

1 **TITLE LXVI—STRATEGIC PRO-**  
2 **GRAMS, CYBER, AND INTEL-**  
3 **LIGENCE MATTERS**

4 **SEC. 6601. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON USE OF INTERGOVERN-**  
5 **MENTAL PERSONNEL ACT MOBILITY PRO-**  
6 **GRAM AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFOR-**  
7 **MATION TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE PROGRAM**  
8 **TO OBTAIN PERSONNEL WITH CYBER SKILLS**  
9 **AND ABILITIES FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF**  
10 **DEFENSE.**

11 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

12 *(1) the Department of Defense should fully use*  
13 *the Intergovernmental Personnel Act Mobility Pro-*  
14 *gram (IPAMP) and the Department of Defense Infor-*  
15 *mation Technology Exchange Program (ITEP) to ob-*  
16 *tain cyber personnel across the Government by*  
17 *leveraging cyber capabilities found at the State and*  
18 *local government level and in the private sector in*  
19 *order to meet the needs of the Department for cyberse-*  
20 *curity professionals; and*

21 *(2) the Department should implement at the ear-*  
22 *liest practicable date a strategy that includes policies*  
23 *and plans to fully use such programs to obtain such*  
24 *personnel for the Department.*

1 **SEC. 6602. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ESTABLISHING AN**  
2 **AWARD PROGRAM FOR THE CYBER COMMU-**  
3 **NITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.**

4 *It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense*  
5 *should consider—*

6 *(1) establishing an award program for employees*  
7 *of the Department of Defense who carry out the cyber*  
8 *missions or functions of the Department of Defense;*

9 *(2) all award options under law or policy, in-*  
10 *cluding compensation, time off, and status awards;*

11 *(3) awards based upon operational impact and*  
12 *meritorious service;*

13 *(4) providing the largest possible opportunity for*  
14 *such members or employees to earn such rewards*  
15 *without regard to type of position, grade, years of*  
16 *service, experience or past performance;*

17 *(5) individual and organization rewards; and*

18 *(6) other factors, as the Secretary considers ap-*  
19 *propriate, that would reward and provide incentive to*  
20 *cyber personnel or organizations.*

21 **SEC. 6603. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR AND RADI-**  
22 **OLOGICAL TERRORISM PREVENTION STRAT-**  
23 **EGY.**

24 *(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Energy, acting*  
25 *through the Administrator for Nuclear Security, shall enter*  
26 *into an arrangement with the National Academy of*

1 *Sciences to assess and recommend improvements to the*  
2 *strategies of the United States for preventing, countering,*  
3 *and responding to nuclear and radiological terrorism, spe-*  
4 *cifically terrorism involving the use of nuclear weapons, im-*  
5 *proved nuclear devices, or radiological dispersal or expo-*  
6 *sure devices, or the sabotage of nuclear facilities.*

7       **(b) REVIEW.**—*The assessment conducted under sub-*  
8 *section (a) shall address the adequacy of the strategies of*  
9 *the United States described in that subsection and identify*  
10 *technical, policy, and resource gaps with respect to—*

11           (1) *identifying national and international nu-*  
12 *clear and radiological terrorism risks and critical*  
13 *emerging threats;*

14           (2) *preventing state and non-state actors from*  
15 *acquiring the technologies, materials, and critical ex-*  
16 *pertise needed to mount nuclear or radiological at-*  
17 *tacks;*

18           (3) *countering efforts by state and non-state ac-*  
19 *tors to mount such attacks;*

20           (4) *responding to nuclear and radiological ter-*  
21 *rorism incidents to attribute their origin and help*  
22 *manage their consequences; and*

23           (5) *other important matters identified by the*  
24 *National Academy of Sciences that are directly rel-*  
25 *evant to those strategies.*

1       (c) *RECOMMENDATIONS.*—*The assessment conducted*  
2 *under subsection (a) shall include recommendations to the*  
3 *Secretary of Energy, Congress, and such other Federal enti-*  
4 *ties as the National Academy of Sciences considers appro-*  
5 *priate, for preventing, countering, and responding to nu-*  
6 *clear and radiological terrorism, including recommenda-*  
7 *tions for—*

8           (1) *closing technical, policy, or resource gaps;*

9           (2) *improving cooperation and appropriate inte-*  
10 *gration among Federal entities and Federal, State,*  
11 *and tribal governments;*

12           (3) *improving cooperation between the United*  
13 *States and other countries and international organi-*  
14 *zations; and*

15           (4) *other important matters identified by the*  
16 *National Academy of Sciences that are directly rel-*  
17 *evant to the strategies of the United States described*  
18 *in subsection (a).*

19       (d) *LIAISONS.*—*The Secretary of Energy, the Secretary*  
20 *of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Sec-*  
21 *retary of State, and the Director of National Intelligence*  
22 *shall appoint appropriate liaisons to the National Academy*  
23 *of Sciences with respect to supporting the timely conduct*  
24 *of the assessment required by subsection (a).*

1       (e) *ACCESS TO MATERIALS.*—*The Secretary of Energy,*  
2 *the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Secu-*  
3 *rity, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National*  
4 *Intelligence shall provide access to the National Academy*  
5 *of Sciences to materials relevant to the assessment required*  
6 *by subsection (a).*

7       (f) *CLEARANCES.*—*The Secretary of Energy and the*  
8 *Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that appro-*  
9 *priate members and staff of the National Academy of*  
10 *Sciences have the necessary clearances, obtained in an expe-*  
11 *ditated manner, to conduct the assessment required by sub-*  
12 *section (a).*

13 **SEC. 6604. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NATIONAL SPACE DE-**  
14 **FENSE CENTER.**

15       (a) *FINDINGS.*—*Congress makes the following findings:*

16           (1) *Space is a warfighting domain.*

17           (2) *Deterrence of adversaries of the United*  
18 *States, preserving the space domain, and defending*  
19 *against threats to space systems requires coordination*  
20 *across the Department of Defense, including the mili-*  
21 *tary departments, and the intelligence community.*

22       (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*  
23 *that—*

1           (1) *the National Space Defense Center is critical*  
2 *to defending and securing the space domain in order*  
3 *to protect all United States assets in space;*

4           (2) *integration between the intelligence commu-*  
5 *nity and the Department of Defense within the Na-*  
6 *tional Space Defense Center is essential to detecting,*  
7 *assessing, and reacting to evolving space threats; and*

8           (3) *the Department of Defense, including the*  
9 *military departments, and the elements of the intel-*  
10 *ligence community should seek ways to bolster inte-*  
11 *gration with respect to space threats through work at*  
12 *the National Space Defense Center.*

13       (c) *INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DEFINED.—In this sec-*  
14 *tion, the term “intelligence community” has the meaning*  
15 *given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security*  
16 *Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).*

17 **SEC. 6605. PROHIBITION ON ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY**  
18 **DEPARTMENT OR CORPS SEPARATE FROM OR**  
19 **SUBORDINATE TO THE CURRENT MILITARY**  
20 **DEPARTMENTS.**

21       *No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act*  
22 *or otherwise available for fiscal year 2018 for the Depart-*  
23 *ment of Defense may be used to establish a military depart-*  
24 *ment or corps separate from or subordinate to the current*  
25 *military departments, including a Space Corps in the De-*

1 *partment of the Air Force, or a similar such corps in any*  
2 *other military department.*

3 **SEC. 6606. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION ON IRON DOME SHORT-**  
4 **RANGE ROCKET DEFENSE SYSTEM AND**  
5 **ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE**  
6 **PROGRAM.**

7 *Paragraph (2) of section 1651(c) shall have no force*  
8 *or effect.*

9 **SEC. 6607. REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF MODERNIZATION**  
10 **AND SUSTAINMENT OF NUCLEAR TRIAD.**

11 *(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

12 *(1) On January 27, 2017, President Donald*  
13 *Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum on Re-*  
14 *building the United States Armed Forces, which em-*  
15 *phasized the need for a “modern, robust, flexible, re-*  
16 *silient, ready, and appropriately tailored” nuclear*  
17 *deterrent.*

18 *(2) On January 31, 2017, Secretary of Defense*  
19 *James Mattis issued a memorandum entitled “Imple-*  
20 *mentation Guidance for Budget Directives in the Na-*  
21 *tional Security Presidential Memorandum on Re-*  
22 *building the U.S. Armed Forces”, which called for*  
23 *“an ambitious reform agenda, which will include hor-*  
24 *izontal integration across DoD components to im-*

1     *prove efficiency and take advantage of economies of*  
2     *scale”.*

3     **(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—**

4             **(1) IN GENERAL.—***Not later than 120 days after*  
5     *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Sec-*  
6     *retary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Lo-*  
7     *gistics (or a successor in the Office of the Secretary*  
8     *of Defense with responsibility for acquisition pro-*  
9     *grams), in coordination with the Secretary of the*  
10    *Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force, shall submit*  
11    *to the congressional defense committees a report on*  
12    *the potential to achieve greater efficiency by inte-*  
13    *grating elements of acquisition programs related to*  
14    *the modernization and sustainment of the nuclear*  
15    *triad.*

16            **(2) ELEMENTS.—***The report required by para-*  
17    *graph (1) shall, at a minimum—*

18                    **(A)** *identify any opportunities for improved*  
19    *efficiency in program management, cost, and*  
20    *schedule to be created by increasing integration,*  
21    *co-location, and commonality between the stra-*  
22    *tegic deterrent programs and their systems, sub-*  
23    *systems, technologies, and engineering processes;*  
24    *and*



1           (B) identify any risks to program manage-  
2           ment, cost, and schedule, as well as mission and  
3           capability, created by the opportunities identi-  
4           fied under subparagraph (A).

5           (3) *FORM.*—The report required by paragraph  
6           (1) shall be submitted in classified form, but with an  
7           unclassified summary.

8 **SEC. 6608. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED**  
9           **STATES REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF DE-**  
10           **FENSE CRITICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS**  
11           **EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES OBTAINED FROM**  
12           **SUPPLIERS CLOSELY LINKED TO A LEADING**  
13           **CYBER-THREAT ACTOR.**

14           (a) *REPORT REQUIRED.*—Not later than 180 days  
15           after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller  
16           General of the United States shall submit to the congress-  
17           sional defense committees a report on any critical tele-  
18           communications equipment, technologies, or services ob-  
19           tained or used by the Department of Defense or its contrac-  
20           tors or subcontractors that is—

21           (1) manufactured by a foreign supplier, or a  
22           contractor or subcontractor of such supplier, that is  
23           closely linked to a leading cyber-threat actor; or

24           (2) from an entity that incorporates or utilizes  
25           information technology manufactured by a foreign

1        *supplier, or a contractor or subcontractor of such sup-*  
2        *plier, that is closely linked to a leading cyber-threat*  
3        *actor.*

4        *(b) FORM.—The report shall be submitted in unclassi-*  
5        *fied form, but may include a classified annex.*

6        *(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

7            *(1) The term “leading cyber-threat actor” means*  
8            *a country identified as a leading threat actor in*  
9            *cyberspace in the report entitled “Worldwide Threat*  
10           *Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”, dated*  
11           *May 11, 2017, and includes the People’s Republic of*  
12           *China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic*  
13           *People’s Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federa-*  
14           *tion.*

15           *(2) The term “closely linked”, with respect to a*  
16           *foreign supplier, contractor, or subcontractor and a*  
17           *leading cyber-threat actor, means the foreign supplier,*  
18           *contractor, or subcontractor—*

19                *(A) has ties to the military forces of such*  
20                *actor;*

21                *(B) has ties to the intelligence services of*  
22                *such actor;*

23                *(C) is the beneficiary of significant low in-*  
24                *terest or no-interest loans, loan forgiveness, or*  
25                *other support of such actor; or*

1                   (D) is incorporated or headquartered in the  
2                   territory of such actor.

3 **TITLE LXXVIII—MILITARY CON-**  
4 **STRUCTION AND GENERAL**  
5 **PROVISIONS**

6 **SEC. 7801. CERTIFICATION RELATED TO CERTAIN ACQUI-**  
7 **SITIONS OR LEASES OF REAL PROPERTY.**

8           Section 2662(a) of title 10, United States Code, is  
9 amended—

10           (1) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at  
11           the end and inserting the following: “, as well as the  
12           certification described in paragraph (5).”; and

13           (2) by adding at the end the following:

14           “(5) For purposes of paragraph (2), the certification  
15           described in this paragraph with respect to an acquisition  
16           or lease of real property is a certification that the Secretary  
17           concerned—

18           “(A) evaluated the feasibility of using space in  
19           property under the jurisdiction of the Department of  
20           Defense to satisfy the purposes of the acquisition or  
21           lease; and

22           “(B) determined that—

23           “(i) space in property under the jurisdic-  
24           tion of the Department of Defense is not reason-



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