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#170  
20 JUN 79



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

20 JUN 1979  
In reply refer to:  
I-22236/79

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Korean Troop Withdrawals -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

At the Friday Foreign Policy breakfast, you should seek authorization to foreshadow--at least in general terms--further adjustments in the troop withdrawal plan in order to elicit a positive ROKG attitude toward expanding its own defense efforts. For that purpose, the following talking points may be useful.

- I will arrive in Seoul on June 27th and meet with Minister Ro on the 28th. That meeting will provide an opportunity to prepare the Koreans for your approach to them concerning the necessity of increasing their defense budget and reordering their spending priorities to emphasize improvement in ground forces capabilities. With the Minister I intend to:

- Share the general conclusions of our recent North Korean O.B. and its implications for the military balance on the peninsula.
- Emphasize the need to rectify that imbalance through a somewhat larger ROK defense budget and reprioritizing of its expenditures.
- In that context raise questions about the prudence of moving forward quickly on pending arms transfer requests until we can jointly reconsider defense priorities.
- Aircraft coassembly. (Reiterate turndown on F-16 coproduction but indicate a more forthcoming attitude toward F-5 or A-10.)
- F-16 sale. (Reaffirm willingness to sell but ask Ro to consider timing carefully in light of other requirements.)

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Declassify on 20 Jun 1984

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- Submarine acquisition. (Suggest delay.)
- Missile development. (Relate future cooperation to their coming clean on their activities with Brits, i.e., the Ferranti case.)
- Foreshadow several low-cost U.S. actions to improve our ground and air force presence--e.g., early deployment of AWAC's, etc--emphasizing that details could be discussed at the next SCM meeting in Seoul in October.

- I would expect a sympathetic hearing from Ro regarding increased ROK defense expenditures. But the receptivity in the Blue House to these suggestions--not to mention our proposals for diplomatic initiatives--will depend on our willingness to alter the troop withdrawal plan. It would be helpful in setting the tone for the President's meetings with Park if I can foreshadow--on a close hold basis--the prospect for a significant adjustment in the withdrawals without, of course, discussing the nature of these adjustments.

\* \* \* \* \*

In discussing the troop withdrawal options at the breakfast, it will be essential to underscore for the President the linkage between major adjustments in the withdrawal plan and ROKG willingness to follow-through on the trilateral diplomatic initiative and expand its defense effort. On the former issue Park has now agreed to include in the communique a joint call for a trilateral meeting between senior representatives of the ROK, DPRK, and U.S. He has attached these conditions:


- No bilateral U.S.-DPRK preparatory talks;
- No Paris Peace Talks approach, i.e., secret side discussions with the North;
- The President at least disclose to Park in private the direction of his thinking on the troop withdrawal decision;
- Public announcement of our decision on withdrawals by mid-July;
- Reaffirmation of the U.S. security commitment by the President at every public opportunity during his visit.\*

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\*In addition, Ambassador Kim indicated that the ROKG does not wish to have the North informed in advance of the trilateral talks proposal.

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We know [REDACTED] that Ambassador Kim misreported to his government last week that the President would indicate his intent to suspend further withdrawals. Whether this was willful misrepresentation or careless reporting I don't know. State has taken the precaution of clarifying to Kim that the President has made no decision yet. Nonetheless, Park's decision to go ahead on the diplomatic initiative may have been based on the expectation of such a dramatic change. If the President doesn't show his hand while in Seoul--at least to Park--all bets are off on the trilateral talks idea.



David E. McCiffert  
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International Security Affairs

DOS FOIA 5 USC § 552 (b)(1);  
E.O. 13526 3.3 (b)(1)

OSD FOIA 5 USC § 552 (b)(1);  
E.O. 13526, 3.3 (b)(1)(6)

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