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approval may be made final immediately after the Conference.

B. Since the United States has approached various governments in the past, especially those which are members of the IAEA Board, seeking their support on various aspects of the problem, the following detailed information may be useful:

1. In April of 1959, the Safeguards Division of the IAEA circulated, for the comments of the IAEA's Board of Governors, a proposed set of principles and procedures for IAEA safeguards. This document was long and complex and contained features which were not acceptable to various members, including the United States. In September of 1959, the Board provisionally approved a much revised and condensed version of the safeguards principles. The Board requested that a set of procedures implementing the principles should be drafted by the IAEA Secretariat. These draft procedures were considered by the Board at its January 1960 meeting. At this meeting, the technical basis for the procedures prepared by the Secretariat and the previously approved principles came under particularly heavy criticism from the Soviet Bloc and neutral countries.^{1/}

In addition, many other countries submitted extensive amendments to the draft procedures. Consequently, the Board decided to refer the whole problem to a technical drafting committee under the chairmanship of Professor Gunnar Randers of Norway.

^{1/} In opposing draft safeguards documents during the Board discussions, Soviet Bloc spokesmen have followed the general line that the proposed Agency safeguards system (a) is too onerous and detailed and rests on a questionable scientific basis; (b) is discriminating in that it would apply only to the less-developed countries, i.e., the atomic "have-not" countries; and (c) should consist merely of safeguards measures developed for each Agency project on a case-by-case basis.

India has followed much the same line, while professing its willingness to adhere to a safeguards system which has universal non-discriminatory application to all countries. India has also maintained that safeguards on nuclear source materials and equipment are not necessary since these are now normal articles of commerce. The UAR and certain other countries of the Afro-Asian bloc have tended to follow the Indian lead in this regard or remain silent during Board discussions.

2. The drafting

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2. The drafting committee included technical representatives from Brazil, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was instructed to simplify and combine into one document the previously approved principles and the amended procedures. In February, the committee met in Vienna and prepared a draft document in accordance with its instructions. This document was considered at the crucial March-April Board of Governors Meeting, provisionally approved as finally amended, issued as GC(IV)/108, and referred to the General Conference as mentioned above. It is in general accordance with the United States safeguards position.

3. The United States strongly supports document GC(IV)/108, which represents the results of exhaustive consideration in the Board, as well as at the technical level, and reflects a realistic balance of technical and political considerations. Although the document was developed by the Board of Governors and the great majority of the IAEA members who will attend the General Conference have not participated actively in its preparation, all member countries have had the opportunity to review successive drafts during the period of the Board's consideration of this document. Therefore, the United States strongly hopes that, in order to achieve definitive action on this important problem at the General Conference, other member states will join us in seeking to avoid a recapitulation of the Board discussions by reopening each paragraph of the document to substantive debate.

As further background, a summary of the salient features of GC(IV)/108 is enclosed (Enclosure 1).

II. Action Required

In view of our intent to actively support this document at the General Conference in September, we will be initiating discussions with various IAEA member governments with the object of making clear the significance and need for IAEA approval of these principles and procedures. It is anticipated that the United States will be joined by other free world proponents of safeguards in approaching various IAEA member governments.

Addressee Missions are, therefore, requested:

a. To become thoroughly familiar with the contents of GC(IV)/108;

b. To address

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b. To address to the Department any questions on this document, or on safeguards in general, not later than July 1, in order that the Department may reply well in advance of the Conference;

c. To report any significant inquiries received on this subject; and

d. Not to initiate any formal discussions on this subject with representatives of the governments to which accredited at this time. Further specific instructions on this matter will follow at a later date.

*Countries on the IAEA Board of Governors voting for provisional approval of IAEA safeguards document at March/April 1960 Board Meeting: Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United States, Venezuela, the United Kingdom.

Enclosures:

HERTER

1. Summary of IAEA Safeguards Document.

2. Copy of GC(IV)/108. *with Action Copy*

CC: The American Embassy, OTTAWA
The American Embassy, PARIS
The American Embassy, CANBERRA
The American Embassy, LONDON
The American Embassy, CAIRO
The American Embassy, CAPETOWN
IAEA Mission, VIENNA (Enclosure 1 only)

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ENCLOSURE 1

SUMMARY OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS DOCUMENT

The following is a summary of GC(IV)/108 with reference to the paragraph numbers in that document:

A. The proposed IAEA safeguards principles and procedures seek to prevent nuclear materials and equipment from being used in such a way as to further any military purpose in the following three situations: (Paragraph 1)

- a. when the IAEA supplies the assistance;
- b. when the IAEA is requested to administer safeguards for bilateral or multilateral agreements; and
- c. when the IAEA is requested to apply safeguards to a State's own activities.

B. The scope of the principles and procedures covers the requirements anticipated by the IAEA in the immediate future and relates only to: (Paragraph 4)

- a. research, test, and power reactors with less than 100 thermal megawatts output;
- b. the source and special fissionable materials used and produced in these reactors; and
- c. small research and development facilities.

C. Throughout GC(IV)/108 an important distinction is made between "attachment" and "application" of safeguards. (Paragraphs 21 and 22). "Attachment" means the requirement to apply appropriate procedures. "Application" is the implementation of those procedures.

D. IAEA safeguards will be applied to the various types of nuclear material supplied by the IAEA when the quantity of that material subject to IAEA consideration in the State exceeds (Paragraph 33):

- a. two metric tons of uranium with a Uranium 235 (isotope) content between 0.5 and 1.0 per cent, or an equivalent amount of more highly enriched uranium corresponding to 200 grams of pure Uranium 235, Uranium 233, or plutonium (a formula for deriving

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deriving equivalent amounts of uranium of various enrichments is used, see appendix);

b. four metric tons of depleted uranium with a Uranium 235 content of less than 0.5 per cent; or

c. four metric tons of thorium.

Safeguards will be applied in only a nominal manner when the quantities are between 2 and 10 metric tons of natural uranium or its enriched equivalent, 4 and 20 metric tons of depleted uranium, or 4 and 20 metric tons of thorium.

E. IAEA safeguards will be applicable to nuclear materials produced, processed, or used in nuclear facilities or materials which are subject to IAEA safeguards. IAEA safeguards will also be applicable to all special nuclear material produced in a reactor to which IAEA safeguards are not applicable but which contains nuclear material to which IAEA safeguards are applicable, if such material permits the reactor to operate at more than 200¹/₁ per cent of the power at which it could operate without such material. (Paragraphs 26, 30, 34, 35, 36)

F. IAEA safeguards will be applicable to nuclear facilities supplied or substantially assisted by the IAEA. Reactors not fueled with IAEA supplied nuclear material, which, after an inspection at initial criticality, are assessed by the Board to have a maximum calculated power for continuous operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts, shall be exempted from safeguards provided that the total such power of reactors thus exempted in any State may not exceed 6 thermal megawatts.² (Paragraphs 27, 31, 37)

G. IAEA safeguards will be applicable to non-nuclear material and equipment supplied by the IAEA if it can substantially assist a nuclear facility or further a military purpose. (Paragraphs 27, 32, 38)

H. The IAEA safeguards principles and procedures provide for the review of the design of existing facilities and those which are planned or being constructed which will become subject to IAEA safeguards. The purpose of such a review is to determine whether the facility will further any military purpose and if it will permit effective IAEA safeguards.

I. A provision

¹/₁ United States position favored 150 per cent.

²/₂ United States position favored placing all reactors under at least nominal safeguards with no exemption.

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I. A provision is made for records and reports which will be worked out in detail for specific facilities with a State receiving substantial assistance. Special reports are required in case of incidents involving possible loss of material. Reports are also required whenever significant changes are made in inventories of equipment subject to safeguards. The minimum routine report frequency for reactor facilities will be twice a year. (Paragraphs 41, 45-54, 63)

J. Special inspections are permitted in cases of possible material or equipment losses or changes in inventories or equipment which are reported as mentioned above. Routine inspections will be made at a maximum frequency provided by a technical evaluation of the significance of the quantity, enrichment and type of the material provided, or the special nuclear material production potential of the facility provided. These inspections will normally include verification of amounts of material by physical inspection, measurement sampling, auditing reports and records, and examining facilities. (Paragraphs 55-60, 64-66)

K. Nominal safeguards for less significant assistance will require only one annual routine report, no routine inspections, and special reports and inspections as necessary. (Paragraph 61)

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