range of Berlin contingency planning as it related to Poodle Blanket. For instance, the subject of the interrelationship of political and economic measures to military ones would require some kind of briefing. The U.S. was therefore planning to have Mr. Nitze, Mr. Ausland, and Colonel Armstrong go to Paris for this purpose. He hoped that in view of the need for cutting time that the group might consider asking Stikker to schedule meetings Thursday and Friday to insure expeditious handling. There is now a meeting planned for next Wednesday. The U.S. would propose that the Council proceed Thursday and Friday so we can get as much laid out as possible. All the papers and interrelationships can be seen before governments ask guidance. It was also the U.S. thought that because of some differences, particularly in Phases III and IV -- now well cloaked in rather neutral language, there could be some understanding between the countries present that they would minimize hard confrontations among the four powers as they spoke to differences. They should not, he felt, involve NATO in the more difficult issues of strategy. The Secretary of State would speak to this point in the Ambassadorial meeting. The U.S. would interpret NATO agreement on BQD-M-22 (Tripartite-NATO relations) as a consensus of the Alliance that they accepted the transfer of control principle. Perhaps we can get agreement. He then solicited the views of the others. (There was a brief discussion of the time of the next day's meeting. The Germans said they were unsure whether their Ambassador could attend, the French Ambassador would attend, and the British Ambassador would not.)

Lord Hood said that his thoughts on the role of the Permreps coincided with Mr, Kranich's, that he would have them confer with Stikker and that they should have the lattitude to alter wording where necessary. So far as the availability of experts was concerned he doubted whether that would be necessary. He thought the necessary requirements would already be met in Paris. His delegation has the encyclopedia (BQD-CC-1), he said. Regarding the Permreps

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meeting, that would have to be decided in Paris. On the important issue of how they handle differences, he saw no advantage of anyone's maximizing differences. Perhaps it would be better that each have a slightly different approach. These approaches wouldn't emerge as a confrontation, but as good alternatives. The British were interested in what others would have to say.

M. Winckler said that as far as he was concerned it was imperative that the Permanent Representatives get together. He agreed with what had been said so far. On the question of experts he did not know, but supposed Paris would provide them as needed.

(Pause)

Admiral Lee commented on a remark by Lord Hood that the question was whether, as well as how or when. He said that the Tripartite-NATO paper was a valuable tool in holding problems in balance. Without it the BERCON/MARCON plans would be out of context.

Lord Hood said that the final decision must rest in Paris.

Dr. Wieck said that he had no objection to tabling the sequence paper. Whether it were a quadripartite or national paper would depend on the Permreps decision. But he accepted the need for a paper even though he had reservations. There is consensus as to preferred sequence, for instance. This would get German support without doubt. The Germans would send experts to Paris as needed. They hoped that the paper would be discussed with the other two. As to details in NAC, he would report the suggestion that the Permreps make the decision. He also hoped that the discussion would not lead to a conflict of different views. The present wording, he felt, would lead to a good discussion, but it is important that the four governments try to minimize their differences. Of course, each has his approach as Lord Hood pointed cut. He noted that the German Permrep was in Washington two weeks ago, and that there would be no worry about his accepting the paper. He asked what the format of the new sequence paper would be?

Admiral Lee said that new copies of the paper would be out by noon the next day, and with a new date it would be titled BQD-M-30(Revised).

Lord Hood asked if they might number the paragraphs. There were no objections from the State Department. Admiral Lee said he would oblige Lord Hood, if he could.

(The meeting was adjourned at 4:50.)

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