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SECRET

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Ambassy DJAKARTA

December 7, 1965

JOINT WEEKA NO. 46

This Weeka Covers the Period November 25 to December 3, 1965

POLITICAL

1. Army-Sukarno Struggle
2. Death of Aidit and Arrests of Communists
3. Relations with China
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PSYCHOLOGICAL

Negative

MILITARY

Negative

SECRET

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POLITICAL1. Army-Sukarno Struggle (SECRET)

The struggle for power between Sukarno and Military leaders entered a quiet phase this week, with little political maneuvering evident at the surface. The Army concentrated on strengthening its position in the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) which began to extend its authority in the field of the economy. The situation in the press was relatively quiet, as Minister of Information Achmadi's new press regulations went into effect and were observed by all papers except the split FNI journals. Omar Dani was finally replaced as head of the Air Force by his pro-Communist deputy Sri Muljono Herliambang, a move taken without the concurrence of the Army which is said to have angered Nasution. Several ministerial pro-Communists were reportedly placed under city arrest during the week. By the end of the week, Sukarno had called a session of the MPRS, theoretically Indonesia's highest ranking policy-making body, for December 6; however, it was indicated that he would not deliver his "political solution" to the September 30 Affair at this meeting.

2. Death of Aidit and Arrests of Communists (CONFIDENTIAL)

a. Information received from a number of high-ranking and well-placed sources indicate that PKI leader D.N. Aidit was captured in Central Java on November 21 and killed after "resisting interrogation" or "attempting to escape." The Indonesian press has also subsequently carried reports to this effect. There is some evidence that Aidit may have been captured as early as mid-October and been under secret interrogation in Bandung and that Army reports of his subsequent presence in Central Java were intended to mislead Sukarno. In any event the recent reports indicate that Aidit is almost certainly dead now, whenever he may have been captured.

b. The Embassy has also received several reports from well-placed sources that PKI First Deputy Chairman Lukman and the pro-Communist Governor of North Sumatra, Sitepu, have been arrested and are in prison. After a flurry of rumors that Njoto, the PKI Second Deputy Chairman and a Sukarno protege, had been arrested, more recent reports indicate that he was not and that he may still be under Presidential protection. (On the other hand, the later reports may be Army-inspired fabrications designed to prevent Sukarno from acting effectively to secure Njoto's release if the latter is imprisoned). There are also reports from well-placed and reliable sources that a number of prominent crypto-Communists have been placed under house arrest including the (left-wing) FNI Secretary General, Surachman, and the

Minister of Central Bank Affairs, Jusuf Muda Dalam.

c. The Army's willingness to arrest PKI leaders under Sukarno's personal protection and to restrict to house arrest crypto-Communist cabinet ministers weakens Sukarno further and shows an Army determination to challenge him more directly than heretofore. Reports from various sources indicate that most of the PKI Politburo have been captured by now although the solidity of our information varies from case to case and no information has been heard at all concerning one Politburo member (Rewang). The countdown now reads: Aidit - believed dead, Lukman - believed to be in prison; Njoto - status unclear but may be arrested, Sudisman - believed in prison, Sakirman - believed in prison, Adjitorop - in Peking since July, 1964, Njono - definitely in prison, Rewang - unknown. The whereabouts of two Politburo candidate members and most Central Committee members are not known but it is likely that most were arrested and/or killed by the Army. A few are known to be in hiding.

d. As for lower level repression of the PKI, Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito told the DCM that there are now 34,000 PKI prisoners in Java alone. The slow extension of provincial bans continued as the PKI was dissolved in West Kalimantan, the Karo Batak area of North Sumatra and in the Jogjakarta Special Area.

3. Relations with China (CONFIDENTIAL)

The recently uncertain course of Sino-Indonesian relations took a turn for the worse again this week. Liquid assets of Chinese-origin residents of Indonesia were confiscated in several provinces, and Minister of Agriculture Sudjarwo announced that regional military commanders would take over all rice mills and textile enterprises owned by members of the Chinese community association Baperki. Perhaps in retaliation for these and other acts of economic repression, NCNA announced December 4 that Communist China was suspending trade relations with Indonesia. The Chinese Ambassador presented several more protests to Dr. Subandrio, who maintained that Sino-Indonesian relations were in the process of "normalizing." This is patently not the case.

4. Confrontation in the News (CONFIDENTIAL)

a. After several weeks in which Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia has been mostly notable from its absence from public attention,

the Foreign Ministry-controlled Indonesian Herald this week single handedly campaigned to condemn alleged British atrocities against guerrilla fighters in North Borneo. For three days the Herald printed atrocity pictures and stories, but the vernacular press continued its preoccupation with domestic events and has not picked up the theme.

b. In what may be a further effort to stimulate attention on foreign affairs, several claims of Indonesian victories along the border have also appeared in the press. Subandrio once more hinted at "negotiations" on December 1 when he commented to the press that Indonesia would not reject an opportunity to exchange ideas with the British concerning Malaysia. Subandrio also claimed that with the elimination of the PKI Indonesia was now free to pursue confrontation more vigorously.

c. COMMENT (CONFIDENTIAL): The atrocity stories seem mostly designed to make the continuing atrocities committed against rival political factions within Indonesia following the abortive September 30 coup seem less reprehensible, by pointing the finger at alleged barbarity elsewhere. The slightly increased press attention in general may also be partly related to the December 6 anniversary of the declaration of independence in 1961 by the Indonesian puppet government of the "Unitary State of North Kalimantan." No significant increase in physical confrontation appears in the cards, however, and, except for the Palace and Subandrio, most Indonesian leaders now seem inclined to work toward the eventual dismantlement of confrontation.

5. Rhodesian Declaration of Independence Condemned (UNCLASSIFIED)

a. On November 26, the Indonesian rubber-stamp Parliament (DPGR) "unanimously" issued a statement condemning Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence and accusing the British of having manipulated this result. Accepting the resolution on behalf of the Government, Foreign Minister Subandrio said that it was the Government's conclusion that Britain had plotted with Smith to achieve the independence of the racist Rhodesian regime and announced that Indonesia would extend no recognition to Smith but would extend recognition to "Zimbabwe" if African political leaders declared independence.

b. COMMENT (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE): Editorial and other comment on Rhodesian developments has been relatively sparse, reflecting the major preoccupation of both the press and the politicians at present with domestic Indonesian political developments. Such statements as have been

issued, however, have made an effort to blame Britain for the situation, consonant with the Indonesian stereotype of the British as, at best, "neo-colonialists". Unlike many AA countries, Indonesia has announced no sanctions or trade restrictions with Rhodesia and it seems likely that for the time being Indonesian involvement in this African issue will be minimal. Should internal Indonesian politics stabilize while Rhodesia still survives under a minority white government, however, Indonesia may yet attempt to assume a position of demagogic leadership over this issue in line with her self-image.

6. U.S. Relations (SECRET)

a. Appearance of Sukarno's autobiography.

i. During the week US-Indonesian relations seemed to find their most conspicuous expression through the publication and attendant publicity of the autobiography of Sukarno as told to the American writer, Mrs. Cindy Adams. Especially conspicuous and flamboyant was the treatment given the subject by the Foreign Department's Indonesian Herald which lauded the book and felt that here at last was an American who understood Sukarno and Indonesia. The paper printed accounts of cocktail parties sponsored by Ambassador Palar to mark the publication of the book and in general established the full approval of Subandrio's Foreign Department for the project.

ii. The Indonesian-language press on the other hand paid little heed to the book. Its publication was conservatively noted but without excessive comment.

iii. COMMENT: We understand directly from Mrs. Ganis Harsono, wife of the Second Deputy Foreign Minister, that not only she and her husband but also both Subandrios have read and were delighted with the book. Sukarno has not been heard from publicly on the subject.

b. Official Calls

During the past week both the Ambassador and DCM have had occasion (the latter in the course of making farewells) to call on several cabinet ministers. This marks what may be the opening of a possibility of dialogue between responsible officials of the two governments, - a possibility which did not exist during the past several weeks in the wake of Gestapu.

c. Indonesian Approaches

From an increasing number of Indonesians we are receiving approaches, not yet worked out in detail and often quite vague in expression, for economic assistance. Both civilian and military elements foresee coming crises in January-February before the new rice harvest will be reaped and the Lebaran holiday will increase demand. The US posture is to listen while keeping the door open for possible future consideration when circumstances warrant.


PSYCHOLOGICAL

Negative.

MILITARY

Negative.

For the Ambassador:



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First Secretary of Embassy



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