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WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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NLS F99-060/1 H-348

By AMJ, NARA, Date 5/21/06

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Allied Views on a Response to Gorbachev

As you recall, Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny (along with Ron Lehman and Bob Linhard) were sent last week to consult with our NATO and Asian allies, respectively, on the approach you propose to take in responding to the overall arms control plan put forward by General Secretary Gorbachev last month. I provided you with a preliminary staff summary of the reports coming in from the consultation teams last weekend in California. At Tab A and Tab B are letters from your two emissaries formally reporting on their trips. They represent a more seasoned assessment of the allied reaction from their perspectives.

Additionally, we have begun to receive replies to your most recent letter on this subject sent to allied leaders. You may find the personal replies of Prime Minister Thatcher (Tab C), Prime Minister Nakasone (Tab D) and Prime Minister Lubbers (Tab E) of particular interest. Each, for very different reasons, has reacted to our proposed INF approach. [REDACTED]

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We are revisiting the INF approach, taking into consideration these results and will be providing you with a recommended course of action by week's end.

Attachments:

- Tab A Letter from Ambassador Paul Nitze dated 2/14/86
- Tab B Letter from Ambassador Edward Rowny dated 2/14/86
- Tab C Letter from Prime Minister Thatcher dated 2/11/86
- Tab D Letter from Prime Minister Nakasone dated 2/10/86
- Tab E Letter from Prime Minister Lubbers dated 2/17/86

Prepared by:
Bob Linhard
Bill Wright

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 14, 1986

Dear Mr. President,

Pursuant to your instructions, Ron Lehman and I consulted with the senior government leadership in London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, The Hague and Brussels. We also held consultations with the North Atlantic Council at the end of our bilateral discussions in capitals. This is our report on those consultations.

Our European allies are most appreciative of your emphasis on the consultative process and showed general support for your anticipated response to General Secretary Gorbachev's January program. They understand the necessity of your trying to work with Mr. Gorbachev to find common ground in arms control on which we can base an agreement which would be in the interest of both East and West. They are, however, fully aware that Mr. Gorbachev's proposal was packaged and delivered to maximize its political and propaganda impact. They are supportive of the "positive tone" of your proposed response to Mr. Gorbachev, but largely because they believe such a tone is necessary to counter the public effect of the Gorbachev proposal. In sum, they are, in general, with you in your response to the Soviets.

There was no significant disagreement with our appraisal that the Gorbachev proposal is astute, designed for its political impact, designed to drive wedges in the Alliance, and requires a careful response. Almost all favored a response that would be positive in tone but cautious as to specifics. They approved the idea of focusing on bilateral first steps, and the idea of emphasizing the preconditions to a nuclear-free world. None suggested changing our START or our basic Defense/Space position.

There are problems, however. A number of issues surfaced which should be considered as suggestions for modifications to your anticipated response to Mr. Gorbachev or to our public handling of that response.

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BY AM NARA DATE 5/31/06

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[REDACTED] there was some questioning of a response which included in its first steps a zero/zero outcome on INF in Europe. [REDACTED]

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Some opponents of zero/zero INF in Europe argued that withdrawing U.S. INF forces could "decouple" the U.S. from Europe, a situation which they claim the 1979 dual-track decision was aimed to redress.

The Germans are supportive of both the goal of total elimination and zero/zero INF in Europe. Because of their unique geographic position, they are also sensitive to the shorter-range missile issue. Hence, they are appreciative that your proposed response would address this issue, whereas Mr. Gorbachev did not.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

There was general support for SDI as a research program which potentially could strengthen the deterrent; there was disagreement, however, with linking it to the objective of a nuclear-free world. Some thought we should develop a dialogue to clarify ABM Treaty restraints in a way that would make evident that SDI research is not limited. Some also suggested an extension of time with regard to withdrawal.

There was a virtual consensus that you should press Mr. Gorbachev strongly for a total ban on chemical weapons and on an acceptable outcome on a package of CSBMs from the Stockholm Conference. The Allies are also anxious for movement in MBFR. They are mindful, however, that an agreement from the Vienna forum cannot in itself redress the conventional force imbalance in Europe.

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
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With the exception [REDACTED] ^{FOUO (1)} there was universal concern over U.S. opposition to a CTB. Most of this criticism seemed to stem from domestic political pressure in the Allied countries. Some suggested we express more strongly approval of a CTB as a goal to be attained some time in the future.

Almost all urged that we continue to abide by the limitations of existing strategic arms treaties; otherwise it would have devastating effect on European support for and confidence in U.S. arms control policy.

Finally, the Allies were unanimous in the view that your response to Mr. Gorbachev should pick up on, and challenge him to demonstrate his willingness meaningfully to implement, his overture on verification.

Respectfully,



Paul H. Nitze
Special Advisor to the President
and the Secretary of State
on Arms Control Matters

The President

The White House

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~~SECRET~~ United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 14, 1986

Dear Mr. President,

The leaders of Japan, PRC, Korea and Australia all expressed their gratitude that you sent me to expand upon your proposed response to Gorbachev's January 15 "plan."

They were unanimous in their praise of your initial reaction. While they consider Gorbachev's "plan" to be largely propaganda, they said you were correct in adopting a positive attitude and "welcoming" the common ground while expressing disagreement with many of the details of his "plan."

All believe you are on the right track in broadening the US/USSR issues beyond arms control to include regional issues, human rights, and bilateral issues. They all bore down hard on the importance of effective verification and expressed skepticism that the Soviets would go beyond their rhetoric and permit on-site inspection.

In Japan, I was, unfortunately, preceded by a New York Times story which had been reprinted in the Japanese press. It characterized the proposed INF reductions as 100% in Europe, but only 50% in Asia. I pointed out that a 100% reduction of INF missiles, on a global basis, was our preferred position and still on the table. Moreover, while we agreed with the Soviets that there should be a 50% reduction in strategic systems in an appropriate manner in the first phase, we also agreed that during the same phase our plan would, in fact, amount to about an 80% reduction of INF warheads on a global basis. Further, we would retain the right to match their remaining LRINF missiles until they reduced to zero.

Nevertheless, I accept the Japanese argument that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Accordingly, the way we package our proposal will be very important. [REDACTED] idea that we call for an 80% global reduction in Soviet

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The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

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By AMJ, NARA, Date 5/31/06

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LRINF missiles, permitting the Soviets to keep their remaining SS-20s (about 85) in Novosibirsk, Barnaul and Kansk, represents one possible solution. These Soviet missiles would be labeled neither European nor Asian.

The Japanese also [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] I explained why the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile depended on continued testing which would make a moratorium unacceptable. Mike Mansfield was supportive throughout.

The Chinese reaction was similar but much more muted. At one point, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] emphasized our steadfast commitment to global elimination of LRINF missiles. I explained that although the Soviets still refused to include Asian LRINF systems in their initial proposal, they had agreed, for the first time, to eliminate LRINF missiles in Europe. The US, in response, proposes to accept the Soviet position in Europe but calls for reductions in Soviet Asian LRINF missiles as well. This US proposal would result in 80% reductions on a global basis during the first phase. The Chinese were friendly throughout the meeting and during Win Lord's luncheon. Win has quickly gained the respect of the Chinese.

In Korea, Dixie Walker, a college classmate and old friend, was particularly helpful. I had more than an hour with President Chun, whose approach was supportive of our proposal. He expressed confidence that we will do whatever is best, not only for US-Korean relations, but for our allies in the region. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] He characterized the US-Korean relationship as being very strong. Other Koreans I spoke with expressed a desire to improve economic relations.

The Australian reaction produced no surprises. A session with Prime Minister Hawke and Defense Minister Hayden, originally scheduled for twenty minutes, went well over an hour. We covered the gamut from INF to SDI to nuclear testing. The Prime Minister, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] understands our commitment to zero INF globally. The Australians showed great interest in the nuclear testing issue. Here again, I stressed the continued need for nuclear testing to ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile. On SDI, the Australians [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Bill Lane is new but a quick learner.

In summary, the reaction from our Asian friends and allies was as expected, especially on INF. The negative reaction concerning the INF portion of our proposal can be dealt with by how we characterize that proposal.

I recommend that we modify our proposal slightly. First, we should restate our commitment to a global zero-zero LRINF missile solution. Second, we should propose an interim step on the road to this goal with the USSR reducing its LRINF warheads by 80% and the US matching the Soviet global warhead level. The remaining systems could be deployed by the US and the USSR without geographical constraints of any kind.

I am convinced this approach will be significantly more palatable to our allies in Asia and would be met with a positive reaction in Europe as well.

Yours respectfully,

Ed. Rowny
E. Rowny