

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)  
EO 13526 § 3.3(b)(1)

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#217  
SECDEF HAS SEEN

29 OCT 79

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PAGE 1

CALL 2114302754  
INPUT COSN = DKAD65  
YOP: 291331Z OCT 79 TOT: 291332Z OCT 79

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10/29  
Show also  
RWIC  
DEM.  
MA.

AUTO\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*

ACTION\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*

INFO: DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001  
RTR=58

*This appears to be the most complete account yet, and in general behavior. It includes some strange behavior, but some of that usually occurs in such circumstances*

~~EYES ONLY~~

[REDACTED]

ZNY MMORN  
ZKZK DD SOA DE ZDK DUE TO NUMEROUS SVCIS, SVC CLKS CLEAR YOUR LOGS

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD, DTG...  
DATE 12 SEP 2016  
FOIA CASE # 04-F-2690

SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION	
SEC DEF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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CABLE CH	<input type="checkbox"/>
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ZNY MMORN  
ZKZK DD SOA DE  
O 291334Z OCT 79  
FM SSD KOREA  
TO SSD DIA  
JCS  
CINCPAC

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ZEM  
~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~ SECTION 1 OF 3  
SSD DIA FOR HAROLD BROWN, SECDEF  
CINCPAC FOR GEN JONES, CJCS (TDY CINCPAC)  
JCS FOR ADM HAYWARD, ACTING CJCS  
CINCPAC FOR ADM WEISNER, CINCPAC

DECLASSIFIED

FROM GEN WICKHAM, CINC UNCF/CFC  
SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION AND THE AFTERMATH (U)  
1. (U) THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES A LONG, PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH GENERAL LEW (DCINC CFC) DURING DINNER AT MY QUARTERS 28 OCT 79.  
2. ~~(S-NOFORN)~~ GENERAL LEW BEGAN BY COMMENTING ON THE MOTIVES BEHIND KIM JAE KYU'S MURDER OF THE PRESIDENT. LEW HAS KNOWN KIM FOR MANY YEARS AND IMPLIED THAT KIM SUFFERED A SERIES OF PERSONAL FAILURES OF INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE AS HE FILLED HIGHER POSITIONS. UNTIL PRESIDENT PARK PICKED HIM UP FOR GENERAL, KIM HAD GONE NO FARTHER THAN COLONEL ON HIS OWN MERIT. TO EVERYONE'S SURPRISE AT

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AT THAT POINT HE WAS GIVEN CORPS COMMAND BUT WAS RELIEVED AFTER A SHORT PERIOD. SUBSEQUENTLY, HE WAS APPOINTED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND AGAIN TURNED IN A POOR PERFORMANCE. AS DEPUTY KCIA HIS INCOMPETENCE ALSO WAS APPARENT. NEVERTHELESS, AS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT HE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE FAVORS OF HIGH POSITION CULMINATING IN THE CURRENT ONE AS HEAD OF THE KCIA. HOWEVER, WITH THE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT HIS INCOMPETENCE WAS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT AND WIDESPREAD RUMORS EXISTED THAT HE WAS TO BE RELIEVED IN THE UPCOMING CABINET RESHUFFLE. GENERAL LEW SAID THAT KIM WAS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM SUBORDINATES IN THE KCIA WHO FELT HE WAS LESS THAN ABLE IN INFLUENCING POLICY. ALSO, HE WAS UNDER SEVERE ATTACK FROM ADVISORS CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT SUCH AS CHA JI CHUL. AS A RESULT, IT IS CONCEIVABLE IN GENERAL LEW'S MIND THAT A TEMPORARILY DERANGED KIM DECIDED TO ELIMINATE THE PRESIDENT AND CHA S. ~~(S NOFORN)~~ GENERAL LEW WENT ON TO DESCRIBE SOME OF THE DETAILS OF THE ASSASSINATION. DINNER WITH THE KCIA DIRECTOR WAS ARRANGED LATE IN THE AFTERNOON BY CHA JI CHUL. APPARENTLY THE KCIA DIRECTOR HAD ARRANGED FOR DINNER WITH THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, CHUNG SEUNG HWA ON THE SAME DAY. THIS WAS SCHEDULED BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S DINNER BUT KIM DID NOT CANCEL. WHEN THE PRESIDENT ARRIVED FOR DINNER KIM EXCUSED HIMSELF AND WENT TO ANOTHER ROOM NEARBY WHERE CHUNG SEUNG HWA WAS WAITING. KIM EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DINNER HAD BEEN ARRANGED SUDDENLY AND IF CHUNG SEUNG HWA WOULD PERMIT

LET KIM'S POLITICAL OFFICER TO HOST HIM FOR DINNER, KIM WOULD BE BACK IN TWO HOURS. CHUNG SEUNG HWA AGREED AND KIM WENT BACK TO DINNER WITH THE PRESIDENT. DURING THE DINNER WITH THE PRESIDENT THERE WAS HEATED DISCUSSION WITH CHA JI CHUL AND KIM LEFT THE ROOM. HE THEN RETURNED TO THE ROOM WITH THE WEAPON WHICH HE USED TO KILL CHA AND THE PRESIDENT. OTHER PERSONAL AIDES OF KIM JAE KYU KILLED NEARBY SECURITY GUARDS. APPARENTLY THIS HAD BEEN PREARRANGED ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER MORE THAN THE PERSONAL AIDES WERE INVOLVED. ALSO AT THE DINNER WAS BLUE HOUSE SENIOR SECRETARY KIM KYE WON WHO EMERGED UNSCATHED FROM THE FIRING. AFTER THE MURDER OF THE PRESIDENT, KIM KYE WON TOOK HIM TO A MILITARY HOSPITAL NEARBY WHILE THE KCIA DIRECTOR RUSHED COATLESS AND SHOELESS INTO THE ROOM WHERE CHUNG SEUNG HWA WAS FINISHING DINNER. HE EXPLAINED EXCITEDLY THAT TRAGEDY HAD OCCURRED AND CHUNG SEUNG HWA SHOULD COME IMMEDIATELY WITH HIM AND HIS POLITICAL ASSISTANT TO

KCIA HEADQUARTERS. ON THE WAY TO THE HEADQUARTERS CHUNG SEUNG HWA SUSPECTED THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY HAVE BEEN INCAPACITATED (HE HAD HEARD SHOOTING) AND SUGGESTED THAT HIS RESPONSIBILITIES CALLED FOR HIM TO GO TO THE MND WHERE THE ROK ARMY BUNKER WAS LOCATED. ON THE WAY TO THE ARMY BUNKER, KIM ASKED CHUNG IF THE CARS FOLLOWING THEM CONTAINED PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY FORCE GUARDS WHICH COULD BE DANGEROUS. CHUNG SAID NO, THEY CONTAINED ONLY AIDES AND KCIA BODYGUARDS.

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SEC NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.  
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DATE: 211-003031  
INPUT CDSN = DKA069  
TDY: 291333Z OCT 79 TOT: 291334Z OCT 79

AUTO\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*  
ACTION\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*  
INFO: DNCO(1)  
TOTAL COPIES = 00001  
RTR#24

6SD  
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1);  
E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b)(1)

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ZNY MMORN  
ZKZK OO SOA DE-ZDK DUE TO NUMEROUS SVC'S, SVC CLKS CLEAR YOUR LOGS

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ZNY MMORN  
ZKZK OO SOA DE  
O 291334Z OCT 79  
FM SSD KOREA  
TO SSD DIA  
JCS  
CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

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ZEM  
~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~ SECTION 2 OF 3  
SSD DIA FOR HAROLD BROWN, SECDEF;  
CINCPAC FOR GEN JONES, CJCS (TDY CINCPAC);  
JCS FOR ADM HAYWARD, ACTING CJCS;  
CINCPAC FOR ADM WEISNER, CINCPAC;

FROM GEN WICKHAM, CINC UNCL/CFC;  
SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION AND THE AFTERMATH (U)  
4. ~~(S NOFORN)~~ WHEN KIM AND CHUNG SEUNG HWA ARRIVED AT THE ARMY  
BUNKER, CHUNG CALLED MND RO, GEN KIM (CJCS) AND GEN LEW. THEY ALL  
ARRIVED AT THE BUNKER AROUND 9 P.M. AND FOR THE NEXT THREE TO FOUR  
HOURS DEBATED WHAT TO DO. KIM JAE KYU DID NOT CONFESS THE SLAYING  
BUT RATHER ARGUED STRONGLY FOR THE MILITARY TO TAKE ACTION IN SUP-  
PORT OF THE SITUATION. KIM SAID THAT MOST OF THE POPULATION IN  
SEOUL WAS ANTI-GOVERNMENT AND WOULD SUPPORT THE MILITARY TAKING  
ACTION. DURING THIS INTERVAL KIM KYE WON WAS CALLED ALTHOUGH IT

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... WAS DIFFICULT TO TRACK HIM DOWN. HE HAPPENED TO BE WITH PRIME MINISTER CHOI. OVER THE PHONE KIM KYE WON TOLD THE GROUP TO COME TO THE BLUE HOUSE BUT KCIA DIRECTOR KIM REFUSED CITING DANGER WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY FORCE GUARDING THE BLUE HOUSE. INSTEAD, KIM KYE WON AND PRIME MINISTER CHOI WERE ASKED TO COME TO THE ARMY BUNKER. AFTER ARRIVAL AT THE BUNKER, KIM KYE WON INITIALLY DID NOT REVEAL WHO BEGAN THE SHOOTING. APPARENTLY CONCERNED FOR HIS OWN SAFETY, HE WAS SIZING UP THE SITUATION AMONG THE MILITARY AND KCIA DIRECTOR KIM TO FIND OUT WHO WAS IN CHARGE. FINALLY, AROUND 1 A.M., AFTER MUCH HEATED DISCUSSION KCIA DIRECTOR KIM CONFESSED THAT HE HAD KILLED THE PRESIDENT AND ARGUED STRONGLY THAT NO DISCLOSURE OF THIS SHOULD BE MADE UNTIL THE MILITARY HAD DECIDED WHAT ACTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN. ACCORDING TO GEN LEW IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT THE MILITARY DECIDED TO THROW THEIR SUPPORT BEHIND PRIME MINISTER CHOI AND THE EXISTING CABINET. SUBSEQUENTLY, KIM WAS SEIZED BY MILITARY POLICEMEN AND DISARMED OF THE TWO LOADED PISTOLS HE WAS CARRYING. IN ADDITION, SEVERAL BODYGUARDS THAT KIM HAD BROUGHT WITH HIM TO THE BUNKER ALSO WERE DISARMED. AS EVIDENCE OF THE MILITARY'S INNOCENCE DURING THIS EPISODE GEN LEW SAID THAT THE FEM MPS IN THE BUNKER HAD NO AMMO WITH THEIR WEAPONS!

5. ~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ GEN LEW CONCLUDED THAT THERE STILL EXISTS MYSTERY ABOUT BLUE HOUSE SENIOR SECRETARY KIM KYE WON (WHO HAS JUST BEEN ARRESTED) -- PARTICULARLY HOW HE ESCAPED UNSCATHED AND WHY HE DELAYED FULL DISCLOSURE OF THE KCIA DIRECTOR'S ACTIONS. ALSO, WHILE THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME QUESTION ABOUT GEN CHUNG SEUNG HWA'S INVOLVEMENT, GEN LEW NOTED THAT THE DINNER ENGAGEMENT WITH DIRECTOR KIM HAD BEEN MADE BEFORE THE SUDDEN DINNER ARRANGEMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT, THUS ELIMINATING THE POSSIBILITY OF COLLUSION. GEN LEW CONSIDERS CHUNG SEUNG HWA TOTALLY INNOCENT. HE VIEWS HIM AS A MODERATE MAN WITH TOO MUCH AT RISK WITH FOUR CHILDREN AND TWO GRANDCHILDREN.

6. ~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ MOVING BEYOND THE ASSASSINATION, GEN LEW EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD. HE FELT THERE WOULD BE MANY LOUD-MOUTHS SUCH AS KIM TAE CHUNG AND KIM YANG SAM WHO WOULD, BY PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS, CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR DISSENSION AND PRESENT A PICTURE OF WEAKNESS TO NORTH KOREA. HE SAID THAT THE ACTING PRESIDENT MUST TAKE FIRM STEPS WITHIN A WEEK TO ANNOUNCE A STRONG PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, COVERING THE FULL RANGE OF GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES. GEN LEW FELT THAT THE ACTING PRESIDENT WAS WEAK AND PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE A SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION. THE OTHER TWO OBVIOUS CANDIDATES KIM JONG PIL AND CHUNG IL KHAN ALSO HAD SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL AS WELL AS PERSONAL LIABILITIES AND THEREFORE ALSO MIGHT NOT BE SUCCESSFUL IN ELECTION. GEN LEW DID NOT SUGGEST OTHER POTENTIAL CANDIDATES, MERELY NOTING THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO COMMENT. GEN LEW TOLD ME THAT HE IS CAUTIONING ALL MILITARY OFFICERS AGAINST TAKING ACTIONS FOR THEIR PERSONAL GAIN DURING THIS TROUBLED PERIOD. HE IS URGING THEM TO PLACE THE FUTURE OF THE REPUBLIC ABOVE PERSONAL INTERESTS. HE SEES NO PERSONAL THREAT TO HIMSELF BUT HE REMAINS VERY CAUTIOUS AND IS NOT LIVING AT HOME FOR THE TIME BEING. HE

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PAGE 3

CONTINUES TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH OTHER SENIOR MILITARY, ATTENDS PERIODIC MEETINGS, AND IS CLEARLY WIRED INTO THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS.

~~DECLAS 28 OCT 88~~

SSD NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.  
#0751

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ZCZCOPG140  
DANS: 211-001155  
INPUT CDSN = DKAB25  
TORI 291215Z OCT 79 TOT: 291225Z OCT 79

AUTO\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*

ACTIONE\*\* UNASSIGNED \*\*

INFO: DNCO(1)

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1);  
EO 13526 & 3.3(b)(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001  
RTR#58

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ZKZK OO SOA DE  
O 291034Z OCT 79  
FM SSD KOREA  
TO SSD DIA  
JCS  
CINCPAC

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ZEM  
~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN EYES ONLY SECTION 3 OF 3~~  
SSD DIA FOR HAROLD BROWN, SECDEF;  
CINCPAC FOR GEN JONES, CJCS (TDY CINCPAC);  
JCS FOR ADM HAYWARD, ACTING CJCS;  
CINCPAC FOR ADM WEISNER, CINCPAC;

SECRET

FROM GEN WICKHAM, CINC UNC/CFC;  
SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION AND THE AFTERMATH (U)  
7. ~~(S)~~ ~~NOFORN~~ IN THE FUTURE MUCH SPECULATION ABOUT THE MILITARY'S  
ROLE IN THIS CRISIS PROBABLY WILL EMERGE. HOWEVER, IF THE FORE-  
GOING IS TRUE, IT SUGGESTS THAT THE MILITARY ACTED RESPONSIBLY.  
MY VIEW IS THAT THE MILITARY SEEM TO HAVE BEEN PRESENTED WITH A  
FAIT ACCOMPLI WITHOUT THEIR FOREKNOWLEDGE OR PLANNING. AS EVIDENCE  
OF THIS, AFTER THE ASSASSINATION THE ARMED FORCES DID NOT FOLLOW  
SUCH STEPS AS SEIZING COMMUNICATIONS, CALLING FOR LOYALTY OATHS  
FROM SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS, OR MOVING MAJOR UNITS (EXCEPT FOR THE  
20TH DIVISION MOVE TO THE KOREAN MILITARY ACADEMY WHICH WAS CON-  
CURRED IN BY CFC). FOR REASONS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR AT THIS TIME THE  
MILITARY TO THEIR CREDIT AGREED TO SUPPORT THE ACTING PRESIDENT AND  
THE CONSTITUTION. THE FOUR-STAR LEADERS OF THE MILITARY INCLUDING  
MND RD APPEAR TO HAVE SUPPORT OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEY HAVE

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SIGNED A PUBLIC PLEDGE OF SUPPORT FOR THE CABINET,  
 8. ~~(S-NOFORN)~~ WHILE THESE LEADERS SPEAK SINCERELY OF THEIR SUPPORT  
 FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, THEY REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT  
 THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY AND FOR NORTH KOREAN INTERVENTION.  
 AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. TO CONTINUE IN  
 OVERT WAYS STRONG SUPPORT AGAINST ARMED INTERVENTION BY NORTH KOREA.  
 THE ROK MILITARY LEADERS HAVE BEEN DEEPLY MOVED BY THE PROMPT AND  
 UNEQUIVOCAL EVIDENCE OF U.S. SUPPORT DURING THIS CRISIS. IN  
 ADDITION, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. TO CONTINUE URGING THAT  
 THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS BE SUPPORTED BY ALL ELEMENTS IN THE  
 KOREAN SOCIETY. THIS SHOULD ASSIST THE MILITARY IN FOLLOWING THE  
 COURSE IT HAS CHARTED TOWARD SAFEGUARDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS.  
 9. (U) BASED ON WHAT WE KNOW AT THIS TIME THE FOREGOING IS HOW  
 THE AMBASSADOR AND I SEE THE SITUATION.  
 10. (U) VERY RESPECTFULLY.  
 DECLASS 29 OCT 98

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SSD NOTE: DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS.  
#0752

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