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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW
MR. STEPHEN HADLEY
MR. VICTOR ALESSI
MR. DOUGLAS MACEACHIN
LTG JOHN SHALIKASVILI
AMBASSADOR READ HANMER

FROM: JOHN GORDON *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Nuclear Initiatives Discussion Paper

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records Declass Div, WHS
Date: APR 25 2016

We plan to meet this afternoon at 3:00 pm to discuss where we go in response to the new initiatives presented by President Gorbachev. I have drafted a short paper (attached) outlining the specific Soviet proposals and a few of the considerations that should bear on how we respond.

At our meeting I would like to briefly discuss each element and decide how to proceed on each.

Attachment
Discussion Paper

NSC Declassification Review [EO 13526]
DECLASSIFY IN PART
by Mary Ronan on 12/22/2014

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Department of Energy Document Review	
1 st Review Date: <u>11/12</u> <i>[Signature]</i> US-60 Reviewer Authority: IC <u>DD-X</u> Derived From: _____ Declassify On: _____	Determination: [Circle Number(s)] 1. Classification Retained 2. <input checked="" type="radio"/> Upgraded/Downgraded To: <u>FRD</u> 3. Contains No DOE Classified Info 4. Coordinate With: _____ 5. Declassified 6. Classified Info Bracketed 7. Other (Specify): <u>W/Att. Encl.</u>
2 nd Review Date: <u>11/4/13</u> <i>[Signature]</i> US-60 Reviewer Authority: DD	

Office of the Secretary of Defense S.U.S.C. § 552
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Soviet Proposals

1. Destroy all naval tactical nuclear weapons.

President Gorbachev proposed that on a reciprocal basis the two sides destroy all naval tactical nuclear weapons.

There are three obvious options for the U.S. -- stick by our original position to destroy a portion of those removed, agree to the Soviet proposal, or find some middle ground.

Under the original U.S. initiative, we plan to retain only the SLCMs and B-61s gravity bombs. [REDACTED]

It would seem that there is little to be gained by seeking an intermediate option, destroying a greater percentage of these weapons. We would not have met the Soviet initiative, would not have saved much money, and would seem to be a niggling response.

Before deciding between the other two options we need to answer the following questions:

- What is the role we envisage for the stored weapons?
- What weapons and in what numbers are the Soviets likely to retain? What is their military potential?
- If we say "no" to this Soviet proposal, how will we articulate the need to retain these weapons in the face of the Soviet offer to do away with the entire class.

2. Central storage of all tactical air-deliver nuclear weapons.

President Gorbachev proposed that on a reciprocal basis, all air-delivered tactical weapons be stored at centralized locations, away from combat units.

This seems to be a workable proposition, one at least worth consideration for a positive response. It would bring the Soviet weapons under potentially better control and store them away from their aircraft. At the same time, the Soviets have given air-delivered nuclear weapons in Europe a new legitimacy. (Some would argue that the Soviet offer in itself gives US air-delivered forces in Europe a new legitimacy.)

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4. Proposal to examine developing joint early-warning systems of nuclear attacks with land- and space-based elements.

We should be willing to talk to the Soviets about this -- it is a more specific proposal of the President's statement in his speech. That forum may also be another place to speak to stability, strategic balance, MIRVs and the like.

5. A one-year unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, hoping to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

(!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)

6. Agree on the verified cessation of weapons-grade fissionable materials.

The United States has not enriched uranium for nuclear weapons since 1964 -- we anticipate an excess of some 170 metric tons over the next several years and plan to use the majority of the excess for naval power reactor fuel. There is also a significant excess of plutonium, and planned weapons returns will more than make up for the requirements for new production, provided we can process the return material.

This appears to be a step we can sign up to promptly, but we should not agree to verification. That is, our step should be a unilateral policy statement to the effect that it is not US policy to produce additional fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. We will have to make clear that this does not limit our operation of tritium production reactors which have the inherent capability of producing plutonium, and that it does not limit our ability to produce the plutonium isotope used by NASA in space power systems.

We will need to define what we want to do in terms of "openness and transparency," but we do not want to get into a verification swamp. It is clear from earlier work that we cannot hope to verify the quantity of already existing Soviet material.

7. Joint declaration by all nuclear powers on no first use of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. position (and NATO's) has long been that all should disavow the first use of all military force. We see no reason to change at this time. In fact we may be in an extremely strong position with the reformists in the Soviet Union to get them to sign up to our formulation.

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