

**CLASSIFIED**

ON: 3090  
DATE: 18 MAY 75

**TELEGRAM**

INDICATE:

- COLLECT
- CHARGE TO

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

GDS

MASS, ~~XXXX~~ KS, KN

MEETING W WITH PRESIDENT PARK:  
MISSILE STRATEGY

5:06 p.m.

010806Z

DISTRIBUTION

- AMB
- DCM
- POL
- D/CHRON

ACTION:

SECSTATE WASH DC PRIORITY

7

SECRET SEOUL 3090

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCPAC FOR ADMIRAL GAYLER

EXDIS

**EXDIS**

REF:

SEOUL 3061

SUMMARY: DURING APRIL 30 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR, PRESIDENT PARK SET FORTH HIS DETERMINATION DEVELOP KOREAN MISSILE PRODUCTION CAPABILITY. ADDITIONALLY, HE OUTLINED STRATEGY OF COUNTERACTING NORTH KOREAN AIR SUPERIORITY WITH MISSILE ATTACKS ON NORTH KOREAN AIR FIELDS AND MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS. BOTH/PREMISED ON POSSIBILITY US FORCES WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA. AMBASSADOR URGED, AND PRESIDENT AGREED, FULL CONSULTATIONS WITH USG ON BOTH SUBJECTS. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF POSTPONEMENT I CORPS DISESTABLISHMENT (REFTEL), PRESIDENT PARK RAISED WITH ME US FAILURE TO AGREE TO LOCKHEED PROPELLANT PLANT. I POINTED OUT USG HAD RECEIVED NUMBER OF SEPARATE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE ]

DRAFTED BY:

AMB: RLSNEIDER/MAM

DRAFTING DATE

5/1/75

TEL. EXT.

4200

APPROVED BY:

AMB - RICHARD L. SNEIDER

CLEARANCES:

SECRET

Classification

**CLASSIFIED**

**CLASSIFIED**

RELATED TO DEVELOPMENT OF MISSILE PRODUCTION CAPABILITY IN KOREA. THESE REQUESTS OFTEN ~~INVOLVED~~ INVOLVED EXPORT OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY, ~~XXXXXXXX~~ RATHER THAN HARDWARE, WHICH USG CLOSELY CONTROLLED EVEN TO MORE ADVANCED COUNTRIES SUCH AS JAPAN AND WESTERN EUROPE. US HAS STRONG COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN THIS FIELD WHICH WE WISH TO RETAIN. IN REQUESTS, CASE OF KOREAN ~~REQUESTS~~, WE HAD NO CLEAR CONCEPT OF LONGER TERM KOREAN PLANS TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR MUTUALLY AGREEABLE ASSISTANCE. <sup>I</sup> HE SUGGESTED THAT, WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ~~OF KOREAN~~ OF KOREAN PLANS, ~~HE~~ DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL ITEMS MIGHT BE FACILITATED.

2. PRESIDENT PARK AGREED TO ADVISE ME OF FULL KOREAN PROGRAM AND PLANS FOR YEARS AHEAD. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE ADD PRESIDENT SHIM GET IN TOUCH WITH ME. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT SHIM HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO DEVELOP AN ~~IN-~~ <sup>IN-</sup> COUNTRY MISSILE CAPABILITY WITHIN THE NEXT THREE TO FIVE YEARS <sup>WHILE US FORCES STILL IN KOREA.</sup> ~~XX~~ /IF THE US WAS NOT PREPARED TO ASSIST, THEN KOREA WOULD SEEK AID FROM THIRD COUNTRIES. WHILE RECOGNIZING FINANCIAL BURDEN PLACED UPON KOREA, <sup>PRESIDENT SAID</sup> /KOREA "MUST BE PREPARED FOR RAINY DAY." IT WOULD BE TOO LATE IF KOREA WAITED TO DEVELOP ITS MISSILE ~~CAPACITY~~ CAPACITY UNTIL US INFORMS ROKG THAT IT PLANS TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES.

**SECRET**

Classification

**CLASSIFIED**

**CLASSIFIED**

3. I POINTED OUT TO PRESIDENT PARK VERY LARGE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT COSTS ~~WERE~~ INVOLVED IN FIELD OF MISSILE/~~WEAPONS~~ AND THAT IS PREFERABLE COURSE ~~OR~~ WORKING WITH US.

4. IN DESCRIBING HIS BROADER PLANS FOR DEFENSE PRODUCTION, PRESIDENT STATED THAT:

~~HE~~ ~~HE~~ NO

A. ROKG HAS/~~NO~~ REPEAT NO PLANS TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS:

B. ROKG DOES NOT PLAN TO DEVELOP LATEST TYPE FIGHTER MILITARY AIRCRAFT, BUT IS INTERESTED IN CO-ASSEMBLY PROJECTS IF ~~THE~~ FINANCIAL COSTS ARE NOT ~~AS~~ MUCH GREATER THAN BUYING AIRCRAFT DIRECTLY FROM US PRODUCTION:

C. IN OTHER AREAS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, ROKG WISHES DEVELOP ITS ON CAPABILITIES AND IS ~~BE~~ HAVING SOME SUCCESS ALREADY.

5. PRESIDENT PARK THEN EXPLAINED HIGH PRIORITY GIVEN TO MISSILE CAPABILITY. IN FIRST PLACE, NORTH KOREA HAS AND ROK NEEDS RETALIATORY WEAPONS. MISSILES CAPABLE OF ATTACKING SEOUL/ SECONDLY, NORTH KOREA HAS CONSIDERABLY MORE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT THAN ROKG WITH NUMBERS INCREASING. WHILE ROKG AIR FORCE EXPANDING, IT NUMBER OF ~~ROK AIRCRAFT~~ KOREAN AIRCRAFT HAS NO HOPE OF MATCHING/NORTH ~~KOREAN AIRCRAFT~~/DUE TO HIGH COST. ~~OF AIRCRAFT~~ ONLY ALTERNATIVE FOR ROKG IS MISSILES TO COUNTER NORTH KOREAN AIR FORCE SUPERIORITY WITH RANGE

**SECRET**

Classification

**CLASSIFIED**

**CLASSIFIED**

SUFFICIENT TO ATTACK PYONGYANG AND WONSAN AS WELL AS NORTH KOREAN AIR FIELDS. THUS, IF NORTH KOREA LAUNCHES SURPRISE ATTACK, ROK WILL COUNTER NOT WITH AIRCRAFT BUT WITH MISSILES. FINALLY, ROK MISSILE CAPABILITY SHOULD IN FACT BE SUFFICIENT TO CONTAIN AND PREVENT NORTH KOREAN ATTACK.

6. IN CONCLUSION PARK STATED THAT ROKG IS DETERMINED TO IN BUILD UP SELF-RELIANCE/DEFENSE PRODUCTION, PARTICULARLY TO PREPARE FOR DAY WHEN US LEAVES. MISSILE CAPABILITY, ~~SECURITY MEASURES~~/ ROKG EXPECTS FULL MEASURE OF US SUPPORT FOR THESE ~~PLANS~~ PLANS. I SOUGHT TO COUNTER AGAIN PARK'S CONCERNS REGARDING US WITHDRAWAL AND SUGGESTED THAT, RATHER THAN MAKING ANY INITIAL COMMENT ON HIS MISSILE STRATEGY, THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE FORTHCOMING SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING. GIVEN ITS IMPORTANCE AND MAJOR US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA, STRATEGY DECISIONS OF THIS NATURE SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO MUTUAL AGREEMENT. PARK INDICATED HIS HASTE TO MOVE AHEAD MORE RAPIDLY AND SAID THAT HE WOULD ASK DEFENSE MINISTER TO BRIEF ME ON THIS STRATEGY IN GREATER DETAIL SO THAT I MIGHT INFORM WASHINGTON QUICKLY.

7. COMMENT: IN THIS AND PREVIOUS CONVERSATION PRESIDENT PARK HAS UNVEILED MORE EXPLICITLY HIS PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPING

~~SECRET~~ SECRET  
Classification

**CLASSIFIED**

SECRET

Page 5 of

**CLASSIFIED**

KOREAN SELF-RELIANCE ON CONTINGENCY OF US WITHDRAWAL.  
 ONCE MORE HE HAS MADE CLEAR HIS EXPECTATION OF PROBABLE  
 WITHDRAWAL ALONG WITH PLANS FOR URGENT DEVELOPMENT OF  
 SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE INDUSTRY DURING REMAINING YEARS OF  
 US FORCES DEPLOYMENT TO KOREA. I CAN ONLY URGE THAT THIS  
 PARK POLICY  
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ BE GIVEN THE FULLEST AND EARLIEST CONSIDERATION  
 AS MAJOR ASPECT OF OVERALL KOREAN POLICY REVIEW I HAVE  
 PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED. GIVEN CURRENT ATTITUDES WITHIN  
 CANNOT IGNORE  
 CONGRESS, WE ~~SHOULD CONSIDER~~ EITHER PARK'S CONCERNS  
 REGARDING US WITHDRAWAL OR HIS PLANS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE.  
 IT SHOULD BE FEASIBLE TO DEVELOP A US POLICY WHICH GIVES  
 ROK REASONABLE SENSE OF SECURITY IN ~~DEFENSE~~ ~~MAINTENANCE~~  
 OF KOREA EVEN IN  
~~MEMORANDUM~~ CONTINGENCY OF US WITHDRAWAL, WHILE AVOIDING  
 RISKS OF NK-SK ESCALATION IN MISSILE AND OTHER AREAS OF  
 HIGH TECHNOLOGY.

SNEIDER



SECRET

Classification

**CLASSIFIED**



National Security Archive,  
Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University,  
2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037,  
Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, [nsarchiv@gwu.edu](mailto:nsarchiv@gwu.edu)