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DOD - Wolfowitz
Ford

PAGE 01 OF 06 SEUL 11536 00 OF 02 290730Z C08/11 021620 H03486
INFO: SS (10) SWO (01)

----- 29/0751Z A2 JL (TOTAL COPIES: 011)
SUBJ: MEETING WITH KIM CHONG WHI
////REPEATED TOSEC BY SSO////
////NOT/NOT PASSED TO U/S WOLFOWITZ BY SSO////

REDACT STATE
EQUITIES AS
SHOWN 25X6;
requires DOD review

DECLASSIFIED BY DASD(NM)
DOS, OUSO(P)
DATE 04OCT2017
FOIA CASE # 12-F-1306

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13-m-4328

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000W

-----A5CA42 290735Z /10 38

O 290734Z OCT 91 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SEUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7118

~~SECRET~~ SEUL 11536

OCT 30 1991
cf: ISA
PP

NODIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

PASS TO UNDER SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ

~~E.O. 12356 DECL. OADR~~

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MNUC, KS, KN, US
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH KIM CHONG WHI

1. ~~SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. SUMMARY: IN AN HOUR-LONG MEETING, KIM CHONG WHI SPOKE ABOUT KOREA'S PLAN TO MOVE FORWARD WITH AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS NUCLEAR POLICY POSSIBLY PRIOR TO SECRETARY CHENEY'S VISIT; NORTH KOREA'S DILEMMA AND THE NEED FOR CONTINUED PRESSURE; HIS STRONG OPPOSITION TO A HIGH LEVEL US-NORTH KOREA MEETING IN THE NEAR FUTURE; HIS HOPE THAT PAUL WOLFOWITZ CAN COME OUT TO CONTINUE CONSULTATION ON NUCLEAR MATTERS; AND ATMOSPHERICS AND ANECDOTES FROM NORTH KOREA. END SUMMARY.

3. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OVER TWO YEARS OF MEETINGS, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR KIM CHONG WHI HAD A NOTETAKER PRESENT DURING OUR 28 OCTOBER MEETING. HE WAS KIM JAE SUP, A SECONDED MOFA OFFICER WHO DEALS WITH NUCLEAR AND OTHER SENSITIVE MATTERS.

4. FOR NUCLEAR POLICY

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KIM OPENED THE MEETING BY STATING THAT THE KOREANS ARE THINKING OF MAKING A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON ROKG NUCLEAR POLICY BEFORE THE CHENEY VISIT. I ASKED IF THE TIMING FOR THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS SET. KIM SAID THAT IT WAS NOT. HE THEN REITERATED HIS HOPE THAT UNDER SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ COULD COME TO KOREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO CONTINUE THEIR CONSULTATION. LOOKING DIRECTLY AT ME, KIM SAID "WE WANT TO CONSULT WITH YOU ON THIS MATTER. DO YOU HAVE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS I RAISED WITH WOLFOWITZ IN NEW YORK?" I SAID I DID NOT. KIM THEN SPOKE OF THE



5. PYONGYANG ATMOSPHERICS

KIM STATED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE DURING THE TALKS IN THE NORTH HAD BEEN COLD AND AT TIMES BITTER. HE SAID AT ONE TIME HE HAD HAD TO BREAK UP A NEAR "SHOUTING MATCH" BETWEEN THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS. HE SAID THE KOREAS REMAIN APART ON ALMOST EVERY ISSUE OF DETAIL THAT WAS DISCUSSED, FROM TERMINOLOGY USED TO DESCRIBE THE TWO SYSTEMS; THE NAME FOR THE DOCUMENT WHICH THEY WILL NOW WORK ON; THE RATIONALE FOR CRM'S; AND METHODS OF OPENING UP MEDIA EXCHANGES THROUGH TV AND RADIO. ~~STILL~~ UNDERNEATH THEIR OBDDURACY KIM SAID HE SENSED AN EAGERNESS ON THE PART OF THE NORTH KOREANS TO ESTABLISH BETTER LINKS WITH THE WORLD. THEIR DILEMMA IS THAT IF THEY OPEN UP THEIR SYSTEM TO REACH OUT, THEIR LEGITIMACY WILL BE DESTROYED. KIM STATED HIS FEELING THAT IF "PRESSURE IS CONTINUED, NORTH KOREA CAN BE MADE TO ACCEPT A GRADUAL OPENING OF ITS SYSTEM. KIM STATED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS WERE ANXIOUS TO TALK TO HIM PRIVATELY AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WAS THE MAN WHO HAD ARRANGED PRESIDENT RON'S TALK WITH GORBACHEV. HE SENSED A TREMENDOUS FEELING OF DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SOVIET COUP HAD FAILED, THAT KIM IL SUNG HAD NOT BROUGHT ANYTHING TANGIBLE BACK

0USD(P) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); EO. 13526 § 1.4 (b)(d)
DASD(NM) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); EO. 13526 § 1.4 (d)
DOS 5 USC § 552 (b)(1);
E.O. 13526 § 3.3 (b)(6) ~~SECRET~~

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FROM CHINA, THAT THE JAPANESE HAVE NOT COME UP WITH AID AND THAT
TALKS WITH THE U.S. HAD NOT EXPANDED. KIM STATED THAT THE ECONOMY
IN THE NORTH GROWS WORSE ALL THE TIME. HIGH LEVEL OFFICERS NOW SAID
THEY WERE WALKING TO WORK TO IMPROVE THEIR HEALTH AND TO AVOID
POLLUTING THE AIR. THE REAL REASON WAS, OF COURSE, THE LACK OF GAS.
GIFTS WERE NOT EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS. KIM FELT THE
REASON WAS THAT THE NORTH KOREANS WERE FEARFUL OF THE IMPACT OF HIGH
TECH GIFTS THAT THE SOUTH KOREANS HAD BROUGHT WITH THEM ON PREVIOUS
VISITS.

6. PRESSURE ON PYONGYANG

KIM SAID TO ME THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO TIGHTEN THE SCREWS. HE THEN
ALLUDED TO A MESSAGE FROM HIS EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TALKING ABOUT THE
POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ANDERSON
AND HO JUNG IN NEW YORK. AGAIN LOOKING DIRECTLY AT ME, HE STATED
"PLEASE DON'T DO IT AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER OUR DECEMBER NORTH-SOUTH
MEETING IN SEOUL." HE URGED THAT WE SEND THROUGH OUR EXISTING
CHANNEL IN BEIJING THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO THE NORTH
KOREANS THAT THEY
MUST TALK OVER MILITARY MATTERS WITH THE SOUTH. KIM STATED THAT THE
NORTH KOREANS HAVE GOT THEIR RICE HARVESTED AND HAVE ENOUGH FOOD TO
LAST THE WINTER. HE BELIEVES THAT THE TRADITIONAL PERIOD OF SPRING
HUNGER MAY BE THE TIME WHEN THE PRESSURE CAN TAKE EFFECT TO BRING
CHANGES ABOUT. AGAIN HE SAID DIRECTLY "PLEASE DO NOT HOLD A HIGH
LEVEL MEETING AT THIS TIME."

7. TALKS IN PANMUNJOM

THE WORKING LEVEL TALKS IN PANMUNJOM WILL START IN 10-14 DAYS. FROM
THE NORTH WILL COME PAEK NAM JOON, FORMER NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR TO
POLAND; CHOI WU-JIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE PEACE AND DISARMAMENT
INSTITUTE AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO GHANA, AND MAJOR GENERAL KIM YONG
CHOL. THE ROK DELEGATION WILL BE LED BY VICE MINISTER OF UNIFICATION
SONG HAN-HO, AMBASSADOR LIM DONG WON FROM IFANS, AND LEE DONG BOK,
SPOKESMAN FOR THE TALKS, WHO IS A SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO NSP DIRECTOR
SUH.

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8. TWO-STAGE DEALINGS WITH PYONGYANG

KIM CHONG WHI SAID HE HAD HAD AN INTERESTING CONVERSATION WITH KIM JONG WOO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECTS, WHO IS SUPPOSEDLY RELATED TO KIM IL SUNG. THIS KIM SCOLDED OTHERS AND ACTED IN A SWAGGERING AND CONFIDENT MANNER. HE WAS VERY INTERESTED IN ROK/U.S. ECONOMIC COOPERATION, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT NO ECONOMIC OPENINGS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITH THE SOUTH UNTIL SOME SORT OF NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH. KIM CHONG WHI TOLD ME HE NOW BELIEVES THIS DESIRE FOR A NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT MUST BE ACCOMMODATED AND THAT IT CAN PAVE THE WAY FOR DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR MATTERS, ECONOMIC EXCHANGES, ETC. HE FEELS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD BE SIGNED BY THE SPRING. AFTER THAT HE THINKS THAT THE IMMINENT EMERGENCE OF A NEW ROK GOVERNMENT MAY DELAY THE PROSPECTS OF TALKS. KIM CHONG WHI URGED HIS NORTH KOREAN COUNTERPART TO MOVE QUICKLY IN DEALING WITH ROK TAE WOO'S CONSERVATIVE REGIME. HE DREW A PARALLEL BETWEEN ROK TAE WOO AND PRESIDENT NIXON AND RELATED TO NORTH KOREAN KIM THAT IT HAD BEEN CONSERVATIVE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS WHO HAD MADE THE GREATEST OPENINGS TO PREVIOUSLY HOSTILE COMMUNIST REGIMES.

9. KIM AGAIN URGED ME TO SEND A MESSAGE ASKING THAT UNDER SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ COME SOON TO KOREA. HE SAID "WE WANT TO CONSULT." HE STATED FLATLY THAT BAN KI MOON, WHOM HE RESPECTS VERY MUCH, CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE BLUE HOUSE OR THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND THAT HE CANNOT ACT AS A SUBSTITUTE CHANNEL.

10. [REDACTED]

I ASKED KIM IF HE HAD ANY THOUGHTS ON WHAT WOULD BE BEST IN TERMS OF THE [REDACTED] HE SAID HE HADN'T THOUGHT ABOUT IT. I TOLD HIM I HOPED THAT WE COULD BE FLEXIBLE ON THE ISSUE AND THAT HE SHOULD LET ME KNOW WHAT KOREA'S SENSE OF TIMING ON THAT ISSUE WOULD BE.

11. IN CLOSING, KIM ASKED IF WE HAD NOTED ANY SIGNIFICANT FALLOUT

DASD(NM) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(d)
DOS 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b)(6)

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FROM KIM IL SUNG'S VISIT TO CHINA. I SAID WE HAD NOT. HE ASKED TO
BE INFORMED OF ANY INSIGHTS THAT WE RECEIVE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED
CONCERN THAT THE NEW MIYAZAWA GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN CONTINUE ITS TOUGH
LINE TOWARD NORTH KOREA. I SAID WE WOULD DO ALL WE COULD TO INSURE
THAT THAT WAS THE CASE.

12. COMMENT: THIS WAS A SLIGHTLY NEW AND DIFFERENT KIM CHONG WHI.
HIS NOTETAKER WROTE FURIOUSLY ALL THOUGH THE MEETING AND KIM IS
CLEARLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, NOW BUILDING A PAPER RECORD OF OUR
CONVERSATIONS. I HOPE THAT THIS WILL NOT RESTRICT THE FRANKNESS
WITH WHICH WE HAVE TALKED. HE CLEARLY FEELS VULNERABLE ON THE
CONSULTATION ISSUE. I HOPE THAT WE CAN BE AS POSITIVE AS POSSIBLE.

THE THREAT TO ANNOUNCE A [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] BEFORE SECRETARY CHENEY'S VISIT MAY BE BLUFF TO PRESSURE US
ON CONSULTATIONS, BUT IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO CALL THEIR BLUFF, IF
WE CAN AVOID DOING SO.

GREGG

DASD(MM) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(d)

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