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United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520



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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
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October 5, 1993

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DECL: OADR

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: T - Dr. David [initials]
FROM: PM - Robert L. Gallucci [initials]
SUBJECT: Your October 6 Lunch Meeting with Secretary Aspin and Mr. Lake

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This memo reflects our weekly effort to identify political-military and other issues that deserve Principals' attention. We have coordinated the following agenda with OSD and NSC staff. We see NATO expansion as the main issue you should address with Mr. Lake and Secretary Aspin.

ISSUES

NATO Expansion (State Lead)

We have attached a package on how to approach this issue.

Somalia (NSC Lead)

Mr. Lake will want to be briefed by you and Secretary Aspin on your consultations with Congress on Somalia.

FIREPROOFERS

Congressional Consultations on PRD-13 (NSC Lead)

Mr. Lake will likely ask about the status of congressional consultations on peacekeeping and PRD-13. Senior officials will likely consult with key committees some time in the next week.

On September 28, Doug Bennet, NSC Senior Director Dick Clarke and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Sarah Sewall briefed HFAC in an on-the-record, closed session. Although there was some tough questioning, the response was generally favorable. Lee Hamilton emphasized that Congress would have trouble

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putting U.S. combat troops under UN command and re-emphasized the importance of consultations with the Hill. At the same time, Hamilton acknowledged the difficulty of consulting "Congress" and suggested the creation of a standing Congressional consultative committee to serve as the Administration's interlocutor. Representative Tom Lantos, on the other hand, criticized our proposed guidelines for deciding whether or not to support UN peacekeeping operations, arguing that the Administration was falling into a trap by trying to impose artificial precision on an ambiguous, murky world.

Truck Sales to Iran

(NSC Lead)

Mr. Lake may ask if State has arrived at a position on the question of whether or not to permit export of trucks to Iran. You should inform him that we are still considering the matter. In May, NEA, S/CT and PM recommended that the Department oppose decontrol of truck exports, arguing that approval would send the wrong signal both to Iran and European states. Dr. Davis advised against making a final decision at that time and suggested that we would have fuller policy context for this decision after we had reached agreement with the allies on multilateral export controls for Iran, Libya and the like. Progress with the EC, Japan and Canada on this issue is being made, but tangible results are not likely until the end of the year. Talks were held in Bonn in September and re-convened in Rome this week.

Nuclear Waste Disposal at Sea

We understand that Mr. Lake will ask Secretary Aspin about DoD's policy on disposing of low level nuclear waste at sea.

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NATO SUMMIT

The United States needs to decide whether to adopt the State approach to NATO expansion, or support an approach focused on a "partnership for peace with general link to membership," as proposed by OSD. We have elaborated further the State proposal, see TAB A. At TAB B is the OSD proposal. The primary difference is over whether NATO would commit at the January NATO Summit to expansion, or simply hold out the vague possibility. Where we agree is that NATO needs to be restructured to undertake a variety of peacekeeping activities, and so the overall character of NATO's military activities will be the same, whatever our choice on NATO expansion.

Opening up the possibility of NATO membership would represent a significant change, and will require an approach which will need to be seen to provide strong support for reform in Russia as well as in the Central and East European states. Our Allies are very sensitive to any possibility that NATO expansion might come at the expense of the organization's cohesiveness or military effectiveness. They are waiting for the American view, and can be expected to follow. Eastern and allied views are described in TAB C. A strategy for managing NATO expansion with the East is at TAB D.

Your lunch provides an opportunity informally to discuss NATO's expansion. Most important now is to come to a decision, for we are losing the opportunity to lead the alliance on this issue, and to promote our goals for supporting democracy and reform in the East. We need also to begin the task of gaining support from Americans for our continued role in Europe, which the Summit will need to dramatize.

See if you can get Tony and Les to agree to your approach to NATO expansion, and to the draft NATO Declaration Language, at TAB E.

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NATO Expansion: Eastern and Allied Views

The Russian Angle

Since Yeltsin's statements in Warsaw and Prague that seemed to give a "green light" to NATO expansion, Moscow has been busy "refining" its position. Yeltsin's letter to the President reaffirmed the sovereign right of each state to join military alliances and acknowledged that post-war European history gives grounds for East European apprehensions about security. But it argued that NATO can best address these concerns by changing its overall mission, rather than by expanding its present structure. He proposed NATO's transformation or integration into a "truly pan-European security system." If a "new NATO" emerged, Russia could accept NATO expansion and perhaps become a member itself.

Yeltsin sees two advantages in this "pan-European" approach:

- o First, in Russia's view, NATO's current structure is a legacy of East-West confrontation. With the Cold War over, a new structure transcending blocs is needed if Europe is to respond to the real threat confronting it: inter-ethnic conflict and nationalist extremism.
- o Second, absent deeper changes, NATO expansion would create perceptions in Russia that NATO wanted to "contain" Russia, and thus undermine domestic support for Yeltsin's policy of integrating Russia into the West. Yeltsin argued that "not only the opposition, but also the moderates would interpret this as a neo-isolation of the country, rather than its natural integration into the Euro-Atlantic area."

Yeltsin also referred to the treaty on German reunification signed in 1990, claiming that its provision prohibiting the stationing of foreign troops in the territory of the former East Germany "excludes by its meaning the possibility of expansion of the NATO zone to the East."

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Yeltsin's sensitivity to domestic political fallout from any NATO expansion to the East will only grow in coming months as Russia prepares first for parliamentary elections and then for adoption of a new constitution and a Presidential election. While Russian voters will be moved by economic rather than security concerns, Yeltsin's entire reformist platform is based on the assumption that Russia's relations with the West have turned a corner and Cold War antagonisms have been put aside. If this assumption were called into question, NATO expansion could damage the foundation of Yeltsin's policies. This could especially be the case with two key constituencies Yeltsin will need throughout this period: the military and security services.

For all these reasons, Yeltsin would like this issue to be resolved in a manner satisfactory to Russian concerns. He has called for a "prudent, unhurried approach" with close Russian-U.S. consultation and with Russian-NATO relations given priority over those between Eastern Europe and NATO. He also suggested joint NATO-Russian security guarantees for East European states. We can expect the Russians in coming weeks to caution us that NATO expansion is one of the foreign policy issues that could -- if mishandled -- cause real trouble for Yeltsin domestically.


Ukraine and Other NIS

The reaction by other NIS states to the prospect of NATO expansion is likely to be more positive than Russia's. Ukraine, the most important of them, has repeatedly expressed an interest in joining NATO and would likely welcome NATO expansion if it enhanced the chances of its own future membership. This creates



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At least in the short run, NATO expansion to the East could




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Views of the Central and East Europeans

Recent high-level consultations by DOD's Walt Slocombe and EUR's Sandy Vershow in the Visegrad and Baltic states confirmed strong support for NATO expansion but indicated that the issue of differentiation will have to be managed with care. For example:



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The Czechs advocate what they call a realistic middle course: that NATO declare that expansion is on the agenda and lay down general criteria that even Russia could, some day, hope to meet; that NATO stress that this will be an evolutionary process in which some countries will advance more quickly than others, based on the pace of their reforms and their contribution to collective security efforts through NACC; but that there be no explicit differentiation at this time among potential members.

CEE preferences aside, the results of the recent Polish election raise the issue of whether the next government in Warsaw will pursue NATO membership as eagerly as its predecessor. Moreover, depending on its eventual composition, we will also need to consider whether a government in which

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former communists play an important -- perhaps even a leading -- role can be welcomed into a special relationship with NATO. The same issues could potentially be posed by upcoming elections in Hungary.

Views of NATO Allies

NATO Allies agree that the Summit must address expansion in some manner and that NATO should in principle be open to new members. They also strongly believe that action on expansion must not undermine NATO as a defense alliance or provoke the reemergence of a threat from the East. Our judgment is that, if we meet their concerns about keeping the defense side of the Alliance strong and not exacerbating problems in Russia and Ukraine, we can carry the Allies along with us for the approach we are now contemplating on expansion.

Secretary General Woerner, who has publicly supported a NATO opening to the East, has in the past few weeks -- following the Polish elections and the Russian "reinterpretation" of Yeltsin's Warsaw remarks -- seems to have turned more cautious. While we will hear his views directly this week when he is here, his bottom line appears to be that NATO -- the one viable security institution in Europe -- must not lose its capacity to act. In weighing the responses to his earlier public statements on expansion, Woerner has concluded it would be difficult -- perhaps impossible -- to get a positive vote in sixteen NATO parliaments to admit any new state in the near future. He now believes that a "perspective" on enlargement can come to fruition only after a few years.


The key Allies with whom we have had closest consultations share many of these concerns. Cautious about Summit action to operationalize in the short term the principle that NATO is not a "closed club," they favor linking NATO and EC/WEU membership as a way to give states in line for EC entry a "perspective" on eventual NATO membership as well. They have no answer to the point that any such linkage would defer the prospect of NATO membership until into the next century. Our talks indicate, however, that they are ready to consider seriously any new ideas that we may propose.

Public pro-expansion comments by Defense Minister Ruehe have given Germany the highest profile on membership issues. Ruehe has said that the Summit should offer a "clear perspective for membership" to the Visegrad states and consider whether NATO

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
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membership could be granted prior to EC membership. Expansion would bring "stability from outside" into unstable Eastern states and be "in the interest of Germany." But Ruehe does not speak for his government on this issue. FM Kinkel warned in a September 10 speech that the Summit "should not weaken the reformist forces in Moscow by taking unconsidered, precipitate action." Stating that Eastern states could join NATO before the EC "only if it does not open up fresh gulfs," Kinkel said NATO should intensify practical cooperation through NACC, especially in peacekeeping, and declare its readiness to reach bilateral agreements on security cooperation with states seeking to join the EC.



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In our September 24 bilateral consultations with France,



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The UK agrees that NATO must change with the strategic environment, but it wants to clarify certain issues before endorsing expansion. Discussion within the government continues, and some ministers have not been engaged. Hurd is cautious, however, and Rifkind warned in a September 22 speech

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in Moscow that the goal of NATO enlargement "must be to secure stability throughout Europe -- not to generate new areas of contention and mistrust." The possibility that expansion might "dilute" NATO's common defense, destabilize countries not at the top of the queue (especially Russia), and "import" national rivalries into NATO fora is a frequent theme in UK remarks. London favors linking NATO and WEU membership to give Eastern states in line to join the EC a "perspective" for eventual entry into NATO. It does not believe Russia or Ukraine could ever be NATO members, and thinks a special NATO relationship to them, perhaps through treaties of cooperation, is needed.

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Managing the NATO Expansion Issue with the NIS

Russian President Yeltsin sharpened the debate on NATO expansion with his late August comments expressing an understanding of Polish and Czech aspirations to join NATO. Many influential Russians from across the political spectrum are concerned about the domestic consequences of this gesture and may try to walk Yeltsin's position back. Russian officials have urged caution and dialogue, and stressed that Russia sees NATO expansion as a long-term proposition in the context of an emerging all-European security system.

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Against this backdrop, it will be essential to handle a NATO expansion initiative in a way that minimizes damaging repercussions in the NIS, especially Russia and Ukraine. We must help these countries see our initiative as a positive step for their own overall security and sense of belonging in Europe.

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We must continue to stress NATO's ongoing transformation. Today's NATO is no longer the Cold War body it was, designed to defend West from East. Rather, the Alliance is in the process of defining a broader mission of contributing to security for all Europe. The NATO of 2000 may be even further transformed.


Likewise, NATO's expansion can be framed to avoid giving NIS states, especially Russia and Ukraine, a feeling of being left out in the cold. We should project the vision of an inclusive NATO, and the membership door should be explicitly open to all NACC partner states. Whatever the prospects for Russian/Ukrainian entry into NATO in the foreseeable future, publicly accepting the principle of inclusiveness will be important in blunting the opposition of conservative, nationalistic forces in Russia and Ukraine.

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We should furthermore consider coupling our expansion initiative with special steps to improve Russia's and Ukraine's sense of security.

- o We would begin with informal consultations now, explaining to Moscow and Kiev the general outlines of what we are thinking and how it flows from an interest in enhancing security throughout Europe. Secretary Christopher is scheduled to see Foreign Ministers Kozyrev and Zlenko in during the last week of September. The Secretary's planned trip to the NIS in October offers an ideal opportunity to engage the Russians and others on this issue, and assure them that our initiative offers enhanced security for all.
- o In the run-up to the summit, we and key allies could engage Moscow and Kiev in special consultations on NATO's deliberations, akin to the 2+4 process on German unification. This arrangement would allow Russia and Ukraine to participate in the expansion process and give them confidence that expansion is not directed against them and does not threaten their interests.
- o At the summit, we would announce NATO's policy on expansion in the context of enhancing the NACC's evolution into an operational organization focused upon orchestrating peacekeeping operations. This would underscore that NATO's main military activities would, over time, become more focused on crisis management rather than defense against external threats. As the peacekeeping partnership developed, there would be joint planning activities and exercises in the East open to all NACC members, including the Russians and other NIS.



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- o NATO could exchange permanent emissaries with Moscow and Kiev. This could be accomplished by designating a "lead" NATO-member Embassy or stationing a representative from the NATO Secretariat. Russian and Ukrainian representatives might meet periodically with NATO counterparts at the level of Foreign and Defense Ministers or even at the January summit. There may be other institutional arrangements that would compensate Russia and Ukraine for not being in the first (or second) tranche of prospective members. Polish President Walesa has suggested that the G-7 might formally admit Russia. If President Clinton visits the NIS after the NATO summit, he could also provide reassurances.

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It is therefore important to find ways to bolster their sense of security, too, and prevent a perception among them that they have been excluded from the new European security architecture. This is another reason it will be critical for the summit to give greater operational meaning to the NACC.

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