

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969045

By WDP NARA Date 10/19/00

SECRET/~~EXCIS~~ (H2) 9/22/78

EXCIS FILES

7118562

Distribution in S/S-S 11/22/71

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

COMPLETED DISTRIBUTION

DATE: NOV 22 1971

Initial WDP

DATE: November 16, 1971

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Michael Butler, Counselor, Embassy of Great Britain
Robert A. Martin, PM/DCA (State Department)

COPIES:	S	EUR 2	ACDA (2)
	U	INR	CIA-Mr. Clarke
	J	S/PC	OSD/SA-Dr. Tucker
	C		OSD/ISA-Col. Randall
	PM 2		NSC Secretariat—Mrs. Davis
			AmEmbassy LONDON

USDEL SALT VI

Mr. Butler asked to get a run-down on the US position for SALT VI. I told him that the basic US position is unchanged, and that Ambassador Parsons would be so indicating in a restricted NAC in Brussels tomorrow. Mr. Butler said he was not surprised at this since this is the general impression he had gained from talking to various people during the recess.

Mr. Butler then gave me the Talking Points on SALT that had been cleared by UK Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas Home for use in his meeting with President Nixon September 30. (See attachment) Mr. Butler said he had been instructed to provide the points to Mr. Spiers, and I said that I would ensure that Mr. Spiers saw them. I noted that the Talking Points made clear the UK interest in a Soviet ABM level "as low as possible." Mr. Butler assured me that this point remained of central importance to the UK.

In that regard, Mr. Butler said he wanted to correct a possible misimpression created by some comments made by Mr. Macklen of the UK MOD during the US-UK bilateral SALT discussion in late July.

PM/DCA:RAMartin:sac
(Drafting Office and Officer)

TOP SECRET/~~EXCIS~~

check for orig

11/16/71

ROL UK-MS X DEF R-3 AUS (VI)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969045By WDP NARA Date 10/18/00TOP SECRET/EXDIS

2.

Mr. Macklen had indicated that the critical level of Soviet ABMs with respect to UK penetration capability was 300. However, Mr. Butler emphasized, this would only be true with a UK force of greater penetration capability than now exists; the proposed improved UK nuclear force. In the current situation, the UK would have difficulty if the Soviets had more than 200 ABM launchers. Therefore, the US 2-or-1 ABM proposal was fine with respect to this specific UK interest and concern, because the Soviets surely would choose to defend Moscow and be limited thereby to 100 launchers. If the USSR did not accept this proposal, the UK would infinitely prefer a change to 1-for-1 and not one which allowed the USSR 2 sites and, thereby, 200 launchers. I told Mr. Butler, as I indicated at the outset, that the US position is unchanged, including the specifics of our 2-or-1 ABM proposal.

TOP SECRET/EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969045By WDP NARA Date 10/18/00TOP SECRET

ATTACHMENT

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES: SEPTEMBER 1971

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NIXON

SALT

(-) Points to be made (see annexed Background Brief)

"1. We are grateful for being kept informed of developments, bilaterally as well as through NATO.

"2. We welcome the progress made at the recent Helsinki session. The agreements on measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, and to improve hot-line communications between the US and the USSR are a useful practical and public sign of this progress.

"3. The negotiation of an agreement to limit ABMs is apparently at an advanced stage, and we assume, now that the Helsinki session is over, that the Americans will be considering their final bargaining position. The Russians appear to have shown some flexibility on ABM levels. This may therefore be a suitable opportunity to put our position on record with the President. We realise that ABM levels are only one element of these complex negotiations, and that there are many other factors which the Americans must take into account. But as British officials have explained on a number of occasions, we have a special national interest in the level of Soviet ABMs which emerges from SALT being as low as possible. This is of vital concern to us for the maintenance of our own nuclear capability. We trust that our interest will be taken into account when the President is deciding what proposals should be put to the Russians."

For MK-745

TOP SECRET