

DATE: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CANCELLED
JUN 9 1967

For the Atomic Energy Commission JOINT TASK FORCE ONE
OPERATION CROSSROADS
Washington, D.C.

7 March 1946

ROBERT L JACKSON *RM* for the
Chief, Declassification Branch
Public Information Estimate No. 1

1. This estimate is prepared with a view to informing personnel of Joint Task Force One of the general attitude of the public toward Operation Crossroads, and suggesting appropriate public information policies to be followed. It is planned to supplement this estimate in the future by further analyses of trends in public opinion as they develop. In addition to this estimate, press digests will be issued as frequently as practicable.

Criticisms

2. The basic public attitude toward Operation Crossroads appears to be sane and encouraging. The test is generally accepted by the press as valuable, its conduct is regarded as competent and impartial, and it is widely recognized as a forward-looking military experiment.

3. There is strong public interest in Crossroads, which has resulted in close examination of its publicized elements and in prompt criticism of those features which, to some, appear dangerous or ill advised. These criticisms may be summarized as follows:

- Interests of the Navy or the Armed Services.
- a. Alleged unfair conduct of the tests in the Navy or the Armed Services.
 - b. Excessive expense.
 - c. Alleged unscientific nature of the tests, particularly a limited participation by civilian scientists.
 - d. Lack of necessity for the tests in view of data already available.
 - e. The tests form a vehicle for inter-service jealousies based on the contention that the tests will prove the Navy obsolete, or the Air Force obsolete, and other speculative combinations of this sort, including the question of merger.
 - f. Possible large-scale dangers involved:
 - (1) Uncontrollable chain reaction.
 - (2) Tidal waves.
 - (3) Volcanic eruptions.
 - (4) Radiation effects at great distances.
 - (5) Grave risk to personnel in the Marshalls and those conducting the tests.

- 08
- g. Lack or inadequacy of foreign representation.
 - h. Lack or inadequacy of press representation.
 - i. Sacrifice of ships with sentimental or historical value.
 - j. Destruction of sea life and damage to fisheries.
 - k. Damage to international relations and the progress toward proper control by conducting experiments with the atomic bomb.
 - l. Pacifistic reaction against further development of weapons and armed forces.
 - m. Use of animals in the test.

Possible Future Criticisms

4. Additional lines of criticism, as yet undeveloped, may be seen as follows:

- a. Jeopardy of essential military secrecy by authorization of foreign observers to attend.
- b. Alleged slowdown of demobilization because of tests.
- c. Excessive security enforced during the tests.
- d. Inefficient conduct of tests.

5. To date public opposition to the tests has been sporadic, relatively unorganized, and ineffective. Widest opposition appears to come from the "dissatisfied scientists," who state that data now on hand will not be increased by the tests. There is strong S.P.C.A. reaction to the use of animals.

Suggested Public Information Policies of JTF-1

6. In developing a sound public information policy with respect to these tests, it is suggested that the members of the task force, in their public utterances, keep in mind the following general points:

- a. The tests are not intended to "prove" or "disprove" anything. The first test is an experiment to measure the effects of one Nagasaki-type bomb dropped from a plane, against an array of naval ships and various other Army and Navy equipment such as airplanes, tanks, etc. On some of these targets it is intended to inflict maximum damage on others, the damage must be slight. Otherwise the data gathered will not be of great value. We are trying to sink some ships and leave some relatively undamaged. There is no analogy of the tests to a "simulated attack" by aircraft carrying atomic bombs against a disposition of warships at sea or at anchor in a harbor.
- b. The bomb we are using is the Nagasaki type, which is the most powerful in existence. Since the publication of the Smyth report there has been much talk about atomic bombs hundreds and thousands of times as powerful as the Nagasaki bomb, probably based on a misinterpretation of statements made in that report. To produce even a few bombs hundreds of times as powerful as the

Nagasaki bomb would require a new scientific and industrial effort at least comparable to the Manhattan District; and it is not certain then that the effort would be successful.

- c. The tests are scientific experiments to gather needed information.
- d. The conduct of these tests has no relation to the current public controversy concerning Congressional action on the McMahon Bill tending toward control of atomic energy by civilians, and the May-Johnson Bill in which large powers over atomic control are vested in the Armed Forces. Emphasize that the tests are going forward as a proper military measure which is necessary if the Armed Forces are to discharge the responsibilities to the nation which they have under the Constitution. This they must do until world organization is further developed than is now the case. Point out that all thinking persons in the Army and Navy hope that the atomic bomb will never be used as a weapon by any nation.
- e. The operation is a joint project of the Army and Navy, with participation by the Manhattan District and the support and cooperation of other branches of the Government such as Fish and Wildlife Survey, U.S. Construction and Geodetic Survey, U.S. Geological Survey, etc.
- f. Publicize the fact that over 500 civilian scientists are actively cooperating in the operation.
- g. Avoid speculation as to the probable results of the tests and the immediate significance of the results after they are known. Emphasize we are trying to find out what will happen. Thus far only three atomic bombs have been detonated. Until we hold these tests we will not know the effects of these bombs on ships, on many other lesser targets, and on water.
- h. Point out that until plans for control of atomic energy are developed and crystallized by the Congress of the United States and the United Nations Organization, it is the duty of the Armed Forces of the United States to safeguard many secrets concerning the development, manufacture, and military uses of the atomic bomb.
- i. Full evaluation of the data obtained will not be possible until many months have elapsed after the tests. It will be erroneous and possibly harmful to the United States and to the world at large for the public to draw hasty conclusions from the headline results of the test, such as so many ships sunk, winds of such velocity, waves so many feet high, etc.

- j. Extensive precautions that are being taken for the safety of the personnel conducting and observing the tests.
- k. Avoid attempting to answer specific criticisms of the test. Do not allow controversies to build up in attempting to defend one or another aspect of the operation. Simply keep pointing out the facts as we now know them; i.e., what we are doing how we are doing it, for what purpose we are doing it.

Submitted

Fitzhugh Lee

FITZHUGH LEE

Captain, USN

Public Information Officer

Approved

[Handwritten Signature]

S. H. P. BLANDY

Vice Admiral, USN

Commander, Joint Task Force One