



Department of State

(S012)

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 647

PAGE 01 TEGUCI 02313 082033Z

70/16
ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 7015W

026697

R 072205Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2183

RELEASE IN PART B6

UNCLAS TEGUCIGALPA 02313

DISSENT CHANNEL

CORRECTED COPY FOR GARBLED PORTIONS PARA 2 AND 3

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY B6

2. OUR POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION IN BURUNDI DURING MASSIVE MURDERING OF HUTU TRIBESMEN COULD BE A REPEAT OF REVENT EVENTS IN BANGLADESH. WE SEEM TO BE WAITING UNTIL REPORTED "SELECTIVE GENOCIDE" HAS RESULTED IN THE ELIMINATION OF ANY DISSIDENT HUTU LEADERS. SUCH DISPLAY OF TUTSI POWER MAY INDEED RESULT IN SUBSEQUENT TRANQUILITY IN BURUNDI BUT IT WOULD SEEM FOOLISH TO DISPEL THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUTU MAJORITY.

3. IF IT IS TRUE THAT WE DO NOT HAVE LEVERAGE IN BURUNDI AND WE CANNOT ALTER THE SITUATION THEN I SHOULD HOPE OUR POLICY WOULD FOLLOW THAT OF VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES WHICH SUSPENDED ASSISTANCE. SINCE WE HAVE NO AID PROGRAM, POTENTIAL ELIMINATION OF FUTURE AID RATHER THAN SUSPENSION MAY PROVIDE THE LEVERAGE. DISASTER RELIEF IS OF DUBIOUS VALUE TO THE HUTUS, AND WILL PROBABLY BE MORE BENEFICIAL TO THE CONTROLLING TUTSI GOVERNMENT. IF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WERE TO VOTE ON THE ISSUE OF SUPPORTING THE BURUNDI GOVERNMENT DURING THIS CRISIS THEY MAY WELL PREFER BREACH OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS TO AUGMENTATION OF DISASTER RELIEF.
RYANI

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

mean: pure

5013

RELEASE IN PART B6

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

July 20, 1972

DISSENT CHANNEL

Dear [redacted]

B6

After the Department received your telegram (#2313) of July 7, I consulted with the Bureau for African Affairs and other interested officers in the Department. This further response to your message outlines in some detail the Department's actions in relation to the crisis in Burundi.

As soon as the crisis in Burundi erupted on April 29, 1972, with a coordinated Hutu attempt to overthrow the Tutsi regime, the U.S. Government tried to be helpful from both the humanitarian and political points of view. In response to the initial requests from the Burundi Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services, and Caritas International, we supplied \$80,000 worth of relief supplies to help victims of the initial hostilities. We are reasonably certain that these first supplies reached the intended recipients without discrimination against any ethnic group.

On the political side, we joined with other governments represented in Burundi in an appeal to the Burundi Government to refrain from reprisals and repression against the Hutu majority. In view of the fact that we have no aid program in Burundi beyond a modest self-help program (\$35,000 in FY 72), and that traditionally the United States has been identified with the Hutus because of American missionary activity, we felt that the most effective influence on the regime to cease the repression could be exerted by other African governments. We actively pursued contacts with African leaders who are well known and respected in Burundi, such as President Mobutu of

[redacted]

American Embassy,
Tegucigalpa.

B6

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2

Zaire, President Ould Daddah of Mauritania, and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Apart from Mobutu who sent a special envoy to Burundi to urge moderation, all the other Africans appeared reluctant to interfere in what they considered an internal matter of a sovereign African state. The annual summit conference of the Organization of African Unity in June 1972 did not even discuss the problem.

As soon as it became clear that subsequent distribution of humanitarian assistance was being controlled in such a manner as to deprive the Hutus in favor of Tutsis, we suspended all consideration of providing further aid. Other organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross also suspended plans for providing assistance.

In late June, the Secretary General of the United Nations sent a mission to Burundi to determine the facts and to recommend courses of action. The mission was sent with our encouragement, and Embassy Bujumbura assisted the mission in obtaining an accurate picture of the situation despite Burundi Government efforts to the contrary. We are now awaiting the Secretary General's reaction, and are encouraging his associates to move quickly because the killing and suffering continue.

In addition to the suffering within Burundi, a serious refugee problem has developed in neighboring countries, especially along Lake Tanganyika in eastern Zaire, and in Tanzania. Most of the refugees, including many Hutu students who escaped execution squads, are in terrible condition. The Department has requested the posts in the area to focus on this problem and to make recommendations. We have urged the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to take an urgent interest in the matter, and he has agreed to send a representative to the area immediately to coordinate assistance. The Catholic Relief Services is already working there, and the Department gave that organization a grant of \$50,000 on July 14th to start the relief program going while we obtain more details.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3

I believe that from the foregoing you will agree that the U.S. Government has been doing the maximum within its limited capabilities to help the Hutus and to encourage a return to peaceful conditions.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
William I. Cargo

William I. Cargo
Director
Planning and Coordination Staff

Drafted: AF/C: HJCohen
SP/C: HJSpiro/ebd

Concurrence:

AF - Mr. Newsom

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE