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The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A Fresh Look at the U.S. Response *

Few events during the Cold War have received as much attention or generated so much criticism as the Soviet Union's crushing of the Hungarian revolution.[1] While Moscow's action cost it the support of many Western communists and others on the Left, Western powers have shared the blame for the revolution's failure. Not only did the West essentially remain passive, but Britain and France joined Israel in invading Egypt at the moment the revolution seemed close to success, thus diverting world attention and providing cover for the Soviet Union to suppress the Hungarians. (U)

Nearly all accounts have criticized the weak U.S. response. Only a few months later, a bipartisan Congressional group focused on the Eisenhower administration's lack of preparedness and inability or unwillingness to take effective action. "With the Hungarian revolution the whole earth quaked," the group declared. "The United States, the free world leader, stood by."[2] Numerous studies have accused the administration of hypocrisy for encouraging the peoples of Eastern Europe, through public statements by Eisenhower and others beginning with the 1952 election campaign and through subsequent Radio Free Europe (RFE) broadcasts, to throw off their communist

* The focus is on the period between the outbreak of violence in Budapest on 23 October, which prompted the first Soviet intervention, and the second large-scale attack on 4 November that effectively ended the revolution. Events preceding the revolution, the many months of subsequent UN debate and continuing Hungarian resistance, and the refugee question are only touched upon. (U)

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governments and then doing little when the Hungarians at tremendous human cost nearly accomplished this.* Passage of time and availability of new records have softened these judgments only slightly.[3] Recent works still contend that the United States betrayed the revolution.[4] Even a U.S. diplomat who lived through the events in Budapest, looking back a half century later, concluded that Washington, "if unintentionally, had misled Hungarians and then was unwilling to shoulder its responsibilities and to make a serious enough effort to find a solution."[5] (U)

The harsh views should be tempered. The United States was more prepared for turmoil in Eastern Europe than has generally been acknowledged and was pursuing, in accord with its NATO allies, a carefully constructed policy—short-sighted in one key respect--which nevertheless nearly succeeded. At the UN the Americans took the lead in addressing the Hungarian question right up to the time of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. The Legation in Budapest performed well under difficult circumstances. Finally, reporting by western radios of UN consideration of Hungary's plight and the action it took in the Middle East crisis, more than anything RFE said, may have misled Hungarians into thinking the West would intervene on their behalf. The major U.S. shortcoming was that Washington made no plans to deal with sustained violent demonstrations in the Soviet bloc because it did not consider them possible. For that matter, no one else did. (U)

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* According to one tabulation, the toll included 2,000 Hungarians killed, 17,000 wounded, 13,000 imprisoned or deported, 229 sentenced to death and executed, and nearly 200,000 out of a population just under 10 million who chose to flee the country. (Eörsi, *Hungarian Revolution of 1956*, 23 (U). Another source says that 26,000 were imprisoned and as many as 600 executed. (Kramer, "Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland," 211 (U). In addition, more than700 Soviet soldiers lost their lives and some 1,200 were wounded (Györkei and Horváth, *Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary*, xiii (U).

As political and intellectual ferment spread through Soviet bloc countries in the wake of Nikita Khrushchev's February 1956 speech denouncing Stalin, the United States continued to modify its policy toward Eastern Europe, an adjustment that had begun as early as 1952 and continued into the Eisenhower administration. Instead of promoting unrest and revolution behind the Iron Curtain with the aim of toppling the communist governments, it sought to encourage gradual change and the establishment of governments along the lines of Tito's in Yugoslavia that would enjoy a measure of independence from Moscow. This objective underlay a National Security Council (NSC) paper adopted in July 1956 and [redacted] for the East European satellites completed the following month. Earlier, in the spring, Washington had established an interagency working group, chaired by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Jacob Beam, to monitor developments in the Soviet bloc and make recommendations for responding to rapidly changing situations, as it subsequently did during the riots that briefly swept Poznań, Poland, in June 1956. The United States wanted merely to "keep the pot simmering" in Eastern Europe, not to have it boil over into a major outbreak of violence that would result in a bloodbath. Since it desired and expected no more than brief, small-scale outbursts, it was not prepared to deal with a national revolution.[6] ~~(S)~~

There may have been surprise in Washington and elsewhere that further unrest developed as quickly as it did, but there was no doubt that it was going to happen at some point and that Poland and Hungary were likely places. The charge by Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, echoed by others, that it took the U.S. Government completely by surprise has little merit. Washington's attention, particularly

that of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, had been focused since the summer on resolving the Anglo-French dispute with Egypt following Egyptian President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Nevertheless, Dulles's 18 October early draft of a speech he planned to deliver a fortnight later referred to "the rising tide of protest against the ruthless domination of the Kremlin, which appears in the press, on the radio and in public statements in Poland, Hungary, and other satellite countries." The draft reiterated his belief that it had "never been our purpose to try to provoke violent revolutions which would be bloodily repressed by vastly superior military forces. But, by maintaining a position of sympathetic encouragement, and by following policies in the rest of the world which foster democratic development, we can exert a contagious influence which inevitably helps build up a steady pressure for freedom. This pressure will in the long run prove irresistible."[7] (U)

What surprised everyone was the suddenness of the crisis that erupted in Poland when Khrushchev and a high-level Soviet delegation appeared unannounced at the Warsaw airport on 19 October and confronted the new Polish leader, Władysław Gomułka, recently released from prison and reinstated to communist party membership, about the liberalizing trends taking place within the country and the rumored removal of hard-line figures from the government. An emotional standoff ensued, with Gomulka demanding that Khrushchev halt the advance of Soviet military units on Warsaw. Fearing tough resistance by Polish militia and the general population and after receiving assurances that Poland would remain a loyal Soviet ally, Khrushchev agreed and the crisis passed.[8] (U)

The Polish Dry Run

During both the Polish trouble and the early days of the Hungarian revolution that followed, the Department of State's communication with its mission in each capital was severed. Washington was so poorly informed about events in Poland that even if it had wanted, it probably would not have become involved. Gomułka's successful defiance of the Soviet Union, however, reinforced the U.S. inclination, shared by other Western powers, to stand back and let events run their course if something similar happened elsewhere in the satellites. (U)

Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles knew little more than what was in the newspapers. At home the morning of 20 October, a Saturday, when he received reports of the confrontation between Polish and Soviet leaders, Dulles decided to issue a statement expressing the "hope that Poland was achieving the independence promised by the UN Charter" and recalling the 1945 Yalta agreement about free elections. He cautioned Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., that "we must not however seem too action [active?]." State officials who came to work that day declined comment for the press, admitting that they "had little more information than appeared on the news tickers." The department's situation report as of mid-afternoon depended entirely on press and radio accounts. Not until late afternoon was it able to establish direct telephone connection with the Embassy in Warsaw.[9] (U)

Eisenhower, on the last leg of a campaign swing through the Western states prior to the 6 November presidential election, was about to land in Denver when he received a message from Washington drawn mostly from press accounts about the Polish situation. It quoted Khrushchev saying to the Polish leaders, "We spilled our blood to liberate this

country and now you want to turn it over to the Americans." Before leaving the aircraft, Eisenhower telephoned Dulles to discuss the situation; then deplaned to make the following remarks: "We read about Poland in our papers, we read about these captive peoples that are still keeping alive the burning desire to live in freedom, a freedom that we have come to take almost for granted, but which they have found is the most difficult thing to sustain in the world. Our hearts go out to them, that they may at last have that opportunity to live under governments of their own choosing." Later that day the President released a statement noting the numerous reports of Polish unrest and accounts of Soviet troop movements. He said he was in close touch with Dulles and reiterated his sympathy for the Polish people's "traditional yearning for liberty and independence."[10] (U)

Washington's lack of solid information was evident at a special meeting of the interagency Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) that afternoon. The minutes noted merely that "members exchanged views on intelligence and information from various sources bearing on developments in Poland and the *apparent* [author's emphasis] crisis in Polish-Soviet relations." CIA Director Allen Dulles later said the CIA's reporting at the meeting "had been fairly good but there were few, if any, contributions from anyone else."[11] (U)

That evening Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Murphy summoned Polish Ambassador Romuald Spasowski to the Department to learn more about what was happening. Murphy admitted that "we did not have much official confirmation as yet," only the many newspaper accounts. He asked whether Spasowski considered the reported movement of Soviet tanks toward Warsaw an internal or an

international affair, indicating that his answer would determine the course of the rest of the conversation. The Ambassador replied, "An international affair." Smiling, Murphy said the conversation would continue. Had Spasowski answered otherwise, it would have ended. However, the Ambassador was of little help. He could not confirm whether Khrushchev had made the statements attributed to him nor could he shed light on Soviet troop movements. But an aide who accompanied him referred to Poland's grave economic difficulties and implied that U.S. assistance would be welcome.[12] (U)

During a nationally televised interview on 21 October, one to which little attention has been given, Secretary Dulles candidly described the administration's cautious approach. Asked what the United States would do if a bloodbath occurred in Poland, he expressed doubt that one would take place: If "you have a whole people rising up, it's unlikely. . . that efforts will be made to put it down by mass military measures. . . what we see going on is part of a process. I don't think this liberation of Poland is going to happen overnight. I think you see there is what I have called the 'yeast' which is working, but I think it will be a process which will not be as spectacular as some newspaper reports seem to suggest." Asked what the United States and its allies would do to hasten this development, he replied; "We have been doing the only thing that can hasten it effectively, in my opinion—that is, to keep alive the idea of freedom, to practice freedom and constantly see that it is brought to the attention of the Polish people." Intervention, meddling, or interference by a foreign country, he pointed out, often proved counter-productive. Freedom was "a contagious thing and if anybody is apt to catch it, it's going to be the Poles." Asked whether the Soviet Union might become so alarmed that it would resort to repression in Poland and elsewhere, Dulles reiterated what

he had been saying for several months, that the Kremlin's adoption of more liberal policies had created a dilemma: It "had loosed irresistible forces that it would be difficult to halt without resorting to Stalinist practices. . . . a dilemma from which I do not think they can escape." Dulles then made what some observers considered an unfortunate remark in answering a question whether the movement of Soviet troops into Poland would constitute aggression. He replied that under the Warsaw Pact the Soviet Union perhaps "technically" had the right to do so. (U)

Another questioner recalled the lack of U.S. response to the 1953 East German uprising and inquired whether the United States would again "sit back" and allow a similar outcome in Poland. Dulles's answer was unequivocal:

> I do not think we would send our own Armed Forces into Poland, or into East Germany under those circumstances. I doubt if that would be a profitable or desirable thing to do. It would be the last thing in the world that these people, who are trying to win their independence, would want. That would precipitate a full-scale world war, and the probable results of that would be all these people would be wiped out.

Instigating military activity was a tricky business, he recalled, as in 1944 when the Soviet Union stirred the Polish underground in Warsaw to revolt only to have it put down by the Germans.[13] (U)

If military intervention were ruled out, came still another question, what specifically would the United States do? According to one observer Dulles replied "almost apologetically as if fumbling to figure out what could be done" and said that it would be indiscreet to answer the question in full. He briefly mentioned steps being taken to maintain "the love of liberty," such as Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe broadcasts, as well as leaflets carried into the satellites by balloons.[14] (U)

Another interviewer wondered about the growth of national communism, pointing out that in Poland one communist government merely seemed to be replacing another. Dulles said the important thing was to see the breakup of the Soviet monolith. Democracy could not be imposed. Many countries had "an internal government that we don't like. That, however, is not a matter for official government action. . . . If we had that test, we would have friendly relations with very few countries." Asked about coordination with the British and French regarding the liberation of Eastern Europe, Dulles thought that "the United States has been more concerned about that than perhaps they have been, and there is some feeling that to press that issue too much might lead to a danger of war in Europe." But he added that the three countries were in broad agreement on policy and "are in closer agreement within the last month or two than we had been at any time within the last few years. Not everyone within the administration agreed with Dulles's approach. At a meeting the next morning, Beam stressed the importance of adhering to the Secretary's position as set forth in the televised interview despite pressure from the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and others for a "less restrained approach."[15] (U)

Dulles's statements did reflect thinking at State. Its Policy Planning Staff recommended that the United States encourage Poland to become increasingly independent of the Soviet Union and seek to "avert Soviet forceful intervention . . . , which would not only terminate that independence but also might involve a risk of spreading hostilities." One of its members thought the changes in Poland irreversible, short of Soviet reoccupation of the country. More importantly, he said, "the pressures elsewhere to imitate the Poles will be irresistible." He thought it would take a long time:

> If we look for the demise of Communism next year we shall be disappointed. If we are patient, and if nothing happens that the Soviets can construe as a new and important threat to their national security, we have good reason to hope for a desirable modification in the internal operations of the European Soviet bloc. . . . Although there might be many gains for us if we could stir things up to the point of causing direct Soviet intervention, that course would carry very sizable risks. We can make smaller but still substantial gains at virtually no risk. . . .[16] (U)

The crisis passed quickly. By 24 October the bulk of three Soviet mechanized and two tank divisions brought up to the Polish-East German border had returned to their home stations. Engineer bridging equipment, according to U.S. military intelligence reports, remained in assembly areas near the Oder River, suggesting possible use if needed.[17] (U)

There was concern that Moscow might change its mind. The British Ambassador in Warsaw believed the Poles had dealt the Soviets "a notable diplomatic defeat," but it "hardly seems credible that the Russians could put up with such a snub, both because of the repercussions among the other satellites, and because of the vital strategic importance of Poland to the Soviet bloc." Both he and U.S. Ambassador Joseph Jacobs believed the Soviet loss of prestige "should be played down, for the obvious reason that they might feel more inclined to intervene with force if their discomfiture were rubbed in . . . .."[18] (U)

In Washington top officials reportedly said that the time might come, perhaps in six months, when Poland would ask the United States to help reduce its economic dependence on the Soviet Union, but "right now United States and other Western leaders had better keep quiet about it." Taking quick action would make it easier for Moscow to denounce Gomułka "as a tool of United States imperialism." They doubted whether the Soviet Union would use force to topple him. "Moscow's alternative to forceful action,"

they believed, was "to sit by while one satellite after another follows the example of Poland to the limit of its possibilities." This probably would not "mean the end of Soviet influence in the area, but Soviet power will be greatly weakened."[19] (U)

Eisenhower did not wait to hint at what the United States could offer. In a campaign speech the evening of 23 October he noted that discontent, unrest, riots, and demonstrations would continue in the satellite states "until the tyranny exercised over them either dissolves or is expelled. The day of liberation may be postponed where armed forces for a time make protest suicidal." The mission of the United States was "to help those freedom-loving peoples who need and want and can profitably use our aid that they may advance in their ability for self-support and may add strength to the security and peace of the free world."[20] (U)

State officials felt that the President had made only an offer of economic aid. In retrospect, though, it is easy to understand how people in Eastern Europe could interpret the remarks and the one he made at a rally two nights later, that the United States had never forgotten them "nor ever will," as meaning something more. For the administration the immediate question was how to convey the offer of economic aid privately to the Gomułka government. State favored making the approach through the Embassy in Warsaw, because calling in Spasowski would create too much press notice. A discreet approach in Warsaw would likely generate less publicity. Moreover, Spasowski was regarded as an old-line Stalinist. "We could not be sure that his report to the Polish Government in Warsaw would be accurate and according to our desires. He apparently has very close relations with the Soviet Ambassador, and he would probably inform him

at once of our approach so that the Soviet Government would be apprised of it from here."[21] (U)

Just a few days before the Polish crisis erupted, Eisenhower had announced that the United States, despite considerable Congressional opposition, would continue providing military assistance to Yugoslavia. The administration now saw the events in Poland as vindication of that support. Dulles had long believed that Yugoslavia's independence from Moscow should be encouraged, a policy the Truman administration had begun, because other communist countries would follow its example. The White House issued a statement that "the President's insistence on continued aid to Yugoslavia reflects itself in the Polish situation and in other unrest in other satellite nations." Under Secretary Murphy declared that the aid "helped to bring about some loosening of the bonds upon the once-free nations of Eastern Europe" and created "problems for the Communist leaders which they have not yet been able to resolve."[22] (U)



[redacted]

Gomułka and the Poles took the initial step [redacted]

[redacted] thereby raising Hungarians' expectations of what they, too, could achieve.

Without the Polish example there likely would have been no Hungarian revolution. (See table 1) Even before the standoff in Warsaw, Hungarian students, wanting to show solidarity with participants in the Poznań disorders awaiting trial, planned sympathy demonstrations that included demands for democratic reforms in Hungary. As a

Table 1. Hungarians' Reasons for Attempting an Uprising*

	Most Important	Next Important
Example of Poland	40	17
Rehabilitation of Rajk and others	18	24
Soviet Leaders' Denunciation of Stalin	12	16
Encouragement from the West	11	13
Relaxation of Russian Control	9	14
Example of Yugoslavia	6	7
Don't know	8	12
TOTAL PERCENT†	104	103
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	1,107	1,107

[redacted] The responses shown were to Question 8: "Now here are some things that have been suggested as reasons why people in Hungary were willing to attempt an uprising. (CARD) Which one of these, in your opinion, was most important in the minds of the Hungarians? Which one was next most important?"

† Percentages total more than 100% since some respondents gave more than one answer. [footnote in the original]

further display of solidarity, students in Budapest organized a march on 23 October to the statue of Joseph Bem, a Polish hero of the 1848 Hungarian revolt. The march turned into a massive public demonstration. There soon followed the outbreak of violence that led to the return to power of former Prime Minister Imre Nagy, who, like Gomulka, had been ousted from the communist party; the new government requested Soviet forces stationed in Hungary to quell the disturbance. (U)

Thus began the Hungarian revolution, lasting 12 days and passing through several phases. In this important respect, it differed from the recent troubles in Poznań and Warsaw and the 1953 violent outbursts in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, all of which were almost over by the time the outside world digested what was happening.

For the Soviet leadership, experience with the Polish defiance represented a kind of dress rehearsal for what would occur in Hungary.[24] And it gave Washington an opportunity to consider what action it might take if a similar situation developed in the region, enabling it to respond more quickly than it otherwise might to the outbreak of violence in Budapest. But the follow-on after the initial response posed problems. However ready Washington may have been for another flare-up likely to be snuffed out as quickly as before, none of its planning envisioned a prolonged struggle that would almost succeed in replacing a communist government with a democratic one. Nor apparently did any other country, including the Soviet Union.

The Budapest Legation's Performance

Journalists who witnessed the revolution and even members of the U.S. Legation in Budapest have suggested that the United States might have responded more vigorously

to the revolution if the Legation had performed better.[25] The criticism seems unwarranted. It is difficult to identify what could have been done differently. Any diplomatic mission required to function in the midst of major violence inevitably encounters trouble. The Legation in Budapest, located on the Pest side of the Danube near Parliament Square where much fighting took place, was no exception.[26] (U)

It also had to contend with unusual technical and personnel problems. What most hindered its effectiveness was the severance of communication with the outside world for two long stretches during the first week of the revolution. Unlike the British--the only Western staff with their own wireless transmitter, the Americans relied on a leased land-line to send encrypted communications to Washington. The Hungarian Government had not permitted them to operate their own equipment because the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had refused similar rights for the Hungarian Legation in Washington. Within hours of the outbreak of violence, Budapest's telegraph and telephone communications with the outside world were cut. Nevertheless, the staff continued to prepare cables. Because few reached Washington, Second Secretary Thomas Rogers and Assistant Army Attaché Captain Thomas Gleason brought copies to Vienna on 29 October for the Embassy there to transmit.[27] Until then, the Legation was virtually inaudible as far as Washington was concerned. (U)

Another shortcoming involved the staff's ability to communicate with the local population. Though a few of the attachés and political officers had a smattering of Hungarian, the Legation had a shortage of fluent speakers. One [redacted] with native command of the language, Vice Consul Ernest Nagy, was transferred in

September, leaving only Press Officer Anton Nyerges [redacted] with that capability.[28] (U)

The Legation's lack of leadership has been questioned. Its approximately 30 members represented the largest staff among the Western missions in Budapest,[29] but it was without a chief in the period leading up to and during much of the revolution. After 4 ½ years service in Hungary, Minister Christian Ravndal was transferred in August 1956. His replacement, Edwin Wailes, then serving as Ambassador in South Africa, was appointed Minister in late July but did not leave Washington until 30 October, arriving in Budapest on 2 November just before the second Soviet intervention. (U)

Some have viewed the delay as a sign of Washington's disinterest in Hungary or even mismanagement by the Department of State. One writer contended that Wailes "had been kicking his heels, pottering around in his Washington rose garden since August."[30] None of this was true. Wailes himself was primarily responsible for the delay. A veteran Foreign Service officer with the rank of Ambassador,* he became upset and threatened to retire when State asked him to take the lesser Hungary position. Although the Department said it was anxious to strengthen its representation there in view of recent Soviet bloc developments, Wailes felt that it had decided to move someone else to South Africa and was merely "scratching" for a place to put him. State's personnel director urged him to reconsider and said that Dulles and others considered him "one of the most valuable officers" in the Foreign Service. He pointed out that the "rapidly changing situation" in Eastern Europe promised to make Hungary a "challenging and interesting" post, and

* Wailes entered the Foreign Service in 1929 and served in China, Belgium and Luxembourg, Canada, North Africa, and Great Britain. He also held several administrative positions within the Department of State before being named to his first ambassadorial post in South Africa in September 1954.

added, "Please don't let us down." Wailes exacted a price for changing his mind. He requested permission to return to the United States by sea, and as he put it, thereby receive "18 days rest, as I have had little time off in many years." He planned to report to the Department for consultation the day after Labor Day, 4 September. After that, he hoped for a week's language training to brush up on French, which would be "followed by about a month's leave." His swearing in as minister to Hungary was scheduled for 4 October. These activities account for about two months of the delay. When he was in fact sworn in and why he did not leave in early or mid-October is not known, but on 25 October State informed the Legation in Budapest that he had applied for visas and would be departing in a week or ten days.[31] (U)

The delay may not have seemed a problem if the official serving in the interim had been a stronger personality. In the absence of a minister, Counselor N. Spencer Barnes headed the Legation as Chargé d'Affaires. Experienced in Soviet bloc affairs, he had held posts in Moscow, Teheran, and Berlin before coming to Budapest in January 1955. Though intellectually sharp and a gifted writer, he was almost universally regarded as a timid man. The interim nature of his position did not improve matters. A colleague considered him lacking in "rank, weight, or appreciable powers, and for that reason he was exceedingly cautious, weak, and soft. He did not take any action when the situation demanded it." An example cited of Barnes's timidity—and it seems misplaced--was his butler's hanging, apparently on his own initiative, a white flag from Barnes's residence during the 23 October demonstrations. Nyerges heard about the flag and rushed to the house to take it down. One journalist observed that "the incident did not say much for American resolve." In fact, however, it reflected the butler's lack of resolve, not that of

Barnes or the United States. Another colleague compared Barnes unfavorably to Ravndal, "a decisive, vigorous, gutsy fellow" whose "word was listened to in Washington." He was certain that if Ravndal had been in Budapest during the revolution the United States "would have reacted quite differently."[32] However, given the lengthy breakdowns in communication, it is hard to see how someone else would have made any difference. (U)

Moreover, the Legation's messages reflected anything but timidity, often including bold recommendations for action. Perhaps this is because Rogers did much of the drafting. Anything he drafted was of course subject to Barnes's revision and approval, but he recalled that Barnes did not often disapprove.[33] (U)

During the fighting Legation staff had frequent contacts with participants that shaped the nature of its recommendations. After its members witnessed the fighting at the Hungarian radio building the evening of 23 October and Nagy's speech in Parliament Square that badly disappointed the crowd, it strongly urged that U.S. media for the time being avoid "taking any kind of stand on Imre Nagy." Reflecting the views of a crowd demonstrating outside the Legation a few days later, it urged that the Soviet intervention be brought before the United Nations. It also proposed that Washington issue a high-level statement of sympathy and suggested the statement's text.[34] (U)

Hungarians were not reluctant to ask for help. On the evening of 25 October a man broke into the garden of Rogers's home. Admitted to the home by the children, he told Mrs. Rogers that he had a message for transmission to the United Nations, the contents of which she promptly telephoned to the Legation. Signed by the "fighting youth organization," it recapitulated in detail events of the last few days and appealed for the UN to discuss the Soviet intervention.[35] The same evening another man left at the

Legation door a leaflet signed by the new provisional revolutionary government and civil defense committee. It listed 17 demands, including the end of martial law, the "immediate termination" of the Warsaw Pact, a general political amnesty, and the establishment of socialism based on true democracy. He came the next day and said he had headed a delegation that met the night before with Nagy who had agreed to all their demands.[36] (U)

Shortly after midnight on 2 November, three young men came to the Legation and asked that an urgent message be sent to Washington requesting support of their cause at the United Nations. They wanted to unite all the rebel groups and have one representative from each appointed as an overseer in every major government department. They wanted use of a Legation car or help in getting the minutes of their meetings to Gyor, where they could be printed as leaflets and distributed by aircraft over Budapest. The youths asked that details of their negotiations with government leaders be brought to Washington's attention and demanded the intervention of UN forces.[37] (U)

The Legation also made efforts to reach out to the Hungarian government. Since the lack of communication with Washington deprived it of official instructions, it took the initiative on 28 October to telephone the Foreign Ministry with a proposal for a ceasefire. It wanted to bring about a compromise between the insurgent groups and the government to end the bloodshed. Speaking to the Deputy Foreign Minister, the Legation's representative--either Barnes or Rogers--said that the bloodshed was regrettable, that a "ceasefire seemed desirable, and speaking purely unofficially we would assume that any foreign Legation, including this one, would be glad to do whatever" was practical to end the fighting. The Hungarian official appreciated the thought, but said

nothing could be done since the insurgents were being crushed and made clear he had no intention of dealing with them. The Legation believed it advisable not to spurn the approaches by the insurgent groups in order to improve the chances for the government to negotiate with them and asked for State's advice. But State felt that no specific response to these approaches was necessary.[38] (U)

On another occasion, Rogers attempted to obtain the British Legation's agreement for a joint proposal that a left-of-center coalition government be established which would include Nagy and members of the Social Democratic Party, one which Moscow might accept, but the British Minister wanted a more right-wing coloration and Rogers was not sure that the proposal was forwarded to London.[39] (U)

The military attaches were active. On 30 October Air Attaché Colonel Welwyn Dallam talked with the government's chief of military protocol, who said the government's aim was to establish an independent, socialist state similar to Yugoslavia. Dallam, pessimistic, felt that the Soviet Union would "settle for nothing less" than the complete crushing of the revolution, continued Communist political control of the government, and continued Soviet military occupation. He said that the Hungarian people "of both sides," apparently referring to government supporters and rebels, were "looking to UN for action."[40] (U)

The author of the CIA's internal history of its role in the revolution was not impressed with the Legation's performance. From his standpoint, its reporting had less value than that of Western journalists because it had a narrower range of contacts. While some active participants in the revolution did come into the Legation, "these were naturally not of our choosing and in many cases were justifiably open to some suspicion."

Moreover, the reporting "was at best sporadic and laced with premature analysis and assumptions (of the sort that diplomats feel their government stands in need of)."[41] (U)

Despite criticisms from various sources and taking into account the difficulties it faced, on the whole the staff performed well. That it did not have a greater influence on shaping policy in Washington resulted more from the break in communications with Washington than from its own shortcomings. (U)

Leading at the UN

The United States has also been criticized for a lack of interest, even opposition, to raising the Hungarian question at the United Nations.[42] This was not true, at least at first, as the State Department had to pressure the British and French to get the matter on the Security Council's agenda. Some have charged that the administration's main motive was to gain the support of voters of East European descent in the presidential election. The evidence indicates the opposite. Motives were mixed, but Eisenhower and Dulles seemed genuinely concerned about the Hungarian situation and wanted to avoid even the appearance that UN consideration was designed to attract voters. (U)

Although State had decided during the summer not to bring the Poznań disturbance before the UN, that course of action remained an option if similar situations developed. On 23 October its Policy Planning Staff was in fact considering a UN appeal in case the Soviet Union changed its mind and decided to intervene militarily in Poland.[43] This facilitated its turning to the UN as the initial response to Soviet intervention in Hungary. Moreover, since the UN had been wrestling for several weeks with the question of Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal, attention had been focused on it as a possible arbiter in international disputes. (U)

There was another reason for prompt action--others were demanding it. The Hungarian National Council in New York on 25 October sent telegrams to Dulles and to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld asking that Hungary be placed on the Security Council's agenda. That evening Dulles broached the idea with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. "From a political standpoint," the Secretary worried about people saying that "here are the great moments and when they came and these fellows were ready to stand up and die, we were caught napping and doing nothing." He raised the possibility of acting as early as the next day and having the British and French join in the U.S. initiative.[44] (U)

Dulles discussed the matter with his brother Allen, Director of Central Intelligence, expressing concem that Hungarian émigrés "might jump the gun—by going to the UN via the Latinos." He told the President that State was seeking British and French support, but he doubted they would want to act quickly. If action was not taken the next day (Friday, 26 October), the Secretary wondered whether it was worth doing at all—a remark apparently reflecting his concem that over the weekend Soviet forces would be able to put down the trouble. Eisenhower was willing to wait until Monday to gain multilateral support and avoid the impression that the United States was raising the issue for domestic political reasons. Dulles doubted if other NATO countries, especially the major ones, would "come along with us—as they will interpret it as being an election move." But the President did not want to act alone—"some agreement from our allies no matter who puts it in would take the noose off." Both men agreed that raising the matter in the UN was a close call. "The worst thing," Eisenhower said, would "to be thought of as guilty of spurious interest."[45] (U)

Dulles then called Lodge to inquire about circulating to the signatories of the 1947 Hungarian Peace Treaty a letter condemning the Soviet invasion and sounding them out on possible further action. State had drafted such a letter stressing the Soviet intervention but not criticizing the Hungarian government. If the signatories opposed further action, Dulles said, "at least we would have a reason for not acting." Lodge suggested that they try first for a resolution and failing that settle for a letter.[46] (U)

State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO), unsure of the benefits of UN involvement in East European troubles, feared that "over-zealous activity on our part could stimulate counter-action and resentment that would defeat our objectives of encouraging the satellites to loosen their ties with Moscow." But "silence might be subject to misinterpretation. At the least, we must continue to make clear by appropriate and timely statements our readiness to extend assistance if desired and our championship of the cause of human freedom. . . ." The strongest action the Security Council might take would be to exhort the contending sides to stop fighting and/or to establish an ad hoc investigative committee to prepare the way for further Council action, if necessary. If the Soviet Union exercised its veto, "the uniting for peace machinery could be utilized to move the case to the General Assembly."* In any event, IO felt that the United States should take the initiative and persuade others to join; "a small-power initiative would be less likely to succeed, and we would be regarded as having employed a stooge and as not having the courage of our convictions."[47] (U)

Already at work on the matter, the mission in New York concluded that any UN involvement was unlikely to change "the immediate course of events," so the object had

* [Korean War Uniting for peace machinery]

to be psychological. It should provide the widest possible expression of moral support to the Hungarian people and other satellite peoples, an opportunity for 'exposing Soviet actions completely," and "a basis for keeping open the possibility of needling the Soviets in future." Any "resolution calling for UN action must be mild enough to avoid the charge that it is merely a Cold War move, flexible enough to accommodate changes in the Hungarian situation, and broad enough to permit a complete exposé of Soviet actions." In any event, the likelihood of a veto by the Soviet Union in the Security Council would not be considered a deterrent.[48] (U)

On the contrary, the U.S. Mission staff in New York felt a veto would increase U.S. prestige and particularly enhance the organization's standing in the eyes of the satellite peoples. It preferred a mild resolution which would receive fairly widespread support, "particularly if action [were] taken expeditiously while public interest is high." It also favored sending observers if the Hungarian Government approved, or at least to neighboring countries to interview refugees. "We could announce we were not courting a veto, that we did not want a cold war item, that we wanted real results. . . ." Whoever cleared the message for transmission to Washington added, "Recommend prompt action. We will get maximum support if we strike while iron is hot." The mission's draft resolution called for appointment of a committee consisting of Australia, Iran, and Yugoslavia to investigate the situation and report at the earliest practicable date.[49] It did not specifically mention sending observers to Hungary, but the committee would presumably have to do this as part of its investigation. (U)

To secure multilateral support State that evening approached the five peace treaty signatories, along with France, seeking their backing for either circulating a letter within

the Security Council or submitting a resolution. One Council member, Yugoslavia, was a special case that State feared might find it awkward to support either step, given its special relationship with the Soviet Union and the possibility the two governments were already discussing the Hungarian situation. Not wanting to exclude Yugoslavia and thereby prejudge its position, State left the decision up to the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade as to whether and how to approach the government. It also sent its initial thoughts on the fighting in Budapest for communication to Belgrade, noting that it did not expect unarmed Hungarians to be able to defeat the Soviet forces. Under the circumstances, it wanted to minimize the bloodshed, keep the Hungarian Government from taking reprisals, "and (assuming it still has some good-will with populace) encourage it [to] proceed with rapid democratization." The Yugoslavs could facilitate this process by lending support or using their influence with Moscow. However, when the Ambassador informally raised with the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry the idea of joint UN action with the Western powers, it made clear its unwillingness to join them.[50] (U)

Washington's close allies eventually went along with the proposal, but with reservations. Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, favored UN consideration because it might prevent further bloodshed, but warned against rash intervention in Eastern Europe that might hurt the Poles and Hungarians "by provoking a cruel and powerful reaction from those who may be waiting for an opportunity to move in and destroy these new liberating and national forces, using the excuse of foreign threats or interference from our side." The French Foreign Ministry said that it was essential that the resolution "not contain any disposition which may disturb our actions in

Algeria and our relationship with Morocco and Tunisia. We are particularly against the formation of a committee of inquiry."[51] (U)

The British presented a bigger stumbling block. Although the Prime Minister's office expressed "sympathy and admiration" for the insurgents' struggle and announced a donation of money to the International Red Cross for medical and other supplies, the Foreign Office was reluctant to take a strong public stance of support. The press quoted authoritative sources in London as believing that direct Western intervention "would certainly lead to harsher punitive measures" by the Soviet Union in Hungary and other satellites and "could also lead to war." British officials recalled the warning Khrushchev had made when he visited England in April that the Soviet Union would fight to retain control of its position in Central Europe.[52] (U)

The Foreign Office preferred not to raise the matter in the Security Council and instead wanted to wait until the opening of the General Assembly regular session on 12 November, where it felt a fuller debate could take place. Discussion there would make clear the West's interest in the Hungarian situation while "gaining time to decide how to play our hand in the Assembly in the light of the way in which events turn out in Hungary over the next two weeks." It considered the Western position in the Security Council weak. The Soviet Union could exercise a veto and also justifiably argue that the Hungarian Government had requested help in dealing with an internal revolt, a matter outside UN jurisdiction. Since "no large scale troop movements have taken place," the British said, it would be difficult to contend that a threat to international peace had arisen. In a telling comment as events would prove, the Foreign Office believed that Security

Council inscription would "encourage the Hungarians to needless self-slaughter" and the Soviets "to be rougher and tougher than they already are." (U)

The excuses went on. Taking the matter up in the Security Council would imply that the United States and Great Britain were "conniving" with the rebels. Moreover, the General Assembly was a better place to raise the issue since smaller and neutral nations would be more inclined to speak out. Finally, delaying debate until the second week of November would assure the Soviet Union that the West had no intention of intervening, which for the rebels was "the kindest message" the West could give. But the question had to be handled carefully in the General Assembly so as not to prejudice the British presence in Cyprus. As the U.S. Embassy in London observed, even though a Soviet veto would keep the Security Council from acting, the mere suggestion would disturb the British Government, which had "its hands full in Suez and feels [a] shortage of friends." [53] (U)

Dulles told the President he planned to send a personal message to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd urging prompt inscription on the Security Council agenda. He would tell Lloyd that focusing attention on Hungary would discourage the Soviet Union from carrying out widespread reprisals and would "give us a chance to talk privately with them" at the UN. Such talks were nothing new. Following Stalin's death in March 1953, when the collective Soviet leadership signaled a willingness to negotiate on outstanding international issues, U.S. and Soviet diplomats at the UN had engaged in informal but fruitless contacts.[54] The President suggested that Lloyd be told that the situation was "so terrible that we would be remiss if we did not do something." In a message to Lloyd sent later that evening, Dulles pointed out that the revolt was assuming proportions that might

bring a major Soviet intervention. The "emotional reaction" in the United States, he stated, would certainly be quite serious. It was most important to focus attention on Hungary promptly and at the same time to create an opportunity for informal discussions with Soviet UN representatives.[55] (U)

Dulles's message led to a British about-face, with Lloyd now agreeing to join in the Security Council action. Whether the reversal had anything to do with the military measures Britain, France, and Israel were secretly planning to take against Egypt is not known.* The decision may also have resulted from a report from Budapest the previous day that 2,000 demonstrators had gathered outside the British Legation, and that some who entered the building had asked that their request be passed to London for the UN to take up the question of the Soviet intervention. Not only did the British now favor Security Council action, they wanted a meeting held the next day, a Sunday, because they maintained that quick action would bolster the morale of the Hungarian people and limit time for the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Government to counterattack. France wanted to meet even earlier--that afternoon or evening--but agreed on Sunday to allow the delegations time to prepare. Lodge felt that they should avoid a call for a cease-fire that might allow the Soviet forces and Hungarian Government a chance to consolidate their positions. The British and French agreed and reiterated their objections to any resolution that mentioned a commission of inquiry, which might embarrass the British in Cyprus and the French in Algeria.[56] (U)

State wanted the meeting limited to quick adoption of the agenda without any substantive debate. Expecting the Soviet representative to object violently, it cautioned

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* Representatives of the three countries had met at Sèvres outside Paris on 24 October to make final arrangements for the attack on Egypt.

Lodge not to engage in rebuttals, but to say that in view of the urgency of the situation, the United States did not wish to submit a resolution and reserved the right to deal with any Soviet charges at a later meeting. This would allow flexibility to determine a precise course of action and the kind of resolution to be submitted later. It also reminded Lodge that it needed more information from Budapest, from which it had been cut off, and that any decision on a course of action would require concurrence at the highest level in Washington.[57] (U)

A Washington journalist noted that although the appeal to the Security Council was taken at U.S. initiative and there was "an intense desire here to assist the insurgents, it is still limited by a certain caution." Russia would "not easily tolerate anything but a Communist government in Hungary and that therefore any Western action should, if possible, avoid provoking the Russians further or suggest to them that the West is attempting to bolster a hostile State within the political boundaries that Russia has hitherto considered essential for her security. The State Department is apparently still seeking a way of offering the Russians a manner of withdrawal that will not be too humiliating."[58] (U)

At the Security Council's 28 October meeting, the first time since the Korean War that it had convened on a Sunday, Soviet representative Arkady Sobolev argued against including Hungary on the agenda on the ground that it constituted interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. The Western powers, he said, sought to encourage a reactionary underground movement bent on overthrowing the legally constituted government. He claimed a speech Secretary Dulles had given in Dallas the previous evening had "plainly called for the replacement of the existing Hungarian Government by

another." Over Sobolev's protest, the Council voted 9-1, with Yugoslavia abstaining, to place the item on the agenda. By the same vote, it rejected his proposal to adjourn for three or four days to allow members to obtain more information.[59] (U)

In the discussion that followed, Lodge defended action by the UN, quoted extensively from Dulles's speech, and briefly recapitulated events, closing with a reference to contradictory reports that the Hungarian Government had begun negotiations with the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops, but also that new Soviet forces had entered the country and that large-scale fighting had broken out. When the meeting adjourned, it was left to the Council President's discretion when to call another.[60] (U)

It took the Security Council five days to convene a meeting intended only to raise the question. Given the time required for this initial step and the confused situation within Hungary, it is difficult to agree with those who later contended that the UN during these first few days should have dispatched Secretary General Hammarskjöld to see first-hand what was going on.[61] It would have been virtually impossible to get agreement to do so. And no one was even suggesting it at this point. (U)

Washington's Policy Takes Shape

Eager to have the Security Council take up the Hungarian question as a multilateral initiative, Eisenhower was in no hurry to do much else alone. His deliberateness stemmed in part from the uncertainty surrounding the situation and in part from his customary cautious approach to decision-making. Although Poland and Hungary were not on the agenda of the NSC's 26 October meeting, Allen Dulles brought them up during his briefing on world developments. Discussion proceeded in a curious way. Deputy Secretary Reuben Robertson, attending in Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson's

absence, apparently said nothing, and JCS Chairman Admiral Arthur Radford's only contribution was raising a question about the American Communist Party's reaction to the East European events. Secretary Dulles's remarks were few. The President, Allen Dulles, and disarmament adviser Harold Stassen dominated the discussion. In summarizing developments in Hungary, Allen Dulles said that it was "too early to reach any firm conclusions," but thought "the revolt constituted the most serious threat yet to be posed to continued Soviet control of the satellites." (U)

The discussion brought out the major reason for Eisenhower's hesitancy—his fear of provoking the Soviet Union into rash action. He wondered whether the Kremlin's leaders, "in view of the serious deterioration of their position in the satellites, might . . . resort to very serious measures and even to precipitate global war." When Germany faced certain defeat near the end of World War II, Hitler "had carried on to the very last and pulled down Europe with him." Soviet leaders, the President thought, might do something similar. Responding to his concerns, Stassen wondered about getting a message to Minister of Defense Marshal Georgii Zhukov that the Soviet Union should not look on freedom in the satellites as a threat to Soviet security. "We should make clear," said Stassen, "that this development would not impel the Western powers to make any warlike move against the Soviet Union." Eisenhower did not think such a step worthwhile, because he doubted whether the Soviet leaders really feared a Western attack. (U)

Stassen had suggested that in view of the significance of the satellite developments the President might want to call a special NSC meeting. Eisenhower, however, preferred to have the interested departments and agencies first analyze the

situation and then present their findings to the NSC. This was "better than to plunge right into a discussion in the Council on these difficult subjects." But he set no deadline for them to accomplish this task before the next regularly scheduled meeting on 1 November.[62] (U)

Greatly worried about the Soviet reaction, after the meeting Eisenhower warned Radford and Allen Dulles to stay "unusually watchful and alert.". At Radford's request the Joint Chiefs discussed the possibility that a "serious defeat by the Soviets [in the satellites] could conceivably result in precipitous action on their part." The Defense Department adopted alert measures, including notification of the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), General Alfred Gruenther.[63] ~~(S)~~

Stassen persisted. In a letter to Eisenhower that afternoon, he apologized for not making his views clearer at the NSC meeting. Soviet leaders, he believed, "may calculate that if they lose control of Hungary, that country would be taken into NATO by the United States, and this would be a great threat in Soviet eyes to their own security. May it not be wise for the United States in some manner to make it clear that we are willing to have Hungary be established on the Austrian basis – independent – and not affiliated with NATO?" That afternoon he also met with Secretary Dulles and reiterated his idea "that we should let the Russians know that we would accept for the satellites some neutralized status like that of Austria" and suggested that it be done "through diplomatic channels or through Tito." Dulles doubted "that it was desirable to use any such channels as the Russians could publicize what was happening and give the revolutionary elements the impression that we were working secretly with the Russians behind their backs." But he would think about some other way to get the idea across, although he was unsure whether

"we should go so far as to commit these countries to an Austria type neutralization."[64] Dulles told the President he was reluctant to follow up on the suggestion unless it went through the Security Council where "we could have some backstage talks going on during the time the Council was in session, which would be more or less legitimate."[65] (U)

Dulles adopted Stassen's suggestion in part. He added language to his speech in Dallas on 27 October, assuring the Soviet Union that the United States had no military interest in either Poland or Hungary:

> And let me make this clear, beyond a possibility of a doubt: The United States has no ulterior purpose in desiring the independence of the satellite countries. Our unadulterated wish is that these peoples, from whom so much of our own national life derives, should have sovereignty restored to them and that they should have governments of their own free choosing. We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies. We see them as friends and as part of a new and friendly and no longer divided Europe.

He cleared this passage with the President and asked his brother and the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Amory to go over the final draft with a small group of State Department officials, none of whom objected to the part reassuring the Soviet Union.[66] (U)

In the speech Dulles also said that those "who peacefully enjoy liberty" had a duty "to seek, by all truly helpful means, that those who now die for freedom will not have died in vain." He spoke of help the United States might provide and made clear that it was economic, not military:

> The captive peoples should never have reason to doubt that they have in us a sincere and dedicated friend who shares their aspirations. They must know that they can draw upon our abundance to tide themselves over the period of economic adjustment which is inevitable as they rededicate their productive efforts to the service of their own people, rather than of

> exploiting masters. Nor do we condition economic ties between us upon the adoption by these countries of any particular form of society.[67] (U)

Other assurances came from an unlikely source--Secretary of Defense Wilson, whose indiscreet public remarks on more than one occasion in the past had aroused the President's ire.[68] Appearing on 28 October on the same television interview program that Dulles had a week before and speaking with the tact of a diplomat, Wilson said he did not think developments in Poland and Hungary would cause any revision in the U.S. defense posture. Like Dulles, he explicitly ruled out American military involvement. An interviewer mentioned the rebels' pleas for Western help. "Is there any way," he asked, "that the United States and its NATO allies could assist these people who are fighting for freedom?" Wilson replied:

> The American people are very sympathetic with the people of any land that are trying to throw off tyranny and oppression and assert their freedom and their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. When it comes to intervention, that's a much more difficult thing. We deplore bloodshed in any of these things and hope that they can be solved, and many times they are, by men of good will finally asserting a position in various places over the world, and in the light of world public opinion, work something out that is just and fair. (U)

An interviewer mentioned Adlai Stevenson's charge that the East European turmoil had caught the administration off guard. Wilson disagreed, pointing out that the world's trouble spots were well-known but it took time to deal with them. Did the United States have any idea about the timing of the Polish crisis or the Hungarian rebellion? In that kind of situation, Wilson observed, it was impossible to "tell within a day or month or even sometimes within a year; but potentially the thing was there, because—to hold peoples with long records of freedom under tyrannical domination for any great length of time through the years, is almost impossible." Asked whether the Republican Party had

contributed to the unrest in Eastern Europe, Wilson answered unequivocally, "I would say not." When the moderator pressed him, referring to statements by Republican spokesmen that this was the case, Wilson said that such statements "wouldn't be correct, exactly. The fact that we haven't gotten into any more trouble in the world, or lost out, I could say, that the Administration deserves some credit for, but the exact timing of the—of the business, I would say we had nothing to do with it." Another questioner jumped in: "Well, you would not feel, then, as Mr. Dulles says—said he feels, that the Eisenhower administration's stubborn insistence on the idea of the eventual liberation of peoples held under foreign domination—that their refusal to give Soviet tyranny a good name by making agreements and sitting down time and again with them, has held the hope of freedom alive in those countries." Wilson replied that he certainly agreed with Dulles. "But as for the planning of any particular event at any particular time, we had no hand in that." Did the United States have agents inside Hungary that started the rebellion? Wilson replied, "Not to my knowledge, certainly." (U)

Questioning reverted to military assistance. Had the provision of military equipment to Yugoslavia over the years encouraged the Hungarians to revolt? Wilson was not sure: "It possibly has, because they have a clear example of another nation, another people that have asserted their independence from Moscow in spite of their Communist type of society." Before the discussion turned to other subjects, a question was put directly to the Secretary: "Have you seen anything within your Department where there is a suggestion of arms aid to the Hungarians if they make this rebellion stick?" Wilson's replied firmly: "No, I have not."[69] (U)

Other comments by Defense officials reported in the press painted a bleak picture of the rebels' chances. Under such headlines as "Pentagon Sees Hungarians in Losing Battle" and "Reds Can Quell Revolt in a Few Days," the *Chicago Tribune* cited unnamed Pentagon sources as saying the rebels lacked the "tight military organization, weapons and supply lines plus outside support necessary for victory over the Russians." Little wonder that students in a northwestern Hungarian town reported receiving word from sources along the Austrian border that "military aid from NATO countries appeared to be hopelessly out of the question," although no one knew why.[70] (U)

In the absence of an NSC decision, the closest thing to a statement of policy came in a paper prepared on 28 October by Richard Davis of State's Policy Planning Staff, whose recommended courses of action Dulles approved the following day. As Davis saw it, the principal U.S. objective regarding the satellites was "to encourage, as a first step toward eventual full national independence and freedom, the emergence of 'national' communist governments. While they might continue to be in close political and military alliance with the Soviet Union, they would be able to exercise to a much greater degree of independent authority and control than formerly in the direction of their own affairs, primarily confined in the first stage to their internal affairs." The rapid pace of developments in Hungary and lack of reliable first-hand information, Davis felt, made it difficult to foresee the course of events. Citing confirmed reports that additional Soviet troops were entering the country, Davis found it difficult to believe that the Soviet Union, after committing itself so deeply to intervention, "could disengage its forces until order is reestablished under a Hungarian Government willing and able to maintain its military and political alliance with the USSR." He believed that the basic objectives and conclusions

of the NSC paper adopted in July remained valid, but he advanced several additional tentative conclusions and courses of action. He argued that any U.S. intervention, either unilaterally or with other countries, would precipitate "a major crisis with the Soviet Union and possibly the outbreak of general war." The United States and other countries should instead try to find a balance between encouraging "forces in the satellites moving toward US objectives" and provoking "counterforces including the Soviet Union to intervene and set back those 'liberalizing' influences at work."[71] (U)

With regard to Hungary, Davis listed several goals:

1. Our immediate objective is to discourage and, if possible, prevent further Soviet armed intervention in Hungary as well as harsh measures of retaliation or repression. For this purpose the U.S. should mobilize pressures on the USSR against such measures through the UN action and by other means while reassuring the USSR we do not look upon Hungary or the other Satellites as potential military allies and recognize legitimate Soviet security interests in its relations with these areas.

2. In line with this approach consider* making in the UN or elsewhere a proposal of Hungarian neutrality on the Austrian model.

3. If the Nagy Government succeeds in establishing peace and its authority in the country, we should use whatever capabilities we may possess to influence the new Hungarian leaders to adhere to and fulfill the commitments they have made to the Hungarian people which will advance U.S. objectives, including the promise to seek Soviet agreement for the total withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary.

A decision on long-term U.S. economic assistance was to be kept in abeyance. While doubting that the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces from Hungary until assured of a government that would maintain friendly ties with Moscow, Davis believed that the

*A partially legible revision, apparently in Robert Bowie's hand, reads: "whether it is valuable [?] to make . . . ."

Polish and Hungarian events so far "may well lead the Kremlin to reappraise the value of its present position in the Satellites and the costs of seeking to maintain it on the present basis." He therefore recommended that the NSC Planning Board "urgently undertake a study of policies and actions which might encourage or bring about such a withdrawal." [72] (U)

Stassen was convinced his recommendations had little effect. The most they accomplished, he recalled, was to encourage Dulles to insert in the Dallas speech the reassuring words to the Soviet leaders. He had really wanted a direct approach to the Soviets, saying in effect, "Let us confer immediately on the Hungarian situation. Let us work out some solution." Dulles had said he could not do this because the revolution "was moving in a way that was favorable to United States policy."[73] (U)

In fact, Dulles did decide to make an approach, but through Ambassador Charles Bohlen in Moscow rather than the Soviet UN mission. He may have thought doing so in the Soviet capital minimized the chance of a leak. Although there is no indication that his name ever came up, a less risky New York channel might have been Anatolii Dobrynin, who as a UN Deputy Secretary General was on Hammarskjöld's staff and not part of the Soviet mission. Dobrynin lived in an apartment separate from the Soviet compound and had his own direct means of communication with the Foreign Ministry.[74] (U)

On 29 October Dulles sent Bohlen a message, having cleared it with Eisenhower, which quoted the passage about Eastern Europe in the Dallas speech. He asked that the passage be brought to the attention of the Soviet leaders, including Zhukov. Bohlen could also mention a Western proposal for a treaty of assurance in connection with German reunification. Dulles stressed that the démarche should be kept from being publicly

attributed to the United States. It is ironic that at the time Dulles was instructing Bohlen to approach the Soviet leaders, the Legation in Budapest, presuming that a debate was taking place within the Presidium between proponents of an iron-fisted approach and those advocating a moderate course, warned State against any "weak-kneed" Western reaction that would tip the scale in favor of the harder line.[75] (U)

In the meantime, Davis's paper formed the basis for the Planning Board's drafting of a new policy paper to deal with events in Poland and Hungary. During its deliberations the Board Assistants discussed, but rejected, proposals, to take steps quickly to detach Albania and Czechoslovakia from the Soviet bloc, give covert assistance to the Hungarian rebels, and redeploy U.S. forces as a warning to the Soviet Union.[76] It is not clear who made these proposals. ~~(S)~~

The NSC Special Staff also discussed the possibility of covertly supplying arms to the rebels but noted that matters like this traditionally fell outside the Planning Board's purview. It seems that at least some at the CIA favored a more direct involvement than diplomatic action. Indeed, Allen Dulles had cabled Wisner on 27 October that "these are dramatic days and we must weigh carefully all our actions. However, I'm not one of those who believes we should be hindered by Undue Caution."[77] ~~(S)~~

The possibility of supplying weapons to the insurgents became a live issue during the last days of October [redacted] recalled that insurgents came to the Legation several times asking for weapons, especially anti-tank guns "We don't need American soldiers," they declared. "Just give us weapons, send us weapons!" He knew of stockpiled weapons of Soviet manufacture in West Germany that had been captured during the Korean War: "if we wanted to keep it quiet we could have brought in some of

those." [redacted] was also aware of "a corps of Hungarian volunteers in West Germany," apparently a reference to a fraternal group of former Hungarian officers, who were armed and "only waiting for the authorization to set off for Hungary—an authorization that was never given."[78] No evidence has been found that this possibility was considered. (U)

While the Legation had not received a formal request for arms or any kind of military assistance, Military Attaché Todd thought he should request guidance from Washington in case the government so inquired. Delayed in transmission, his message of 31 October did not reach the Pentagon until 2 November. The next day officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) discussed it with Beam, who believed "strongly that any reply could be misinterpreted." Therefore, they sent none.[79] So the question of sending arms to Hungary apparently never got very far in Defense. (U)

The Planning Board's draft policy paper, circulated on 31 October for consideration by the NSC the following day, repeated much of Davis's language about the objectives in Eastern Europe. In one important respect, it went further. It evidenced a cautious note of optimism in recommending what kind of help the United States should provide if a government came to power "at least as independent as that in Poland." In addition to (1) furnishing disaster relief; (2) increasing economic, scientific, and cultural exchanges; (3) being open to requests for moderate amounts of economic and technical assistance; and (4) adopting measures to reorient Hungary's trade toward the West, it proposed that the U.S. Government make the new leaders aware of its "support of their aims; and, to the extent that their success depends on such assistance, be prepared to assist them [redacted] accomplish their purpose of forming and preserving

such a government."[80] Whether the assistance would include direct financial subsidies is not clear. (U)

The paper saw two courses open to the United States. The first was to continue the present policy, i.e. pressure through public statements and action at the UN "to inhibit the Soviet Union from further armed intervention" and provision of food and medical assistance for Hungary. The second was a more aggressive course, [redacted] to "open recognition of their belligerent status" or "overt military support and recognition of their government if one be formed and succeeds in holding a portion of the country." But Stassen had added a third course to the draft paper—to try "to facilitate the complete withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Hungary and the development of a Hungarian government broadly based on Hungarian public support with an independent status not allied to either the West or the East in a manner similar to the establishment of Austria." He also wanted the NSC to consider whether the United States should indicate a willingness "to consult with NATO on the probable withdrawal of some U.S. forces from Western Europe" if the Soviet Union pulled its forces out of Hungary.[81] (U)

The Joint Chiefs strongly opposed Stassen's recommendations. They felt his proposed third course of action added little to the paper and feared that any offer of a partial withdrawal of troops might lead to a Soviet effort to obtain withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Europe. In their view, it might not be necessary to offer Moscow anything. If developments continued favorably, there was a possibility "that local actions will result in the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from that country without involvement of the United States." The JCS even opposed the Planning Board's inclusion of a recommended

action that Dulles, with the President's approval, had already taken—publicly and privately assuring the Soviet Union that "we do not look upon Hungary or the other Satellites as potential military allies." They believed that such assurances would undermine whatever "influence the United States may have on the government which is established in Hungary, and could in the future operate to our military disadvantage."[82] (U)

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was prepared to back the JCS. A briefing paper ISA prepared for Secretary Wilson's use the day before the NSC meeting recommended that he concur in the draft paper, which it considered "generally acceptable," but that he oppose Stassen's recommendations and support the JCS views if Admiral Radford made a convincing presentation. ISA observed that the policy approved in July (NSC 5608/1) was "seriously inadequate in that, in its emphasis on the evolutionary approach toward the Satellite problem, it fails to give sufficient policy guidance as to what the U.S. should do in the event revolutionary action occurs."[83] ~~(S)~~

An NSC staff member had different reasons than those of the JCS and OSD for criticizing the paper. He thought it presented "little or nothing substantial and immediate which is not already done or contemplated." Moreover, it implied that the United States should do nothing more for the time being. If this were true, he wondered, would it not "be clearer to say so."[84] ~~(S)~~

In the meantime the U.S. intelligence community, asked to rate the likelihood of precipitate Soviet action, had furnished an assessment on 30 October as part of a general estimate of the East European situation. In typically hedged language, the estimate concluded:

> It seems unlikely that US action short of overt military intervention or obvious preparation for such intervention would lead the USSR deliberately to take steps which it believed would materially increase the risk of general war. The Soviet leaders probably recognize that the US nuclear-air capability remains superior to that of the USSR, and have probably concluded that at present the USSR, even if it launched a surprise attack, would receive unacceptable damage in a nuclear exchange with the US.

The estimate sounded a note of caution: "Soviet suspicions of US policy and present circumstances which involve Soviet troop movements and alerts probably increase the likelihood of a series of actions and counteractions leading inadvertently to war," a series of events the estimate believed would most likely originate over East Germany, not Hungary.[85] (U)

NATO: Talk and Sympathy

If the NSC was responding in a deliberate manner, NATO by comparison moved ponderously. It produced papers, held meetings, and generally passed the ball to the United Nations. One scholar has quipped that when it came to the Hungarian revolution, NATO stood for "No Action, Talk Only." There is no evidence that it considered military intervention in Hungary. General Lauris Norstad, Gruenther's deputy and soon to succeed him as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), recalled only that it had "some intelligence warning on the Hungarian crisis." He remembered discussions being held about 'what the hell can we do if we decide to do something. . . . But there was nothing useful or constructive that could be done."[86] (U)

Since the spring of 1956 NATO had been following with interest the political and cultural thaw taking place in Eastern Europe, but a paper its International Staff circulated in late September warned against over-optimism regarding the liberalizing trends in the satellites and the ability of outside powers to influence them. It recommended that the

West continue using its cultural and informational contacts to assure the satellite peoples "of its moral support in their efforts to free themselves." But since "we are not prepared to use force to liberate them, we should not encourage futile rebellions on their part."[87] (U)

To allow delegations a full month to review and comment on the paper, Secretary General Hastings Ismay scheduled it for North Atlantic Council (NAC) consideration on 24 October, at which time the discussion centered on Poland and the region in general without reference to the tumultuous overnight events that had taken place in Hungary. The meeting resulted in a request for the International Staff to prepare three papers: (1) a summary of policies toward Eastern Europe being followed by NATO countries, (2) an up-to-date background paper; and (3) a paper directed towards a serious discussion of the possibilities for action, if any, to be taken by NATO governments "to promote the development of the thaw." The first paper was to be circulated within the next week or two; the latter two prior to the December ministerial meeting.[88](U)

Because of the rapidly worsening Hungarian situation, Ismay called a special Council meeting for 27 October. Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Alberico Casardi, concerned that reporters would press representatives to comment on Hungary, suggested that they keep the Kremlin guessing about NATO's intentions. He thought representatives should avoid stating or even implying "that under no circumstances would we consider military intervention in any way in the situation in Eastern Europe," but they should also avoid suggesting that intervention was under consideration. "If we say we will *not* intervene, then the Stalinists can argue that they have carte blanche to take any repressive measures they want. If we say that we might

intervene, then Russian national prestige becomes more involved and a disengagement more difficult."[89] Noting that the revolution showed no sign of ending, he concluded:

> The question which now arises is whether any regime with Communist participation can stabilize the situation except as a form of Soviet military government. The Polish solution is thus overrun by events. Either the Russians must bow to the will of the people and withdraw, or they must intervene in a massive way. The human cost of the latter course would be terrible and we can only explore every avenue which might offer a hope of persuading them that withdrawal is preferable.[90] (C)

Casardi suggested that NATO mobilize world public opinion, seek to involve leaders of neutral countries, offer medical assistance to Hungary, support the UN Security Council's consideration of the question, and appeal to the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces, perhaps through Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak then visiting Moscow. Casardi may have been echoing Washington's position by suggesting that the Council offer Moscow "some form of assurance that the NATO powers will not encourage or even countenance the establishment by any Hungarian government of military ties with the West" and "a guarantee on the Austrian model of Hungary's neutrality, perhaps of her demilitarization."[91] After some discussion, the representatives considered his suggested courses of action "premature" but thought that they "merited consideration at a later date."[92] They agreed that NATO as a body should not take any action regarding Hungary and that the question should be dealt with in the UN, where "care should be taken to avoid action or declarations which would give the Russians a pretext for even more violent intervention."[93] (U)

The Council discussed Hungary again on 30 and 31 October without settling on a course of action. At the latter meeting the discussion focused only on how far in advance of the December ministerial meeting Casardi should submit a paper recommending

actions NATO might take with regard to the satellites. The submission date was set for 1 December.[94](U)

U.S., British, and French representatives took the lead in quickly ruling out any military action to aid the rebels. The restraint Casardi had desired was evidenced in the absence of official comment to the press. His recommendation that the organization keep its intentions uncertain was apparently heeded. Not until the middle of December did NATO issue a public statement about the Hungarian situation.[95] (U)

Turning Points

During the last days of October and the first day of November a concurrence of domestic and external events produced a fundamental watershed in the course of the revolution. For policymakers in Washington and elsewhere, the speed with which one development overtook another made it difficult to discern clearly what was happening. (U)

In New York, the Security Council was indeed moving toward action regarding Hungary, but another British about-face delayed implementation. Lodge had worked out with Dulles and other State officials a rather aggressive plan. The U.S. delegation would have a resolution introduced, but not voted on at a meeting on 1 November, calling for withdrawal of all Soviet armed forces, political police, and paramilitary units, as well as verification of the withdrawal by neutral UN observers. But the British balked. Their Permanent Representative in New York, Pierson Dixon, likened the proposal to a "Sword of Damocles" that might halt what he considered favorable momentum underway in the Security Council. The next meeting should instead be devoted to speeches condemning

the Soviet intervention, questioning the new Hungarian representative* whether the Nagy government was in fact negotiating the withdrawal of Soviet forces, and introducing a procedural resolution to suspend deliberation for 48 hours to allow time for the negotiations to be concluded. Then, two days later, a substantive resolution could be submitted.[96] (U)

State approved the British plan, "subject to developments," and particularly whether by the time the Security Council met on 1 November the Hungarian-Soviet negotiations had begun. Waiting another two days before introducing a substantive resolution would allow the United States or other countries to deal with the Soviets "directly, if desirable." That night State sent the U.S. delegation a slightly revised draft substantive resolution calling for the Soviet Union to cease its intervention and still proposing the creation of a UN fact-finding committee.[97] (U)

In Budapest, under pressure from student groups, workers' councils, and revolutionary committees established in provincial cities and towns, Nagy steadily discarded the communist system and instituted a series of reforms, including a multi-party political system. On 29 October Soviet forces began to withdraw from Budapest, although they stationed themselves outside the city and other forces remained in the countryside. Inside Hungary the impression prevailed that the revolution had triumphed. The Legation declared on 31 October that "it became virtually certain in Budapest this morning that the Hungarian revolution" was now a "fact of history," something which it had doubted could be achieved without the "strongest Western support."[98] (U)

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* The Nagy government had announced the replacement of the previous government's appointee, who had made such a poor showing at the 28 October Security Council meeting, by newly appointed Foreign Minister, Imre Horvath, said to be en route to New York.

As favorable as the trend appeared within the country, outside developments proved decisive. On 29 October, according to a plan worked out with Britain and France, Israeli forces invaded Egypt with the aim of seizing control of the Suez Canal. The next day the two Western powers issued an ultimatum that unless Israel and Egypt agreed to a cease-fire, they would move forces into the area as well. (U)

The Eisenhower administration had to make two critical decisions: whether to concentrate attention on the Middle East at the expense of Hungary and whether to break with its close allies because of their action against Egypt. State's Policy Planning Staff concluded that the United States "should condemn the Israeli aggression and disassociate itself with the British and French action," both actions fully supported by Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. With regard to Hungary, the group decided that if the Soviet Union undertook massive repression, any "effective action" by the United States "would probably involve hostilities with the Soviets." But, displaying the same kind of optimism as the JCS and others had, it believed that "the long-term prospect seemed to be for gradually growing Hungarian independence, even in the event of US inaction, although the Soviets might keep sufficient troops in the country to slow down the trend and to ensure that Hungary remained an ally of the USSR."[99] (U)

In the Security Council the United States and the Soviet Union jointly sponsored a resolution condemning the invasion of Egypt, which Britain and France vetoed. The Suez crisis was then transferred to the General Assembly, with an emergency session called for the evening of 1 November. As a result the Security Council postponed its meeting on Hungary. The attention of the West, in part because the Hungarian situation now seemed nearing resolution, shifted to the Middle East. (U)

In Moscow events also took a sharp turn. In a lengthy conversation the afternoon of 29 October, Zhukov told Bohlen that the Soviet Union had not sent more troops into Hungary, that its forces had concentrated on Budapest and had bypassed towns held by rebel forces, and that they had not fired any shots during the last two days. Bohlen considered Zhukov's comments a mixture of "untruths, half-truths and possibly some elements of real fact." He concluded that Moscow had decided to continue backing the Nagy government, possibly "leaving provinces and other towns for subsequent mopping" up if the resistance could first be broken in Budapest. In this way a total military occupation could be avoided. Bohlen therefore interpreted Nagy's statement about a Soviet troop withdrawal from Budapest as merely a trick, "with Soviet connivance, to cause [the] insurgents to cease fire."[100] (U)

Contrary to Bohlen's expectation, the presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party the very next day, 30 October, decided to withdraw Soviet forces from Hungary. It also issued a declaration, which represented the views of the moderate presidium members, on the principles governing Soviet relations with other socialist countries. A key sentence indicated that "the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary."[101] (U)

Because of Zhukov's remarks, Bohlen doubted whether calling the Soviet leaders' attention to Dulles's speech in Dallas, as he had been instructed, would have much effect on Soviet policy. Moreover, he was reluctant to bring up the treaty of assurance, which the Western powers had raised at the Geneva conference in July 1955, because it was so

tied in with the question of German reunification and had provoked Molotov's strong opposition. Since the Soviets had been advocating a nonaggression agreement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, Bohlen feared they might interpret his talking about a treaty of assurance as a hint that the United States might consider a broader agreement.[102] (U)

At an evening diplomatic reception on 30 October, Bohlen made the approach. He took Molotov and Zhukov aside, but not Khrushchev or Bulganin for fear of arousing speculation by journalists present. The Ambassador translated from memory Dulles's remarks regarding Eastern Europe. Molotov's only comment was that he would look up the speech. Zhukov said he found it difficult to reconcile it with the President's encouragement of the rebels, which he thought constituted interference in Hungary's internal affairs. Bohlen did not mention the treaty of assurance regarding Germany. Despite the cool response by the two Soviet officials, some scholars have claimed that by making the demarche the United States gave the Kremlin a green light to do what it wished in Hungary.[103] (U)

The next morning the presidium again met and unanimously—apparently without debate--reversed its position of the previous day. According to fragmentary notes, Khrushchev urged that they not withdraw troops but instead "take the initiative in restoring order." Withdrawal would "give a great boost to the Americans, English, and French," who would "perceive it as weakness on our part and will go onto the offensive. . . . To Egypt they will then add Hungary." Moreover, "our party will not accept it if we do this." Neither he nor anyone else mentioned events inside Hungary, statements by Western leaders, Bohlen's demarche, or the Security Council consideration of the issue. The motive seemed to be the loss of prestige a withdrawal would entail. After learning

that the Soviet military would need only three days to prepare a major attack, Khrushchev, Molotov, and Malenkov embarked on a whirlwind tour to confer secretly over the next few days with the leaders of the satellite governments and Yugoslavia and inform them of the presidium's decision. Only Gomulka objected. Before Khrushchev left Moscow, Anastas Mikoyan, who had been in Budapest when the decision was reached and who favored a negotiated settlement, unsuccessfully pleaded with him to hold another meeting to reconsider and gave him the impression that he would commit suicide if Khrushchev refused.[104] (U)

What the outside world saw happening in Moscow on 31 October was the publication of the previous day's hopeful declaration on relations with the satellites, not the presidium's decision that morning to crack down on the revolution. In Washington attendees at Secretary Dulles's staff meeting drew his attention to the declaration, which they felt represented "a shift in Soviet policy." They discussed the Security Council meeting planned the following day (it had not yet been postponed) at which the British intended to request a 48-hour delay in considering Hungary. Dulles emphasized "that he did not want us to become distracted by Middle Eastern events from the critical importance of following and taking appropriate actions on the Hungarian situation."[105] (U)

Did the Soviet leaders genuinely fear Western military intervention, either a large-scale assault or the infiltration of smaller groups across Hungary's border with Austria? Probably not. Khrushchev repeated in his memoirs Moscow's propaganda line that the West was infiltrating troops into Hungary, but a young Soviet Foreign Ministry official later assigned the task of writing a pamphlet to prove Western instigation and support of

the revolution could find no evidence that this had happened. The Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, Yurii Andropov, later privately admitted that the charge was "nonsense."[106] (U)

Nor was there evidence of a military buildup in Western Europe. Although U.S. forces in Europe went on alert, no visible troop movements or threatening maneuvers took place. One of the few intelligence documents Moscow has released, a 28 October telegram from KGB Chief Ivan Serov who had been sent to Budapest after the outbreak of the revolution, suggested that the UN was contemplating a massive intervention to help the Hungarians. It reported statements by two U.S. Legation "employees" as they were "leaving the city with their things." The two men, "Olivart and West," told an agent "of our friends"--presumably the Hungarian secret police--that "if the uprising is not liquidated in the shortest possible time, the UN troops will move in at the proposal of the USA and a second Korea will take place." The men, whose names were Oliveiras and Vest, were not Legation employees but couriers responsible for carrying the diplomatic pouch between State and overseas posts. They could hardly be expected to reflect the Legation's views. Indeed, no mention has been found that it advocated or even discussed a possible armed UN intervention.[107] (U)

Nevertheless, the 160-mile border Hungary shared with Austria had become porous. In the spring and summer of 1956 the Hungarian Government's removal of barbed wire and mines had already increased the movement of people across it. According to one account, when the revolution broke out [redacted] the West German Gehlen organization gave money and weapons to Hungarian refugees in Austria so they could return and take part in the fighting. In addition, members of private armies

composed of former Hungarians mobilized to come to the aid of the rebels. One of them, the fraternal Society of Hungarian Fighters, established a headquarters in Vienna and may have infiltrated small bands of armed men into western Hungary. A Russian émigré group based in Germany, the *Narodnyi Trudovoy Soyuz* (NTS or National Labor Council), also showed up in the border area with the main objective of encouraging defection of Soviet troops. By the end of October it established a group to liaise with the rebels, another to discuss with Austrian authorities the possibility of sending volunteer fighters into Hungary, a Red Cross unit ready to enter Hungary, and a propaganda team to prepare handbills for distribution. How much activity the NTS pursued inside Hungary is unclear. But Americans traveling from Vienna to Budapest on 30 October came across one of its leaflets in Hungarian and Russian; its message attempted to persuade Soviet officers and troops to join the insurgents.[108] ~~(S)~~

Americans were also at the border. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson instructed the staff of the Vienna Embassy to stay away for fear the Soviet Union might use any official U.S. presence there in its propaganda. According to a diplomat detailed to the Embassy, "there were all sorts of Americans wandering around Hungary--journalists, welfare people, adventurers and so on.

[redacted]

Anxious to maintain the position of neutrality established by the Austrian State Treaty the previous year that resulted in the withdrawal of occupation forces, the Austrian Government, though sympathetic to the aims of the revolution, took great pains to minimize the border crossings. On 31 October it conducted the military attachés of the

four former occupying powers on an extensive tour of the border area. The attaches indicated their satisfaction with the precautions being taken.[110] Infiltrations from Austria into Hungary that did occur had to have been on a very small scale. (U)

On the other hand, the attack by British and French forces on Suez created a major problem. Because of that crisis suddenly impinging on Hungary, the President's advisers thought he needed to report to the American public immediately on both crises. State sent a draft statement to the White House the afternoon of 31 October a few hours before the President was to deliver it over national radio and television. Speechwriter Emmet Hughes thought the draft terrible. He and Eisenhower made several changes, including dampening State's optimistic language about developments in Eastern Europe. For example, their revised version called popular pressures "more and more insistent" instead of "irresistible," as State's draft had characterized them. When Dulles came to the White House to review the new version, he insisted on retaining some of the original phrasing. The differences were minor, but they did reflect the generally positive assessment of developments by Dulles and others at State. The Secretary's attitude also showed in his telephone comments that day to Vice President Richard Nixon: "Two things are important from the standpoint of history. It is the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Empire. The second is the idea is out that we can be dragged along at the heels of British and French policies that are obsolete."[111] (U)

The President's statement that evening, even with the rewriting, exuded optimism about Eastern Europe. He spoke of the Polish people, "with their proud and deathless devotion to freedom," securing "a peaceful transition to a new government." Hungary was not far behind. "Today, it appears, a new Hungary is rising from this struggle, a

Hungary which we hope from our hearts will know full and free nationhood." The President hailed the Soviet Union's declaration on relations with the East European nations, including its stated willingness to consider withdrawing troops. If the announced intentions were carried out, "the world will witness the greatest forward stride toward justice, trust and understanding among nations in our generation." Eisenhower reiterated his willingness to provide economic aid to Poland and Hungary, again emphasizing that "we do not demand of these governments their adoption of any particular form of society as a condition upon our economic assistance." And he pointed out that the U.S. Government had "sought clearly to remove any false fears" the Soviet Union might have "that we would look upon new governments in these Eastern European countries as potential military allies."[112] (U)

One newspaper saw the President's remarks as embodying a main objective of the administration's foreign policy—the avoidance of war. He and Dulles were "one-step-at-a-time men." The idea behind their policy was that people who had taken the first step to throw off a foreign tyranny would understand how to rid themselves of a domestic tyranny." At this point war would deny them the time needed "to take the second step."[113] (U)

As it turned out, the NSC did not discuss the new draft paper at its 1 November morning meeting. Shortly before it started, Secretary Dulles telephoned the President and mentioned the possibility of taking sanctions against the Israelis and what should be done at the General Assembly meeting that evening. He thought "we are going to have to make important decisions here today and don't know how much time we should spend at NSC." Policy toward Poland and Hungary, slated to be the NSC's main topic, he now felt

was "academic as the situation has pretty much taken care of itself." The President accepted his suggestion that they focus entirely on the Middle East and so informed Council members at the start of the meeting.[114] (U)

The only mention of Hungary came at the beginning of the meeting in Allen Dulles's customary briefing on world developments. He called developments there "a miracle" that "belied all our past views that a popular revolt in the face of modern weapons was an utter impossibility." The Soviet declaration on relations with the satellites was "one of the most important statements to come out of the USSR in the last decade." The main problem, as he saw it, was the "lack of a strong guiding authority to bring the rebels together. Nagy was failing to unite the rebels, and they were demanding that he quit." Unlike the previous week's meeting, the briefing sparked no comments. It is interesting to speculate what position Eisenhower and Dulles would have taken on the new draft NSC paper in view of the strong JCS objections to certain of the recommendations. But discussion of the paper was deferred. (U)

Instead of Eastern Europe, the group concentrated on how to handle the Middle East crisis at the UN. Secretary Dulles made an impassioned statement that unless the United States took the lead in condemning the use of force there, the Soviet Union would do so, and the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa would turn to Moscow. The timing of the Anglo-French action particularly rankled him:

> It is nothing less than tragic that at this very time, when we are at the point of winning an immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe, we should be forced to choose between following in the footsteps of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa, or splitting our course away from their course. Yet the decision must be made in a matter of hours—before five o'clock this afternoon.

Dulles spent the rest of the morning and early afternoon on Middle East matters before departing Washington by air to take part in the General Assembly's emergency session.[115] (U)

Aboard the aircraft, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Burke Elbrick discussed with him a memo recommending that the Security Council as soon as possible again take up the Hungarian question. "It would be a pity," said the memo, "to lose the momentum we have established because of diversion of attention to the Middle East." Elbrick felt that the emergency session of the General Assembly could not address the Hungarian question; therefore he recommended continuing to deal with it in the Security Council before thinking about putting it on the General Assembly's regular agenda.[116] (U)

During the day the administration, soon after deciding to concentrate on the Middle East on the assumption that the Hungarian situation was virtually resolved, received contrary news from Budapest. State learned of a radio broadcast, confirmed by the Legation, that Nagy had called in the Soviet Ambassador protesting the arrival of new troops, immediately terminating Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact, and proclaiming the country's neutrality. The broadcast indicated that Nagy was informing Secretary General Hammarskjöld of these decisions and requesting that the Hungarian matter be discussed at the next General Assembly session.[117] (U)

The White House did not receive news of Nagy's message to the UN until shortly after 3 o'clock, along with erroneous wire service reports out of Vienna [redacted] that new Soviet forces had begun reoccupying Budapest.[118] The news caused Hughes, in the midst of drafting the President's speech for that evening, to revise the part

on Hungary. On seeing the draft, Eisenhower said he favored using cautious language. "I'm always scared of superlatives," he declared. Hughes mentioned that Dulles had overruled him the day before regarding the tone of the President's statement. Eisenhower replied that he "always thought Foster a little too optimistic about developments there." He looked at things rationally and believed the Soviets would adapt to changed circumstances in a rational way. Eisenhower said, "I've had a lot more experience than he has with these fellows—it's the same business as with Hitler—you *can't* count on their doing the rational thing, they are NOT rational."[119] (U)

Whereas the mood in Washington had been so upbeat earlier in the day, the President that evening spoke guardedly about Soviet intentions in his final campaign address in Philadelphia:

> We are—only today—troubled by news of new Soviet efforts to suppress the people of Hungary by force. If this be true, this is a black day of sorrow. But the Soviet Union has declared its readiness to reshape oppressive policies of a decade—and to contemplate withdrawal of its armed forces from Poland and Hungary and Rumania. If this be true—and if this be done—there could be in the making a bright new day of justice and trust among all nations.

He reiterated that the United States had no selfish motive in Eastern Europe, but reminded listeners that he had "always made clear that we would never renounce our hope and concern for these lands and peoples." While the U.S. Government had publicly denounced the Soviet use of force in Eastern Europe, "we ourselves have abstained from use of force—knowing it to be contrary to both the interests of these peoples, and to the spirit and methods of the United Nations." And referring to the Middle East, the President said he was proud, "that the United States had publicly opposed the use of force there as well as in Eastern Europe.[120] (U)

At the General Assembly's emergency session on the Middle East that evening, Secretary Dulles, doubting "that any representative ever spoke from this rostrum with as heavy a heart," said that "the United States finds itself unable to agree with three nations with which it has ties of deep friendship, of admiration and of respect, and two of which constitute our oldest and most trusted and reliable allies." He introduced a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all military forces, and requesting the Secretary General to observe and report on the compliance with the resolution.[121]

Change of Tactics at the UN

As aggressively as the United States to this point had pushed for Security Council consideration of Hungary, it suddenly put on the brakes, in effect switching positions with the British and the French. Washington did not want to bring the matter to a vote, incur a Soviet veto, and have it transferred to the General Assembly where it would complicate that body's handling of the Middle East crisis. On the other hand, the British and the French were anxious to do precisely that. (U)

Back in Washington the afternoon of 2 November after an all-night session in New York, Dulles telephoned Lodge to say that it was "a mockery" for the British and the French "to come in with bombs falling over Egypt" and then denounce the Soviet Union "for perhaps doing something that is not quite as bad." He instructed Lodge to oppose the submission in the Security Council of any resolution on Hungary, but keep the matter on the agenda and suggest they try to have the Nagy government's new representative reach New York as soon as possible. Dulles said there wasn't any "hard information" on what was happening inside Hungary, but there was "no doubt" concerning Egypt. He added that "we may have to try to press for further action in the

way of setting up a comm. to deal with various aspects of it," a cryptic remark that might have referred to the Middle East or to the establishment of a commission or committee to deal with Hungary.[122] (U)

Two hours before the Security Council met on 2 November, the three Western representatives went over their tactics. Dixon now found Lodge's ideas much different from his. Dixon wanted to submit a substantive resolution; Lodge said he had no authority to do so. Events were too confused, Lodge maintained, and State was unsure how to handle Hungary's declaration of neutrality. It had no intention, if the Soviet Union exercised its veto, of moving on to the General Assembly. "Lodge claimed, without much conviction," Dixon reported to London, "that the Russians would be under greater pressure if the debate continued in the Security Council." According to the French representative's report of the conversation, Lodge wanted to postpone consideration of Hungary until the following Monday, 5 November.[123] (U)

As their discussion grew heated, Lodge suggested that British eagerness to transfer the issue to the General Assembly was apparently designed to distract that body's attention from the Middle East. Dixon explained that the British had put forward their two-phase plan involving a delay of 48 hours because the Nagy government's position was then unclear, and "we did not wish to push them" into Moscow's arms. The declaration of neutrality had changed all that. He told Lodge that "the apparent reluctance of the Americans to harass the Russians on Hungary contrasted oddly with the alacrity with which they were pursuing their two closest allies in the Assembly on the Middle East. In short, it seemed like deliberate procrastination to leave the decks free for

Assembly action against us." The French representative supported Dixon and said he had instructions to submit a resolution quickly, which he would do alone if necessary.[124] (U)

Urgent phone calls to Washington produced no change in the U.S. position, after which Dixon offered Lodge a deal. Since the British wanted to maintain a tripartite front regarding Hungary, he would not submit a substantive resolution if they could have a gentlemen's agreement to limit themselves that evening to making speeches, then adjourn until the following day when together they would introduce a substantive resolution. Lodge immediately agreed "with evident relief."[125] (U)

The Security Council meeting did not go as planned. Right away the members became embroiled in debate over who could represent Hungary at the meeting, and the Council President made clear he did not expect to finish discussion at the meeting. According to Dixon, Lodge "led off with a very feeble speech against the Russians in which he dwelt on the obscurity of the recent events and the need for time to clarify them." Other representatives followed with strong condemnations of the Soviet Union and calls for prompt Council action. Dixon and the French representative kept their part of the bargain by not introducing a substantive resolution.[126] (U)

The British became suspicious that the U.S. delegation had let it be known it would not object to postponing the next meeting until 5 November. "As this seemed to me tantamount to breaking our gentlemen's agreement," Dixon told the Foreign Office, "I challenged Lodge privately at the table and he gave instructions to his team to organize adjournment until tomorrow afternoon, while agreeing that we should have a tripartite meeting late in the morning to work out a draft resolution." Afterwards Lodge assured Dixon he would join the British and French in tabling a resolution the next day. Dixon

felt, however, that the Americans might insist on including a proposal for an investigating committee and might still resist pushing the resolution to a vote.[127] (U)

In fact, Lodge asked the State Department to authorize him to introduce both a procedural and a substantive resolution unilaterally at the next meeting. If State still wanted to delay a vote on the substantive resolution to avoid a Soviet veto, he recommended leaving blank the names of the countries to serve on the proposed investigating committee. In this way the United States could keep the resolution pending until ready for a vote, although it risked having the British or French secure priority for their own resolutions.[128] (U)

Two UN meetings were scheduled for 3 November. The Security Council planned to take up the Hungarian question at 3 p.m., the General Assembly the Middle East crisis at 8 p.m. In Washington that morning, State's Legal Adviser Herman Phleger reported that Secretary Dulles, who had been taken to a hospital for stomach surgery during the early morning hours and with whom he had evidently been in contact, did not want to join the British and French in introducing a Security Council resolution on Hungary. Eisenhower "said that such a thought was almost absurd."[129] (U)

Lodge therefore told Dixon that he had been instructed, contrary to what he had said the night before, to introduce a resolution immediately and without further consultation with the British and French. This would avoid the appearance of being too closely identified with them. He did not intend to bring the resolution to a vote and felt that the reported troop withdrawals might mean the Soviet Union would not veto the resolution if it did come to a vote. Dixon did not consider it worthwhile to start a row "over this piece of American duplicity partly because I felt we would need all Mr.

Lodge's genuine sympathy for Britain in our struggle at tonight's Assembly, and partly because the distrustfulness is only a symptom of a much wider difference." Robert Murphy told the French Ambassador that the United States wanted to avoid taking "precipitate action in the Security Council" that might "look foolish a few hours later," and it did not wish to do anything the Soviets might view "as a provocation for strong action."[130] (U)

Initially, the French Foreign Ministry instructed its delegation to toughen up the wording of the U.S. draft so as to provoke a Soviet veto. But Foreign Secretary Lloyd was opposed to doing so, since he considered it in Britain's and France's interest to preserve what remained of the Western tripartite position in the Security Council. In any event, Lloyd pointed out, it was "too late to try to use Hungary to strengthen our hand or procure delays in the Assembly over Egypt." Accepting the British reasoning, the French eventually agreed not to strengthen the U.S. resolution.[131] (U)

When the Security Council resumed deliberations at 3 o'clock that afternoon, (9:00 p.m. in Budapest), Lodge introduced the resolution and led off debate with a recapitulation of recent reports of further Soviet intervention, including a quote from Nagy's message circulated at the Council meeting the previous night about the large-scale Soviet buildup. He asked the Hungarian representative and Sobolev if they could confirm reports of fresh troops entering the country and whether negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet forces had begun. The Hungarian, who obviously had worked out his statement with the Soviet and Yugoslav delegations, said that he could report "with satisfaction . . . the following promising information received from Budapest today: The leaders of the Hungarian and Soviet armies met today at noon, and both parties expressed

their views of the technical questions involved in withdrawing the Soviet troops. They agreed that they would study each other's proposals and that they would meet again at 10 o'clock tonight, Budapest time. According to the Soviet proposal, no more troops will cross the border until an agreement is reached." The Yugoslav representative immediately requested adjournment to avoid "doing anything that might impede the negotiations." Along with the Soviet, Hungarian, Yugoslav, and two other representatives, Lodge voted against a resolution to meet the following day, which would have carried had it not been for his vote. It was this vote--the culmination, as it turned out, of Washington's efforts to prolong Security Council consideration of the Hungarian issue--that later earned Lodge much criticism. The Council then accepted a motion to adjourn until Monday morning, 5 November, to await the results of the negotiations in Budapest.[132] Dixon considered the meeting completely unsatisfactory. "If the United States had been in the least anxious to obtain a vote on their resolution," he lamented, "we could easily have defeated the delaying tactics."[133] (U)

Clutching at Straws

The Nagy government's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, declaration of Hungary's neutrality, and appeal to the UN were calculated gambles. To soften the negative reaction in Moscow and to appear evenhanded, it appealed not just to the West to safeguard its neutrality, but to all four major powers. In their public utterances over the next few days government officials went out of their way to emphasize that Hungary did not want to join NATO, restore capitalism, or undo the achievements of socialism.[134] (U)

Why did Nagy ask that the General Assembly place the Hungarian question on its agenda? Did he believe that a Soviet veto in the Security Council would prevent effective

action and that only the Assembly could act decisively? Or was he, as one scholar contended, not expecting the Assembly to take up the question right away in emergency session but to wait until the regular session opened on 12 November? He may have thus been seeking leverage on the Soviet Union to encourage it to halt the troop buildup, in which event he would withdraw the appeal to the UN.[135] (U)

To outsiders the situation in Hungary seemed confused and no longer as bright as just a few days before. Nagy's requests for help contrasted sharply with the efforts of his government, undergoing daily reporganization, to convey a business-as-usual demeanor in the face of the Soviet buildup. Under Secretary of State Hoover remarked at a staff meeting the morning of 2 November that the situation "was being lost." He requested "a review of what actually has gone on and particularly what we have done" and that "adequate publicity" be given to the situation. This led Beam to observe "that we still are not sure what we can do until we know more of the government with which we would deal."[136] (U)

Washington's confusion showed in its dispatch of Minister-Designate Wailes to Budapest. On 2 November Wailes arrived after a two-day layover in Vienna, where he had informed Ambassador Thompson of State's instructions not to present his credentials to the Nagy government. Thompson, who felt strongly that Wailes should present the credentials, telephoned State to try to have the instructions amended--but without success. The U.S. Embassy in Vienna may have inspired a journalist's claim that the insurgents had seized on Wailes's imminent arrival and presentation of credentials as a hopeful sign--"another indication that the United States does not intend to permit Moscow to again extinguish Hungary's newly regained freedom." The day after Wailes

arrived, State changed its mind and asked him to make the presentation as soon as possible, but the message arrived too late for him to do so before the Soviet attack.[137] (U)

The situation within Hungary was grim. The Legation reported that Soviet forces had returned in a rapid and systematic way. Budapest was almost completely encircled. Troops also saturated provincial areas and surrounded important towns, military bases, and air fields. The Legation thought that Moscow might issue an ultimatum, perhaps in the veiled form of a request for negotiations, to discuss Hungary's participation in the Warsaw Pact and the composition of the government. Although the government might yield in the face of hopeless odds, the general populace might not do so and a slaughter would ensue.[138] (U)

The government's appeal to the UN struck the Legation as a "desperate striving to find [a] way out." Before then, Hungarians had viewed that body's discussions in far-off New York as a means of applying diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union. A British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) journalist recalled that people he encountered "were quite convinced that the United Nations would manage to put pressure on the Russians to stay out. . . . The Americans were trying to call for meetings, Security Council and so on and all this was being broadcast to the Hungarian people. So they had this faith that the West would not necessarily intervene directly, but would at least prevent the Russians from coming back in."[139] (U)

As the sense of desperation grew, Hungarians looked to the UN for more immediate assistance. On the morning of 3 November Budapest radio announced that the city's main airport had received a message from Prague reporting that "an aircraft carrying 16 UN delegates" would soon arrive. On hearing the news, a French journalist

went to the airport only to learn that no plane had landed. He nevertheless clung to the hope that the group might come the following day, since "one knows now that the free world is alerted." An American reporter, with a group of foreign journalists ordered out of the city and then forced to turn back, recalled: "We were driving now into Budapest with the flags of 20 countries. And the Hungarians thought we were the arrival of the rescue battalion. We were cheered all the way." Talk of a UN delegation's imminent arrival caused a stir in the Parliament building, where government officials said if the Soviets refused permission for the aircraft to land, it would find another airport. In any event, it would ensure that Moscow honored its promise to withdraw. When the Legation informed Washington of the rumor, State quickly responded that the UN had not appointed nor even discussed sending a delegation. It noted that the Security Council planned to take up the Hungarian question later in the day, with Lodge tabling a resolution merely calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops and not interfere in Hungary's internal affairs and also asking members to provide relief and medical assistance.[140]

The rumor apparently grew out of comments by the Cuban UN delegate in the Security Council on 2 November when he mentioned the possibility of sending a UN commission to investigate the situation in Hungary. He said that "a draft resolution should be submitted as soon as possible," providing among other things "for the establishment of a Security Council commission to supervise the position and to report on compliance with measures adopted by the Council to ensure the national independence and political freedom of the Hungarian people." The next day RFE's reporting of the remarks was misleading. The broadcast indicated that he had said, "Let the U.N. send a

committee to Hungary which should, on the spot, assure the conditions for political independence in Hungary." It failed to mention that no resolution had in fact been submitted, much less approved. RFE also asserted that the Hungarian question would "most likely" be transferred to the General Assembly, an action the United States in fact was opposing at the time. RFE was not the only source of the rumor. The French Minister in Budapest told Paris that "various Western radio stations" carried news about the UN committee of inquiry, whose arrival "everyone" was awaiting.[141] ~~(S)~~

Information on the deteriorating military situation came first-hand from a high government source, [redacted] who had requested a meeting that day with the American military attachés. [redacted] estimated that nearly 5,000 Soviet tanks and 10-12 divisions were in Hungary with more units arriving. He asked the Americans to bring the situation to the urgent attention of the UN delegation rumored en route to Budapest. [redacted] who heard it had been delayed in Pozsony (present-day Bratislava), offered personally to fly there. In reporting the conversation to Washington, Todd observed that if no commission were on the way, a trap was likely being set to eliminate [redacted] whom he called a "pillar of strength" in the Air Force and "strongly pro-American."[142] ~~(S)~~

Though Nagy was scheduled to give a press conference in the afternoon, Zoltán Tildy, a member of Nagy's cabinet, took his place, meeting with correspondents for about 1½ hours but absenting himself briefly while someone else took over. When Tildy returned, he seemed in a depressed mood, was vague, and dodged questions. He described the Hungarian-Soviet negotiations that had started earlier in the day as essentially military and suggested that new committees might be formed to discuss

broader subjects. The Legation reported that "believe it or not" a correspondent, whom it considered highly reliable, claimed that Soviet military representatives had agreed to the complete withdrawal of troops from Hungary. Resumption of the negotiations that evening would cover the details and timing of the withdrawal. Other rumors circulated. Early that evening the British Legation received word that Nagy was "appealing today to the Secretary General of the United Nations to visit Hungary." To reinforce the request, Nagy was reportedly "thinking about flying to New York as soon as possible from an airfield in Hungarian hands."[143] (U)

In Washington at this eleventh hour, two strikingly different ideas were under consideration, one—suggested by Bohlen—was to have Eisenhower appeal directly to Premier Nikolai Bulganin to withdraw Soviet forces from Hungary. Someone in State drafted the letter on 3 November, reiterating the assurances that the United States was not seeking military allies in Eastern Europe but saying nothing that had not been said before. It offered no specific concessions in return for Soviet troop withdrawal. And there is no evidence that Acting Secretary Hoover saw the draft or that it was forwarded to the White House.[144] (U)

The other idea involved military action. The diplomatic correspondent of the London *Observer* quoted "a high American government official" as saying that the U.S. Government feared the Soviet Union had probably "decided to drown the Hungarian revolution in blood." If the fears were borne out "and the Hungarians manage to hold out for three or four days," the report continued, "the pressure on America to help militarily might become irresistible." According to the report, the NSC had discussed recommendations to "use tactical atomic weapons on Russian lines of communication to

help Hungary." The President was said to be unwilling to do this without Congressional approval, which could not happen until after the election. The unnamed official said that if the Hungarians were still fighting the day after, "we will be closer to a world war than we have been since August 1939."[145] (U)

Far-fetched as the story seems, it may have been accurate. The quoted official was probably the CIA's Robert Amory, the agency's representative on the NSC Planning Board. Years later Amory recalled that "as soon as it had become clear that the Russians, instead of withdrawing, were pouring reinforcements into Hungary," he recommended giving the Soviet Union an ultimatum to either "keep their hands off Hungary or we would not be responsible for whatever happened next." He wanted to interdict rail and road connections into Hungary by "a surgical nuclear strike limited to Lvov in Soviet-annexed Poland and selected passes in the mountains of Russian Ruthenia and western Rumania." Allen Dulles told him to discuss his recommendation with Bowie, but it apparently got nowhere. In Paris the Norwegian representative to NATO expressed concern about the *Observer* article, but U.S. officials told him not to "take seriously [a] speculative account of this kind." Looking back 30 years later, Amory conceded that the idea "must appear to have been lunacy." But at the time he felt that the United States enjoyed a relative nuclear strategic advantage that it would never have again.[146] (U)

Revolution Crushed, False Hopes Raised

Shortly after the negotiations in Budapest resumed late in the evening on 3 November, KGB officers entered the room and arrested the Hungarian representatives. Around 4 o'clock the next morning, a massive Soviet attack on Budapest began. Within a few days Hungarian resistance, not only in the capital but elsewhere, was effectively

ended, with the Soviet Union installing a puppet government headed by János Kádár. Nagy and other members of his government who took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy were later lured out, arrested, and eventually executed by the Kádár regime. (U)

The General Assembly, in the midst of discussing the Middle East when it received news of the attack, voted to adopt Hammarskjöld's plan for what was then a unique peace-keeping instrument--a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to be sent to Egypt to "secure and supervise an end to hostilities."* It adjourned at 3 a.m., and the Security Council met an hour later to deal with the Soviet attack on Hungary. After condemning the attack, Lodge submitted a resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces and creation by the Secretary General of a commission to enter Hungary, which only the Soviet representative voted against. In light of the Soviet veto, the Security Council then transferred the question to a second emergency session of the General Assembly and adjourned at 5:25 a.m. Delegations represented in both UN bodies had been in almost continuous session from 3 o'clock the previous afternoon.[147] (U)

The establishment of UNEF for the Middle East raised hopes and reinforced rumors that outside help was on the way to Hungary. One rebel fighter recalled his commander urging them to hold out a few more hours because UN troops would soon arrive. The next day the commander said much the same thing, adding: "The whole world has its eyes on us. The newspapers of the West talk of nothing else. Everywhere, they're holding demonstrations in our favor. And public opinion is insisting that help should be sent to Hungary." Another person claimed that RFE had asked the insurgents to keep

* Unlike the UN force established in 1950 to deal with North Korea's attack against South Korea, the UNEF for the Middle East in 1956 did not have troops furnished by any of the major powers.

fighting until the U.S. presidential election and that "as soon as the new President assumes his responsibilities, UN troops will certainly begin to arrive." A rebel radio station appealed for immediate UN help by having parachute troops dropped into Western Hungary. Later in the day another station addressed a long appeal to Hammarskjöld and the UN delegates, calling them "the last citadel of hope."[148] (U)

An American businessman who had taken refuge in a Budapest apartment building when the attack began on 4 November recorded in his diary that Hungarian soldiers during the day asked him when the UN troops would arrive. That evening, as building residents listened to the General Assembly proceedings, they prayed that the UN would be able to stop the fighting. Shortly after midnight, Lodge's resolution condemning Russia produced shouts of joy. The businessman's diary noted, "Much hope now." Three hours later: "Result of U.N. vote brings pandemonium. People hug my neck and kiss me. They discuss how much time it would take for plane to fly in U.N. delegation from New York." By 6 November rumors were circulating that two U.S. parachute divisions were being dropped in Hungary. People pointed to the businessman, smiled, and said: "American divisions."[149] (U)

Official Washington's immediate reaction to the attack registered shock and dismay. At noon on 4 November ISA, noting that the invasion was "undoubtedly facilitated by the Middle East crisis," recommended to Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray several responses it felt consistent with the policy of avoiding military conflict: (1) immediately sending observers to Hungary under the UN Secretary General's authority; (2) covertly encouraging protests and demonstrations in other satellite countries, particularly in Poland and the Hungarian minority areas of Romania,

to create pressure on the Soviet flanks; and (3) staging a "practice alert" in southern Germany by the U.S. Seventh Army that would subtly indicate U.S. concern without provoking a Soviet reaction.[150] There is no evidence that Gray followed up on any of the recommendations. ~~(S)~~

At the Pentagon there was much hand-wringing and second-guessing. At a meeting of Defense's civilian leadership the morning after, Gray wondered whether "our basic assumption on all Satellite planning—don't antagonize the USSR—should not be reconsidered." Secretary Wilson pointed out: "The problem is that if you stir up these people, thousands get killed. You have to have a plan of action." Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles challenged Gray's suggestion. The Soviet Union, he said, could not accept satellite governments that were not communist or members of the Warsaw Pact. "We cannot help unless we are willing to risk a full-scale atomic war." Gray agreed, but he thought the UN would have sent a police force to Hungary had the Suez intervention not occurred.[151] ~~(S)~~

Frustration boiled over a few days later when Beam told his committee that the United States had "heaven knows taken a tremendous interest in Hungary and either explored or accomplished every possible action." Roger Ernst, Deputy Director of ISA's Office of Planning, disagreed. He "felt soiled" by U.S. inaction. To him it was quite clear that the United States had not done everything it could. If the new NSC paper had been adopted on 1 November when it was scheduled for discussion, he thought "a better showing might have been made." Specifically, if the NSC had approved the paragraph dealing with covert aid to any new democratic government that might emerge, the United

States could have carried out "a far more affirmative program to save either the state of Hungary or at least a more sizeable number of Hungarians."[152] ~~(S)~~

The press reported that suggestions made several days before for the United States to deter a possible attack by demonstrative movements of the Strategic Air Force or cancelling military leaves had not been approved. Nor did they apparently surface again at a 4 November discussion of Hungary and the Middle East that Eisenhower had with Allen Dulles, Acting Secretary Hoover, and other State officials, with Defense representatives notably absent. Adlai Stevenson had sent a letter to Eisenhower recommending that the UN immediately "mobilize large teams of official observers and fly them into Hungary, or at least the still-free parts of Hungary, and also into other satellite nations, such as Poland, that might welcome or consent to their presence." That afternoon the General Assembly approved a U.S. resolution calling for UN observers to be sent to Hungary. But the participants at the White House meeting decided against sending a UN armed force to Hungary.[153] (U)

In the immediate aftermath, it is easy to understand how UN intervention in Hungary and the Middle East became muddled in Hungarian minds. As they anxiously looked for UN help after Nagy's appeal to Hammarskjöld and with the rumor circulating of a delegation en route to Budapest, there came the General Assembly's request for a peacekeeping force to be sent to Egypt and for UN observers to be dispatched to Hungary. Regarding the latter, the Kádár government did not reply until 12 November when it rejected the idea on the grounds that any trouble within the country was purely a domestic affair.[154] (U)

Shortly thereafter came the suggestion that Hammarskjöld himself should go to Hungary.[155] The government dragged its feet in responding to this request and finally rejected it, too, when he proposed a specific date.[156] Some have contended that if he or other UN representatives had entered the country before the second Soviet attack, things might have turned out differently.[157] Hammarskjöld, who resented insinuations that he should have tried to go sooner and that he did not appreciate the urgency of the Hungarian situation, felt that these were efforts to make him a scapegoat for the revolution's failure and to deflect blame from others for their lack of action. He pointed out that in the period from 28 October through the 4 November attack, no Security Council member "felt the situation was clear enough" to propose that he go to Hungary. Nor had a precedent been established for the Secretary General to act in such a situation without an enabling directive from the Security Council or General Assembly. For him the Suez crisis "had a time priority" in the UN; his handling of it was not by choice. "It was history itself," Hammarskjöld maintained, "which arranged it that way."[158] (U)

Perhaps the British had been right in refusing at first to join in bringing the issue before the Security Council for fear that it would only prolong the Hungarians' fight against hopeless odds. The prospect of UN assistance, whether through diplomacy or the dispatch of troops, did seem a major motive in their willingness to persevere. President of the International Rescue Committee Leo Cherne, who was in Budapest until just before the second Soviet attack, recalled: "The Hungarian people were not waiting for American troops." They "were waiting for the U.N." under the illusion that it "had an emergency police force, which of course it did not have."[159] (U)

But a New York firm's interviews of refugees in Austria after the revolution suggest that the expectation of UN assistance had been an insignificant factor (see table 2). According to the way the firm categorized the answers, only 5% of the 965 interviewees thought that "confidence in the UN" was the reason for expecting assistance. The tabulation of answers, however, may be misleading. Unlike other questions put to interviewees, this one did not involve showing cards to elicit quantifiable responses. Here interviewers had to determine how to sort a wide variety of answers. It is clear from the arbitrary grouping of responses that considerable overlap existed. Moreover, the interviews were conducted after it had become obvious that the UN could do little for Hungary. By this time "confidence" in the body had to be low. If refugees had instead been asked specifically whether they had expected the UN to have a restraining influence on the Soviet Union in the period leading up to the second attack, or whether they had expected UN help in the form of an emergency force right after the attack, positive responses probably would have been much higher. (U)

Radio undoubtedly played a huge role during the revolution. From all accounts, Hungarians closely followed radio reports of UN deliberations. Much like internet connectivity during violent upheavals during the early 21st century, radio provided the primary means by which the Hungarian people learned what was happening inside and

Table 2. Hungarians' Reasons for Expecting Western Aid*

	Percent of Respondents
West the only source of help	21
Foreign-western broadcasts	19
Hungary is part of anti-Communist West	18
Western propaganda	10
Hungary alone could do nothing; therefore we believed in Western aid	7
RFE broadcasts	7
Hungary's confidence in the UN	5
Nagy's appeal to the West for help	1
Others	6
TOTAL PERCENT†	104
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	965

[redacted] Do you think the Hungarian people expected aid from the West, and from the U.S., in the uprising, or don't you think so?" Of the 1,007 persons asked the question, the 965 who said that they did expect aid were then asked question 10a: "What do you think led the Hungarian people to expect such aid?"

† Percentages, based on number of cases, add to more than 100% since some respondents gave more than one answer. [footnote in the original]

outside the country. A number of foreign stations beamed programs into Hungary—the VOA, the BBC, other European outlets including Radio Madrid and Vatican Radio, as well as rogue transmitters such as that of the Russian-émigré NTS. But by far one station has received the most scrutiny and criticism—Radio Free Europe, in part because it was the one most listened to and listeners may have thought everything they heard emanated from it.[160] (U)

RFE emerged from the revolution a major villain accused of various sins, primarily of giving Hungarians the impression that the West would intervene militarily against the Soviet Union. It should be remembered that the station, which communist governments throughout Eastern Europe and left-wing opinion in Western Europe had attacked since its establishment in 1950, had steadily improved the quality of its programming and toned down the inflammatory rhetoric that often characterized the earlier broadcasts.[161] RFE may have been attacked for its role in the Hungarian revolution more for what it had been, not for what it did then. (U)

That said, a few Hungarian-language broadcasts, contrary to guidance, contained outlandish statements, such as giving instructions on the making of Molotov cocktails. Many programs were of poor quality. Some vilified the Nagy government prior to 30 October, contrary to guidance and out of step with policymakers in Washington who were basically adopting a wait-and-see attitude toward Nagy. In an examination of 500 RFE scripts the only program identified that implied Western military intervention was a summary of the *Observer* article on the eve of the Soviet attack, with a comment added by an RFE editor: "In the Western capitals, a practical manifestation of western sympathy is expected at any hour."[162] (U)

If the output to Hungary of other stations, like VOA or the BBC, were examined with the care that RFE's was, they might not stand up as the models of dispassionate objectivity that some claim. By 1956 the difference in broadcasts to Hungary between RFE and the BBC may not have been pronounced. In July the British Legation in Budapest recommended that the BBC, RFE and VOA "let loose simultaneously a propaganda barrage" if parliamentary elections were held as planned later in the year, an event it believed would represent "a vast hoax." It wanted the BBC to consider whether to advise the Hungarian people to boycott the elections, spoil their ballots, or enter the names of non-communist political parties. Voters might be asked to organize a passive demonstration either before or during the voting, but the Legation recognized that it would be more dangerous to bring this off in Budapest than in the countryside.[163] Later, after the revolution had broken out, an American official complained about the sterile VOA Hungarian language programming that ignored the fighting in Budapest, while the BBC carried two strong commentaries condemning the Soviet intervention and, although acknowledging the difficulty in determining who had called in the Soviet troops, called for the removal from office of whoever was responsible.[164] (U)

Was Failure Inevitable?

Studies of the Hungarian revolution tend to dwell on the question of whether it was bound to fail, whether the participants could or should have done something differently. The Soviet Union obviously had the decisive voice. Whatever the West or the Nagy government did--or failed to do--after the presidium's 31 October decision to crush the uprising mattered little.[165] In conversations immediately afterward with Mikoyan and East European leaders, Khrushchev made clear his determination to go ahead regardless

of their views. At this point threatening or conciliatory Western gestures would likely have had no effect. (U)

To influence Moscow the United States needed to act before the presidium's decision. Several things might have been done differently. First of all, Eisenhower could have hastened the NSC's consideration of the matter, either by accepting Stassen's suggestion for a special meeting or by fixing tighter deadlines for the preparation of recommendations for action. Instead, he let the matter slide until the next regularly scheduled meeting on 1 November, a delay which allowed the illusion of moderation in Soviet behavior, the encouraging steps taken by the Nagy government, and the intrusion of the Suez crisis to undercut the urgency for action. If the NSC had come up with an attractive proposal by 28 or 29 October to be communicated to Moscow, it might have altered the outcome. (U)

Exactly what the United States should have attempted is, of course, open to debate. During the crucial early days, it basically did four things: (1) publicly expressed sympathy for the Hungarian people and general support for the revolution's goals; (2) took the lead in raising the issue in the Security Council; (3) assured the Soviet Union that it was not seeking a military alliance with Hungary or other East European countries; and (4) held out the prospect of limited economic assistance to governments in Eastern Europe if they achieved a measure of independence from Moscow. Implicit in the administration's response was the belief that the small chances of a successful revolution hinged on the United States taking a fundamentally hands-off position. Whether the revolution was to be crushed or would ultimately prevail, inaction seemed the preferred

policy. This was especially the perception after the first four or five days when the prospects for success improved. (U)

If the United States had talked tough and engaged even in bluffing measures, as some advocated, there is no evidence that the Soviet Union would have been deterred from acting as it did. However, if Washington had offered a substantial concession, Moscow might have been interested. The approach it made was feeble. Bohlen's demarche the evening of 30 October merely repeated what Dulles and Eisenhower had been saying in public. It is difficult to comprehend what they hoped to accomplish and easy to understand the apparently casual dismissal. From the meager Soviet documentation available, reassuring public statements about U.S. motives in Eastern Europe by Dulles, Eisenhower, and Wilson, as well as the hands-off policy the press said Washington and its allies favored, did not seem to have factored into Moscow's thinking. (U)

Should the United States have put forward a more attractive proposal? Recalling how distressed Dulles and others at State had been, Murphy said that they "considered every possible avenue of the solution, what could be done, and really none of us had whatever imagination it took to discover another solution."[166] That is not true. In addition to Stassen's, several possibilities were proposed, but there is no indication that they reached Dulles. (U)

In a perceptive commentary at the height of the revolution, journalist Chalmers Roberts said that events seemed to be proving Dulles right about the way things would turn out in the satellites and vindicating the administration's encouragement of national communist governments. Although the Gomulka and Nagy governments were not yet

Titoist, forces were at work that might eventually bring about the removal of Soviet troops from the two countries, a major U.S. objective. So far, he said, Dulles had "scrupulously" avoided endorsing the rebellion against the Nagy government and had concentrated on the outside intervention. Dulles knew "there must be no direct confrontation from which the Soviet Union could not retreat;" he wanted to find "a tolerable way for the Kremlin to pull back." Most of Roberts's diplomatic sources did not believe Moscow would withdraw, either "willingly or grudgingly," unless the West--particularly the United States--paid "a fair price at the proper moment." He understood that ideas under discussion in Washington included offers to withdraw U.S. forces from continental Europe or to close bases in Spain or the United Kingdom in return for a military withdrawal from the satellites. Roberts did not know of one other proposal. Within the U.S. Embassy in Vienna an informal working group recommended that the United States offer to withdraw forces from Italy in exchange for Soviet withdrawal from Hungary. To enhance credibility, the offer would be transmitted through the Yugoslavs. Although not opposed to the idea, Ambassador Thompson apparently did not pass it on to Washington.[167] (U)

The administration did not pursue a more active policy for several reasons. First, its policy did not call for encouraging violent upheavals since communist forces were expected easily to crush them. During the first few days of fighting, with its sources of information restricted, it seemed to doubt that the revolution would succeed. Secondly, time seemed to be working in the long run against the Soviet Union and the local communist regimes. Why should the West meddle and risk halting the trend toward greater satellite independence? Third, though the United States expected additional short-

lived violent outbursts, it did not anticipate a prolonged, nationwide struggle like the Hungarian revolution. It had no plans on how to respond to such an eventuality. It belatedly learned its lesson and, after the second Soviet attack on 4 November, prepared a contingency paper in the event the Soviet Union decided to attack Poland.[168] Fourth, none of the major European allies or NATO as an organization supported a more active policy. Since Eisenhower had as a major goal—if not the most important—strengthening and maintaining European unity, a unilateral foray into Eastern Europe would have severely strained and possibly ruptured U.S. relations with its allies. Fifth, as Eisenhower explained afterward, Hungary's location, surrounded by communist countries and neutral Austria, did not allow an easy military intervention. Finally, he and European leaders feared that a more active policy might result in a global war. (U)

The worry that a more active approach might lead to war with the Soviet Union seemed to bother Eisenhower more than it did others. In comparing the situation confronting the Soviet leaders in Hungary with that facing Hitler at the end of World War II, he may well have exaggerated their sense of desperation. But the possibility of war certainly increased after the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt and Moscow's threat to send volunteers to help defend that country. Adlai Stevenson was guilty of only slight rhetorical excess when he declared on 31 October that the world stood "on the brink of war again."[169] (U)

Although the comparison between the Hungarian revolution and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis should not be overdrawn, they both involved an extension of Soviet military power from which Moscow, for reasons of prestige, found it difficult to pull back. In both instances the United States had several days to weigh its options, from threatening

military action to proposing diplomatic tradeoffs. [redacted] If the Eisenhower administration had made a similarly bold approach to Moscow and done it quickly, it might have been able to achieve the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary, or at least secure a more favorable outcome. This is obviously speculation, especially in the absence of a more substantial Soviet documentary record. Perhaps nothing, even imaginative measures taken early on, would have worked. (U)

Stopping in mid-Novembe[redacted]n the last leg of a European trip, Frank Wisner noted that prior to the revolution U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe had been designed "to maintain at an undiminished pace the various forms of pressure previously deemed useful," to be ready "to bring additional pressures to bear on the weak points as they develop," and to avoid "more extreme forms of provocation." During his talks [redacted] the [redacted] had "substantially endorsed" this approach. The Polish events, he said, "were actually anticipated and taken as an assumption" in the CIA's basic paper approved in the summer. These events had seemingly "validated our paper and our assumptions as to the probable course of developments there," as did the Hungarian events "up to the point when matters got out of control of the nationalist Communists, who had themselves started the fight, and moved swiftly to the point of explosion." Bemoaning the "rantings" and "anguished bleats" of Western journalists who had been in Budapest, who "were far more sweeping and bitter in their denunciations of American actions and American failures" than Hungarian refugees, Wisner urged that the

United States not become "distracted and tormented by too much self criticism for our policies of the past eight years toward the Satellites—policies which were endorsed by Democratic as well as Republican administrations, and which have no doubt had much to do with the development of events in the Satellite areas up to the present point."[170] (U)

The Hungarian revolution represented a possible turning point which, if successful even in a limited way, would have dramatically altered the course of the Cold War and likely shortened it. For the Eisenhower administration, however, the risks of too active an involvement outweighed the advantages. Its cautious response, in part because of the Suez crisis, managed to avert an East-West military clash whose consequences would likely have represented a far greater disaster than the snuffing out of a nascent Hungarian democracy. Eisenhower and Dulles envisaged the demise of communism over a long period of time. In the end their patience earned its reward. (U)

1. There is no comprehensive up-to-date bibliography of English-language material on the revolution. An extensive bibliography of works through 2002 in Hungarian, English, and other languages is in Békés, Byrne, and Ranier, eds, *1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 568-82 (U). For a review of four books in English that appeared in conjunction with the revolution's 50th anniversary, see Hobsbawm, "Could It Have Been Different?" (U)
2. House Cte on For Aff, *Report of the Special Study Mission to Europe*, 5 (U).
3. Hungarian and U.S. records, and to a lesser extent British, are mostly open. In recent years the Central Intelligence Agency has declassified significant material on the revolution. British intelligence records and those of the British mission at the United Nations during the revolution are still unavailable, although records of the British Legation in Budapest are open at the National Archives in Kew. The U.S. Legation destroyed its records when Soviet forces attacked the city on 4 November. Important Soviet records, mainly fragmentary notes of presidium meetings, have been released, but the Russian Government, as a general policy, refuses to release diplomatic cable traffic and other material of the early Cold War years. (U)
4. For example, see Gati, *Failed Illusions*, 18-21 (U); Sebestyen, *Twelve Days*, xxiii-xxv, 294-97 (U); and Lendvai, *One Day That Shook the Communist World*, 185-94 (U).
5. Kovács, Rogers, and Nagy, "Remembered or Forgotten?" 37 (U).

6. See Landa, *"Almost Successful Recipe."* For the text of NSC 5608/1, "U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," 18 Jul 56, see Békés, Byrne, and Ranier, eds, *1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 152-56 (U). Regarding the Beam committee, see the editorial note, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:167 (U).

7. Draft address, 18 Oct 56, 8-9, fldr Speech 11/27/56: "Task of Waging Peace," box 351, John Foster Dulles Papers, PU (U). Since the draft was typed, it is not possible conclusively to determine authorship. Dulles usually drafted his own speeches, so the language is probably his own.

8. Kramer, "Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland," 169-74 (U); Persak, "Polish-Soviet Confrontation in 1956," 1290-1303 (U).

9. Telcon, Dulles and Hoover, 20 Oct 56, 10:30 am, Microfilm Reel 2, *Dulles/Herter Telephone Conversations* (U); INR memo, 20 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:253-55 (U); *New York Times*, 21 Oct 56 (U). Murphy called Dulles that evening and said that a paper was being prepared that would be given to the President the next morning and would be sent to Dulles (telcon, Dulles and Murphy, 20 Oct 56, 6:05 pm, Microfilm Reel 2, *Dulles/Herter Telephone Conversations* (U)). The memo printed in *FRUS* is probably the one to which Murphy referred.

10. Tel WH 323 to Pres, 20 Oct 56, 7:15 p.m., fldr Dulles, Foster Oct '56 (1), box 7, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL (U); Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 60 (U); remarks upon arrival in Denver and statement on reports from Poland, both 20 Oct 56, *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1956*, 978-81 (U). In *Waging Peace* (60, note 2), Eisenhower said that he received such intelligence reports daily, which he

paraphrased, but the 20 October message in the Whitman File was the only one the author found at the Eisenhower Library. Another discrepancy is that the speech to which he said he appended the comment about the Polish situation was given at 12:15 pm, well before he received message WH 323.

11. Mins IAC mtg, 20 Oct 56, 4:00-4:45 pm, CIA-RDP82-00400R0001000090012-4, CREST, NACP (U); mins DCI mtg with Deputies, 22 Oct 56, fldr Minutes of Deputies' Meeting, CIA-RDP80B01676R002300200017-9, ibid (U).

12. Memcon, Murphy, Spasowski, et al, 20 Oct 56, 5 pm, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:256-58 (U); Spasowski, *Liberation of One*, 338-40 (U). Eisenhower's brother, Milton, recalled a discussion about Poland with the President that he said took place the evening of 20 October but which their remarks, as he reconstructed them, suggest may have occurred later (*President Is Calling*, 354-55) (U).

13. Transcript, "Face the Nation," 21 Oct 56, in Branyan and Larsen, eds, *Eisenhower Administration*, 665-69 (U).

14. Drew Pearson, *Washington Post & Times Herald*, 26 Oct 56 (U).

15. Transcript, "Face the Nation," 669-70, cited in n 13 (U); notes, Sec's staff mtg, 22 Oct 56, fldr Minutes Aug. 1, 1956-Dec. 31, 1956, box 6, Entry 1609, Secretary's Staff Meetings, RG 59, NACP (U).

16. Memo Tresize for Bowie, 24 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:266-68 (quotes, 267-68) (U).

17. Msg SX-2719 USAREUR G-2 to DeptA, 26 Oct 56, fldr Cables, Receipt #3, 1956, box 110, Entry 2020, Assistant Chief of Staff (G2) Intelligence Cables, RG

549, NACP; CIA; OCI, *Current Intelligence Weekly Summary*, 25 Oct 56, pt 1:3, CREST, NACP (U).

18. Desp 222 Warsaw to For Off, 23 Oct 56, FO 417/53, Confidential Print: Poland, NAK (U).

19. *New York Times*, 23 Oct 56 (U). Journalist Cyrus Sulzberger suggested to retired General Lucius Clay that State secretly advise the new Polish Government of its willingness to provide economic aid, but not do anything to embarrass it. Clay agreed, and said he would immediately contact the President (diary entry, 22 Oct 56, Sulzberger, *Last of the Giants*, 334-35 (U)).

20. Address, Washington, D.C., 23 Oct 56, *Eisenhower Public Papers 1956*, 991-97, (quotes, 995) (U).

21. Address, New York, 25 Oct 56, ibid, 1020-27 (quote, 1022) (U); memo Elbrick for Sec, 24 Oct 56, fldr Hungary and Poland, box 29, Entry 1274, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files, RG 59, NACP (U). The memo, with the remarks about Spasowskii deleted, is printed in *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:268-70 (U).

22. Tel 282 State to Belgrade, 12 Oct 56, and ed note, *FRUS 1955-57*, 26:749-51 (U); *New York Times*, 22 Oct 56 (U); address, Seattle, Washington, 24 Oct 56, Department of State *Bulletin*, 5 Nov 56, 722 (U).

23. [redacted]

OSD 1.4 (C), (d)
CIA 1.4 (c), (d)

[redacted]

24. Györkei and Horváth, *Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary*, 9-10 (U).

25. The Legation's sharpest critic was Hungarian-speaking journalist Leslie Bain. See his articles published soon after the revolution, "Communism's Dry Rot" and How We Failed In Hungary," and his book that appeared in 1960, *Reluctant Satellites* (U).

26. [redacted] "Major Oversight on Our Part" (U); Kovács, "Understanding or Misunderstanding?" (U); and Kovács, Rogers, and Nagy, "Forgotten or Remembered?" (U).

27. The Legation lost telephone and telegraph contact with the outside world from the afternoon of 23 October until the morning of the 25th. For most of the day on the 24th the staff used an open Telex line that could also handle encoded messages; but it broke down and remained inoperable for several days. The first telegram

about the unrest, sent on the 23rd, was not received in Washington until 7:15 a.m. on the 25th. During the two-day interruption, State had to rely on press accounts and reports by the government-controlled Radio Budapest. Communication with Washington was broken again from 5 a.m. on the 25th until 2 p.m. on the 27th, when a single message was transmitted in the clear through the Hungarian Foreign Ministry informing State that all Legation employees were safe. Regarding the communications problems, see *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:275, n 6; 313, n 3; Kovács, Rogers, Nagy, "Forgotten or Remembered?" 7 (U); and memo Leverich for Murphy, 29 Oct 56, fldr Hungary and Poland, box 29, Entry 1274, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files, RG 59, NACP (U).

28. Kovács, Rogers, Nagy, "Forgotten or Remembered?" 5 (U).

29. In addition to the 9 Communist countries which maintained embassies in Budapest, 18 non-communist countries and Yugoslavia had Legations there. At the beginning of 1956 the U.S. Legation had 20 people with official accreditation, the British Legation 11, and the French 9 (*A Budapesten akkreditatált diplomáciai testület tagjainak névsora*, 5-7, 30-31, 93-95, 99-100, 110-12) (U). The Department of State's *Foreign Service List* for July 1956 showed 17 people, including the military attachés, as accredited to the Legation (U). The Legation staff also included code clerks, secretaries, and U.S. Marine guards.

30. Marton, *Forbidden Sky*, 179 (U). Rogers, First Secretary in the Legation, called State's failure to have a new minister in place when the revolution broke out "a serious dereliction of duty." (Kovács, Rogers, Nagy, "Forgotten or Remembered?" 8 (U). See also Irving, *Uprising*, 482 (U).

31. Tels 2, 11, 14 State to Pretoria, 6, 11, 14 Jul 56; tels 11, 24 Pretoria to State, 12, 30 Jul 56; memo Elbrick for SecState, 27 Sep 56, w/atchd Biographic Summary: fldr 123 Edward T. Wailes, box 811, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, NACP (U); transcript teletype conv, 25 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:284 (U).

32. Bain, "How We FGailed in Hungary," 26 (U); Marton, "Why Has the West Slept?" 27; Kovács, Rogers, Nagy, "Forgotten or Remembered?" 8-9 (U); interv Endre Marton by Martin Ben Swartz, 31 Oct 85; Swartz, "A New Look at the 1956 Hungarian Revolution," 573 (U); [redacted] Major Oversight on Our Part," 112 (U).

33. Kovács, Rogers, Nagy, "Forgotten or Remembered?" 7 (U).

34. Tel 154 Budapest to State, 23 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:263-65 (U).

35. Tel 161 Budapest to State, 26 Oct 56, reel 3, Microfilm Reel C-0026, RG 59, NACP (U).

36. Tel 166 Budapest to State, 26 Oct 56, ibid (U). The message does not identify the man and notes that the other members of his group forbade him to divulge their names. He left his name and phone number and said he wanted to stay in touch with the Legation. Barnes informed State that it would accept any information he offered but would avoid the impression that it was negotiating with him.

37. Tel Budapest 214 to State, 2 Nov 56, Reel 7352, box 290, Entry 1014, Microfilmed Messages, RG 319, NACP ~~(C)~~.

38. Tel 171 Budapest to State, 28 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:319-20; memo Elbrick to SecState, 31 Oct 56, summarized ibid, 320, n 5 (U).

39. Interv Jordan T. Rogers by Thomas Dunnigan, 22 Aug 06, 6, FAOHP (U).

40. Tel IAI-IND 17306 CINCUSAFE Wiesbaden to CSAF, 1 Nov 56, microfilm reel 7352, box 290, Entry 1014, RG 319, NACP. The message contained Military Situation Report No. 1, as of 1400, 30 October, from the Air Attaché in Budapest.

41. CIA, "Hungarian Revolution and Planning for the Future," 1:101 (U).

42. For example, McCauley, "Hungary and Suez, 1956," 790 (U), states that during the 10 days leading up to the second Soviet intervention on 4 November, U.S. representatives in New York lobbied behind the scenes against any UN action on Hungary.

43. Recd of mtg, 23 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:259-60 (U).

44. *New York Times*, 25 Oct 56; tel Varga to Dulles, 24 Oct 56, reel 3, Microfilm C-0026, RG 59, NACP (U); tel Varga to Dixon, 24 Oct 56, Taylor-Haraszti, ed, *Hungarian Revolution*, 99-100 (U); telcon Dulles and Lodge, 24 Oct 56, 6:07 pm, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:273 (U (U).

45. Telcons Foster and Allen Dulles, 25 Oct 56, 4:37 pm, and Foster Dulles and Pres, 25 Oct 56, 5:02 pm, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:290, and n 2.

46. Memo, 38th mtg, Spec Cmte on Soviet and Related Problems, 25 Oct 56, 3:00 pm, [redacted] telcon Dulles and Lodge, 25 Oct 56, 5:29 pm, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:291 (U).

47. Memo Cook and Pratt for Lodge, 25 Oct 56, fldr Hungary (1946-Nov 1956), box 92, Entry 1030-D, UN Mission Files, RG 84, NACP (U).

48. Tel MISUN 250 State to New York, 25 Oct 56, fldr 1956 Inc Tels US (Jul-Oct 56), box 17, Entry 1030-H, ibid (U).

49. Tel 403 New York to State, 25 Oct 56, fldr Master File 296-445 (Oct 3-30, 1956), box 48, Entry 1030-F, ibid (U).

50. Tel 2981 State to London, 25 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:292-93 (U); tel 313 State to Belgrade, 25 Oct 56, file 764.00/10-2556, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, NACP (U).

51. *New York Times*, 28 Oct 56 (U); tel 3282 For Min to New York, 27 Oct 56, Békés, Byrne, and Rainer, eds, *1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 250 (U).

52. Middleton, "Britain Cautious in Hungary Crisis," *New York Times*, 29 Oct 56 (U).

53. Tel 2290 London to State, 26 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:303-04 (U); For Off min, 26 Oct 56, Taylor-Haraszti, ed, *Hungarian Revolution*, 103-05 (U).

54. Gardner, "Poisoned Apples," 82 (U).

55, Telcon Dulles and Pres, 26 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:306-07 (U); tel 3008 State to London, 26 Oct 56, ibid, 307 (U).

56. Tels 417 New York to State, 27 Oct 56, fldr Master File 296-445 (Oct 3-30, 1956), box 48, Entry 1030-F, UN Mission Files, RG 84, NACP (U); tel 421 new York to State, 27 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:315-16 (U).

57. Tel 211 State to New York, 27 Oct 56, fldr 1956 Inc Tels US (Jul-Oct), box 17, Entry 1030-H, UN Mission Files, RG 84, NACP (U); *Manchester Guardian*, 27 Oct 56 (U).

58. O'Connor, "America Takes the Initiative," *Observer* (London), 28 Oct 56 (U).

59. Ltr French, UK, and US Reps to SC Pres, 27 Oct 56 (Doc S/3690), Security Council, *Official Records*, Eleventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1956, 100; proceedings 746th SC mtg, 28 Oct 56, 4:00-9:50 pm,

Security Council *Official Records*:1-9 (quotes, 4) (U). The 27 October letter is also in Department of State *Bulletin*, 12 Nov 56, 757 (U).

60. Proceedings 746th SC mtg, 28 Oct 56, 4:00-9:50 pm, Security Council *Official Records*, cited in n 59 (U). Excerpts of Lodge's statement are in Department of State *Bulletin*, 12 Nov 56, 758-59 (U).

61. See for example Rogers's untitled presentation at George Washington University, 31 October 1986, fldr Hungary 1953-56, box 492, Subject files, OSD Hist (U).

62. Memo of disc, 301st NSC mtg, 26 Oct 56, Békés, Byrne, and Ranier, eds, *1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 240-43 (U). A sanitized text is in *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:295-99 (U).

63. Diary entry, 26 Oct 56, Galambos, ed, *Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, 17:2334 (U); unsigned memo, "U.S. Policy with Respect to Poland and Hungary," (a typewritten marginal notation indicates the memo was prepared for the Planning Board meeting of 29 Oct), fldr U.S. Policy toward Develop. Poland/Hungary, box 16, ISA Policy Planning Staff files, Acc 65A-3500, WNRC ~~(S)~~.

64. Ltr Stassen to Pres, 26 Oct 56, fldr Dulles, Foster Oct '56, box 6, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL (also Doc. CK3100439890, *DDRS*) (U); telcon Dulles and Stassen, 26 Oct 56, 3:39 pm, Microfilm Reel 5, Dulles/Herter Telephone Conversations (U); Dulles memcon, 26 Oct 56, 4:10 pm, fldr Memos of Conversation General-S (a), box 1, John Foster Dulles Papers, DDEL (U). The memcon is also Doc. CK3100245433, *DDRS* (U).

65. Ltr Stassen to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 56, (U); telcon Dulles and Pres, 26 Oct 56, 7:06 pm, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:306-07 (U); tel 3008 State to London, 26 Oct 56, ibid, 307 (U).

66. Address, Dallas, 27 Oct 56, Department of State *Bulletin*, 5 Nov 56, 695-99 (quotes, 697) (U). Several drafts, dating as early as 18 October, are in fldr Speech 10/27/56: "Task of Waging Peace," box 351, John Foster Dulles Papers, PU (U). Draft no. 9, identified as Dulles's and dated 25 October, also bears Eisenhower's handwritten comments and changes. The quoted passage in the speech as given replaced this passage in this draft: "There are great tasks of liberation to be performed. We dare not be impetuous, but equally we dare not seem indifferent. To be at once prudent and effective will put heavy demands upon our future foreign policy." See also interv Robert Amory, Jr., by Martin Ben Swartz, 26 Mar 87, in Swartz, "New Look at the Hungarian Revolution," 486 (U).

67. Dallas address, cited in n 66 (U). The British Embassy in Washington felt that the speech reflected the administration's anxiety "to dispel any Soviet fear that the United States intends to exploit the current situation in the satellite area to the point of creating a strategic threat to the Soviet Union." That anxiety was also reflected in a newspaper report that Dulles, through the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, had secretly signaled the Soviet Union that the United States was agreeable to a buffer zone of neutral states in Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea, a rumor the British Embassy was unable to confirm but which it thought consistent with U.S. policy (ltr Barker to Brimelow, 2 Nov 56, Haraszti-Taylor, ed, *Hungarian Revolution*, 152-53 (U).

68. Leighton, *Strategy, Money, and the New Look*, 15-16 (U).

69. Transcript, "Face the Nation," 28 Oct 56, *Wilson Public Statements, 1956*, 3:1078-83 (U).

70. *Chicago Tribune*, 28 Oct 56 (U); Beke, *Student's Diary*, 113 (U).

71. Davis Paper, "Developments in Poland and Hungary: US Policy and Courses of Action in the Light Thereof," 28 Oct 56, fldr Europe (East), box 108, Entry 1272, Policy Planning Staff Files, RG 59, NACP (U). A handwritten notation indicates that Dulles approved the paper on 29 October. Another notation, in someone else's hand, states that the NSC Planning Board discussed it on 29 October.

72. Paper, 28 Oct 56, cited in n 71 (U).

73. Interv Harold E. Stassen by Richard D. Challener, 3 Jun 65, 45-47, JFDOHP, PU (U).

74. Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 33-35 (U).

75. Tel 177 Budapest to State, 29 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:329 (U).

76. Memo MWB [?], "Poland—Hungary: Proposals Discussed But Not Adopted by the Board Assistants," 31 Oct 56, fldr Soviet Satellites in E. Eur. & US Policy, box 7, NSC Staff, Special Staff Series, DDEL ~~(S)~~.

77. Memo Weber to Lay et al, 29 Oct 56, fldr Soviet Satellites in E. Eur. & US Policy (2), box 7, NSC Staff Special Staff Series, DDEL ~~(S)~~; unsigned memo, "U.S. Policy with Respect to Poland and Hungary," cited in n 63 ~~(S)~~; Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 146 (U).

78. [redacted] "Major Oversight on Our Part," 124 (U).

79. Memo Guthrie for ASD/ISA, 6 Nov 56, fldr 091.3 Hungary. box 16, ISA Files, Acc 60A-1339, RG 330, WNRC (U). On 6 November ISA concluded that the request had been overtaken by events and quietly dropped the matter.

80. Ibid, 8-9 (para. 24) (U).

81. NSC 5616, "U.S. Policy toward Developments in Poland and Hungary," 31 Oct 56, fldr NSC 5616, box 44, OSANSA Records, White House Office Files, DDEL (U). A declassified version, with only paragraph 24 excised, is on the Digital National Security Archive website.

82. Memo Radford for SecDef, 31 Oct 56, atchd to memo Lay for NSC, 6 Nov 56, Doc. CK3100246045, *DDRS* (U).

83. Briefing paper for 302nd NSC mtg, Item 2: U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary, [31 Oct 56], fldr 5616 U.S. Policy toward Develop. Poland & Hungary, box 16, ISA-NSC Files, Acc 65A-3500, RG 330, WNRC (S).

84. Memo Weber for Lay, 31 Oct 56, fldr Soviet Satellites in E. Eur. & US Policy, box 7, NSC Special Staff Series, DDEL (S).

85. SNIE 12-2-56, "Probable Developments in East Europe and Implications for Soviet Policy," 30 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:330-35 (U).

86. Interv Lauris Norstad by Hugh Ahmann, 22-25 Oct 79, 416-17, OAFH (U).

87. Political Division Paper (C-M(56)110), "The Thaw in Eastern Europe," 24 Sep 56, Békés, Byrne, and Rainer, eds, *1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 168-77 (U).

88. Summary rcd, NAC mtg, 24 Oct 56, 10:15 am (C-R(56)56), NAC Records, NATO (U); tel Polto 910 Paris to State, 25 Oct 56, Microfilm Reel 7334, Box 289, Entry 1014, Microfilmed Messages, RG 319, NACP (U).

89. Memo AsstSecGen for Pol Affairs for SecGen, 27 Oct 56, NAC Central Registry Files, NATO (C).

90. Note, AsstSecGen for Pol Affairs, "The Situation in Hungary," 27 Oct 56, ibid (C).

91. Draft paper, AsstSecGen for Pol Affairs, "Possibilities for Council Action on Hungary," 27 Oct 56, ibid (S). A copy of the paper is in FO 371/122380, Foreign Office: General Political Correspondence, NAK (U), and is printed in Haraszti-Taylor, ed, *Hungarian Revolution*, 112-13, which mistakenly identifies it as a British Foreign Office draft (U).

92. Tel 180 UK Del Paris to For Off, 27 Oct 56, FO 371/122377, Foreign Office: General Political Correspondence, NAK (U).

93. Ibid (U).

94. For a summary of the discussion of Hungary at these meetings, see Kecskés, "North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 120-22 (U).

95. Ibid, 131 (U).

96. Tels 430 and 434 New York to State, 29 Oct 56, fldr Master File 296-445 (Oct. 5-30, 1956), box 48, Entry 1030-F, UN Mission Files, RG 84, NACP (U).

97. Tels 225 and 228 State to New York, 31 Oct 56, 2:00 pm and 7:00 pm, fldr 1956 Inc Tels US (Jul-Oct), box 17, Entry 1030-H, ibid (U).

98. Tel 200 Budapest to State, 31 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:349-50 (U).

99. Telcon Dulles and Pearson, 30 Oct 56, 3 pm, ibid, 16:865 (U); Owen notes, 30 Oct 56, fldr Staff Meeting Minutes 1956, box 110, Entry 1272, Policy Planning Staff Files, RG 59, NACP (U). More than a month later, on 5 December, Owen

prepared a revised version of the meeting notes (ibid) (U). It contained the following additional language regarding the Middle East: "It was generally agreed that as a matter of moral principle, which coincided with the national interest, the US should condemn the Israeli aggression against Egypt and disassociate itself from the British and French ultimatum." The new section on Hungary omitted altogether the final conclusion about Hungary's long-term prospects. No explanation was given as to why these changes were made.

100. Tel 992, Moscow to State, 30 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:335-38 (quotes, 336, 338) (U).

101. Malin working notes, presidium mtg, 30 Oct 56; "Declaration by the Government of the USSR on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and other Socialist States," 30 Oct 56: Békés, Byrne, and Ranier, eds, *1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 295-99, 300-02 (U).

102. Tel 993 Moscow to State, 30 Oct 56, fldr Dulles, Foster, Oct. '56 (1), box 6, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL (U); also Doc. CK3100187323, *DDRS* (U).

103. Tel 1005 Moscow to State, 30 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:347-48 (U). See, for example, Swartz, "New Look at the 1956 Hungarian Revolution," 306, n 523 (U).

104. Malin working notes, presidium mtg, and atchd extract, 31 Oct 56, Békés, Byrne, and Ranier, eds, *1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 307-09 (U). For Khrushchev's recollections of the meeting, see Khrushchev, ed, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev*, 3:644-61 (U), and Talbott, ed, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 416-29 (U).

105. Mins Sec's Staff mtg, 31 Oct 56, 9:15 am, fldr Minutes Aug. 1, 1956-Dec. 31, 1956, box 6, Entry 1609, Secretary's Staff Meetings, RG 59, NACP (U).

106. Israelyan, *On the Battlefronts of the Cold War*, ____ (U).

107. Tel Serov to Mikoyan, 28 Oct 56, Cold War International History Website (U). Regarding the presence of Oliveiras and Vest in the Legation, see transcript of teletype conv, 25 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:284 (U). There is no indication of how seriously Moscow took Serov's report.

108. Lomax, *Hungary 1956*, 128-29 (U [redacted] For background on the NTS, see Dorril, *MI6*, 404-24, 513-15 (U). See also tel C-126 USARMA Budapest to CSA and CSAF, 31 Oct 56, microfilm reel 7352, box 290, Entry 1014, Microfilmed Messages, RG 319, NACP (U).

109. Interv William Stearman by Martin Ben Swartz, 5 Jun 86, in Swartz, "New Look at the 1956 Hungarian Revolution," 593-94 (U). Stearman, who spoke German and had been working at the U.S. Mission in West Berlin, was detailed to the Vienna Embassy on 3 November. Therefore, his first-hand experience primarily covers the period after the 4 November attack [redacted]

OSD 1.4 (C)/(d)
CIA 1.4(c), (d)

[redacted]

110. Schlesinger, *Austrian Neutrality*, 37-38 (U); *New York Times*, 31 Oct 56, 4 Nov 56 (U).

111. Entry, 31 Oct 56, fldr Diary 1953-1957, box 5, Hughes Papers, PU (U); telcon, Dulles and Nixon, 31 Oct 56, quoted in Lucas, *Britain and Suez*, 92 (U).

112. Radio and television rpt, 31 Oct 56, 7 pm, *Eisenhower Public Papers 1956*, 1060-66 (quotes, 1061-62) (U).

113. *Baltimore Sun*, 2 Nov 56 (U).

114. Ed note, *FRUS 1955-57*, 16:901; memo of disc, 302nd NSC mtg, 1 Nov 56, ibid, 902 (U).

115. Telcon Eisenhower and Dulles, 1 Nov 56, 8:40 am, ibid, 901 (U); extracts, memos of disc, 302nd NSC mtg, 1 Nov 56, ibid, 25:358-59 (U); ibid, 16:902-16 (quote, 907) (U).

116. Memo Elbrick for SecState, 1 Nov 56, fldr Hungary (1946-Nov 1956), box 92, Entry 1030-D, UN Mission Files, RG 84, NACP (U).

117. Memo Freers for Elbrick, 1 Nov 56, fldr Hungary and Poland, box 29, Entry 1274, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files, RG 59, NACP (U). The idea of a proclamation of Hungary's neutrality may have come from a student newspaper circulating in Budapest on 31 October, which stated that "we are in dire need of the friendship of the Western powers. We are in dire need of an international convention in which the four Western powers would assure the neutrality of Hungary on the pattern of that in Switzerland and Austria." (Beke,

Student's Diary, 112) (U). It is not clear which four Western powers the newspaper had in mind.

118. CIA note, 1 Nov [56], and paraphrase of Budapest tel, 1 Nov 56, received 3:10 p.m., fldr Speeches 1956, box 4, Hughes Papers, PU (U). See also Hughes's typewritten, undated note, entitled "Philadelphia Speech," ibid (U). In addition to the erroneous information about Soviet troops re-entering Budapest, the press reports also mistakenly said that Soviet planes had conducted bombing raids in the fighting around airfields and that, according to Budapest radio, Tildy had replaced Nagy, whom people blamed for the bloodshed, as head of the government.

119. Entry, 1 Nov 56, fldr Diary 1953-1957, box 5, ibid (U).

120. Address, Philadelphia, 1 Nov 56, 9:30 pm, *Eisenhower Public Papers 1956*:1066-74 (quotes, 1068, 1070-71) (U).

121. Proceedings 561st plenary meeting, 1 Nov 56, 5 pm, UN General Assembly *Official Records*, First Emergency Special Session, 10-12 (U).

122. Telcon Dulles and Lodge, 2 Nov 56, 4:11 pm, *FRUS 1955-57*, 16:938 (U).

123. Tel For Off to New York, 2 Nov 56, Haraszti-Taylor, ed, *Hungarian Revolution*, 161 (U); tel New York 1027 to For Off, 2 Nov 56, in Békés, "Hungarian Question on the UN Agenda," 112-13 (U), and Haraszti-Taylor, ed, *Hungarian Revolution*, 164-66 (U); tel 2162-2163 New York to For Min, 2 Nov 56, *DDF 1956*, 2:152-53 (U).

124. Tel New York 1027 to For Off, cited ibid.

125. Ibid. Lodge's report of the agreement differed slightly from Dixon's. According to him, they all agreed that the U.K. and France would not submit a substantive resolution nor would the United States submit a procedural one. Lodge would make a speech near the beginning of the meeting, the Cuban or another member would be asked to suggest after all the speeches that no further action was possible that evening, and there would be a follow-up meeting the next day. This would allow Lodge to consult with his two colleagues on both resolutions the following morning (tel 475 New York to State, 2 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:368-69 (U).

126. Proceedings 752nd mtg, 2 Nov 56, 5:00-8:50 pm, Security Council *Official Records*:1-27 (U). Excerpts of Lodge's statement are in Department of State *Bulletin*, 12 Nov 56, 759-61 (U).

127. Tel New York to For Off, 3 Nov 56, cited in n 124 (U).

128. Tel 475 New York to State, 2 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:368-69 (U).

129. Memcon Hoover and Phleger w/Pres, 3 Nov 56, 11:10 am, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:369, n 11 (U).

130. Tel 1038 New York to For Off, 3 Nov 56, in Békés, "Hungarian Question on the UN Agenda," 115-116 (U); memcon, 3 Nov 56, quoted in ed note, *FRUS 1955-57, 25*:372-73 (U).

131. [change in British and French tactics at UN on 3 Nov]; tel 2184Paris to State, 5 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 16:996 (U).

132. Proceedings 753rd SC mtg , 3 Nov 56, 3-6:30 pm, *Official Records*, 1-23 (U). For an exchange of letters in 1961 between Lodge and the editor of the *Hungarian*

Quarterly, which had published an article critical of Lodge's handling of the Hungarian revolution, see Kovács, ed, *Fight for Freedom*, 206-09 (U).

133. Tel 1050 New York to FO, 4 Nov 56, Békés, "Hungarian Question on the UN Agenda," 118-19 (U).

134. See, for example, a statement by Minister of State Ferenc Farkas (Peasant Party); the article by Laszlo Nemeth, member of the presidium of the Writers' Union, which was broadcast on Radio Free Kossuth; and a statement by Geza Losonczy at a press conference for Hungarian and foreign correspondents, all on 3 November (Free Europe Committee, *Revolt in Hungary*, 79-82 (U).

135. Békés, "1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality," 486 (U).

136. Tentative notes (Howe), ActgSec staff mtg, 2 Nov 56, 9:15 am, fldr Minutes Aug. 1, 1956-Dec. 31, 1956, box 6, Entry 1609, Secretary's Staff Meetings, RG 59, NACP (U). An extract is in the editorial note, FRUS 1955-57, 25:364 (U).

137. Interv Llewellyn Thompson by Philip Crowl, 29 Jun 66, 21-22, JFDOHP, PU (U); Drake, datelined Vienna, "Hungary Alarmed by Soviet Troops," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 Nov 56 (U); tel 199 State to Budapest, 3 Nov 56 (dispatched 6:50 pm (00:50 am in Budapest), *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:373-74 (U).

138. Tel 219 Budapest to State, 3 Nov 56, 1:00 pm, reel 7357, box 250, Entry 1014, Microfilmed Messages, RG 319, NACP (8).

139. Interv Charles Wheeler, nd, National Security Archive website (U).

140. Tel 219 Budapest to State, 3 Nov 56, cited in n 138 (8); Radio Free Kossuth announcement, 3 Nov 56, 9:10 am, quoted in Free Europe Committee, *Revolt in Hungary*, 74 (U); Leblond in *Le Dauphiné Libéré* (Grenoble), 3 Nov 56, in Lasky,

Hungarian Revolution, 222 (U); Wood, "Failed 1956 Hungarian Revolution Remembered," 18 Oct 56, *VOANews.com* (www.voanews.com/english/archive) (U); Marton, *Forbidden Sky*, 172 (U); tel 196 State to Budapest, 3 Nov 56, 4:30 pm, reel 7357, box 250, Entry 1014, Microfilmed Messages, RG 319, NACP (S).

141. Proceedings 752nd mtg, 2 Nov 56, 5:00-8:50 pm, Security Council *Official Records*, 10-11 (U); International Commentary No. M-1 (Script No. 5), 3 Nov 56, fldr Free Europe Committee, 1956 (3), box 54, C. D. Jackson Papers, DDEL (U)); tel 70 706 Budapest to Paris, 3 Nov 56, 5:10 pm, *DDF, 1956*, 3:161 (U). Granville (*First Domino*, 175 (U)) erroneously summarized the script, indicating that the Cuban representative "submitted a proposal to send a U.N. committee to Hungary."

142. Tel C-132 Army Attaché Budapest to DeptA, 3 Nov 56, 1600, microfilm reel 7357, box 290, Entry 1014, Microfilmed Messages, RG 319, NACP (S) [redacted]

143. Tels Budapest 224 and 226 to State, 3 Nov 56, Microfilm Reel 290, Entry 1014, RG 319, NACP (U); tel 560 Budapest to For Off, 3 Nov 56, 6:10 pm, FO 371/122380, NAK (U).

144. Draft ltr, nd, fldr Hungary and Poland, box 29, Entry 1274, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Files, RG 59, NACP (U). Although it bears no drafting date, the text refers to "my address to the nation of two nights ago" which made it clear "we are not seeking military allies in eastern Europe but simply wish those countries to be friends who are free."

145. *Observer* (London), 4 Nov 56 (U).

146. Interv Amory, in Swartz, "New Look at the 1956 Hungarian Revolution," 484-85; Amory, "Hungary '56," 20-23 (U); tel Polto 994, 4 Nov 56, file 740.5/11-456, box 3136, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, NACP (U).

147. *Manchester Guardian*, 5 Nov 56 (U).

148. Szabo, *Boy on the Rooftop*, 88, 110, 113 (U); Teglas, *Budapest Exit*, 88-89 (U); broadcasts, Free Radio Dunanpentele and Free Radio Csokonya, 4 Nov 56, 1:12 and 4:20 pm, "Hungarian Revolt: Hungarian Radio Stations," 82-84 (U).

149. Diary entries, 4-6 Nov 56, Hiott, "Close-Up Story of Last Fight," 33 (U).

150. Memo Eur Region ISA for Gray, 4 Nov 56, fldr 000.7 Hungary, box 16, ISA Files, Acc 60A-1339, RG 330, WNRC ~~(S)~~.

151. Livesay notes, Joint Secs mtg, 5 Nov 56, fldr Joint Secretaries 4th Quarter 1956, box 8, AFPC Meeting files, Acc 77-0062, RG 330, WNRC ~~(S)~~.

152. Memo Ernst for Harr, 9 Nov 56, fldr 092 Hungary, box 16, ISA files, Acc 60A-1339, RG 330, WNRC ~~(S)~~.

153. *New York Times*, 5 Nov 56 (U). The portion of the discussion dealing with the Middle East is described in memcon (Goodpaster), 4 Nov 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 16:976-77 (U).

154. *New York Times*, 13 Nov 56 (U).

155. Ibid, 14 Nov 56 (U). A press despatch from Vienna (*Los Angeles Times*, 12 Nov 56) of an interview Mindszenty had reportedly given on 4 November to Western journalists after taking refuge in the U.S. Legation, which quoted him as urging that Hammarskjold come to Budapest immediately, is probably misleading. It

probably misleading. It may have represented remarks made well after 4 November. Mindszenty recalled meeting in the Legation with American journalists on the evening of 5 November and mentioned the two most important issues they raised, neither of which was a visit by Hammarskjold (Mindszenty, *Memoirs*, 213-14 (U)). However, the memoirs of one of the journalists, Endre Marton (*Forbidden Sky*, 186), uses the same language as the Vienna 12 November dispatch and dates the interview as 4 November.

156. Having announced his intention to accompany the first contingent of UNEF troops to Egypt (they arrived together on 15 November), Hammarskjöld offered also to go to Hungary to oversee distribution of UN relief supplies. When the Kádár government replied that he would be welcome to come but "at a later date," he set the date for 16 December. The government rejected that date as unsuitable and proposed no alternative time. (*New York Times*, 4, 6 Dec 56) (U)

157. For example, see Ernest Nagy's comments in Kovacs, Rogers, Nagy, "Forgotten or Remembered?" 33 (U).

158. Lash, *Dag Hammarskjold*, 92-93 (U); Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 233-43 (U).

159. Cherne's response during a question-and-answer period following his speech, "1958—Year of Survival," before the industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, DC, 14 Mar 58, 15, NDUL (U).

160. Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, 95 (U). Among many other treatments of RFE's role in the revolution are Mickelsen, *America's Other Voice*, 91-103, Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, and Gati, *Failed Illusions*, 166-71 (U)

161. For a summary of major criticisms of RFE and the Free Europe Press by U.S. and foreign officials, US newspaper correspondents, and native listeners, see the paper, Criticism of Radio Free Europe," September 1956, CIA-RDP78-02771R000200230002-0, CREST, NACP (U).

162. Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, 94-103 (U).

163. Min Cope, 10 Jul 56, FO 1087/3, Budapest Legation Files, NAK (U).

164. Tel Dir Munich Radio Center to Dir International Broadcasting Service, 25 Oct 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, 25:276 (U).

165. For example, the contention has been made that the UN needlessly delayed responding to Nagy's 1 November appeal to Hammarskjöld and that by acting more quickly it could have changed the outcome of the revolution (Gaskill, "Timetable of a Failure.") (U)

166. Interv Robert Murphy by Richard Challener, 8 Jun 65, 46, JFDOHP, PU (U).

167. Roberts, "Dulles' Decision May Greatly Affect History," *Washington Post and Times Herald*, 29 Oct 56 (U); interv John Mapother by Martin Ben Swartz, 23 Mar 87, in Swartz, "New Look at the Hungarian Revolution," 561-62 (U).

168. NSC 5705/1, "U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland," 25 Feb 57, Doc. CK3100113759, *DDRS* (U). Because the paper was not declassified until 1996, it did not appear in the *FRUS* volumes. Regarding the paper's development and main provisions, see Marchio, "Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives" (U).

169. *Baltimore Sun*, 1 Nov 56 (U).

170. Memo, 13 Nov 56, fldr Correspondence, box CL 1, Luce Papers, LC (U). Attached to the memo is a typewritten chit: FRANK WISNER dictated the attached notes [redacted] on November 13, 1956, the day after he returned from [redacted] Some of Wisner's colleagues and friends believed that his anguish over the failure of the revolution contributed to a nervous breakdown shortly afterward and to the deterioration in his mental health and eventual suicide in 1965 (Hersh, *Old Boys*, 402-04 (U), and Thomas, *Very Best Men*, 144-52 (U)).

OSD 1.4 (C),(d)
(IA 1.4(c),(d)

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