

~~SECRET~~
OIL DENIAL

Record of Meeting held in the State Department on 1st May 1951.

Present:

United States

Mr. George Prussing, C.I.A.
Lt. Col. D. Roberts, U.S.A.F.,
(Office of Petroleum Programmes,
Department of Defense)

United Kingdom

Mr. J.A. Beckett, Petroleum Attaché
Major J.A.B. Darlington, G.H.Q.,
Middle East Land Forces

1. At the request of the U.K. representatives, Mr. Prussing outlined their organisation for carrying out denial in Saudi Arabia. The organisation is based on the three Aramco districts and follows the company's administrative system. Spread over the districts are 45 senior company officials fully in the picture in relation to their own districts, with a total of about 200 individuals with some knowledge of the plans. The majority of these, however, are only aware of the particular part they would have to play should denial become necessary. The U.K. authorities believe that as a result of this organisation, sufficient men would always be available to cover the absence of a small percentage. In addition to the company officials, the C.I.A. have five officials employed in the ARAMCO organisation carrying out normal oil industry duties ranging from an assistant to the General Manager down to a stereosetter. These five men are charged with the responsibility of keeping the C.I.A. informed of the company's developments and plans which, in the main, have been developed on the site. Only the General Manager of the company and the U.S. Consul General in Tehran are aware of the dual role of the C.I.A. representatives operating as company employees.

2. Major Darlington then presented the U.K. general priority list and handed copies to the American representatives. Following Major D. Darlington's detailed explanation of the application of this list to Abadan and Kirkuk, the Americans expressed themselves as being in general agreement with the U.K.'s views similar to their own. The priority list is attached to this minute as Annex A. The American representatives said that in their opinion our plan was sound because of the absence of any arrangements for co-ordination with our companies in advance. They expressed disappointment that we had not made progress in this direction.

3. Mr. Prussing then read extracts from a paper on American theoretical priority of denial targets within a refinery area. He agreed, subject to revision, to provide a copy of this paper and also a sterilised copy of the plans for Saudi Arabia.

4. The following points arose during discussion on the Army

- (a) Their plan is divided into three sections - Plan A, complete denial and occurring ample time. This plan only insofar as a reduction of effort is involved a degree of denial judged sufficient to keep the operation for a period of six to twelve months between 48 to 96 hours to execute and Plan C, requiring limited time only and which could be carried out without the use of explosives. C.I.A. to supply the explosives which consist of charges and American standard military explosives are now being despatched in do not yet sufficient quantity for the although we are less likely to return to involve months once we abandon to carry out our demolition plans so that modern and limited denial.

(b) Mr. Prussing explained in further detail the plan to destroy power services. He stated that they are not intending to destroy turbines or alternators but would attack the governors and flexible couplings. The main alternators, they feel, would be useless if the rest of the denial plan is carried out and the Russians would experience great difficulty if they attempted to ship them to Russia. The Americans recognise that the U.K. is faced with a more difficult problem at Abadan and Kirkuk owing to the rather better transportation facilities to the north. It is felt, however, that the necessity of destroying heavy machinery of this type might be re-examined in London.

- (c) With regard to the destruction of stores and smaller pieces of machinery which might be transported with relative ease, the Americans intend to attack with flame throwers and, in general, to make use of this weapon quite extensively in their denial activities. The possibility of the U.K. adopting a similar course might be examined as this method might be more economical in weight.
- (d) The Americans plan to use thermite grenades for the destruction of stocks of oil and T.E.L. and in the destruction of transportation vehicles. Stocks of spare parts, and in particular tyres, will be attacked in the same manner.
- (e) Following up the suggestion made by the American representatives at the meeting held on 30th April about running down the stocks at Abadan by increasing the rate of export in a time of emergency, it suggested that it might be possible, prior to any denial action, to recycle at any rate a proportion of refined products which do not be lifted by tanker.

5. With regard to drilling equipment, the Americans intend to attack light rigs used for water-well drilling. The heavy oil rig will be tackled by destruction of draw works, power plant and the like from the area.

6. During a discussion on counter-denial measures in the pre-Prussing explained the operation of the Oatis plug. He indicated that no one has full information about the development of the use of the Oatis plug or one of similar type would be action permanently it could only be removed by drilling. Equipment has been removed by us and it would interrupt starting production if the drilling rigs have been cut. It is understood that at present the Oatis plug is available through the tubing.

7. Some discussion took place about the introductory spirit, which might be left intact, and abroad. Consideration should be given to this question in case of occupying contaminating agents.

8. Mr. Prussing explained that field test, those, together with the result of techniques - Sabotage in conjunction with our own exports, had methods for dealing with the various types of planes. Army officials had received practical training in to be called upon to carry out.

9. Mr. Prussing said that if detailed ~~work~~ he would probably attend and also his representative in Basra. Discussions could start after the 10th June.