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Soviet Tactical Nuclear Forces and Gorbachev's Nuclear Pledges: Impact, Motivations, and Next Steps

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- If Gorbachev's *unilateral* initiatives to reduce tactical nuclear warheads are carried out, *almost 75 percent* of Moscow's inventory of these warheads will be *destroyed or placed in central storage*.
- If Gorbachev's *reciprocal* proposals are implemented, all of the Soviet inventory of tactical nuclear warheads will be *destroyed or placed in central storage*.
- The elimination process will take at least several years.
- Soviet arms control positions probably are not fully worked out, but in the future Soviet negotiators are likely to become more flexible and abandon most old agenda items with the exception of dual-capable aircraft and the nuclear weapons of other countries.

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Date: MAR 22 2016

Key Judgments

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The Potential Impact of Gorbachev's Proposals

The withdrawal of many Soviet units from Eastern Europe and reductions in the size and number of units within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone that have occurred over the past two years already have caused a sharp decline in the number of tactical nuclear systems in Soviet forces opposite NATO.

President Gorbachev's 5 October proposals, if implemented, further advance that process. We estimate that unilateral measures will lead to the destruction of between 4,000 and 9,000 warheads, or more than half the tactical nuclear warheads in Moscow's inventory. From 1,300 to 2,800 tactical nuclear warheads will be moved to central storage.

A unilateral reduction on this scale will:

- Eliminate the nuclear capability of Soviet Ground Forces.
- Increase the amount of time the Soviet Navy will require to arm its ships, submarines, and aircraft with nuclear munitions.
- Take at least several years to implement.

Reciprocal measures proposed by Gorbachev would, if implemented:

- Eliminate the tactical nuclear capability of the Soviet Navy.
- Limit the air forces' quick-response tactical nuclear capability by placing warheads in central storage.

Motivations Behind the Proposals

The speed and content of Gorbachev's response to President Bush's initiative of 27 September reflect the high priority Soviet officials place on nuclear security:

- Elimination of all nuclear artillery projectiles and short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) warheads will remove most of the tactical nuclear warheads located in non-Russian republics.
- Gorbachev is using the US proposal to reassert himself as a reliable and credible negotiating partner, but his capability to fulfill completely his own proposals is questionable.

The Future of Soviet Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Negotiating Positions

Dismantling and destroying nuclear warheads is a complex and time-consuming process, and any new union, therefore, is likely to retain a tactical nuclear capability for the foreseeable future.

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Because of continuing improvements in conventional weapon systems, the senior Soviet leadership has probably concluded that tactical nuclear warheads can be eliminated or stored without significantly compromising the war-fighting capabilities they will require. [REDACTED]

The Soviets probably have not had enough time to think out fully their negotiating positions. We believe the Soviets are likely to:


- Be less insistent on old agenda items and display considerable flexibility, while trying to preserve the option to revisit issues, especially those affected by evolving relations between the center and the republics.
 - Maintain a low-key approach to further negotiations to avoid kindling the interest of republic leaders in becoming full players in formal talks.
- [REDACTED]

Carryovers from the old Soviet agenda, however, will include concern about US dual-capable aircraft and inclusion of other countries in discussions of tactical nuclear systems. This posture may reflect a greater concern about proliferation to the south and on the continent than about the United Kingdom and France. [REDACTED]

At a minimum, the Soviets will seek a process of consultations during all phases of the implementation of US and Soviet reductions. They probably will also seek technical—and perhaps financial—aid in dismantling and destroying warheads. [REDACTED]

Disarray in Moscow and evolving political relations will complicate the negotiating process for some time. Elements in the military may still be recalcitrant, and the republics—especially Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—want a greater say in the Kremlin's nuclear decisionmaking.

[REDACTED]



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Discussion

President Gorbachev's response to President Bush's nuclear initiative affects all Soviet nuclear forces, but its emphasis on elimination of tactical nuclear munitions gives it a particularly sweeping effect on tactical nuclear forces. At the same time, it cuts through months of fencing on the nature and scope of negotiations that were intended to achieve some of the same ends that each side has now pledged to reach unilaterally. This paper examines the impact of Gorbachev's response on tactical nuclear forces, the motivations behind his action, possible future proposals, and our ability to track Soviet implementation of Gorbachev's promises. [Redacted]

Tactical Nuclear Forces

Tactical nuclear forces include short-range weapon systems of the Soviet ground, air, and naval forces.¹ Most of the weapon systems involved are "dual capable," that is, capable of using both conventional and nuclear munitions.² Because of their dual capability, these weapon systems are integrated into the general purpose, or frontal, forces of the Soviet Union.³ [Redacted]

In number, breadth, and depth, Soviet tactical nuclear forces reached their zenith in the mid-to-late 1980s. Since then, cutbacks in Soviet general purpose forces—resulting from unilateral force reductions, the

¹ As used in this paper, the term tactical nuclear forces includes short-range ballistic missile and rocket systems, field artillery systems capable of firing nuclear projectiles, atomic demolition munitions, tactical aircraft (including light and medium bombers) capable of using nuclear bombs or air-to-surface missiles, and naval nuclear torpedoes, antiship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, depth charges, and mines. [Redacted]

² These weapons are also capable of delivering chemical munitions. [Redacted]

³ The number of "nuclear-capable" systems in this paper include all items of equipment in the inventories capable of performing a nuclear mission regardless of the availability of warheads, trained crews, or maintenance of the system for a nuclear role. In each case, smaller numbers of delivery systems than counted here would actually be assigned nuclear missions. [Redacted]

withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and the downsizing of Soviet forces within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) zone in anticipation of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty provisions—have resulted in a significant decline in the number of tactical nuclear-capable weapon systems in active unit inventories. However, since nuclear delivery missions would not be assigned to all technically capable weapons, these reductions have not significantly reduced Soviet capability to deliver tactical nuclear warheads. Modernization programs to improve these systems have continued, but the uncertain future most of these programs faced before the abortive August coup is even more open to question in its aftermath. [Redacted]

Soviet Ground-Based Tactical Nuclear Forces⁴

These forces comprise short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) systems, artillery systems, and atomic demolition munitions. (See table 1 on page 11) Ground-based, nuclear-capable systems are integrated with the ground forces and are found in all the current and former Soviet republics. The largest concentrations are assessed to be in Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia. Some tactical nuclear-capable systems remain with Soviet forces in Germany and Poland, but we believe their nuclear munitions have been returned to the former USSR. [Redacted]

The SRBM force currently consists of some 1,600 Scud, SS-21, and FROG launchers, of which 1,200 are in the active unit inventory. This figure represents a decline of 20 percent of the 1989 SRBM force in active units. Of the over 300 FROG and Scud launchers removed from the active unit inventory through unit disbandments, about two-thirds have been placed in storage; the other third has been [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 22 2016

destroyed. None of the more modern SS-21 systems have been removed from the active unit inventory. For the most part, SRBM systems are organized into independent brigades (although the older FROG system and some SS-21 battalions remain in maneuver divisions). [REDACTED]

The Soviets have some 9,000 nuclear-capable artillery pieces in active units, with another 4,200 in storage. Most of these are 152-mm cannons, with smaller numbers of 203-mm cannons and 240-mm mortars. Some 4,500 of these nuclear-capable artillery pieces were moved east of the Urals in anticipation of the signing of the CFE Treaty. Nuclear-capable artillery systems are found in front artillery divisions, army artillery brigades, and in the artillery regiments of virtually all maneuver divisions. [REDACTED]

We believe the Soviets have two types of atomic demolition munitions (nuclear land mines)—one small enough to be man portable and one so large that its emplacement requires engineering equipment. The man-portable mines are associated with *spetsnaz* brigades; the larger ones with special construction troops. We estimate the Soviets have a total of 50 to 200 atomic demolition munitions. [REDACTED]

Air Force Tactical Aviation

Excluding heavy bombers, the Soviet Air and Air Defense Forces have some 6,700 nuclear-capable aircraft in their active unit inventories. These are organized into medium and light bomber, fighter-interceptor, fighter-bomber, ground support, and reconnaissance regiments. (See table 2 on page 11) These regiments are based in most republics of the former USSR; the largest concentrations are in Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia. Another 1,000 nuclear-capable tactical aircraft are in flyable storage. [REDACTED]

CFE mandated reductions—combined with unilateral withdrawals, basing adjustments, and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact—have led to changes in the disposition, structure, and subordination of tactical aviation, but not to a significant reduction in the size of the force since the late 1980s. About 400 nuclear-capable tactical aircraft were removed from the ATTU zone, and another 650 were resubordinated from the Soviet Air Force to Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA). [REDACTED]

Naval Forces

Currently, 158 surface ships, 224 submarines, and about 1,370 aircraft in SNA active units are capable of using tactical nuclear weapons. About 500 SNA aircraft are in flyable storage. (See table 3 on page 13.) The tactical weapon systems with which these ships, submarines, and aircraft are equipped include nuclear torpedoes, antiship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, depth charges, and mines. The number of ships and submarines with nuclear-capable weapon systems has declined in recent years; this decline will continue as construction slows and scrapping of older ships and submarines accelerates. Because newly commissioned ships and submarines can carry significantly more nuclear-capable missiles, however, the at-sea nuclear capability of the Navy has remained relatively constant. [REDACTED]

Nuclear Warhead Stockpile

The Soviet inventory is assessed to contain some 7,500 to 15,000 tactical nuclear warheads.¹ The warheads are stored in 146 locations in the former Soviet Union. Almost 60 percent of these sites are in the Russian Republic; most of the others are in Ukraine and Byelorussia. (See table 4 on page 15.) These locations include 118 Direct Support Sites that store warheads for particular combat units and 28 National Stockpile Sites that are larger repositories for a wide variety of munitions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] changes in its disposition [REDACTED] apparently relate to withdrawals of nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe and areas of civil unrest in the former USSR. [REDACTED]

Impact of Gorbachev's Response

Unilateral Steps

The steps Gorbachev promised to undertake unilaterally would substantially cut Soviet tactical nuclear capability. The promised destruction of warheads

¹ To avoid confusion between delivery means and nuclear munitions, this paper uses "warhead" rather than "weapon" to refer to all specific nuclear munitions. [REDACTED]

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Tactical Nuclear Warheads Affected by Soviet Proposals

<i>System</i>	<i>Community Estimate</i>	<i>Soviet Proposal</i>
Unilateral Steps		
<i>SRBMs</i>	<i>2,500 to 6,000</i>	<i>Elimination</i>
<i>Nuclear artillery</i>	<i>1,500 to 3,000</i>	<i>Elimination</i>
<i>Atomic demolition munitions (ADM)s</i>	<i>50 to 200</i>	<i>Elimination</i>
<i>Tactical ship-borne naval weapons ^a</i>	<i>1,000 to 2,000</i>	<i>Withdrawal, centralized storage, partial elimination</i>
<i>Naval Aviation</i>	<i>300 to 800</i>	<i>Centralized storage, partial elimination</i>
Steps Conditioned on Reciprocity		
<i>Tactical aviation</i>	<i>2,000 to 3,500</i>	<i>Reciprocally agreed withdrawal and centralized storage</i>
<i>Tactical naval weapons</i>	<i>See above</i>	<i>Complete elimination upon mutual agreement</i>
Total	About 7,500 to 15,000	

^a Includes nuclear torpedoes, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, depth charges, and mines

would reduce the estimated stockpile of tactical nuclear warheads by more than half; that is, by 4,000 to 9,000 nuclear warheads:

- Elimination of all nuclear warheads for SRBMs, artillery, and mines would remove entirely the nuclear capability of the Soviet Ground Forces.
- Withdrawal to centralized storage and partial elimination of warheads for tactical naval systems would not eliminate the Navy's tactical nuclear capability, but it would reduce its responsiveness. Current Soviet practice is to load tactical nuclear warheads onto some naval ships and all submarines performing routine peacetime patrol. The unilateral withdrawal of tactical naval warheads to central storage would involve an estimated 1,300 to 2,800 warheads.
- Cancellation of a developmental, air-launched, "short-range nuclear missile" program. [REDACTED]

Steps Conditioned on US Reciprocity

The additional steps Gorbachev proposed, conditioned on US reciprocity, would further reduce Soviet tactical nuclear capability. They would eliminate the Navy's tactical nuclear capability, and the nuclear capability of the tactical air forces would be circumscribed in responding immediately to a crisis by withdrawal of warheads to central storage. If consolidation of warheads in central storage were extended to tactical air forces, an estimated 2,000 to 3,500 warheads would be involved. [REDACTED]

The effect of these steps on capabilities depends, in part, on the meaning of "central storage." If the Soviets mean consolidation away from the Direct Support Sites—presumably at the National Stockpile Sites (and perhaps only at those in the Russian Republic)—nuclear munitions would be placed at a considerable distance from the ports and airfields of most of the units that might employ these warheads. This step, in combination with the elimination of all ground-based nuclear munitions, would limit a Soviet quick-response tactical nuclear capability. It is not clear if Gorbachev meant that warheads to be placed

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 22 2016

CIA
1.4(c) + 3.5(c)

in central storage would be moved to the National Stockpile Sites; it is also not clear that these sites would have the capacity to absorb them. [REDACTED]

Motivations

Gorbachev's response probably was not motivated principally by military considerations. More likely, Gorbachev saw a political need to respond in a comprehensive and forthcoming way to President Bush's initiative and to growing concerns about the security of Soviet tactical nuclear warheads in the various republics. [REDACTED]

Soviet officials almost certainly welcomed the Bush initiative as a means of curbing republic nuclear ambitions and reasserting the need for central control of nuclear weapons. Even before the US announcements, nuclear security had become a top priority of the leadership. Had there been no US initiative, the center almost certainly would have held out the prospect of talks with the United States on tactical nuclear forces as one more reason why nuclear weapons had to remain under central control. The center will continue to portray the control of tactical nuclear forces as an arena in which it must take the lead. [REDACTED]

The content of the US initiative encouraged the Soviets to respond with a parallel focus on warheads, rather than delivery systems, but concerns about nuclear security may also have pushed them in that direction. Indeed, Gorbachev's plan to eliminate nuclear artillery projectiles and SRBM warheads will remove a substantial portion of the most accessible nuclear warheads located in the non-Russian republics. [REDACTED]

Concern about the nuclear status of the republics may have accounted, in part, for the decision to eliminate all nuclear artillery projectiles and SRBM warheads, rather than only a portion of them. The Soviets had been reluctant to take this step because they hoped to trade their substantial numerical superiority in ground-based systems for cuts in Western dual-capable aircraft (DCA). In circumstances where leaders of both Ukraine and Kazakhstan had made clear their

resentment of Russian acquisition of all nuclear warheads, the leadership may have hoped to appeal to non-Russian republics by calling for complete elimination of artillery and SRBM nuclear munitions. There may also have been some concern about the security of tactical nuclear warheads in Russia. [REDACTED]

The center almost certainly also welcomed the US initiative as a chance to reassert itself as a reliable and credible negotiating partner. Soviet and Russian officials strongly support the US message on the need for a single voice on issues of nuclear security. They undoubtedly expect to use US concerns in their domestic discussions of future defense structures. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev's response also reflects a perception among key military and political leaders of the diminished utility of tactical nuclear forces in the changed strategic circumstances. Previously assigned nuclear missions were predicated on large-scale offensive operations deep into Western Europe. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and the enunciation of a defensive doctrine emphasizing defense of Soviet territory, tactical nuclear forces lost much of their relevance in theater planning. [REDACTED]

The Future of Soviet Tactical Nuclear Forces

The future of these forces, like everything else in the former Soviet Union, is subject to great uncertainties. Tactical nuclear capabilities will remain for the foreseeable future. The complexities of warhead dismantlement and destruction mean that there will be no quick denuclearization, even for those systems for which warheads are to be eliminated. Some nuclear planning options probably will remain for tactical naval forces, whose warheads are to be consolidated in central storage. Moreover, restrictions on the tactical air forces' nuclear capabilities will primarily occur through negotiated agreements. [REDACTED]

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 22 2016

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Even with the removal or elimination of nuclear munitions, these forces will retain important nonnuclear capabilities (including the delivery of chemical munitions). Modernization programs are under way that will significantly enhance the conventional capabilities of these systems. For the most part, these programs aim at improving the accuracy, range, lethality, and survivability of delivery systems. At the same time, these improvements will increase the nuclear capability of systems whose warheads are not being eliminated and will add to the potential nuclear capability of other systems if decisions to eliminate warheads are reversed. [REDACTED]

Since the mid-1980s, the Soviets have asserted that emerging conventional weapons were equivalent to battlefield nuclear munitions in their destructive effects. Some theorists now question the military utility of nuclear weapons because of their destructive collateral damage effects and the inability to control escalation. The Soviets note that emerging conventional weapons are more responsive, produce less collateral damage, and pose far less risk of escalation. Consequently, the senior Soviet leadership has probably concluded that tactical nuclear warheads can safely be removed from the Ground Forces inventory without significantly compromising their war-fighting capabilities. [REDACTED]

Against the backdrop of economic collapse, efforts to convert defense industries to civilian production, and uncertainties about future commitment of resources to research and development and procurement, however, the future of modernization programs for tactical systems is open to serious question. To the extent that they can influence resource decisions, military leaders are likely to push for the cheaper, near-term programs that emphasize improvements to existing systems. [REDACTED]

Whatever the fate of the modernization programs, tactical nuclear-capable forces will shrink in size over the next few years. This smaller force will be more modern, with a higher percentage of newer weapon systems because reductions will be achieved by destroying older systems first. [REDACTED]

Soviet Policy and Perspectives on Tactical Nuclear Reductions

The combined impact of postcoup realities and President Bush's initiative has sharply altered the environment in which the Soviets assess their goals for tactical nuclear forces. This change will lead the Soviet leadership to assess priorities against a backdrop of new uncertainties. The US initiative put considerable pressure on Soviet leaders to respond quickly, yet they probably have not had time since the events in August to reassess fully a policy line that even then was in evolution. In this atmosphere, it seems likely that the Soviets will be less insistent on some previous agenda items and will display considerable flexibility on other matters, but they will also seek to preserve the option to revisit issues as center-republic relations are resolved. [REDACTED]

Developing a New Agenda

The center probably will want to be engaged in ongoing discussions with the United States on tactical nuclear forces to reinforce its own status and may seek to portray future talks on parallel reductions or technical issues as "negotiations." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Soviets will probably maintain their low-key approach and seek to get technical discussions—a priority for both the center and the republics—under way quickly. [REDACTED]


The new environment may substantially alter attitudes toward some of the traditional questions related to tactical nuclear forces. Gorbachev's proposals provide an opportunity to revisit these issues once the initial work of denuclearizing republics and newly independent states has been accomplished. [REDACTED]

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 22 2016

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Gorbachev's inclusion of proposals to consider reductions in air-delivered nuclear munitions suggests that to some degree the importance of *capturing US dual-capable aircraft* has carried over from the old short-range nuclear forces (SNF) negotiating agenda.



Moreover, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev raised the prospect of reductions in DCA.

indicating that even those officials most disposed to large-scale, unilateral reductions in their nuclear arsenal view Western air capabilities as a threat. At the same time, the prospect of additional unilateral cuts in their own forces may prompt the Soviets to be less protective of their own assets and more willing to sustain deep cuts in air and conventional capabilities to capture US systems.

Inclusion of a reference to the *tactical nuclear systems of "other countries"* is also a holdover from the earlier SNF agenda. The driving force for such a marker, however, may now reflect Soviet concern about nuclear proliferation both in nations to the south and on the continent, rather than merely an effort to limit British and French capabilities. Nevertheless, the center is unlikely to press for expanding the talks to include third-country systems at this time, while its docket is dominated by the overwhelming need to ensure nuclear security in the republics.

Gorbachev's cancellation of a developmental, air-launched "short-range nuclear missile" program preserves the nominal *right to modernize* systems at a later date—a hedge that may have been merely a

concession to the military's near-term concerns for maintaining a broad spectrum of future defense options.

Soviet views on *reductions in components of tactical nuclear forces other than munitions* (that is, delivery systems) probably are also still under development. Even in the less fluid environment before the abortive coup, the Soviet view of the right unit of account for tactical nuclear discussions remained undefined.

a range of options, including cuts in SRBM missiles and launchers for concessions on DCA from the United States, offers for reciprocal reductions in warhead holdings, and even a zone-based or range-cap approach to negotiating certain systems. A near-term move to place launchers—and thus their conventional capability—on the block may come about only because of the center's concern over thinking among the republics about their own defense requirements. Over the longer term, the center may still try to use its SRBM force as a bargaining chip, but officials almost certainly recognize that a lack of nuclear potential will diminish its value in negotiations.

Next Steps

Moscow will seek a thorough consultation process during all phases of projected US and Soviet unilateral actions. The extent to which the Soviets will want to move beyond this approach—particularly while center-republic defense issues are being sorted out—will depend in large part on their assessment of European desires for a more formal process. The Soviets probably will remain interested in—and receptive to proposals for—such confidence-building measures as information exchanges on dismantlement and destruction timetables, both to track US actions and possibly to build trust among the republics as new security relations develop.


Center officials probably will press for further details on technical, and perhaps financial, aid for dismantlement and destruction programs. The results of the

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West European Perspectives on Tactical Nuclear Forces in Europe

NATO members enthusiastically support the US and Soviet unilateral proposals to eliminate ground- and sea-based tactical nuclear warheads as a way to reduce the threat to NATO flank countries and the East Europeans. They are optimistic that these measures will reinforce central control over Soviet tactical nuclear warheads and hope that speedy destruction of these warheads will lessen the risk of nuclear proliferation in the republics. Most Allies supported the unilateral nature of the US announcements, but they probably will advocate continued US consultations with Moscow and the republics—as well as within the Alliance—on tactical nuclear forces.




The US and Soviet initiatives may encourage Allies to continue to argue for a lower profile for nuclear weapons in NATO's strategic concept and for further distancing from the old strategy of flexible response.

The Allies support US intentions to maintain a nuclear presence in Europe, even if there is little support for the deployment of new air-delivered nuclear systems on the continent. We believe most Allied governments will resist Soviet initiatives further to reduce or eliminate NATO's remaining dual-capable aircraft and air-delivered nuclear weapons.



follow-on talks seem to demonstrate that the thinking of the Soviets on procedures, coordination between republics, or, indeed, on whether they have the infrastructure needed to dismantle and destroy warheads, is still in its early stages.



Soviet officials may also raise issues related to tactical nuclear forces in the 1992 Helsinki review conference and its preparatory talks, as well as in the future Security Forum of 38 nations. The Soviets could try to use these multilateral forums to build pressure on the United States for further reductions in the remaining tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe—particularly in DCA. Officials are probably already watching Europe, and Germany in particular, for signs of growing anti-nuclear sentiment and may move quickly to exploit such attitudes to gain greater understanding of remaining Western nuclear capabilities.

OSD 3.3(b)(1), 3.5(c)

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Potential Complications

Continued Central Authority.

[REDACTED]
the speed with which Gorbachev delivered his response to President Bush suggests he can mobilize the national security bureaucracy when necessary.

[REDACTED]

Soviet negotiating behavior in arms control forums since the attempted coup suggests that the disarray in the formal power structures in Moscow has not yet caused policy paralysis, but there is evidence that military recalcitrance continues. Soviet delegations have returned to all arms control and security forums [REDACTED]. Some new positions indicate that they have received changes in instructions. At the same time, [REDACTED] military elements in Moscow continue to resist progressive arms control positions.

Role of the Republics. The extent of the republics' roles in formulating Gorbachev's response is unclear.

[REDACTED]

Commentary from republic leaders on the tactical nuclear portions of Gorbachev's proposals has been sparse. Even Russian officials who called for deeper reductions in strategic forces than those proposed by Gorbachev have not taken exception to those portions of his response dealing with tactical warheads. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, in meetings with US officials, showed no signs of disagreement with the proposal on tactical nuclear warheads. In fact, he highlighted the need for a Western response to Gorbachev's suggested moves on air-delivered nuclear weapons, raised the prospect of future negotiations on tactical nuclear-capable forces, and emphasized the

importance of further measures to restrict proliferation among the republics. Kozyrev explicitly declined to be seen as negotiating for the center, but, on these issues, he and Gorbachev seem to agree. [REDACTED]

Greater input from the republics—especially Russia—almost certainly will nudge the center toward more flexible positions. These may focus on actions that reduce the defense burden and respond to domestic concerns about environmental degradation and nuclear safety. Over the longer term, however, as republics contemplate their own defense needs, they may become less cooperative on nuclear-capable systems. If they continue to regard Russia as a potential enemy, some may see value in a limited nuclear deterrent, or at least in retaining the conventional capability of tactical nuclear delivery systems. Ukraine and Kazakhstan have qualified the nuclear-free stance they adopted immediately after the August coup attempt. Both are now actively engaged in defining their defense needs and their role in the control of nuclear weapons in the former USSR. [REDACTED]


The center's ability to implement pledges on tactical nuclear weapons will depend heavily on military cooperation among the key republics. These relationships remain fluid, and the climate that results from the resolution of questions concerning defense cooperation will determine whether implementation can be accomplished. [REDACTED]

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Table 1
Disposition of Soviet Ground-Based Nuclear-Capable Delivery Systems,
October 1991

	Total Force	Russia	Ukraine	Moldova	Byelorussia	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Kazakh
Short-range ballistic missile launchers	1,210/401	612/180	192/200	30/0	84/21	46/0	24/0	24/0	32/0
Scud	460/135	232/80	96/50	12/0	30/5	12/0	12/0	12/0	12/0
SS-21	298/36	70/35	76/0	18/0	54/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
FROG	452/230	310/65	20/150	0/0	0/15	34/0	12/0	12/0	20/0
Nuclear-capable artillery pieces	8,988/4,210	4,470/3,555	1,358/49	96/0	598/1	60/0	76/0	60/0	608/38
152 mm	8,368/2,901	4,150/2,255	1,250/42	96/0	550/1	60/0	76/0	60/0	560/38
203 mm	446/574	200/567	102/7	0/0	48/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	24/0
240 mm	174/735	120/733	6/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	24/2

Table 2
Disposition of Soviet Tactical Nuclear-Capable Aircraft,
October 1991*

	Total Force	Russia	Ukraine	Byelorussia	Georgia	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Turkmeniya	Uzbeki
Aircraft	6,672/1,006	2,959/513	898/19	519/15	205/0	82/0	453/188	208/269	218/0
Backfire	179/0	90/0	34/0	37/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Badger	123/213	60/50	20/16	15/15	0/0	0/0	10/132	0/0	0/0
Blinder	120/0	0/0	40/0	80/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Fencer	958/0	300/0	248/0	125/0	58/0	40/0	35/0	0/0	35/0
Fishbed	510/124	250/68	128/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	92/56	0/0	0/0
Fitter	627/93	350/78	30/0	0/0	41/0	0/0	40/0	55/15	62/0
Flanker	524/0	285/0	40/0	21/0	32/0	0/0	0/0	15/0	31/0
Flogger	2,223/501	1,179/317	150/3	56/0	40/0	0/0	200/0	108/179	0/0
Foxbat	150/0	35/0	14/0	50/0	0/0	12/0	16/0	0/0	0/0
Frogfoot	409/75	150/0	34/0	85/0	0/0	30/0	15/0	0/75	30/0
Fulcrum	849/0	260/0	160/0	50/0	34/0	0/0	45/0	30/0	60/0

* Includes Soviet Air and Air Defense Forces.

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: **MAR 22 2016**

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In active unit inventory/in storage

Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Turkmeniya	Uzbekistan	Tajikistan	Kyrgyzstan	Lithuania	Latvia	Estonia	WGF/ Germany	NGF/ Poland
24/0	32/0	24/0	4/0	4/0	4/0	12/0	4/0	4/0	102/0	8/0
12/0	12/0	12/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	30/0	0/0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	72/0	8/0
12/0	20/0	12/0	4/0	4/0	4/0	12/0	4/0	4/0	0/0	0/0
60/0	608/388	21/0	372/116	18/0	0/0	120/0	18/0	3/0	1,020/101	90/0
60/0	560/386	21/0	324/116	18/0	0/0	72/0	18/0	3/0	1,020/101	90/0
0/0	24/0	0/0	24/0	0/0	0/0	48/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
0/0	24/2	0/0	24/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0

In active unit inventory/in flyable storage

Turkmeniya	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	Lithuania	Latvia	Estonia	WGF/ Germany	NGF/ Poland
208/269	218/0	40/0	50/2	191/0	151/0	540/0	158/0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	18/0	0/0	0/0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	18/0	0/0	0/0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
0/0	35/0	0/0	0/0	12/0	0/0	24/0	81/0
0/0	0/0	40/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
55/15	62/0	0/0	0/0	14/0	0/0	35/0	0/0
15/0	31/0	0/0	0/0	35/0	0/0	0/0	65/0
108/179	0/0	0/0	50/2	130/0	115/0	195/0	0/0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	11/0	12/0
0/75	30/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	65/0	0/0
30/0	60/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	210/0	0/0

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Table 3
Disposition of Soviet Tactical Nuclear-Capable Naval Forces, October 1991

	Total Force	Russia	Ukraine	Moldova	Byelorussia	Latvia	Estonia
Submarines	224	198	10	0	0	16	0
Akula-class SSN	7	7	0	0	0	0	0
Sierra-class SSN	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
Victor-class SSN	46	46	0	0	0	0	0
Yankee Notch-class SSN	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
Foxtrot-class SS *	25	12	4	0	0	9	0
Kilo-class SS	20	17	2	0	0	1	0
Tango-class SS	18	17	1	0	0	0	0
Whiskey-class SS	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Charlie-I-class SSGN	9	9	0	0	0	0	0
Charlie-II-class SSGN	5	5	0	0	0	0	0
Echo-II-class SSGN	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
Modified Echo-II-class SSGN	10	10	0	0	0	0	0
Juliett-class SSG	8	0	2	0	0	6	0
Oscar-class SSGN	8	8	0	0	0	0	0
Delta-class SSBN	43	43	0	0	0	0	0
Typhoon-class SSBN	6	6	0	0	0	0	0
Yankee-class SSBN	10	10	0	0	0	0	0
Yankee-class SSGN	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Surface ships	158	120	31	0	0	7	0
Kuznetsov-class CVG	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Baku-class CVHG	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Kiev-class CVHG	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
Moskva-class CHG	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
Kirov-class CGN	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
Kara-class CG	7	4	3	0	0	0	0
Kresta-I-class CG	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Kresta-II-class CG	10	10	0	0	0	0	0
Kynda-class CG	3	1	1	0	0	1	0
Slava-class CG	3	2	1	0	0	0	0
Kashin DDG	7	0	6	0	0	1	0
Modified Kashin DDG	2	1	1	0	0	0	0
Sovremenny-class DDG	14	14	0	0	0	0	0
Udaloy-class DDG	12	12	0	0	0	0	0
Krivak-I-class FF	21	16	5	0	0	0	0
Krivak-II-class FF	11	9	2	0	0	0	0
Nanuchka-I-class PGG	17	8	4	0	0	5	0
Nanuchka-III-class PGG	19	17	2	0	0	0	0
Tartantul-III-class PGG	21	17	4	0	0	0	0

Table 3 (continued)
Disposition of Soviet Tactical Nuclear-Capable Naval Forces, October 1991

	Total Force	Russia	Ukraine	Moldova	Byelorussia	Latvia	Estonia
Naval aviation (in active unit inventory/ in flyable storage)	1,360- 1,373/489	846-868/ 160	398-412/ 222	33/0	0-5/107	39/0	30/0
Backfire	157-170/6	82-104/0 ^b	61-75/4	0/0	0-5/2	0/0	0/0
Badger	143/205	130/142	13/58	0/0	0/5	0/0	0/0
Blinder	27/4	0/3	27/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Fencer	112/0	53/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	29/0	30/0
Fishbed	0/28	0/15	0/13	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Fitter	170/160	126/0	44/130	0/0	0/30	0/0	0/0
Flanker	24/0	0/0	24/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Flogger	38/70	38/0	0/0	0/0	0/70	0/0	0/0
Frogfoot	102/16	70/0	32/16	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Fulcrum	81/0	0/0	48/0	33/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Bear F	55/0	53/0	2/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
May	46/0	33/0	3/0	0/0	0/0	10/0	0/0
Mail	96/0	67/0	29/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Helix A	124/0	105/0	19/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Hormone A	103/0	44/0	59/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Haze A	82/0	45/0	37/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0

^a DIA holds 45 Foxtrots in the inventory. CIA identifies only 25 Foxtrots active.

^b One regiment of approximately 20 Backfire aircraft now used as trainers at a Ukrainian naval airbase is expected to transfer permanently to a Northern Fleet airbase in Russia in the near future.

CIA
1.4(c) + 3.5(c)

OSD 3.3(b)(2) + 3.5(c)

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Date: MAR 22 2016

Table 4
Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites Serving
Tactical Nuclear Forces, October 1991

	Total Force	Russia	Ukraine	Moldova	Byelorussia	Georgia	Armenia
Direct support nuclear storage sites	118	63	21	2	10	4	1
Supporting ground forces	54	23	12	1	6	1	1
Supporting tactical aviation forces	33	15	6	1	3	3	0
Supporting tactical naval forces							
Supporting submarines and surface ships	15	14	0	0	0	0	0
Supporting naval aviation	16	11	3	0	1	0	0
National stockpile sites	28	22	4	0	1	0	0

CIA
1.4(c)+3.5(c)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)+3.5(c)

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: **MAR 22 2016**

Russia	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Turkmeniya	Uzbekistan	Lithuania	Latvia
4	1	2	6	3	1	3	2	
1	1	2	4	2	0	2	0	
3	0	0	2	1	1	1	0	
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	

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