

115TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3776

To support United States international cyber diplomacy, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 14, 2017

Mr. ROYCE of California (for himself, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. MCCAUL, Mr. TED LIEU of California, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mrs. DINGELL, Mr. POE of Texas, Mr. RUPPERSBERGER, Mr. YOHO, Mr. LANGEVIN, Mrs. WAGNER, and Mr. BRENDAN F. BOYLE of Pennsylvania) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To support United States international cyber diplomacy, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Cyber Diplomacy Act
5 of 2017”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) The stated goal of the United States Inter-
9 national Strategy for Cyberspace, launched on May

1 16, 2011, is to “work internationally to promote an
2 open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information
3 and communications infrastructure that supports
4 international trade and commerce, strengthens inter-
5 national security, and fosters free expression and in-
6 novation . . . in which norms of responsible behav-
7 ior guide States’ actions, sustain partnerships, and
8 support the rule of law in cyberspace.”.

9 (2) The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)
10 on Developments in the Field of Information and
11 Telecommunications in the Context of International
12 Security, established by the United Nations General
13 Assembly, concluded in its June 24, 2013, report
14 “that State sovereignty and the international norms
15 and principles that flow from it apply to States’ con-
16 duct of [information and communications technology
17 or ICT] related activities and to their jurisdiction
18 over ICT infrastructure with their territory.”.

19 (3) On January 13, 2015, China, Kazakhstan,
20 Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan pro-
21 posed a troubling international code of conduct for
22 information security which defines responsible State
23 behavior in cyberspace to include “curbing the dis-
24 semination of information” and the “right to inde-
25 pendent control of information and communications

1 technology” when a country’s political security is
2 threatened.

3 (4) The July 22, 2015, GGE consensus report
4 found that, “norms of responsible State behavior can
5 reduce risks to international peace, security and sta-
6 bility.”.

7 (5) On September 25, 2015, the United States
8 and China announced a commitment “that neither
9 country’s government will conduct or knowingly sup-
10 port cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, in-
11 cluding trade secrets or other confidential business
12 information, with the intent of providing competitive
13 advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”.

14 (6) At the Antalya Summit from November 15–
15 16, 2015, the Group of 20 (G20) Leaders’ Commu-
16 nique affirmed the applicability of international law
17 to State behavior in cyberspace, called on States to
18 refrain from cyber-enabled theft of intellectual prop-
19 erty for commercial gain, and endorsed the view that
20 all States should abide by norms of responsible be-
21 havior.

22 (7) The March 2016 Department of State
23 International Cyberspace Policy Strategy noted that,
24 “the Department of State anticipates a continued in-

1 crease and expansion of our cyber-focused diplomatic
2 efforts for the foreseeable future.”.

3 (8) On December 1, 2016, the Commission on
4 Enhancing National Cybersecurity established within
5 the Department of Commerce recommended “the
6 President should appoint an Ambassador for Cyber-
7 security to lead U.S. engagement with the inter-
8 national community on cybersecurity strategies,
9 standards, and practices.”.

10 (9) The 2017 Group of 7 (G7) Declaration on
11 Responsible States Behavior in Cyberspace recog-
12 nized on April 11, 2017, “the urgent necessity of in-
13 creased international cooperation to promote secu-
14 rity and stability in cyberspace . . . consisting of
15 the applicability of existing international law to
16 State behavior in cyberspace, the promotion of vol-
17 untary, non-binding norms of responsible State be-
18 havior during peacetime” and reaffirmed “that the
19 same rights that people have offline must also be
20 protected online.”.

21 (10) In testimony before the Select Committee
22 on Intelligence of the Senate on May 11, 2017, the
23 Director of National Intelligence identified six cyber
24 threat actors, including Russia for “efforts to influ-
25 ence the 2016 US election”; China, for “actively tar-

1 getting the US Government, its allies, and US com-
2 panies for cyber espionage”; Iran for “leverage[ing]
3 cyber espionage, propaganda, and attacks to support
4 its security priorities, influence events and foreign
5 perceptions, and counter threats”; North Korea for
6 “previously conduct[ing] cyber-attacks against US
7 commercial entities—specifically, Sony Pictures En-
8 tertainment in 2014”; terrorists, who “use the Inter-
9 net to organize, recruit, spread propaganda, raise
10 funds, collect intelligence, inspire action by followers,
11 and coordinate operations”; and criminals who “are
12 also developing and using sophisticated cyber tools
13 for a variety of purposes including theft, extortion,
14 and facilitation of other criminal activities”.

15 (11) On May 11, 2017, President Trump issued
16 Presidential Executive Order 13800 on Strength-
17 ening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and In-
18 frastructure which designated the Secretary of State
19 to develop an engagement strategy for international
20 cooperation in cybersecurity, and noted that “the
21 United States is especially dependent on a globally
22 secure and resilient internet and must work with al-
23 lies and other partners” toward maintaining “the
24 policy of the executive branch to promote an open,
25 interoperable, reliable, and secure internet that fos-

1 ters efficiency, innovation, communication, and eco-
2 nomic prosperity, while respecting privacy and
3 guarding against deception, fraud, and theft.”.

4 **SEC. 3. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE**
5 **POLICY.**

6 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Congress declares that it is the
7 policy of the United States to work internationally with
8 allies and other partners to promote an open, interoper-
9 able, reliable, unfettered, and secure internet governed by
10 the multistakeholder model which promotes human rights,
11 democracy, and rule of law, including freedom of expres-
12 sion, innovation, communication, and economic prosperity,
13 while respecting privacy and guarding against deception,
14 fraud, and theft.

15 (b) **IMPLEMENTATION.**—In implementing the policy
16 described in subsection (a), the President, in consultation
17 with outside actors, including technology companies, non-
18 governmental organizations, and security researchers,
19 shall pursue the following objectives in the conduct of bi-
20 lateral and multilateral relations:

21 (1) Clarifying the applicability of international
22 laws and norms, including the law of armed conflict,
23 to the use of ICT.

24 (2) Clarifying that countries that fall victim to
25 malicious cyber activities have the right to take pro-

1 portionate countermeasures under international law,
2 provided such measures do not violate a funda-
3 mental human right or peremptory norm.

4 (3) Reducing and limiting the risk of escalation
5 and retaliation in cyberspace, such as massive de-
6 nial-of-service attacks, damage to critical infrastruc-
7 ture, or other malicious cyber activity that impairs
8 the use and operation of critical infrastructure that
9 provides services to the public.

10 (4) Cooperating with like-minded democratic
11 countries that share common values and cyberspace
12 policies with the United States, including respect for
13 human rights, democracy, and rule of law, to ad-
14 vance such values and policies internationally.

15 (5) Securing and implementing commitments
16 on responsible country behavior in cyberspace based
17 upon accepted norms, including the following:

18 (A) Countries should not conduct or know-
19 ingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual
20 property, including trade secrets or other con-
21 fidential business information, with the intent
22 of providing competitive advantages to compa-
23 nies or commercial sectors.

24 (B) Countries should cooperate in devel-
25 oping and applying measures to increase sta-

1 bility and security in the use of ICTs and to
2 prevent ICT practices that are acknowledged to
3 be harmful or that may pose threats to inter-
4 national peace and security.

5 (C) Countries should take all appropriate
6 and reasonable efforts to keep their territories
7 clear of intentionally wrongful acts using ICTs
8 in violation of international commitments.

9 (D) Countries should not conduct or know-
10 ingly support ICT activity that, contrary to
11 international law, intentionally damages or oth-
12 erwise impairs the use and operation of critical
13 infrastructure, and should take appropriate
14 measures to protect their critical infrastructure
15 from ICT threats.

16 (E) Countries should not conduct or know-
17 ingly support malicious international activity
18 that, contrary to international law, harms the
19 information systems of authorized emergency
20 response teams (sometimes known as “com-
21 puter emergency response teams” or “cyberse-
22 curity incident response teams”) or related pri-
23 vate sector companies of another country.

24 (F) Countries should identify economic
25 drivers and incentives to promote securely-de-

1 signed ICT products and to develop policy and
2 legal frameworks to promote the development of
3 secure internet architecture.

4 (G) Countries should respond to appro-
5 priate requests for assistance to mitigate mali-
6 cious ICT activity aimed at the critical infra-
7 structure of another country emanating from
8 their territory.

9 (H) Countries should not restrict cross-
10 border data flows or require local storage or
11 processing of data.

12 (I) Countries should protect the exercise of
13 human rights and fundamental freedoms on the
14 Internet and commit to the principle that the
15 human rights that people have offline enjoy the
16 same protections online.

17 **SEC. 4. DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITIES.**

18 (a) OFFICE OF CYBER ISSUES.—Section 1 of the
19 State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22
20 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended—

21 (1) by redesignating subsection (g) as sub-
22 section (h); and

23 (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the fol-
24 lowing new subsection:

25 “(g) OFFICE OF CYBER ISSUES.—

1 “(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established an Of-
2 fice of Cyber Issues (in this subsection referred to
3 as the ‘Office’). The head of the Office shall have
4 the rank and status of ambassador and be appointed
5 by the President, by and with the advice and consent
6 of the Senate.

7 “(2) DUTIES.—

8 “(A) IN GENERAL.—The head of the Of-
9 fice shall perform such duties and exercise such
10 powers as the Secretary of State shall prescribe,
11 including implementing the policy of the United
12 States described in section 3 of the Cyber Di-
13 plomacy Act of 2017.

14 “(B) DUTIES DESCRIBED.—The principal
15 duties of the head of the Office shall be to—

16 “(i) serve as the principal cyber-policy
17 official within the senior management of
18 the Department of State and advisor to
19 the Secretary of State for cyber issues;

20 “(ii) lead the Department of State’s
21 diplomatic cyberspace efforts generally, in-
22 cluding relating to international cybersecu-
23 rity, internet access, internet freedom, dig-
24 ital economy, cybercrime, deterrence and
25 international responses to cyber threats;

1 “(iii) promote an open, interoperable,
2 reliable, unfettered, and secure information
3 and communications technology infrastruc-
4 ture globally;

5 “(iv) represent the Secretary of State
6 in interagency efforts to develop and ad-
7 vance the United States international
8 cyberspace policy;

9 “(v) coordinate cyberspace efforts and
10 other relevant functions within the Depart-
11 ment of State, and with other components
12 of the United States Government, includ-
13 ing—

14 “(I) the Department of Com-
15 merce;

16 “(II) the Department of Defense;

17 “(III) the Department of Energy;

18 “(IV) the Department of Home-
19 land Security;

20 “(V) the Department of Justice;

21 “(VI) the Department of the
22 Treasury;

23 “(VII) the Intelligence Commu-
24 nity; and

1 “(VIII) the National Security
2 Council; and

3 “(vi) act as liaison to public and pri-
4 vate sector entities on relevant cyberspace
5 issues.

6 “(3) QUALIFICATIONS.—The head of the Office
7 should be an individual of demonstrated competency
8 in the field of—

9 “(A) cybersecurity and other relevant cyber
10 issues; and

11 “(B) international diplomacy.

12 “(4) ORGANIZATIONAL PLACEMENT.—The head
13 of the Office shall report to the Under Secretary for
14 Political Affairs or official holding a higher position
15 in the Department of State.

16 “(5) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in
17 this subsection may be construed as precluding—

18 “(A) the Office from being elevated to a
19 Bureau of the Department of State; and

20 “(B) the head of the Office from being ele-
21 vated to an Assistant Secretary, if such an As-
22 sistant Secretary position does not increase the
23 number of Assistant Secretary positions at the
24 Department above the number authorized under
25 subsection (c)(1).”.

1 (b) UNITED NATIONS.—The Permanent Representa-
2 tive of the United States to the United Nations shall use
3 the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to op-
4 pose any measure that is inconsistent with the United
5 States international cyberspace policy described in section
6 3.

7 **SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE EXECUTIVE AR-**
8 **RANGEMENTS.**

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to
10 enter into executive arrangements with foreign govern-
11 ments that support the United States international cyber-
12 space policy described in section 3.

13 (b) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—The formal or in-
14 formal text of any executive arrangement entered into by
15 the United States under subsection (a) shall be trans-
16 mitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
17 of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
18 tions of the Senate not later than five days after such ar-
19 rangement is signed or otherwise agreed to, together with
20 an explanation of such arrangement, its purpose, how such
21 arrangement is consistent with the United States inter-
22 national cyberspace policy described in section 3, and how
23 such arrangement will be implemented.

24 (c) STATUS REPORT.—Not later than one year after
25 the formal or informal text of an executive arrangement

1 is submitted to Congress pursuant to subsection (b) and
2 annually thereafter for seven years, or until such an ar-
3 rangement has been discontinued, the Secretary of State
4 shall report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
5 House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
6 Relations of the Senate on the status of such arrangement,
7 including an evidence-based assessment of whether all par-
8 ties to such arrangement have fulfilled their commitments
9 under such arrangement, whether the stated purpose of
10 such arrangement is being achieved, and whether such ar-
11 rangement positively impacts building of cyber norms
12 internationally. Each such report shall include metrics to
13 support its findings.

14 (d) EXISTING EXECUTIVE ARRANGEMENTS.—Not
15 later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
16 Act, the President shall satisfy the requirements of sub-
17 section (c) for the following executive arrangements al-
18 ready in effect:

19 (1) The arrangement announced between the
20 United States and Japan on April 25, 2014.

21 (2) The arrangement announced between the
22 United States and the United Kingdom on January
23 16, 2015.

24 (3) The arrangement announced between the
25 United States and China on September 25, 2015.

1 (4) The arrangement announced between the
2 United States and Korea on October 16, 2015.

3 (5) The arrangement announced between the
4 United States and Australia on January 19, 2016.

5 (6) The arrangement announced between the
6 United States and India on June 7, 2016.

7 (7) The arrangement announced between the
8 United States and Argentina on April 27, 2017.

9 (8) The arrangement announced between the
10 United States and Kenya on June 22, 2017.

11 (9) The arrangement announced between the
12 United States and Israel on June 26, 2017.

13 (10) Any other similar bilateral or multilateral
14 arrangement announced before the date of the en-
15 actment of this Act.

16 **SEC. 6. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE.**

17 (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than one year
18 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
19 of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
20 Federal departments and agencies, shall produce a strat-
21 egy relating to United States international policy with re-
22 gard to cyberspace.

23 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
24 section (a) shall include the following:

1 (1) A review of actions and activities under-
2 taken to support the United States international
3 cyberspace policy described in section 3.

4 (2) A plan of action to guide the diplomacy of
5 the Department of State with regard to foreign
6 countries, including conducting bilateral and multi-
7 lateral activities to develop the norms of responsible
8 international behavior in cyberspace, and status re-
9 view of existing efforts in multilateral fora to obtain
10 agreements on international norms in cyberspace.

11 (3) A review of alternative concepts with regard
12 to international norms in cyberspace offered by for-
13 eign countries.

14 (4) A detailed description of new and evolving
15 threats to United States national security in cyber-
16 space from foreign countries, State-sponsored actors,
17 and private actors to Federal and private sector in-
18 frastructure of the United States, intellectual prop-
19 erty in the United States, and the privacy of citizens
20 of the United States.

21 (5) A review of policy tools available to the
22 President to deter and de-escalate tensions with for-
23 eign countries, State-sponsored actors, and private
24 actors regarding threats in cyberspace, and to what

1 degree such tools have been used and whether or not
2 such tools have been effective.

3 (6) A review of resources required to conduct
4 activities to build responsible norms of international
5 cyber behavior.

6 (7) A clarification of the applicability of inter-
7 national laws and norms, including the law of armed
8 conflict, to the use of ICT.

9 (8) A clarification that countries that fall victim
10 to malicious cyber activities have the right to take
11 proportionate countermeasures under international
12 law.

13 (c) FORM OF STRATEGY.—

14 (1) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The strategy re-
15 quired under subsection (a) shall be available to the
16 public in unclassified form, including through publi-
17 cation in the Federal Register.

18 (2) CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—

19 (A) IN GENERAL.—If the Secretary of
20 State determines that such is appropriate, the
21 strategy required under subsection (a) may in-
22 clude a classified annex consistent with United
23 States national security interests.

24 (B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in
25 this subsection may be construed as authorizing

1 the public disclosure of an unclassified annex
2 under subparagraph (A).

3 (d) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after the pro-
4 duction of the strategy required under subsection (a), the
5 Secretary of State shall brief the Committee on Foreign
6 Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Com-
7 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on such strat-
8 egy, including any material contained in a classified
9 annex.

10 (e) UPDATES.—The strategy required under sub-
11 section (a) shall be updated—

12 (1) not later than 90 days after there has been
13 any material change to United States policy as de-
14 scribed in such strategy; and

15 (2) not later than one year after each inaugura-
16 tion of a new President.

17 (f) PREEXISTING REQUIREMENT.—Upon the produc-
18 tion and publication of the report required under section
19 3(c) of the Presidential Executive Order 13800 on
20 Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and
21 Critical Infrastructure on May 11, 2017, such report shall
22 be considered as satisfying the requirement under sub-
23 section (a) of this section.

1 **SEC. 7. ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS**
2 **PRACTICES.**

3 (a) REPORT RELATING TO ECONOMIC ASSIST-
4 ANCE.—Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
5 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end
6 the following new subsection:

7 “(h)(1) The report required by subsection (d) shall
8 include an assessment of freedom of expression with re-
9 spect to electronic information in each foreign country.
10 Such assessment shall consist of the following:

11 “(A) An assessment of the general extent to
12 which internet access is available to and used by citi-
13 zens in each country.

14 “(B) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
15 ernment authorities in each country attempt to fil-
16 ter, censor, or otherwise block or remove nonviolent
17 expression of political or religious opinion or belief
18 via the internet, including electronic mail, as well as
19 a description of the means by which such authorities
20 attempt to block or remove protected speech.

21 “(C) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
22 ernment authorities in each country have persecuted,
23 prosecuted, or otherwise punished an individual or
24 group for the nonviolent expression of political, reli-
25 gious, or ideological opinion or belief via the inter-
26 net, including electronic mail.

1 “(D) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
2 ernment authorities in each country have sought to
3 collect, request, obtain, or disclose the personally
4 identifiable information of a person in connection
5 with such person’s nonviolent expression of political,
6 religious, or ideological opinion, belief, or commu-
7 nication that would be protected by the International
8 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

9 “(E) An assessment of the extent to which wire
10 communications and electronic communications are
11 monitored without regard to the principles of pri-
12 vacy, human rights, democracy, and rule of law.

13 “(2) In compiling data and making assessments for
14 the purposes of paragraph (1), United States diplomatic
15 personnel shall consult with human rights organizations,
16 technology and internet companies, and other appropriate
17 nongovernmental organizations.

18 “(3) In this subsection—

19 “(A) the term ‘electronic communication’ has
20 the meaning given such term in section 2510 of title
21 18, United States Code;

22 “(B) the term ‘internet’ has the meaning given
23 such term in section 231(e)(3) of the Communica-
24 tions Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(e)(3));

1 “(C) the term ‘personally identifiable informa-
2 tion’ means data in a form that identifies a par-
3 ticular person; and

4 “(D) the term ‘wire communication’ has the
5 meaning given such term in section 2510 of title 18,
6 United States Code.”.

7 (b) REPORT RELATING TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE.—
8 Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
9 U.S.C. 2304) is amended—

10 (1) by redesignating the second subsection (i)
11 (relating to child marriage status) as subsection (j);
12 and

13 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
14 section:

15 “(k)(1) The report required by subsection (b) shall
16 include an assessment of freedom of expression with re-
17 spect to electronic information in each foreign country.
18 Such assessment shall consist of the following:

19 “(A) An assessment of the general extent to
20 which internet access is available to and used by citi-
21 zens in each country.

22 “(B) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
23 ernment authorities in each country attempt to fil-
24 ter, censor, or otherwise block or remove nonviolent
25 expression of political or religious opinion or belief

1 via the internet, as well as a description of the
2 means by which such authorities attempt to block or
3 remove such expression.

4 “(C) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
5 ernment authorities in each country have persecuted,
6 prosecuted, or otherwise punished an individual or
7 group for the peaceful expression of political, reli-
8 gious, or ideological opinion or belief via the inter-
9 net.

10 “(D) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
11 ernment authorities in each country have sought to
12 collect, request, obtain, or disclose personally identi-
13 fiable information, or other information that could
14 be used to classify individuals into a historically dis-
15 criminated category based on a person’s nonviolent
16 expression of political, religious, or ideological opin-
17 ion or belief, including without limitation commu-
18 nication that would be protected by the International
19 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

20 “(E) An assessment of the extent to which wire
21 communications and electronic communications are
22 monitored without regard to the principles of pri-
23 vacy, human rights, democracy, and rule of law.

24 “(2) In compiling data and making assessments for
25 the purposes of paragraph (1), United States diplomatic

1 personnel shall consult with human rights organizations,
2 technology and internet companies, and other appropriate
3 nongovernmental organizations.

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5 “(A) the term ‘electronic communication’ has
6 the meaning given such term in section 2510 of title
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9 such term in section 231(e)(3) of the Communica-
10 tions Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(e)(3));

11 “(C) the term ‘personally identifiable informa-
12 tion’ means data in a form that identifies a par-
13 ticular person; and

14 “(D) the term ‘wire communication’ has the
15 meaning given such term in section 2510 of title 18,
16 United States Code.”.

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