SENSITIVE

(b)(3) CIAAct [redacted]

6 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Senator John Glenn, Democrat, Ohio, on the NUMEC Case

1. Background. Senator Glenn's office had been in dialogue with the Agency via OLC for several weeks on the question of the NUMEC diversion issue. The Agency had initially steered Senator Glenn toward discussing his questions with the FBI and ERDA. After the Senator had completed this action he decided that he wanted to discuss this issue further with CIA. As a result OLC, with the A/DDCI's approval, had arranged for Mr. Shackley, ADDO, to brief Senator Glenn on CIA's knowledge of the NUMEC diversion issue. As a result on 5 August 1977 Mr. Shackley, accompanied by [redacted] PCS, and [redacted] OLC, met with Senator Glenn at his office. The Senator had Mr. Leonard Weiss present at the meeting.

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2. Briefing. The meeting started with Senator Glenn outlining the nature of his interest in the NUMEC case. As a result Mr. Shackley drew on the talking paper outline which is attached in order to make his presentation on the NUMEC diversion issue. After Mr. Shackley's presentation was completed there was a lengthy question and answer session. The key questions that emerged from this meeting and the essence of the answers are outlined below.

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[redacted]

c. Question: To what level of the U. S. Government did knowledge and/or speculation about NUMEC activity go?

Answer: The record reveals that Presidents, Attorney Generals, Directors of FBI and key people in AEC and ERDA were briefed about [redacted] 25X1

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d. Question: What came back down from the top of the Government to CIA?

Answer: The record shows that when President Ford was briefed by DCI Bush on the NUMEC issue in the 21 to 28 April 1976 time frame, President Ford directed Attorney General Levy to have the FBI reinstitute its investigation of NUMEC. In this context it was pointed out that Mr. Duckett had relayed a vignette to us which indicated [redacted] It was then pointed out that clarification of this point could only really come from those who were direct participants in the events at the time.

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e. Question: Has President Carter been briefed on NUMEC?

Answer: Yes. The record indicates that DCI Bush gave President-elect Carter information on the NUMEC issue in the period around 19 November 1976. Senator Glenn was also advised that we were aware that Dr. Jessica Tuchman had been working on preparing a briefing for Dr. Brzezinski on the NUMEC issue in recent days. It was pointed out that in our discussion with Dr. Tuchman we had been led to understand that this briefing would also be made available to President Carter. It was stressed, however, that authoritative answers on this type of a question could best be obtained from direct contact with the White House.

f. Question: Are there any conclusions outlined in any CIA documents that state that diversions actually occurred?

Answer: Mr. Shackley and [redacted] both stated that they had not seen any single document which flatly stated that a diversion had occurred. In this context the whole process of deductive reasoning and the difficulties of establishing a counterintelligence type of case which would lead to a flat conclusion that a diversion had occurred was again repeated. At the same time it was stated that new documents might be uncovered as we searched our files which would alter this conclusion.

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[redacted]

Answer: Mr. Weiss was told that we were not aware of such a file and repeated essentially the answer which was provided to question f.

h. Question: If a poll were to be taken of CIA officers who were involved in the NUMEC matter, would the conclusion be that the materials had been diverted?

Answer: We are not able to estimate what a poll would reveal. [redacted] then pointed out how the question had initially been raised as to whether a diversion had occurred. In short, all of the old ground was plowed once again with the conclusion being that we knew of no flat conclusion that said diversion had occurred.

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i. Question: Why keep the investigation of NUMEC alive if there was no evidence of diversion? What does [redacted] think about this issue?

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Answer: [redacted] outlined his views on what type of steps needed to be taken to establish whether a diversion had or had not occurred. In this context Mr. Shackley made the point that [redacted] had been part of an institutional process at CIA which had resulted in the diversion questions being raised. It was stressed that this was not something that [redacted] had done alone. It was also pointed out that [redacted] was not a disaffected employee who was on a crusade. Senator Glenn indicated that he understood these points but simply wanted to obtain a better feel for why the Agency had flet compelled to press for an investigation of [redacted] NUMEC.

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j. Question: Are there bad connections between the FBI and CIA on NUMEC?

Answer: No. The point was stressed that CIA and the FBI simply took difference approaches to the basic question. On the one hand CIA was trying to obtain information which would clarify an intelligence estimate. On the other hand the FBI was looking for material that could be used in a criminal case.

k. Question: Was there an answer to Director Helms' 1968 letter to Attorney General Clark?

Answer: The record had thus far not uncovered a written response from Attorney General Clark to DCI Helms' 2 April 1968 letter to the Attorney General. It was stressed, however, that the written record did show that there was a 3 September 1969 letter from FBI Director Hoover to Mr. Helms in which the bottom line was the statement that the FBI was discontinuing its active investigation [redacted]

l. Question: Did the answer address Director Helms' implicit suggestion that there might be diversion?

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Answer: No.

m. Question: Is Carl Duckett still with the CIA?

Answer: No. Mr. Duckett has retired but is still living in the Washington area.

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n. Question: What did Jim Angleton have to do with the NUMEC matter?

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Answer: Mr. Angleton was the Chief of the CI Staff [redacted] As a result [redacted] had worked for Mr. Angleton. In view of this situation Mr. Angleton had obviously been aware of and interested in [redacted] activities. The point was made that such activities obviously focused on NUMEC [redacted]

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o. Question: Was there any U.S. involvement in the diversion [redacted]

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Answer: No. Senator Glenn was then given a brief review [redacted]

p. Question: What was the substance of the "cocktail conversation" [redacted] with NUMEC's help.

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Answer: The point was made that CIA could not really comment on this question, because we had no firm way of corelating this event to anything that was in our files.

q. Question: Does the CIA have concerns similar to those about NUMEC about any other U.S. plants that are handling nuclear materials?

Answer: No.

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r. Question: Is NUMEC still considered an active case for CIA?

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Answer: No. It was stressed, however, that if CIA [redacted] which would shed light on the possibility that NUMEC had diverted materials to Israel, this intelligence would be made available to the Justice Department and the FBI.

s. Question: Is there no current investigative or other activity going on in the U.S. or Israel [redacted]

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Answer: This question could most properly be put to the FBI.

t. Question: Were others in NUMEC [redacted]

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[redacted]

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u. Question: Would CIA's technical people differ with ERDA on the figures of materials possibly diverted?

Answer: This question had never been formally put to the scientific people at CIA insofar as Mr. Shackley or [redacted] could ascertain from the files. It was stated, however,

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that one had the impression from listening to general conversations that had taken place with our scientific personnel, that it was clear that they understood the MUF concepts that ERDA had been talking about.

v. Question: What was done after President Ford directed that the investigation of NUMEC be reopened?

Answer: The FBI had reopened its investigation. It was stated that CIA did not know the status of this investigation.

w. Question: Was or is there any evidence of a concerted conspiracy to divert nuclear materials from the U.S. to Israel?

Answer: CIA had no hard facts which pertained to this question.

x. Question: Is the CIA aware of any conspiracies to sabotage U.S. nuclear installations?

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Answer: No.

y. Question: Was there any electronic surveillance used in the U.S. [redacted] or others involved in NUMEC?

Answer: This was a question that should be put to the FBI.

z. Question: Did the FBI investigation of NUMEC not focus on possible diversion?

Answer: This was a question that should be put to the FBI. It was pointed out that available documents indicate that the FBI investigation of NUMEC [redacted]

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aa. Question: Have there been changes in the nature of the background investigations that are being conducted on managers and others associated with licensed plants handling nuclear materials as a result of the NUMEC affair?

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Answer: This is a question which is beyond CIA's competence to comment on. It was suggested that this issue might best be discussed with ERDA.

[redacted]

Answer: No. The previous explanations on this point were repeated once again.

cc. Question: Would the CIA reach such a conclusion?

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Answer: Previous answers to this question were repeated once again.

dd. Question: Why did the CIA continue to brief Presidents on NUMEC?

[redacted]

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Answer: CIA continued to brief Presidents on [redacted] how this might relate to NUMEC.

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[redacted]

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ff. Question: Is the next step for Senator Glenn to go and seek a White House decision on what should be done now? Should everyone involved in the NUMEC affair (or concerned about MUF) get together to make some decisions?

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Answer: It was suggested that the Senator might want to discuss this question with someone like Dr. Brzezinski rather than CIA.



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3. Comment. Senator Glenn appreciated the receipt of the data that was covered in paragraph 2. At the conclusion of the meeting one was clearly left with the impression that Senator Glenn was considering pursuing a more detailed investigation into the NUMEC diversion issue via a Senate Hearing.

Theodore G. Shackley
Theodore G. Shackley
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

Attachment:
Talking Paper Outline

Distribution:
1 - DCI w/att
1 - A/DDCI w/att
1 - DDO w/att
1 - OLC w/att
1 - C/SIA w/att
1 - SA/DO/O (extract) w/att