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APR 18 1958

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Your letter of September 27, 1957, transmitting instructions to the United States Delegation to the first session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency requested, in paragraph 12, the submission of an official report covering the work of the Delegation and the final actions taken.

Pursuant to that request, there is enclosed the official report of the United States Delegation together with a confidential report with additional classified information. These reports follow the outline enclosed with the instructions to the Delegation. Because of its volume, only one copy of Annex B of the report, news clippings, is submitted.

As you are aware, Mr. Strauss was present in Vienna only for the first week of the Conference, that is, from October 1 through October 5. After that time Mr. McKinney, as the Permanent United States Representative to the Agency, acted as head of the U. S. Delegation.

Very sincerely yours,

Lewis L. Strauss

Robert M. McKinney

The Honorable
John Foster Dulles,
Secretary of State.

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CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION
to
THE FIRST MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE AND
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
of the
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
October 1 - 23, 1957

OUTLINE

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Summary

When the General Conference opened on October 1, 1957, 52 of the original 80 signatory states had ratified. The US was generally relied upon by most of the Delegations present for leadership in this period of development for the Agency, although the stature of the Soviet Delegation was increased by its decision not to oppose the selection of an American Director General and to continue to play an active role in the Agency. Past controversies of the October 1956 Statute Conference were not as heatedly pursued as had been anticipated by the United States Delegation. However the issues of sovereignty versus safeguards, the composition of the Board of Governors, the relationship between the Board and the General Conference, and the participation of non-member states and other international organizations were all raised directly or reflected in positions taken on other issues, but the tone of the controversies at the Conference on these issues was generally subdued.

The Soviet Bloc attended the Conference in full strength. The Soviets were in general restrained in their political efforts and gave the impression of serious constructive work. They presented the appearance of a reasonable delegation willing to consider a compromise on certain points at issue.

India took a deep interest in the Agency as revealed by the outstanding character of its delegation and the high-level of its participation. From the point of view of the cooperation with the US, the Canadian and Brazilian Delegations were by far the most outstanding and the most competent. The Netherlands Delegation, one of the most able at the Conference, and some of the other Delegations from the smaller European states had the feeling of being left out since they could not attend closed meetings of the Board and were not treated with much consideration by the British and French. Although the British and French Delegations ultimately supported the positions the US was interested in they often raised unnecessary difficulties and obstacles that frankly gave the impression that they were not wholeheartedly interested in promoting the prospects of the Agency.

The US emerged from the Conference with its major objectives generally obtained, although many delegations felt that the US had been too insistent in pursuit of its own particular objectives. The US must continue to exercise leadership and initiative in the Agency, for example by supplying thorough technical and political staff work and by careful preparation of positions which will generate broad support. There is evidence that any default in leadership by the US will be used to advantage by the Soviet Union in an effort to attain a dominant position in the Agency.

The Delegation recommends, among other things, that the US should be prepared to develop projects in underdeveloped countries friendly to the US, contribute substantial sums to the fellowship program and an operating budget for the development of technical assistance projects, and take the initiative in working out and supporting concrete means to assure that the Agency is "in business" by the 2nd General Conference.

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I. Background

As October 1, the date for the convening of the Conference, approached the ratifications began to flow in. By the opening, 52 out of the original 80 signatories had ratified. A substantial number of Latin American and Arab countries, however, failed to ratify in time. In consequence, from the point of view of the United States the limited participation of the Latin American members was disappointing. Nonetheless, the United States Delegation was able to muster the necessary majority of votes on important political issues.

The Conference itself was well attended, and almost every country which had ratified was represented. The excellent preparations of the Preparatory Commission and the able assistance of a dedicated Secretariat, together with the Austrian efforts, contributed to the good atmosphere in which the Conference set to work. A further factor making for harmony was the general desire of the member Governments to see the Agency established as an effective operating organization with functions of unique importance and to avoid a showdown fight on any issue. However, the stalled disarmament negotiations, the developments in Syria and the anniversary of the Hungarian uprising and the Suez Canal crisis provided a grim backdrop, which was always present in the minds of the Delegates.

Although the United States was recognized throughout the Conference as the government which had conceived and nurtured the Agency, the treatment by the world press of the Little Rock affair, the decline of the American securities market, and the launching of Sputnik somewhat detracted from United States primacy. The immediate potentialities of atomic energy were now being assessed throughout the world and within the United Nations with some skepticism, and the role of the Agency versus other approaches to international cooperation in the atomic field was undefined. Thus, the climate, at the opening of the Conference, was less favorable than that in which President Eisenhower first presented the concept of the Agency in his "Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations in December 1953.

There was obvious concern among Delegates over the possibility of an uncooperative Soviet attitude toward the Agency as a consequence of the election of an American as Director General. As the Conference opened the Soviets made evident their intention to accept as inevitable the selection of the American candidate and thus gave the appearance, at the outset at least, of preparedness to be more cooperative in the Agency than in other international organizations. The cooperative attitude gave rise to rumors that the Soviets might make a dramatic offer to the Agency which would overshadow the United States offer and leadership in the Agency. However, no such offer materialized.

Irritations arose in the course of the Conference. For example, the Statute was so drafted as to require the convening of a Regular Session, immediately followed by the meeting of the Board of Governors to act on the recommendations of the Preparatory Commission, and then a Special Session. This meant that 36 Delegations to the Conference found themselves largely idle and uninformed, while awaiting decisions taken by the Board in closed meetings. This situation was not only costly to governments but frustrating to the delegates who could not follow the proceedings. The selection of an American as Director General resulted in sensitivity on the part of some delegations with regard to other US objectives, particularly where these objectives appeared unduly inflexible from their point of view.

Nevertheless, the inspired concept of the Agency, the record of the Statute negotiations and the record of the Preparatory Commission (in which all decisions had been taken without vote) enlisted the efforts of all Delegations to support the Agency and to bring the work of the Conference to a successful conclusion.

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II. Issues which arose

The past controversies of the Statute Conference were not as heatedly pursued as had been anticipated by the United States Delegation. As expected, the issues of sovereignty versus safeguards, the composition of the Board, the powers of the Board versus those of the Conference, and the participation of non-Member States were all raised directly or reflected in positions taken on other issues. But the tone of the controversies of the Conference on these issues was subdued, possibly due to a conclusion that vigorous pressing of these matters in this forum at this time would not succeed and might indeed prejudice the outcome of future discussions.

The issue most strongly pressed was the question of Chinese representation and the participation of non-Member States. The Soviets adhered to an informal undertaking to refrain from making use of the propaganda possibilities of the opening day to parade this issue before the television and radio public of the world. Thereafter, however, the Soviet Bloc raised the issue in the First Session of the General Conference, in the Legal and Administrative Committee, and in the Plenary of the Special Session. They were defeated by overwhelming votes, which were larger than they expected compared to similar votes in other international forums. Their subsequent action, although persistently pursued, appeared largely dictated by a need to make a record.

The sovereignty versus safeguards controversy emerged in comments of the Soviet Bloc and Indian delegates on the work program and brought replies in support of the Statute provisions from the US, Canada, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia, Norway, and others. No effort was made to put any aspect of this question to a vote, however, and the Statute and the PRECO report provisions on this question remained unimpaired.

The question of the powers of the Board of Governors versus those of the Conference did not arise directly. However, the Netherlands Delegation made specific reference to the possible future necessity for clarification of the Statute on this point. The Dutch did, however, raise the question of permitting non-Board members to send observers to Board meetings. They were supported by Austria, Greece, Denmark, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Argentina, and Ceylon, in urging that the Board of Governors give consideration to this problem. The frustrated feeling of non-participation and irritation on the part of the Dutch and other Western Europeans non-Board members was heightened by the behavior of the British and French delegations. These two Delegations did little to keep the Western European Members informed of the action of the Board or of the reasons behind these actions. They expected the Western European Members to take instructions from them on issues which arose in the Conference and tried to channel all contacts with the United States, Canadian, and Latin American Delegations through the United Kingdom and French Members of the Board.

The Scandinavian and Netherlands Delegation rebelled strongly against these maneuvers. Due in part to the good relationship which the United States delegation had established with them, these delegations looked to the American delegation for leadership as well as information and advice. This paid dividends, since the Netherlands, Norwegian, and Danish Delegations vigorously defended positions taken by the United States, sometimes spontaneously and almost invariably in response to appeals.

However, this controversy foreshadows a continued latent conflict over the powers of the Board and the General Conference. It may well find expression in future issues which the United States may find difficult to handle. Even though the Board of Governors has agreed that each Member not belonging to the Board may send one observer to Board meetings and may receive agenda of the

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meetings

meetings, final summary records and a monthly report of actions taken, some Delegations are continuing to adopt a "wait and see" attitude. The Netherlands delegation indicated it will pay its assessed contribution but will see how the Agency develops and what the role of Members not on the Board will be before it makes any voluntary contributions.

Many members would have preferred a Director General from a neutral country and up until the beginning of the Conference they were uneasy over the prospect of an open conflict between the Soviets and the United States on this issue. They expressed anxiety that such a development would interject into the Agency cold war attitudes, or would result in minimum Soviet participation, or extreme Soviet demands for other key positions. The Soviet decision not to oppose Mr. Cole's election was generally greeted as a statesmanlike act. Many friends of the United States praised the Soviets and the latter gathered considerable credit for themselves. The Soviets indicated that they may seek the appointment of a Soviet national to succeed Cole and they will be in a better position to achieve this end since they accepted an American Director General initially. By giving in to the inevitable they gained a reputation for cooperative effort to maintain the friendly atmosphere which had existed during the Statute Conference and the Preparatory Commission.

On one issue the Delegation did not obtain acceptance of the United States position, although it was successful in forestalling a final decision by the Conference. This was with respect to invitations to specific inter-governmental organizations to attend the Conference as observers. The issue arose initially in the Preparatory Commission when the Soviets proposed that the three organizations mentioned in paragraph 28 of the report of the Preparatory Commission be invited to send observers to the First General Conference. The organizations involved were CERN, the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in the Soviet Union, of which Communist China is a member, and the Nordic Institute for Theoretical Studies of Nuclear Research. Since the OEEC had requested an invitation, it was also added to the list. In line with instructions from the Department, the United States delegation to the Preparatory Commission sought the exclusion of the Joint Institute by proposing that none of the organizations in question be invited. There was no sympathy for the United States position, however, even among those customarily considered the United States' staunchest supporters and as defeat was certain and no vote had been taken in the Preparatory Commission on any other matter, the Delegation did not press this issue to a vote.

The issue arose again during the General Conference when the Soviets and Czechoslovaks in the Legal and Administrative Commission introduced a resolution granting permanent observer status to the first three organizations mentioned above and inviting them to the Second General Conference. The United States Delegation was able to defeat this proposal on the ground that it was too early to grant a permanent observer status to any organization and this question, as well as that of invitations to the Second General Conference, was left to the Board of Governors to decide. In voting against the invitation to these organizations, such states as Canada, the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the Vatican clearly stated that at an appropriate time they would not oppose extending invitations to these organizations as they had a legitimate interest in the work of the Agency. Time and again reference was made to the fact that these three organizations had been invited to the First General Conference.

Thus the United States delegation was able to postpone final action on observer status for these organizations, and it will be left to the Board of Governors to draw up rules for the participation of observers of inter-governmental organizations at forthcoming meetings of the General Conferences and to invite appropriate organizations to the Second General Conference.

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It was clear to the United States delegation that it would have been contraproductive to advance the proposal that organizations may be granted observer status only if they are represented by "nationals, of States members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies,". A further opportunity to introduce this qualification will arise when the rules and regulations for participation of inter-governmental organizations are discussed in the Board.

However, in discussions with other friendly Delegations it was obvious that, unless a great deal of diplomatic pressure is exerted, it will not be possible to deny observer status to the three organizations mentioned in the Preparatory Commission report. Moreover, the concept of specifying the nationality of a representative of an inter-governmental organization is considered by most Delegations as a dangerous and unwise precedent and might not produce the result desired by the US i.e., the exclusion of the Joint Institute. In the history of international organizations this concept has never before been accepted.

The entire problem of inter-governmental organizations and their relationship to the Agency will have to be carefully evaluated prior to future discussions in the Board. The organizations mentioned in the Preparatory Commission report are legitimate scientific organizations. There will be others. It is generally accepted that the Agency can benefit from the technical information such organizations can supply. A point which merits consideration is whether it is in the best interest of the United States and the Agency to attempt to cut off this source of information. If the United States attempts to ~~keep out~~ only the Joint Institute, it will be considered by many as an introduction of cold war issues into a body which they wish to see have a technical character only. In consequence if the United States decides to press this position in the Board it will probably be necessary to seek support on a straight political basis.

III. Positions

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III. Positions of other countries

The Soviet Bloc attended the Conference in full strength. The USSR and Czechoslovakia were obviously the leaders with none of the other Delegations, with the possible exception of Poland, taking any initiative or deviating from the Party line. Ambassador Winkler, the head of the Czechoslovak Delegation, was one of the more competent representatives attending the Conference due in part to his knowledge of procedural matters and of the work of the Preparatory Commission. As Chairman of the Board of Governors, he conducted its meetings with skill. He sometimes attempted to shape Board conclusions in the interest of the Soviet Bloc. On the other hand, he sometimes passed over opportunities to cause the United States trouble when he could readily have done so without noticeably trespassing the bounds of propriety for the conduct of his office.

In general, the Soviets were restrained in their political efforts and gave the impression of serious constructive work designed to contribute to the creation of a successfully functioning technical body. They presented the appearance of a reasonable Delegation willing to consider compromise on many points at issue. They were cooperative from time to time with the United States in working out solutions and supported the original organizational chart for the Agency staff presented by the United States for the Board's consideration.

The Soviet delegation was headed by Professor Emelyanov whose apparent status in the Soviet hierarchy, faithful attendance, and appearance of earnest intent at the Conference conveyed an impression that the Soviet Union is willing to contribute scientific talent to the success of the Agency. Emelyanov and his deputy Zamyatin, both exhibited the capacity and skill resulting from extensive experience in international negotiation as well as technical background. The Russian delegation's technical capacities, backed with the evident ability of the Soviet Union to contribute significantly to the success of the Agency should it choose to do so, constitutes a formidable potential basis for seizure of leadership of the Agency.

The Yugoslav Delegation was headed by Franc Kos, who, although supporting the Soviet line on all political issues, took no active part in these debates but merely voted with them. In conversations with Members of the United States Delegation, Mr. Kos was frank and outspokenly critical and distrustful of the Soviets. The Yugoslavs have real hopes for the future of the Agency and desire to get assistance from the Agency. They have made an offer for the training of a limited number of technicians and have offered to undertake a limited amount of nuclear research on behalf of the Agency.

The Egyptian Delegation and particularly Mr. Fahmy in the Board of Governors frequently supported the Soviets against the United States. However, he sometimes departed from the Soviet position and at other times even opposed it or cooperated with the United States Delegation in advancing a common proposal or working out a compromise on a disputed issue. Mr. Fahmy took an active part in the debates and used his position as Chairman of the Administrative and Legal Committee and as a Member of the Board of Governors to interject his own ideas and positions in the debate.

Although the Indonesian Delegation usually followed the Soviet line on political issues, they were not as aggressive about it as the Egyptian Delegation.

India took a deep interest in the Agency as revealed by the outstanding character of its Delegation and the high level of its participation. India's representation was headed by its foremost nuclear scientist, Dr. Bhabha, and included an able member of its Foreign Service, Dr. Rajan

Dr. Rajan. One of these two always sat for India on the Board of Governors. The attitude of India reflected not only expected benefits in the form of technical assistance (the early possibilities of which it appeared to overestimate), but also the force of the Agency as a concept. The positions taken typified those, as might have been expected, of an Asian neutral and underdeveloped country. They were presented with force, brilliance and serious purpose by perhaps the most articulate of all the participants. Having come prepared to give the Agency their country's full support, the Indians experienced frustration when they failed to receive the Presidency of the Conference for Bhabha, or any commitment of support for an Indian candidate for a second-line position on the Agency staff. This frustration, together with their disgruntlement at the drive of the United States to accomplish its objectives, was expressed in polite but tart comment on some of the United States proposals and on the selection of the Director General.

From the point of view of cooperation with the United States Delegation, the Canadian, and Brazilian were by far the most outstanding and the most competent. The Canadian Delegation was led by Ambassador Max Wershof, who never failed to come to the assistance of the United States. The Canadians appear to be one of the Delegations most interested in the success of the Agency. They have offered unlimited quantities of uranium. Ambassador Wershof spoke forcefully and effectively on the United States behalf and led the argument against the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia when they tried to open the membership of the Agency to all States whether or not Members of the United Nations or specialized agencies. His outstanding ability and effectiveness, his friendliness, and complete understanding of the United States position made him the staunchest ally of the United States in the Conference and on the Board of Governors.

The Brazilian Delegation was equally as friendly to the United States and supported the US positions. Ambassador Muniz, as always, was an excellent Chairman of the Program and Budget Committee. Mr. Bernardez, who was Chairman of the PRECO, was invaluable in assisting the United States with his knowledge of the proceedings of the PRECO. Although the Brazilian Delegation took the initiative in coordinating the views of the other Latin American delegations, especially on the subject of slates (selection of officers and election of members to the Board), a well organized regional caucus did not develop.

It should be mentioned that several delegations at the Conference relied heavily on the guidance of the United States delegation for their positions and, as a matter of fact, in some cases the Delegation had only to tell them which way to vote on each item as it came up. Three of the Delegations, those of Turkey, Korea and China, asked to be contacted periodically to be kept informed of the forthcoming issues and the position the United States would take. Of these three, the Turkish Delegation proved to be the most articulate and valuable in promoting joint positions. The Delegation of Portugal was also very cooperative and responsive to consultation with the United States Delegation.

The Netherlands Delegation was one of the ablest at the Conference. Because of this they were also one of the most disgruntled when they had to sit and wait for the Board of Governors to take action before the Conference could consider the Preparatory Commission recommendations. Their irritation was increased when told they should not introduce their amendments or proposals because the language presented was a result of compromises reached in the closed meetings of the Board of Governors or the

PRECO to which they had not been a party. They were further disturbed when the United Kingdom and France indicated that the Dutch contacts with the United States should be through the United Kingdom or French Members of the Board of Governors. The United States was able to step into this situation and the Dutch were grateful for it. They are not, however, going to recommend that their Government make any contribution to the Agency's fellowship program for the first year until they have a better idea of the way the Agency will develop. They do not have any candidates for top-level positions in the Agency nor are they seeking to find any. They have put forward the names of some junior officers for administrative and financial positions, but they are not pressing their candidatures.

The majority of other Members supported United States positions along the same lines as is generally followed in the United Nations. Most Members evidenced an interest and a desire for the success of the Agency and the development of a sound, constructive program. The scientific members of all Delegations were disappointed over the lack of technical discussions and the tendency to concentrate on procedural and organizational matters. Dr. Randers of Norway particularly deplored this lack and it is possible that his proposal for a scientific committee was prompted as a consequence.

Although the United Kingdom and French Delegations ultimately supported the positions the United States was interested in, they often raised unnecessary difficulties and obstacles. Because of the tactics of the delegations of the United Kingdom and France with respect to the issue of the admission of observers from Member States to the Board of Governors and the undiplomatic method of dealing with the Western European Members, there were times when it appeared that the United Kingdom and France lacked a serious interest in the success of the Conference. They contributed to the Dutch reaction of pressing for the admission of observers to the Board of Governors. They frequently left the impression that they were reluctant to see the Agency embark on any activities which might adversely affect other parts of their atomic energy programs. For example, the French made it clear that their major efforts would be directed towards Euratom rather than the Agency. It appeared that the United Kingdom policy was to keep British technical manpower at home, and instead to seek the appointment of one of their nationals as Deputy Director General for Administration in order to have effective working control of the Agency.

IV. The United States negotiating situation and future course of action

The United States emerged from the Conference with its major objectives generally attained. Some Delegations considered that the United States pressed too strongly to realize some of its own particular objectives. This created some feelings of disgruntlement which were expressed through thrusts in debate of the Board at the United States Delegation and the American Director General.

However, it is believed that this effect can be remedied in the future by careful efforts to take perceptive account of sensitivities of these countries and to maintain with them an active consultative relationship based on a give-and-take exchange of views. Their good will should be cultivated with sympathy and attentiveness both in negotiations and in informal exchanges. It is hoped our task will henceforth be less difficult in that the United States representative will not be called upon again to press for so many major American objectives at one time.

The United States can thus continue to exercise the leadership and initiative it has already shown since 1954 in the genesis of the Agency. Because of the predominant role played by the United States other countries have come to expect this leadership. They often have not had the opportunity to develop carefully prepared positions and have lacked the technical background for doing so. They have had all the more reason, therefore, to follow the guidance of the United States. It is imperative for the United States, both from Washington and Vienna, to fill these needs by supplying the leadership desired through thorough technical and political staff work, and careful preparation of positions which in the future must be largely based on sound analysis of the prospects for effective Agency action in various directions in the atomic energy field.

If there is any default in this leadership, there is evidence that the Soviets will be ready to take it over. They have indicated that their representation to the Agency will consist of a relatively large group of political, economic, scientific and technical officers so that they will be ready to make concrete proposals and to review those of other Missions and of the Agency staff. The Soviet attitude so far revealed suggests that the Soviets desire to see that the Agency operates as a successful technical body in which they can gain influence with other countries by displaying to advantage their own scientific attainments and technological advances. It may be assumed then that they desire to play a dominant part whenever the opportunity presents itself.

From the negotiating situation set forth above the following specific recommendations emerge as to our future course of action.

- 1) The United States should face the possibility that the USSR may help underdeveloped countries prepare projects using Russian reactors and technicians, and fuel from the Agency. These projects might be so well prepared that the Board would find them hard to reject, and, if we are to resist them, we must be able to examine them searchingly and develop a convincing case for alternative projects. Thus, the United States should be prepared to develop projects in the underdeveloped countries friendly to the United States.

- 2) The United States should be prepared to contribute substantial sums to the fellowship program of the Agency and to offer a sizeable number of fellowships for study in the United States under Agency auspices.

- 3) The United States should take the initiative in working out or supporting concrete means to assure that the Agency is "in business" by the Second General Conference. Every effort should be made to see the Agency undertake

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undertake as early as possible a limited number of projects which will capture the imagination of the public and of the underdeveloped countries.

4) The United States should maintain close contact with other Member Governments, including those not on the Board of Governors, and should not rely on other Delegations to consult on our behalf.

5) The United States should be careful not to appear to be a spokesman for the Director General or an intermediary between him and other Members of the Board of Governors.

6) The United States should confine to a minimum those issues on which support has to be sought on the basis of pressure on the ground that the issue is of political importance to us and should consider modifying its position in those situations in which a convincing case for the United States stand cannot be stated in terms of promoting the objectives of the Agency.

7) The United States Delegation should keep in close touch with the Secretariat at all levels with a view to affording them a full understanding of the problems facing the United States Delegation in seeking United States approval and support of specific types of projects in different fields. In this way it is hoped that proposals which cannot be accepted by the United States may be modified or changed before they are actually presented to the Board.

8) The Department of State should take appropriate steps to stimulate ratification of the Statute by friendly powers before the 2nd General Conference in order to improve the political balance of power. Special attention should be given to increasing the number of Latin American members in order to maintain the present formula of 4 members on the Board of Governors from this area.

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National Security Archive,
Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University,
2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037,
Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu