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INSTRUCTIONS FOR JAMES DONOVAN

1. James Donovan will be returning to Cuba at Castro's invitation for a week in March. While, from our point of view, the primary purpose of Donovan's mission will be to secure the release of the Americans, his time with Castro will provide the United States Government an invaluable opportunity to affect the course of events in Cuba. This paper deals with the potentialities of the Castro discussions and not with the prisoners' release.

2. We should anticipate that it will be difficult to obtain a United States position on what should be said to Castro. While this is a policy decision--and policy is not our role or responsibility--everything that can be said to Castro will be based on what CIA believes Castro might do as a result of what Donovan may say to him.

3. The United States has three objectives in Cuba. First, we want to get rid of all the Russians and their equipment and weapons. Second, we want to stop the Communists from using Cuba as a base for subversion throughout Latin America. Third, we want the Cuban government to change from one that is Communist controlled to one that is acceptable within the framework of the Organization of American States.

4. United States objectives in Cuba can be accomplished in a variety of ways. First, there can be an invasion by U.S. military forces

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in order to overthrow the Castro government and install one to our liking. This is obviously the last resort and certainly one which the United States has not been willing to face up to. It is obvious that we will never have another opportunity like that of October 1962 when the provocation was obvious and clearly demonstrable to the world. Second, we could covertly support the Cuban exiles in another operation designed to overthrow the Castro government. While Castro has probably less support today within Cuba than he did at the time of the Bay of Pigs, he still is sufficiently strong militarily to defeat any exile attempt that is not backed by U. S. military force. We have little reason to believe that this situation will change. Third, we can engage in other phases of political warfare to persuade Castro to break with the Communists, and restore some form of relations with the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. This is where Donovan comes in.

5. From what Donovan has told us about his discussions with Castro, and from what gleanings we can pick up from other intelligence sources, particularly third country diplomats, there seems to be some possibility that Castro might be weaned away from the Communists if his idealism, his nationalism and his vanity were all properly catered to. How to do this without offending the OAS, other allies, or U. S. public opinion is what must be considered. Therefore, it would seem that the basic question is what Donovan should tell Castro is something to give him the basic prerequisites for re-establishing amicable relations with the U. S.

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6. First, Castro should be told that he must get the Russians out of Cuba lock, stock and barrel. This is a theme which should bear some success with Castro because he is beyond question disillusioned with his Soviet friends as a result of their removing the missiles and bombers, apparently without consultation or notice. Beyond question, he must be disillusioned with Big Brother who backed down when the United States threatened force.

7. Second, Castro must agree to stop all Communist subversion efforts directed at Latin America. There is hope in this line also. At his last meeting he told Donovan that he thought there was the possibility of reform in Latin America without revolution between now and 1970. He must recognize that the Alliance for Progress has many of the same objectives as his revolution. Donovan could be thoroughly briefed along these lines for his discussions with Castro.

8. Third, Castro should be persuaded to throw the Communists out of his government and to renounce his "Marxist-Leninist" thesis. As far as getting rid of his Communist associates is concerned, there are some indications that there are splits in the Cuban hierarchy. Further, Castro can be given plenty of illustrations of the dangers of his position and the fact that if he doesn't get rid of the others, they will inevitably get rid of him. His own renunciation of Marxism is far more difficult, but here arguments can be used to show him that the split between Russia and China leaves him as nothing more than a pawn between two

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powers at the other side of the world, and that they are going to be far too concerned with their own major differences to be able to back him at the end of an extended line of communication. If the Russians back down over the missiles, obviously the Chinese are in even a less advantageous position as far as Cuba is concerned.

9. If Castro can be persuaded to evolve toward the above conditions, then perhaps Donovan could hint at the United States gradually giving consideration to the resumption of trade and commerce with Cuba. Donovan should make it very clear that the United States demands proof of good intent before it will act, and that while Castro has made a start in this direction by releasing the Bay of Pigs and the American prisoners, any trend toward resumption of good relations will require other evidence.

10. This could lead into a discussion of the resumption of Pan American flights, the development of first what would be limited trade and the possibility of the return of the American tourist, which, second only to sugar, was one of Cuba's principal sources of income. Here, the political warfare aspect of the problem starts to bear fruit. The return of the American tourist, or from that point of view, even the third country traveller, will afford the CIA tremendous opportunities for intelligence collection and political and psychological warfare. The Cuban is basically very pro American and has always liked the North Americans. While undoubtedly Castro has lined up some hard core

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anti-Americans among the youths and Negroes, in a little over four years he has not been able to blot out the image of the United States as a friend which exists in the minds of most Cuban adults. In fact, it might be hazarded that the Castro regime would have difficulty surviving the resumption of normal relations with the United States.

11. Finally, Donovan could paint for Castro a glowing picture of what could be done for Cuba as a friend of the United States in contrast with the permanently black picture that will prevail--with only one ultimate result--if Cuba continues to make the United States her enemy. With Donovan's gift as an actor and his forensic ability, he should be a good match for Castro in this debate.

