

5003

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April 17, 1972

To: S/PC - Mr. Cargo

From: Jack Perry JP

Dissent: The Soviet Union and Vietnam

Through the Department's established procedure I wish to submit my strongly held views on this critical subject.

I first sought to affect policy as it was being made. On April 8 I submitted to Mr. Richard T. Davies a draft memorandum from Mr. Hillenbrand to the Secretary, covering a draft memorandum for the Secretary to send to the President. During the week I asked about my drafts, and made several efforts to have them moved forward. Unfortunately Mr. Davies had to leave for Moscow before I could speak with him again, but I believe my assumption is correct that he judged my drafts would not express considered Departmental policy. I of course accept this as proper, but it is for this reason that I turn to the dissent channel. It is my conviction that profound American interests are being jeopardized by our present course in Vietnam insofar as it relates to the USSR. I wish to seek to affect our present policy in any way open to me. As a loyal Foreign Service Officer, I do not believe in leaking or in public dissent, but I do hope my views will be given due consideration.

A word about my credentials for commenting: I began studying Soviet affairs in 1951, have been in Soviet affairs continuously in the Foreign Service since 1959, served in Moscow from 1962 to 1964, and worked on the Soviet side of the Vietnam talks in Paris under both Harriman and Lodge from May 1968 to July 1969. I am now on the Soviet Desk.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND VIETNAM

I will argue in this paper that the present U.S. course of action towards Vietnam places the Moscow summit in jeopardy and endangers American interests of far greater importance than the current military situation in Vietnam.

Keeping the Soviet perspective in mind, the following are the key developments leading to the present Vietnam situation:

(1) Out of the long history of the war, three fundamental facts stand out. First, the Soviet Union has always been committed to the DRV as a socialist ally. Second, the bombing of the DRV, launched when Kosygin was in Hanoi, always put the USSR in an acutely embarrassing situation, especially in the competition with Peking. Third, against Chinese wishes the Soviets worked to get the DRV and NLF to negotiate in Paris. Our policy of "Vietnamization" apparently looked to the Soviets like a turning of our backs on the Paris talks as a serious negotiating channel.

(2) Most recently, the President's trip to Peking exacerbated the USSR's problems in dealing with Hanoi. Competing with the PRC for influence, the Soviets condemned the PRC for ignoring or even betraying the Vietnamese cause. The continuation of Soviet aid to Hanoi was essential in the Sino-Soviet context, although there are strong indications that the USSR refused to give all that Hanoi wanted.

(3) Our new position on the Paris talks, taken by Hanoi to be a boycott, put Moscow--the advocate of the talks--in a weaker arguing position in Hanoi. The approach of the Moscow summit made it harder for the Soviets to show weakness in supporting Hanoi.

(4) The weight of the evidence strongly argues that Moscow did not encourage the present DRV offensive, but was in no position to dissuade Hanoi from launching it. Moscow was obligated to provide aid and express some support. Backing away from military aid commitments was a policy the Politburo could not have agreed on.

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At present our public signals to Moscow, followed by the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi, have put the Soviets in an acutely embarrassing position. In my opinion, we should not imagine that because of our opening to China we have the Soviets in a position of weakness from which they cannot afford to react to our moves. Almost the opposite is more likely true. Unless they are to look weak--to the world, and to each other within the Politburo--they will be forced to react. The potential loss for American interests, I believe, is much more serious than any loss we could suffer now in Vietnam.

I believe the Soviets see their own situation at present as follows: Their aid commitment to the DRV cannot be reneged upon. The Soviets do not control Hanoi. They must demonstrate loyalty, must work out their arms delivery policy from a poor negotiating position, and cannot impose political or military advice. In the absence of Paris negotiations or any move back towards the table in Paris, their influence is lessened, and the renewed bombing exposes Moscow to charges of "complicity with imperialism" in moving towards the summit. Larger Soviet purposes dictate continued attachment to the summit, especially the desire to keep up with Peking and not promote further U.S.-PRC rapprochement; but the pressures from the Vietnam situation are more immediate and may become inexorable. Once put on the spot as Hanoi's essential ally, the Soviets must live up to the commitment as a matter of priority over most other things. Cancellation or postponement of the summit would be a probable step, and if the military situation continued bad--if the bombing escalated--then stepped-up military aid measures would have to follow. Some U.S.-Soviet negotiations now in progress might be kept going for specific purposes, but the Soviets would be likely to move towards another "freeze" in U.S.-Soviet relations. This, I repeat, is how I believe the Soviets see their situation now.

I do not know if our current policy is aimed at Moscow as well as Hanoi. I suspect the Soviets think it is, because of the President's public statements over recent days. Regardless of whether our policy is aimed at Hanoi alone or at both Hanoi and Moscow, I would argue that the risks are more important than the possible gains. We have tried bombing before and it failed to accomplish our military aims, although the political damage to the United States around the world was incalculable. Even if our bombing attains short-term military ends, I

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3

strongly believe that a long-range U.S. policy in Indochina cannot be based upon it. My own conviction is that the potential benefits of concrete improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations, of East-West relations in Europe and elsewhere, enormously outweigh the short-term military advantages we hope to gain by our present course in Vietnam.

The fact is that we cannot compel the USSR to alter its own policy towards Vietnam or Hanoi's policy on the ground, and I believe those who know Vietnam better than I do would also say that our military pressure cannot compel Hanoi to alter its tactics except over a very limited time span. And meanwhile the harm to American interests elsewhere, beginning with our Soviet relationship, can be lasting and deep.

Therefore I would plead for a cessation of U.S. statements tending to put responsibility on the Soviet Union for events in Vietnam, and would urge an avoidance of the type of bombings of the DRV which might force the Soviets to take compensatory political or military steps.



Chick Feller
Department of State

Follow up
TELEGRAM

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ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 /015 W

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R 260901Z APR 72
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2923

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BANGKOK 5767

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (RAISE CLASSIFICATION TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PER R PETERSON S/PC)

USOM BANGKOK

DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJ: STATEMENT OF OPPOSITION TO THE BOMBING OF HAIPHONG

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B6

2. WE, THE ABOVE-MENTIONED UNITED STATES FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE OFFICERS, CURRENTLY SERVING WITH THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USOM) IN THAILAND, HEREIN FORMALLY REGISTER OUR OPPOSITION TO THE RECENT MILITARY ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

3. WE HAVE CHOSEN THIS METHOD TO COMMUNICATE OUR DISAPPROVAL AS IT REPRESENTS THE SOLE OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED FORUM FOR FOREIGN SERVICE EMPLOYEES TO EXPRESS THEIR DISSENT AND BECAUSE WE CONSIDER ANY UNRESTRAINED, PUBLIC CRITICISM ON OUR PART, EITHER PERSONALLY OR THROUGH THE NEWS MEDIA, AS SERVING NO USEFUL PURPOSE. EVERY CONCEIVABLE ARGUMENT FOR OR AGAINST THE WAR HAVING LONG SINCE BEEN MADE.

4. ADDITIONALLY, WE REGARD THE AIR ATTACKS AGAINST FUEL AND OTHER STORAGE

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FACILITIES AT HAIPHONG AND THE MASSING OF CONSIDERABLE AIR AND SEA FORCES IN THE AREA (PRESUMABLY TO FORESTALL FURTHER NORTH VIETNAMESE THRUSTS IN THE SOUTH) AS A BREACH OF THE SPIRIT IF NOT THE LETTER OF OUR STATED POLICY TO DISENGAGE FROM THE INDO-CHINA CONFLICT, AND AS SUCH CONSTITUTES AN ILL-TIMED, ENTIRELY IDEFENSIBLE ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES. WHETHER INITIATED AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE TO SAFEGUARD REMAINING UNITED STATES TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM OR TO BUY ADDITIONAL TIME FOR "VIETNAMIZATION," THE RETALIATORY RAIDS ON APRIL 15-16 WERE UNWARRANTED. WHAT IS MORE, THEY ARE LIKELY TO LOSE US SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS WELL AS AT HOME AND RUN THE VERY REAL RISK OF PROVOKING COUNTRIES WHICH, TILL NOW, HAVE LIMITED THEMSELVES TO MATERIAL SUPPORT OF THE NORTH.

WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE RISK OF ANY OF THESE ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES WORTH THE TEMPORARY RELIEF THE UNITED STATES IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM BY ITS ACTIONS. FURTHERMORE, WE DEPLORE THE FAILURE TO CONSIDER OTHER OPTIONS WHICH THIS ACTION REPRESENTS. WE FEEL OTHER NATIONS OF THE WORLD WILL MERELY FIND RENEWED JUSTIFICATION OF THEIR VIEW THAT THE U.S. INTEREST IN WORLD AFFAIRS IS EXPRESSED PRIMARILY IN MILITARY TERMS AND THAT WE ARE ONLY INTERESTED IN MILITARY DOMINANCE. WHILE DISAPPROVING OF UNITED STATES RESUMPTION OF BOMBING, WE IN NO WAY CONDONE THE RECENT MOVES OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO ESTABLISH ITS DOMINANCE OVER THE SOUTH THROUGH FORCE OF ARMS. RATHER, WE FEEL AND WHOLE HEARTEDLY ENDORSE THE COURSE OF ACTION THE ADMINISTRATION EMBARKED UPON IN THE 1968 WITHDRAWAL. WE APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT TO ADHERE TO THIS POLICY AT ALL COSTS.

MILITARY TRIUMPH, AT THIS JUNCTURE, IS WELL BEYOND THE GRASP OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT IS IS NOT TOO LATE TO SALVAGE PART OF THE NATIONAL PRESTIGE WE HAVE SACRIFICED IN VIETNAM OVER THE LAST DECADE. ULTIMATELY, AS THE U.S. HAS OFTEN DECLARED SINCE 1968, SOUTH VIETNAM MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRESERVING ITS NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. UNLESS OUR GOVERNMENT IS NOW PREPARED TO PUT ITS CONFIDENCE IN "VIETNAMIZATION" TO THE TEST (EVEN RISKING ITS FAILURE), U.S. INVOLVEMENT WILL REMAIN DIRECT AND OUR COMMITMENT OPEN-ENDED, NEITHER OF WHICH ARE ATTRACTIVE PROSPECTS.

WE HOLD OUR FIRM HOPE THAT THE NIXON DOCTRINE REPRESENTS A SINCERE EFFORT TO LOOK AT NEW POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE 1970'S AND TO LEAVE

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BEHIND THE NARROW, MILITARY DOMINATED OPTIONS WHICH WERE
CONSIDERED THE ONLY VALID ONES DURING THE 1960'S. IF NEW OPTIONS
ARE TO BE CONSIDERED, WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE NOT ALLOW
OURSELVES TO BE TEMPTED TO USE THE OLD AND EASILY AVAILABLE
EXPEDIENTS (AS WE DID IN THE BOMBING) UNTIL WE HAVE EXHAUSTED
ALL OTHER MEANS.
UNGE#

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3159

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y UPGRADING FM UNCLAS TO LIMITED OFFICAL USE

USOM, BANGKOK

DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJ: STATEMENT OF OPPOSITION TO THE BOMBING OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

1. PENDING ESTABLISHMENT OF AID PROCEDURES FOR DISSENT, THIS
CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED]

B6

2. (QUOTE) I, A UNITED STATES FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE OFFICER,
CURRENTLY SERVING WITH THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT (USOM) IN THAILAND, FORMALLY REGISTER MY OPPOSITION TO THE
RECENT MILITARY ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV).

3. I TAKE THIS POSITION AS I STRONGLY FEEL THAT THE BOMBING OF THE
DRV IS ADVERSE TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND CONSTITUTES
AN ANGRY AND INTEMPERATE REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES RATHER THAN
AN OBJECTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE ACT OF A GREAT NATION PROTECTING ITS
PERCEIVED INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

4. VIEWED FROM ITS VARIOUS ASPECTS OUR MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE
NORTH CAN ONLY SERVE TO AID THE DRV'S ATTEMPT TO TAKE OVER THE

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47



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SOUTH.

A. AVAILABLE EVIDENCE PERSUASIVELY INDICATES THAT BOMBING HAIPHONG AND OTHER AREAS IN THE NORTH, THOUGH BRINGING HARDSHIP AND MISERY TO THE PEOPLE, DOES NOT HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY OF THE DRV TO CONTINUE ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS OUTSIDE ITS BORDERS. RATHER IT SERVES TO BRING THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH TOGETHER AGAINST A COMMON, TANGIBLE AND IMMEDIATE ENEMY, THE UNITED STATES. THE BOMBING TENDS TO MOTIVATE THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH TO STRONGER EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THE PHYSICAL DAMAGE OF THAT BOMBING AND TO GIVE THEM ADDITIONAL REASONS TO BACK THEIR LEADERS IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO MILITARILY CONQUER THE SOUTH.

B. THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH INDIRECTLY ENCOURAGES THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE OTHER SIDE AT THE PARIS TALKS BY DIRECTLY ENCOURAGING SINCERE AND WIDESPREAD PROTESTS IN THE UNITED STATES THAT ARE INTERPRETED BY THE OTHER SIDE AS POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION. THE LACK OF AN OBJECTIVE RATIONALE FOR THE RECENT BOMBING ADDS TO THE CYNICISM IN THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING OUR DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA IN INDOCHINA. TAKEN TOGETHER THIS ADDS UP TO DECREASED DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR OUR PARIS POSITION HINDERING OUR SIDE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

C. OUR BOMBING OF THE DRV IS A CHALLENGE TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE USSR TO STAND BY THEIR ALLY, THE DRV. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD ERODE THEIR IMAGE WITH THEIR SATELLITES AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD. THIS CHALLENGE TO THE LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD IS BEST MET BY CONTINUED, IF NOT INCREASED, SUPPLIES TO THE DRV. THESE SHIPMENTS OF SUPPLIES HAVE IN THE PAST NEGATED MUCH OF THE EFFECT OUR AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE NORTH AND THE "HO CHI MINH" TRAIL. IN ALL LIKELIHOOD IT WILL DO SO AGAIN. AGAIN NOTHING IS GAINED BUT THE PROBABILITY OF A NET LOSS IS LARGE.

D. OUR ALLY, THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, IS HARDPRESSED TO REPULSE THE CURRENT COMMUNIST ASSAULT ON THEIR COUNTRY. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE RESOURCES BEING EXPENDED IN THE NORTH COULD BE PUT TO BETTER USE IN THE SOUTH TO DEFEAT THIS ASSAULT.

E. WHAT TROUBLES ME MOST ABOUT THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH IS THAT IT IS NOT THE ACTIONS ONE WOULD ATTRIBUTE TO A GREAT NATION. WITH SO LITTLE, IF ANY, EVIDENCE THAT SUCH MILITARY ACTIONS CAN HAVE A POSITIVE POLITICAL AND/OR MILITARY OUTCOME ONE MUST WONDER IF

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OUR COUNTRY HAS REACHED THE POINT THAT A MILITARY RETALIATORY REACTION IS THE ONLY WAY WE CAN RESPOND TO A CHALLENGE TO OUR INTERESTS. CERTAINLY, A GREAT NATION, IF IT IS TO REMAIN GREAT, MUST HAVE THE SELF-CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY TO ACT OBJECTIVELY AND WITH RESTRAINT. OUR POWER IS TOO GREAT FOR US TO ACT PEEVISHLY WITHOUT GIVING OUR CURRENT AND POTENTIAL FRIENDS CAUSE FOR ALARM. IF WE WANT PEOPLE TO TRUST US, AS THIS IS THE ONLY BASIS FOR TRUE FRIENDSHIP, THEN WE MUST EARN THAT TRUST BY BEHAVING AS A MATURE NATION CAPABLE OF FACING ADVERSE EVENTS WITHIN A CONFIDENT AND RATIONAL MANNER. AS I CAN SEE NO RATIONAL REASON FOR BOMBING THE DRV, I URGE A CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TO ONE PROHIBITING A U.S. MILITARY INCURSION INTO THE DRV, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE. (END QUOTE)
UNGER

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FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6756

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UNCLAS GUATEMALA 2534

DISSENT CHANNEL

REF: 3 FAM 629.1-1

1. THIS TELEGRAM TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED]

B6

2. 3 FAM 629.1-1A STATES THAT IT IS THE POLICY OF STATE THAT THE SPOUSE OF A FOREIGN SERVICE EMPLOYEE BE OR INTEND TO BE A U. S. CITIZEN. MY CANADIAN BORN WIFE [REDACTED] BECAME A U. S. CITIZEN THROUGH NATURALIZATION IN JANUARY, 1970.

B6

3. 3 FAM 629.1-1B STATES THAT AN EMPLOYEE ASSIGNED ABROAD WHO MARRIES AN ALIEN WILL BE TRANSFERRED AS QUICKLY AS FEASIBLE TO THE U. S. FOR A TOUR OF DUTY IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE SPOUSE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME BETTER ACQUAINTED WITH LIFE IN THE U. S. AND TO ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP. AS STATED ABOVE, MY WIFE HAS BEEN A U. S. CITIZEN FOR THE PAST TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS. SHE HAS SPENT ONE HOME-LEAVE PERIOD AND ONE R&R PERIOD IN THE U. S. PLUS SEVERAL PRIVATE VISITS TO THE U. S. BEFORE AND AFTER OUR MARRIAGE. SHE [REDACTED]

B6

4. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT MY WIFE HAS BEEN A U. S. CITIZEN FOR TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS AND IS ACQUAINTED WITH LIFE IN THE U. S., IT IS MY BELIEF THAT WE HAVE MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 3 FAM 629 AND A WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENT BASED UPON THIS POLICY IS NOT VALID.

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PAGE 02 GUATEM 02534 060647Z

5. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE DEPARTMENT POLICY CONCERNING
3. FAM 629 IS INCONSISTENT AND THEREFORE DISCRIMINATING IN VIEW
OF THE DEPARTMENT'S RECENT ASSIGNMENT TO MONROVIA OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO HAS A FOREIGN-BORN WIFE
WHO HAS NOT YET BEEN NATURALIZED AFTER MANY YEARS OF MARRIAGE.

B6

6. REQUEST THIS TELEGRAM ALSO BE DISTRIBUTED TO UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR COMMUNICATIONS, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
ADMINISTRATION AND CHIEF OF PERSONNEL.
BOWDLER

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DISSENT CHANNEL

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1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY

B6

2. OUR POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION IN BURUNDI DURING MASSIVE MURDERING OF HUTU TRIBESMEN COULD BE A REPEAT OF RECENT EVENTS IN BANGLADESH. WE SEEM TO BE WAITING UNTIL REPORTED "SELECTIVE GENOCIDE" HAS RESULTED IN THE ELIMINATION OF ANY DISSIDENT HUTU LEADERS. SUCH DISPLAY OF TUTSI POWER MAY INDEED RESULT IN SUBSEQUENT TRANQUILITY IN BURUNDI BUT IT WOULD SEEM FOOLISH TO DISPEL THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUTU MAJORITY.

3. IF IT IS TRUE THAT WE DO NOT HAVE LEVERAGE IN BURUNDI AND WE CANNOT ALTER THE SITUATION THEN I SHOULD HOPE OUR POLICY WOULD FOLLOW THAT OF VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES WHICH SUSPENDED ASSISTANCE. SINCE WE HAVE NO AID PROGRAM, POTENTIAL ELIMINATION OF FUTURE AID RATHER THAN SUSPENSION MAY PROVIDE THE LEVERAGE. DISASTER RELIEF IS OF DOUBIOUS VALUE TO THE HUTUS, AND WILL PROBABLY BE MORE BENEFICIAL TO THE CONTROLLING TUTSI GOVERNMENT. IF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WERE TO VOTE ON THE ISSUE OF SUPPORTING THE BURUNDI GOVERNMENT DURING THIS CRISIS THEY MAY WELL PREFER BREACH OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS TO AUGMENTATION OF DISASTER RELIEF.
RYANI

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AIRGRAM

*Per Peaslee,
Alexander L*
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FROM : Amconsul, HALIFAX

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: July 21, 1972

SUBJECT: Dissent Message: U.S. Assistance to Essentially Totalitarian Regimes: Value of Old UNRRA and China Relief Mission Approach
REF : State A-3559, April 8

DISSENT CHANNEL

This airgram transmits a dissenting view submitted by FSO-2 Alexander L. Peaslee, Principal Officer.

"As a retiring FSO with 29 years of Government service, I would like to suggest that the United States Government would in the long run ensure its security more effectively by reducing its assistance and close ties to essentially totalitarian governments. My comments are primarily directed at totalitarian governments of the right, such as Greece, Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan, and Paraguay, inasmuch as we already provide little assistance to most of the totalitarian governments of the left.

"Without going into any detail, it has been my impression that much of the aid has not been effectively used and has often gone to those individuals who already are well off. Even more unfortunately, our aid has been interpreted as approval of undemocratic regimes. We find Admiral Moorer, in his New Year's message of several years ago praising our fine ties with Brazil at the very time that the New York Times and other sources are documenting torture and methods used in preventing free expression of opinion.

"I recall that in the final days of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) assistance program and in the work of its U.S. supported successor, the China Relief Mission (CRM), those programs were quite successful in maintaining efficiency in their operations by simply cutting off aid to regions whenever corruption was noted.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

In Out

Drafted by:

ALPeaslee:mt

Contents and Classification Approved by:

ALPeaslee

Clearances:

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No public statement was made, but local officials knew why the aid had stopped. This produced good results, considering the chaos of the time on mainland China in the midst of a civil war.

"I believe that a similar approach might be usefully considered in our aid to those countries that are unrepresentative in their governments. In the long run we lose the goodwill of those who are oppressed by those governments and we gain none from the totalitarian regimes (which usually take the attitude, "What have you done for me lately?") We also lose the money.

"The people whose support we lose are usually the ones most influential in the longer run future of their country. They often turn to more extreme means of getting their way and the right wing regime leads to the later far left government. And we are seen as opportunists who do not really believe in representative government.

"One of the arguments used against such a policy is that the specific regime is vital to our national security. However, if this is true, then why encourage a swing from one extreme to the other? And, secondly, what totalitarian regime can we point to since World War II that really has been essential to our security?"

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R. B. ...', is written over the word 'CLASSIFIED'.

Declassify on August 1, 1972.

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ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 /015 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3916
INFO AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY MASERU
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

RRP

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DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR O/DG

RELEASE IN FULL

REF: (A) A-9235 (B) A-3559

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY PETER SPICER, OMC/CHARGE.

2. I STRONGLY PROTEST "ALL PARTIES" (REF A) AGREEING TO DISENFRANCHISE ME AND OTHERS IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES IN REPRESENTATION ELECTION UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11636. AFRICA AND OTHER AREAS STAFFED THROUGHOUT WITH FSO-4/3 DCISM AND PRINCIPAL OFFICERS MANY OF WHOM HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE IN ATTEMPTS ACHIEVE IMPROVEMENT SUCH AS BY SERVICE ON TASK FORCES AND IN DAILY PERFORMANCE PRESENT AND PREVIOUS POSITIONS. AGREEMENT OF DEPARTMENT TO DEFINITION THESE OFFICERS AS MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS AND CONSEQUENT EXCLUSION FROM BALLOT PRIVILEGE SEEMS IMPLY AGREEMENT WITH THESIS THAT A PROGRAM DIRECTOR IN FIELD IS IPSO FACTO A "TOOL OF MANAGEMENT" AND THEREFORE INCAPABLE OF VOTING AN INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT. THIS IS DEMEANING. IT IS ALSO DISCRIMINATING SINCE OFFICERS OF SIMILAR OR HIGHER RANKS IN LARGER POSTS OR DEPARTMENT WHO MAY BE IN SECTION CHIEF POSITIONS APPARENTLY WILL VOTE. IT IS MY FOREIGN SERVICE TOO. FINALLY I BELIEVE THAT FIELD EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS HAS BENEFITED AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO BY JUDGMENTS OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS WHO

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HAVE EARNED ASSIGNMENT TO RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS IN FIELD. I
URGE DEPARTMENT TO CONTINUE CONSIDER FRANCHISE ELIGIBILITY
QUESTION IN LIGHT VERY EXISTENCE THIS TELEGRAM. IF I
WERE TOOL OF STATE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT OBVIOUSLY I WOULD
NOT SEND IT.
SPICER

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FORM DS-1652



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JK

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APPROVED BY: S/PC-WILLIAM I. CARGO
NEA-MR. SISCO(SUBS)
NEA-MR. VAN HOLLEN
NEA/INC-MR. SCHNEIDER
S-MR. TAYLOR
S/S-MR. ELIOT
S/S-1 INFO (S/S 7200155)

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105961

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EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR AND POLCOUNS

REF: NEW DELHI 19255

VIEWS EXPRESSED IN REPTEL HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED BY SENIOR POLICY LEVEL OFFICERS IN DEPARTMENT AND DISCUSSED WITH SMALL NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS WHO ARE DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH SOUTH ASIAN POLICY. AS NOTED IN AMBASSADOR'S FORWARDING COMMENTS, NUMBER OF POINTS MENTIONED RUN COUNTER TO CURRENT US POLICY. [REDACTED] COMMENTS, HOWEVER, ARE WELL-STATEDED AND USE OF VOICE/TEXT CHANNEL APPROPRIATE. DEPARTMENT EXPRESSES ITS APPRECIATION TO AMBASSADOR AND TO STUFF FOR BOTH SUBSTANCE AND MANNER OF HANDLING ROBERS

B6

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 657

PAGE 01 ASUNCI 01499 01 OF 02 141640Z

51
ACTION SS-14

RELEASE IN PART B6

INFO: OCT-01 /015 W

104495

R. 141535Z JUN 72:
FM AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8374

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 ASUNCION 1499

DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE: NARCOTICS CONTROL

REF: (A) DEPT A-3559 OF APRIL 8; (B) ASUNCION A-54 OF
JUNE 12; (C) ASUNCION A-9 OF JANUARY 31 (COUNTRY ANALYSIS
AND STRATEGY PAPER)

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY

[REDACTED]

B6

[REDACTED] CONCURS SUBSTANCE OF MESSAGE. RECOM-
MEND THIS CABLE RECEIVE SAME DISTRIBUTION AS REF. (B).

2. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS RECOMMENDED MEASURES TO BE
TAKEN BY U.S. IN LIGHT PARAGUAYAN GOVERNMENT'S LACK
OF COMMITMENT TO COOPERATE IN NARCOTICS FIELD.
REF (B), POUCHED JUNE 12, UPDATES EMBASSY'S NARCOTICS
ACTION CONTROL PLAN. IN OUR OPINION, THIS UPDATED PLAN
SATISFACTORY AS FAR AS IT GOES, BUT LACKS SPECIFIC
RECOMMENDATIONS ON U.S. ACTIONS AND TIME FRAMES FOR
COHERENT IMPLEMENTATION. THE TIME IS LATE, AND CONCRETE
MEASURES MUST NOW SUPPLEMENT WORDS IF WE ARE EITHER TO
OBTAIN GOP COOPERATION OR BRING HOME TO GOP CONSEQUENCES
OF FAILURE TO COOPERATE.

3. BACKGROUND: LACK OF PARAGUAYAN POLITICAL COMMITMENT.
REF. (B) OUTLINES LACK OF GOP COMMITMENT, BUT WE BELIEVE
FACTS SET FORTH THEREIN SHOULD BE INTERPRETED EVEN MORE
UNFAVORABLE AGAINST GOP. ITEM: TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, GOP
HAS NOT MADE HARD DRUG ARREST ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE IN

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 ASUNCI 01499 01 OF 02 141640Z

PAST FEW YEARS. THOUGH THREE COCAINE TRAFFICKERS ARRESTED LATE MAY 1972, BASED ON INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY BNDD, GOP HAS HUSHED UP ARRESTS. THOUGH IT HAS PRIVATELY STATED INTENTION PROSECUTE EX POST FACTO UNDER TO-BE-PASSED DRUG LAW, WE BELIEVE GOP KNOWS PROSECUTION WILL FAIL ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS.

4. ITEM: SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT CONCLUSION THAT DELAY IN APPROVAL PENDING DRUG LEGISLATION IS RESULT OF INTERVENTION BY PRESIDENT STROESSNER, RATHER THAN "LOW PRIORITY" HE ASSIGNED TO PASSAGE. HAD HE WISHED, LAW WOULD BE PASSED BY NOW.

5. ITEM: EVENTUAL DEPORTATION AUGUSTE RICORD EVEN TO COOPERATING THIRD COUNTRY WOULD STILL NOT DEMONSTRATE FULL COMMITMENT TO COOPERATE WITH U.S. ON DRUG PROBLEM. EVEN IF EVENTUALLY RESULTING IN U.S. CUSTODY OF RICORD, WOULD SUGGEST TO THIRD COUNTRIES U.S. MORE INTERESTED IN "SACRIFICIAL LAMBS" FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES THAN IN OBTAINING BASIC POLITICAL COMMITMENTS TO COOPERATE IN DRUG CONTROL. IN FACT, EVEN EXTRADITION AT THIS LATE DATE WOULD SHOW PRECIOUS LITTLE COMMITMENT.

6. STROESSNER'S REFUSAL TO RECEIVE AMBASSADOR WHEN LATTER HAD RETURNED FROM CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE SPECIFICALLY TO SEE STROESSNER IS, AT VERY LEAST, SYMPTOM OF WHAT WE BELIEVE IS HIS FAILURE TO COMPREHEND SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH U.S. VIEWS TRAFFICKING, DESPITE CONSIDERABLE U.S. EFFORTS. TO DATE, HOWEVER, STROESSNER HAS HEARD ONLY WORDS FROM US. WE BELIEVE U.S. MUST GO BEYOND WORDS NOW TO ENSURE THAT STROESSNER UNDERSTANDS CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO COOPERATE AND GIVE HIM OPPORTUNITY GET MESSAGE ONE LAST TIME.

7. WE OWE STROESSNER OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO ACTS BECAUSE DURING PAST YEAR BOTH OUR WORDS AND ACTS HAVE CONVEYED MIXED SIGNALS ABOUT DEPTH OF OUR CONCERN WITH PARAGUAYAN COMMITMENT. EMBASSY OFFICERS AND SOME USG VISITORS HAVE TRIED REPEATEDLY CONVEY OUR DESIRES, BUT ONE HIGH DOD OFFICIAL INTENTIONALLY OMITTED DISCUSS DRUGS WITH STROESSNER. IN CONTRAST AMBASSADOR'S HARD-LINE APPROACH TO FOREIGN MINISTER TWO WEEKS AGO, STROESSNER

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PAGE 03 ASUNCI 01499 01 OF 02 141640Z

INVITED TO USMILGP RECEPTION THIS WEEK "TO HONOR INALTERABLE FRIENDSHIP" BETWEEN U.S.-PARAGUAYAN ARMED FORCES. MEANWHILE, OUR ACTS OVER SAME PERIOD HAVE ALMOST CERTAINLY GIVEN STROESSNER IDEA THAT ALL IS WELL: PASSAGE SUGAR QUOTA, APPROVAL AID LOANS, DELIVERY 20,000 RIFLES AND 13 HELICOPTERS EARLY 1972, AND DELIVERY TWO MAP BULLDOZERS WOTH \$90,000 LAST WEEK.

8. PHASE ONE: FIVE RECOMMENDATIONS DESIGNED TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATION REF. (C) PAGE 7 TO USE ALL MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO ELICIT A POLITICAL COMMITMENT FROM GOP BEFORE AUGUST 1, DEMONSTRATED BY CONCRETE ACTS. RECOMMENDED U.S. ACTION BEFORE JULY 1!

I. EMBASSY BE INSTRUCTED CANCEL FOURTH OF JULY RECEPTION UNLESS RICORD EXTRADITION CASE DECIDED FAVORABLY BY APPEALS COURT BY JUNE 26.

II. EMBASSY BE INSTRUCTED CONVEY FOLLOWING TO GOP THIS WEEK, EITHER INFORMALLY OR BY NOTE: A) U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PARAGUAY WAS CUT THIS YEAR, PARTLY DUE LACK OF SATISFACTORY PARAGUAYAN PERFORMANCE DRUG FIELD; B) DELIVERY 600 BAR RIFLES, TWENTY CANNON NOW ON HIGH SEAS, RIFLE AMMUNITION AND OTHER MATERIEL IN SUPPLY CHANNEL BEING DELAYED SAME REASON.

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PAGE 01 ASUNCI 01499 02 OF 02 141619Z

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ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 /015 W

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FM AMEMBASSY ASUNCIION
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8375

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 ASUNCIION 1499

DISSENT CHANNEL

III. EMBASSY BE INSTRUCTED INFORM GOP NOT LATER THAN JUNE 26 THAT AMBASSADOR WILL NOT RETURN IN EVENT RICORD EXTRADITION CASE NOT FAVORABLE RESOLVED BY THEN. RECOMMENDED ACTION BEFORE AUGUST 1!

IV. EMBASSY BE INSTRUCTED MAKE CLEAR TO GOP DURING JULY THAT UNLESS DRUG LAW PASSED, RICORD EXTRADITED, AND 1961 SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTICS AMENDMENTS SIGNED, U.S. WILL BEGIN PHASE OUT MILGP, AID ASSISTANCE, AND SALES OR GRANTS MATERIEL.

V. THAT IF DRUG LAW PASSED AND RICORD EXTRADITED DURING JULY, EMBASSY BE AUTHORIZED OFFER BNDD ADVISOR TO MINISTRY OF HEALTH FOR IMPLEMENTATION DRUG LAW, AND OFFER SHARE COSTS OF EQUIPPING POLICE NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION UNIT ALONG LINES REF. (B) PAGE 10.

9. PHASE TWO; THREE RECOMMENDATIONS DESIGNED TO EXTRACT BENEFITS FROM GOP FAILURE TO COOPERATE, BASED ON OUR ESTIMATE OF USG GLOBAL STRATEGY IN FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS AND POSITION OF PARAGUAY WITHIN STRATEGY.

10. IF PARAGUAY REMAINS UNCOOPERATIVE, U.S. INTERESTS MIGHT BEST BE SERVED BY DECISIVE STEPS AGAINST PARAGUAY, WHICH OFFERS OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE MEASURES AT MINIMUM COST TO U.S. INTERESTS AND, PERHAPS, WITH POLITICAL BENEFIT. MOREOVER, FAILURE TO TAKE MEASURES IN FACE PARAGUAYAN INTRANSIGENCE CAN BE INTERPRETED IN FOREIGN CAPITALS AS RELUCTANCE ON PART USG TO UTILIZE

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28



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PAGE 02 ASUNCI 01499 02 OF 02 141619Z

AVAILABLE MEANS TO ENCOURAGE COOPERATION. WE DOUBT THAT USG WILL BE ABLE TO SPEAK WITH CREDIBILITY IN PROBLEM COUNTRIES IN WHICH IT HAS IMPORTANT STRATEGIC INTERESTS IF IT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE ITS RESOLVE IN PARAGUAY. IF THIS ANALYSIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OVERALL USG VIEW, WE RECOMMEND FOLLOWING:

I. IF GOP HAS NOT TAKEN SATISFACTORY ACTION ON INITIATIVES IN PHASE ONE BY SEPTEMBER 1, EMBASSY BE INSTRUCTED TO ADVISE GOP THAT UNDER PROVISIONS OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PARAGUAY HAS BEEN FOUND UNCOOPERATIVE AND THAT PRESENTLY PROGRAMMED MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WILL BE DISCONTINUED AND RESUMPTION NOT RECONSIDERED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS GOP DEMONSTRATES TO SATISFACTION OF USG ITS FULL AND WILLING COOPERATION.

II. USG SHOULD RAISE ISSUE OF PARAGUAYAN COMPLACENCY ABOUT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IN APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL FORUMS OF WHICH BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE MEMBER.

III. GOP REQUESTS FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL LENDING AGENCIES IN WHICH USG HAS VOICE SHOULD BE GIVEN "SPECIAL" CONSIDERATION AND U.S. CONCURRENCE ONLY ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS.

GP-3. BREWIN

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ZUI RUEHCS 1564W & 1606W RUFHJA2011S

ATTN CCO
H/W TRANS 2055/1 AND 2055/2(2 IS UNDER 0014S)
DE RUFHNA 2055/1
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R 202945Z NOV 72
FM USMISSION BERLIN
TO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 902
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1060
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ECTION 1 OF 2 BERLIN 2055

DISSENT CHANNEL (PER STATE A-3559)
THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DESSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY
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EUR/CE; EB/OA.

SUB: AIR AGREEMENTS WITH GDR

REF: A) BERLIN 2042 B) BERLIN 2000 C) STATE 182950 PARA 4
D) BERLIN 354 PARA 6

1. SUMMARY: INCONTEXT FORTHCOMING FRG-GDR AVIATION
BILATERAL, CONSIDERATION OF FOLLOWING PROPOSITIONS,
WHICH WOULD SUPPLEMENT MORE THAN DISSENT FROM PREVIOUS
MESSAGES, IS RECOMMENDED: ALLIES SHOULD NOT GRANT
RIGHTS FOR LUFTHANSA PASSENGERS BETWEEN FRG AND BERLIN,
EVEN IN PRINCIPLE FOR LATER PERIOD; IF FRG RAISES
SUBJECT OF SUCH RIGHTS, ALLIES SHOULD ASK WHETHER FRG
IS REALLY INTERESTED IN VIABLE ALLIED INNER GERMAN
SERVICE(IGS) FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE AND POINT OUT PROPABLE
NEED TO RAISE IGS FARES AGAIN NEXT YEAR EVEN WITHOUT LUFTHANSA
PARTICIPATION; AND ALLIES SHOULD OBTAIN RIGHTS TO
OVERFLY GDR AT SAME TIME FRG OBTAINS SUCH RIGHTS, PREFER-
ABLY THROUGH GDR JOINING ICAO AND INTERNATIONAL AIR
SERVICES TRANSIT AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. FRG IS APPARENTLY INTENT ON REACHING AGREEMENT WITH GDR IN NEAR FUTURE WHICH WOULD PERMIT LUFTHANSA STOPS IN BERLIN ON ROUTE TO MOSCOW AND EVENTUAL CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS BY LUFTHANSA BETWEEN FRG AND BERLIN. WITH OBJECTIVE OF FURTHERING U.S. INTERESTS IN CONTEXT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, CONSIDERATION OF FOLLOWING IS RECOMMENDED:

A) ALLIES SHOULD NOT GRANT RIGHTS FOR LUFTHANSA PASSENGERS BETWEEN FRG AND BERLIN NOR INDICATE POSSIBILITY OF GRANTING SUCH RIGHTS LATER. TO DO SO WOULD SERIOUSLY THREATEN VIABILITY OF ALLIED IGS BECAUSE, ONCE ALLIES ACCEPT PRINCIPLE OF LUFTHANSA PARTICIPATION IN IGS, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO LIMIT THAT PARTICIPATION. SINCE FRG REPORTEDLY CONTENT IF LUFTHANSA WERE TO CARRY NO PASSENGERS BETWEEN FRG AND BERLIN AT LEAST FOR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF YEAR OR TWO, FRG HAS NO LOGICAL NEED TO ASK ALLIES EVEN TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION NOW.

B) IF FRG NEVERTHELESS SEEKS ALLIED CONSIDERATION NOW OF POSSIBILITY OF GRANTING LUFTHANSA FRG-BERLIN PASSENGER RIGHTS LATER, ALLIES SHOULD ASK WHETHER FRG IS REALLY INTERESTED IN VIABLE ALLIED IGS FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE. IF THIS IS BEGINNING OF END OF SUCH SERVICE, PANAM AND BEA CAN CUT LOSSES BY ORDERLY PLANNED PHASEOUT, IF NOT, THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN FIRM LONG-RANGE UNEQUIVOCAL ASSURANCES. IN THIS CONNECTION ALLIES SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT TO FRG PROBABLE NEED TO RAISE IGS FARES AGAIN NEXT YEAR TO BRING THEM CLOSER TO LUFTHANSA PER SEAT-MILE FARES WITHIN FRG, EVEN WITHOUT LUFTHANSA IGS PARTICIPATION. LOW BERLIN FARES WERE ESTABLISHED AS SOCIAL MEASURE IN VIEW OF SURFACE TRAVEL DIFFICULTIES, NOW THAT SURFACE TRAVEL EASIER, MUCH TRAFFIC HAS ALREADY SHIFTED FROM AIR TO SURFACE AND ORIGINAL JUSTIFICATION FOR RELATIVELY LOW BERLIN AIR FARES IS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. ANOTHER FARE INCREASE WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY EVEN IF LUFTHANSA STAYS OUT OF IGS, BECAUSE HIGHER THAN NORMAL LOAD FACTORS ARE NEEDED TO BREAK EVEN AT NEW DECEMBER 1 FARES, MUCH OF BEA INEFFICIENCY IS STRUCTURAL AND NOT EASILY REMEDIED (E.G. TYPE OF AIRCRAFT), AND MOVE TO TEGEL WILL BE EXPENSIVE.

C) ALLIES SHOULD OBTAIN OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS FROM GDR AT SAME TIME FRG DOES. UNTIL ALLIES HAVE SUCH RIGHTS, WE CAN NOT DO MUCH ABOUT PRESENT DIFFICULTIES, SUCH AS 10,000 FOOT CEILING AND LACK OF BULGARIAN LANDING RIGHTS FOR MAT CHARTER FLIGHTS, AND GDR MIGHT DEVISE WAYS TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR OTHER FLIGHTS USING CORRIDORS WHICH THEY COULD PLAUSIBLY ARGUE WERE UNRELATED TO SUPPORT OF ALLIED GARRISONS IN WEST BERLIN. WHILE WE WOULD MAINTAIN THAT CORRIDOR RIGHTS ARE NOT DEPENDENT UPON GDR GRANT OF OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS, THEY COULD INTERPRET THEIR ACTIONS AS REGULARIZING CORRIDORS FOR ALL ALLIED CIVIL FLIGHTS AND THUS HAVE EXCUSE TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE GENERALLY. ALLIED OVERFLIGHTS FROM BERLIN TO EAST ARE, OF COURSE, DEPENDENT UPON GDR GRANT OF RIGHTS. THREE POSSIBILITIES FOR ALLIES TO OBTAIN RIGHTS TO OVERFLY GDR ARE DESCRIBED BELOW IN ORDER WHICH THEY MIGHT LOGICALLY BE TRIED CHRONOLOGICALLY:

(1) GDR MIGHT JOIN ICAO AND RELATED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES TRANSIT AGREEMENT (IASTA), WHICH PROVIDES FOR OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS FOR SERVICES ON MULTILATERAL BASIS. BY GDR JOINING, ALLIES AS WELL AS FRG WOULD OBTAIN DESIRED OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS WITHOUT HAVING TO NEGOTIATE BILATERALS WITH GDR (ALTHOUGH LESS FORMAL SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE NECESSARY FOR SUCH ITEMS AS ROUTE DESIGNATIONS). GDR MAY BE RELUCTANT TO JOIN IASTA, SINCE THEY WOULD THEREBY LOSE BARGAINING LEVERAGE THEY NOW USE, E.G. TO PERSUADE SAS AND AUA TO FLY TO SCHOENEFELD RATHER THAN TO WEST BERLIN. HOWEVER, BY JOINING THEY WOULD RECEIVE SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS TO OVERFLY OTHER COUNTRIES AND THEY MIGHT FIND IT ATTRACTIVE TO BE TREATED LIKE MANY OTHER COUNTRIES ON QUESTION OF OVERFLIGHTS (RESULTANT GDR RIGHT TO OVERFLY US WOULD PROBABLY COST US LITTLE IF ANYTHING SINCE FLYING OVER US WOULD NOT SEEM TO FIT INTO FORESEEABLE INTERFLUG ROUTE NET). BERLIN SENATOR GRABERT BELIEVES GDR WILL JOIN IASTA (REF. C). ALLIES MIGHT LOGICALLY REFER TO GRABERT STATEMENT AND ASK FRG TO URGE GDR TO JOIN IASTA, EITHER INSTEAD OF OR SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH FRG-GDR BILATERAL. WE MIGHT ALSO REFER TO FRG UNDERTAKING IN ARTICLE 3 OF CHAPTER 12 OF SETTLEMENT CONVENTION "TO PURSUE, IN ITS BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS, A LIBERAL AND NONDISCRIMINATORY POLICY."

BT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BERLIN SVC
ZUI RUEHCS 1564W & 1626W RUFHJA03115

ATTN CCO

H/W TRANS 2055/2
S3 471#,- 2059
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FM USMISSION BERLIN
TO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 933
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1861
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BERLIN 2059

DISSENT CHANNEL (PER STATE A-3959)
THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DESSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY
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X(2) THREE ALLIES MIGHT JOINTLY NEGOTIATE "BILATERAL"
WITH GDR AT SAME TIME FRG DOES. ALLIES MIGHT GRANT
GDR LANDING RIGHTS IN WEST BERLIN FOR FLIGHTS ORIGINATING
IN GDR (E.G. ROSTOCK OR LEIPZIG) IN RETURN FOR U.S.,
U.K. AND FRENCH RIGHTS TO VOVERFLY GDR. WE COULD ALSO
SEEK RIGHTS FOR SAME WEST BERLIN-GDR ROUTES TO BE GRANTED
TO GDR, IF MIRROR IMAGE TYPE AGREEMENT PREFERRED; BUT
OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE SIGNIFICANT TO
US THAN LANDING RIGHTS IN GDR. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD KEEP
ALL THREE ALLIES IN STEP AND WOULD CONCEDE NOTHING OUTSIDE
GERMANY. IT WOULD DEVIATE FROM NORM OF FRG NEGOTIATIONS
ON BEHALF OF WEST BERLIN, BUT OCCUPYING POWERS HAVE
RESERVED RIGHTS IN FIELD OF AVIATION.

ALLIES WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH GDR ON AVIATION (OR ANYTHING ELSE) AS SOON AS FRG IS READY TO COMMENCE AIR TALKS WITH GDR. HOWEVER, IF FIRST FRG PROPOSAL TO GDR WERE THAT GDR JOIN IASTA AND, FOR SOME REASON, THAT DID NOT WORK OUT, ENOUGH TIME MIGHT HAVE ELAPSED SO THAT ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK WITH GDR FOR SECOND ROUND. GDR PROBABLY HAS LITTLE INTEREST IN FLYING TO WEST BERLIN; BUT THEY MAY BE MORE INCLINED TO PERMIT OTHER NOW-THREE POWER FLIGHTS TO WEST BERLIN, INCLUDING LUFTHANSA, IF THEY THEMSELVES ALSO HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO. FURTHERMORE, PRESTIGE OF ENTERING DIRECTLY INTO AGREEMENT WITH THREE ALLIES, ESPECIALLY ONE INVOLVING WEST BERLIN, MIGHT APPEAL TO THEM.

(3) EACH OF THREE ALLIES MIGHT EXCHANGE OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS WITH GDR IN SEPARATE BILATERALS AT TIME OF FRG-GDR AIR AGREEMENT. GDR MIGHT PREFER US, UK AND FRANCE OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS TO WEST BERLIN LANDING RIGHTS OR BOTH MIGHT HAVE TO BE CONCEDED FOR ALLIES TO OBTAIN RIGHTS TO OVERFLY GDR. EVEN BOTH MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH UNLESS DONE EARLY ENOUGH SO THAT FACT OF AGREEMENTS WOULD BE WORTH SOMETHING TO THEM REGARDLESS OF SUBSTANCE. LATER GDR MIGHT INSIST ON LANDING RIGHTS IN US AS PART OF ANY BILATERAL AND IT IS DOUBTFUL IF THERE IS ANYTHING WE WOULD WANT FROM GDR IN AVIATION TERMS WHICH WOULD BE WORTH OUR GRANTING THEM LANDING RIGHTS IN US. GOSKLEIN

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Dissent file

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~~OFFICIAL-INFORMAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN PART B6

May 14, 1973

DISSENT CHANNEL



B6

USAID Mission
Islamabad, Pakistan

Dear Mr. Hager:

As I promised in my letter of March 27, we have pursued the questions on South Asia arms supply that you posed in your dissent channel letter of March 21, 1973.

You have raised a number of specific substantive points. They are material ones and they deserve an answer. I have asked my staff, together with other concerned persons in the Department, to comment on them. These comments are enclosed with this letter.

The main burden of my letter is not, however, substantive. The important point for you to know is that the considerations you have raised have repeatedly occupied attention at the highest levels. They have been discussed in National Security Study Memoranda, in meetings of the Senior Review Group, in discussions with the Secretary, and in many other gatherings of persons at all levels who are concerned, as you are, with the implications of our arms supply policy.

I am personally convinced that these points have received an extensive and fair hearing, and have had an impact on our policy, for as the enclosed comments point out, we have settled on a policy that is very restrictive and is designed to meet many of the difficulties that you raise. Obviously these arguments did not carry the day in the sense that we did not impose a total arms embargo. As you are aware, there are strong counter-considerations--and, indeed, I am not sure that the logic of your argumentation necessarily leads to a total embargo.

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The dissent channel was created as a further means of ensuring that all points of view are brought forth in the interest of making the best policy choices. Your constructive concern in this policy question is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
William I. Cargo

William I. Cargo
Director
Planning and Coordination Staff

Enclosure:

Comments on South Asian Arms Supply

Clearance: NEA/PAB - Mr. Bruce Laingen ^B

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Comments On The Points Raised In
[redacted] Dissent Letter On
South Asian Arms Supply

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I. General

First, the points are extremely pertinent and have been raised repeatedly in the discussions that led up to the arms supply policy decision.

Second, [redacted] appears to be overinterpreting the intent of the policy. It is in fact extremely restrictive -- to a great extent, precisely because of the kinds of points that [redacted] A review of the 1967-71 arms policy (which was very similar to the present one) shows that it resulted in only very small transfers of military supplies. There is every reason to assume that the present policy will be interpreted at least as strictly.

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Third, there is an implicit problem in considering arms sales to any other country. There are strong moral, political and (often) economic arguments advanced not to sell arms at all. Yet this is simply unrealistic as a general principle, and once this is admitted, then it

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is difficult to see why we should make a unique exception for South Asia. We seek to apply a rule of reason in all of our arms sales and this should also be our guide in South Asia.

II. Specific Points

A. The lethal/non-lethal distinction.

argument is largely valid; there is no clear dividing line between the two categories and the marginal cases pose many problems. But once the decision has been made to sell some military equipment, there is much to be said for a policy that seeks explicitly to avoid the supply of such clearly lethal items as tanks, fighter aircraft and artillery. These indisputably lethal items have been excluded since 1965 and this is all to the good. Conversely, there is no reason to exclude items such as radios or early-warning radar. By setting up the lethal/non-lethal distinction, however imperfect, we have at least excluded the most "objectionable" items and have decreased the likelihood that we will be pressed for them as would be the case were the policy

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purely ad hoc. The distinction also provides an important "declaration of intent" in passing on requests for purchase of the marginal items.

B. Question of Use

Again, [] is quite correct that we cannot guarantee that our arms will only be used in the context in which they were supplied. The argument made above, concerning the lethal/non-lethal distinction, is of some importance here; the kinds (and quantities) of arms involved are designed to minimize possible damage when used out of context. The fact remains that modern sovereign nations do have armies and armaments. Our refusal to sell will not change this.

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Also, as we will bring out in the next paragraph, we believe that the likelihood of India and Pakistan using weapons against each other has diminished markedly.

C. The Arms Race

Here [] is on the weakest ground. First, we perceive a genuine change in the power realities of the subcontinent. We do not believe that Pakistan is likely to engage in an "arms race" with India any more. The

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outlook for peace is better than at any time since 1947 and a very limited arms supply policy is not going to change this. Second, a well-executed supply policy can in fact reduce the arms race. For instance, by providing spare parts for older generation aircraft, we reduce the likelihood that Pakistan will opt for entirely new, more advanced systems that would in turn encourage India to obtain still later generation aircraft from the Soviet Union.

Also, of course, we do not control the pace of the "arms race." We are by no means the major supplier of armaments to the subcontinent. By staying in the game in a limited way we probably have a better chance of discouraging other suppliers from providing excessive amounts of weaponry.

There are obviously pitfalls, but the narrow intent of our policy and the record of implementation between 1967 and 1971 suggests that we should be able to act responsibly in meeting these problems.

D. Guns vs Butter

The point that South Asia needs to spend less money

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on arms is irrefutable. The counter-argument is much the same one as made in C. above -- that we do not control the situation and indeed may be able to retard the arms race (and hence expenditures) by keeping some role for ourselves. Certainly the equipment that we provide costs Pakistan considerably less than what they have had to spend on the international arms market for comparable items. One can also argue that Bhutto's predilection is to spend less, rather than more, on armaments. By giving him some sign of cooperation we strengthen his bargaining power against those who want to divert still more resources into armaments.

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CU/YSS:RTARNDT:LSB
4/23/74:EXT. 23730
S/P - SLEWIS

CU/OPP:NBOYER
T - CJONES {INFO}

S/P:HCBLANEY
ARA/CAR:JWSIMMS

ROUTINE SANTO DOMINGO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, OGEN, DR, SCUL
SUBJECT: YOUTH PARA, DISSENTING VIEW
REF: {A} SD 538 FEB 6, 1974 {B} SD 2190 MAY 21, 1973
{C} STATE 209583 OCT 24, 1973 {D} SD 4159 OCT 9, 1973
{E} SD 4585 NOV. 8, 1973 {F} STATE 228145 NOV 20, 1973

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JWS
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1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES VIEWS OF FSOS [REDACTED] THEIR OPINIONS WILL BE PRESENTED IN FORTHCOMING REVIEW OF YOUTH POLICY PAPER WHICH RESULTED FROM WORLDWIDE POST REA*SPONSES. DISCUSSION WILL TACKLE QUESTION OF BROAD REFOCUSING OF APPROACH TO YOUTH QUESTIONS, TAKING ACCOUNT OF IDEAS RAISED IN THIS MESSAGE AS WELL AS OTHERS. THIS REVIEW WILL FOCUS ON PROBLEM OF HOW BEST TO ASCERTAIN AND MAINTAIN AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF ATTENTION AT EACH MISSION AND TO INTEGRATE THE YOUTH DIMENSION INTO OVER-ALL MISSION EFFORTS.
2. THE DEPARTMENT HAS STRESSED BASIC IMPORTANCE OF ON-COMING GENERATION AS FACTOR IN PRESENT AND FUTURE POLI- TICAL AND ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF COUNTRIES IN WHICH US HAS INTEREST. THUS YOUTH FACTOR SHOULD BE REL*FLECTED AS APPROPRIATE IN POLITICAL REPORTING AND ANALYSIS.
3. IN LIGHT OF POINTS IN DEPTTEL 2190, ANY FURTHER SUGGES-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Continuation Sheet

FORM DS 322A(OCR)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12

TIONS ON SPECIFIC POINTS IN PARAS 2, 4 AND 5 WHICH
AUTHORS MAY WISH TO ADD WOULD BE WELCOMED BY REVIEW
GROUP.YYY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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S/P - Mr. Smith
5034

DRAFT CABLE

ACTION TO: BANGKOK FOR EMBASSY, USOM and RED

Subject: Reorganization of RED/USOM Relationships

Ref: A) State 107086; B) Bangkok 8679; C) Bangkok 11952

1. We have reviewed the reorganization proposed in ref A, the policy implications discussed in ref B and the Embassy comments contained in ref C, as well as the history of the regional programs and prospects for their future.
2. The Department and AID wish to reconfirm that it is US policy to support Asian regionalism and those Asian regional institutions which foster regional cooperation, understanding and interdependence. In part because of the success of the concept and the institutions which RED helped to foster, other bilateral and international donors have supported regional activities and the Asians themselves have come to recognize the value of regional cooperation in selected development areas and are devoting substantial resources to it. Hence, while we believe that the US need not in the future play as energetic a leadership role in regional activities, as it has in the past, a separate and distinct office supporting our relationships and contributions to Asian regionalism will continue to operate.
3. We believe that the operational and administrative arrangements described in ref. C are reasonable ones and need not adversely affect US support of regionalism in fact or in the eyes of the Asians. However, it must be clear to

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the regional organizations and the countries involved in them that the US continues to strongly support Asian regional activities and maintains in Bangkok a regional office through which the US will continue to support them. Changes that are being made in that office are internal and administrative and should not have any effect on the programs nor imply any diminution of our support of useful regional arrangements.

4. The questions raised in the "dissent cable" ref. B are serious ones and were given careful scrutiny and review. On balance we support the views proposed in Bangkok 11952 and assume they will prove satisfactory. Of course if the organizational arrangements in light of experience after an adequate trial, perhaps a year, prove to be less effective than anticipated, this shift can be reviewed at that time.

Drafted by:S/P:CWKontos

Authorized by:CWKontos

Clearance:

EA/AFHummel
AID/Asia:AWHITE
AID/Asia:K.Rabin (info)
S/P:RSmith (info)

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UNCLASSIFIED 7416

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PAGE 01 YAOUND 01876 131217Z

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ACTION SP-03.

RELEASE IN PART B6

INFO: OCT-01 ES-02 /006 W

010744

R 131105Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3462

20420

UNCLAS YAOUNDE 1876

DISSSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
SUBJECT: DISSSENT MESSAGE

FOR ADMINISTRATOR, MR. DANIEL PARKER, ROOM 5942

REFS: A) A-3592., B) AIDTO CIRC. A-207., C) STATE 118917
D) YAOUNDE 1669

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY
[REDACTED] YAOUNDE

B6

2. REF. B CALLS FOR INFORMATION ON EMPLOYEES AT POST WHO ARE FOREIGN BORN OR HAVE FOREIGN BORN SPOUSES. IT ASKS FOR THE EMPLOYEE'S NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, NAME OF FOREIGN BORN SPOUSE, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, CURRENT CITIZENSHIP OF EMPLOYEE OR SPOUSE, DATES OF NATURALIZATION IF U.S. CITIZEN AND LOCATION OF SPOUSE. THIS INFORMATION IS APPARENTLY REQUESTED EVEN THOUGH IT IS A MATTER OF RECORD THE SUBJECT EMPLOYEE AND SPOUSE ARE BOTH U.S. CITIZENS. THE PRESENT DISSSENT IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE POLICY OF REQUIRING SUCH INFORMATION.

3. ON THE FACE OF IT, LIST-MAKING OF U.S. CITIZENS WHO ARE FOREIGN BORN SMACKS OF INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION. ANYONE MAKING UP LISTS LIKE THAT HAS THE BURDEN TO EXPLAIN THE REASON FOR IT. THEREFORE, AID/W WAS REQUESTED BY RE D TO GIVE THE REASON WHY SUCH INFORMATION WAS CALLED FOR BECAUSE THE MANUAL ORDERS CITED IN REF. B DO NOT MAKE CLEAR THE REASON FOR IT. THE RESPONSE WAS.

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45

FORM DS-1652
9-66



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 YAOUND 01876 131217Z

REF, C, A NON-RESPONSE.

4. LIST-MAKING OF DIRECT-HIRE FOREIGN BORN U.S. CITIZENS AND SPOUSES IS OBJECTIONABLE UNLESS THERE IS SOME LEGITIMATE REASON FOR IT. THE PURPOSE BEHIND REF. B SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED TO DETERMINE ITS LEGITIMACY. IF IT IS LEGITIMATE, AID/W EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO PROPER EXPLANATION WHEN BEING CALLED UPON TO PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION.

5. NO OBJECTION IS BEING RAISED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF ASKING AN EMPLOYEE SUCH QUESTIONS ON AN EMPLOYMENT QUESTIONNAIRE. ASKING CITIZENSHIP, PLACE AND DATE OF BIRTH IS STANDARD PRACTICE. IT IS THE APPARENT COMPILATION OF A LIST OF FOREIGN BORN U.S. CITIZENS WHICH AT FIRST BLUSH SEEMS OUT OF BOUNDS UNLESS THERE IS SOME ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION. THE PERMISSIBLE DISTINCTIONS IN TREATMENT OF NATURAL BORN U.S. CITIZENS AND NATURALIZED CITIZENS HAVE BECOME FEWER OVER THE YEARS TO THE POINT WHERE ONE CAN QUESTION THE LEGITIMACY OF SUCH A REQUEST AS IN REF. B.
MOORE

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FORM DS-1652
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ACTION COPY

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ACTION SP-03

INFO: OCT-01 ES-02: /006 W

075476

R 190951Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2705

RELEASE IN PART B6

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEL AVIV 3305

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, IS
SURJ: ISRAEL'S FY 1975 PL 480 TITLE Y REQUIREMENTS

REF: A, TEL AVIV 26987 B, TEL AVIV 3305

1. FOLLOWING REPRESENTS DISSENTING VIEWS (SEE REF B) OF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B6

2. I BELIEVE EMBASSY'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL (REF A) WAS SOUNDLY BASED, TO EXTENT THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY SITUATION REQUIRES USG FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE--AND IT UNQUESTIONABLY DOES--MILITARY CREDIT AND SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE ARE APPROPRIATE. USG HAS BEEN GENEROUS WITH THIS AID, AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO BE SO. AS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (ESPECIALLY PL 480), ISRAEL'S INCREASING PROSPERITY HAS PROGRESSIVELY ERODED ISRAEL'S CASE. OUR PL 480 ASSISTANCE IS MORE URGENTLY NEEDED BY COUNTRIES WITH ONE-FIFTH OF ISRAEL'S PER CAPITA GNP.
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TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7260

PAGE 01 PRETOR 02857 281543Z

RELEASE IN PART B6

80
ACTION SP-03

INFO OCT-01 09-02 /006 W

071781

R 281509Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0138
INFO USIA WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRETORIA 2857

R.O. 11652: GDS
TAGSI DECX, SF
SURJI DISSENT MESSAGE

DISSENT CHANNEL

REF: (A) PRETORIA 2663/ (B) PRETORIA 2787

STATE FOR: AF & CU/AF

USIA FOR: IAA

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY

[Redacted]

B6

2. NIH SHOULD BE REQUIRED AS MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY TO SHOW THAT POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS DESCRIBED IN REFTEL A AWARDED WITHOUT RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. RACIAL COMPOSITION OF SELECTION COMMITTEE, POSITIVE PROOF THEIR EFFORTS MAKE AWARE SCIENTISTS ALL RACIAL GROUPS AVAILABILITY SUCH AWARDS, RACIAL BREAKDOWN APPLICATIONS RECEIVED AND AWARDS MADE, ALL OF WHICH POST UNAWARE, ARE RELEVANT FACTS IN DETERMINING IF THIS PROGRAM FREE FROM RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES.

3. FEEL A STRONGER PUBLIC STANCE THAN DESCRIBED REFTEL B RE PASSPORT REFUSALS MORE CONSONANT WITH CULTURAL EXCHANGE POLICY AS ARTICULATED "TO DEMONSTRATE SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR HAVE-NOT MAJORITY" ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

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4



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 PRETOR 02867 281543Z

"EMBASSY DEEPLY REGRETS REFUSAL PASSPORTS [REDACTED] B6
[REDACTED] OUTSTANDING LEADERS THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES.
IN EFFORTS TO KEEP LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS OPEN WITH SOUTH
AFRICA AND TO ENABLE INTERESTED AMERICANS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND
CONTEMPORARY SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
INVITED CRITICS AS WELL AS ADVOCATES OF SAG POLICIES TO TAKE
PART IN EXCHANGE PROGRAMS. WHENEVER CRITICS OF GOVERNMENT
POLICIES ARE NOT ALLOWED TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY, THIS DENIES
AMERICAN PUBLIC SPECTRUM OPINION REGARDING SOUTH AFRICA AND
MAKES DIFFICULT FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT MAINTAIN OPEN DOOR
POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA. WE REGRET ALSO THAT INDIVIDUALS
INVOLVED NOT ENTITLED HAVE REASONS FOR REFUSALS OR DAY IN
COURT TO BRING OUT FACTS AND DETERMINE IF SAG ACTED IN
ARBITRARY MANNER, WHICH ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO AMERICAN CONSTIT-
UTIONAL PRACTICE, AS WELL AS TO UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE. SHOULD
AT SOME FUTURE DATE PASSPORTS [REDACTED] B6
[REDACTED] BE GRANTED, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA STANDS READY
RE-NEW OUR INVITATION VISIT OUR COUNTRY, WHERE THEY WILL BE
MADE MOST WELCOME."

HURD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3111

PAGE 01 PRETOR 02911 021120Z

53
ACTION SP-03

INFO OCT-01 ES-02 /006 W

106814

R 021053Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0160
INFO USIA WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRETORIA 2911

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OEXC, SF
SURJ: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: PRETORIA 2857 AND 2787

1. I REFER TO DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE OF [REDACTED] (PRETORIA 2857) RELATING TO THE EXCHANGE VISITOR PROGRAM IN WHICH HE TAKES ISSUE WITH CERTAIN DECISIONS ON THIS PROGRAM WHICH I HAD PERSONALLY APPROVED.

B6

2. IT CERTAINLY NEEDS NO DEMONSTRATION THAT OUR POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA IS, TO USE THE OFT-QUOTED PHRASE, ONE OF ABHORRENCE OF APARTHEID AND THE RACIAL POLICIES OF THE PRESENT SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME. WE HAVE SAID SO, MANY TIMES AT MANY LEVELS. I SHARE WITH [REDACTED] HIS DISLIKE OF THIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICY, AND I AM OF COURSE FULLY AWARE OF THE MORAL DILEMMAS THAT OUR OWN POLICIES PRESENT IN THEIR ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION. WE CAN THROW UP OUR HANDS AND WALK AWAY FROM THE ILLIBERALITY OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, OR WE CAN KEEP HAMMERING AWAY AT IT, SEEKING CHANGE FOR THE BETTER STEP BY STEP. SINCE WE CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FULL FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, THE LATTER COURSE IS THE ONE THE USG HAS WISELY ELECTED TO FOLLOW.

B6

3. FROM THIS HIGH-LEVEL DECISION FLOWS A NEED FOR ME TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBLE ACTIONS. WE INTEND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 PRETOR 02911 021120Z

TO KEEP THE EXCHANGE VISITOR PROGRAM ON A PREDOMINANTLY BLACK, MULTI-RACIAL BASIS. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO PLACE EMPHASIS ON THE NEEDS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICALLY UNREPRESENTED MAJORITY, BUT AT THE SAME TIME TO TRY TO INFLUENCE IMPORTANT MEMBERS OF THE RULING WHITE MINORITY, WHICH CONTINUES TO PLAY SUCH AN IMPORTANT PART IN DETERMINING THE PACE AND EXTENT OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE HAVE PURSUED THIS TWO-PRONGED OBJECTIVE WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAG, WHICH, WHILE HAVING SOME HEARTBURN, HAS GENERALLY NOT INTERFERED WITH WHAT WE HAVE DONE.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SAG'S PASSPORT REFUSALS FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS CONSIDERED ACTUALLY OR POTENTIALLY SUBVERSIVE REMAIN A REAL PROBLEM. WE MIGHT, AND DO, DISAGREE THAT AN INDIVIDUAL MAY BE SUBVERSIVE, BUT THE SAG, AS A MATTER OF SECURITY POLICY, ADAMANTLY REFUSES TO GIVE SPECIFIC GROUNDS FOR SUCH REFUSALS. IF THE SAG SAYS IT HAS ADVERSE SECURITY INFORMATION ON SUCH AN INDIVIDUAL, NO AMOUNT OF USG "FOOT-STOMPING" WILL ALTER ITS DECISION. THE SAG WILL STAND ON ITS RIGHT, AS THE GOVERNMENT OF A SOVEREIGN STATE, TO REFUSE TO ISSUE A PASSPORT TO ONE OF ITS CITIZENS. IN MY OPINION, IF WE INVEIGH AGAINST THEIR ATTITUDE ON THIS MATTER WITH NO CHANGE OF ALTERING IT, WE COULD DAMAGE THE PROSPECTS OF OTHER BLACK IVP NOMINEES.

5. MOREOVER, BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE EXCHANGE REPORTED IN PRETORIA 2787, SUCH ACTION COULD WELL BE AT THE COST OF A VALUABLE HIGH-LEVEL CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION. IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE I CANNOT AGREE WITH ISSUING THE KIND OF STATEMENT THAT [REDACTED] ADVOCATES.

B6

6. THE EMBASSY'S MEASURED APPROVAL OF THE NIH-PROPOSED CANDIDATES WAS TRANSMITTED WITH FULL REGARD TO THE EXTREMELY SHORT LEAD TIME FOR A RESPONSE AND WE HAD NO REASON TO OBJECT TO THOSE CANDIDATES AS INDIVIDUALS, EACH OF WHOM APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN WELL-QUALIFIED. IN THE COMING YEAR WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH NIH CONCERNING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICAN SELECTION PROCESS WORKS SO AS TO ASSURE THAT OUR POLICIES RECEIVE THEIR DUE RECOGNITION IN CANDIDATE SELECTION.
HURD

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9966

PAGE 01 STATE 163349

70
ORIGIN SP-03

INFO OCT-01 ES-02 /006 R

DRAFTED BY CU/AF JONESTMORELANDIRDG
APPROVED BY CU J RICHARDSON
CU/AF W BEDMONDSON
AF/S H KAISER (DRAFT)
USIA/IAA J MCGINLEY (DRAFT)
USIA/AA M BEAU'EN (DRAFT)
S/P H SPIRO (DRAFT)
S S MR. L M
AF J FOLEY (DRAFT)
S/P OFF R SMITH (DRAFT)

REFERRED FOR CONSULTATION NIH

007256

R 262222Z JUL 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 163349

DISSENT CHANNEL:

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS OEXC, SF
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: PRETORIA 2887, 2911; STATE 146614

1. AFTER REVIEWING PRETORIA REFTELS AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT THE DECISION NOT TO ISSUE A PUBLIC STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE SAG'S REFUSAL OF PASSPORTS TO THREE NON-WHITE IV GRANTEES WAS APPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. USIA CONCURS.

2. CU PROGRAM IN SOUTH AFRICA HAS UNDERGONE SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION DURING PAST TWO FISCAL YEARS, GROWING FROM MODEST PROGRAM IN FY-72 TO ONE OF THE LARGEST IN AFRICA IN FY-74 AND ONE THAT APPROPRIATELY CONCENTRATES APPROXIMATELY 2/3 OF ITS RESOURCES ON BLACK, COLORED AND

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FORM DS-1652



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 165349

EMPHASIS ON NON-WHITE GRANTEES CERTAINLY HAS NOT GONE UNNOTICED BY THE SAG. GIVEN THE OCCASIONAL DISPLEASURE AND PERHAPS APPREHENSION SUCH EMPHASIS MUST GENERATE, THE RELATIVELY LITTLE INTERFERENCE ON THE PART OF THE SAG IS NOTABLE.

3. ESPECIALLY WHEN VIEWED AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE THINK THE POST'S TWO MAIN POINTS ARE WELL TAKEN; NAMELY, THAT A PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF USG REGRET AT THIS POINT IN

TIME COULD ENDANGER A HIGH-LEVEL CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION, PARTICULARLY AFTER INTERIOR MINISTER MULDER TOOK THE INITIATIVE PERSONALLY TO ASSURE THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE SAG WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO UNDERMINE THE PROGRAM. SECONDLY, WE AGREE THAT THERE IS A GENUINE RISK OF PROVOKING SAG RETALIATION IN PREVENTING FUTURE NON-WHITE GRANTEES FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE PROGRAM.

4. THE REFUSAL OF THE PASSPORTS COULD, OF COURSE, CONSTITUTE SAG INTERFERENCE IN EXCHANGE PROGRAM DESPITE THEIR DENIALS THAT THIS WAS NOT INTENDED. SAG ACTIONS IN THIS AREA WILL BEAR CLOSE WATCHING TO SEE IF THEY DEVELOP INTO PATTERN OF ATTEMPTING TO FRUSTRATE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM. IF SUCH A PATTERN DOES EMERGE, A THOROUGH ASSESSMENT IN OVERALL CONTEXT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE IN ORDER.

5. THE POLICY QUESTION IMPLICIT IN THE MESSAGE IS WHETHER THE USG SHOULD NOT BE PLAYING A STRONGER "ADVERSARY" ROLE WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE SAG'S RESTRICTIVE POLICIES. THIS QUESTION IS UNDER CONTINUOUS REVIEW AND DISCUSSION IN THE DEPARTMENT. BUT, IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, WE FEEL THAT VIGOROUSLY PUSHING AHEAD WITH THE OPERATION OF A PROGRAM WHICH IS A TANGIBLE EXPRESSION OF OUR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH ALL SOUTH AFRICANS IS LIKELY TO BE MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN A PROVOCATIVE, CRITICAL STATEMENT AT THIS TIME.

B6

6. REGARDING QUESTION OF NIH FELLOWSHIPS, THE DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES VIEWS EXPRESSED IN BOTH PRETORIA 2857 AND 2911. SINCE NIH PROGRAM IS IN FACT A COMPETITION, DEPARTMENT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03. STATE 163349

AGREES THAT ACCESS TO COMPETITION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR FINAL SELECTION SHOULD BE OPEN TO ALL QUALIFIED PERSONS WITHOUT REGARD TO RACE. BEST MEANS OF ACCOMPLISHING GENUINELY NONDISCRIMINATORY SELECTION AND MAKING THIS CLEARLY BUT INOFFENSIVELY EVIDENT TO ALL IS MATTER FOR CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IN LIGHT OF NIH PROGRAM OBJECTIVES, INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. DEPARTMENT WILL EXPLORE MATTER FURTHER WITH NIH AND KEEP EMBASSY AND CAO ADVISED. INGERSOLL

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FORM DS-1652
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 166505

ORIGIN *Q* 80-03

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APPROVED BY CU/AFI JONES/MORELAND

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0 311002Z JUL 72

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 166505

DISSENT CHANNEL // // // // // // // //

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OEXC, SP

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE; CORRECTION

REF: STATE 163349

PARAGRAPH 2 REFTEL SHOULD BE CORRECTED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

2. CU PROGRAM IN SOUTH AFRICA HAS UNDERGONE SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION DURING PAST TWO FISCAL YEARS, GROWING FROM MODEST PROGRAM IN FY-72 TO ONE OF THE LARGEST IN AFRICA IN FY-74 AND ONE THAT APPROPRIATELY CONCENTRATES APPROXIMATELY 2/3 OF ITS RESOURCES ON BLACK, COLORED AND ASIAN COMMUNITIES. SUCH EXPANSION AND THE IMPORTANT EMPHASIS ON NON-WHITE GRANTEEES CERTAINLY HAS NOT GONE UNNOTICED BY THE SAG. GIVEN THE OCCASIONAL DISPLEASURE AND PERHAPS APPREHENSION SUCH EMPHASIS MUST GENERATE, THE RELATIVELY LITTLE INTERFERENCE ON THE PART OF THE SAG IS NOTABLE. KISSINGER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

(SD44)
RS

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FILE DESIGNATION

HANDLING INDICATOR: ~~CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS~~ A-442

TO : Department of State
E.O. 11652: ADS, DECLAS 3/1/79
TAGS: AMGT VS

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 5 4 33 PM 1974
FADRC
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

NO. A-442
Note returned process: 9/9/12

FROM : Amembassy BELGRADE
DATE: September 2, 1974

SUBJECT : Dissent Message

REF : DISSENT CHANNEL

RELEASE IN PART B6

This message transmits a dissenting view submitted by [redacted] B6
[redacted] American Embassy, Belgrade.

SUMMARY. A consistent distortion of the flow of foreign service reporting from Vietnam exists and is serious enough to call into question the Department's ability to reach any policy decisions based on this reporting. END SUMMARY

The war in Vietnam has been accused of much adverse influence on American society. It is my belief that, while the war has declined and much of this influence has disappeared, its effects continue on the Foreign Service and the Department.

I have recently completed a six-month TDY in Vietnam. During that period I served as a political reporting officer in the Consulates General in Can Tho and Nha Trang. I had access to a considerable proportion of reporting from the Consulates General to Saigon, and from Saigon to Washington. I myself prepared some of these reports.

I have concluded, on the basis of my experience and talks with other FSOs in Vietnam, that there were frequent, significant omissions from the reporting to Washington to which I had access. Furthermore, the language of the reporting that did go out to Washington was frequently slanted toward one interpretation of events. What I describe amounts to, in my opinion, a consistent distortion of the whole body of reporting from the Embassy to the Department. In my judgment, the distortion may be enough to

POST ROUTING

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Action Taken:

Date: _____
Initials: _____

FORM 10-67 DS-323

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 In Out

Drafted by: _____ Drafting Date: _____ Phone No.: _____ Contents and Classification Approved by: _____ B6
DCM: DMM/ter

Clearances: POL:DCTice

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~~CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS~~Page 2 of
A-442
Belgrade

seriously call into question the Department's ability to reach any policy decision based on this reporting.

This distortion manifested itself in many, individually insignificant instances. For example, in the report I drafted on the Four-Party ICCS investigation of the Cai Lay School mortaring in March 1974, I indicated a strong suspicion that local GVN officials had permitted or even planned the demonstration which brought the investigation to an abrupt end. Some revisions were made to this section in the Consulate General in Can Tho, softening the wording but leaving the meaning essentially intact in CAN THO 0113. When the Embassy relayed the report to Washington, the section was deleted entirely. Some weeks later the Embassy sent a follow-up telegram summarizing the incident which asserted among other things that the South Vietnamese spared no effort to ensure the success of the investigation. This ignored the Consulate General's analysis. This analysis--my analysis--was based on a long-standing acquaintance with the GVN officials involved, and thorough familiarity with the security arrangements for the investigation, as well as on eyewitness accounts gathered by another TDY FSO. My acquaintance with local officials was established during my service as a CORDS adviser in Dinh Tuong Province in which Cai Lay is located, from 1970 to 1972. My knowledge of security arrangements for the investigation was based on a number of long discussions with concerned district and province officials, and with members of the GVN delegation to the JMC as well as on two walks through Cai Lay District Town, one just before and one during the investigation, to actually observe security precautions. The Embassy decided on an interpretation diametrically opposite to my own.

For a second example, in preparing the Weekly Ceasefire Situation Report for II Corps in the Consulate General in Nha Trang, I was under instructions from the Acting Consul General to de-emphasize events which were or could be interpreted as GVN ceasefire violations. These instructions made it necessary for me to note at one point, for example, intensified action in the Eo Gio area of Kontum Province instead of reporting the actual division-sized GVN attack on NVA lines northeast of Kontum City.

Again, in reporting from Nha Trang, I was told to describe a series of operations by GVN units as taking place "in unpopulated areas adjacent to populated areas" in one coastal province. These were actually deep penetrations into Communist base areas from which VC/NVA units had been launching raids. But this latter description, I was told, could be interpreted as a South Vietnamese ceasefire violation.

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Page 3 of
A-442
Belgrade

A general factor determining the shaping of all reporting was the tendency by higher-level officers to accept optimistic appraisals at face value, but to demand careful documentation of any unfavorable statement.

I can cite other examples of systematic alterations in reporting in my own experience, as well as examples from other FSOs with Vietnam service. I can also note the Moose-Meissner report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which I have not read, but whose conclusions as reported by the International Herald Tribune seem quite correct.

There are a number of explanations which are advanced among Foreign Service Officers in Vietnam to account for such instances as the above. One was that the Embassy reporting to which we lower-level officers had access was designed for the lower levels of the Department, where most leaks to the press occur. According to this theory, the most highly classified reporting included a large part of what we saw camouflaged or omitted in lower-level reporting. Thus the Ambassador might attempt to avoid press leaks which would harm the South Vietnamese position.

A second explanation seems more reasonable: that the Ambassador directs the content and tone of reporting to Washington on the basis of his own determination as to what should be reported. This occurs to some extent in every foreign service post as an obvious derivation of the Ambassador's position as the head of the US mission. But this factor becomes harmful when the Ambassador's determination results in the exclusion of a coherent body of information, that is, when it results in a substantial distortion of the entire flow of reporting available to the Department from his post.

The existence of a substantial flow of distorted information to the Department has serious effects on two levels, in my opinion. On the institutional level, it can only harm the Department's efforts to maintain an influential position in foreign policy management. On a personal level, it wastes the services of the Foreign Service Officers assigned to deal with it. Furthermore, it is a direct attack on both the morale and the integrity of the officers required to participate in its production.

The question of the content of the Ambassador's personal communication with the Secretary of State is relevant here. If this communication adds the dimension that was lacking/the communications to which I had access, the detrimental effects on policy of lower-level distortion

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Page 4 of
A-442
Belgrade

would not be as severe. But these effects continue on material produced by levels of the Department which do not have access to this communication. The effects on the individual Foreign Service Officers required to deal with distorted reporting are just as serious as they are if no Ambassador-to-Secretary communication is taking place.

I use general terms here because I suspect that similar situations have existed in reporting from other missions, though perhaps none as serious or as long-lasting as Vietnam.

To correct this situation, I strongly urge that the Department reaffirm to all posts its commitment to insuring an accurate flow of reporting from the field. This commitment would be made most clear in a message similar to the following: "The Department wishes to remind each Head of Mission that it is his responsibility to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the flow of reporting from his mission to the Department... If, in the judgment of the Secretary of State, this responsibility is not fulfilled and significant shortcomings are found to exist in reporting to the Department through the fault of the Embassy, the Chiefs of Mission and senior Foreign Service Officers of the mission are reminded that this is sufficient reason to recommend or effect their censure and/or removal from post. This flow of reporting must include, as a matter of course, dissenting views of any significance from members of the mission staff. The inclusion of these dissenting views is the responsibility of the Chief of Mission and of the senior Foreign Service Officers of the mission."

I further recommend that the Department form a panel of FSOs to investigate cases where substantial inaccuracies may exist in Foreign Service reporting. The panel, which would be constituted at regular two-to-three year intervals (or as special occasions arise), would consist of a small number of officers, including junior and middle-grade officers. The Under Secretary would designate, at the time the panel is constituted, a list of posts from which reporting is most critical and/or posts where there is a controversy regarding reporting. At present, for example, such a list might include Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Vietnam, and any or all of the countries involved in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. On reaching a finding that there are shortcomings in a post's reporting through the fault of the post, the panel will recommend action to the Under Secretary of State. The Under Secretary will then contact the Ambassador and other officers concerned and, in the presence of the panel, request their answer to the charges made. When the

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Page 5 of
A-442
Belgrade

Under Secretary reaches a decision in the matter, he will transmit his decision and recommendation for action, along with a transcript of the inquiry proceedings, to the Secretary of State. A finding of neglect will include recommendations for censure and/or removal of the responsible officers. If the Secretary does not concur in the finding, the procedure ends. If he does concur, he will forward any recommendations for censure or dismissal of an Ambassador to the President for his action. Action against lower ranking officers will be the responsibility of the Secretary of State.

I have designed this procedure with consideration to the regular system of inspections, as a useful and necessary supplement.

I specifically recommend that such a panel be constituted immediately to investigate the accuracy of political reporting from the US Mission to the Republic of Vietnam. Specific attention should be paid to reporting of military actions, possible South Vietnamese ceasefire violations, instances of corruption and any other occurrences which might be seen as reflecting adversely on the South Vietnamese effort. In view of the demonstrated interest of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in this matter, and with a view toward maximizing the Department's credibility with Congress, I further strongly urge that the Committee be kept informed of the progress of this inquiry.

I request distribution of this message to be made to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Inspector General, and the Chairman of the Secretary's Open Forum Panel, in addition to the minimum distribution in State A-3592, May 2, 1974. Signed

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ORIGIN/ACTION			
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

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UNCLASSIFIED

A-255

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State
 E. O. : N/A
 TAGS : AMGT, VS
 INFO : **RELEASE IN PART B6**
 DEPT PASS:
 FROM : American Embassy, Saigon DATE: December 17, 1974
 SUBJECT : Dissent Message
 REF : A) Belgrade A-442; B) State 225131; C) State 260551; D) State 260507

1. I have not, until now, found time to look seriously at Belgrade's A-442, the text of which was forwarded to me in Ref A and the Department's response contained in Ref B. Now that [redacted] has again raised the question in Ref C and the Department has again responded in Ref D, perhaps a few comments from me might be useful.

2. I had a copy of [redacted] message for some time before I received it officially on October 22, 1974. Its substance is, of course, a most serious charge against the most valued item any diplomat can carry in his professional baggage - his reputation for total professional integrity, and his competence to insure that reporting to the Department is objective, dispassionate, and wholly accurate.

3. Now it is true that I personally have, perhaps, an old-fashioned set of values. I was taught by my superiors almost three decades ago that the Foreign Service, if it was to serve the President, the Secretary, and the American people, as they had a right to demand, must have an internal discipline and cohesion arising from mutual trust and confidence. Absorbing that lesson from Jefferson Caffrey, Charles Bohlen, Jamie Bonbright, Theodore Achilles, Phillip Bonsal, Hugh Fullerton and others, it simply would never have occurred to me to file such charges against a fellow officer without confronting him with my suspicions, either personally or by private communication,

FORM 3-70 DS-323

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted by: AMB:GMartin:ek
 Clearances:

Drafting Date: 12/17/74

Phone No.: 7300

Content and Classification Approved by: *Andrew Martin*

Page 2
Saigon
A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

and attempting to arrive at a personal judgment only after I had carefully considered what he had to say. That is the course followed by one of [redacted] colleagues in Can Tho. But not by [redacted]

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4. Nor by those in the Department charged by the Secretary with monitoring his "Dissent Channel". I was hoping the Department would respond immediately to me, or to any officer so accused, asking for whatever comment he cared to make before the Department responded. It seemed to me that failure to do so would violate the most elemental canons of common decency and fairness. It also seemed to me that failure to do so would mark the Department's further descent into the neo-McCarthyism which has already been embraced by a small segment of the so-called "investigative reporters" of today's American press. These, in turn, have also infected a few of the young Foreign Service Officers, whose academic exposure took place in the middle and late sixties with the consequence that, as one now retired Service colleague observed, many are not only ignorant of history but seem to be wholly innocent of the fact that history exists. Fortunately, there are only a very few.

5. The most charitable comment I can make about the Department's failure to recognize [redacted] message was in no way a "dissent" case dealing with policy but an ad hominem attack on the integrity of a fellow officer, requiring he be immediately informed, was that it was assumed that since the charges regarding the Embassy reporting in the Senate Staff report had been met head on in the July 25 session I had with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and disposed of; that since on subsequent press inquiry the Department spokesman was personally authorized by the Secretary to term it completely unfounded, it was not therefore, deemed necessary to go into the substance of [redacted] comments. But not to do so is equally unfair to [redacted] I will come to that later.

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6. A preliminary comment may have some relevance. If I had been afraid of such attacks, I would not have accepted the Saigon assignment. It was totally certain that such attacks would be as inevitable as they have been on every Chief of this Mission for the last fifteen years. It is, of course, essential for those opposed to U. S. policy in Southeast Asia to attempt to discredit U. S. Mission reporting.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3
Saigon
A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

Otherwise their principal weapon - propaganda - would be blunted in its attempt to persuade the world that the fighting in Viet-Nam was only an indigenous uprising compelled because of the intolerable tyranny of a wholly repressive regime. For years Hanoi has vehemently denied that a single North Vietnamese soldier was in the South. Hanoi has not deviated from the figure of 200,000 "political prisoners" for the past fifteen years, providing this figure through every media opening it can find. Others, as Hanoi well knew, would establish their credibility and objectivity by lowering this figure by varying degrees - to 100,000 by Amnesty International; to 40,000-60,000 by a Senate Appropriations Sub-Committee and even 500 to 1,500 by the Department. All were totally wrong. The patient, painstaking work of FSO Harry Sizer, and the circulation I helped give his findings, has largely demolished the issue in the Congress.

7. Again the controversy between the U. S. Mission and the Saigon based American press is a historical continuum since the early sixties when the Buddhist bonzes were carefully programmed for immolation only when the TV cameras were in place. Therefore, a continuing controversy could not be avoided if the U. S. Mission insisted that its reporting should be held to a standard which insisted the American people and the Department had an inalienable right to the whole truth rather than the theatrical distortions still demanded of many Saigon reporters by their editors.

8. The third certainty concerned some of the junior officers. Many were really innocent of any historical perspective, most were handicapped by the considerable burden of an erroneous conventional wisdom which they could not possibly escape absorbing from the pervasive propaganda campaign of distortions about Viet-Nam which has flooded America since the sixties. Some few would be certain that, as in the Indian allegory of the five blind men and the elephant, their particular but limited exposure to a small sector of Viet-Nam gave them an access to the revealed truth. Therefore, if their perceptive reports were not accepted as such by their superiors, distortion and "slanted reporting" had obviously taken place.

9. As expected, all three have materialized. Nevertheless, if United States interests were to be truly served, it would be essential

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 4
Saigon
A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

to permit none of them to divert the Mission from reporting the whole truth. As our policy demands that we try to speed up the process of winding up the U. S. involvement in Viet-Nam, in a way that will contribute to, not impede, the achievement of larger policy goals elsewhere in the world, there is an enormous premium in having the Mission reporting inform Washington with great precision and accuracy of conditions as they really are in Viet-Nam. A simple exercise in logic establishes there is really not the slightest motive to do otherwise. This I have tried to do and, I believe, with considerable success.

10. When, as a result of a New York Times despatch, Senator Fulbright wrote the Department which queried me for the facts, I decided to answer the Senator directly. I might add I am pleasantly surprised to be again able to agree with [redacted] characterization of the New York Times in his second message. The Senator has released the correspondence and it appears in the record of my report to the Committee on Foreign Relations on July 25, 1974. It is a revealing bit of correspondence, since the staffer who drafted the Senator's letter was also the author of the section of the staff report dealing with Mission reporting. The last part of my reply to the Senator's letter sets forth the standards I have set for this Mission's reporting. Also in this record are the report of the Senate Staff Study and my comments on the section dealing with the Mission's reporting. These two records are enclosed as Annex A and Annex B for the benefit of [redacted] who, even in his second message, is still apparently dealing with press reports rather than original documentary evidence.

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11. Now we come to [redacted] It appears from the attached comments of his supervisors in Can Tho and Nhatrang (Annexes C and D) that they have no recollection of his expressing concern over the ConGen reporting, nor have I been able to find anyone in the Embassy to whom he expressed concern about the overall Mission reporting from Saigon. Yet, apparently motivated in part from the version of the Senate Staff Report appearing in the New York Herald Tribune, he raises questions in his original message about the accuracy and integrity of the Mission's reporting. He repeats these in his second message. Unfortunately he mentions only three examples, which will be discussed later.

B6

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 5
Saigon
A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

12. To take [redacted] message in the sequence in which he presented it, I would agree with the first paragraph after his summary. The effects of the war in Viet-Nam do "continue on the Foreign Service and the Department." The effects are inimical, dangerous in the extreme, both to the interests of the nation, but also to the continuing utility of the Department and, most particularly, of the Foreign Service, to serve the President and the Secretary. I have long contended that both should be the principal instruments for foreign policy analysis, for formulating recommendations for policy changes to protect and advance American interests in a constantly evolving and rapidly changing pattern of power relationships, and finally for the overseeing of the execution of the President's foreign policies. Such a role is not likely to be afforded either the Department or the Foreign Service unless both can demonstrate a capacity for discipline, for dispassionate analysis, and for total integrity in Foreign Service reporting. The latter two qualities, dependent on the first, must be as remote from personal "engagement" or "involvement" as imperfect human beings can possibly manage.

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13. Therein lies the validation of [redacted] observation on the continuing adverse effects of "Viet-Nam" on the Foreign Service and the Department. But, not for the reasons he gives. Rather, I suggest, as long as young Foreign Service Officers, and their colleagues in the Department, insist that only those items which fit their preconceived conclusions can be reported, that those messages which their monopoly of the "revealed truth" prove to them are wrong can be leaked to journalists or Congressional critics, and as long as their actions are tolerated by their colleagues in the Service and excused, under whatever rubric, by those carrying senior responsibilities in the Department, we are in very grave danger that the President and the Secretary will use other mechanisms to carry out the most vital and sensitive parts of their constitutional responsibilities to the nation for the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs. Therein lies the real danger both to the Department and to the Foreign Service. While young Congressional staffers and young "engaged" investigative journalists (subject to and inevitably and obviously affected by the same flood of distortions about Viet-Nam which characterized the sixties and still exists) may delude themselves that the end justifies the means, the Department and the Foreign Service cannot do so and survive.

B6

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 6
Saigon
A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

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14. In the paragraph, [] outlines the nature of his responsibilities during his six month temporary assignment on which he bases the conclusions advanced in the following paragraph. It is, of course, very easy to issue sweeping and blanket charges. Senator McCarthy was very good at this, as I well know from a bitter eight year attack for my part in exposing the absurdity of the Cohn-Schine "investigation" of USIA in Europe in the early fifties. In the end, however, when specific facts were demanded to substantiate the sweeping charges, the judgment of the Senate about Senator McCarthy is now history.

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15. The first specific instance provided by [] involves the fact that in the reporting of the Cai Lay school mortaring in March, "The Embassy decided on an interpretation diametrically opposite to my own". That is quite true. The Embassy determined that [] "suspicion" was not supported by either logic or fact. Indeed, there was a much stronger logical presumption that the incident was staged by the communist ICCS delegations to rescue their "PRG"/NVA friends from the very sticky public relations situation in which the Cai Lay incident had placed them. But since we could not establish hard evidentiary material to substantiate the presumption, we reported neither this presumption nor [] "suspicion". The follow-up cable stated, to quote [] ".....that the South Vietnamese spared no effort to ensure the success of the investigation". This statement was based on several sources. It was also logical and credible. To one extent I share [] obvious bias against the GVN. Never has any Government been so inept in handling its external public relations. Nevertheless, here was the murder of school children by an indiscriminate NVA/VC mortar attack. Here was the first case where universal horror at the death and maiming of these innocent children had forced the Hungarians and the Poles to actually participate in a field investigation. There were powerful incentives for the GVN to make every effort to ensure no untoward incident which could detract from establishing the clear fact that "PRG"/NVA action was responsible for the death of the children. As inept as the GVN has often been in getting the truth out, they are not really stupid enough to play into the hands of their enemies. Apparently [] would also deny the possibility that the Vietnamese might love their children enough to have spontaneously protested even though the GVN had, as the Embassy reported, "spared no effort to ensure the

B6

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B6

B6

B6

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 7
Saigon
A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

success of the investigation". The Hungarian and Polish Delegations, Radio Hanoi, the Budapest press, the "PRG" Liberation Radio and Hanoi's Nhan Dan all agree with [redacted] "suspicion" that local GVN officials had permitted or even planned the demonstrations which brought the investigation to an abrupt end". On the basis of better evidence, accumulated by several elements of the Mission, it was concluded that this was not true. After a recent thorough review I conclude that the Embassy's reporting was solidly based on the evidence. In this review, including the log of [redacted] running report by telephone, I conclude he is a very competent reporter as long as he is dealing with facts, not his "suspicious".

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16. In the only two other examples cited by [redacted] he states he was "under instructions from the Acting Consul General in Nha-trang to de-emphasize events which were or could be interpreted as GVN cease-fire violations." Mr. Cook, his Foreign Service colleague referred to, informs me that this is not an accurate statement, that his instructions were to avoid ambiguities and be very cautious with adjectives and simply describe accurately what was going on. Nha-trang's 0361 of 4 June 1974 written by [redacted] has the following item:

B6

B6

"3. Kontum: The push toward Vo Dinh initiated by the 41st and 44th Regiments 24 May has bogged down along a line crossing Highway 14 twelve kilometers northwest of Kontum City. Intense shelling of ARVN units continued, with light casualties reported. However the operation may be achieving its main objective: to draw enemy attention away from the isolated outposts of Mang Buk and Chuong Nghia. No incidents were reported at either location during the week. Minor action continues north and east of Outpost Five, 13 kms northeast of Kontum City."

17. The two units involved were identified. It was assumed Washington readers knew how large a regiment is. In any event, a full and complete report from DAO was already available to the principals in Washington.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

18. The next and last incident cited by [] involves instructions he alleges he was given "to describe a series of operations by GVN units as taking place 'in unpopulated areas adjacent to populated areas' in one coastal province. These were actually deep penetrations into communist base areas from which VC/NVA units had been launching raids. But this latter description, I was told, could be interpreted as a South Vietnamese ceasefire violation."

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19. No one remembers this incident or issuing any such instruction. I would have preferred [] version since it indicated the GVN was not sitting idly by without taking action against areas from which, as [] says, "VC/NVA units had been launching raids." Here again, a full report was already in Washington from DAO before [] [] report was written.

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20. I have not had and do not now have the slightest objection to the full and complete description of all military actions, which are routinely reported by the DAO and are available to all Washington agencies. I have assumed those in Washington who were interested could draw their own conclusions. I have been less interested in contributing to distortions by forwarding judgments attempting to assess blame to one side or the other for alleged cease-fire violations, since a cease-fire has never existed, and was not really expected to exist by anyone who was at all familiar with the past history of Hanoi's action. Even Mr. Moose in the Senate Staff Report, on which [] [] places such reliance, observed that "lack of respect for the (Paris) Agreement is so widespread that it is impossible to apportion responsibility for the continued fighting. Even in the case of isolated incidents initial responsibility is invariably lost in cycles of action and reaction."

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21. I pass over [] subsequent paragraphs on the machinery he recommends since its content makes any comment on its practicality unnecessary. I answered the basic issue in my response to Senator Fulbright last January when I said:

B6

"Your last question inquired 'what guarantees there are that Embassy reporting will be objective and that a full spectrum of views can be expressed to the Department.' The answer is, of course, none except my integrity. And

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 9
Saigon
A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

that, on the basis of a forty year record, is a complete guarantee. Even Mr. David Halberstam, to whose book *The Best and the Brightest* you referred at the time Messrs. Godley, Sullivan and I appeared before you for confirmation, bears indirect testimony to that fact. I am not even mentioned in the book. I am told that when asked how I possibly could be omitted, he replied that the thrust of the book was to demonstrate that when the military machine started rolling no one could stand in its way. Since I had fought bitterly and successfully to keep the Americans totally out of any direct involvement in the Thai insurgency, it would have disproved his thesis to have mentioned me.

If you will refer to another book, Charles Bohlen's *Witness to History*, you will find recorded the precepts for the kind of reporting this Embassy will do. Facts, carefully researched, thoroughly documented, reported without adjectives implying a judgment only history can give. Even the story says, "But the information is still there." Since I have been here, no report has been either stopped or slanted. The officers are beginning to take pride in the fact that our objective is to ensure the most candid, objective, wholly dispassionate reporting to the Department that has ever come out of this Embassy and reporting which will fully live up to the Bohlen tradition. We will report Viet-Nam as it really is, successes, failures, beauty spots and warts. And we will not permit ourselves to be swayed from pursuing this goal by anything a once great newspaper may print."

Nor, I might add, by anyone else.

22. On [redacted] second message, I have no comment except to point out that, although in paragraph 4 he states "domestic press coverage is itself frequently biased and incomplete....New York Times coverage has been a particular example," he uses the same press reports in the very next paragraph to justify his conclusion that my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was inaccurate. Perhaps if he depended more on original sources, the record of the hearings in this case, or a personal interview with me while he was in Viet-Nam (which was always available to any

B6

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FSO who requested one) perhaps both his reporting and his conclusions would be more soundly based.

23. Paragraph six of [redacted] second message perhaps explains why he sought no such interview or, as far as I can determine, discussed with any of his supervisors while here, the enormous distortions that were, according to him, taking place. The only tentative conclusion I can, with great reluctance, draw from this paragraph is that [redacted] and, if we are to believe him, others of his colleagues, did not have the courage of their convictions to raise their concerns with their superiors. Rather they would wait until, with OERs safely tucked away, they would indulge in such charges from the safety of a post half way round the world. That paragraph is the most savage, utterly damning self-indictment I ever recall seeing. B6

24. The statements made by me before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are the exact truth and had [redacted] bothered to ask he could have easily so ascertained while he was here. B6

25. But more troubling is the concept of dissent this paragraph displays. What [redacted] seems to be seeking is not the opportunity for legitimate and reasoned dissent, but licensed anarchy, to be engaged in at will, with full and complete guarantees absolving him from any responsibilities for his actions. In twenty-seven years in the Foreign Service of the forty years I have spent in the service of the American people I have, it seems in retrospect, to have been engaged in constant dissent. I still am. I have given it some thought and offered publicly in 1968 some "Reflections on Dissent". Having always asserted my right to dissent, I have always been meticulous in assuring that right to others. But I never assumed I could dissent without risk even if I had carefully prepared a case which would establish my dissent was responsible, serious, and based on incontrovertible fact. With the thought that it just possibly could have some relevance I am attaching a copy of those remarks as Annex E and call attention to the closing paragraph. B6

26. I said in the beginning I shared [redacted] distaste for the Department's responses to him. My reasons are obviously different. The channel was set up for dissent on "policy" issues according to the communications to the field announcing its creation. [redacted] communications would not seem to fit the description. [redacted] B6

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 11
Saigon
A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

communications are, in reality, an attack on the integrity, honesty, and competence of a fellow member of the Foreign Service. This doesn't bother me personally. It has been tried over the years by far abler antagonists. It has been tried this year. I am perfectly able to defend myself, and a record of forty years of total integrity really makes me impervious to this kind of attack. As certain politicians have discovered this year the circulation of distortions about me can have results that are politically disastrous to them. But I am concerned, for others, that this kind of attack can be widely circulated, without prior notice to the officer so attacked, simply because its author forwarded it through the "Dissent Channel". I suggest this is a prostitution of the Secretary's intent when he established the "Dissent" procedure.

27. My other objection centers on the fact that when questioned on the release of the Senate Staff Report, the Department spokesman, with the personal approval of the Secretary, expressed total confidence in the integrity of the reporting of the U. S. Mission in Saigon. Even the procedure recommended by [redacted] in paragraph 16 of his first message contemplates that the Secretary's determination is final.

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28. Therefore, to indicate, as S/P's replies to [redacted] does that there is still an open question to be resolved by the forthcoming inspection would seem to imply that the Inspectors are better able to arrive at such a conclusion than is the Secretary, an implication I rather think the Secretary may find both distasteful and absurd.

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29. This reply is too long. If I were concerned only over the attack on me I would have ignored it. The two "Dissent" messages, and the Department's response, highlight a more important issue. The report I wrote for the Foreign Service Association in 1948, published under the title, Toward a Modern Diplomacy, included an annex on openness of the Service. On page 124 of that small volume there appears the following:

"c. Evaluation: The real test of openness for the foreign service comes at the policy-making phase when debate is hot and differences are engaged. The tendency of policy formulators from desk officers on up to resent outside advice or resist debate is a natural bureaucratic reaction. The foreign service must, however, play a more active role in

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 12
Saigon
A-255

devising new ways to keep debate alive and to support the objectives of those parts of the bureaucracy whose primary function is to question established policy."

30. That report was, in and of itself, a "Dissent". It was done without authority or sanction of the Department, and it, therefore, entailed considerable risk to those who participated in it. But we believed what we had to say was important enough to pay the price. The "Dissent Channel" is a logical outgrowth of that exercise and the subsequent Macomber Task Forces which it spawned.

31. The "Dissent Channel", in my opinion, is important. It should be preserved. It is not likely to be if those charged by the Secretary with monitoring its use continue to permit it to be abused as it has been in this case,

32. Therefore, assuming all Foreign Service Officers have the same rights under the "dissent" procedure, even those temporarily detached while serving the President as Chief of Mission, I suggest this message be considered a "dissent" from all four of the referenced messages and be accorded the same distribution as they received, adding the Director of Personnel. Those messages and this response are being sent by me to all Foreign Service Officers in Viet-Nam.

33. As a matter of fact, I have not the slightest objection to whatever wider distribution may be desired, including Mr. Moose of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff, and the press. And to ease the slight twinge of conscience which might impede the inclination of some to leak it, I am sending this message as "Unclassified".

34. The Secretary has already directed that it be publicly announced that the Department has complete confidence in the integrity and completeness of the reporting of the Saigon Mission. I have been told that it is horrible to be nibbled to death by ducks, but when they are your own ducks it is both obscene and ridiculous. Therefore, having the old-fashioned idea that his subordinate bureaucracy cannot overrule the Secretary, I consider the matter closed and I shall not address it again.


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UNCLASSIFIED

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13

RELEASE IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED

Annex A
Saigon
A-255

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

We are meeting this afternoon to hear a report from our Ambassador in Viet-Nam, Ambassador Graham Martin. He has a very long and distinguished career in Foreign Service.

Earlier this year there appeared an article in the New York Times which was brought to my attention by the staff, and prompted me to write a letter to the Secretary of State. By way of background for the hearings I think that letter and then a reply from the Ambassador should be put in the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

Hon. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

January 24, 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary: I was somewhat disturbed at the article in the January 17 issue of the New York Times entitled "U. S. Envoy Runs Tight Saigon Ship; Curbs News, Strongly Backs Thieu," a copy of which is enclosed. I hope that the Embassy in Saigon is not going down the same road again that contributed to official U. S. misperceptions of Viet-Nam in the past--the road of thought control, censorship of Embassy reporting, lack of contact and communication with the press. I have learned from experience that when press accounts to this effect appear from normally reliable reporters they usually have some basis in fact.

I wonder if you might inquire and let me know what Ambassador Martin's policy is concerning press contacts between American officials in general, and with regard to requests for interviews, what the Ambassador's policy is with regard to access by members of the press to the Defense Attache's Office and what guarantees there are that Embassy reporting will be objective and that a full spectrum of views can be expressed to the Department.

From other sources I am aware that several American news

UNCLASSIFIED

14

Page 2
Annex A
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

organizations have encountered severe difficulties in maintaining their representation in Viet-Nam. Some journalists have been refused extension of their visas and others have been denied admittance. We understand that the Embassy in Saigon has been of minimal assistance to the U. S. individuals and organizations involved in these difficulties. These reports are a matter of concern to me, and I would hope that the Embassy in Saigon would be asked to make every effort to assist the American media in performing its functions in South Viet-Nam.

Sincerely yours, J. W. Fulbright, Chairman

(From the New York Times, Jan. 17, 1974)

U. S. ENVOY RUNS TIGHT SAIGON SHIP; CURBS NEWS, STRONGLY BACKS THIEU

(By James M. Markham)

Saigon, South Viet-Nam, Jan. 16-In Ambassador Graham A. Martin's six months in Saigon, he has asserted firm control of the sprawling official American community, established a severely restrictive public-information policy and given almost uncritical support to the Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

The 61-year-old career diplomat, whose ambassadorial style is reclusive to the point of secretiveness, rarely ventures outside the white, fortresslike embassy in downtown Saigon.

Unlike his predecessor, Ellsworth Bunker, Mr. Martin sees only a restricted circle of high-ranking South Vietnamese officials; he has no known contact with opposition figures. There are some middle-level members of his staff he has not met. One American jokingly calls him God. "I know he exists, but I haven't seen him," this embassy aide remarked.

A Baptist minister's son born in Mars Hill, N. C., Mr. Martin is said to be a strong family man and, according to friends, a devoted friend. He reportedly spends a good deal of time with his

UNCLASSIFIED

15

Page 3
Annex A
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

wife, Dorothy, in the heavily guarded ambassadorial residence. One of their four children, an adopted son who was a helicopter pilot, was killed in a crash in South Viet-Nam in 1966.

After Mr. Martin graduated from Wake Forest College in 1932 and before he joined the Government, he was a correspondent for several small Southern newspapers in the South and in Washington, and he has retained a strong, even passionate, interest in the press. He has been known to lecture visitors about the damage that "irresponsible" reporting did to the American effort in Viet-Nam, and he is evidently determined not to suffer similar reporting while here.

"Everyone knows that he's the boss, that he's in charge," a Foreign Service officer said admiringly, contrasting the Martin tenure with the loose, almost baronial system over which Ambassador Bunker presided.

According to associates, both a streak of insomnia and a passion to sift through raw intelligence data keep Mr. Martin up at home until 2 in the morning, reading almost everything written by his subordinates. This emphasis on detail has lifted the spirits of some Foreign Service officers who appreciate the attention but others say there is distinct pressure to cast things in an optimistic light. "He doesn't like what he calls internal biased or defeatist reporting," an American explained. "So instead of saying that the South Vietnamese Army suffered disastrous defeat, we say that it suffered a setback, losing 80 men, 12 trucks, 15 guns. But the information's still there."

A. REVERSAL ON RICE

According to one account, the embassy was rather glowingly reporting on the success of the rice harvest and distribution system in one part of the country until it became evident that a fresh infusion of rice from the United States was needed. "The reporting reversed gear," a diplomat said.

Publicly Mr. Martin takes an extremely rosy view of South Viet-Nam and its future at a time when many well-informed South

UNCLASSIFIED

16

Page 4
Annex A
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

Vietnamese do not. To visitors he praises President Thieu lavishly and asserts that his Government is rooting out corruption and that it holds no political prisoners.

"If he were pessimistic there would be nothing to do," said an ambassador who generally admires Mr. Martin's approach to his job.

The American envoy's firm support has reportedly delighted Mr. Thieu and his closest aides, who are said to consider Mr. Martin their strongest lobbyist in Washington.

According to a report from there, the Ambassador has been a prime mover in a campaign to obtain \$1-billion in sophisticated weapons for the South Vietnamese armed forces to off-set up-to-date weaponry reportedly infiltrated by the Communists.

"He's at the end of his career, he didn't really want to come here in the first place," another diplomat has said. "He wants to retire to his farm in Tuscany. He doesn't particularly care what people think of him."

A devoted family man and, according to friends, a devoted friend, Mr. Martin is said to spend a good deal of his time with his wife, Dorothy, in the heavily guarded ambassadorial residence. Their adopted son, a helicopter pilot, was killed in a crash in South Viet-Nam in 1966.

As a young man, before he joined the government, Mr. Martin was a correspondent for several small Southern newspapers, and he has retained a strong, even passionate, interest in the press. He has been known to lecture visitors about the damage that "irresponsible" reporting did to the American effort in Viet-Nam, and he is evidently determined not to suffer similar reporting while here.

Access to American officials has been sharply restricted since his arrival in mid-July. Veteran Viet-Nam correspondents who periodically return to Saigon find that old friends in the mission are nervous about talking with them.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 5
Annex A
Saigon A-255

PASSES ON INTERVIEWS

The Ambassador personally passes upon interviews with members of the embassy who hold sensitive posts and has almost completely cut off journalists' official access to the Defense Attache's Office.

Officials were recently instructed to talk only about their own "areas of responsibility"--a somewhat vague injunction that has made some career-minded members of the mission even jumpier with the press than they already were.

Theoretically, if you know about roads and bridges, you can't talk about blowing up roads and bridges," said a young Foreign Service officer stationed outside Saigon.

Defenders of Mr. Martin's press policy say he is trying to reduce the appearance of American interference in South Viet-Nam's internal affairs, while critics in the embassy say, as one put it, that he is "hiding a pretty good story that we have to tell."

Correspondents of The New York Times in Saigon have repeatedly requested interviews with Mr. Martin; none have been granted.

Hon. J. W. Fulbright,
U. S. Senate
Washington, D. C.

Saigon, Viet-Nam,
February 5, 1974.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I have just received today the text of your letter of January 24 to the Secretary. It is most welcome to me. As I never respond to newspaper articles it affords an opportunity, which I would not otherwise seek, to respond fully and completely to the concerns you have expressed.

For more than the forty years I have spent in the service of the people of the United States the one asset I have prized most highly is a reputation for complete and total integrity. It is a

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 6
Annex A
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

deserved reputation for I have flatly refused either to equivocate or evade reporting and saying what I believed to be the exact truth even when to do so was certain to offend those who wished to hear only that which supported conclusions they have already reached. This is a risky course and, at times, a costly course but one from which I determined long ago I would not be diverted, no matter what the personal cost might be. This fact is too widely known to be open to serious question and will be completely evident to historians when the archives containing all my reports are finally open for their inspection, particularly so for the reports and comments dealing with Southeast Asia.

I hope, therefore, that you can accept my categorical assurance that, as long as I am charged with this Mission "the Embassy in Saigon is not going down the same road again that contributed to official U. S. misperceptions of Viet-Nam in the past -- the road of thought control, censorship of Embassy reporting, lack of contact and communication with the press". The historical record will completely attest that it was my rather acid criticisms from Bangkok of just these factors of Saigon reporting which got me in serious trouble a decade ago with both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. I would even agree with the last sentence of your first paragraph stating, "I have learned from experience that when press accounts to this effect appear from normally reliable reporters they usually have some basis in fact". In this case, I would add the caveat that your adjectives "normally reliable" could only be accorded the old Scotch verdict - "not proven".

My policy concerning press contacts is governed, inevitably, by my own experience as a working journalist. I was regarded as a good reporter. I often wonder what would have happened had I accepted the invitation to do a column for the Washington Post. Perhaps today it might be my byline rather than Scotty Reston's to which you would turn over your morning coffee. And I might have been tempted to observe that I was probably the only living person who, as a working journalist, had covered the last case in which the Senate sat as a Court of Impeachment.

Perhaps, as some of my journalist friends have observed,

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 7

Annex A

UNCLASSIFIED

Saigon A-255

I left the profession so young that I still regarded it as a profession - not a trade. I thought then and now that those who were fortunate enough to enjoy the protection of the First Amendment had a corollary professional responsibility to inform the American people of the whole truth as clearly and completely as one might perceive it after persistent digging, cross checking, and making every attempt to insure that all facts were accurate. Under no circumstances would one slant a story either to conform to an editor's known prejudices or to push one's own personal point of view. Those who did were not regarded as journalists but as propagandists - the word we used was "flacks". Nevertheless, I still maintain a deep and almost passionate conviction that a free press, even with its, fortunately small, most rotten and biased elements, is an absolutely indispensable ingredient for the preservation of our freedom.

Believing this it is, of course, essential that I would insure we provide for an effective and orderly mechanism to provide as completely and accurately as we possibly can answers to questions presented to this Embassy by American news correspondents. This is and will continue to be my policy. To provide this service I have requested that press inquiries be channeled through the Counselor of Embassy for Press Affairs, a senior, experienced and highly capable officer who will either obtain and make available the information if it is readily accessible or arrange for an interview with a senior official responsible for the area with which the question deals. The story is quite correct that I have observed that it makes little contribution to accuracy of the information reaching the American people if officers speculated in talks with newsmen on matters about which they were not informed. In such cases, it would be better if the reporter talked with the real expert in the field covered by his question. It's just as well, perhaps, that the reporter was not told the rest of that observation. I recalled that I had not been convinced that numerous interviews with mess sergeants on the high strategy of the war, during our extensive and unnecessary military involvement, had made a great contribution to public enlightenment. Of course, neither had the interviews with the Generals. Nevertheless, I thought that, perhaps, our experts could do better. I still think this to be sound advice.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 8
Annex A
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

Most of the press have found these arrangements quite satisfactory. Some have not. For example, during the 1972 offensive by the North Vietnamese forces, when American forces were still present and American airpower was actively engaged, my predecessor authorized CIA officials to routinely and regularly brief the press in order to give the American people a full and accurate picture of the fighting.

I found this still continuing when I arrived. I ordered it stopped. We are now engaged in no way in the fighting which is going on as a result of the North Vietnamese decision to raise the intensity of the violence of their attacks in violation of the Paris Agreements. Therefore, I thought it highly improper that we should appear to be speaking in any way for either side or that the CIA should be briefing the press in any event. Similarly with the Defense Attache office. Its role is wholly concerned with logistics. It is precluded from any advisory role in the fighting that is taking place. Its personnel are logistically trained, not as combat personnel. Therefore, to permit continuation of briefings or comments on the course of the fighting would not only give a completely false indication of our involvement in the fighting but would quite probably be beyond their professional competence. I suggested this also cease.

To those reporters, including those of the New York Times, who now had to work a bit harder to get their information from those actually involved in the fighting, this naturally becomes the establishment of "a severely restrictive public information policy". I do not so regard it nor do I believe you would wish me to revert to the previous procedure.

My practice in regard to requests for interviews is to grant them whenever possible. I have probably spent more hours with journalists than has been justified, but I do feel the compulsion I mentioned earlier to contribute as I can to the proper exercise of a free press. I obviously cannot grant all requests. I feel no compulsion at all to grant interviews to reporters from papers whose emotional involvement in a North Vietnamese victory is

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 9
Annex A
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

transparently clear and whose reporting, features, and editorials combine to present gross and blatant distortions to the public. To do so would permit my own reputation for integrity to be used as a platform to deceive the American people and this I simply will not do no matter what the personal cost. The last line of the story was one of the few that was wholly accurate. It states, "Correspondents of the New York Times in Saigon have repeatedly requested interviews with Mr. Martin; none have been granted." Another phrase could have been added: "and it is highly unlikely that any will be in the future". That, too, would have been accurate.

Your last question inquired "what guarantees there are that Embassy reporting will be objective and that a full spectrum of views can be expressed to the Department". The answer is, of course, none except my own integrity. And that, on the basis of a forty year record, is a complete guarantee. Even Mr. David Halberstam, to whose book The Best and the Brightest you referred at the time Messrs. Godley, Sullivan and I appeared before you for confirmation, bears indirect testimony to that fact. I am not even mentioned in the book. I am told that when asked how I possibly could be omitted, he replied that the thrust of the book was to demonstrate that when the military machine started rolling no one could stand in its way. Since I had fought bitterly and successfully to keep the Americans totally out of any direct involvement in the Thai insurgency, it would have disproved his thesis to have mentioned me.

If you will refer to another book, Charles Bohlen's Witness to History, you will find recorded the precepts for the kind of reporting this Embassy will do. Facts, carefully researched, thoroughly documented, reported without adjectives implying a judgment only history can give. Even the story says, "But the information is still there". Since I have been here, no report has been either stopped or slanted. The officers are beginning to take pride in the fact that our objective is to ensure the most candid, objective, wholly dispassionate reporting to the Department that has ever come out of this Embassy and reporting which will fully live up to the Bohlen tradition. We will report Viet-Nam

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 10
Annex A
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

as it really is, successes, failures, beauty spots and warts. And we will not permit ourselves to be swayed from pursuing this goal by anything a once great newspaper may print.

I am afraid the other sources quoted in the last paragraph of your letter are no more accurate than Mr. Markham's story. Although the Republic of Viet-Nam understandably has grown sensitive over the consistent distortions some elements of the media have promulgated, this Embassy has consistently intervened in their behalf although we do not always tell them the full extent of that intervention. The most recent case is the author of the article to which you have referred. In complete disregard of the regulations well known to all correspondents, Mr. Markham visited certain PRG controlled areas without obtaining prior permission as required which would have been routinely forthcoming. He compounded this offense by taking along as interpreter a non-journalist "peace activist" well known as an apologist for Hanoi, even including their incredible record of American MIAs. The Embassy intervened to secure his release and the return of his notes. In fact, my own personal intervention probably exceeded the limits of intervention into the internal affairs of another country you indicated were proper at my confirmation hearing. Nevertheless, noting with great sadness that the New York Times has recently purchased the newspaper for which I first wrote, I took the risk in the forlorn hope that the New York Times may yet return to the standards of objectivity and accuracy that once made it a truly great institution.

I apologize for the length of this letter but I wanted to be certain that, as always, I responded fully to any request that might come from you or the Committee.

Sincerely,

Graham Martin

The Chairman. Several members of the committee at that time had requested that when the Ambassador was back in Washington it would be useful to have him before the committee to give us some report upon the situation in Viet-Nam and what he thought about it. That is the reason we are having him today.

UNCLASSIFIED

23

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 11
Annex A
Saigon A-255

We are very pleased to have you, Ambassador Martin. I believe you have a statement?

UNCLASSIFIED

5046B

24

RELEASE IN FULL

Annex B,
Saigon
A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT ON REPORTING

QUESTION OF ACCURACY OF SAIGON EMBASSY'S REPORTING

The Chairman. One last area here with regard to the material which I inserted and about which I wrote the Secretary, is the question of reporting from the Saigon Embassy. There seems still to be some question about the accuracy of the reporting.

We have a recent report from our staff which I quote:

"A review of the material used by the Embassy to prepare these reports indicates that the thrust of information submitted from the field to Saigon is sometimes altered and that on occasion significant information is withheld altogether. One consistent pattern which emerges from a study of these reports is the Embassy's tendency to play down or to ignore obvious cease-fire violations by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces.

This spring, for example, one consulate general reported to Saigon the conclusion of a large Government operation designed to clear out a Communist base area and noted that hundreds of homes and bunkers had been destroyed. In summarizing this information, in its weekly report to Washington, the Embassy made no mention of the Government operation, but noted instead an overall decline in military activity despite significant Communist attacks." Do you wish to comment on that?

Mr. Martin. Yes, sir.

I think if we had been consulted on that, we could have immediately put the incident in its true perspective. I don't know what the incident is -- but many times in order to avoid the sort of ceaseless flood of paper we have not reported through "State channels" what has already been reported either through Defense channels or through the CIA channels.

Now, I have just been made aware of the implications in this staff report. It surprises me because basically I do not believe there is the slightest foundation to it.

UNCLASSIFIED

25

Page 2
Annex B
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

Now, I have consulted with my colleagues here in Washington who are responsible for Vietnamese affairs and I have been assured that they have been completely satisfied that in the totality of the reporting that comes from all sources in Saigon, there have been no significant omissions of any kind.

Now, as I wrote you, Mr. Chairman, that has been my intention, my conviction, and is one on which I have worked as hard as I could. I mean to get it totally understood that what we are trying to do now in Viet-Nam is to see that we report to Washington the total facts as they are, the whole truth. We have had some difficulties in the beginning in getting some of our younger officers to separate fact from rumors, from opinion. They can report it all, but I insist rumor or opinion, it be identified as such. I think we are entitled at this time when decisions are being made, which are of considerable importance and involve considerable sums of money, that there be no imprecision in the reporting from Viet-Nam. That has been my goal. It will continue to be my goal.

The Chairman. It is a very worthy goal, but the representatives of this committee, both of whom I believe had experience in foreign service are very experienced observers, seem to have a very different report.

The report will as a whole be published; it is already available to the committee. I will read one more paragraph and I will yield to my colleagues.

It says: "Some U. S. officials with whom this reporting" -- this is the practice to which I have already referred -- "was discussed, point out that the question of who initiates a given military action is not of itself a significant matter given the fact that both sides constantly violate the agreement. That is the Paris peace agreement.

These same officials did, however, express concern that those who rely on the Embassy's reporting could be misinformed. Other U. S. officials discount the importance of this practice, noting that the Embassy's biases are well known and supplemental sources of information are available.

"The Embassy is also known to make substantial deletions in reports from its consulates general before relaying them to Washington. Earlier this year, one of these posts reported to Saigon a serious deterioration in security within its military region. The message in

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3
Annex B
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

question included five specific references to declining security conditions or poor performances on the part of Government forces. In this instance, the text of the consulate general's report was relayed to Washington but only after the passages in question had been deleted, thereby eliminating significant aspects of the field assessment. Readers in Washington had no way of knowing that the message had been altered."

Then the more important deletions are referred to.

Mr. Martin. I would say again, I am sorry to have to completely disagree, Mr. Chairman --

ACCURACY OF REPORTING BY SAIGON EMBASSY

The Chairman. This report compared to the report of the press, to which you have taken serious objections, does raise a very serious question about the accuracy of our information. I would ask that the staff report be printed in the record after it has been through the executive branch clearance process. (See appendix.)

Mr. Martin. I, of course, have not seen it and it is difficult for me to comment on it without seeing it, and if it would be agreeable to you, Mr. Chairman, I think in fairness it would be perhaps a contribution in determining the accuracy of the situation as it really exists to permit me after I have seen the totality of this particular section to insert my own comments immediately following.

The Chairman. Certainly.

(The information referred to follows:)

(Excerpts from pages 13-17 of Committee Staff Report)

Over the years the American Embassy in Saigon has acquired a reputation, among both official and unofficial observers, for close identification with the policies of the South Vietnamese government and for selective reporting. These same tendencies are apparent today.

UNCLASSIFIED

27

Page 4
Annex B
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

Each week the four consulates general in South Viet-Nam send the Embassy a round-up of events relating to the military situation and the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The Embassy submits a summary of this information, together with comments on developments in Saigon, in the form of a weekly telegraphic report to Washington. A review of the material used by the Embassy to prepare these reports indicates that the thrust of information submitted from the field to Saigon is sometimes altered and that on occasion significant information is withheld altogether.

One consistent pattern which emerges from a study of these reports is the Embassy's tendency to play down or to ignore obvious cease-fire violations by the South Vietnamese armed forces. This spring, for example, one consulate general reported to Saigon the conclusion of a large government operation designed to "clear out a Communist base area" and noted that "hundreds of homes and bunkers had been destroyed." In summarizing this information in its weekly report to Washington the Embassy made no mention of the government operation, but noted instead an overall decline in military activity despite "significant Communist attacks."

We encountered many other instances in which South Vietnamese offensive initiatives were not reported to Washington. The following are examples of items contained in field summaries but which were omitted from the Embassy's weekly round-up:

Most contacts in (locations deleted) were the result of RVNAF (South Vietnamese) initiatives";

Most (of the incidents) occurring in ... and might be attributed to elimination by ... (South Vietnamese) divisions of (enemy) minibases... in accordance with the MR commander's instructions";

There was an increase in military activity in province as a result of (government) operations. Communist initiated incidents were at the lowest level for a year.

Some U. S. officials with whom this reporting was discussed point out that the question of who initiates a given military action is not of itself a significant matter given the fact that both sides

UNCLASSIFIED

28

Page 5
Annex B
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

constantly violate the Agreement. These same officials did, however, express concern that those who rely on the Embassy's reporting could be misinformed. Other U. S. officials discount the importance of this practice, noting that the Embassy's biases are well known and that supplemental sources of information are available.

The Embassy is also known to make substantial deletions in reports from its consulates general before relaying them to Washington. Earlier this year, one of these posts reported to Saigon a serious deterioration in security within its military region. The message in question included five specific references to declining security conditions or poor performances on the part of government forces. In this instance, the text of the consulate general's report was relayed to Washington but only after the passages in question had been deleted. Readers in Washington had no way of knowing that the message had been altered. The more important deletions were as follows:

This latest round of VC/NVA attacks further eroded security in some provinces where deterioration which began in December must now be viewed as serious.

Overall security in has fallen sharply since December, a condition which province officers say they are powerless to remedy with existing forces.

Last week the province chief learned that an accommodation had been reached between the RF company in and VC in the area by which RF soldiers were allowed to travel unarmed by sampan from their outpost unhindered. The province chief immediately ordered the company out on operations,.... (province) like(province) has seen security decline markedly in 1974.

Although Embassy reporting normally downplays government initiatives, it sometimes highlights successful operations. In February 1974, as noted in an earlier section, two South Vietnamese regiments attacked a long time Communist base area at Tri Phap in the delta. Embassy summaries at the time referred to the operation as follows: "The successful six weeks GVN (South Vietnamese

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 6
Annex B
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

government) operation against Tri Phap continues." In early April, the Embassy reported that the government had "concluded the pacification phase of its military efforts and began to consolidate its control through outposts and construction and preparation for permanent resettlement."

In the first of these summaries the Embassy made critical mention of the ICCS's failure "to conduct a formal investigation into the Cai Lay school atrocity." A similar comment was lacking in the Embassy's treatment of the Tri Phap operation. Both the reported government attack on Tri Phap and the apparent Communist mortar attack on Cai Lay were, of course, violations of the cease-fire.

In this connection we noted that briefing officers on the Defense Attache staff as well as Embassy officers generally employ terms such as "consolidation" or "pacification" activities and "security operations" when referring to what are, in reality, offensive actions by the South Vietnamese army. North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Government statements refer to such activities by the government as "land grabbing."

The Embassy, both in briefings provided to us and in its reporting to Washington, closely followed the public line of the South Vietnamese government in justifying the South Vietnamese measures which precipitated the temporary breakdown in May 1974 of the talks in Paris and Saigon between the South Vietnamese and the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The ostensible cause of this break was what President Thieu's spokesmen widely publicized on April 12 as a "massive North Vietnamese ground attack supported by tanks," which allegedly "overran" the long besieged border outpost of Tong Le Chan and presumably resulted in the loss of its entire garrison. In the following days, according to the Department of State, the South Vietnamese "reacted politically" by suspending their participation in the bilateral talks with the Provisional Revolutionary Government at La Celle St. Cloud in Paris and further isolating the Communist military delegates at Tan Son Nhut in Saigon by cutting their telephone lines, suspending

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 7
Annex B
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

weekly liaison flights to the Provisional Revolutionary Government headquarters and cancelling the weekly Saigon press conferences of the Provisional Revolutionary Government representatives. In response, the Communists suspended participation in the Two Party military team meetings and the missing in action talks (Four Party Joint Military Team) in Saigon and announced the "sine die" suspension of the Paris sessions.

Within a few days following the fall at Tong Le Chan, it became widely known in Saigon that the outpost had not, in fact, been overrun by tanks and infantry but rather had been abandoned by the South Vietnamese in the face of increasing Communist pressure. According to reliable American and foreign observers the commander of the outpost informed Saigon in early April that his position had become untenable. The government was then faced with a decision of whether to sacrifice the garrison in a last ditch defense or to attempt to extricate its personnel. Not wanting to undermine the morale of other isolated bases or to appear to be surrendering, Saigon apparently decided to exploit the situation for propaganda purposes. On the night of April 11, the government defenders withdrew from the outpost taking 65 wounded with them, and made their way to safety without any losses. U. S. military officials now concede that what the government first portrayed as a heroic last stand ("a little Dien Bien Phu") and what later appeared to have been a skillfully executed strategic withdrawal, was, in fact, facilitated by the North Vietnamese who "surrounded" the outpost -- on three sides -- and allowed the defenders to leave unmolested.

Although the Embassy must have had access to these facts, it reported to Washington April 16 what it described as the Communists' "transparent attempt to distract attention from their overrunning of Tong Le Chan" noting that Communist media had "... admitted laying siege to the base...but denied involvement by (North Vietnamese) ground forces, asserting instead that the defenders fled their base." For at least two weeks thereafter, the Embassy, even in its telegrams to Washington, supported the government's exploitation of the Tong Le Chan incident. On April 24 the Embassy noted that the "...bombardment and fall of Tong Le Chan have caused the (South Vietnamese government) to be less generous in its application of the eleven point privileges

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 8
Annex B
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

and immunities accorded to the Communist delegations and to take a less permissive approach to 'PRG' behavior."

Many foreign observers in Saigon, including members of the diplomatic corps, believe that the extensive publicity which the Saigon government was giving to the Tong Le Chan incident and other military actions in April and May, such as the maneuvering around Ben Cat, was part of a deliberate effort by the Saigon government, assisted by the U. S. Embassy, to impress the U. S. Congress of the necessity to authorize additional military assistance for South Viet-Nam. Some American officials, however, expressed concern at the impact of this public relations campaign on the prospects for future negotiation among the Vietnamese parties. One senior U. S. official with whom we discussed this problem acknowledged that the South Vietnamese government had made a determined effort to "position itself as the victim of North Vietnamese violations," and conceded that they "might have overreached themselves." Other Americans noted that the Embassy must bear a significant measure of responsibility for having encouraged them to do so.

Even those officials who are critical of the Embassy's reporting note that it contains one significant new element. In the past the Embassy's institutional memory has consisted of the personal expertise of a few individuals. During the past year the Embassy has devoted considerable attention to the study of leadership, and the interlocking political, social and financial patterns of Vietnamese society. In contrast with past practice, the Embassy's reporting on these subjects is now said to be perceptive, frank and of significant potential value to policy makers.

SUBSEQUENT COMMENT BY AMBASSADOR MARTIN ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT

I have now had the opportunity to review pages 13-17 of the Staff Report dated August 5, 1974. I am compelled to reiterate the regret I expressed to the Committee on July 25 that the author of this section of the report did not utilize the opportunity to discuss its substance with me during his visit to Saigon. Had this happened perhaps the Committee would have had a more accurate assessment of the accuracy of the reporting of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission in

UNCLASSIFIED

12

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 9
Annex B
Saigon A-255*

Saigon. As it is written, the part of the report is just plain wrong in most of its specifics and totally wrong in its implications.

No attempt has been made, and none will be, to have "Embassy" or "State Department" reporting duplicate reporting by other elements of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission. It is true that, quite often, sections of reports from the Consulate Generals will be eliminated from routine weekly reports because the substance had already been reported to Washington by other elements of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission. The illustrations given on pages 14 and 15 come within this framework.

The "Tong Le Chan" incident cited on page 14 is of a different character. What is not cited is that the Government of Viet-Nam did not actually know the post had been evacuated on decision of its Commander against specific orders not to do so. When all contact was lost, the GVN logically assumed that it had been overrun. The report says that "Although the Embassy must have had access to these facts..." the truth is that not until the remnants of the garrison showed up some days later did the GVN know precisely what had happened. Washington was completely and currently informed of all information as soon as it was known in Saigon. The conclusion attributed to U. S. military officials in the last sentence of the first paragraph on page 16 that the "skillfully executed strategic withdrawal" was in fact facilitated by the North Vietnamese is not supported by any competent U. S. military official known to me.

Similarly, the report notes that "On April 24 the Embassy noted that the ".....bombardment and fall of Tong Le Chan have caused the (South Vietnamese government) to be less generous in its application of the eleven point privileges and immunities accorded to the Communist delegations and to take a less permissive approach to 'PRG' behavior." This is, of course, a true statement. Over 900 mortar rounds fell on Tong Le Chan within one hour just before all contact was lost. The post did "fall", and it is also, of course, true that the fact that the fall of this outpost which had always been under GVN control did cause the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 10
Annex B
Saigon A-255

GVN "to be less generous in its application of the eleven point privileges and immunities..."

All of this information would have been available to the staff member had he bothered to inquire about it rather than depend on a combination of a partial examination of Embassy files which were made freely available to him and obviously uninformed comment and explanation by unnamed sources.

Similarly, only the penultimate sentence of the third paragraph of page 16 has even any partial validity. In the "maneuvering around Ben Cat" between 16 May and June 30 more than 3,990 casualties were incurred by both sides according to DOD. It is hardly credible to any objective observer that either side would have incurred such costs to "impress the U. S. Congress."

With respect to footnote 1 on page 16, the use of quotation marks in reference to the "PRG" (Provisional Revolutionary Government), or a qualifying term such as "so-called PRG", is necessary and appropriate in diplomatic parlance since the United States Government neither recognizes this organization as a government nor considers it a legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people.

It is quite true that the reporting of the U. S. Mission in Saigon now has a bias. It is to see that the U. S. Government, the American people and the American Congress receive the whole truth about current realities in Viet-Nam. As long as it remains in my charge, that is the only bias that will be followed.

Mr. Martin. I would repeat what I have said before, I think in these instances if they had been called to my attention at the time of the staff visit to Saigon, rather than uncritically accepting comments of unnamed people who are quoted as saying whatever it is, we would find that the information which was taken out of one report had already been reported in another.

Now I understand you have also made some points in this committee, and I think this committee has endorsed them, on the role of an ambassador. I have myself very definite feelings about this which I understand are in line with those of the committee.

UNCLASSIFIED

34

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 11
Annex B
Saigon A-225

I do not run the U. S. Embassy alone. I am responsible for the totality of the U. S. activities there.

No, when it is said that the Embassy's reporting, which I think as mentioned here is shorthand for State Department reporting, is supplemented by other sources, I regard it all as my reporting. Other sources, I assume, means other agencies. I also assume other agencies are present in Viet-Nam because it involves the foreign policy of the United States, otherwise they would not be there. Since this is the case, I assume the responsibility for their actions and their reporting.

If the reports come in, then, through other channels and are made available to the senior officials here in Washington who are responsible for the area, I am not necessarily all that interested in seeing that they are duplicated in State Department channels.

UNCLASSIFIED

5046C

35

RELEASE IN PART B6

UNCLASSIFIED

Annex C
Saigon
A-255

MEMORANDUM

Date: December 2, 1974

TO: The Ambassador
FROM: POL/INT: Lacy A. Wright
SUBJECT: Answer to Dissent Message of [redacted]

B6

This report is in response to your request to me November 27 to prepare suggestions for a reply to [redacted] second dissent message (State 260507). I would propose that the Embassy answer [redacted] specific allegations in the following manner.

B6

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A. [redacted] charges the Embassy with "consistently and intentionally distorting its reporting" (Belgrade 5659). As evidence for that sweeping statement, he offers two examples (Belgrade A-442). Neither holds water. (Here the Embassy should refute the two allegations in detail.)

B6

B. [redacted] takes issue with the Department's reply (State 225131) to his original dissent message (Belgrade A-442) by proclaiming his lack of confidence that reporting "gaps" noted in A-442 were adequately covered through other reporting channels. In support, he says that "of those channels cited in the Department's reply, the only ones completely unavailable to me were domestic press reports and debriefings of visitors to the Department." (Note: Channels cited by the Department were State, CIA, USIA, DOD, and AID.) Anyone familiar with the operations of an Embassy knows that [redacted] is simply wrong here. Some Embassy messages are known only to the Ambassador; others are restricted to the front office or are limited to various other people or offices. In Consulates General, officers do not even see all messages leaving their own post, let alone all those sent from the Embassy.

B6

B6

UNCLASSIFIED

36

Page 2
Annex C
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

C. [] takes issue with Ambassador Martin's statement that "younger officers...are entitled to report it all" provided it is accurately labeled. He says that "this was not mission policy as understood in the Consulates General in which I worked. Nor was it, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the effective policy in the Embassy itself." [] goes on to say, "The atmosphere in the Consulates General in which I worked was such that dissenting officers, considering potential career damage and even working relationships with their superiors, were under strong pressure to do nothing. There was, in addition, a strong fear of being caught in an erroneous position through postulated information to which only higher levels of the Embassy had access."

B6

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There is no attempt on [] part to substantiate these charges. He cites not one case of an officer's attempting to present an unpopular view and suffering for it. He did not do so himself while he was here. The same dissent channel that is open to him in Belgrade was open to him -- and others -- here in Saigon. The contention that officers in Viet-Nam did not use this channel because they feared for their careers, if true, speaks poorly for the officers involved. The dissent channel at Embassy Saigon was open then -- and is open now -- for those who wish to employ it.

B6

As noted above, [] maintains that "there wasa strong fear of being caught in an erroneous position through postulated information to which only higher levels of the Embassy had access." To say this is simply to acknowledge that an Embassy is hierarchical in structure; if every officer felt himself entitled to make the judgments now reserved to the Ambassador and top mission officers, the result would be reporting chaos as well as a gross infringement on the right of the Ambassador to run his Embassy. The "fear" of which [] speaks is one which ought

B6

B6

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3
Annex C
Saigon A-255

to grip any officer who contemplates making judgments on matters the scope of which he cannot possibly have the information to comprehend.

- D. [] contends that "the fact of this distortion (which he has failed to prove) is damaging to the morale and to the integrity of the Foreign Service." Only individual officers can say how their morale is faring. [] is apparently faring poorly. If others who have served at Embassy Saigon agree, they should speak up.

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UNCLASSIFIED

5046D

38

Annex D
Saigon
A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

Date: December 6, 1974

RELEASE IN PART B6

TO: The Ambassador

FROM: M. J. Spear, Consul General, Nha Trang

SUBJECT: Dissent Message of [redacted]

B6

1. While I believe the Embassy in Saigon will respond to [redacted] dissent, I would like to enter my own demurrer with regard to his objections to the reporting from this Post.

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2. [redacted] feels that failure to clearly label GVN military initiatives as violations of the cease-fire amounts to a consistent distortion of reporting, serious enough to call into question the Department's ability to reach policy decisions based on this reporting. He cites two instances of this from the Cease-Fire Weekly reports from Nha Trang.

B6

3. I have reviewed the Cease-Fire Weekly reports drafted by [redacted] and I note that during the period they cover, the GVN outposts at Dak Pek in Kontum and Tieu Atar in Darlac were assaulted and captured by communist forces and a major thrust was carried out by elements of the 3rd NVA Division in Binh Dinh against GVN positions including the Phu Cat airbase. None of these were characterized in [redacted] reporting as communist violations of the cease-fire. Mr. Cook, who was Acting Consul General at the time, advises me that the question of so characterizing them was never raised by [redacted]. This, together with his recommendation that a panel should be constituted to investigate reporting of "...possible South Vietnamese cease-fire violations, instances of corruption and any other occurrences which might be seen as reflecting adversely on the South Vietnamese effort," suggest to my mind that [redacted] may have a few biases of his own which he believes should be reflected in official reporting. I do not see how this would differ from the "consistent distortion of reporting" of which he complains.

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B6

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2
Annex D
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

4. At this Post we have simply reported the facts as best we could gather them (and this is difficult enough, at best) and have been content to let them speak for themselves, without trying to characterize them (unless this is clearly labelled as "Comment"). We believe the Department is quite capable of drawing its own conclusions.

5. Turning to specifics, [] complains that it was necessary to repeat as an "intensified action in the Eo Gio area of Kontum" what was an actual division-sized GVN attack on NVA lines north-east of Kontum city. I note that the following week he reported this as "a push toward Vo Dinh by the 41st and 44th Regiments". I believe the Viet-Nam experts in the Departments of State and Defense are capable of recognizing a push by two regiments as a division-sized attack without the benefit of [] Order of Battle analysis. I cannot see that there was any "cover-up" in this reporting.

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6. [] feels he should have described a GVN operation as a "deep penetration into communist base areas" (presumably because this constituted a GVN cease-fire violation). He then goes on to note that these were "base areas from which VC/NVA units had been launching raids", but without any suggestion that these raids constituted cease-fire violations by the communists - prior ones to which the GVN was responding.

B6

7. The Moose-Meissner report, which [] cites with approval, notes that "lack of respect for the (Paris) Agreements is so widespread that it is impossible to apportion responsibility for the continued fighting. Even in the case of isolated incidents, initial responsibility is invariably lost in cycles of action and reaction." With this I would agree, and that's why we try to avoid value judgments and let the facts speak for themselves.

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UNCLASSIFIED

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90

RELEASE IN FULL

Annex E
Saigon
A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

REFLECTIONS ON DISSENT

Address by
The Honorable Graham Martin
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
at the
Fall Convocation
of
Wake Forest University
Winston-Salem, N. C.
Thursday, September 18, 1969
11:00 a.m.

I have just returned from Istanbul where I represented the United States Government at the XXI World Conference of the Red Cross. Our headlines are usually devoted to violence and tension. This Conference, attended by the representatives of the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of 96 nations and by government delegations representing 84 countries, bears eloquent testimony that there is still overwhelming concern in the great humanitarian objectives which constituted the agenda for this conference.

On the way, I again visited Geneva. It is fascinating to renew contacts with old friends, to discuss what is happening in the world and to speculate on how future events may unfold. Most useful is the deeper perspective one gains from the opportunity to learn how this great nation really looks to experienced, dispassionate and perceptive observers of other nations.

In talking to one old friend, one of Europe's most distinguished scholars, I told him that I had been asked to deliver an address at the Fall Convocation at my old school. I said that I regarded the award of the degree of Doctor of Laws from Wake Forest University as one of the highest honors I had ever received in a career that had given me more honors than I could possibly deserve. I hoped, therefore, I would have something useful to say.

My friend was silent for a moment. He then said that he was very glad that I so regarded it. He believed, he said, along with his British colleague, C. P. Snow, that the church-related liberal

UNCLASSIFIED

4.

Page 2
Annex E
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

arts institutions in the United States were rapidly becoming one of the last bastions for the preservation of that particular sense of responsibility imparted through an acquaintance with and respect for the humanities. If these basic values are not preserved, he thought, it is not likely that our civilization can make the necessary adaptations that will insure its continued dedication to the principle of individual human dignity.

There are many things it would be useful to say, he went on. You could comment on the failure of the communications media to adequately inform our peoples. The virtual revolution in communications technology has so deluged us with unrelated facts that we are in great danger of losing the perspective that is essential to survival in a nuclear world. I said that I agreed with him but that I had already alluded to this dangerous drift in some comments I had made before the Overseas Press Club in New York in 1966.

He asked what I had chosen as a theme. I replied that I wanted to offer a few reflections on dissent. He looked out over the terrace and pointed across the lake to the old city of Geneva. It is good that you stopped by here, he said, you can start by thinking again of our Jean Jacques Rousseau and the influence of his writings on your Thomas Jefferson. This ancient Republic and Canton of Geneva has had an historic connection with the quality of dissent in America, he went on, and we, as in fact does the entire world, are watching with fascination how you are handling it now because on your success may very well depend our survival.

So, I am going to speak about dissent. Our system cannot really endure without it. Yet, unbridled, it can destroy all that we cherish.

If students are going to have any influence on the larger establishment they will soon join, dissent from "conventional wisdom" which has lost its relevance simply must become part of their baggage.

Some of us can testify from experience that it will never be a non-hazardous undertaking. Some of us can also say that if dissent is to be effective, that dissent must be not only vigorous but also informed and intelligent.

UNCLASSIFIED

42

Page 3
Annex E
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

Few would contend that dissent on the American scene today is marked by a lack of vigor. Fewer still, I think, would contend that, on the whole, it is an informed dissent, or, very often, that it is an intelligent dissent. Nevertheless, the unparalleled revolution in communications technology now guarantees that certain aspects of current American dissent, particularly those involving dramatic instances of violence, are immediately known throughout the world. Herein, I suggest, lies a very great danger which must give us most serious concern.

Many observers of our free and open society have been confused by the toleration toward violent expression of dissent that has been a consistent part of the American tradition. The man I consider the most distinguished living alumnus of Wake Forest graphically described this phenomenon in a terse, tightly reasoned essay entitled "The Inscrutability of the Yankee".

The universality and pervasiveness of the influence of the values absorbed by those exposed to the great Wake Forest faculties is once again illustrated by the fact that I first encountered this essay in Cairo in 1943 where it had been reprinted in an English language literary journal.

Gerald W. Johnson, as only he could with his uniquely masterful command of the art of lucid and cogent exposition, made an arresting and compelling point. It was that while we ascribe to the Orient a certain talent for obscuring real meaning by an impassivity of countenance and circumlocution of expression, it is really we Americans who often totally confuse the rest of the world.

Gerald Johnson was calling attention to such events of the thirties as the Johnson Act, the Neutrality Act, and extension of the draft in the House of Representatives by a one-vote margin, and Roosevelt's 1940 campaign speech in Boston with the assurance given "Again, Again and Again" that our sons would not be involved in a foreign war.

These instances, Johnson pointed out, and others like them could be and were interpreted by Hitler's analysts of the American scene as clear evidence that they could pursue their ambitions

UNCLASSIFIED

40

Page 4
Annex E
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

without effective American opposition. Yet, as Gerald Johnson correctly concluded, underneath the surface indices provided by these individual instances, there was clearly emerging, apparent to all truly perceptive observers, a consensus that would rapidly insure the full employment of American resources against the aggressors of that historical time-frame.

The intervening quarter-century has revalidated time and again the perceptive observations of Gerald Johnson on "The Inscrutability of the Yankee". In my own mind, there is no doubt that the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis had their origins in the same basic misreading of the American scene. The latter event brought us to the edge of the abyss of nuclear confrontation. Therefore, it seems to me that elementary prudence indicates, now and in the foreseeable future, a compelling necessity to take into account the effects our dissent may have abroad. Another such serious miscalculation, in an age of growing nuclear stockpiles, may involve, quite literally, the continued existence of mankind.

If, as I have already observed, our system cannot really endure without dissent, we must consider the nature of the duty to dissent and try to locate the appropriate limits on the right to dissent. Another of the truly great American journalists, J. R. Wiggins, has put it very well:

"Let us begin with the duty to dissent from the policy of government when that policy seems to the individual citizen to constitute a departure from national interest or moral rectitude. That there is such a duty, it seems to me, is the very essence of self-government, the very vital spark of a democratic system. A people devoid of this impulse would induce such passivity into an electorate as to make the form of government a matter of indifference. And a people with this impulse will invest even the most unsatisfactory system of government with the vigor and force that may make it adequate to deal with society's problems."

Wiggins went on to point out that "When we quarrel with today's dissenters we may be differing with tomorrow's conformists. Some principles are changeless and immutable, but most policies

UNCLASSIFIED

44

Page 5
Annex E
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

are transient and perishable." Not only the change from generation to generation but the change from day to day must concern us when we deal with contemporary dissent, he added, calling attention to the plaint of Thomas Decker in 1603: "Upon Thursday it was treason to cry God save King James of England, and upon Friday, high treason not to cry so."

"Americans then", Mr. Wiggins said, "are inclined to tenderness toward dissent by the instruction of their own history, by the exhortation of their philosophers, by the knowledge that truth is changing and by the counsels of their heart--which incline them, if the truth be told, toward the disrespect of authority and the admiration of nonconformity."

But he went on quickly to add that this inherited characteristic was balanced by another in the American makeup "deriving from their respect for order, their belief in representative government, their confidence in the wisdom of the majority and their belief in the integrity of their own government."

My friend in Geneva had referred to the intellectual debt we owed to Jean Jacques Rousseau, the violent anti-monarchist who helped set Europe aflame with revolution and who had a profound influence on Jefferson. But revolution was not all that we absorbed from Rousseau. As Wiggins reminds us, in his elaboration the theory of the Social Contract, Rousseau "called it an agreement of individuals to subordinate their judgment, rights and powers to the needs and judgment of their community as a whole. He saw all citizens as entering implicitly into this contract to conform to the general will -- a combination to the will of the majority, the lessons of the past and the fate of the future. And he thought that if, as often happens, an individual does not agree with that will as expressed in law, the state may justly force him to submit. This was not viewed as a violation of freedom, but as a preservation of it, even for the refractory individual; for in a civil state it is only through law that the individual can enjoy freedom from assault, robbery, persecution, calumny and a hundred other ills. He thought this especially true in Republics for 'obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty'".

UNCLASSIFIED

45

Page 6
Annex E
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

Francis Bacon in his essay "Of Seditious and Troubles" wisely urged rulers to make every effort to ascertain the causes of discontent and to remove them. If this failed he advocated facing the discontented with overwhelming military force. During Shay's rebellion Washington gave almost exactly the same advice when he wrote to Henry Lee on October 31, 1786: "Know precisely what the insurgents aim at. If they have real grievances, redress them if possible; or acknowledge the justice of them, and your inability to do it in the present moment. If they have not, employ the force of the government against them at once... Let the reins of government then be braced and held with a steady hand, and every violation of the Constitution reprehended".

I have cited these brief references to emphasize that while the essentiality of dissent is as important today as it has always been in our system, our history illustrates that deep in our national fabric are precedents for not permitting dissent to degenerate into anarchy. Our tradition insures that of the two alternatives set out by Bacon and Washington the former is not only more preferable but is also usually perfectly feasible, given the enormous resources and the demonstrated ingenuity this country has available. We should therefore confidently persevere in making rapid progress in diminishing the legitimate discontents.

But for those who are not really interested in the rights and responsibilities of dissent within the framework of a democratic society, for those who are interested in the overturn of that society, for those who dissent from the system of government and not just the policy of government, our tradition insures a simple answer. It is that a government and a society, if it intends to survive, has no recourse against them but the second alternative set out by Bacon and Washington.

For those included in this particular special group, we need not overly concern ourselves with trying to ascertain the appropriate limits on their rights and duties, since they admit of no responsibility and demand unlimited right including the right to use force and violence. Even Dr. William Sloane Coffin has said that "You cannot ask the government to respect your right to be a revolutionary".

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 7
Annex E
Saigon A-255

I have said that to be constructive and effective, dissent must be informed, intelligent and intellectually honest. But before turning to this type of dissent, may I venture a few comments on some identifiable types of dissent that I find to be distasteful.

The first we might term The Chronic Dissenter. We are all familiar with this type, the perennial nay-sayer, the born pessimist, the intellectual hypochondriac.

They are only mildly annoying. One usually feels sorry for them as one does for those who suffer chronic indigestion. It is unfortunate that we have not yet discovered an intellectual Pepto-Bismol, both to alleviate their discomfort and also our own when we have to listen to them for very long. It is hard to keep one's mind accurately focused on the particular issue they are dissenting on at any given moment. The listener's mind tends to wander. One is apt to find oneself speculating on the possible traumas and frustrations of this dissenter's upbringing that have led to imprisonment in a permanent cage of adolescent rebellion, chirping away unendingly like a busy canary complaining about the inferior quality of his birdseed. One reluctantly concludes that only Group Therapy might be useful and that even there the prognosis would likely be for only marginal improvement.

The second category might be termed The Status Dissenter, who is terribly concerned that his intellectual hemlines are adjusted precisely to the prevailing mode. Although they may be aware from automatic empirical observation that mini-skirts may be a delight or a disaster depending on the quality of what is revealed, they seldom seem aware that such automatic adjustment of their intellectual hem-lines just possibly might reveal a mini-brain. A sub-category of this species might be termed The Melodramatic Status Dissenter. They may be found in all walks of life. Recently we have noted their emergence from the groves of academe whence, moth-like, they are irresistably attracted by the glare of TV kleig lights to become "instant" experts on the rather intricate and complex factors dealing with the life and death of nations. Unfortunately, at times, their contributions have seemed to possess

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 8
Annex E
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

an inverse ratio of value to their legitimate expertise in biology or pediatrics.

A third category we might term The Loud Dissenters. My hackles still rise when I think of our former Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who like you received his basic training in the humanities here in North Carolina at Davidson, who was himself a splendid listener, as well as one who showed unfailing courtesy to others, being shouted down by hoots, bullhorns and stamping feet while trying to deliver a speech. I regret that I am compelled to say that to me this is the eternal howl of the tormented infant, who can bear no more frustrations, who must have his way or tantrums must surely follow. Devoid of manners, contemptuous of the well established rules of fair play which have long characterized discussion of public issues in this country, they fail to realize the offense they give and that they automatically signal that the principles they allegedly advocate quite likely could not win acceptance in the acid test of free and rational discussion.

The tragedy is at times their grievances are real, are legitimate, are in need of redress, but this fact becomes quickly obscured in the universal revulsion against the tactics they have chosen.

A fourth category might be called The Violent Dissenters. Without wishing to minimize in the slightest the major social questions left still unanswered in today's world, it is my opinion that those dissenters who choose violence as their mode of expression raise a question which towers over all others. They raise the question of our very survival as a nation and a society under law.

In commenting on the increasing incidence of violence, J. R. Wiggins observed that "Nothing is more certain than that one side to a public controversy will not long enjoy a monopoly on the use of force to harass those with whom they disagree. This is a technique perfected by the Facists and the Nazis. Those who are in dissent ought to be the last to encourage a contest in which the side with the most numbers and least scruples is bound ultimately to triumph. Those in dissent, if they are at all farsighted, should be the first to demand for those who speak in opposition to them full personal security. The business of breaking heads is not an enterprise involving so much ingenuity that others cannot be instructed in it or

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 9
Annex E
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

learn to profit by it, if it becomes one of the necessities of public life. When it does, however, dissenters and non-conformists will not gain the greatest advantage from it.... Ours is not a phlegmatic or passive people and recurrent acts of violence will call forth reprisal. Innocent citizens will be the victims of such disorders, but the great casualty will be the political institutions which rest upon freedom of speech."

It is essential, I submit, that we clearly recognize the consequences of failing to insure that the level of violence begins to subside. Wiggins noted "the tendency of dissent and repression to occur in cycles of some kind--to work themselves out through a discernible sequence beginning with disagreement, proceeding to debate and verbal dissent, verging into passive resistance and civil disobedience and culminating in violence. This violent climax has then been followed by a reaction that has tended to reverse the process by starting out to discourage violence alone and that has often proceeded down the scale toward the repression of civil disobedience, passive resistance and even verbal dissent."

Such a process of reaction may well already be underway. All of us, I am certain, devoutly hope that we may be spared future excesses of violence which otherwise, will certainly accelerate inevitable reaction down the scale elaborated by Mr. Wiggins.

A fifth category might be called The Opportunistic Dissenter. I personally find those I would place in this category almost as dangerous as The Violent Dissenter, and far more distasteful. Whatever excuses may be advanced for the misguided zeal of those in other categories do not seem to me to be applicable here.

Usually well-informed, usually quite aware of the importance of the issues to the national safety and well being they are, nevertheless, quite capable of attempting to advance their own careers by supporting a particular aspect of a popular topic of dissent. Such an aspect is usually either distorted out of its true context, or quite often is really irrelevant to the basic issue, but its endowment does give the illusion of participation while providing ample room for rapid disengagement when no longer profitable.

UNCLASSIFIED

44

Page 10
Annex E
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

The degree of the confidence of the opportunistic dissenters that they can successfully disengage before the deluge engulfs their sincere followers is only matched by their cynical assumption that the memory of the American people does not extend beyond today's headline. That they are often gambling with the nation's safety is unimportant in comparison with the fleetingly transient advantage they calculate to be theirs.

Fortunately the American people seem to have an innate ability to detect and finally reject the phony, and I am very grateful that there still remain enough honest, sincere, and dedicated journalists to insure that the American people finally get all the facts.

But there is another kind of dissent. It is rather like a rare flower--it takes a particular happy accident of circumstances and environment to bring it about. It is intelligent dissent. It is marked by several characteristics. I would like to allude to two or three of them.

The intelligent dissenter has taken the trouble to become informed. He not only knows there are two sides to an argument, he has taken the trouble to know as much as he can about both of them. And in this process he exercises a certain skepticism about what he reads and, most particularly, about what he sees on television.

He recognizes that our modern revolution in communications has posed certain problems with which we are still struggling; that one such problem is the tendency to emphasize only the dramatic; that the emphasis on the dramatic inevitably underscores the chaos often attendant on rapid change and tends to obscure the slow and steady progress that is surely being made. He seeks for perspective, for he knows that without perspective knowledge cannot be equated with wisdom. He is skeptical about the validity of assumptions which dedicated advocates sometimes distort to support the desired rationale. He would not be impressed, for example, by the working papers produced at the Detroit conference in 1967 of the National Council of Churches. The premise that the government of the United States was wholly wrong was never challenged.

UNCLASSIFIED

57

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 11
Annex E
Saigon A-255

Wiggins notes that "in fact, this was so clearly the first premise of the session that no occasion arose to even formulate this assumption." I think our intelligent dissenter might have remembered that after leaving the Presidency Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1811 to William Duane:

"It is true that dissentients have a right to go over to the minority, and to act with them. But I do not believe your mind has contemplated that course; that it has deliberately viewed the strange company into which it may be led, step by step, unintended and unperceived by itself. . . . As far as my good will may go (for I can, no longer act), I shall adhere to my government, Executive and Legislative, and, as long as they are republican, I shall go with their measures whether I think them right or wrong, because I know they are honest, and are wiser and better informed than I am".

The intelligent dissenter will take time to listen. He listens not simply out of courtesy, although that should always be a basic motivation. He listens not just to gather breath for a new onslaught, or to wait to pounce on the flaws of an opposing argument. He listens, rather, in the hope of learning something he didn't know before. He listens to find out what flaws there might have been in his own argument, and is quick to acknowledge them where they appear, in the hope of closing on some common ground. He listens because his conviction is basically intellectual, not emotional, and can therefore be changed if the weight of the evidence indicates a change or modification.

The intelligent dissenter knows that his dissent must be responsible. He will remember the words of Zechariah Chafee, in his classic work "Free Speech in the United States", when he said: "I want to speak of the responsibilities of the men who wish to talk. They are under a strong moral duty not to abuse the liberty they possess. All that I have written goes to show that the law should lay few restraints upon them, but that makes it all the more important for them to restrain themselves. They are enjoying a great privilege, and the best return they can make is to use that privilege wisely and sincerely for what they genuinely believe to be the best interests of their country".

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 12
Annex E
Saigon A-255

UNCLASSIFIED

The intelligent dissenter will also remember Chafee's admonition that it would be extremely dangerous "if speakers and writers use their privilege of free discussion carelessly or maliciously, so as to further their own ambitions or the immediate selfish interests of their particular minority. By abusing liberty of speech", he said, "they may easily further its abolition".

That warning, the intelligent dissenter knows, is as valid today as when it was given just before World War II. The intelligent dissenter will know that restraint must be an integral part of his baggage and that he must force himself to display a degree of tolerance that, at times, will be extremely difficult to attain. The intelligent dissenter will remember St. Paul's injunction that the greatest of virtues is that spirit of Christian charity which we profess but too often honor in the breach.

And, above all, the intelligent dissenter will never forget that in the end, however high the temporary cost may seem to be, he must be true to his own sense of personal integrity. I have had the great good fortune to be sustained all my life by the example of my father who was born a bit to the north of this campus on the banks of the Dan one hundred years ago. He loved this institution, as he did all the Baptist institutions of this State, and it would have given him great pleasure to see me here today. He served his denomination and his State for more than fifty years as a Minister of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. As I grow older I recognize ever more fully that were I allotted twice the normal life span I just might hope to be half the man he was.

Although he never sought controversy, he seemed to be always involved in dissent. I recognize now that his towering personal integrity would permit no other course. The twenties were turbulent years also and one incident I remember involved one of the great Presidents of this institution, Dr. William Louis Poteat. It seems incredible now that such a gentle man as Dr. Poteat, the most Christian of Christians, could be subjected to such scathing attacks by both the clergy and the laity of the Baptists of this State for quietly maintaining, as indeed his own integrity demanded, that Darwin was, after all, right.

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52

Page 13
Annex E
Saigon A-255

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I remember accompanying my father to an Association meeting in Cabarrus County. Speaker after speaker denounced Dr. Poteat until my father could no longer take it. He demanded the floor and I sat spellbound as he lashed them for the ultimate sin of blasphemy in daring to substitute their finite, limited comprehension for the omniscience and omnipotence of God. I still remember the hushed quiet as he closed with the quotation of the exhortation of Oliver Cromwell: "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken".

I do not remember the name of the speaker at my own commencement 37 years ago, and only a line or two of his deathless words of wisdom. Perhaps, if you remember two of mine 37 years hence, I will have bettered par for the course. Then, we had other things on our minds as we set out to carve a small niche for ourselves in the establishment. We soon found, as you will, that you don't join the establishment -- it joins you. While I hope you will be intelligent dissenters from such of its manifestations your conscience dictates you must oppose, I also hope you will handle with equal intelligence the dissent you will encounter against those of its institutions in which you deeply believe.

"Think it possible that you may be mistaken". I never forgot that line. I commend it to you. It will make intelligent dissent a little less difficult if you remember, as you encounter a succession of minds that enjoy the rare certainty of complete conviction, that the presence of a reasonable doubt is not an unmitigated disaster in human society.

Thank you for letting me be with you today.

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AIRGRAM

SD47

FOR RM USE ONL

RM/R	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
L	FBI	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

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RECEIVED
SEP 9 10 24 AM 1977

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : OGEN PFOR
FROM : AmEmbassy MOSCOW

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F.A.D.R.
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

RELEASE IN PART B6

DATE: 5 SEPTEMBER 19

FROM :
SUBJECT: Dissent Message

REF :

DISSENT CHANNEL

This message transmits a dissenting view submitted by [redacted] of the Embassy Economic/Commercial Section.

B6

A POLICY PROPOSAL:

**AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN SOVIET ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION
AS A CATALYST FOR COMPLETING THE DETENTE PROCESS**

Introduction

Now as never before since its inception, prominent voices in both the US and USSR are questioning the concept of detente. "What does detente mean?" or, more to the point, "What is there in it for us?" The results of detente initiatives so far are inconclusive. Both countries need something more tangible than an abstract concept known as detente. With the advent of a new administration, now is a prime time for new bold initiatives, for introduction of a policy that will give guts to the word "detente." This should be a policy which will speak to and satisfy the fundamental interests of the US and USSR—interests which ultimately can be realized only within the bilateral framework. This paper sets forth a policy designed to meet that requirement.

The Presuppositions

The action program outlined herein is based on certain presuppositions as to what each country has most to gain from detente. A discussion of these presuppositions follows later.

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FOR DEPT. USE

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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2

United States - The fundamental goal of the United States from detente is the achievement of verifiable arms control and/or disarmament with the Soviet Union which will assure long-term US security.

Soviet Union - The one significant payoff for the USSR from detente would be a USG policy permitting essentially uncontrolled acquisition of American equipment, technology, credits, and other economic benefits for its own economic development and modernization.

The Policy Objective

To seek a broad agreement with the Soviet Union linking all-encompassing economic cooperation with the USSR (the Soviet payoff, which only the US can provide) with verifiable arms control and/or disarmament concessions from the USSR to guarantee long-term US security (the US payoff, which only the USSR can provide).

Discussion

I. That long-term security--i.e., a condition of real peace--is the prime US objective from detente can hardly be open to contention. Far less obvious is the reality that the only genuine payoff for the USSR from detente is in the economic/trade area. This is because the Soviet domestic economy, mainly due to damaging structural (ideological) inadequacies, is incapable of performing efficiently. It can sustain annual growth only through injections of disproportionately massive capital investments rather than by stimulating increased labor productivity (efficiency).

In the field of planning and management, the Soviets are still bound by basic ideological hangups which prevent them from applying real decentralization in economic decision-making. The absence of such decentralization has caused a chain reaction of problems, the end result of which is the fact that the ordinary worker has no real reason to work productively or be responsive in any other way to the overall economic needs of the country. Further, the performance indicators applied by Soviet planners to gauge economic progress still consist chiefly of quantitative rather than qualitative elements. Quantity rather than quality is a historical phenomenon in Soviet economic planning which has led to a modus operandi characterized by low-quality manufactured goods containing needlessly large amounts of raw materials. In short, besides being inefficient the Soviet economy is extremely wasteful.

Because of the constant emphasis on quantity, the Soviet economic system is incapable of absorbing the results of research and development into the production process in any coherent or rapid

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Moscow A- 342

3

way. The Soviets (and Russians before them) have historically produced fine and innovative thinkers; many of their contemporary research institutes are producing excellent work. Yet the transformation of technological processes into production is largely unattainable since factory managers pay attention to the plan (it is a law) and its fulfillment. Because diverting resources to absorb R&D into production would render plan fulfillment more difficult, that absorption is achieved only very slowly. In a recent conversation with Senator William Roth of Delaware, Dzherman Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the prestigious USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, made precisely this point. He stated: "A major problem in the Soviet economy is the delay in introducing new technology and processes into actual production. Soviet research is of high quality, whereas production and management techniques lag behind."

For these reasons, the Soviet economy is essentially an inefficient, ponderous, aimless organism. By the same token, rather than catching and passing Western economies in its performance--as predicted 15 years ago by Khrushchev--the Soviet economy is falling farther behind them, relatively speaking, since innovation in the West finds its way into production so much more quickly than in the USSR.

II. One might reasonably ask why, if the Soviet economy is in such disarray, the leadership does not adopt a series of tough, pragmatic measures to tighten it up. The answer is that basic economic change can take place only when accompanied by basic political change, and that is intolerable to those in power.

Instead, the Soviets are banking on acquiring sufficient Western technological processes and sophisticated equipment to offset the weaknesses caused their economy by its ideological basis. In this way they hope to achieve real economic progress without changing the existing economic structure. Soviets have told Embassy officers (see Moscow A-25 of January 24, 1974, for example) that economic planners have already effectively given up trying to find ways of inducing Soviet workers to increase their efficiency and productivity.

III. In general terms, then, the Soviets intend to rely heavily on foreign technology and equipment to modernize and rationalize their economy. Specifically, moreover, there is every reason to believe that the Soviets see the US as their chief hope for achieving that goal. This is apparently a deliberate policy decision on their part. The present bottleneck in US-USSR trade, revolving around the intertwined MFN-credits-Jewish emigration

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4

issues, has caused bureaucrats at the operational level in the Soviet foreign trade structure to question the desirability of "wasting time" with the US market. Yet it is known that policy-makers have consistently rebuffed such points of view, stressing the overriding importance of acquiring sophisticated American equipment for Soviet internal economic development.

An ipso facto indication of the great Soviet desire to enjoy the benefits of the US market is the increasingly conciliatory stance taken by the USSR on the Jewish emigration issue, this in spite of the Soviet leadership's intense indignation at what it views as US interference in internal Soviet affairs. The most recent evidence of this Soviet policy was the revelation on August 27, 1974, by a leading economist at the prestigious USA Institute that all Soviet industrial ministries have established American sections to deal exclusively with ways and means of acquiring needed US equipment.

At the same time, increasing Soviet trade with other developed Western countries is an acknowledged fact. Clearly, the Soviets are prepared to "make do" with other, less-desirable partners if a comprehensive agreement with the US cannot be achieved.

IV. Aside from the glaring and presently insoluble problems faced by the Soviets in developing their economy, additional problems are created for the USSR by the arms race itself. In the US, with its exceptionally high level of economic development, increased resource allocation to the armaments industries serves as a stimulus for the economy. In the Soviet Union the reverse is true. Expenditures in the military sector--especially the enormous funds required for developing new strategic weapons systems--are a definite hindrance to overall economic growth and result in delays to or postponements of important development projects, most particularly in Siberia.

In discussions with Embassy officers, Soviet officials now openly acknowledge this problem. For example, a leading Soviet economic planner made the following statement to this writer recently: "The reason we want to come to an agreement with you on armaments is in order to divert resources to other more pressing areas of the economy. This is a sincere desire, not only for security but also for economic reasons."

V. This writer's assessment of the urgent requirements of the Soviet economy, combined with a perceived Soviet leadership mentality to seek foreign economic "assistance" which only the US can provide, adds up to the conclusion that the USSR can be persuaded to

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agree to a strategic accommodation (including appropriate safeguards, verification procedures, etc.) with the US which will satisfy our security requirements.

Again, the question may logically be asked as to why the Soviets would agree to a linkage of such crucial importance for both countries when they can hardly swallow the relatively modest coupling of increased Jewish emigration from the USSR in return for American MFN and credits. There are several possible answers to this question.

First of all, the kind of USG-sanctioned economic cooperation with the USSR envisaged by this proposal would be far greater than the rather limited issues of MFN and Ex-Im Bank credits. It would also greatly exceed anything envisaged under existing US-USSR bilateral agreements in the trade and economic fields, and would include such measures as:

- effective abolition of commodity and technology export controls by the US, except in those areas with particularly sensitive military applications
- comprehensive US company participation in Soviet development projects
- continuing technology inflows from the US, including upgrading state-of-the-art on existing and future projects supplied from the US
- provision of US management assistance, both participating (in conjunction with individual projects) and advisory (in overall economic planning), subject to Soviet sensitivities in this area
- direct USG credits outside the Ex-Im Bank framework at concessionary rates to the USSR for purchases of American equipment and technology

Other areas of cooperation would be mutually agreed upon depending on expressed Soviet requirements.

Secondly, the Soviets have reacted so bitterly to the Jackson Amendment because it was construed as foreign interference in the internal affairs of the USSR. A linkage involving Soviet concessions in the arms control field could not possibly be viewed as internal interference since it is an area involving directly the security interests of foreign countries, in this case the US.

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6

In other words, it is not "linkage" per se to which the Soviets object; in many conversations with Soviet officials this writer has received the impression that a proper linkage involving key national interest questions of both countries would be not only possible but also desirable.

VI. This analysis deals only with the economic/trade aspects of a proposed agreement. The specific arms control and/or disarmament gains which would represent the US payoff naturally would be determined by experts from the appropriate USG agencies. Obviously, the agreement could be viable only if adequate safeguards, verifications, etc., can be guaranteed. Here again, however, Soviet participation in such an agreement would be dictated by the economic gains which the USSR would obtain.

Objections

United States

1. Some political elements in the US might view such an agreement as a sell-out of US vital interests, arguing that it would involve a military or strategic stand-off while at the same time strengthening the Soviet economy and thus making that country more powerful. Such an argument would fail to take hold of two key points:

-- Technology and equipment alone--no matter where they come from--will not be adequate to modernize the Soviet economy, it being structured in such a way as to inhibit the assimilation of any kind of innovation.

-- Should significant economic gains become possible in the USSR through foreign equipment and technology purchases (coupled with modest structural reorganization), such gains will ultimately be felt at the consumer level resulting in aggravation of latent pressures for more consumer goods. Under Soviet circumstances, consumer pressures would lead to political pressures. The advent of "consumerism" in the USSR would have the effect of forcing traditionally outward-looking Marxism-Leninism to become more introspective. This would, of course, also be a positive development for the US.

2. The defense establishment may object that economic cooperation will lead to a strengthening of the USSR militarily. While this is true, it is a negative aspect that would have to be accepted for the sake of overriding interests. Again, it must be stressed that any US-USSR accommodation could work only if it included workable procedures for verifying adherence by the USSR to the arms control and/or disarmament provisions.

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Moscow A-342
7

Soviet Union

1. The greatest opposition of all is likely to come from the Soviet military establishment. Having seen the USSR approach parity with the US militarily, Soviet generals will hardly be inclined to level off or even diminish the degree of their offensive capabilities.

2. Far-sighted conservative elements in the CPSU leadership may oppose an agreement on the grounds that large-scale introduction of US technology into the Soviet economy will ultimately force basic political liberalization. This assumption is probably correct. On the other hand, in reaching an agreement with the USSR as espoused in this paper the US would be giving its tacit, if unspoken, agreement to renouncing any kind of interference in Soviet domestic affairs, including its system of internal control. The realization of the US position on that question would be a strong argument in overcoming conservative opposition to an agreement.

Neither the Soviet military establishment nor conservative CPSU elements would be likely to oppose an agreement on the grounds of fear of a preemptive military strike from the US. It is doubtful that there remains any military or political groupings of any size in the USSR which actually believe, and therefore fear, that the US represents a military threat to the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

The formula known as detente, while not yet floundering, requires a catalyst to achieve a genuine reduction in or elimination of tension between the world's two superpowers. An agreement linking economic cooperation with guaranteed strategic security can provide such a catalyst. Detente would be fulfilled and genuine long-term peace would be far nearer attainment. With that goal in mind this proposal is herewith respectfully submitted.

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RELEASE IN PART B6

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SUBJECT: Dissent Message entitled "A Policy Proposal: American Participation in Soviet Economic Modernization as a Catalyst for Completing the Detente Process"

REF: Moscow's A-342, September 5, 1974

In accordance with the procedures set forth in the Department Notice of May 8, 1974, concerning dissent messages, this will constitute the response to the subject message by [redacted] of Embassy Moscow's Economic/Commercial Section. The Policy Planning Staff takes responsibility for this response, in which the Bureau of European Affairs, the Counselor's Office, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research also concur. The lateness of the response is regretted.

B6

1. This message contains something less than specific disagreement with established policy and something more than a recommendation for an alternative course of specific actions. Rather, it commends a general US approach to the US-Soviet relationship involving a tradeoff of "all-encompassing economic cooperation with the USSR" for "verifiable arms control and/or disarmament concessions from the USSR to guarantee long-term US security." It chooses to deal only with the economic/trade aspects, leaving the "US payoff" in arms control/disarmament

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to "be determined by experts from the appropriate US agencies."

2. Since the Administration recognizes the fact of linkage between various areas of the US-Soviet relationship in our dealings with the Soviets, and since economic relations and arms control figure prominently on the US-Soviet agenda, there is clearly a substantial overlap between current policy and the suggested approach. At the same time, this approach appears to proceed from a perspective on detente which is different in certain important ways from that which underlies US "detente policy" as it has developed in recent years. It may be useful to define these areas of overlap and difference, and even, if agrees, to ^{submit this exchange to} ~~give the discussion wider circulation~~ ^{for publication} ~~in~~ the Open Forum Panel Magazine, as a contribution and incentive to dialogue within the foreign affairs community. Secondly, translation of the suggested approach into specific policy terms would encounter a number of severe practical constraints, and some of these will be noted for completeness' sake.

3. The message focuses on analysis of Soviet motives and perceptions in seeking vastly expanded economic relationships with the developed market economies, and especially the

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United States. This analysis is excellent, and persuasive even outside the context of the proposal it is intended to support. Coincidentally, it is confluent with the mainstream of Washington analysis. There can be little disagreement concerning the major theses that the Soviet economic system as such is inefficient; that the Soviet leaders realize it; and that they hope expanding economic ties with the West will "offset the weaknesses caused their economy by its ideological basis" and "achieve real economic progress without changing the existing economic structure."

4. The proposal is also firmly based on the concepts of linkage, mutuality and a balance of risks and incentives. It recognizes, in other words, that detente serves American interests, that both sides must benefit, and that we must seek to provide for mutual benefits and for trade-offs among various programs, points emphasized by the Secretary in his September 19 statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This constitutes a second important element of overlap between the suggested approach and current policy.

5. However, there appear to be important differences concerning the scope, pace, and character of detente.

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6. Our current approach is based on recognition of the facts that the US and the USSR have the capacity to destroy mankind and impinge on each other across the globe and across the spectrum of relationships. As a policy, detente seeks to create and nurture habits of restraint and constructive behavior across this spectrum, in recognition of these realities. The proposed approach focuses heavily on two types of relationships: economic/trade and arms control/disarmament. These are admittedly central, but the focus on two is restrictive, both in terms of the US-Soviet bilateral relationship itself and in terms of its global significance. Bilaterally, it limits the number of trading elements; globally, it gives short shrift to presently or potentially vital issues of competition and cooperation involving alliances, third areas, and global problems. In the end, it could make the task of "normalizing" restraint and constructive behavior in international relations harder rather than easier.

7. Our current approach is incremental, in that it seeks to develop constructive relationships step-by-step where possible and necessary. It works within the limits of the possible, but is also based on a perception that abrupt or radical change is as liable as not to be destabilizing,

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and therefore to work at cross purposes with our search of international stability. The proposed approach calls essentially for a one-shot deal of very considerable magnitude. Even if practicable, and otherwise attractive, it would be open to the objection that its very size would send unpredictable, destabilizing, and therefore self-defeating impulses through the international system.

8. Finally, our current approach sees detente as "a continuing process, not a final condition, that has been or can be realized at any one specific point in time," in the words of the Secretary's September 19 statement. In one sense, again, this merely recognizes the limits of the possible, but, in another sense, it is based on a perception that permanence or irreversibility in politics may well be neither achievable nor desirable. As its title indicates, the message proposes a tradeoff of a permanent Soviet guarantee of US security for a permanent US blank check to the Soviet economy, "as a catalyst for completing the detente process." Three possible objections come to mind.

9. First, it can be argued that neither economic development nor military security are or can be permanent or stable: they are by nature processes, rather than states. They are continuously changing under the pressure of

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technological developments, economic stringencies, and political decisions. One major goal of our detente policy is to give these processes structure and predictability, but stopping the clock--as distinguished from creating it--cannot be a realistic policy objective.

10. Second, it can be argued that Soviet politics in particular (as well as politics in general) make a permanent tradeoff of economic and military security chimerical. The potential Soviet objections discussed on page 7 of the message may well be so weighty as to make either term of the proposed tradeoff unacceptable to the Soviets. The "Soviet military establishment" and "conservative elements in the CPSU" have been consistently powerful and often dominant in Soviet politics. If the assumption that US economic involvement on this scale "will ultimately force basic political liberalization" is "probably correct", as the message states, either giving the US a permanent security guarantee or accepting permanent large-scale US involvement in the Soviet economy would be equivalent, for these elements, to signing their own death warrant. And, if the French proverb "partir c'est mourir un peu" has some relevance, "mourir c'est partir beaucoup" has more.

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11. Third, it can be argued that "completing the detente process" would be undesirable even if achievable by something like the suggested trade. Maintenance of detente as a process provides the US with flexibility to shape policy in unforeseen circumstances to unforeseen ends and with permanent leverage on the Soviet Union which may well outweigh the costs in uncertainty and the modesty of each result under the present approach, or even the benefits of neatness and finality, under the approach suggested in this message.

12. Finally, it should be pointed out that implementation of the suggested approach would face severe practical constraints.

13. On the economic side, it would be difficult in the best of circumstances to convince the US polity of the overriding merits of an economic blank check to the Soviet Union. Even in return for substantial arms control concessions, the US contribution to the tradeoff would be costly, would compete with scarce resources, and would dispense with bargaining leverage for other goals, such as influence on Soviet emigration policies, which have their own importance. (And, even if the Soviets were unexpectedly convinced that US economic involvement on the

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scale contemplated would not entail interference in their domestic affairs, US commitment to non-interference in the form of a blank check would be hard to sell here, and perhaps justly so. Thus, we would be speaking out of the wrong side of our mouth in two directions, and needlessly damaging the credibility a democratic foreign policy must have.) Finally, some of the specific measures proposed on page 6 -- effective abolition of all but the most strategically essential export controls, comprehensive US company participation in soviet development projects, continuing technology inflows from the US, and provision of US management assistance -- would require a degree of government control in the economy which may exist in the USSR but does not and is unlikely to exist here.

14. On the arms control side, it is fair to point out despite the self-denial in the message that the task of formulating the "US payoff" -- "verifiable arms control and/or disarmament with the Soviet Union which will assure long-term US security" -- boggles the mind. The ferocity which "experts from the appropriate US agencies" and the Soviets would bring to this task would be a pale reflection of the inherent difficulty: given the size and complexity of the arsenals, the relentless pace of

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technological change, and the weight of past history and present security interests, the prospect for defining a stable situation "which will assure long-term US security" is dim, if it exists at all. An American government which claimed to have defined and achieved "US security" forever would be thrown out, and deserve it.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

RELEASE IN PART B6

5049

TO : S/P - Mr. Winston Lord

DATE: September 13, 1977

FROM : INR/CIS -

B6

SUBJECT: Dissent Message

Attached is a paper entitled "Section 212(a) 15 of the INA: Eliminating Public Charges or the Working Poor?", which I would like to submit through the Dissent Channel. Mr. Carl Shepard in the Visa Office has expressed an interest in seeing the paper. It is unclassified.



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5049A

Section 212 (a) 15 of the INA: Eliminating Public Charges or the Working Poor?

By

B6

The Department's airgram of September 1, 1973 entitled "Determination of Public Charge" was a valiant attempt to instill some objectivity into the interpretation of Section 212 (a) 15 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Relying on "common sense" as had been urged by one Consul General had resulted in grossly different standards and refusal rates not only among posts in the same country but among officers at the same post, with the prevailing interpretation reflecting too often the personal prejudices and political philosophy of each officer. Disagreement by Junior Officers with whatever the prevailing view of the head of the visa section held, whether "liberal" or "conservative" resulted in negative sanctions in efficiency reports written by officers convinced that after twenty five years they were the law in the area. Veteran consular officers tended to feel that the upstart changing the section's refusal percentage was either unreasonable on one hand, or had no guts for enforcing the letter of the law on the other hand. This situation must have given potential immigrants the first impression that the United States government was just like the government of the country they were leaving, irrational and arbitrary. In this situation any attempt at rationality and consistency had been overdue since the proliferation of public assistance programs in the 1960's, and what follows is not meant to detract from the significance of the effort made by the Visa Office.

The September 1st airgram falls short in two areas. First it does not allow for any sort of special status for the spouse of American citizens, a status which the drafting officer feels is constitutionally required by recent Supreme Court decisions. Second, the general income levels chosen are not related to any program which would make a person a public charge by the Department's own reasoning.

The privileged position of the marital union has been recognized by the Supreme Court in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut.¹ That case held that in placing restrictions on the use of birth control pills in a marital relationship the state was infringing on a "right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights." Although the case involved action by a State Government it is obvious that the same right would be held against the Federal Government in view of the invocation of the ninth amendment and Justice Harlan's description of the right as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." In the case of an immigra

¹ 381 U.S. 479 (1968).

separated from an American citizen spouse on the basis of 212 (a) 15 of the INA, the state of marital privacy is not only being interfered with, it is being effectively destroyed. The only way the couple can exercise that right is for the U.S. citizen to leave the United States. The government must have an overwhelming interest in causing this separation, and the prospect of losing a few dollars on "welfare" would not provide that interest, even to a conservative Supreme Court, as shown by the position of Justice Harlan. We tend to forget in the case of IR spouses that there is now another person involved, an American citizen, who according to one view has literally become one flesh and one spirit with the immigrant before us.² The separation of spouses is the thing that understandably causes most of the Congressional correspondence on visas.

It seems possible that the Supreme Court would extend the Griswold rationale to the spouses of resident aliens under the rationale of Graham v. Richardson.³ Graham was a unanimous decision holding that any classification based on alienage, such as those based on nationality or race, was inherently suspect, thus indicating that any right given to alien spouses of American citizens would have to be granted to alien spouses of resident aliens. The specific holding of Graham was that a state could not deny welfare benefits to an alien on the basis of alienage, or even place residence requirements on the time an alien had to be in the state.

Whether or not spouses of resident aliens were recognized as having a fundamental right to be in the United States, certain classes of immigrants would remain who would not be given "equity" on the basis of a spouse in the United States. The rest of this paper is written on the assumption that these immigrants would be subject to the public charge provision of the INA. An attempt will be made to develop a standard which is more reasonable than the current "Table M" interagency poverty guidelines being used.

Section 212 (a) 15 has remained the principal basis for refusing an immigrant visa, in spite of the fact that the requirement of a Labor Certification under 212 (a) 14 has eliminated applicants without basic equity since 1965. Most

²During the past year the drafting officer was on LWOP and consequently would not have had sufficient resources to meet the Schedule M income guidelines to bring an alien non-English speaking wife into the U.S., an injustice which seems to greatly outweigh the cost of the public assistance which probably would have been needed if that situation had existed.

³403 U.S. 365 (1971).

consular desire to establish a high potential income standard comes from (1) a feeling that an alien who is eligible for any kind of assistance is a public charge, or from (2) an attempt to cut down on the number of illegals who subsequently immigrate on the basis of a family tie in the United States, by refusing to let an immigrant return to the low paying job he held while in the United States illegally. The first attitude is precluded by previous decisions of the VO, as will be developed below, and the second attitude is a classic case of barn-door closing post horse. In the second approach the consular officer may feel that the family tie was established as part of a scheme to evade the requirement for a Labor Certification. If this can be proven the visa should of course be refused. However, the refusal must be made explicit on this basis, not as an underlying rationale for setting a high income standard. It has not been proven that setting high standards for 212 (a) 15 has discouraged a single alien from crossing the border illegally. Even if the idea of having a child or acquiring a spouse in the United States exists in the back of an alien's mind, the overwhelming majority are not sophisticated enough in terms of our laws to think in terms of using that relationship to evade the public charge provision, and are simply coming looking for work. The reality is that several million illegals cross our border every year, that the problem will become worse as countries such as Mexico double their populations in the next twenty years, and that the illegals will keep coming in an increasing flood as long as our borders are not physically sealed off and sanctions applied against employers who hire the illegals. Less than ten percent of the illegals entering every year acquire any sort of family tie in the United States. Therefore even if this small percentage who show up at Consulates asking for IV's were totally shut out, the flood crossing and recrossing the borders would still go on. It is not rational, perhaps not constitutional, for consular officers to take out their justified outrage at illegal immigration by using one section of the INA as a punitive stick, aimed at a tiny minority of the actual malefactors.⁴

Most IV applicants will present a legitimate job offer at the first interview, often to return to the place where they were employed illegally, doing farm labor, or washing dishes.

⁴This is not to deny that closing off illegal crossing completely would greatly reduce the number of legal immigrants. 2/3ds of the applicants in a sample done at Ciudad Juarez in November 1977 admitted having worked illegally in the U.S. If the "equity" were established while in the U.S. illegally in every case and illegal immigration were cut off entirely, then presumably family equity would be established only through legitimate intercourse across the border, and legal immigration from Mexico would be cut by 2/3ds.

When confronted by a consular request that they obtain a job offer paying them three dollars an hour rather than \$1.90 an hour, they will simply regard the request as another irrational demand of an unfeeling bureaucracy. This is a situation they confronted in their native country and they didn't really expect much different from the American Consul. No matter how many stories they heard about how tough it was to get "working papers", that hadn't stopped them from crossing the border illegally the first time. The prime object then was to work, unlike the second time when they cross again in search of a better job offer.

Obtaining a legitimate job offer to meet the Table M guidelines would be difficult enough if the applicants were legally present in the United States and could go personally to the job site. The first step will be to go back to the visa fixer who may be able to bribe someone in the personnel office of a company to write an employment letter at the appropriate salary. Among one small sample of job offers which the Consulate in Ciudad Juarez investigated two years ago, ninety percent turned out to have been written without the knowledge of the person who allegedly signed the letter. These services of course cost money, which will drive the applicants further into debt before they immigrate. If they cannot immediately obtain a letter they will probably cross into the United States again in search of a better job offer, or to earn money to pay the visa fixer. In addition to asking for a high job offer one consular officer of long experience in Mexico was in the habit of asking that the job offer be accompanied by an IRS-943, the employer's business income tax form, ostensibly to see that the applicant was being offered at least as much as half of the other employees were making and to check the job turn-over at the firm. Since most firms wish to protect the confidentiality of these forms this constituted another block in the aliens' path which usually blocks the issuance of a visa for six months or a year. When it was pointed out that this would only encourage fraud and drive the United States resident members of the family onto welfare in the absence of the breadwinner, the officer described the process as "a paper game." This thesis is an attempt to stop "playing paper games" with people's lives and develop public charge standards which both serve the legitimate interests of the United States Government and are fair to the immigrant.

The system would have reached the height of its absurdity in operation, if not in theory, had the Department ruled that recipients of food stamps were public charges. Food stamps or surplus commodities are given in every county in the United States, and fifty million Americans are currently eligible to receive them because the income standards are set so high.

The use of the food stamp net income guidelines as the public charge threshold would possibly have resulted in a ninety percent first interview refusal rate at a post like Ciudad Juarez, if the standards were applied rigorously and honestly by the interviewing officers. It is clear that such a refusal rate would lead to the collapse of a post's immigrant visa processing function, because of the number of repeat interviews generated, a flood of Congressional correspondence, and visits by irate relatives.

Some officers have felt that the "law" must be enforced no matter what and may in fact have been aiming for the type of crisis confrontation depicted above as a means of drawing attention to the illegal alien problem. It is possible that the courts would find the above process so unreasonable that they would establish their own definitions of "public charge". A more certain result would be Congressional action, either on a formal or informal level to initiate new guidelines. The Department has already shown an inclination to instill some fairness and concepts of due process into the interview process, even though it recognizes that aliens outside the United States have no rights under the United States Constitution. The new requirements for finding ineligibility under 212 (a) 19 (false documents) issued in the fall of 1972 and the Department's airgram of May 18, 1973 to all Mexican posts concerning Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) and Old Age Assistance point the way out of our dilemma.

Under the AFDC program, if the breadwinner is separated from a family with children, the family receives AFDC "welfare" payments in all states and is automatically eligible for food stamps. (Twenty-five states pay welfare (AFDC) even to united families with unemployed breadearners.) The result is that keeping an alien with natural or step-children separated from his family costs the government more money in twenty-five states than if he were admitted and did not work at all, as the reunification of the family would make the family ineligible for welfare in twenty-five states, no matter how low its income. The only universal income supplement program available is the Food Stamp program. The Department's May 18th airgram suggests that if the alien is going to one of the states where reunification of the family would make it ineligible for AFDC, the visa should be issued, if the applicant has a job offer sufficient to support himself without regard for capability of supporting the family. The Department has thus moved towards establishing a definition of public charge that does not regard someone who is working as a public charge, even though he is working at a sub-poverty level income when family size is considered.

Seen in this light, the Department's holding that recipients of AFDC are public charges, while recipients of food stamps are not, is not reasonable. Since the Department did not adopt the actual AFDC income guidelines, which are much higher than the Table M poverty guidelines actually adopted, it has indicated that it is not going to engage in the confrontation scenario of ninety percent refusal rates. In view of the holding that recipients of food stamps and public housing or rent supplements are not public charges, it is not logical to call recipients of AFDC, who likewise get federal money for food and housing, public charges. The money is coming out of the Federal Treasury in both cases, simply under programs with a different name. It would seem that an AFDC recipient should be regarded as a public charge only if he did not have sufficient income to meet needs other than those for his housing and food. This would entail setting public charge guidelines much lower than those in Table M.

The May 18th, 1973 Airgram also dealt with the problem of Old Age Assistance. I had pointed out in my airgram of January 31, 1973 that persons over sixty-five were eligible for Old Age Assistance no matter what the income of their sponsors if they themselves did not have an income of at least one hundred thirty dollars a month. Thus, nearly every elderly person joining his children in the United States is eligible for Old Age Assistance, even if the sponsors are millionaires, as relatives' income is not considered as part of the applicants' resources. Rather than making the impossible decision to completely cut off immigration of non-rich elderly people, the Visa Office agreed with my suggestion that we simply analyze the total situation and determine the likelihood of the immigrant making an application for welfare, and not simply reject him because he would be eligible for aid.

From these two decisions it is possible to see two principles emerging. One is that a person is not a public charge if he is receiving aid for his housing and food, but is working in an attempt to provide himself with his other needs and as much of his subsistence needs as possible. The second is that, even in the face of theoretical eligibility for a program which has been designated as a public charge program, the consular office must feel that the alien will actually make application for such a program. The problem in setting income standards is then to set standards which will not keep out an alien simply because he will theoretically be eligible for aid for that proportion of his income which will be allotted to housing and food. The Table M Interagency guidelines the Department has adopted represent a total standard of poverty which can be related in a rough way to eligibility for most of the federal assistance

programs. However, they act to exclude people who in fact will not receive any aid which would make them public charges. An example would be a Mexican family of four with an income of \$3,328 a year. They would be able to fulfill their food needs through the food stamp program and pay the rent through rent subsidies, thus not getting any aid from a program which made them public charges under the Visa Office's own decisions. If they were in a state which found it more feasible to pay them out of federal funds under the AFDC program it would not be consistent to say that receipt of money for their food and housing would make them public charges.

The Department's rationale for adopting Table M as a guideline is based on the popular idea that the welfare field is hopelessly complicated and that it would take a "qualified social worker" to determine welfare eligibility on a jurisdiction to jurisdiction basis. However, the Table M guidelines result in the exclusion of immigrants who are going to live in poverty in the United States, not people who are going to be public charges. While the major judicial decisions of the last fifty years are inconclusive as to who is a public charge under the immigration laws, they cannot possibly be used to justify excluding immigrants who are going to be poor for several years after they enter. Such a policy goes against the entire history of immigration in the United States, and what must have been the legitimate interests in the framers of the Immigration and Nationality Act when they inserted Section 212 (a) 15 in the Act. Further, as argued here, such a position is not logically required even by the internal logic of the Visa Office's recent decisions.

As shown in the table below, most of a family's AFDC money could be expected to go for food and housing, items which the Labor Department says should take up 50 percent of the total budget of a family of four with an \$8,181 gross annual income.

Summary of annual budget for an urban family of four ⁵			
Total Family consumption		6,580	% of <u>Total</u> Budget
Food	2,440		30
Housing	1,627		20
Transportation	563		7
Clothing	696		8
Personal Care	205		2
Medical Care	660		8
Other consumption (Entertainment etc.)	389		5
Other Items (Savings etc.)		385	5
Taxes		1,216	
Social Security	492		6
Income Tax	724		9
Total Budget		\$8,181.	%100

⁵Adapted from Table A of U.S. Department of Labor USDL: 74-304, June 16, 1974. "Autumn 1973 Urban Family Budget".

Food and housing comprise sixty two percent of the consumption budget, that which is available for spending after taxes, savings and other similar items which are minimal or nonexistent for the newly immigrated family. In addition, the budget includes allowances for savings, gifts, life insurance, membership in group hospital and surgical plans, and a number of trips to doctors and dentists. Since these expenses are also minimized by immigrants it is apparent that easily over eighty percent of the budget of our typical poverty level immigrant may be used for food and lodging, items which are provided in non-public charge programs. For the sake of discussion, however, I will assume that fifty percent of the total budget of any size family in any geographic area will go for food and lodging. The following table is an adaptation of the Table M figures currently being used, showing how much money different size families would have to earn to keep off AFDC to fill needs which they could not fill through food stamps or rent supplements.⁶ Excluding food or housing needs the threshold for AFDC is fifty percent of the poverty threshold.

Size of family	Poverty Threshold			
	Nonfarm	%50	Farm	%50
1	\$2,244	1122	1900	950
2	2,896	1448	2442	1221
3	3,552	1776	3020	1510
4	4,550	2275	3880	1940
5	5,368	2684	4575	2287
6	6,038	3019	5157	2578
7	7,426	3713	6310	3160

The minimum wage for industrial labor is now \$2.00 an hour (\$4,160 per annum), for service workers, \$1.90 (\$3,952 per annum), and for farm labor \$1.60 (\$3328 per annum). It would thus be virtually impossible for an employer to make a legal full time job offer that would not cover the fifty percent of an immigrant's income that could potentially be covered by AFDC or state supplemental benefits. However, it is entirely likely that use of the full Table M guidelines, without the suggested fifty percent deduction, will result in large numbers of non-English speaking immigrants, with

⁶Adapted and weighted with a ten percent cost of living increase from Department of Commerce Pub. 60 no. 86, Current Population Reports Series, "Consumer Income Characteristics of Low Income Population", Table M.

moderate size families, having their legitimate work offers at the minimum wage rejected.

The argument for using the Table M guidelines is that under the Federal plans of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled, each state has traditionally had power to decide who was eligible for the programs, and how much aid each person would get. In addition, each state has its own General Assistance welfare programs to supplement the federal programs, and these programs have different eligibility standards. Using one national poverty guideline is therefore seen as a means of avoiding having complex public charge thresholds for each of the states under 212 (a) 15. This problem as to aid to the aged, blind and disabled has been resolved because, since January 1974 these programs have been absorbed into a new Federally administered program called Supplemental Security Income. Under AFDC the only significant difference affecting 212 (a) 15 among state standards is the requirement in twenty-five states that the breadwinner abandon the family before the family is eligible for cash payments, and the Visa Office has already spoken to this issue in its May 18, 1973 airgram to all Mexican posts.⁷

The problem then remains as to the State General Assistance programs. Assuming that 212 (a) 15 requires the Federal government to define its immigration policies with regard to State welfare programs,⁸ it can be argued that, in spite of the complications, the Visa Office should develop separate public charge guidelines for each of the States. After all, we know it takes more to live in New York City than in a Texas border town as a "commuter alien." However, we are spared this problem by two generalizations which can be made about the States' programs. The first is that the State programs are supplemental to the Federal programs. Aid under the non-Federally supported General Assistance Programs comprised only 3.6 percent of the total for public assistance given in January 1974. Second, in every case the income standards are the same or more restricted than those of the Federally funded programs. Differences seem to come mainly in the payment of medical costs or in the evaluation of owned property. These exceptions can be handled on an individual basis under the Visa Office's guidelines on "rebuttable presumptions" of welfare eligibility.

⁷As far as the drafting officer knows this airgram, requiring the consular officer to inquire as to which state system the immigrant would be subject, was only sent to Mexican posts. If his suggestions had merit as stated in the Airgram, these instructions should be sent to all consular posts along with appropriate information to implement them.

⁸Graham, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), stated that the State laws conflict with "overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government." State alien residency requirements "encroach upon exclusive federal power: 'This holding may, analogy, eliminate the consideration of purely state programs and 212 (a) 15."

Once we have escaped from the necessity of mechanically applying the eligibility standards under AFDC and General Assistance, our analysis can be framed in the context of an alien's contribution to our society versus the cost of having him here. A full time agricultural worker with a job offer at the minimum of \$3,328 p.a., and three dependents, will make a contribution to our society that outweighs the fact that he may buy low cost food with food stamps, or that a few "liberal" states such as New York or California may supplement his income out of state funds so he can pay his rent. Such people ought not to be considered public charges anymore than the widow on her Social Security pension. When one looks at the big picture, such a ruling seems totally inconsistent with our history and national spirit. The reunification of families and their work contribution to our society outweigh the cost of supplementing their incomes as they adjust to this country. Other countries, such as Australia and Sweden make nearly total support payments to the new immigrant. This is not an argument that we should abandon 212 (a) 15, but that we should not get hung up on technicalities of saying that someone who buys his food with Food Stamps is not a public charge, while someone who buys his groceries with AFDC cash is a public charge, when the money comes out of the same Treasury. Someone who is working on a full time job is making at least enough money to pay all of his other needs besides housing and food. The holding that anyone with a credible full time job offer is not a public charge would also put the Department more in line with the interpretation of 212 (a) 15 as administered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

References:

Department's Airgrams of May 18, 1973 to all Mexican posts, and September 1, 1973 to all Diplomatic and Consular posts
Consulate Ciudad Juarez' Airgram of January 31, 1973

3050



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE IN PART B6

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

December 10, 1974

MEMORANDUM TO: INR/CIS - [redacted]

B6

FROM: S/P - Samuel P. Lewis *sm*

SUBJECT: Dissent Message on Visa Procedures
re Public Charge

S/P has again discussed your dissent message of September 13 with SCA.

We are informed that your views regarding the definition of a public charge under our visa procedures, along with other views on this subject, are now receiving the careful attention of senior officers in the Visa Office and in SCA. This subject is an important item on the agenda at the consular conference now being held in Mexico, and it is anticipated that policy recommendations on this subject will probably be developed following this meeting.

S/P accordingly believes that your well-reasoned views are receiving adequate attention in the policy consideration now under way. Although we expect that any final decisions on this subject will be made generally known, we have in addition requested SCA to apprise you of them when the current review is completed.

S/P would like to thank you for your interest and helpful assistance in regard to this important matter.

Clearances:

- OFP - Mr. Smith *rl*
- SCA - Mr. Recknagel *rl*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LC NO. 42439
T-122/R-XXXIV
French

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF GABON IN THE UNITED STATES

No. 50404/AW

Washington, June 28, 1974

The Embassy of the Republic of Gabon in the United States of America presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to reiterate the extreme interest that its Government attaches to the immediate issuance of an export license for a McDonnell Douglas DC8-63-CF airplane now being purchased from Seaboard.

*reported in Sept. 97
highlighting*

This aircraft is intended for the personal use of the President of the Republic of Gabon as well as for travel by official missions of the Gabonese Government. This transportation at present is provided by the expensive method of chartering flights on various airlines (Air-Afrique, UTA, Air Zaire, etc.);

of what kind?

On numerous occasions this matter has been brought to the Department of State's attention, through both the United States Embassy at Libreville and the Embassy of the Republic of Gabon at Washington. Furthermore, all pertinent documents were transmitted in due time to the American authorities.

Nonetheless, no decision has been taken, so the President of the Republic of Gabon decided to send a plenipotentiary and extraordinary mission to the Department of State, which the Ambassador of the Republic of Gabon had the honor to lead on Friday, June 28, 1974. The exceptional nature of

this mission underlines the importance that the Chief of State and the Gabonese Government attach to a prompt solution.

Indeed, it should be pointed out that:

1. On March 20, 1974, the Republic of Gabon, represented by its Minister of the Economy and Finance, signed the contract to purchase the aforesaid aircraft from Seaboard and immediately made a down payment of US\$ 400,000. The American authorities were advised of this transaction.

2. Concurrently, approaches were made to the Export-Import Bank of the United States, which offered the hope that a favorable decision would soon be forthcoming.

3. Furthermore, the American financial establishments consulted by the Gabonese Republic stated that they would make the additional financing available.

4. At that time, by letter of April 16, 1974, the President of the Republic of Gabon transmitted all relevant information concerning the use and operation of the aircraft to the President of the Export-Import Bank. The United States Ambassador at Libreville was also informed.

5. During his visit to the United States during the same period, the President of the Republic of Gabon was informed of no potential objections or restrictions concerning the purchase of the DC8-63-CF. Moreover, a contract for the purchase of a Hercules C-130 was concluded simultaneously with no difficulty being raised.

However, the delay in issuing the export license for the DC8-63-CF implied that the American authorities might have certain reservations that had never been explicitly stated.

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not so we told him USA would write to OAU. These be followed.

For that reason, in order to avert any restrictive interpretation, the Gabonese Government took the initiative of communicating fully all documents establishing the total regularity of the transaction, both economically and politically:

read OAU election

1. On the economic level, the conclusion of a technical management contract with UTA guarantees:

a. Suitable logistics, since UTA, which is certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, will provide industrial maintenance and supply, train, and supervise the trained crews required on a permanent basis;

b. An effort to ensure a sound rate of return by integration with the operations of the UTA-Air Afrique group (both companies are members of the International Air Transport Association and have a DC8 fleet);

is this totally correct?

c. Harmonization with the present air system. Consequently, there would be no danger of disturbing its equilibrium through the introduction of a potential outside the provisions of the Yaoundé Treaty of which the Gabonese Government, a founding member of Air-Afrique, is a co-signatory.

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2. On the political level, the Gabonese Government stresses that it informed its fellow African Governments that are members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and, in that respect, it produced both a letter from the OAU Secretary General granting approval confirmed by a letter from the Organization's Acting President, General Gowon, President of the Republic of Nigeria. Both documents clearly established the unqualified approval of this transaction.

no, the Secretary General

did not approve only acknowledged

Furthermore, the recent OAU meeting held in June 1974 at Mogadiscio reconfirmed the total absence of objections.

not done, but was carried in the reports - committee document & conclusions are.

As a founding member and partner of the multinational company Air-Afrique, as established by the Yaoundé Treaty, the Gabonese Government saw in this transaction an opportunity to point up its attachment to the principles of inter-African solidarity and therefore formally and publicly excluded any possibility of using the DC8-63-CF in contradiction to those principles.

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The Gabonese Government again states, if necessary, that in no event will the DC8-63-CF be used in a different way that might somehow benefit any one of the countries censured by the international organizations of which Gabon is a member, such as the OAU, UN, and CAMO.

Under these circumstances, the Gabonese Republic can only be surprised at the unexpectedly long period of time required to issue the export license essential for its purchase.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Gabon takes pleasure, however, in underscoring the quality of the bonds uniting the United States of America and Gabon. Furthermore, he notes that American enterprises have always met with cordial and understanding acceptance in his country, with whose development they are associated in many fields (manganese mining, petroleum prospecting, general equipment, etc.).

He is pleased that prompt approval could be given to the President of the Republic of Gabon concerning the supply of a ^{Lockheed} Hercules C-130 aircraft and hopes that similar arrangements will permit the immediate delivery of the DC8-63-CF.

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If in the past undoubtedly circumstantial incidents at times have troubled the serenity of relations between the United States of America and Gabon, the two countries nonetheless remain united by the same trust in the free

-5-

future of the Western world. It would be most unfortunate, therefore, if a totally unjustified misunderstanding were to alter this climate of mutual understanding and friendly cooperation profitable to both countries.

Conveying the deep concern evidenced by the President of the Republic and the Gabonese Government, the Ambassador of Gabon therefore solemnly expresses the wish that the American authorities will not further delay in settling this matter and avails himself of this occasion to renew to the Department of State the assurances of his very high consideration.

[Signature]

[Embassy of the Republic of Gabon
stamp]



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Ray Smith
1-11/27/74
SD53

RELEASE IN PART B6

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

TO : AF/C -
FROM : S/P - Reginald Bartholomew, Acting *RB*
SUBJECT: Your Dissent Message of September 15
Regarding the Sale of a DC-8 to Gabon

B6

The purpose of this memorandum is to report to you what actions were taken by S/P in response to your dissent message of September 15.

With Respect to the Secretary

- On September 16 Mr. Swiers notified Mr. Gompert of the Secretary's staff that S/P had received your draft dissent message and requested that if, as you expected, AF recommended approval of the issuance of an export license for the sale of a DC-8 to Gabon, he bring your draft dissent message to the Secretary's attention before the Secretary acted on the recommendation.

- On September 19, after receiving AF's Action Memo of September 16, Under Secretary Sisco's office attached and forwarded to the Secretary Mr. Djerejian's copy of your dissent message. We understand that the Secretary read your dissent message before making his decision.

- Although the Secretary had already acted on AF's memo before we received the final version of your dissent message, we nonetheless forwarded it to the Secretary's office. This final version was returned to us on October 16 with the note that "The Secretary has seen the attached dissent memo."

~~SECRET~~

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2

With Respect to Officials in the Export Import Bank and the Department of Commerce

- In response to your request of September 24 to Mr. Lord that the Department make your dissent message available to officials in the Export Import Bank and the Department of Commerce, S/P, in consultation with AF and L, decided that if it had not yet done so, the Department should apprise the two agencies of your dissent message and invite them to send officers to the Department to review it along with all other relevant documents. We decided that these documents should not be sent to the agencies since they constituted internal working papers of the Department.

- Even before the above decisions had been taken, Mr. Keith Huffman of the Legal Adviser's Office, in accordance with a previous commitment to cooperate closely with the Export Import Bank, had invited Mr. John Lentz of the Export Import Bank to come to the Department to review his file on this matter. Mr. Lentz did so on September 27. Among the documents reviewed by Mr. Lentz was your dissent memorandum of September 24 and the attachments to it.

- On October 2 Mr. Huffman called Mr. Morris Licht of the Department of Commerce to inform him that while the Secretary had decided to approve an export license for sale of the aircraft, there had been some strong objection to this action in the Department; that arguments against granting a license were recorded in a dissent message; and that he or any other Department of Commerce official would be welcome to come to the Department to review this dissent message. Noting that he was aware that the Department was not "all of one mind" regarding this sale, Mr. Licht said that a dissent memorandum would only be of historical interest since the Department of Commerce would be guided by the Secretary of State's decision. Mr. Licht asked, however, if Mr. Huffman could forward to him a copy of the dissent message for his records, with any restrictions the Department of State might wish to place on its distribution. Mr. Huffman said that he thought this might be possible. Before Mr. Huffman could pursue the matter, however, Mr. Licht called back withdrawing his request for a copy of the message.

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3

S/P believes that the actions which were taken by S/P and in AF and L fully meet your request that the Secretary and officials in the Export Import Bank and the Department of Commerce be promptly apprised of your dissent message so that they would be aware of the reasons why, in your opinion, they should not approve the issuance of an export license for the sale of the aircraft. We are persuaded that, insofar as the Department of State is concerned, the Secretary, Assistant Secretary Easum and officials in AF and L gave careful and thoughtful consideration throughout this case to the reservations raised by you and others in the Department. Quite clearly, the Secretary agreed with Assistant Secretary Easum and L that on the basis of the evidence and information available to the Department the issue of the legality of the sale turned on a judgment as to the likelihood of misuse of the aircraft. S/P shares this view.

We wish to commend you for taking the initiative to bring your views to the attention of the Secretary. If you think further action should be taken on your dissent message please let us know.

~~SECRET~~

ORIGIN/ACTION		
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AGR	COM	FRB
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TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

SDH

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-195
NO.
TO : Department of State

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

RECEIVED HANDLING INDICATOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 22 10 35 AM 1974

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, TW, CH, US

FADRC
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

FROM : Amembassy TAIPEI

DATE: 10/17/74

SUBJECT: Dissent Message: Another View of US China Policy
and the GROC's Options Regarding its International

REF : Taipei 5933 Status
DISSENT CHANNEL

Summary.

This airgram is submitted by FSO [redacted] B6
Political Officer, US Embassy Taipei, and transmits a
dissenting view to Taipei 5933 entitled "US China Policy
and the GROC's Options Regarding its Status." Major points
of difference between the Embassy analysis and [redacted] B6
were reported in Taipei 6297.

With further US initiatives toward Peking and continuing
ROC diplomatic decline, the GROC could come to view its
current policy of pragmatic acceptance of US China policy
as a liability in its struggle to maintain itself as a
political entity. Should Premier Chiang come to believe
during the process of US PRC rapprochement that assumed
or explicit US/ROC relationships will not be sufficiently
reassuring to insure his position as the recognized leader
of a stable Taiwan, he is likely to declare a separate
status for Taiwan. Such a declaration could range from
minimal assertion of separate sovereignty to an outright
declaration of independence from China. The nature of
the declaration could be heavily influenced by our candor
or lack of it in discussing post diplomatic relationships
with Premier Chiang during the transition process. In
any case, CCK might well decide that prospects for domestic
stability and international survival would be improved by
a pre-emptive declaration, and he might also use it in a

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

FORM 4-62 DS-323

In Out

Drafted by:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL: HJFeldman

B6

Clearances:

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

Taipei A-195
Page 2

calculated attempt to sabotage US-PRC relations.

Examining US options, the reporting officer concludes that by allowing events to take their course, the ROC could force the China issue on us at a time and in terms of its choosing. In practical terms, we could be faced with a rather stark choice in Asia between standing by our commitments or disavowing them, and we might also be confronted with domestic debate disrupting the present consensus supporting US China policy.

However, an ROC declaration of separate status under controlled circumstances need not be detrimental to US interests. A "temporary" divided state formula, which rebuts neither the Shanghai Communique nor the one-China principle could offer all parties less painful ways of reconciling the realities than other foreseeable options. Neither the PRC nor the ROC would be forced to sacrifice a vital interest, and such a formula might offer the best basis we could reasonably expect for reducing our commitments smoothly and achieving a balanced longer term Asian policy.

Since the possibility of an ROC declaration of separate juridical status during the next few years seems substantial, we should consider discussions with Premier Chiang at some point during the conditioning process described reftel. At an appropriate time, we would make clear our intention ultimately to recognize Peking and our desire to achieve a formula in which the minimum price would be paid by all participants, while emphasizing that the timing and substance of any ROC declaration must be fully coordinated.

While any policy of continuing support for the ROC is likely to hamper our relations with Peking for a while, an indeterminate separate status for Taiwan which is least openly hostile to the PRC may offer greater possibilities for a resolution favorable to us--perhaps eventually through negotiations--than a declaration of independence or separate sovereignty sprung upon us by the ROC when we are not prepared for it. End Summary.

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Page 3I. BACKGROUND: FACTORS CCK MUST CONSIDER - 1971 AND NOW

With the ROC so heavily dependent on the US as its principal trading partner, military guarantor and source of diplomatic support, it is usual to assume that the GROC will not upset US China policy by declaring a separate status for Taiwan. Nevertheless, such thoughts were entertained within the GROC in 1971, and they probably will be entertained again as normalization of US-PRC relations proceeds.

A. 1971

In late 1971, a committee chaired by Minister without Portfolio George K. C. Yeh considered options for the ROC and entertained thoughts about a declaration affecting Taiwan's juridical status by abjuring active claims to the mainland. From what little we know of the deliberations, the proposals were rather cautious and so gained little acceptance. The principal factors leading the GROC to eschew a declaration of separate status in 1971 seem to have been: (a) fear that a traumatic policy break in the wake of the ROC's expulsion from the UN would lead to capital flight, domestic panic and perhaps insurmountable instability; (b) an assessment that undermining the constitutional basis of mainlander rule on Taiwan--a virtually certain by-product of any separate status declaration--could only accentuate domestic dangers; (c) concern that the US would take the position that the mutual defense treaty applied only to the ROC and not to a successor entity; thus, a separate status declaration could risk loss of the ROC's primary source of diplomatic and military support; (d) President Chiang's personal aversion to any modification of ROC claims to be the legitimate government of all China; (e) fear that the PRC would move to preclude any change in Taiwan's status, possibly employing military means in the process.

In sum, Premier Chiang and other leaders probably stayed with a policy line which accorded with US requirements because they judged the dangers of any radical revision to be too great. They apparently believed the ROC could not survive without the US commitment and might survive if they could be maintained. It was imperative to avoid giving the USG any pretext for disassociation from its commitments.

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~~SECRET/NO DIS~~Taipei A-195
Page 4B. 1974 - Domestic Stability Imperative for Survival

CCK's options in 1974, and the major factors affecting his choices among the options, have been discussed in reftel. Suffice it to reiterate here that the Premier's political survival depends most immediately upon maintaining domestic stability. Severe domestic rumblings (or a series of major foreign policy setbacks) could spawn contention for power and constrict CCK's authority. While economic performance is important, Taiwan could probably weather a rather severe economic downturn without instability if belief can be sustained that economic problems are caused by factors beyond ROC control. Although incompetent economic performance is likely to erode domestic support for the CCK government, a political decision to seek negotiations with the PRC--thus breaking the critical bonds holding the mainlander and Taiwanese communities together--would almost certainly destroy it. In the final analysis, if the Premier should ever be faced with a clear choice between loss of his leadership position and declaring Taiwan independence de facto or de jure, his survival instincts probably would prevail over his concept of Chineseness.

II. SECOND-GUESSING CCK'S LIKELY CHOICES

To say that CCK is unlikely to opt for negotiations with Peking, for an outright declaration of Taiwan independence, or for a Soviet connection, does not--in this opinion--mean that he must perforce passively accept the movement of US policy and respond largely in accordance with its dictates. At some point he could stop going along with whatever the US proposes.

CCK, viewing the continuing US-PRC normalization process, might conclude that:

- adherence to one-China theory will move events toward one China in fact;
- US postures or actions undermine the ROC's ability to maintain a minimally acceptable international status;
- assumed or explicit arrangements for post-diplomatic relations with the US do not sufficiently assure his position as the recognized leader of a stable Taiwan.

Should US failure to reassure CCK during the normalization process lead him to these conclusions, he could well choose to

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Taipei A-195

Page 5

abandon present pragmatic policies in favor of declaring a new status for Taiwan. Obviously, he would be most strongly tempted to do so if he saw as imminent US recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China.

At a minimum, CCK might see a status declaration as a way of sabotaging US-PRC rapprochement while enlisting popular support domestically and in the US for "self-determination." While he probably would prefer to avoid an outright declaration of Taiwan independence for much the same reasons which obtained in 1971, he could nevertheless confront the US with a declaration considerably more difficult for the US to handle than anticipated. If CCK either opts for sabotage or feels compelled by domestic considerations to act, he is likely to seek a formula that maximizes the state of separation while not giving the US de jure grounds to renounce or abandon commitments.

Thus, CCK could move to the half-way house of a "one China, two governments" (or "two states in one nation") position. Such an announcement might declare that while China remains one nation, two governments exist as a result of historical forces, each with a recognizably defined area of jurisdiction. It would call on the US and the international community to recognize this reality as was done in the case of East and West Germany. CCK could argue that the US treaty commitment, made after the Republic of China had effectively been confined in jurisdiction to the island of Taiwan, and continued in effect after the US had urged that both governments be represented in the United Nations, was unchanged by ROC recognition of the unmistakable fact that it did not exercise sovereign jurisdiction over the Mainland.

III. TIMING FACTORS

As noted above, the decision to declare a new status for the ROC is most unlikely to be prompted by the sense or knowledge that US recognition of the PRC is imminent. But other factors also exist. In order of decreasing likelihood:

- The 1976 US Presidential election might be seen as an opportunity to bring the China-Taiwan issue to head under the intense spotlight of a Presidential campaign.

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Taipei A-195

Page 6

--The death of President Chiang might be seen as setting the stage for an abrupt change of policy. While CCK appears to be a better strategist than to link a new course solely to his father's death, the confluence of events could push him to take a decision which he would feel must be faced sooner or later in any case.

--A status declaration might be seen as a way to hold on to relations with important Asian neighbors. Geographic propinquity and the presence of a large overseas Chinese community make the Philippines, for example, particularly important to the ROC. Manila's recognition of Peking would be a very severe psychological blow.

--In the event that the GROC leadership does not have to face the juridical question before then, the 1978 ROC Presidential election could be seen as the setting for such a declaration.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

Assuming the foregoing analysis is correct, and that the possibility of imminent US diplomatic recognition of Peking would lead CCK to declare a new status, what are the options open to the US?

1. Attempt to forestall such a declaration and persuade the GROC to maintain the status quo. This option assumes that any declaration must necessarily be embarrassing to US-PRC relations and therefore is inimical to our interests.
2. Follow a course of action which subtly provokes the GROC into making such a declaration: use the declaration as a reason for disavowing our commitments and disengaging from Taiwan.
3. Encourage the GROC to make a status declaration and take a hand in determining timing and content.
4. Allow events to take their course and deal with a declaration when and if it occurs. At that point, we can either use the declaration as an excuse for cutting commitments or accept the new status quo.

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Taipei A-195
Page 7

Option No. 1 - Forestall

A. Advantages

1. Best avoids damage to US-PRC relations since Peking inevitably would suspect US collusion in event of GROC declaration.

2. Avoids domestic debate in US on issues like self-determination which could disrupt present consensus behind US China policy.

3. Present vagueness of definition appears to operate in US interest.

B. Disadvantages

1. GROC probably would demand additional commitments or reassurances as its price. Complying would deepen our commitment while refusal to comply would heighten suspicions and perhaps hasten preemptive declaration.

2. Use of threats to prevent a declaration probably would be publicized by GROC and could lead to just the internal debate in the US we wish to avoid.

3. Policy places us in position of having to actively preserve status quo (despite Shanghai Communique position that we can accept any solution or no solution at all), or risk charges of bad faith and damage to our relations with other countries in Asia.

4. The US might not be able to forestall a declaration in any case.

Option No. 2 - Provoke

A. Advantages

1. Provides a pretext for disengagement.

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Taipei A-195

Page 8

B. Disadvantages

1. Probably incurs widespread damage to US credibility and good faith.
2. Likely to provoke serious political instability on Taiwan. Situation might tempt PRC to use force to "restore order."
3. Probably would stir vigorous and unhelpful domestic debate in US.

Option No. 3 - Encourage and Shape a Declaration

A. Advantages

1. If a declaration is assumed to be inevitable, this option allows us to have it occur at a time and to assume a shape which least damages US interests.
2. A declaration of separate status would be seen in US and internationally as basically in accordance with actual realities.
3. To degree that Taiwan's continued separation from mainland accords with US strategic interests, and to degree formula can be found which least offends one-China principle, US may be able to have its cake and eat it too.
4. Would best satisfy aspirations of people of Taiwan and thus promote internal political stability here. Broad, popular satisfaction could provide atmosphere in which downgrading of official relations and substitution of non-treaty guarantees for present treaty commitment could take place with relative smoothness.

B. Disadvantages

1. Any declaration risks PRC charges of US collusion but this course might be most provocative of all as far as PRC is concerned.

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Taipei A-195
Page 9

2. Having helped shape the declaration, US thereafter could be locked--as it is now--into "special relationship" with GROC, to detriment of our policy vis-a-vis Peking.

Option No. 4 - Allow Events to Take Their Course

A. Advantages

1. Best maintains the Shanghai Communique position that US will neither propose nor inhibit solution of "Taiwan problem," but will leave matters to the Chinese themselves.

2. Leaves further options open as to whether we use a declaration as a pretext to cut commitments, or work for broad acceptance of the new status quo.

B. Disadvantages

1. Leaves open possibility GROC may choose a time and/or a formula which would be maximally unhelpful.

2. US would have to make a rapid policy decision in the full glare of publicity and domestic debate--and we would have to choose between acting counter to principle of self-determination and continued rapprochement with Peking, with serious losses almost certain to ensue no matter what our choice.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The disadvantages inherent in the "provocation" strategy appear sufficient to rule out that option without further discussion. To a lesser extent, the "stalling options," either forestalling an ROC declaration or dealing with it when it occurs, embody the same disadvantages. While the US may enjoy temporarily increased flexibility, ultimately it will have to:

--Face increasing PRC pressure for "progress on the Taiwan problem" as the price for detente. US acceptance of Peking's price would be likely to impell the ROC to declare.

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Taipei A-195

Page 10

--Deal with the ROC (as well as the PRC) from a weaker position. If the ROC concludes that acceptance of US policy will not preserve its vital interests, US leverage which can be used to avert the pitfalls of an ROC surprise declaration will vanish.

--Face possible PRC accusations that US policy (insofar as it preserves Taiwan's separateness) subverts the Shanghai Communique. This price is likely to be paid regardless of the policy we pursue, but perhaps we can reduce the tariff.

Thus the stalling options appear likely to eventually bring us face to face with most of the disadvantages of the provocation option. They are unlikely to forestall an ROC declaration unless we are willing to pay the high price of continuing reiteration of our present commitments--which undoubtedly will hamper relations with Peking.

It is not to US advantage to allow matters to drift to the point where the ROC takes forcing action, because of the risks vis-a-vis the PRC, Japan, and Asia inherent in any policy we pursue in that high pressure scenario. Japan in particular would be likely to be quite insecure about its relations with the US and might move independently to develop its own military capability to compete in the region. These risks will only be exacerbated if the ROC opts for a declaration of independence or one which otherwise rebuts the principle of one China.

Given the US interest in sustaining the momentum of rapprochement with the PRC, events and the ROC's perception of its vital interests could bring us face to face with the China question within the next two years. Under controlled circumstances, an ROC declaration of its status need not be detrimental to US interests. A "temporary" divided state formula which rebuts neither the Shanghai Communique nor the one China principle could be devised and could offer all parties less painful ways of reconciling the realities than any of the other options. Neither the PRC nor the ROC would be forced to definitively sacrifice a vital interest, and such a formula could offer the best basis we might reasonably expect for a balanced Asian policy over the longer term.

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Taipei A-195

Page 11

Since it appears likely that the US will eventually have to confront an ROC declaration affecting its juridical status, we should consider discussions with Premier Chiang at some point during the conditioning process described reftel, in which we would make clear our intention ultimately to recognize Peking, that we want to achieve a formula by which the minimum price would be paid by all participants, and that timing and substance of any ROC declaration must be fully coordinated.

While any policy of continuing support for the ROC is likely to hamper our relations with Peking for a while, an indeterminate separate status for Taiwan which is least openly hostile to the PRC offers greater possibilities for a resolution favorable to us--perhaps eventually through negotiations--than a declaration of independence or separate sovereignty sprung upon us by the ROC when we are not prepared for it.

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PAGE-01 MANILA 17279 01 OF 02 020418Z
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FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7283

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 MANILA 17279

AIDAC

FOR ADMINISTRATOR GILLIGAN

E.O. 11652: N/A
SUBJ: AID DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS AN AID DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF

2. DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION.

3. RECENT CABLE TRAFFIC ON PROJECTS UNDER THE OFFICE OF PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT IMPLIES THAT CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF PROJECT DEVELOPMENT IS BEING INTENSIFIED. IF, AS ADMINISTRATOR AND OTHERS HAVE REPEATEDLY REPRESENTED, AID/W DOES HAVE A POLICY DECENTRALIZING THE TIGHT CONTROL

HERETOFORE ENJOYED BY AID/W, THEN EITHER THE MESSAGE IS NOT GETTING PAST THE ADMINISTRATOR'S DOOR OR THERE HAVE BEEN SECOND THOUGHTS.

4. CASE IN POINT: STATE 251258-WHEREIN PID ON "A FUND FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT" PROJECT, SENT TO AID/W IN MAY, IS STILL BOTTLED UP BECAUSE ONE OFFICE HAS EXERCISED ITS VETO, ASKING US TO SHUFFLE OUR FEET UNTIL "SPECIFIC CONCERNS HAVE BEEN FORMULATED." DRAFTER WHILE ON HOME LEAVE IN JULY SPENT TWO WEEKS IN AID/W ANSWERING

QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSING PROJECT. WHEN TWO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS WERE RAISED AT THE APAC MEETING, THE DRAFTER, BACK HOME, SPENT ANOTHER WEEK

WRITING REPLY. AND WE ARE NO CLOSER TO DECISION. CENTRALIZED CONTROL IS AGAIN THE WINNER WITH THE FIELD PROJECT MANAGER BOBBING ABOUT LIKE

PUPPET ON A STRING.

incorrect reference

5. CASE IN POINT: STATE 283549, WHILE RAISING TWO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON REAL PROPERTY TAX PROJECT, TONE AND DIRECTION IS CLEAR: THE FIELD IS PEOPLED UP WITH PLEASANT BUT INCOMPETENT GENERALISTS WHO NEED VERY CLOSE SUPERVISION LEST THEY DO SOMETHING IRRATIONAL. ISSUES POP UP THAT SEEM TO COME OFF THE WALL BUT WHICH MUST BE ANSWERED, RESEARCHED, REFUTED AND RESTATED OR THE PROJECT FALLS. THE ISSUE, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE NEUTRAL BENEFITS OF THE TAX, ARISES APPARENTLY FROM LACK OF UNDER-

STANDING OF ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY TAX ITSELF WHILE OTHER QUESTIONS DEMOND, ALMOST TO POINT OF HARASSMENT, A RANGE OF DETAIL, QUANTIFICATION, EVENT CONTROL AND PREDICTION THAT ARE NAIVE IN THEIR ASSERTION

AND DESTRUCTIVE IN THEIR NECESSITY. HOW WE CAN RESPOND TO THESE DEMANDS FOR DETAIL WHILE STILL ATTEMPTING CARRY ON THE WORK AT HAND RE-ENACTS CLASSIC DILEMMA OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL VERSUS FIELD OPERATION

IN WHICH ONLY CENTRALIZERS WIN. CABLE APPEARS TO HAVE MADE USUAL ROUND OF SIGN-OFFS, REQUIRING EACH OFFICE TAKE A GOOD HARD SWING THUS SHOWING THEMSELVES TO BE ALERT, IMAGINATIVE AND HARD NOSED. THIS PERFORMANCE NEARLY DUPLICATES SUPERLATIVE JOB OF LAST YEAR, STATE 297439, ON RURAL SERVICE CENTER PROJECT IN WHICH THERE WERE 21 SIGN-OFFS AND 21 QUESTIONS.

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PAGE 01 MANILA 17279 02 OF 02 020421Z 2567
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7284

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 MANILA 17279

6. AID/W HAS PUSHED QUANTIFICATION TO A LIMIT UNJUSTIFIED IN ITS VALUE AND DEBILITATING IN ITS RESULTS. WE ARE, AFTER ALL, WORKING IN AREAS WHERE THE GATHERING OF STATISTICS AND THE KEEPING OF VERIFIABLE RECORDS

IS A LONG WAY FROM PERFECTION DEMANDED BY AID/W. OUR WORK, OF NECESSITY, IS BASED ON LIMITED, OFTEN CONFLICTING SET OF DATA INFORMED

BY OUR OBSERVATIONS, EXPERIENCE AND EVALUATIONS. AND THE MORE FIGURES WE SEND TO AID/W, THE MORE WE ARE DUNNED BECAUSE SOMETHING IS MISSING. THE INVOLVED, COMPLICATED AND DISTORTING PROGRAM PROCESS UNDER WHICH WE WORK, COUPLED WITH CENTRALIZED DEMAND FOR REFINED DATA AND MORE PREDICTIVE MODELS, COMPOUNDS THE PROCESS AND TURNS PROJECT MANAGERS AND TECHNICIANS INTO DATA CLERKS AND INTERPOLATORS. A REVIEW OF STATE 251470 EVIDENCES THIS SEEMINGLY INSATIABLE DEMANDS FOR QUANTI-

FICATION, CONTROL AND PREDICTIVE MECHANISMS.

7. THE RISE IN HARASSING CABLE TRAFFIC FROM AID/W UNSPECIFIC PHILIPPINE PROJECTS FLAG, IN MY MIND AT LEAST, A DEEPER INTENTION OF AID/W TO GO AFTER PHILIPPINE PROGRAM. IF THIS YOUR INTENT WHY NOT APPROACH IT AS MATTER OF POLICY INSTEAD OF KICKING THE PROJECTS AROUND AS THOUGH

WE WERE PARTIES TO A FRATERNITY HAZING; IF YOU MUST, REDUCE OVERALL COMMITMENTS DIRECTLY AND LET THE MISSION PROCEED ON PROJECT BY PROJECT BASIS. THE HARASSMENT, THE PROFESSIONAL DEBASEMENT AND NEGATIVE CLIMATE CREATED IN PROJECT MANAGERS AND TECHNICIANS BY WAY OF PRESENT PROCESS NOT WORTH THE CANDLE.

8. IF YOU ARE SERIOUS ABOUT DECENTRALIZATION, ABOUT ENHANCING FIELD OPERATIONS THEN

- A. REORGANIZE THE BUREAUS TO REDUCE CLEARANCE PROCESS.
- B. ELIMINATE RULE OF COMPLETE UNANIMITY WHERE ONE WITHHELD SIGN-OFF CAN VETO PROJECT OR THE ACTION.
- C. RULE OUT GADFLY QUESTIONNAIRE BY WHICH EVERY QUESTION THAT COMES OFF THE WALL IS INCLUDED IN OUTGOING CABLE.
- D. AMELIORATE RAVAGES OF QUANTIFICATION BY INSTITUTING SELECTIVE CRITERIA BASE FOR INCLUSION IN PID'S AND PP'S.
- E. REVAMP INDIVIDUAL MISSION POLICY BY ESTABLISHING COUNTRY LEVELS THROUGH MISSION OBJECTIVES INSTEAD OF DOING IT THROUGH SELECTIVE BADGERING OF INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS.
- F. GIVE US CLEARER DIRECTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE POOR MAJORITY, PARTICIPATION, ETC. AS THESE TRANSLATE IN DELINEATION OF BENEFICIARIES AND PROJECT DESIGN.

STULL

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OUTGOING
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APPROVED BY A/AID: GAWING

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 267203

AIDAC, FOR MR. PETER CODY

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL -

WAS DISSENT CHANNEL SENT? NOT RECEIVED HERE AS
OF 11-08-77. PLEASE ADVISE. VANCE

B6

B6

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

March 23, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO : AID/ASIA/PT -

FROM : S/P - Anthony ~~Pike~~ *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Message: Normalization of Relations with Vietnam -- Steps Along the Way

B6

This will acknowledge the receipt of your dissent paper on normalization of relations with Vietnam. Douglas Pike of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your paper has been circulated to the Offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and the Chairman of the Open Forum, in addition to the Assistant Secretaries for East Asian Affairs and Economic and Business Affairs and the Director of AID. We commend your use of the dissent channel and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

SUMMARY

RELEASE
IN FULL

The credibility of the whole US ILO exercise has been weakened

1. by our silently accepting an Arab-drafted letter on the 1974 resolution;
2. by our going along with moderate Arabs' decision to give in to radical pressure;
3. by our going along with Blanchard when he reversed himself for the fourth time in response to Arab pressure (and by our making a secret bargain with him instead of our standing firm and letting him bear full responsibility for his failure to stand firm);
4. and by our linking the issues of Arab-Israeli and Article 17 (in negotiations with Blanchard and the Arabs on the letter, and in the USREP's statements in Selections Committee urging delay on Article 17 until the Arab Israeli issue was settled.)

I dissent from the Department's preliminary assessment that this outcome was a success. If the Dept, now receiving more complete reports on the outcome, changes its view to take into account the losses described above and therefore concludes that this was not a success, then the purpose of my dissent has been accomplished.

I ask that I be informed of action taken on this dissent message by letter to me at the US Mission in Geneva, with copy to my office in Washington.

OPTIONAL FORM 135 (OCR) (10-75)
Form 135 (10-75)
Dept. of State

RELEASE
IN FULL

ACK	INFO	DTG	SIGNATURE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE			
CLASSIFICATION			
SPECIAL CHARGES			
S/P: MACASEY, BDM			
EXT: 29716-8-1-77			
S/P: ALAKE			

S/P: A. DEPORTE S/P-OF: NABOYER	CLEARANCES	S/P: R. HARRINGTON	CLEARANCES
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DESIRABLE DISTRIBUTION	S/P: ONLY
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SPECIAL HANDLING	

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR DOBRIN FROM LAKE S/P

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, FR, PINT, PGOV

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: USG RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH LEFT

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON USG RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH LEFT; ANTON DEPORTE OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF WILL BE COORDINATING A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISSENT CHANNEL PRACTICES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOU ON YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

INITIALS

AL *ML*

MAC *ML*

AD *ML*

RJH *ML*

NAB *ML*

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RELEASE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

dissemination

1/18/77

DISSENT CHANNEL

[redacted]
United States Information Service
American Embassy
Mexico, D. F., Mexico

B6

Dear [redacted]:

B6

You will already have seen that the Department issued a statement cautioning Americans about the dangers of traveling in Sinaloa. Although issuing a statement was already under consideration when your dissent message arrived, your telegram provided an important and useful catalyst in focusing the process. I want to thank you for submitting it and commend you for taking this initiative.

For your information, the warning was also passed to the Immigration and Naturalization Service on December 31 who in turn passed it on to customs and immigration posts all along the US-Mexican border. The American Automobile Association had already been briefed along the lines of the release.

We obviously will never know whether this announcement has saved peoples' lives or property, but in a case such as this we must make every effort to protect our citizens. I am grateful to you for helping us do the job better.

Very truly yours,

[Handwritten signature]

Drafted: S/P:TP [redacted] :vb
x21744: 1/12/77

Clearances: SCA - Mr. Walentynowicz (in draft)
ARA - Mr. Luers (in draft)
S/P-OFP - Mr. Boyer (in draft) *[Handwritten initials]*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE
IN FULL

*RJH - Attached
file w/in previous request
at clip. Since we rejected
Snafte's messages as true
dissents, see no issue in
"declassifying" / releasing documents w/
ARA concurrence.*

January 5, 1978

MCC.

MEMORANDUM

TO: S/IG - Ambassador Yost
ARA/LA/CAR - Mr. Ashley Hewitt
~~SP/OPF~~ Mr. Douglas Kinney

FROM: PER/G - Frederick Smith, Jr. *fs*

SUBJECT: Request for Department Records Relating to
Bridgetown

With reference to our telephone conversation this afternoon
attached is a copy of the letter requesting certain
Department documents.

Attachment

As stated



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

February 17, 1976

TO :

FROM : S/P - Reginald Bartholomew *RB*

SUBJECT: Dissent Message, American Policy
and Italy - A Critique

B6

This will acknowledge the receipt of your dissent paper on the Department's policies on Italy. Mr. Anton DePorte of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your paper has been circulated to the offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff and the Chairperson of the Open Forum Panel. We commend your use of the dissent channel and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

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ACTION 21-22

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DISSENT CHANNEL

AIDAC FOR GEORGE PHILLIPS, STATE FOR TOM BOWIE

REF: (A) STATE 24JFC9, (B) LA PAZ 0775

1. SUMMARY: THE LABOR ATTACHE, [REDACTED] OPPOSES AIFLD'S PROPOSAL FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO CRIT BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THAT POTENTIAL GAIN OF IMPROVING CRIT'S ABILITY TO STRENGTHEN LATIN TRADE UNIONS AND ORGANIZE MORE WORKERS DOES NOT COUNTERWEIGH THE DAMAGE THAT WILL ENSUE TO CRIT'S IMAGE IN LATIN AMERICA ONCE IT ACCEPTS SUPPORT FROM THE USG. END SUMMARY

2. FOR YEARS CRIT HAS BEEN CRITICIZED IN LATIN AMERICA FOR BEING DOMINATED BY AN AMERICAN LABOR ORGANIZATION, THE AFL/CIO. TO NOW CHANNEL USG FUNDS INTO CRIT VIA AIFLD WOULD OPEN THE DOOR FOR SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED CRITICISM OF CRIT AS AN ORGANIZATION DOMINATED NOT JUST BY THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT BUT BY THE USG ITSELF. THIS WILL BRING CHARGES FROM THE LEFT THAT CRIT IS CONTROLLED BY THE CIA. THIS CHARGE WILL BE CREDIBLE TO MANY INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATIONS SINCE (ALMOST) ONE HALF OF CRIT'S EXPENSE UNDER AIFLD'S PROPOSAL (1,100,000 OF 2,020,000) WOULD COME FROM THE USG (THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THE AFL/CIO CONTRIBUTIONS).

3. THE LABOR ATTACHE RECOGNIZES THAT CURRENTLY CRIT AFFILIATES ARE MORE CONCERNED WITH IMPROVING CRIT'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE THEM NECESSARY SERVICES THAN WHAT MAY BE THE SOURCE OF THE MONEY THAT PAYS FOR THESE SERVICES, AND HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE FOUR REGIONAL FIELD OFFICES TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE PROPOSED PROGRAM WOULD HELP ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF ASSISTING CRIT'S AFFILIATES TO STRENGTHEN THEMSELVES AND TO ORGANIZE MORE OF LATIN AMERICA'S UNORGANIZED WORKERS. HE ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT CRIT'S ENEMIES ON THE LEFT, PARTICULARLY CLAT AND THE COMMUNISTS, WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACK CRIT WHETHER USG FUNDING IS PROVIDED OR NOT. HOWEVER, HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT USG FINANCING AND THE CRITICISM THAT WILL ENSUE WILL HAVE ON LABOR GROUPS OF THE CENTER THAT ARE POTENTIAL CRIT AFFILIATES OR THAT PRESENTLY COOPERATE WITH CRIT. CRIT'S IDENTIFICATION WITH THE USG MAY MAKE THEM MORE RELUCTANT TO END THEIR INDEPENDENCE BY AFFILIATING OR COOPERATING WITH CRIT. THIS COULD RESULT IN THE CRIT AFFILIATES BEING ISOLATED ON THE RIGHT.

4. THE LABOR ATTACHE AGREES WITH THE AID COMMENT THAT "PROSPECTS" FOR PHASE OUT OF THE PROGRAM, ONCE ACCEPTED, ARE NOT CLEAR AT THIS POINT." IN FACT, PUT MORE STRONGLY, IT IS PROBABLE THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTED THERE WILL BE CONTINUING PRESSURE FROM CRIT, AIFLD AND THE AFL/CIO TO CONTINUE THE PROGRAM UNTIL SUCH TIME IN THE INDEFINITE FUTURE WHEN LATIN AMERICAN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS WOULD BE ABLE AND WILLING TO ASSUME THE COSTS OF THIS PROGRAM.

5. THE LABOR ATTACHE IS CONCERNED HOWEVER THAT, EVEN IF THIS PROGRAM WERE APPROVED FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME AND USG FINANCING WERE THEN WITHDRAWN, CRIT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE IDENTIFIED FOR MANY YEARS TO COME AS A LABOR ORGANIZATION TIED TO THE USG.

6. IT IS NEARLY CERTAIN THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN YEARS CRIT IS

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IN PART
B6

B6

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN
PART B6

PAGE 01 SANTIAGO 09018 041811Z

2226

SANTIAGO 09018 041811Z

ACTION: SE-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISD-00 SSO-00 /004 W
-----057712 041821Z /70

O 041725Z NOV 77
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC HIJACT IMMEDIATE 7052

ALREADY TAKEN BY YOUR GOVERNMENT TO SAFEGUARD AND PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS. I SINCERELY HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO UNDERTAKE FURTHER INITIATIVES IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THAT CHILE WILL SOON TAKE ITS RIGHTFUL PLACE AGAIN AMONG THE NATIONS THAT HAVE FULLY CONSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACIES. END QUOTE.

6. SIGNED: _____
BOYATT

B6

~~SECRET~~ SANTIAGO 9018

DISSENT CHANNEL////////////////////////////////////

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CI, SRUM
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE: REDRAFTING OF CARTER/PINOCHET LETTER

THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT

REF: STATE 262398

REQUESTED DISTRIBUTION: ARA AND NSC

1. THE UNDERSIGNED BELIEVE THAT TRANSMITTAL TO PRESIDENT PINOCHET OF THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER (REFTEL) WOULD NEEDLESSLY PREJUDICE REAL HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENT IN CHILE. ACCORDINGLY, WE PROPOSE THAT IT BE REDRAFTED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING THIS WEEK AND TO CLARIFY THAT THE US DOES NOT INTEND TO IMPOSE A SPECIFIC POLITICAL STRUCTURE ON CHILE.

2. OBJECTION 1: ON NOVEMBER 3, THE GOC ANNOUNCED THAT DINA/CHI HEAD MANUEL CONTRERAS WOULD BE REPLACED BY RETIRED ARMY GENERAL MENA, WHO MAY HAVE BEEN FORCED INTO RETIREMENT IN OCTOBER 1975 BECAUSE OF HIS OPPOSITION TO THEN-DINA'S ABUSES. ON NOVEMBER 4, PRESIDENT PINOCHET TOLD US CONFIDENTIALLY THAT HE PLANNED TO COMMUTE THE SENTENCES OF PENDING DL 504 CASES AND SPEED UP THE PROCESSING OF THOSE IN TRIAL.

3. THE CARTER/PINOCHET LETTER BEARS THE DATE OCTOBER 31. ONCE THAT LETTER BECOMES PUBLIC (AND WE ARE SURE THAT IT WILL) PINOCHET WILL BE SEEN TO HAVE BEEN REACTING TO THIS USG PRESSURE. PINOCHET WILL CERTAINLY COMPREHEND HIS SITUATION AS SOON AS HE RECEIVES THE LETTER -- WITH UNFORETOLD CONSEQUENCES TO HIS STILL PRIVATE DECISION ON THE PRISONER RELEASE AND, WORSE, WITH THE LONG-RUN FEELING THAT HE HAD BEEN VICTIMIZED BY PRESIDENT CARTER. ACCORDINGLY, WE BELIEVE THE LETTER SHOULD BE REDRAFTED IN KNOWLEDGE THAT THE GOC TOOK AND WAS PLANNING TO TAKE THE AFOREMENTIONED STEPS. PARA 5 CONTAINS SUGGESTED WORDING.

4. OBJECTION 2: AS NOW DRAFTED, THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF THE LETTER SPEAKS OF THE NEED "TO RESTORE" THE "DEMOCRATIC TRADITION" IN CHILE. IN THE CHILEAN CONTEXT, IT HAS A VERY SPECIFIC MEANING: A REPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE EXISTING PRIOR TO THE 1973 COUP. NEITHER THE GOC NOR FUTURE HISTORIANS ARE LIKELY TO INTERPRET THIS SENTENCE AS WRITTEN TO MEAN OTHER THAN AN ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A SPECIFIC POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN CHILE. FURTHERMORE, THE MILITARY HAS, AS A BASIC TENET, INSISTED THAT IT WOULD NOT RESTORE THE OLD SYSTEM. EVEN SOME DEMOCRATIC CRITICS OF THE REGIME URGE SIGNIFICANT INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES. BY MAKING "RESTORATION" A SINE QUA NON FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WE WILL HAVE EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATED OUR LEVERAGE ON THE GOC FOR PROGRESSIVE CHANGES, THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF WHICH NEITHER WE NOR THE GOC CAN PREDICT AT THIS TIME. PARA 5 INCORPORATES MORE APPROPRIATE WORDING.

5. WE URGE REPLACING EXISTING PARA 3 OF TEXT OF REFTEL WITH:
QUOTE: AS I NOTED DURING OUR CONVERSATION, HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS REMAIN THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO RESTORATION OF THE TRADITIONALLY CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHILE. I EARNESTLY HOPE SUCH FRIENDLY AND CLOSE RELATIONS CAN GRADUALLY BE REESTABLISHED BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I APPRECIATE THE STEPS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02: STATE 145081

2. BEFORE WE CAN DECIDE THIS MATTER, HOWEVER, URGENTLY NEED YOUR ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING:

A) WHEN WILL PRESENT MAP RICE STOCKS AND FINAL DELIVERIES UNDER CURRENT CONTRACT RUN OUT, AND WHEN WOULD DELIVERIES

OF ANY NEW PURCHASES BEGIN TO ARRIVE IN LAOS?

B) WHAT DO YOU ANTICIPATE WILL BE SPECIFIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECT OF CUTOFF, INCLUDING EFFECT ON PGNU AND FAR ATTITUDES TOWARD MISSION AND USG IN GENERAL?

neglected by Kramers

C) IF DECISION IS NOT TO CONTRACT FOR MORE RICE, WHEN IN YOUR OPINION SHOULD WE INFORM LAO OF THIS DECISION?

D) IF DELIVERIES WERE TO BE CONTINUED FOR SOME MINIMAL PERIOD BEYOND JUNE 30 IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD U.S. PERSONNEL DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER DRAWDOWN TO MINIMUM LEVEL, WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE THIS PERIOD SHOULD BE?

3. FOR [] COULD CONTRACT BE NEGOTIATED BY JUNE 30 FOR LESS THAN AMOUNT NOTED REF: D? KISSINGER

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Sept. 20

RELEASE IN PART B6

Dear Mr. Lord,

I appreciate your comments on my dissent paper and will try to implement them. If, however, the Secretary should decide the issue before my revised revision arrives, I think the Sept.19 version (about five pages) makes most of the major points. Since the AF position paper is considerably longer, I hope a dissent will be deserving of equal attention and therefore my final dissent paper may exceed the two pages you suggest.

Sincerely, *A.*

[Redacted signature box]

B6

CC: Mr. Djerejian

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART
B6

PAGE 01 STATE 055201
ORIGIN SP-02

4097

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 A-01 ONY-00 /019 R

DRAFTED BY S/P: MACASEY
APPROVED BY S/P: ALAKE
M - PKENNEDY
/P: RJHARRINGTON
/A - RFALK
/P: DKINNEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S/P, M, A ONLY

file issued

R 032053Z MAR 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
-----116774 041416Z /14

UNCLAS STATE 055201

E. O. 11652:

TAGS: AGEN, ASCH

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON POLICY ON
ADEQUACY OF OVERSEAS SCHOOLS

REF: SANTIAGO 1223; 77 STATE

FOR [] AND [] FROM S/P - LAKE

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ON THE DEPARTMENT'S
OVERSEAS SCHOOL POLICY. SINCE YOUR DISSENT CONCERNS
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY" I HAVE ASKED THE OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT IN CONJUNCTION
WITH THE BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION TO REPLY TO THE
QUESTIONS YOU HAVE RAISED. IN ADDITION TO THE DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR ADMINISTRATION, THE FOLLOWING HAVE ALSO RECEIVED
COPIES OF YOUR TELEGRAM: THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR UNCLASS
EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS, THE AID ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR PROGRAM AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES, THE
OPEN FORUM, AND THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION,
AND THE FAMILY LIAISON OFFICE. CHRISTOPHER

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UNCLASSIFIED



Chief of Staff
Department of State

RELEASE IN PART

B6 *Followers copy*

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 549

PAGE 01 BANGKO 05767 272352Z

62
ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 /015 W

002685

R 260901Z APR 72
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2923

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BANGKOK 5767

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (RAISE CLASSIFICATION TO LIMITED
OFFICIAL USE PER R PETERSON S/PC)

USOM BANGKOK

DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJ: STATEMENT OF OPPOSITION TO THE BOMBING OF HAIPHONG

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, [REDACTED],
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, [REDACTED] OFFICE
OF PROGRAM, [REDACTED], OFFICE OF PROGRAM AND
[REDACTED], OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS.

B6

2. WE, THE ABOVE-MENTIONED UNITED STATES FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE
OFFICERS, CURRENTLY SERVING WITH THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (USOM) IN THAILAND, HEREIN FORMALLY REGISTER OUR
OPPOSITION TO THE RECENT MILITARY ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES
AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

B6

3. WE HAVE CHOSEN THIS MENTHOD TO COMMUNICATE OUR DISAPPROVAL
AS IT REPRESENTS THE SOLE OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED FORUM FOR FOREIGN
SERVICE EMPLOYEES TO EXPRESS THEIR DISSENT AND BECAUSE WE
CONSIDER ANY UNRESTRAINED, PUBLIC CRITICISM ON OUR PART, EITHER
PERSONALLY OR THROUGH THE NEWS MEDIA, AS SERVING NO USEFUL PURPOSE
.....EVERY CONCEIVABLE ARGUMENT FOR OR AGAINST THE WAR HAVING
LONG SINCE BEEN MADE.

SPECIFICALLY, WE REGARD THE AIR ATTACKS AGAINST FUEL AND OTHER STORAGE

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3



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 BANGKO 05767 272352Z

BEHIND THE NARROW, MILITARY DOMINATED OPTIONS WHICH WERE
CONSIDERED THE ONLY VALID ONES DURING THE 1960'S. IF NEW OPTIONS
ARE TO BE CONSIDERED, WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE NOT ALLOW
OURSELVES TO BE TEMPTED TO USE THE OLD AND EASILY AVAILABLE
EXPEDIENTS (AS WE DID IN THE BOMBING) UNTIL WE HAVE EXHAUSTED
ALL OTHER MEANS.
UNGER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Dissent file

RELEASE IN PART
B6

October 3, 1972

Mr. [redacted]
1702 Burnley Avenue
Charlottesville, Virginia 22903

B6

Dear Mr. [redacted]:

B6

Thank you for your letter of September 16 concerning the "Limited Official Use" administrative designation of two airgrams submitted by you to the Department through the "Dissent Channel" on July 17 and 21 of this year.

As I informed you in my letter of July 28, the "Limited Official Use" designation of these messages will be maintained beyond August 1, 1972. The legal justification for this action is found in 5 FAM 951 and 952.3 (a copy of which is enclosed). In the view of this office, which was the recipient of the messages in question, the material contained therein warranted the retention of its original administrative control designation.

Although information relating to the existence of and operation of the "Dissent Channel" is unclassified, the channel itself is not intended as a public forum to which unlimited access is permitted. On the contrary, it reflects the privileged relationship between those who use it and the most senior officers of the Department and provides an outlet for the free expression of views within this framework. The State Department's security regulations specify that "information received through privileged sources" is material which should be administratively controlled (5 FAM 952.1). I enclose also a copy of these regulations.

I hope this will help to clarify the matter.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
William I. Cargo
William I. Cargo
Director
Planning and Coordination Staff

Enclosures:

As stated

Clearances: H - Mr. Prentice
M - Mr. Gammon
SY - Mr. Shea
S/S - Mr. Miller

Drafted: S/PC:BGrove:L/M:HShamwell:jk
10/3/72 x21140



Department of State

RELEASE IN PART
B6

TELEGRAM

RRP

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 797

PAGE 01 TEGUCI 02313 101749Z

44-41
ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 /015 W

035446

R 072205Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2183

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEGUCIGALPA 02313

DISSENT CHANNEL

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY
[REDACTED] GENERAL SERVICES OFFICER.

2. OUR POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION IN BURUNDI DURING MASSIVE MURDERING OF HUTU TRIBESMEN COULD BE A REPEAT OF RECENT EVENTS IN BANGLADESH. WE SEEM TO BE WAITING UNTIL REPORTED "SELECTIVE GENOCIDE" HAS RESULTED IN THE ELIMINATION OF ANY DISSIDENT HUTU LEADERS. SUCH DISPLAY OF TUTSI POWER MAY INDEED RESULT IN SUBSEQUENT TRANQUILITY IN BURUNDI BUT IT WOULD SEEM FOOLISH TO DISPEL THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUTU MAJORITY.

3. IF IT IS TRUE THAT WE DO NOT HAVE LEVERAGE IN BURUNDI AND WE CANNOT ALTER THE SITUATION THEN I SHOULD HOPE OUR POLICY WOULD FOLLOW THAT OF VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES WHICH SUSPENDED ASSISTANCE. SINCE WE HAVE NO AID PROGRAM, POTENTIAL ELIMINATION OF FUTURE AID RATHER THAN SUSPENSION MAY PROVIDE THE LEVERAGE. DISASTER RELIEF IS OF DOUBIOUS VALUE TO THE HUTUS, AND WILL PROBABLY BE MORE BENEFICIAL TO THE CONTROLLING TUTSI GOVERNMENT. IF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WERE TO VOTE ON THE ISSUE OF SUPPORTING THE BURUNDI GOVERNMENT DURING THIS CRISIS THEY MAY WELL PREFER BREACH OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS TO AUGMENTATION OF DISASTER RELIEF.
RYAN

NOTE: UNCLAS CLASSIFICATION CHANGED. HANDLED AS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PER MR TRENT (SPC)

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 867

PAGE 01 ADDIS 00782 01 OF 02 221529Z

44
ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 NFA-10 PM-08 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 L-03
CIAE-00 INR-09 NSAE-00 DODD-00 AID-20 OMB-01 T-03
GAC-01 EB-11 MC-02 H-02 RSR-01 TRSF-00 PRS-01 ADP-00
/136 W

P R 221418Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2983
INFO AEFMBASSY BOMN 0193
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USCINCEUR
AMCONSUL ASMARA

012462

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 ADDIS ABABA 0782

SURJ: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY OF THE SOMALI THREAT TO ETHIOPIA

1. THIS TELEGRAM, WHICH SUMMARIZES AN AIRGRAM THAT WE EXPECT TO POUCH ON JANUARY 25, HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE COUNTRY TEAM BUT ITS RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO THE CONCURRENCE OF AMBASSADOR ADAIR, CURRENTLY IN WASHINGTON. ITS GIST IS THAT WE BELIEVE THE US SHOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO ASSIST ETHIOPIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE GROWING SOMALI MILITARY THREAT, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE BEING THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE \$2 MILLION SHORTFALL IN US MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH PRESENTLY APPEARS LIKELY FOR FY 73, AND OF ANY PROSPECTIVE SHORTFALL IN FY 74.

2. OVER THE LAST YEAR ETHIOPIAN CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE SOMALI AGGRESSION IN THE FUTURE HAS GREATLY INCREASED. THE CONSIDERABLY INCREASED STRIDENCY OF SOMALI TERRITORIAL DEMANDS, THE OMINOUS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ADDIS 00782 01 OF 02 221529Z

LACK OF SOMALI INTEREST IN MEASURES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS; THE EXPLICIT THREAT OF PRESIDENT SIAD TO USE FORCE IF PEACEFUL TACTICS FAIL; THE REALIZATION THAT A RAISE IN STAKES MAY SOON OCCUR IF OIL IS DISCOVERED IN COMMERCIAL QUANTITIES; THE NEW FEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL GO VERY FAR TO SATISFY SOMALI ARMS REQUESTS IN ORDER TO FORESTALL ANOTHER EGYPTIAN-STYLE OUSTER; DEVELOPMENTS SUGGESTING THE POSSIBILITY OF GREATER EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE ELF INSURGENCY; VARIOUS INTERVENTIONIST ACTS OF COLONEL QADHAFI WHICH SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY OF LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA IN A FUTURE CONFLICT WITH ETHIOPIA; INCREASED DOUBTS REGARDING THE CONTINUATION OF SIGNIFICANT US MILITARY ASSISTANCE; AND A KEENER AWARENESS OF THE EMPEROR'S MORTALITY, WITH ALL THAT IMPLIES FOR ETHIOPIA'S POSSIBLE VULNERABILITY; ALL THESE HAVE COMBINED TO HEIGHTEN CONCERN CLOSE TO ALARM.

3. THE MOST OMINOUS DEVELOPMENT OF ALL HAS BEEN AN APPARENT INCREASE SINCE JULY 1, 1972 IN THE TEMPO OF SOVIET DELIVERIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO SOMALIA, AND IN THE ARRIVAL OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS. THE FACTS OF WHICH THEY ARE AWARE CONCERN ETHIOPIANS DEEPLY; THEIR UNCERTAINTY WHETHER EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT DELIVERIES HAVE RECENTLY OCCURRED, OR WILL SHORTLY OCCUR, WORRIES THEM EVEN MORE.

4. ETHIOPIAN MILITARY LEADERS CONSIDER THAT THE PRESENT SOMALI THREAT CALLS FOR SUCH MAJOR STRENGTHENING OF ETHIOPIAN FORCES AS A MECHANIZED INFANTRY BRIGADE, NUMEROUS ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT, INCREASED AIR DEFENSE RADAR COVERAGE, AND EIGHT MODERN PATROL CRAFT. YET, ALTHOUGH NUMEROUS ETHIOPIAN LEADERS HAVE OF LATE BEEN EMPHASIZING THEIR CONCERN TO US, SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL US ASSISTANCE HAVE THUS FAR BEEN SURPRISINGLY MODERATE. (THEY ARE NOT YET AWARE OF THE SHORTFALL IN US ASSISTANCE WHICH WE ANTICIPATE IN FY 73.) WE BELIEVE THAT MORE SUBSTANTIAL REQUESTS ARE LIKELY BEFORE LONG, HOWEVER, AND WE NOTE IN THIS CONNECTION THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RECENT PREDICTION THAT HIS GOVERNMENT, AND POSSIBLY THE EMPEROR HIMSELF, WILL SOON REQUEST A BASIC DISCUSSION OF THE SOMALI THREAT WITH THE AMBASSADOR (ADDIS 98321). WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT ANY WORD INFORMATION REGARDING THE DELIVERY OF MIG-21S OR T-54 TANKS TO SOMALIA WOULD TRIGGER A CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN THE URGENCY AND MAGNITUDE OF ETHIOPIAN REQUESTS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 ADDIS 00782 01 OF 02 221529Z

5. WE ARE BY NO MEANS INCLINED TO REGARD CURRENT ETHIOPIAN EXPRESSIONS OF APPREHENSION AS A PLOY TO IMPRESS THE US. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THEY ARE SINCERE AND TO A LARGE EXTENT WE CONSIDER THEM JUSTIFIED. THERE IS SUFFICIENT TERRITORIAL APPEAL AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN SOMALIA SO THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A FUTURE DESIRE TO ATTACK ETHIOPIA, POSSIBLY IN A PERIOD OF CONFUSION FOLLOWING THE EMPEROR'S DEATH, MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. THE SOVIETS WILL HOPEFULLY SEEK TO AVERT THIS DANGER BY CAREFULLY THROTTLING THEIR DELIVERIES TO SOMALIA, BUT WITH THEIR RECORD IN THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT IN MIND WE CANNOT AFFORD TO BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC ON THIS SCORE. SOVIET DELIVERIES SINCE JULY 1, 1972 HAVE NOTICEABLY, THOUGH NOT DRASTICALLY, STRENGTHENED SOMALI MILITARY CAPABILITIES. IN OUR JUDGMENT ETHIOPIA HAS GOOD REASON IN CONSEQUENCE TO STRENGTHEN ITS MILITARY POSTURE AND SHOULD CERTAINLY SEEK CONSIDERABLE STRENGTHENING IF SOMALIA SOON ACQUIRES, OR IS FOUND TO HAVE ALREADY ACQUIRED, SUCH IMPORTANT ADDITIONS AS A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF MIG-21S AND T-54 TANKS.

6. IF THE US REACTS TO CURRENT ETHIOPIAN APPREHENSION BY A SIMPLE CONTINUATION OF RECENT ATTITUDES AND PROGRAM TRENDS, INCLUDING A MAP LEVEL OF \$9.1 MILLION (\$8.6 MILLION EXCLUDING PCHT -- PACKAGING, CRATING, HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION) FOR THIS FISCAL YEAR AND PROBABLY FURTHER CUTS IN THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR, THE IEG WILL CONCLUDE THAT US FRIENDSHIP IS OF VERY LIMITED VALUE, AND THEIR LEADERS WILL FEEL CONSIDERABLE DISILLUSIONMENT AND BITTERNESS. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WILL CAUSE A BASIC CHANGE IN ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS KAGNEW, OR SEVERE DAMAGE TO OTHER MAJOR US INTERESTS (ALTHOUGH A CAVEAT MUST BE INSERTED THAT A TENNECO OIL STRIKE COULD AT ANY TIME ADD AN ADDITIONAL US INTEREST IN ETHIOPIA), BUT IT WILL PROBABLY MAKE IT SOMEWHAT HARDER FOR THE US TO ATTAIN ITS OBJECTIVES WITH REGARD TO A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES IN US/ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS. VIGOROUS ETHIOPIAN EFFORTS TO OBTAIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT ON CREDIT FROM OTHER NON-COMMUNIST SOURCES CAN CERTAINLY BE ANTICIPATED. MANY COUNTRIES WOULD GRADUALLY CONCLUDE THAT US WILLINGNESS TO HELP ITS FRIENDS IN TIME OF STRESS HAD REACHED A VERY LOW LEVEL. A LIBYAN-ARMED ELF MIGHT DECIDE TO ATTACK KAGNEW IF IT SAW CLEARLY HOW DISINCLINED THE US WAS TO ASSUME ANY FURTHER INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA. LASTLY, THERE WOULD BE A SOMEWHAT GREATER DANGER OF SOME FORM OF SOMALI AGGRESSION AGAINST ETHIOPIA THAN IF THE US HAD CONTRIBUTED A LITTLE MORE TO ETHIOPIAN STRENGTH.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 04 ADDIS 00782 01 OF 02 221529Z

7. SHOULD THERE EVENTUALLY BE AN OUTBREAK OF SOME FORM OF HOSTILITIES WITH SOMALIA, THE DISADVANTAGES FOR THE US MENTIONED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH WOULD BE INTENSIFIED.

8. THESE CONSEQUENCES OF A SIMPLE CONTINUATION OF RECENT US ATTITUDES AND PROGRAM TRENDS ARE SUFFICIENTLY UNPLEASANT IN OUR VIEW TO JUSTIFY A THOROUGH SEARCH FOR ADDITIONAL ACTIONS WHICH THE US COULD TAKE AT PRESENT TO REASSURE ETHIOPIA, TO STRENGTHEN ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES, AND TO LESSEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF SOMALI AGGRESSION. THE RESULTS OF SUCH AN EXAMINATION ON OUR PART ARE SUMMARIZED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 861

PAGE 01 ADDIS 00782 02 OF 02 221612Z

44
ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 NEA-10 ADP-00 PM-00 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01
L-03 CIAE-00 INR-09 NSAE-00 DDDE-00 AID-20 OMB-01 Y-03
GAC-01 ER-11 MC-02 H-02 TRSE-00 PRS-01 PSR-01 /136 W

012816

P P 221418Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2984
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USCINCEUR
ZNN/AMCONSUL ASMARA

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 ADDIS ABABA 0782

A. THAT A WORKING MEETING BE PLANNED IF POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE EMPEROR AND THE PRESIDENT, POSSIBLY OUTSIDE OF WASHINGTON, PERHAPS IN CONNECTION WITH HIS SCHEDULED LATIN AMERICAN TRIP THIS SPRING. REGARDLESS OF THE STATE OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROSPECTS AT THAT TIME, THE EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN ETHIOPIA EVIDENCED BY THIS MEETING WOULD HELP TO STRENGTHEN US-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS, BOLSTER ETHIOPIAN CONFIDENCE, AND HOLD WITHIN BOUNDS THE PRESSURE FOR US MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

B. THAT THE FEASIBILITY OF A US-IEG MEETING AT THE SECSTATE OR SECDEF LEVEL BE EVALUATED AT A LATER DATE IN LIGHT OF THE POSSIBILITY AND CONTENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL MEETING DISCUSSED ABOVE.

C. THAT THE US SUGGEST TO THE IEG, AND POSSIBLY THE GSDR, THAT IT CONSIDER APPROACHING THE OAU AND/OR FRIENDLY AFRICAN STATES WITH A REQUEST TO MEDIATE THEIR BILATERAL TENSIONS, AS WAS DONE IN 1964.

D. THAT A MEETING WITH THE ISRAELIS BE HELD IN WASHINGTON OR

~~SECRET~~



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ADDIS 00782 02 OF 02 221612Z

JERUSALEM TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE ISRAELI ASSISTANCE (OF LOW VISIBILITY) TO ETHIOPIA) INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITIES OF TRIANGULAR TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING THE US.

F. THAT THE US CONSULT IN APPROPRIATE CAPITALS WITH THE FRENCH, GERMANS, ITALIANS AND BRITISH TO SHARE ASSESSMENTS OF THE PROBLEM AND TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THEY CAN MAKE USEFUL CONTRIBUTIONS.

F. THAT THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDER THE DESIRABILITY OF A HIGH-LEVEL APPROACH TO APPRISE THE SOVIETS OF OUR CONCERN AND TO REQUEST THEIR COOPERATION TO MINIMIZE THE DANGER OF AN ARMS RACE AND FUTURE HOSTILITIES.

G. THAT THE DEPARTMENT REVIEW OPTIONS FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN US RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA AND A SUBSEQUENT INCREASE IN US INFLUENCE THERE.

4. THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY VISITS TO ETHIOPIA AND OF CALLS AT MASSAWA BY DETACHED 7TH FLEET OR OTHER NAVAL ELEMENTS, AS CIRCUMSTANCES MAY WARRANT, BE CONSIDERED.

10. OUR MAAG IS ENCOURAGING IEG SELF-HELP MEASURES TO IMPROVE ITS MILITARY POSTURE; THERE ARE MANY ACTIONS SUCH AS AN IMPROVED COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE AND VARIOUS DEPLOYMENT IMPROVEMENTS WHICH IT HAS BEEN RECOMMENDING AND WHICH IT WILL CONTINUE TO PROMOTE VIGOROUSLY.

1. WITH REGARD TO US MILITARY ASSISTANCE, A SHORTFALL OF \$3 MILLION (FROM THE DOD MAP OBJECTIVE OF \$11.5 MILLION, NOT INCLUDING PCHT) NOW APPEARS LIKELY FOR FY 73 AND WE SUSPECT THAT THE SHORTFALL FOR FY 74 WILL BE EVEN GREATER IF EVENTS ARE ALLOWED TO TAKE THEIR NATURAL COURSE. SUCH SHORTFALLS COULD PERHAPS HAVE BEEN DIGESTED WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE TO US INTERESTS IF ETHIOPIAN-SOMALIA RELATIONS WERE NOW APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS WAS THE CASE A YEAR AGO. THAT IS DECIDELY NOT THE CASE. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE ASCRIBE GREAT IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF US INTERESTS TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE SHORTFALL THREATENING FOR BOTH FY 73 AND FY 74. SUCH ACTION IS NEEDED BOTH IN TERMS OF THE REAL SOMALI THREAT AND THE EXPECTATIONS WHICH THE IEG IS ENTITLED TO HAVE REGARDING US ASSISTANCE IN TIMES OF GATHERING PERIL; ASSISTANCE WHICH WILL MERELY PERMIT A STRAIGHT-LINE CONTINUATION OF THE MODEST MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WHICH BEGAN IN FY 71) WITH FULL US APPROVAL.

12. WE RECOMMEND THAT IMMEDIATE STEPS BE TAKEN TO ELIMINATE THE

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 ADDIS 00782 02 OF 02 2216127

IMPENDING \$3 MILLION SHORTFALL FOR FY 73 BY MEANS OF ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING APPROACHES: (A) AN INCREASE IN MAP; (B) BROADENING THE SPECTRUM OF ELIGIBLE EXPENDITURES FOR THE EXISTING AID AGRICULTURAL SECTOR LOAN TO PERMIT AN IEG SHIFT OF BUDGET RESOURCES TO DEFENSE SUPPORT; AND (C) OFFERING THE IEG MILITARY EQUIPMENT ON A CREDIT/SALE BASIS. ALTERNATIVE (A) IS THE MOST DESIRABLE IN OUR VIEW BUT WE RECOGNIZE THE INTENSE WORLDWIDE DEMANDS UPON A SHRINKING MAP BUDGET. ALTERNATIVE (B) SHOULD BE FEASIBLE WITHOUT MUCH DIFFICULTY IN OUR VIEW TO A LEVEL OF ABOUT \$900,000 THIS YEAR. AN INCREASE OF UP TO \$2 MILLION IN FY 73 WOULD IN FACT BE POSSIBLE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ETHIOPIA'S ABSORPTIVE CAPACITIES, BUT POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 622(S) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT WOULD NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS WELL AS POSSIBLE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE CURRENT IEG UNDERSTANDING WITH THE IBRD THAT ANNUAL DEFENSE SPENDING INCREASES WILL NOT EXCEED 4 PERCENT. ALTERNATIVE (C) THAT THE DISADVANTAGE OF ADDING TO ETHIOPIA'S PRESENT FOREIGN DEBT BURDEN, WHICH AT 12 PERCENT IS ALREADY ABOVE THE 10 PERCENT "ALERT LEVEL" ESTABLISHED BY THE IBRD/IMF FOR ETHIOPIA. THE BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF FUTURE LOAN REPAYMENTS MAY INVOLVE SOME SECTION 622(S) DIFFICULTIES, BUT LESS SO THAN THE LARGER ANNUAL ETHIOPIAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES INVOLVED IN ALTERNATIVE (B). WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, CONSIDER THESE TWO DISADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVE (C) AS SERIOUS AS A US FAILURE TO ELIMINATE THE SHORTFALLS.

13. WE LIKEWISE RECOMMEND THAT ANY LIKELY SHORTFALL FOR FY 74 BELOW THE \$11.5 MILLION ODD PLANNING FIGURE BE ELIMINATED BY MEANS OF ONE OR MORE OF THE APPROACHES SET FORTH IN PARA 12. AS SOON AS WE OBTAIN BETTER INFORMATION REGARDING IEG BUDGETARY DECISIONS FOR FY 74 WE WILL TRANSMIT THIS INFORMATION SO AS TO FACILITATE COMPARATIVE APPRAISALS OF THE THREE ALTERNATIVES.

14. THE US ASSISTANCE RECOMMENDED IN PARAS 12 AND 13 SHOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT ETHIOPIAN MILITARY STRENGTH TO BALANCE THE SOMALI THREAT AS WE NOW PERCEIVE IT. WE FEEL COMPELLED TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THAT SHOULD THERE BE A MAJOR STRENGTHENING OF SOMALI MILITARY CAPABILITIES, SUCH AS WOULD LATER RESULT FROM DELIVERIES OF SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF MIG-21S AND T-54 TANKS, WE WILL OBVIOUSLY NEED TO REASSESS THE PROBLEM.

15. SOME PARTS OF THIS TELEGRAM MAY APPEAR TO SUGGEST THAT WE



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 ADDIS 00782 02 OF 02 221612Z

HAVE IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INDEFINITELY CONTINUING DRASTIC ESCALATION OF US ASSISTANCE IN FUTURE YEARS. THAT IS NOT THE CASE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT IF THE SOMALI THREAT SHOULD INCREASE RAPIDLY AND CONTINUALLY IN THE FUTURE, THERE WOULD COME A TIME WHEN THE US WOULD HAVE TO DRAW THE LINE SHORT OF INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND LEAVE THE SOVIETS TO BEAR THE ONUS OF SUBSEQUENT CONSEQUENCES. IN OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, NOW IS DECIDELY NOT THE TIME TO DRAW SUCH A LINE. THERE IS STILL AMPLE REASON TO HOPE THAT A CONTINUATION OF OUR ORIGINAL PLANS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA, COMBINED WITH A SETTING BY THE SOVIETS OF REASONABLE LIMITS ON THEIR ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA, WILL EFFECTIVELY PROTECT US INTERESTS AND HELP PREVENT THE PROBLEM FROM ERUPTING INTO MILITARY CONFLICT. INVOLVING, AS IT WOULD, ONLY THE RESTORATION OF THE VERY SMALL AMOUNT OF PREVIOUSLY PLANNED US FINANCIAL SUPPORT WHICH WE HAVE RECOMMENDED, THE EFFORT APPEARS WORTHWHILE. GDS./

WYMAN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 STATE 206874

RELEASE IN PART
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ORIGIN SP-03

INFO OCT-01 ES-02 /006 R

DRAFTED BY S/P/OFFIRFSMITHITAN
APPROVED BY S/P/IBSWIERS

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P 192139Z SEP 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 206874

DISSENT CHANNEL

Z.O. 11652IN/A
TAGSIOGEN

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE, FOR [REDACTED]

B6

REF: YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 25 TO DIRECTOR, S/P

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF COPY OF REFERENCED LETTER ON SEPTEMBER 13. LETTER WAS MISROUTED BECAUSE NOT MARKED QUOTE DISSENT CHANNEL UNQUOTE. PLEASE BE SURE TO USE THIS CAPTION IN ANY FUTURE USE OF CHANNEL.

2. MR. WILLARD DEGREE OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF (S/P) HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO THIS DISSENT MESSAGE.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR AIRGRAM HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING STAFF, AND THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. ADDITIONAL COPIES ARE BEING SENT TO THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Tegucigalpa, Honduras
February 25, 1974

RELEASE IN PART
B6

Director of Planning and Coordination
Room 7246
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Sir:

I would like to request official guidance through Department of State regulations in regards to overseas visits or correspondence by Congressmen or Congressional Committees. My personal experience is limited, but I have consulted with others in positions similar to mine and find that Congressional requests can on occasion create problems involving the personal integrity of employees of the Department of State. Requests can be unethical, personally distasteful, or even illegal. The present situation is confusing as there are no official instructions and posts seem to operate so as to avoid any possible repercussions or inquiries by either the Department of State or the United States Congress.

As an example of problems involving personal integrity or job integrity I offer the case of a U.S. Congressman using a U.S. Government leased airplane to visit a resort island off the coast of Honduras without proper travel orders. Use of the leased airplane was authorized at post only because there did not seem to be other alternatives. Problems that developed later when the bill for the use of the airplane was analyzed were also resolved at post with the attitude that it had happened and the post must accept its responsibilities.


Another example indicates that posts seem to be intimidated even by the correspondence from U.S. Congressmen. As an example, a U.S. Senator mailed United States currency through the diplomatic pouch for the purchase of contraband gemstones. The gemstones were purchased by a U.S. Government employee and returned to the Senator through the diplomatic pouch. This example is blatantly illegal with currency carried by the diplomatic pouch and gemstones being illegally imported into the United States, by-passing customs. I would not think such misuse of the pouch is common, but nothing has changed from the viewpoint of the post to prevent another Congressman from using the pouch for similar personal profit.

Page -2-

The more common problem confronting employees at post will not involve legal questions but rather questions of ethics or taste. I refer primarily to the soliciting of female companionship for the visiting Congressmen or staff.

What I have described are instances which I would find unethical or illegal. All are requests which I would consider as improper conduct by an elected member of Congress, or for that matter, anyone. I see the problem as challenging the integrity of an escort officer or certifying officer who finds himself in an undesirable position of acceptance of status quo and blind compliance with requests. Even the meaning of political service or tribute changes here so that it does not apply to the situation. My examples are given only to provide background on what type of problems could be directed at Foreign Service employees. The impetus for my request is that such things can happen and from observation are sometimes actually anticipated and accepted.

What I seek is a reporting mechanism established within the Department of State which would allow decisions relevant to Congressional requests to be made by the Department of State and not by the individual. Precepts for use of such a reporting system should be minimal. The objective is to let the Department of State assume the responsibility for those decisions which have been determined by someone close to the situation as having legal or ethical complications. The post at present does not have a working capability to question, let alone refuse, a Congressman's request. It is not adequate to permit one's supervisor or other person to handle the problem unless the initial protest or query is properly answered by the Department of State. I therefore request the Director of Planning and Coordination to propose official policy to give the responsibility for decisions related to the propriety of a Congressional request to the Department of State rather than the overseas post.



American Embassy/Tegucigalpa

B6

RELEASE IN PART
B6



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 24, 1974

Dear Mr. Lord:

When you make distribution of my dissent paper, I request that it be made available not only to appropriate offices in the Department of State, such as EB/AV but also to the Department of Commerce, Attn. Mr. Raul Meyer, and to EXIM. Commerce has the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether to issue the export license after the State Department has given notice that it has no objections. EXIM has been requested by the Government of Gabon to provide financing of the sale. Both Government agencies are aware of the State Department's long scrutiny of the sale of both the first and second DC-8s, and of the Rhodesian problem. It seems to me to be in the interest of the US Government as a whole to make sure that any agency making a decision on this issue is aware of all the facts and of the arguments concerning the interpretation of these facts. Otherwise, decisions made by Commerce/EXIM might be made on an inadequate knowledge of the situation.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature box]

B6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE IN FULL

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 2, 1974

SUBJECT: Gabonese Efforts to Buy a DC-8/63CF

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. John W. Lentz, Loan Officer,
Export-Import Bank

B. Keith Huffman, L/AF

COPIES TO: AF/S - Mr. T. Cole
AF/C - Mr. W. Cutler
AF - Mr. J. Foley

On September 27, at 3 P.M., John Lentz of EXIM Bank came in at my request to review my file regarding Gabon's request for a DC-8/63CF. Mr. Lentz carefully reviewed AF's final memorandum to the Secretary, Ms. Palmer's dissent memorandum and the attachments to both. He said that he did not need to review any of the rest of the file and did not need to take any documents with him.

Mr. Lentz stated that he had just checked again with his Air Afrique source that tipped off EXIM about the Affretair deal and this source had once again confirmed that the new sale did not involve any transaction with Rhodesia. Mr. Lentz and I also discussed the desirability of EXIM incorporating stringent prohibitions into its loan agreement if it elected to finance the sale. This is discussed in my memorandum for the record dated October 1, 1974.

L/AF: BKHuffman:mmp

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Department of State**

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FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9894

UNCLAS SAN JOSE 3237

E. O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: ENRG, TRGY, CS
SUBJECT: TRADE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM- ALCOHOL FEASIBILITY STUDY

REF: SAN JOSE 2556

1. FOLLOWING IS A DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. DRAFTER IS []
[] REQUEST DISTRIBUTION BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUALS REQUIRED
TO MAKE A DECISION ON THE PROJECT IN QUESTION (REFTEL).

B6

2. GIVEN THE MAGNITUDE AND DIRECTION OF COSTA RICA'S ECONOMIC
DISASTER THERE IS NOT THE SLIGHTEST CHANGE THAT LARGE SCALE
INVESTMENTS IN FUEL ALCOHOL PRODUCTION WILL BE MADE HERE IN
THE CURRENT DECADE. THERE WILL BE NO CAPITAL AVAILABLE-
NEITHER INTERNALLY NOR EXTERNALLY- FOR EITHER THE NECESSARY
INDUSTRIAL PLANT OR MORE IMPORTANT, SUFFICIENT FEEDSTOCK
PRODUCTION. FURTHERMORE, AT LEAST A QUARTER MILLION DOLLARS
WORTH OF RECENT AND RELEVANT FEASIBILITY STUDIES ARE REPORTEDLY
ALREADY AVAILABLE.

3. GIVEN THE GREAT UTILITY OF THE TDP SYSTEM, IT WOULD BE
UNFORTUNATE TO SPEND A SIZEABLE PORTION OF ITS LIMITED
RESOURCES SUPPORTING REDUNDANT RESEARCH WHICH- AND
THIS IS THE KEY POINT - HOLDS OUT ABSOLUTELY NO REAL
PROSPECT OF RESULTING IN A LARGE EXPORT ORDER FOR US
BUSINESS.

4. AT A MINIMUM, BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH
THE IDEA OF USG-FINANCING, SUPPORTERS OF THE PROJECT
SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PLAUSIBLY EXPLAIN WHERE, HOW,
AND ON WHAT TERMS COSTA RICA (GOV'T AND/OR PRIVATE SECTOR)
CAN REASONABLY EXPECT TO SECURE THE FINANCING NEEDED FOR
LARGE SCALE ALCOHOL PRODUCTION.

5. EMBASSY COMMENT TO COMMERCIAL ATTACHE'S DISSENT: THE US
ALCOHOL CORPORATION HAS SAID THAT IT FORESEES A SIGNIFICANT
DOWNSTREAM INVESTMENT IN ALCOHOL PRODUCTION FOR FUEL IN
COSTA RICA. U. S. ALCOHOL CLAIMS THAT IT HAS
ASSURANCES OF BANK FINANCING (US AND EUROPEAN) FOR ITS
ALCOHOL PLANTS. WHETHER THEY REALLY HAVE IT IS HARD TO SAY.
BUT THEY ARE SEEKING OPIC COVERAGE FOR A POTENTIAL INVESTMENT;
THEREFORE, IT MAY BE FAIRLY CONCRETE. THE TDP STUDY WOULD NOT
BE A FEASIBILITY STUDY TO SUBSTITUTE ALCOHOL FUEL FOR
GASOLINE. THE STUDY WOULD CONCENTRATE SPECIFICALLY ON THE
METHOD AND COST OF CONVERTING EXISTING VEHICULAR FLEET IN
COSTA RICA FROM GASOLINE AND DIESEL TO VARIOUS TYPES OF
ALCOHOL, OR BLENDED FUELS. EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THAT
TDP IS COLLECTING INFORMATION DESCRIBED IN PARA 4 ABOVE AS PART
OF ITS EVALUATION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO PROCEED WITH FINANCING
OF THE STUDY (SEE STATE 115830).
MCNEIL

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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DRAFTED BY S/PC:RRPETERSONIJK
3/6/73 EXT 22972
APPROVED BY S/PC:WICARGO
S/S - MR. HARRY BARNES
T - MR. NEWMAN
AF - AMB. CLAUDE G. ROSS
AF/E - MR. WENDELL B. COOTE
S/PC - MR. HERBERT SPIRO

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R 081422Z MAR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINS ET

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL AIRGRAM FROM MESSRS.

B6

REF: ADDIS ABABA A-23 DATED FEB. 7, 1973; STATE 033073

1. DEPT. HAS RECEIVED WITH INTEREST THOUGHTFUL IDEAS EXPRESSED IN REF AIRGRAM AND APPRECIATED THEM. THEY WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT DURING CONTINUING ASSESSMENT HERE OF PROBLEMS ADDRESSED.

2. COUNTRY DIRECTOR LOOKS FORWARD TO DISCUSSION OF ISSUES INVOLVED DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO ADDIS. ROGERS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

AF/C - Ins. 170
DC-8
A

RELEASE IN FULL

DATE: June 28, 1974
TIME: 4:30-5:30 P.M.

SUBJECT: President Bongo's Desire to Acquire a DC-8/63CF

PARTICIPANTS:

Gabonese:

H. E. Vincent Mavoungou, Gabonese Ambassador
Mr. Roland Bru, Economic and Financial Adviser to
President Bongo
Mr. Jacques Pigot, Privy Counselor of President Bongo
Mr. Daniel Richon, Vice President of UTA

U.S.A.

Mr. John Foley, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs
Ms. Alison Palmer, Acting Director of Central African
Affairs
Mr. Keith Huffman, Assistant Legal Adviser for African
Affairs

Mr. Alec Toumayan, Language Services

COPIES TO: Ambassador John A. McKesson III, Libreville, Gabon
AF/C - Ms. Palmer
AF/C - Ms. Diggs ✓
AF - Mr. Foley
AF/S - Mr. O'Neill, Jr.
AF/P - Mr. Linehan, Jr.
EB/OA/AVP - Mr. Ortman
Export-Import Bank - Mr. John W. Lentz

After introductions Mr. Foley stated that the Department representa-
tives were delighted to meet with Ambassador Mavoungou and President
Bongo's special mission.

Ambassador Mavoungou handed Mr. Foley a lengthy note in French which
appeared to set forth President Bongo's efforts to acquire a DC-8/63C

L/AF: BKHuffman:mmp
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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and requested an urgent response to these efforts. Mr. Foley stated that the Department would have the note translated and study it carefully.

Mr. Richon, speaking in French, referred to the Gabonese Government's agreement with Seaboard International to acquire a DC-8/63CF. He described the agreements whereby UTA would maintain and operate the aircraft and Air Afrique would use it on its regular runs when President Bongo was not using it. Mr. Richon further described the close commercial relationship between UTA and Air Afrique under which aircraft from both companies are pooled and maintained and crews are trained.

Mr. Richon said that when UTA had heard that President Bongo was going to acquire a plane, it had been concerned that this might disturb the fragile UTA-Air Afrique routes and disturb the system. Accordingly UTA had urged him to be loyal ("fidel") to UTA. UTA also encouraged President Bongo to acquire a McDonnell-Douglas aircraft which could be fitted into Air Afrique's McDonnell-Douglas fleet and maintenance operations. Mr. Pigot remarked that President Bongo also preferred DC-8's from his own flying experience, preferring to charter DC-8's whenever possible. Mr. Richon said that President Bongo had become convinced of the necessity for acquiring his own aircraft after UTA prepared a tally of Bongo's extraordinary expenditures for leasing aircraft in the past year.

Mr. Foley said he understood President Bongo might already possess one DC-8. All three members of the special mission feigned ignorance about any other DC-8 Bongo might have acquired. Mr. Foley again asked if there was not a DC-8 already in Gabon, in which President Bongo had some personal interest. After a moment of silence Mr. Pigot said "that is a private deal." (C'est une affaire privee.) Ms. Palm asked if the plane was not with Affretair but received only silence as a reply. In response to a question from Mr. Foley, Mr. Richon stated that to his knowledge, UTA did not maintain the present Affretair DC-8. Mr. Richon also said that UTA had invested several hundred thousand dollars in a passenger pack for the DC-8/63CF. UTA's expenditure plus President Bongo's unhappiness towards UTA about the continued unavailability of the aircraft, which it had recommended, made the company extremely anxious to have the sale consummated. Accordingly, he wondered when the aircraft would be available.

Mr. Foley stated that actions by the sprawling U.S. bureaucracy on applications for export licenses took a long time. While he could not state when a decision would be made, he could say that he hoped it would occur very soon.

Mr. Pigot contrasted the speed with which the export license for the C-130 for the Gabonese military had been approved. He also noted that in the present case President Bongo had "cleared" the purchase with OAU.

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Mr. Bru then pressed Mr. Foley for more precise information on the impediments to the sale and a decision date noting that Bongo regarded the DC-8 as his own personal aircraft. Bru asked whether he could advise President Bongo that the DC-8 was now available or whether he should tell Bongo to acquire his aircraft elsewhere. Mr. Foley reiterated his statement regarding the normal delays experienced with the sale of large aircraft.

At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Foley stated that the United States Government prized its fruitful relations with President Bongo, and he requested that Mr. Bru convey the Department's warmest regards to the President and our hopes that a decision would be reached on the DC-8 matter very soon.

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AIRGRAM

5230 *FAM*

REP	AF
EUR	FE
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P	IO
FBO	AID
COM	FRB
L&B	TAR
XMB	AIR
CIA	NAVY
USIA	NSA

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Dept pass USIA, Mr. Kenneth Towery (IOP)
E.O. 11652: N/A

FEB 9 3 28 PM '76

TAGS: PINT, IT
FROM : AMEMBASSY, ROME

DATE: February 3, 1976

SUBJECT: Dissent Message, American Policy and Italy -
A Critique
REF : 11 FAM 243
STATE 209583

This message transmits a dissenting view submitted by
[redacted] USIS.

SUMMARY: HOW WE GOT WHERE WE ARE. ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING THE THREE PILLARS OF US POST-WAR POLICY TOWARD ITALY, I.E. ANTI-COMMUNISM, SUPPORT FOR CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, AND NATO SEEN AS HAVING NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES. IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING MORE POSITIVE POLICY WITH OVERT ENCOURAGEMENT OF POLITICAL FORCES OF DEMOCRATIC SPECTRUM. THE NEED FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY, NEW MODUS OPERANDI BETWEEN TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATS AND CIA EMPLOYEES OVERSEAS, WITH SHARPER GUIDELINES AND PROTECTION FOR LATTER. OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN US AS AN ALLY AND BOLSTER OUR SAGGING ALLIES. NEED TO REPUDIATE TYPE OF ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO AMBASSADOR MARTIN AND REAFFIRM THE CORRECTNESS OF HIS SUCCESSOR IN PUTTING A STOP TO THEM. THE ERROR OF GLOBALIST POLICIES IN TAKING INSUFFICIENT ACCOUNT OF INTERNAL DYNAMICS IN KEY COUNTRIES. SOME MODEST PROPOSALS FOR SPECIFIC INITIATIVES.

A. HOW WE GOT WHERE WE ARE, 1945-75:

Since 1945, American policy towards Italy has been based on two main pillars, anti-communism and support for the conservative Christian Democrats (DC). Both overt and covert activities were often justified by the potential they had of advancing these two causes, which indeed complemented one another.

When Italy joined NATO in 1949, it became the linchpin of the

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Contents and Classification Approved by: *RAM*
Cleared for transmittal: RAMerson

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Page 2
ROME A-53

"Southern Flank." and a third element was added to American policy, which was linked with and dependent upon the other two: enfolding Italy in the NATO security blanket to insure strategic use of its base and post facilities.

As the years passed, the vigor of the Christian Democrats slowly atrophied. Corruption grew and social and governmental reforms demanded by an increasingly affluent society were neglected. Scandals in government and business, and the growing incapacity of the government in dealing with the problems of a modern society further alienated large numbers of the population.

Partly as a result of its own relative efficiency, and partly as a result of disenchantment with the enduring political class and a lessened fear of communism among the post-war generation, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) made slow but steady gains. For many years, these were not manifested in election returns, which showed the leftist forces remaining at a stable level, but rather in local municipal administrations, in the universities and intellectual world, and with the labor unions.

In June 1975, however, the PCI made dramatic gains in local administrative elections, coming to within 2% of the Christian Democrat total and gaining a share of power in every major Italian city except Rome and Palermo.

Through all of this period, the United States, involved elsewhere around the world, saw no reason to change its policy toward Italy. Prior to the apertura a sinistra in 1963, in which the United States encouraged the Christian Democrats to form an alliance with the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in order to increase the anti-communist majority, American officials regarded the Socialists as untrustworthy fellow travelers of the Communists. Embassy officers were severely circumscribed in their contacts with Socialists and a succession of American ambassadors made no secret of their sympathy with, and affinity for, the forces of the Center and Right.

The alliance between the Christian Democrats and the Socialists was marked by frequent squabbling, changes of government, mutual recrimination, unresolved scandals, and a continuing struggle for control of the levers of political and commercial power in Italy. This struggle was almost always won by the Christian Democrats, who were far more numerous and deeply entrenched.

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Page 3
ROME A-53

During these years the PCI generally held its ground, although it suffered setbacks during such events as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. And, it is now safe to say, the Party slowly increased its acceptability among an increasing number of Italians as a Party willing to function within a democratic framework.

One persistent barrier to the acceptability of the PCI was the official American attitude. Through 1975, American officials regarded the Communists much as they had regarded the Socialists in the 1950's. Official contacts were severely circumscribed, confined usually to one middle-grade Embassy officer who met from time to time with the shadow PCI Foreign Minister. Additional contacts, it was feared, would give the Communists "respectability," although by this time the PCI had become Italy's second strongest party and could count on the regular support of 30% of the electorate in national elections. It also had predominant influence in Italy's largest labor federation, strong support among Italy's middle classes, and an extremely influential following among artists, intellectuals, academicians, and university students.

Thus, it was not until 1974 that an American ambassador was willing to travel to Bologna in an official capacity and pay a routine courtesy call on the city's Communist Mayor. In 1975, two leading PCI members were refused visas to travel to the United States in response to invitations from the American academic community, because it was feared that if a Communist Party official travelled to the United States in his Party capacity it would signal to Italy's politically-attuned America watchers that the United States no longer opposed PCI entry into the national government. Many people in both Italy and the United States believed that, if American opposition to the PCI was no longer credible, the last remaining obstacle to the Communists would fall away.

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1958*

Accordingly, the United States continued to associate itself with the Christian Democrats and support a wide range of attitudes, activities, and organizations that appeared to be of value in opposing the PCI.

Rumors of alleged American covert activities were frequent, and it was widely assumed, although never totally proved, that the United States had manipulated the 1948 election in favor of the Christian Democrats and had demanded that they take a harder stance against the Communists. It was also widely assumed that, subsequent to 1948, the United States had funnelled large amounts of money through the CIA and the AFL-CIO to various anti-communist politicians, organizations, and causes.

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Page 4
ROME A-53

While many Italians, especially among the conservatives, appeared to accept reports of these activities as natural and nothing extraordinary, a growing number of Italians began to express resentment and outrage at what they regarded as blatant interference in Italy's internal affairs. Since the Christian Democrats were widely conceded to be corrupt and to have defaulted in their commitment to seek significant social reforms, many Italians began to believe that the principal obstacle to building a modern democratic Italy was not the PCI but the Christian Democrats. In other words, the Christian Democrats began to lose their legitimacy as a credible ruling party. Many were quick to add that continued American support helped to maintain the old guard in power and to blunt any impetus for change within the Party or any efforts from outside to oust the perennial Christian Democrat power structure.

Such, in brief and simplified form, was the political situation confronting American policy at the end of 1975.

B. OLD DOGS TO CARRY OUT NEW TRICKS.

In early January 1976, the New York Times reported that six million dollars had been channelled to Italian political figures and organizations through the CIA to help prevent further Communist gains after the June 1975 elections. This report, which was followed by the tacit admission from official sources that plans along these lines had been developed but that no funds had actually been spent, was based on leaks emanating from those with access to reports on CIA activities being prepared by Senate and House Committees investigating alleged CIA abuses. This story was followed by a daily barrage of further revelations including:

1. names, addresses, office and telephone numbers of Embassy employees reportedly working for the CIA;
2. politicians and organizations which had supposedly received shares of the six million dollars, and other alleged CIA activities in Italy;
3. reports that a total of 75 million dollars had been spent in Italy for covert operations by the CIA since 1945;
4. information showing that American multinational firms and the AFL-CIO had also spent millions of dollars in political contributions and labor union pay-offs to encourage resistance to Communism.

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Page 5
ROME A-53

Since these charges related mostly to payoffs to politicians and political parties, an activity long since assumed to be widespread and engaged in by a variety of powers including the USSR and certain Middle East states, these reports were regarded as scandalous, reprehensible, and corrupting by many, but hardly surprising.

Nevertheless, the many Italians who had come to deeply resent American policy and interference in Italy were given considerable reinforcement for their feelings. Their reactions were not long in coming, in the form of newspaper editorials, magazine articles, and a perceptible if not quantifiable cooling of attitude of some useful Embassy contacts who had once again become accessible after the animosity generated by the Viet Nam war had receded.

More serious was the report on January 28 that a former American ambassador to Italy, who served from October 1969 to February 1973, had channelled \$800,000 in unaccountable funds to General Vito Miceli, then head of the Italian Intelligence Service (SID). The report emphasized that the money was to have been used for "propaganda purposes" and that the project had been initiated only over the strong objection of the CIA station chief in Rome. In 1974, Miceli was implicated in an abortive rightist coup attempt that had taken place in 1970, removed from his post, and indicted. While previous reports of CIA activities involved financial payments to various parties and individuals of the non-Communist political spectrum, this report raised the question of the ambassador's involvement in, and instigation of, activities against the Italian state. Although it was immediately reported that the period of the ambassador's generous support for General Miceli occurred in 1972, two years after the coup attempt, the nature of the alleged initiative brought a new dimension to the long history of American covert operations in Italy. Apparently for the first time, an American ambassador had funnelled upwards of a million dollars to the head of a foreign intelligence service to support and promote anti-communist activities. How the money was spent was left entirely up to General Miceli and no accounting was ever given. Such a project, one must assume, had the approval of those of the ambassador's superiors in Washington who were familiar with it.

Further, Miceli was widely regarded in Italy as far enough to the right to be outside the democratic spectrum, and to be closely allied with elements of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), the Italian neo-Fascist Party. As such, and as the presumptive heir of Mussolini, MSI supporters were repellant to all but a very small segment (5%) of Italians, mostly nostalgic Monarchists, contemporary Fascists, and resentful pockets of the lower middle class who felt encroached upon by everybody. Of course, the MSI was staunchly anti-communist,

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Page 6
ROME A-53

elitist, and pro-NATO and this is apparently what made it an attractive ally for the ambassador and General Miceli. In any case, several previous American ambassadors, notably Clare Boothe Luce (1953-57), had demonstrated their affinity for the MSI and the far right of the Christian Democrats in various ways.

It was particularly painful to observe that the United States, which played the principal role in the defeat of Italian fascism during World War II, had apparently become, through the ambassador's actions in 1972, its principal outside supporter. Further, the ambassador's relationship with the rightist and conspiratorial General Miceli gave dramatic impetus to an ugly supposition: that an American ambassador had by implication supported a subversion attempt against a friendly and allied state.

As additional revelations from the Congressional committees cascaded through the American and Italian press every day, many people were impelled to ask themselves what had been the result of American policy and activities in Italy over the years. Here are some of their conclusions:

1. American intervention, and perhaps especially Marshall Plan assistance, undoubtedly was a factor in keeping the Communists from power in the early post-war years. The United States was also instrumental in securing Italy for the NATO camp, and trade ties were a vital factor in Italy's outstanding if uneven performance of the late 1950's and 1960's.

2. America's staunch anti-communism may have slowed the rate of advance of the PCI, but it has not prevented its coming to the brink of national power. Many argued that in a de facto sense the PCI already plays an active role in national decision-making. Nor has the lack of an American benediction prevented the PCI from steadily increasing its strength as a result of the internal dynamics and tensions of Italian society.

3. America's continuing support for the DC-^aParty now blamed for most of Italy's woes- has raised widespread opposition to US policy and presence in Italy; which has traditionally been the most pro-US of Western European countries.

4. Continued heavy-handed covert intervention in Italy has undermined the very policies we have wished to promote, and has resulted in greatly increased credibility and

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Page 7
ROME A-53

popularity for the PCI. They are now able to appear quite respectable as the party of reform, independence and nationalism. Blundering US support for the Christian Democrats has harmed that party's credibility, blunted its fledging internal reform movement, and allowed the PCI to appear more independent of Moscow than the DC is of Washington.

On a narrower scale, these massive and continuing American covert activities raise several questions:

(1) what results does the United States have to show for the \$75 million reportedly spent in covert activities since 1945? The DC is a shambles; the PCI is stronger than ever; both US image and influence are at an all-time post-war low; anyone named as a recipient of covert funds has been harmed politically, perhaps irrevocably; many US government and business employees in Italy and elsewhere have been placed in personal jeopardy and have seen their effectiveness compromised; the labor unions which the United States cultivated so assiduously are remote from American importuning and influence; the non-Communist democratic forces in Italy have been weakened and their traditional respect for the United States sorely tested; and those forces which desire Italy to leave NATO and adopt a more "neutral" foreign policy have been strengthened, in immeasurable but undeniable ways.

Surely, to survey this wreckage and suggest that some changes are necessary is a major understatement.

C. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

There are obviously many policy considerations which go well beyond the unique and deteriorating situation in Italy. One of these is the urgent necessity for the Executive and Legislative branches to work out effective and more sharply-defined guidelines and oversight procedures for CIA operations. Another is to furnish credible cover and reliable security protection for CIA employees overseas without undermining the credibility of the diplomatic function and weakening the effectiveness of diplomatic officials. However, the following modest suggestions relate especially to Italy, and are limited to initiatives which appear to be immediately feasible.

*to whom?
M. Albani
to House
11/13/73
to committee
to House
next question?*

I. Short-term initiatives

a. Announce publicly that no CIA funds have been used to support political figures or organizations in Italy since early 1973; if this is in fact the case.

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b. Announce further that no such actions are contemplated.

c. Make it clear that giving large amounts of money which cannot be accounted for to persons or organizations outside the spectrum of traditional democratic forces is repugnant to the United States and contrary to our policies.

d. Reaffirm publicly the correctness of Ambassador Volpe's decision to halt further payments to and contacts with General Miceli.

e. Re-emphasize the American hope that the democratic forces in Italy continue to prevail, and that American encouragement for these forces to push for democratic and social reforms desired by the Italian people will be a major aspect of our future attitude toward Italy. Add that both bilateral and NATO ties insure that the US will encourage and assist by overt means a wide-ranging increase in cooperation in fields including trade and commerce, science and technology, mutual security and culture and media, with special emphasis on the academic communities in both countries. Direct principal US agencies with primacy in these fields to suggest feasible and mutually beneficial projects, to be negotiated and funded bilaterally or within organizational frameworks such as NATO, as appropriate. On the US side, appropriate amount of money at least equal to the sum we were prepared to waste on now-counter-productive covert operations.

f. Step-up the program of developing contacts and or ties with the democratic left begun by the present ambassador.

Many additional specific actions to supplement these general suggestions can be developed. The overall purpose is to change our policy from one that appears to many to be both totally negative and a failure, to one that has many positive elements and has a good chance of producing short-term results. More specifically, our justifiable suspicion of and hostility to the PCI should be based not on the sterile anti-communism of the 1950's, but on the vulnerabilities and contradictions of the Party's activities in the 1970's, in the context of Italy's complex domestic situation.

It does not require power of clairvoyance to see what PCI accession to power would do to both our interests in Italy and the fragile forces of Italian democracy.

2. Long-term suggestions

a. Increase INR's research capability on Italy, especially in areas where PCI performance, ideological contradictions, totalitarian remnants, and ties with the Soviet Union can be exploited. Where appropriate, enlist the cooperation of the American academic community. Serious joint projects should also be developed with...

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Page 9
ROME A-53

b. Work with multinational firms operating in Italy to establish general guidelines regarding political contributions, hiring and firing policies, and accountability to host governments.

3. Policy Toward the PCI

a. Slowly expand contacts with the PCI across the spectrum of its influence on a gradual, controlled basis. The purpose would be to learn more about internal divisions and/or conflicts which might (or might not) be exploited, as well as to determine what elements among the Party's supporters might be more attracted to it as a reformist force than because of doctrinaire Communism. Another need is to develop a better capability of dealing with the PCI should their power on a national level require it.

b. Abandon the use of visa regulations as an element of conferring "respectability." It brings us only ridicule, and obscures the truism that if the only thing preventing Communist accession to power is the free granting of visas to PCI officials, the game is already lost.

D. CONCLUSION.

Policy obviously has to be developed with more than one country in mind, especially for a world power like the United States with many complex and interwoven interests to take into consideration. However, if domestic developments in countries of basic importance to us continue to be ignored by those who must think and act in global terms, we can only expect further debacles such as we are now experiencing painfully in Italy. It is simply impossible to preserve the internal status quo in allied countries while we joust with the other superpower. Trying to do so makes us seem, at best, naive and heavy-handed bumblers composed of equal parts of confusion, misdirected idealism, self-righteousness, and arrogance. At worst we are regarded as inveterate meddlers and hypocrites, willing to use any means and to sacrifice every democratic ideal and legitimate desire for social reform to an overweening thirst for political control and economic influence. However overdrawn and simplified both images are, it is hard to deny that there is some truth in both pictures. Unfortunately, these are images that have been stimulated more by our own actions than by the machinations of our adversaries.

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Page 10
ROME A-53

As far as Italy is concerned, there is now an excellent opportunity, which will probably last for only a few weeks, to repair the grievous damage to our interests here by past policies and individuals. To do so would be to restore relations with one of our most important allies to a sound footing; to halt the erosion in the support for our presence and interests here among the Italian populace; to assist the recovery of the most important political force in Italy, which is now demoralized and in disarray, at least in part because of American errors; and reinvigorate the forces which have struggled to preserve Italian democracy during difficult and frustrating years. This is the kind of opportunity which does not come often but which would be a true indication of whether we really care about preserving our interests in Italy and truly understand the factors which threaten them.

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BRITISH EMBASSY.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

8 July 1977

S 99

The President
The White House

ACTION
is assigned to

IO EUP

I have been asked to pass on to you the enclosed message from the Prime Minister on the subject of continuing United States' membership of the International Labour Organisation.

John Moreton
Chargé d'Affaires

FADRC
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

1977 JUL 11 AM 11 07

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

bc: The Hon Cyrus R Vance, Secretary of State, ✓
Department of State

Mr Stephen Worrel, Bureau of North European Affairs,
Department of State



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RELEASE IN PART
B6

October 18, 1972

Honorable William I. Cargo
Director
Planning and Coordination Staff
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Minister Cargo:

Some time has now passed since your letter of August 1, 1972 and I would be appreciative of any information you could pass on to me concerning Personnel's review of 3FAM629.

As you are aware, [redacted] is now on-board in the Department's pouch room and has spoken to your staff concerning this matter. Although [redacted] is no longer on my staff here in Guatemala, it is my full intention to pursue this matter to the fullest utilizing whatever means are available to me to correct this injustice as it applies to the case of [redacted].

Quite frankly, I am not certain from your letter of August 1 whether you support our position or whether you were simply informing me that you were hopeful of an early decision, one way or the other. Should you be in agreement with [redacted]'s case, I would be most grateful of any support you could offer on our behalf.

Vi says hello and sends her greetings to all the Cargo's.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted signature]

Guatemala City, Guatemala

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

R.R.

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RELEASE IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 125373

42
ORIGIN SS-14

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APPROVED BY S/PC:WICARGO
AF:ANAVEZ
S/SIRMILLER

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TO AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA

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DISSENT CHANNEL

FROM DIRECTOR S/PC

SUBJ: DISSENT MESSAGE FROM TEGUCIGALPA ON BURUNDI

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 02313

1. THIS CABLE ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE CONTAINED IN TEGUCIGALPA 02313. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE WILL RECEIVE FULL ATTENTION IN THE DEPT. INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THIS TELEGRAM HAS BEEN MADE TO DEPARTMENT PRINCIPALS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPT, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OFP.
2. A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY TO REFTEL WILL BE SENT FOLLOWING DEPARTMENTAL DISCUSSIONS.
3. REFTEL RAISED TO LOU. IRWIN

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7

Dissent file



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

LOU with
SECRET Attachment

February 21, 1973

dist 2/22/73

TO: T - Dr. Tarr
EB - Mr. Armstrong
PM - Mr. Spiers
AF - Mr. Newsom
EUR - Mr. Stoessel
INR - Mr. Cline
S/S - Mr. Barnes
OFP - Mr. Salisbury

RELEASE IN FULL

FROM: S/PC - William I. Cargo *WIC*

SUBJ: Dissent Channel Message

Attached is a copy of Airgram A-23, dated February 7, 1973, a dissent channel message received from three members of the Political Section in Addis Ababa. We have acknowledged receipt of this message in a telegram to Addis Ababa.

I have designated Mr. Herbert J. Spiro, ext. 22576, as the S/PC action officer on this message, to coordinate any further response.

Attachment:
Airgram A-23, dated 2/7/73

LOU with SECRET Attachment

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Raymond F. Smith, Chairperson, S/P-OFP

DATE: August 27, 1974

FROM : , GSO, Quito

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Letter

REF. : State 184093, Quito 5375

B6

Enclosed please find copy of Dissent Channel Letter as sent on Feb 25, 1974 from Tegucigalpa, Honduras as requested. Reply will be greatly appreciated as the subject is of considerable importance to several employees working in the Administrative area.

GSO: , Jr., mele

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UNCLASSIFIED

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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**INCOMING
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5425

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: KOR
SUBJECT: U.S. SECURITY POLICY TOWARD KOREA

FROM [REDACTED]

1. THIS MAY NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE DISSENT CHANNEL BECAUSE THE COMMENTS ARE ADDRESSED TO OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND PRESS REPORTS ISSUED ELSEWHERE, WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE FULL POLICY DELIBERATIONS INVOLVED. AS THE OFFICER WHO HAS SPENT THE LONGEST TIME WORKING ON KOREAN POLITICAL SECURITY MATTERS, (U.S. ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT 1946-1948, DEPARTMENT WORK ON KOREA 1978-1959 AND 1962-1965), HOWEVER, I FEEL CONSTRAINED TO CALL ATTENTION TO SOME KEY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAT I FEAR MAY BE LOST SIGHT OF IN THE CURRENT ARGUMENTS ABOUT A SCHEDULED WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. GROUND FORCES FROM KOREA.

2. THE KEY POINT IS NOT THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES PER SE BUT THE CLARITY OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DEFEND SOUTH KOREA AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE RENewed AGGRESSION. THE PREPONDERANCE OF SOUTH KOREAN POPULATION AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH OVER NORTH KOREA, AND THE RELATIVELY EVEN MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THEM ALSO ARE LARGELY IRRELEVANT, HAVING EXISTED EVEN AT THE TIME OF 1950. IT IS NOT SO MUCH TO NORTH KOREA THAT THE SIGNALS OF OUR COMMITMENT MUST BE CLEAR AS IT IS TO CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, WITHOUT WHOSE INVOLVEMENT NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND WOULD BE UNLIKELY IN THE FUTURE. AND IT IS NOT ONLY SOUTH KOREA THAT IS AT STAKE, BUT ALSO JAPAN, ONE OF WHOSE OLD LEADERS, APTLY HAVING POINTED OUT THAT KOREA IS A DAGGER AIMED AT THE HEART OF JAPAN.

3. THE PRESENCE OF U.S. GROUND FORCES IS NOT A PERMANENT OR IMMUTABLE NECESSITY, BUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE HANDLED CAREFULLY. THE NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION OF 1950 FOLLOWED ONE YEAR AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES, AND AFTER STATEMENTS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAD MISLED NORTH KOREA, THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA INTO BELIEVING THAT SOUTH KOREA HAD BEEN PLACED OUTSIDE OUR PERIMETER OF DEFENSE. THE OBVIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLICY FACTOR TO CONSIDER NOW IS WHETHER AFTER THE COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER IN VIET-NAM AND OUR CHANGES OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA, A WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM KOREA MIGHT NORTH KOREA, CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO BELIEVE THAT OUR DEFENSE COMMITMENT TO SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN HAS CHANGED.

4. OF EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE THAN THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECLARATION OF THE SIXTEEN AT THE TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE IN 1953, IN WHICH WE AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES WHO HAD CONTRIBUTED FORCES TO THE UN MILITARY ACTION IN KOREA DECLARED THAT IF THE ARMISTICE WERE BROKEN WE WOULD RESPOND PROMPTLY AND THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONFINE THE HOSTILITIES TO KOREA. THIS WAS CLEARLY A WARNING

BELIEVE IS A GRAVE ERROR, PARTICULARLY AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE ANNOUNCING A WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. GROUND FORCES. THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RESPONSE SHOULD IN MY OPINION BE KEPT OPEN.

5. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK BE CONSULTED, PARTICULARLY ON THE ISSUE OF THE DECLARATION OF THE SIXTEEN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. IN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, HE WAS ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR UN AFFAIRS AND WAS PERSONALLY FAMILIAR WITH THESE DECISIONS. I PARTICIPATED IN DISCUSSIONS OF THESE ISSUES WITH HIM LATER, IN 1964, WHEN HE WAS SECRETARY OF STATE.
GARDNER

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~~SECRET~~
Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 229495
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TO AMEMBASSY BOHJ

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SPADIS/////////
DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12865: RDS 7/11/01 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL)

FOR [] FROM PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DIRECTOR, S/P

SUBJECT: REPLY TO [] DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE
ON LEBANON POLICY

REFS: BOHJ 06573

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE DEPARTMENT IS GRATEFUL FOR YOUR CONTINUED ATTENTION TO THE LEBANON PROBLEM AND UNITED STATES POLICY THERE. WE HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE, CIRCULATED IT, AND CONSIDERED YOUR CASE CAREFULLY.

3. YOUR CABLE APPEARS TO TAKE THREE POSITIONS: (A) THAT MAJOR HADDAD'S FORCES ARE "ALMOST FULLY CONTROLLED" BY ISRAEL, (B) THAT ISRAELI "AGGRESSION" IS THE MAJOR DANGER TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON, WHICH IT HAS BEEN OUR TRADITIONAL POLICY TO SUPPORT, AND (C) THAT IN REPORTING THE FOREGOING SITUATION THE DEPARTMENT'S SPOKESMAN SHOULD "TELL THE TRUTH AS WE KNOW IT" AND "LET THE CHIPS FALL WHERE THEY MAY."

4. IN THE PAST IT HAS NOT BEEN DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY FOR THE SPOKESMAN TO "LET THE CHIPS FALL WHERE THEY MAY." IN NEARLY EVERY PRESS BRIEFING THE SPOKESMAN DECLINES TO COMMENT OR GIVE FURTHER EXPLANATIONS ON SOME SUBJECT. IN MANY CASES THERE ARE WIDELY KNOWN FACTS BEYOND WHAT THE SPOKESMAN IS WILLING TO DISCUSS. THIS PRACTICE HAS BEEN SHAPED BY THE BELIEF THAT THE SPOKESMAN'S ROLE IS PART OF UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY AS A WHOLE. THUS THE SPOKESMAN IS NOT CALLED ON TO DISCUSS CERTAIN SUBJECTS WHEN THEIR PUBLIC DISCUSSION WOULD BE HARMFUL TO OUR DIPLOMACY OR TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

5. IN IMPLEMENTING THIS TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF THE SPOKESMAN'S ROLE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS BEEN GUIDED IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS BY SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE USEFULNESS OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT ARE ESSENTIALLY RITUALISTIC, THAT IS, THOSE THAT EXHORT WITHOUT ANY LIKELIHOOD THAT THEY WILL DO ANY LASTING GOOD. WHEN WE DENOUNCE AN ACTIVITY THAT WE ARE NOT ABLE OR WILLING TO EFFECTIVELY HINDER, WE RUN TWO RISKS. ONE IS TO INCUR THE ACCUSATION OF "HYPOCRISY" THAT YOU ATTACH TO PRESENT POLICY. THE OTHER IS TO SUGGEST THAT WE ARE

TRYING TO STOP ISRAELI ACTIVITIES BUT UNABLE TO DO SO, AN IMPRESSION THAT WOULD WEAKEN AN IMPORTANT ASSET WE HAVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST--THE BELIEF THAT WE CAN INFLUENCE ISRAELI POLICY. IN FACT, OVER THE YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ABLE TO MODIFY ISRAEL'S CONDUCT IN SOUTH LEBANON BY PURSUING A COURSE THAT TRIES TO FLEXIBLY COMBINE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND QUIET DIPLOMACY.

6. THE STATEMENT THAT ISRAEL "ALMOST FULLY CONTROLS" MAJOR HADDAD'S FORCES IS AMBIGUOUS. IT IS TRUE THAT MAJOR HADDAD'S FORCES ARE WHOLLY DEPENDENT ON ISRAEL FOR MANY CATEGORIES OF SUPPORT, AND THERE IS A VITAL AND DETAILED ISRAELI ROLE IN TECHNICAL MATTERS. ISRAEL'S PATRONAGE OF MAJOR HADDAD DOES GIVE ISRAEL A MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING HIM BEHAVE IN A MORE RESPONSIBLE WAY. THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT ISRAEL CAN AND SOMETIMES DOES EXERCISE THE RESTRAINT THAT WE HAVE SOUGHT. WE BELIEVE THAT, SINCE ISRAEL CAN LIMIT HADDAD'S AMMUNITION SUPPLY, HE COULD NOT SUSTAIN SHELLING FOR A SUBSTANTIAL TIME WITHOUT ISRAEL'S ASSISTANCE, ALTHOUGH THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT HADDAD SEEKS AND RECEIVES ISRAELI APPROVAL EACH TIME HE OPENS FIRE.

7. BUT IT IS PROBABLY NOT TRUE THAT ISRAEL "ALMOST FULLY CONTROLS" HADDAD'S FORCES IN THE SENSE OF BEING ABLE TO DETERMINE WHATEVER GOES ON IN THE HADDAD TERRITORY. HADDAD'S DEPENDENCE DOES NOT MEAN THAT ISRAEL CAN MAKE HADDAD'S FORCES DO WHATEVER IT WANTS WITHOUT INCURRING SIGNIFICANT COSTS TO ISRAEL. IN MOST CASES WHERE ONE NATION OR GROUP IS DEPENDENT ON ANOTHER, THIS DOES NOT ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP OF STRICT CONTROL, BUT RATHER A RELATIONSHIP OF INFLUENCE DEFINED BY TACTIC BARGAINING. FOR EXAMPLE, A NUMBER OF FRIENDS OF THE UNITED STATES SUCH AS SOUTH KOREA ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THE UNITED STATES FOR SURVIVAL, BUT WE HAVE REPEATEDLY FOUND THAT WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO CONTROL THESE NATIONS, EVEN IN MATTERS WE REGARDED AS IMPORTANT.

8. ONE TEST OF ISRAELI CONTROL OVER MAJOR HADDAD IS WHETHER ISRAEL COULD REPLACE HADDAD WITH AN EQUALLY SATISFACTORY LEADER SHOULD HE FAIL TO FOLLOW THEIR GUIDANCE. IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE QUITE DIFFICULT FOR ISRAEL TO FIND A SUBSTITUTE FOR MAJOR HADDAD WHO HAD COMPARABLE LOCAL STATURE OR WHO HAD THE SAME PERSONAL CLOSENESS TO ISRAEL.

9. IT IS ALSO MISTAKEN TO IMPLY THAT MAJOR HADDAD AND HIS QUITE DIVERSE FOLLOWING ARE A FACTOR IN LEBANESE LIFE CREATED BY ISRAEL. MAJOR HADDAD COULD NOT PLAY THE ROLE HE DOES IN LEBANON, OR EVEN SURVIVE, WITHOUT CONTINUED ISRAELI SUPPORT. BUT WARLORDS SUCH AS MAJOR HADDAD ARE A COMMON FEATURE OF PRESENT-DAY LEBANON. FOR CENTURIES LEBANESE POLITICS HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY CHIEFTAINS WHO HEAD GROUPS OF ARMED RETAINERS LINKED TO THEM BY RELIGIOUS, FAMILY, OR CLIENTAGE TIES.

10. DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD, LEBANESE FACTIONS ALSO BECAME ACCUSTOMED TO SEEK FOREIGN SUPPORT, AND THIS HABIT HAS LIKEWISE PERSISTED THROUGH THE FRENCH MANDATE AND UP TO THE PRESENT. MAJOR HADDAD IS JUST ONE OF MANY EXAMPLES OF FACTIONAL CHIEFTAINS WITH EXTERNAL TIES IN TODAY'S LEBANON.

11. ISRAELI JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SUPPORTING MAJOR HADDAD ARE MOST IMPORTANTLY RELATED TO THE REAL SECURITY THREAT THAT ISRAEL FACES FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON. THE PLO, WHICH REMAINS FORMALLY PLEDGED

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Department of State

OUTGOING
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PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 229495

TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ISRAELI STATE, CONTROLS SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF SOUTH LEBANON, AND HAS FREQUENTLY CARRIED OUT ARMED ATTACKS ON ISRAEL FROM THAT AREA.


ENTRENCHED SYRIAN DOMINATION OF LARGE PARTS OF LEBANON WOULD BE A STRATEGIC CONCERN FOR ISRAEL. WHILE THE UNITED STATES HAS FREQUENTLY OPPOSED PARTICULAR ISRAELI RESPONSES TO THE SECURITY PROBLEM ISRAEL FACES IN SOUTH LEBANON, NO ACCOUNT OF THE TRAGIC SITUATION IN LEBANON CAN IGNORE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS PROBLEM.

12. FINALLY, YOUR MESSAGE COULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLY THAT ISRAELI SUPPORT OF MAJOR HADDAD AND ISRAELI "AGGRESSION" ARE THE ONLY DANGERS TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON. THE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT BELIEVE THIS TO BE THE CASE.

13. A NUMBER OF PARTIES, INCLUDING THE ISRAELIS, THE PALESTINIANS, THE MARONITES, AND SYRIA, HAVE CARRIED OUT ACTIONS DISRUPTIVE OF LEBANON'S INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OVER THE YEARS. AN EFFECTIVE U.S. PUBLIC AND DIPLOMATIC POLICY MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF ALL THESE CHALLENGES.

14. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE DEPARTMENT FEELS THAT YOUR SUGGESTED POLICY WOULD NOT IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE LEBANESE SITUATION, THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE SPOKESMAN'S ROLE, AND THE PRESENT TASKS CONFRONTING UNITED STATES POLICY. THE UNITED STATES HAS CARRIED OUT A CONSISTENT POLICY OF SEEKING, IN THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT EXIST, TO RESTORE THE UNITY AND FULL INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON. YOU ARE AWARE OF THE INTENSE EFFORTS OF AMBASSADOR HABIB TO THIS END. THESE EFFORTS HAVE PROVIDED THE ONLY CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH THAT ANY MAJOR POWER IS NOW CARRYING OUT TOWARD THE LEBANESE TRAGEDY. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS FACT, THE DEPARTMENT FEELS IT IS INCORRECT TO CHARACTERIZE U.S. POLICY AS BANKRUPT. WE DO, HOWEVER, APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE DISCUSSED OUR DIFFERENT APPROACHES OPENLY AND FRANKLY. HAIG

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

file dissent

RELEASE
IN PART B6

April 21, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO : D/HA -

FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake *TL*

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Memo

B6

This will acknowledge receipt of your dissent memorandum on "Changing United States CSCE Policy to Take the Offensive." Mr. Philip Kaplan of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your memorandum has been sent to the Offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff and the Chairman of the Open Forum, as well as to the Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, the Counselor, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. In accordance with dissent channel policy, the CSCE Commission, as an outside agency, has not received a copy of the paper. We commend your use of the dissent channel and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

Cleared: S/P: PKaplan
S/P: NBoyer
S/P: JHarrington *RA*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

DISSENT CHANNEL

December 3, 1976

MEMORANDUM

TO : INR/RAF -

FROM : S/P - Jo Anne Arzet

SUBJECT: A Bicentennial Tragedy -- US Policy On The Spanish Sahara

B6

This will acknowledge receipt of your dissent memorandum on US Policy On The Spanish Sahara. Mr. Donald Petterson of the Policy Planning Staff has been names coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your memorandum has been circulated to the Offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff and the Chairman of the Open Forum. It has also been sent to the Assistant Secretary's Office for the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. We commend your use of the dissent channel and will respond as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

*INR - Saunders } also
AF - Schaeple }*

*Know
Gen G Austin
12/22/76*

B6

RELEASE IN FULL

TAB A.

SECRET - GDS

July 11, 1974

Proposed Sale of Second DC-8 to Gabon:Factual Summary

The Gabonese Minister of Economy and Finance entered into an agreement dated March 20, 1974 with Seaboard World Airlines, Inc., for the purchase of a DC-8/63CF (convertible cargo-passenger aircraft) for a price of \$11,200,000. The contract is contingent upon EXIM financing. Gabon has deposited \$400,000 but can recover this sum if it withdraws from the agreement at this time. Applications for an export license and for EXIM financing have been filed. The GOG has also entered into an agreement with UTA under which the French company would service and operate the DC-8 and an agreement with Air Afrique whereby that airline would operate the DC-8 when Bongo was not employing it for his personal travel. In a letter to Ambassador McKesson dated April 13, 1974, President Bongo stated that the aircraft would be employed for his personal use. In a note to the President of the EXIM Bank dated March 21, 1974 the Minister of Economy and Finance stated that the DC-8 would be used for Presidential travel and the carriage of freight to other countries except those not represented in the United Nations.

In 1972, President Bongo pressured the Department to authorize sale of a DC-8 to Affretair, a Gabonese-registered company. He stated that the DC-8 was to be used for his personal use as well as for freight carriage within Gabon and between Gabon and Europe. Because of published reports of Affretair's involvement in air freight traffic with Rhodesia, the Department requested the Commerce Department to condition issuance of an export license upon the receipt of written assurances from the Gabonese that the aircraft would not be used in trade with Rhodesia. Affretair provided written assurances to this effect but the Gabonese government assurances were only provided orally by the Minister of Transportation upon instructions from Bongo. The export license was then issued with the further proviso that future sales of aircraft or spare parts would be conditioned upon Gabonese compliance with their assurances. Though we have no firm assurance that Affretair advised the Gabonese government about this warning, we consider this a strong possibility.

Prior to issuance of the export license in 1972 some officers in the Department were aware of sensitive intelligence information from British sources that Affretair was a front for a Rhodesian concern and that the DC-8 would be operated and managed out of Salisbury under Gabonese registry. The conduct of the Department officers approving the sale under these circumstances is now the subject of an inquiry by a special panel convened by Deputy Under Secretary Brown. The Acting Director of the Office of Central African Affairs had earlier brought the matter to the attention of the Justice Department. On

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the basis of similar information from private commercial sources including Air Afrique, EXIM denied financing for the aircraft which was then privately financed through the exporter and departed the United States October 14, 1972. On October 28, the London Daily Telegraph reported that a Salisbury concern had acquired Rhodesia's first commercial jet, a DC-8 to be known as the "sanctions buster". Since that time, the aircraft has been engaged in well publicized freight traffic to Gabon and to Europe. The U.S. has received protests from the UN Sanctions Committee and the OAU and there have been critical reports in the press of the Department's conduct. Recently, under UN pressure, Greece announced it would in the future withhold facilities from the DC-8. The Netherlands is also seized with the problem of Affretair's use of its facilities. The U.S. Commerce Department has rejected several applications for licenses to export spare parts to Affretair.

When Bongo first requested another DC-8 in a meeting on December 5, 1973, Ambassador McKesson (as he reported in Libreville 1093 - 7 Dec. 1973) "registered surprise and recalled unfavorable publicity connected with first purchase. He (Bongo) brushed this aside as un-consequential and said that, if it would make it easier for U.S., G.O.G. would purchase plane directly (rather than through Affretair) and he would personally sign any documents we wanted so that no possible criticism could be attached to U.S."

In April of this year Commerce acquired information from a U.S. citizen recently in Rhodesia that Bongo received a substantial sum annually from the Rhodesian concern to keep the DC-8 under Gabonese registry and that the same concern would be attempting soon to acquire another DC-8 in the U.S. also to be registered in Gabon. This disclosure which raised the prospect of a repetition of the 1972 transaction, was subsequently corroborated by reports from two U.S. aircraft vendors that they had been contacted on behalf of Affretair by Frederick B. Ayer & Associates, the Swiss aircraft broker which had arranged the first DC-8 sale. However, closer inquiry by Commerce with the Frederick B. Ayer office in New York disclosed that it was seeking a DC-8/55F for Affretair whereas Bongo had contracted with Seaboard World Airlines to acquire a slightly different model, termed a DC-8/63CF.

Coincidental with Commerce's investigative efforts, EXIM Bank has sought information regarding Bongo's efforts through Air Afrique and UTA (the French carrier), which were among the private commercial sources which tipped-off EXIM about the true nature of the first sale. In the present case, these sources have corroborated Bongo's statement that he desires the aircraft for Presidential travel or lease to Air Afrique. These sources, however, may not be objective, since, as noted, UTA has a contract to service the aircraft for Bongo and Air Afrique has a contract to use it when not being operated for Bongo.

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The Department has also sought information about Bongo's efforts through the British intelligence channels which revealed the Rhodesian link in the last transaction. These sources have not yet disclosed any useful information concerning the present case.

Finally, the Department sought the views of the OAU on Bongo's request, in light of that organization's earlier criticism of our first sale. Though the OAU never responded directly to our inquiry, President Gowon, in his former capacity as OAU President, wrote to Bongo stating in part: "As far as I am concerned, your decision to buy a DC-8/63 aircraft for your personal use is a purely internal affair of the Republic of Gabon, and it is not for the Organization of African Unity to give or withhold consent about its purchase." AF does not believe this communication will in any way immunize the U.S.G. from African criticism should the second aircraft be used in Rhodesian trade.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2063

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 DAMASCUS 1482

DISSENT CHANNEL

R.O. 110001 GDS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SYRIA, ISRAEL AND LEBANON
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT B6 OF [REDACTED] POLITICAL OFFICER. THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE, AND SUGGESTS THAT DISTRIBUTION INCLUDE NEA, [NEA/ARN] INR, EMBASSY DAMASCUS AND EMBASSY BEIRUT.

2. PARTIAL CONVERGENCE OF SYRO-ISRAELI INTERESTS OPERATIVE IN LEBANON FOR APPROXIMATELY PAST YEAR HAS SEEMED TO SHOW SIGNS OF SERIOUS SLIPPAGE. PRIOR TO RECENT NABATIYAH AFFAIR INCREMENTAL INSERTIONS OF SYRIAN TROOPS INTO LEBANON AND THEIR SHIFTS AROUND COUNTRY WERE TOLERATED BY ISRAELI " " SUBSEQUENT TO VIGOROUS EXCHANGES AMONG PARTIES FACILITATED BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN GOOD OFFICERS " " AND REFLECTED UNDERLYING COMMON INTERESTS OF BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA IN FORESTALLING ESTABLISHMENT OF WHAT THEY VIEWED AS RADICAL, PALESTINIAN-DOMINATED REGIME IN LEBANON. ISRAELI UNWILLINGNESS TO TOLERATE SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT TO NABATIYAH SIGNALLED WANTING OF SYRO-ISRAELI CONVERGENCE AND ENTRANCE INTO NEW PHASE OF LEBANESE CRISIS IN WHICH SYRIAN AND ISRAELI ACTIONS POTENTIALLY GOVERNED BY DIVERGENCE OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

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PAGE 02

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3. SYRO-ISRAELI DISHARMONY IN SOUTH LEBANON APPEARS TO HAVE INITIALLY CAUGHT DAMASCUS BY SURPRISE. WHETHER OR NOT BOTH SIDES CONSCIOUSLY REALIZED FULL IMPORT OF RELATIONSHIP OF PARTIAL MUTUALITY WHICH HAD DEVELOPED SINCE EARLY 1978, SYRIANS HAD BECOME RELATIVELY ACCUSTOMED TO GENERAL PATTERN OF ACTIVITY IN LEBANON WHICH MAINTAINED SOME PREDICTABILITY: STIMULUS (INCREMENT OR SHIFT OF SYRIAN GROUND FORCES IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING CONDITIONS AMONG LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS), CRISIS (ISRAELIS, SYRIANS AND LEBANESE COMMUNICATED WITH EACH OTHER OFTEN THROUGH U.S. AND JORDANIAN GOOD OFFICES TO APPLY EXISTING TACIT GROUND RULES TO NEW SITUATION), AND PERCEPTION (GENERAL ISRAELI ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT MOST RECENT STIMULUS DID NOT UNDULY THREATEN THEIR UNDERLYING INTERESTS AND AIMED AT RESTRICTING LEBANESE LEFTIST-PALESTINIAN COALITION). ATTAINMENT OF SUCCESSIVE PLATEAUS OF UNDERSTANDING REACHED OUTER LIMIT OF THIS INFORMAL AND MAKE-SHIFT PROCESS WHEN SYRIAN FORCES BELONGING TO ADF ENTERED NABATIYAH.

4. SYRO-ISRAELI DIVERGENCE IN NABATIYAH AFFAIR AND RESULTING DISORDER IN SOUTH HAVE VEXED ABAAD REGIME AND OTHER OBSERVERS AS WELL. FROM DAMASCUS VANTAGE POINT, EXPLANATION OF RECENT DIFFICULTIES CAN BE SUMMARIZED RATHER BRIEFLY: SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS COOPERATED IN LEBANON, BUT ISRAELIS WERE UNWILLING TO COOPERATE TO ASSIST SYRIA TO IMPLEMENT POST-ARAB SUMMIT GOAL OF EXTENDING BARKIS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY INTO SOUTH LEBANON, WHERE ISRAELIS PERCEIVE PRESENCE OF SYRIAN ADF TROOPS AT NABATIYAH AND BEYOND AS THREAT TO THEIR NORTHERN BORDERS, A THREAT MAGNIFIED BY ISRAELI ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

5. I BELIEVE THIS ALTERED STATE OF AFFAIRS COULD SIG-

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PAGE 03 DAMASC 01482 01 OF 02 051133Z

NIPICANTLY AFFECT OUR GREATER REGIONAL INTERESTS IN SEVERAL WAYS, MOST DIRECTLY BY UNDERMINING SYRIA'S WILLINGNESS TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN BRINGING PALESTINIANS INTO SETTLEMENT PROCESS ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES AND TO EXPLORE WITH SOME CONFIDENCE FURTHER ACCOMODATION TO ISRAEL'S EXISTANCE IN REGION. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROCESS WHICH SECRETARY KISSINGER HELPED NURTURE FOLLOWING OCTOBER 1973 WAR AND WHICH SEEMED TO STALL WITH SIGNING OF 1975 SINAI ACCORD PICKED UP SOME MOMENTUM IN MUTATED FORM ON SYRO-ISRAELI FRONT BEGINNING IN 1976 ALONG LINES SUMMARIZED ABOVE PARA 3. IN UNPLANNED AND UNEXPECTED MANNER, SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS IN MIDST OF EXTREME VIOLENCE AND MOUNTING PRESSURES GROPED TOWARD REGIONAL ACCOMODATION IN LEVANT. ACCUSTOMED BY YEARS OF STERILE POLITICAL DEBATING AND INTERMITTENT WARFARE TO REGARD EACH OTHER WITH SUSPICION AND HOSTILITY, THEY SUDDENTLY FOUND THEMSELVES CONFRONTED BY COMMON DANGER, THE THREAT OF A RADICAL STATE ON THEIR BORDERS. DESPITE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED FOREBODINGS, ISRAEL ULTIMATELY PERMITTED ABOUT 30,000 SYRIAN TROOPS TO ENTER LEBANON. AND DESPITE FEARS THAT ISRAELIS MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR MILITARY WEAKNESS ON GOLAN, ASAD WHEN HE DETERMINED IT WAS NECESSARY DELETED HIS GOLAN FRONT OF SOME MECHANIZED, INFANTRY AND MISSILE BRIGADES TO MEET WHAT HE PERCEIVED AS GREATER THREATS IN LEBANON AND ON IRAQI BORDER. WHILE BOTH PARTIES RECEIVED OUR INPUT BEFORE THEY REACHED THEIR DECISIONS, AT EACH CRISIS POINT THEY ULTIMATELY RISKED RELYING UPON THEIR OWN PERCEPTIONS OF MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST TO EVOLVE A STRATEGY THAT SUCCEEDED.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART

B6

J. H. [unclear]

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~
~~DISSENT CHANNEL~~

[Redacted]

American Embassy
New Delhi, India

Dear [Redacted]:

I am writing in response to your Dissent Channel message on food aid to India (New Delhi 2820); which could not have come at a more opportune time. An action memorandum to the Secretary had been prepared by NEA and EB (and concurred in by S/P) a few hours before your message came. We immediately had the Secretariat hold up the action memorandum; we put a forwarding memorandum onto your message and sent it forward to Mr. Sisco and the Secretary together with the action memorandum. This is one of the best examples of timely use of the dissent channel in my memory.

As you will see from the NEA/EB memorandum (a copy of which is enclosed), the discussion that they set forth was along much the same lines as yours and the recommendation (which I support) came out at the same place. The addition of your special expertise and opinion ensured that the Secretary had a well-rounded set of views on which to draw in making his decision.

The Secretary has not yet acted on the question of PL 480 assistance to India; the NEA/EB memorandum and your dissent, together with Ambassador Saxbe's recommendation, are still before him. Once the decision is made it will of course be communicated to New Delhi. Whatever the outcome, you can take satisfaction in the fact that your proper use of the dissent channel was an integral input to the process of generating the best possible decision in the face of contending points of view.

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DISSENT CHANNEL

-2-

On behalf of myself and the Secretary, I want to thank you for your contribution.

Sincerely yours,

Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

Enclosure:

NEA/EB memorandum.

*No record of signature
8/31 jr*

Drafted: S/P:TPThornton:vb Clearance: S/P:OFP - Peter Lydon
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DISSENT CHANNEL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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2/10/76

MEMORANDUM

TO : S/P - Mr. Winston Lord

FROM : PM -

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL

B6

The Secretary recently agreed to permit a Pakistani Air Force team to come to the United States to visit an LTV plant which manufactures A-7 aircraft. This sudden decision reverses a policy of many months, during which the Department has steadfastly rejected approaches both from the Pakistanis and the manufacturer requesting permission for such a visit. Our refusals stemmed from the clear policy enounced early last year which stipulated that we would be prepared to consider arms sales to Pakistan, but only for defensive weapons. The A-7 does not fit that definition.

I regret this reversal of policy. Although the Secretary has only agreed to a plant visit, it will not be perceived by many quarters as a very limited action. It will have the immediate consequence of forcing us to permit visits by Pakistani teams to other aircraft manufacturers (Northrop, Fairchild and Douglas) who manufacture comparable weapon systems. It will be perceived by the Pakistan Government, the Congress, the Indian Government and the manufacturers as the first step leading to an eventual decision to sell one or more of the various aircraft types.

Based on a cost-benefit analysis, the balance sheet would weigh heavily against the decision. The potential costs might be:

a) Continued pressure by the Pakistan Government and their supporters for approval of the sale of the aircraft.

b) Potential excuse for the Indians to further improve and modernize their forces with Russian equipment. It is the

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military judgment that the Pakistanis cannot achieve parity with the Indians and that further arms acquisition, particularly of an offensive nature, can only lead to increased tensions and not the stability that we hope to achieve.

c) Further restrictive legislation by Congress in order to prevent situations of this kind from recurring. The legislation under Congressional consideration now is already restrictive and burdensome. We should not invite further encroachments into Executive Branch legitimate spheres of action.

d) Pressure from manufacturers, particularly LTV, and their supporters for approval of aircraft sale.

On the benefit side, we might say that:

a) this action permits the US to maintain a positive relationship with GOP, although when one views the panoply of weapons that we are prepared to provide the Pakistani, it would appear that the plant visit cannot be central to maintaining good relationships.

b) The decision may gain support for other Administration initiatives from a small number of Senators who would view the visit sympathetically.

c) If the visit subsequently results in the sale of A-7, LTV will be able to keep its production line in operation and thereby save 15,000 jobs. It has been LTV's contention that the sale to Pakistan is essential if its plant is to remain in operation after this year.

It is this latter benefit which is of particular concern. It may be the only justification that has any basis in fact. It would however be the first instance in my memory at least in which a sale would be justified primarily on domestic economic grounds. If the Administration ever finds itself justifying sales of defense articles and services essentially on domestic economic grounds, then I think we can expect a major Congressional effort to fully eliminate any flexibility that might be available to the Executive Branch. In addition, even without the Congressional aspects, it would be poor foreign policy if arms transfers are to be dictated by domestic economic requirements.

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It seems to me that we must now face the prospect of two further decisions:

a) Preferably, we should conclude that the plant visit is the end of this process and that no sale of offensive weapon systems will be considered.

b) Failing to maintain that position, because of either domestic or Pakistani pressures, we must consider whether we can make a virtue out of necessity. The Pakistanis are interested in a reprocessing plant. We have raised serious objections to this scheme. If we must, we should trade authorization for the sale of an offensive aircraft (A-7 or A-10 or A-4) for assurances from GOP that it will not pursue the acquisition of a reprocessing plant. I am loathe to suggest trading one bad policy for another, but it may be that this is the price we will have to pay. Such a trade can at least be rationalized and might be acceptable to other interested parties such as Congress and India. If we are to consider this trade-off, then there is some urgency since IAEA will be reviewing the reprocessing plant sale proposal in the near future.

PM: :bpw
2/10/76 x23302

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ARA/AND:RSSTEVEN

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TO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

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E.O. 11652:F/A

TAGS: ELAR, CI

SUBJECT: AFL-CIO SOLIDARITY VISIT - MAY 21-23

REF: SANTIAGO 3339

1. AFL-CIO APPRECIATES EMBASSY COOPERATION AND CONCURS WITH GENERAL OUTLINE OF TENTATIVE PROGRAM PREPARED FOR SUBJECT VISIT.

2. SOLIDARITY TEAM WILLING TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT AND/OR OTHER GOC REPRESENTATIVES SUGGESTED IN REFTEL, BUT INSISTS ON PARTICIPATION IN MEETING OF TRADE UNION LEADERS ACCEPTABLE TO AFL-CIO. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT SUCH PARTICIPATION SHOULD INCLUDE SOME DEMOCRATIC LEADERS NOT INVOLVED WITH "GROUP OF TEN". AFL-CIO HAS NO OBJECTION TO THIS PROVIDED "GROUP OF TEN" AND AIFLD CPD AGREE.

3. JESSE FRIEDMAN OF AIFLD WILL ARRIVE MAY 18 TO HELP

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PAGE 02 STATE 118103

FINALIZE ARRANGEMENTS.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER THERE IS AGREEMENT ON INCLUSION OF LEADERS OUTSIDE "GROUP OF TEN" AND IF SO, WHO THEY WOULD BE. VANCA

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

S/F

PAGE 01 STATE 158531
ORIGIN SP-02

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RELEASE IN
PART B6

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 ES-01 /003 R

DRAFTED BY S/P: HJONES, CJR

APPROVED BY S/P: P. RODMAN

M/MO: MKING (SUBS)

M/DGP: DKURSCH

M/COMP: LJURVIS (SUBS)

EAP/EX: EPOLHAN

M: RROLAN

?S/P: OPEN FORUM: JREINERTSON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ANEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 158531

DISSENT CHANNEL FROM S/P, P.W. RODMAN TO

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: APER

SUBJECT: FAMILY EMPLOYMENT AT POST: SHARED AFM POSITIONS

REF: SEOUL 5127.

1. AS I MENTIONED LAST WEEK, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL, THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS, THE IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL, THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR IDEAS CONCERNING THE SHARING OF AMERICAN FAMILY MEMBER POSITIONS BY TWO DEPENDENTS. WE ALL AGREED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO CREATE TWO HALF-TIME PIT POSITIONS FROM ONE FSH/AFM POSITION TO PRODUCE THE SAME RESULT.

2. TO DO THIS FULL TIME, THE POSITION TO BE SHARED WOULD HAVE TO BE REPROGRAMMED FOR TWO HALF-TIME PIT POSITIONS AND THE EMPLOYEES ENCUMBERING THE POSITION WOULD BE PITS. THE POST WOULD TAG THE FSH/AFM POSITION BEING REPROGRAMMED SO THAT IT COULD BE IDENTIFIED IF THE POST LATER WISHED TO REQUEST ITS REESTABLISHMENT AS A FULL-TIME FSH/AFM POSITION.

3. SINCE FTE IS ACCOUNTED FOR ACCORDING TO THE EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY OF THE EMPLOYEES, NOT OF THE POSITION ITSELF, FTE FOR THESE POSITIONS WOULD BE CHARGED AGAINST THE EAP BUREAU'S PIT FTE ALLOCATION. IF THE FTE ALLOCATION FOR PITS WERE INSUFFICIENT TO COVER ITS NEEDS, THE BUREAU COULD REQUEST A TRANSFER OF FTE FROM FSH FTE TO THE PIT CATEGORY.

4. THE JOB-SHARING APPROACH FOR AFMS COULD BE BENEFICIAL FOR FAMILY MORALE AND HOLDS THE POTENTIAL FOR ALLOWING MORE SPOUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN AFM PROGRAMS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WILL BE INCREASED PAPERWORK, A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY THAT A FULL-TIME FSH POSITION WAS "TEMPORARILY" CONVERTED TO TWO HALF-TIME PIT POSITIONS, AND POTENTIALLY HIGHER ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS FOR TWO EMPLOYEES RATHER THAN ONE, PROBLEMS PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED WHEN YOUR EMBASSY FIRST MADE THIS REQUEST.

5. THE DEPARTMENT WILL DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH SEOUL'S ADMIN COUNSELOR WHEN HE VISITS WASHINGTON.

6. ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN OUR MEETINGS ARE IN FAVOR OF SPLITTING THESE POSITIONS AND USING THEM FOR

TWO DEPENDENTS MEETS THE NEEDS OF THE POST. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT IT CAN BE DONE USING THE PIT CATEGORY. AT THIS POINT, THEN, THERE SEEMS NO NEED TO PRESENT THIS AS A FULL DISSENT CHANNEL CASE TO THE SECRETARY AND OTHER PRINCIPALS UNLESS YOU WOULD LIKE US TO DO SO.

7. I APPRECIATE YOUR BRINGING THIS ISSUE TO MY ATTENTION AND TO THE ATTENTION OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED. IF YOU BELIEVE WE CAN OR SHOULD DO ANYTHING FURTHER, PLEASE LET ME KNOW.
SHULTZ

1. HJ
2. CR

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STADIS////////////////////
DISSENT CHANNEL, FOR [] FROM LAKE

B6

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, XX

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY

REF: BUDAPEST 0137

1. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR A THOUGHT PROVOKING AND USEFUL DISSENT MESSAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. YOUR THINKING ON A WIDE VARIETY OF POINTS IS MUCH LIKE OUR OWN.

2. WE ARE WORKING ALONG A NUMBER OF LINES YOU SUGGESTED. THE SECRETARY IS CONSIDERING MAKING A SPEECH DEVOTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS. IN IT, HE MAY RAISE AND DISCUSS A NUMBER OF THE ISSUES YOU RAISED, SUCH AS THE TOOLS AVAILABLE TO US AND THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR PROMOTING RIGHTS. THESE ISSUES ARE ALSO BEING STUDIED INTENSIVELY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT AND THE RESULTING POLICY PAPERS SHOULD REACH THE FIELD SOON.

3. YOU IMPLICITLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICAL RIGHTS TO MORE CLEARLY ECONOMIC RIGHTS. WE ARE LOOKING AT THIS BECAUSE OF THE ATTENTION GIVEN

IT BOTH IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE NORTH-SOUTH CONTEXT AND IN THE RATIONALE FOR OUR POLICY IN BILATERAL AID AND IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. AS TO SETTING LIMITS ON US HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY, THE PRESIDENT DID THIS WHEN HE SAID, IN HIS MESSAGE TO PEOPLE OF OTHER NATIONS, THAT "WE WILL NOT SEEK TO DOMINATE NOR DICTATE TO OTHERS." WE ALSO INTEND TO MAINTAIN A BALANCE OF PUBLIC ACTION AND QUIET DIPLOMACY.

4. FINALLY, YOUR POINT THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ON RIGHTS ISSUES IS WELL TAKEN. SHOULD THE SECRETARY FINALLY DECIDE TO GIVE A HUMAN RIGHTS SPEECH, WE EXPECT IT WILL RECEIVE WIDE ATTENTION AND CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TO THE QUALITY AND EXTENT OF OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE PUBLIC AND CONGRESS WHICH HAS INCREASED AND IMPROVED MARKEDLY DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS.

5. AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL AND EFFECTIVE USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL ON THIS IMPORTANT SUBJECT.
VANCE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE
IN PART B6

April 19, 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO S/P -- W. Anthony Lake

FROM: [REDACTED] (D/HA, x-20334)

Subject: DISSENT Channel -- Changing United States CSCE Policy to Take
the Offensive

(This memorandum is submitted in the dissent channel. Distribution is requested as follows: S, D, P, C, EUR, S/P, S/S, D/HA, the CSCE Commission, and M.)

SUMMARY. U.S. CSCE policy tends to treat the Belgrade Conference as an event synonymous with CSCE itself. Most CSCE time and talent in the Department therefore has been channeled into planning for the Belgrade conference, or into limiting CSCE discussions with Soviet bloc countries to those matters finding favor with NATO CSCE experts. Current U.S. goals for CSCE, most recently stated to the White House on March 19, have stressed the use of CSCE to strengthen the NATO consultative mechanism, while relegating compliance to the Final Act to lesser importance.

Little more than two months remain before representatives of the 35 CSCE states sit down at Belgrade to work out an agenda for the Fall CSCE review. Inside the US government, in Congress, and among the public, sensitivities are being heightened as to what ought to take place at this meeting, and what CSCE is meant to be. However the Belgrade Conference is destined to produce a bland statement of consensus at best, even if it says only that the participants couldn't agree on much. No decisions on specific acts of compliance to the Helsinki accords are likely to be made there.

The U.S. foreign policy community has to come up with some new CSCE thought to parallel, not replace, extant policy and planning for Belgrade. New CSCE policy should be defined, recognizing that decisions to comply with the accords can be made only inside governments, and that the Final Act gives only to signatory governments the formal standing to seek this compliance. The emphasis of this new policy should be on increasing Department and Embassy CSCE talent to augment bilateral and multilateral CSCE activity by the United States. The goal would be to step up formal pressure on other signatory states to comply to all provisions of the Final Act. This pressure should commence before the Belgrade Conference begins, and carry through it and beyond, defusing any danger that an unsuccessful Belgrade venture might be interpreted as an ultimate failure -- or end -- of CSCE itself. END SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL

B6

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-2-

Did CSCE Policy Change When U.S. Administrations Changed? CSCE and the Belgrade Conference have presented an unexpected challenge to the Department. Although Secretary Vance was asked to indicate early in February that this country would continue to coordinate Belgrade policy with our NATO allies, it was inevitable that the profound human rights commitment of President Carter would have to be factored into these plans. The President's repeated public statements on the importance of the Final Act portended heightened US emphasis on the character and outcome of the Belgrade Conference scheduled for the Fall, 1977. They also suggested the propriety of a review, and augmentation, of Department time and talent devoted to CSCE.

Nonetheless, CSCE policy remained oriented to the desirability of convincing NATO allies that the pre-eminent CSCE priority was rallying to a unified NATO approach to the Belgrade Conference. Little time was spent, however, focusing on the politics of achieving this unity, or determining how or whether it would serve the West in finding answers to Soviet-favored CSCE initiatives.

These are questions of politics. Lack of attention to the politics of NATO planning, the politics of Soviet CSCE offensives, or the politics of meeting Common Market priorities with reasonable US alternatives have led to a dilemma today: our closest allies, for reasons different than Moscow's, may attempt to single out the United States as the chief Belgrade troublemaker. That monkey would then be off the Soviet back.

A careful reading of reporting cables from the latest NATO CSCE experts meeting lends credence to the suggestion that the fabric of our NATO-directed CSCE effort has become frayed, or perhaps irreparably damaged. A careful, discreet polling of views among Department officers privy to the details and history of NATO's planning for Belgrade would shed light on whether this is too extreme a statement. The CSCE Commission staff experts on Belgrade could offer additional thoughts, as well.

Remedies. They are necessary only to the extent that the following needs are recognized as serious:

-- the need to delineate a CSCE strategy parallel to Belgrade providing the means to maintain the centrality of the Final Act in CSCE matters even if the Belgrade conference is a failure;

-- the need to determine the merit of arguments heard in NATO that Belgrade planning itself be more flexible and incorporate more European priorities, stressing discussion of differences within NATO, even at Belgrade, rather than trying to paper them over; and

-- the need to go on the CSCE offensive, with the patience and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

firmness necessary to extract Soviet Bloc compliance to all Helsinki provisions, especially Basket III.

This last priority cannot be served in the long term by the finite, transitory character of the Belgrade conference. The need for compliance to the Final Act began once signatures were set to the document; it will last long after Belgrade has ended.

A Review of CSCE Policy: Basic Questions Must Be Answered. What is required is a fresh look by the Department at the past, but especially at the future. In asking ourselves about CSCE, an attempt should be made to answer questions basic to any CSCE policy:

-- What does the Carter Administration expect from CSCE?

-- What are the best ways to attain this?

a) Should US strategy be primarily focused on the Belgrade Conference, or should Belgrade planning be part of an overall CSCE policy? What alternatives exist which can parallel Belgrade planning to insure that the CSCE process will continue if Belgrade fails, or results in a bland, noncommittal document?

b) Should US CSCE strategy be primarily NATO-based? Are we willing to temper the American stance on human rights and the desire for a comprehensive review of implementation in order to maintain a common NATO CSCE policy?

c) To what extent are we willing to risk ruptures in bilateral US-USSR relations in our CSCE policy? How far can we push the Soviets in CSCE-related matters before they make the decision to pull out of Belgrade or CSCE? What would a Soviet CSCE policy look like after Brezhnev dies or retires?

-- Should CSCE be used to bring about fundamental changes in the Soviet system, or should it be used in an attempt to achieve merely the alleviation of the more obvious human rights abuses which are referred to in the Final Act? How can CSCE be used most effectively to give East European countries maximum opportunity for independent lines of action? Is it wise to link the Warsaw Pact with the Soviet Union in Western criticism of Eastern lack of compliance? How are we going to deal with the opportunities afforded the Soviet Union by the Final Act to influence the economic, social and political currents in Western Europe, and to enhance their control in Eastern Europe as well?

-- How can an integrated mechanism be established to identify areas of U.S. non-compliance, and to suggest measures to rectify the

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-4-

problems? Will we have responses to these criticisms at Belgrade?

-- How should the United States clarify that in CSCE, as in overall foreign policy, concern for human rights and the dignity of the individual person is not a political tactic available to NATO but a fundamental aspect of American philosophy and political commitment? Are arguments that a heightened dialogue on human rights may cause problems at Belgrade insensitive to circumstances and opportunities which have emerged since August, 1975 and November, 1976? As Belgrade momentum increases, will it be appropriate for the United States to make strong, bilateral representations that CSCE houses be cleaned up?

The Right of Inquiry, and "Interference in Internal Affairs." The United States and every other Final Act signatory has the political right of inquiry regarding implementation of the Helsinki accords. Whether to press these inquiries, and how to insist on compliance, are decisions the United States along with each CSCE state must make for itself. Prudence and longstanding friendship dictates reflecting on the views of our allies and joining with them whenever possible, but other countries cannot decide for us, nor we for them, on how to press for compliance.

If Basket IV -- which spells out this right of inquiry -- is to be taken seriously, the number one CSCE matter for immediate attention must be to end any argument over the political right of each Final Act signatory to inquire about compliance to the Helsinki accords. This issue transcends everything destined for the Belgrade Conference and everything in CSCE itself.

There is at least one overriding domestic imperative for confirming the right of inquiry -- President Carter's explicit desire that this be done. The President has clearly stated that he considers the Final Act one of the most important political resources available to the US to influence national and international behavior. He believes the Helsinki accords must be implemented, not relegated to the past, and that signatory governments must, if need be, devise innovative means to bring this about. He has explicitly reaffirmed the political willingness of the United States to comply with the Helsinki accords, and he has called on other governments to do likewise. Where compliance requires US housecleaning, the President has insisted time and effort be so devoted.

Europe's Reaction. Our NATO partners are testing the strength of US involvement in NATO caucussing before Belgrade begins. The US has shown it can keep the lead at NATO, in sharp contrast to its record at Geneva.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

In fact, some say the United States is the only alliance country demonstrating imagination and great effort to tie down a NATO strategy for Belgrade. Certainly; our own experts are working hard on this.

There is good reason to seek NATO solidarity for the review conference, and this point is not meant to be debated here. But complete unity can never be achieved. It is an illusory goal. Instead, to merge the concept of NATO solidarity with the apparent sentiments of the President means, for CSCE, to avoid placing all our CSCE eggs — especially the controversial human rights eggs — in the NATO or Belgrade baskets at all.

But we have gone far in that direction. The CSCE transition paper, the Department's sanction for NATO-oriented Belgrade planning, and the March 19, 1977 CSCE review paper read often as if Belgrade were virtually the same thing as CSCE.

A grave error is committed if attention is not focused on what will work at Belgrade and what will not. The "what will not" must be given another forum.

Other CSCE Fora: The Soviets Know They Exist. Overall CSCE policy of this country still does not show sophisticated sensitivity to the notion that the Soviets and their allies are taking effective political measures to separate major portions of CSCE activity from the Belgrade context. Bilateral discussions with Western European signatories and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe are where Moscow's representatives are doing their talking. Soviet media alone have been confirming this in detail for over a year. Still, the evidence even today has not been factored effectively into U.S. planning to counter Moscow's CSCE offensives — Belgrade or other.

Substantive issues such as human rights are meant to be taken up once the Belgrade Fall phase begins, the U.S. has insisted. Yet it is self-limiting, perhaps self-defeating, to assume this is the scenario the USSR will follow, to plan only for it, and to suggest that the proper method to preserve dialogue over the Final Act is to moderate public statements about human rights. Perhaps the dialogue at the conference should be moderate, but perhaps this country should begin to do CSCE battle now on other fighting fields, as the Soviets have been doing for some time now.

A U.S. CSCE Offensive. It should begin with a discreet notification to ally and adversary that the most important Belgrade "initiative," perhaps the only one, should be to seek agreement at Belgrade that each and every CSCE signatory has the right to inquire about compliance to the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-6-

Helsinki Final Act. The intent, obviously, would be to deprive any signatory of the opportunity to declare that such inquiry was interference in its internal affairs. This initiative would include tabling a specific text spelling out how a state receiving these inquiries would respond substantively within a set period of time.

We would presume that the Soviet Union would understand this as a distinct challenge to their favored CSCE tactic of rejecting inquiry as interference in its internal affairs. The United States would signal to the USSR its commitment, before the Conference, to a moderated Belgrade dialogue as the quid pro quo.

There is no question that this approach would require a profound modification of policy presently being hammered out at NATO. Furthermore, it would have to be coupled with another fundamental change in U.S. policy, namely an augmentation of US planning and manpower to begin sophisticated, bilateral diplomatic representations to Soviet Bloc CSCE states lacking in compliance to the Helsinki Final Act.

U.S. Embassy Involvement in the CSCE Offensive. Each U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Bloc would be required to designate one competent officer to read and understand the Helsinki accords. He would be asked to gather together specific Embassy proposals on the precise steps the host government had to take to comply with the Helsinki Final Act, together with an up-to-date evaluation of past compliance. The Embassy would define for itself a role to play in making repeated diplomatic representations asking for further compliance -- compliance to all Baskets of the Helsinki accords.

Such activity would amount to preparing and executing a CSCE diplomatic offensive which could parallel any preparations for the Belgrade Conference. Before Embassies could begin, their CSCE "shopping lists" would have to be reviewed in the Department by an augmented CSCE team in EUR (EUR/CSCE?) to filter out proposals deemed counterproductive to Belgrade planning. The team would have to synthesize the Embassy lists into one document our NATO allies could examine, and even the neutrals and non-aligned could have a look. The opportunity for European allies and friends to comment before the U.S. offensive began would forestall our CSCE discussions compromising what they were doing with the Soviet Union and its clients. Where European friends asked we withhold discussion, a maximum effort by this country would be made to meet these wishes.

Once the reviews of Embassy proposals were completed, U.S. diplomats would begin the offensive. Our allies and friends in Europe would receive discreet updates of progress made, and the Department would speak out publicly whenever an open rendering of accounts was deemed appropriate and useful.

CONFIDENTIAL

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-7-

Impact on NATO-Oriented Belgrade Planning. Without question, this broader-based approach to CSCE would take matters out of the exclusive domain of NATO affairs, although the NATO aspects of CSCE would remain important. But a defined group of CSCE experts in EUR, coordinated at seventh floor level by the newly established Department CSCE mechanism, could begin now to join Embassies and Department resources to cull from the provisions of the Final Act specific actions other governments must be asked to take, along with the U.S. tactics needed to pry out favorable responses. Faithful consultations with our allies would preclude creating an impression that, for the United States, CSCE was to evolve into a unique form of superpower bilateralism.

Defusing Belgrade. If the President were to disclose publicly that this country planned long-term bilateral talks on Final Act compliance, other CSCE governments friend and foe would detect that this country did not pin all of its CSCE hopes, human rights or other, strictly on the Belgrade affair. By defusing what for now seems to be at stake only in the Yugoslav capital, much of the clout would be lost to the Soviet argument that the Belgrade review conference must avoid polemics. Indeed, Belgrade and the current planning for it could be preserved, but the Conference would lose its present character as the only international occasion in CSCE for a formal U.S. statement of commitment to Helsinki principles.

Other International Common Ground for CSCE Discussions. The Final Act provides that the U.N.'s Economic Commission for Europe will have a specific role in seeking compliance to Basket II provisions. U.S. policy has been to downplay this, in an attempt now proven futile to convince our allies in Europe not to respond favorably to positive Soviet suggestions on what the ECE should be doing with the Brezhnev proposals for three pan-European conferences -- on the environment, transportation, and energy. The ECE's annual meeting, later this month, may result in the U.S. appearing as the odd-man-out. Does this auger well for Belgrade?

If not, this country might do well to reverse its decision to resist European attempts to define the utility either of ECE activities or the Brezhnev conference proposals.

In addition, it would do well to rethink the U.S. refusal to support Western European sentiment that, under the CSCE banner, groups of experts might meet to discuss the sort of Helsinki compliance which can take place only if two or more countries cooperate formally. This country has been opposed to such experts' meetings because, in its view, they would amount to "institutionalizing" CSCE. There are good reasons not to institutionalize CSCE, and not to create a cumbersome CSCE bureaucracy

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-8-

which could slow or stymie efforts at compliance. But the Belgrade Conference would be a proper forum to define the competence of experts' meetings, whose function would be to examine the possibilities for multilateral CSCE cooperation or new CSCE initiatives rather than to discuss the obligations of governments to comply to the existing Helsinki accords. Those Final Act obligations are grist for the bilateral mill, primarily. However, if experts are indeed destined to carve out a few areas of their own, the United States would do better by being present at such meetings than to turn a deaf ear. The Soviets won't.

The Impact of an Unsuccessful Belgrade Conference. Even if the Belgrade conference were reduced to an emotional confrontation over Basket III areas, or if it became a dialogue of the deaf, the spirit of Helsinki and pressures for compliance to the accords would be maintained if this country began now to shape a bilateral offensive and to signal its willingness to consider positively the merits of experts' meetings. But far more CSCE time and talent would be needed, and this country would be at pains to apply it carefully before Belgrade so that our European allies and friends would understand the purpose.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

THAT a decision be made by the Department to broaden CSCE policy;

THAT U.S. policy for Belgrade incorporate the intention to seek confirmation at the Conference of a CSCE state's right of inquiry regarding another CSCE state's compliance to the Helsinki Final Act, along with the responsibility of a CSCE state to reply substantively to such inquiries on a timely basis;

THAT CSCE policy emphasize not only Belgrade but a CSCE "offensive" primarily bilateral in nature, but including a definition of where the United States can join European allies to support CSCE experts' meetings. Both undertakings would be meant to carry on the work of CSCE outside the context of Belgrade;

THAT a new office, EUR/CSCE be created, to work closely with EUR/SOV, EUR/EE, the EUR offices for Western Europe, EUR/RPM, EUR/RPE, D/HA and other interested bureaus, together with the CSCE Commission, to shape CSCE policy for presentation to the Department's CSCE coordinating mechanism, and eventually to Congress and to the public; and

THAT EUR/CSCE oversee an immediate designation of U.S. Embassy officers in Soviet Bloc countries to begin the work of preparing CSCE bilateral representations. EUR/CSCE would modify Belgrade planning and policy to the extent necessary to accommodate this activity.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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21 FEB 1978

CONFIDENTIAL
(UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS)

MEMORANDUM

TO : ARA/CCA -

FROM : S/P - Anthony Laferla

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Message on the Spanish Sahara

B6

Thank you for your dissent channel message on the Spanish Sahara. I have asked Steve Cohen of my staff to coordinate a reply to the issues you raise in your memo. We have sent copies to the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, and the Chairman of the Open Forum, in addition to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, the Assistant Secretaries of the European, Near East, African and International Organization Bureaus, and the Director for Politico-Military Affairs.

We expect to respond to your views promptly. Thank you for your submission.

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Department of State

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APPROVED BY S/P: PWOLFOWITZ
S/P: DFORTIER
S/P/OF: GDRAGNICH

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DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR FROM S/P WOLFOWITZ

B6

E.O. 12065: GDS - 4/9/86 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL)

TAGS: NA

SUBJECT: YOUR RECENT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REFERENCE: BONN 06573

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. WE HAVE DISTRIBUTED COPIES TO THE SECRETARY, THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE COUNSELOR, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, AND THE VARIOUS OFFICES IN THE DEPARTMENT WHICH YOU REQUESTED. YOUR MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE EMBASSIES REQUESTED. CHARLES FAIRBANKS, POLICY PLANNING STAFF MEMBER, WILL COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. HAIG

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IO-13 109 R

DRAFTED BY SY/CC:JFPERDEW:SC
APPROVED BY A/SY/OPS - VERNE F. ST. MARS

A - JMTHOMAS
M/CT - J KARKASHIAN (IN DRAFT)
ARA/EX - R GERSHENSON (IN SUBS)
AF/EX - J BRYAN (IN SUBS)
EUR/EX - D LEIDEL (IN SUBS)
EA/EX R MILLS (IN SUBS)
NFA/EX - LC SMITH (IN SUBS)
S/S-O: TGMARTIN

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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

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INFORM CONSULS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3 DIMPTD
TAGS: ASEC, PINS

SUBJECT: PLANNED ATTACKS ON LUFTHANSA
1. DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED REPORT THROUGH ANOTHER AGENCY
THAT A TERRORIST GROUP PLANS ATTACKS WITH ROCKETS AGAINST
LUFTHANSA AIRCRAFT. SOURCE OF INFORMATION HAS IN PAST
DEMONSTRATED RELIABILITY IN REPORTING.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 266580
2. LOCATIONS OF ATTACKS ARE NOT KNOWN.
3. POSTS SHOULD ADVISE ALL PERSONNEL TO REFRAIN FROM
USING LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS UNTIL THIS SITUATION CLARIFIES.
SUGGEST THIS INFORMATION BE HELD TO POST PERSONNEL.
4. DEPARTMENT WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR SITUATION AND
ADVISE WHEN THREAT APPEARS TO HAVE PASSED. VANCE

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

TO :

FROM : S/P - Reginald Bartholomew; Acting

SUBJECT: Your Dissent Message of September 15
Regarding the Sale of a DC-8 to Gabon

B6

The purpose of this memorandum is to report to you what actions were taken by S/P in response to your dissent message of September 15.

With Respect to the Secretary

- On September 16 Mr. Swiers notified Mr. Gompert of the Secretary's staff that S/P had received your draft dissent message and requested that if, as you expected, AF recommended approval of the issuance of an export license for the sale of a DC-8 to Gabon, he bring your draft dissent message to the Secretary's attention before the Secretary acted on the recommendation.

- On September 19, after receiving AF's Action Memo of September 16, Under Secretary Sisco's office attached and forwarded to the Secretary Mr. Djerejian's copy of your dissent message. We understand that the Secretary read your dissent message before making his decision.

- Although the Secretary had already acted on AF's memo before we received the final version of your dissent message, we nonetheless forwarded it to the Secretary's office. This final version was returned to us on October 16 with the note that "The Secretary has seen the attached dissent memo."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

With Respect to Officials in the Export Import Bank and the Department of Commerce

- In response to your request of September 24 to Mr. Lord that the Department make your dissent message available to officials in the Export Import Bank and the Department of Commerce, S/P, in consultation with AF and L, decided that if it had not yet done so, the Department should apprise the two agencies of your dissent message and invite them to send officers to the Department to review it along with all other relevant documents. We decided that these documents should not be sent to the agencies since they constituted internal working papers of the Department.

- Even before the above decisions had been taken, Mr. Keith Huffman of the Legal Adviser's Office, in accordance with a previous commitment to cooperate closely with the Export Import Bank, had invited Mr. John Lentz of the Export Import Bank to come to the Department to review his file on this matter. Mr. Lentz did so on September 27. Among the documents reviewed by Mr. Lentz was your dissent memorandum of September 24 and the attachments to it.

- On October 2 Mr. Huffman called Mr. Morris Licht of the Department of Commerce to inform him that while the Secretary had decided to approve an export license for sale of the aircraft, there had been some strong objection to this action in the Department; that arguments against granting a license were recorded in a dissent message; and that he or any other Department of Commerce official would be welcome to come to the Department to review this dissent message. Noting that he was aware that the Department was not "all of one mind" regarding this sale, Mr. Licht said that a dissent memorandum would only be of historical interest since the Department of Commerce would be guided by the Secretary of State's decision. Mr. Licht asked, however, if Mr. Huffman could forward to him a copy of the dissent message for his records, with any restrictions the Department of State might wish to place on its distribution. Mr. Huffman said that he thought this might be possible. Before Mr. Huffman could pursue the matter, however, Mr. Licht called back withdrawing his request for a copy of the message.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

S/P believes that the actions which were taken by S/P and in AF and L fully meet your request that the Secretary and officials in the Export Import Bank and the Department of Commerce be promptly apprised of your dissent message so that they would be aware of the reasons why, in your opinion, they should not approve the issuance of an export license for the sale of the aircraft. We are persuaded that, insofar as the Department of State is concerned, the Secretary, Assistant Secretary Easum and officials in AF and L gave careful and thoughtful consideration throughout this case to the reservations raised by you and others in the Department. Quite clearly, the Secretary agreed with Assistant Secretary Easum and L that on the basis of the evidence and information available to the Department the issue of the legality of the sale turned on a judgment as to the likelihood of misuse of the aircraft. S/P shares this view.

We wish to commend you for taking the initiative to bring your views to the attention of the Secretary. If you think further action should be taken on your dissent message please let us know.

THIS MEMO WAS CLEARED IN DRAFT BY:

L - Mr. Keith Huffman
AF - Mr. John Foley
 Mr. Walter Cutler } *wm*
S/P - Mr. Ray Smith

~~SECRET~~

RELEASE IN PART B6

ACTION COPY

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INCOMING TELEGRAM 6476

PAGE 01 ACTION SP-02

SANTIA 03615 131624Z

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R 131304Z MAY 78 FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9210

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SANTIAGO 3615

re: S/p 5/15 0900

E. O. 11652: N/A TAGS: N/A SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: AFL-CIO SOLIDARITY VISIT - MAY 21-23 REF: STATE 118443

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [] LABOR ATTACHE. THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE BUT WOULD LIKE TO ENSURE THAT ARA/CH, SAL AND ARA/LA/MRSD/L RECEIVE COPIES.

2. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS LONG HELD A POLICY OF STRENGTHENING FREE TRADE UNIONS. THIS POLICY RECENTLY ENUNCIATED IN DECEMBER BY VICE-PRESIDENT WALTER MONDALE WHEN HE SAID THAT THERE DOES NOT EXIST A FREE SOCIETY WITHOUT FREE TRADE UNIONS. IN ATTEMPTING TO FURTHER THIS POLICY, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN COOPERATION WITH THE AFL-CIO HAS LENT ITS PRESTIGE AND SUPPORT TO A CHILEAN GROUP OF DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNION LEADERS WHO HAVE RISKED THEIR LIVES AND PROPERTY TO URGE A RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNIONISM IN CHILE. THIS GROUP WHO ARE SOMETIMES CALLED THE "DINAMICOS" OR "THE GROUP OF TEN" HAVE BEEN RELENTLESSLY HARASSED BY THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. FOUR OF THEIR MEMBERS (SANTANA, DEL CAMPO, SEPULVEDA AND MERY) HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THEIR UNION POSITIONS BY GOVERNMENT DECREE. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO ATTEMPTED TO DO THE SAME TO EDUARDO RIOS AND RIOS, UNLIKE THE OTHER FOUR, DECIDED TO FIGHT.

3. THE SOLIDARITY VISIT HAS ONE PURPOSE ONLY, THAT IS TO STRENGTHEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN CHILE. THE "GROUP OF TEN" ARE THE PEOPLE ON THE FRONT LINES OF THIS POLICY AND OUR SUPPORT HAS BEEN PRECISELY BECAUSE THIS IS THE GROUP OF TRADE UNION LEADERS MOST IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE TO FURTHER THIS POLICY.

4. THE INSTRUCTION (REFTEL) THAT OTHER DEMOCRATIC GROUPS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN AFL-CIO CONTACTS WITH GOC OFFICIALS WOULD SERVE TO DILUTE THE EFFORTS AND LABOR OF THE "DINAMICOS". THIS NEW POLICY REQUIRING THAT DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS WHO REMAINED ON THE SIDELINES OF THE FIGHT FOR A PROMPT RETURN TO TRADITIONAL TRADE UNION FREEDOMS BE GRATUITOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE UMBRELLA OFFERED BY THE AFL-CIO DELEGATION REWARDS THE WEAK AND THE UNCOMMITTED. IT ALSO SERVES TO DILUTE THE AUTHORITY AND FORCE OF AUTHENTIC DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNIONISM IN CHILE PRECISELY AT THE TIME WHEN IT MAY BE COMMANDING MORE ATTENTION.

5. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT WITHDRAW ITS SUGGESTION THAT OTHER GROUPS PARTICIPATE IN ANY MEETING WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. LANDAU

B6

RELEASE IN PART B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/P:HJONES:CJR
5/24/84:X2972
S/P:P.WRODMAN

S/P:JREINERTSON

S/P:HJONES

PRIORITY

GRENADA

DISSENT CHANNEL FROM S/P, PETER RODMAN TO

NO. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, EAID, GJ, US, XL

SUBJECT: USAID'S PLAN TO SPEED ECONOMIC REFORMS IN GRENADA

REF: GRENADA 1887

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE REGARDING THE AID PROPOSAL TO SEND TEAMS OF EXPERTS TO GRENADA.

2. WE HAVE GIVEN COPIES OF YOUR MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM. POLICY PLANNING STAFF MEMBER RALPH BRAIBANTI WILL COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY, WHICH WILL PROBABLY INVOLVE SENDING ADDITIONAL COPIES TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOTLEY, THE ADMINISTRATOR OF AID AND OTHERS, UNLESS YOU PREFER THAT THE DISTRIBUTION BE LIMITED IN SOME WAY.

3. I HOPE TO BE CONTACTING YOU AGAIN BEFORE LONG WITH A FULL REPLY. YY

PUR *PHC*
HJ *HJ*
JR *JR*
RB *RB*

B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN PART
B6

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S/P:MACASEY:BDM
EXT. 29716 3-10-77
S/P:ALAKE

S/P:G.AUSTIN
S/P:NBOYER

S/P:SVOGELGESANG

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE BUDAPEST

STADIS

DISSENT CHANNEL, FOR [REDACTED] FROM LAKE-S/P

E.O. 11652: N.A.

TAGS: SHUM, HU

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY

REF: A. BUDAPEST 437. B. BUDAPEST 747

I REGRET THAT, DUE TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR, YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY WAS NOT ACKNOWLEDGED UNTIL NOW. MR. GRANVILLE AUSTIN OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE COORDINATOR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

TL
MAC WAC
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE IN PART
B6

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

February 26, 1976

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~
DISSENT CHANNEL

TO: The Secretary

FROM: S/P - Winston Lord *W*Title I Food for India

In accordance with your policy of bringing dissent messages to your attention, I am forwarding herewith a Dissent Channel message from FSO [redacted] in New Delhi. In it he dissents from Ambassador Saxbe's recommendation that you reverse your decision to move ahead on Title I assistance to India.

B6

NEA and EB have prepared an action memorandum on this same subject for you, providing options of (a) agreeing with Saxbe, (b) proceeding as planned, and (c) making a partial cut in the Indian program. NEA and EB recommend, as does Lande in his dissent message, that we proceed as planned. Lande's argumentation parallels that of NEA and EB, taking issue with Saxbe on political, as well as technical economic grounds.

I agree that a PL 480 Title I cut-off is not a good idea at this time, for the reasons stated in the memorandum and Lande cable. The strategy that you approved in January should be followed for a while longer at least. I would also like to express my opposition to the third option that NEA and EB set forth (but do not recommend). A partial cutback would give us the worst of both worlds. It would not meet Saxbe's political concern but would create almost as many problems here and in India as would a complete cut-off. I see this as a non-option.

Attachment:

Dissent Channel message from Peter Lande.

Drafted: S/P:TPThornton:vb
x21744:2/26/76~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~
DISSENT CHANNEL

RELEASE IN PART
B6

MEMORANDUM

secret

5429

TO : AF/C -
FROM : S/P - Winston Lord
SUBJECT: Your Dissent Message of September 15 Regarding
the Sale of a DC-8 to Gabon

*From
Keith
Huffman*

B6

The purpose of this memorandum is to report to you what actions were taken by S/P in response to your dissent message of September 15.

With Respect to the Secretary

- On September 16 Mr. Swiers notified Mr. Gompert of the Secretary's staff that S/P had received your draft dissent message and requested that if, as you ~~had indicated~~ ^{expected}, AF recommended approval of the issuance of an export license for the sale of a DC-8 to Gabon, he bring your draft dissent message to the Secretary's attention before the Secretary acted on the recommendation.

- On September 19, after receiving AF's Action Memo of September 16, Under Secretary Sisco's office attached and forwarded to the Secretary Mr. Djerejian's copy of your dissent message. We understand that the Secretary read your dissent message before making his decision.

- Although the Secretary had already acted on AF's memo before we received the final version of your

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2

dissent message, we nonetheless forwarded it to the Secretary's office. This final version was returned to us on October 16 with the noted that "The Secretary has seen the attached dissent memo."

With Respect to Officials in the Export Import Bank and the Department of Commerce.

- In response to your request of September 24 to Mr. Lord that the Department make your dissent message available to officials in the Export Import Bank and the Department of Commerce, S/P, in consultation with AF and L, decided that the Department should apprise the two agencies of your dissent message and invite them to send officers to the Department to review it along with all other relevant documents. We decided that these documents should not be sent to the agencies since they constituted internal working papers of the Department.

*I think this
decis in post-
dated my
meeting with
Lentz which
I arranged in
my own, in
accordance with
Morris' commitments
to co-operate as
closely as possible
with Ex-IM. I met
with Lentz on
Friday + don't think
I was able to
call Licht until the
following week.*

- On September 27, at the invitation of Mr. Keith Huffman of the Legal Adviser's Office, Mr. John Lentz of the Export Import Bank came to the Department to review Mr. Huffman's file on this matter. Among the documents reviewed by Mr. Lentz was your dissent memorandum of September 24 and the attachments to it.

- On October 2 Mr. Huffman called Mr. Morris Licht of the Department of Commerce to inform him that while the Secretary had decided to approve an export license for sale of the aircraft, there had been, strong objections to this action; that ^{some} arguments against granting ~~reasons for disapproval~~

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of a license were recorded in a dissent message; and that he or any other Department of Commerce official would be welcome to come to the Department to review this dissent message. Noting that he was aware that the Department was not "all of one mind" regarding this sale, Mr. Licht said that a dissent memorandum would only be of historical interest since the Department of Commerce would be guided by the Secretary of State's decision. Mr. Licht asked, however, if Mr. Huffman could forward to him a copy of the dissent message for his records with any restrictions the Department of State might wish to place on its distribution. Mr. Huffman said that he thought this might be possible. Before Mr. Huffman could pursue the matter, however, Mr. Licht called back withdrawing his request for a copy of the message.

S/P believes that the actions which were taken by S/P and in AF and L fully meet your request that the Secretary and officials in the Export Import Bank and the Department of Commerce be promptly apprised of your dissent message so that they would be aware of the reasons why, in your opinion, they should not approve the issuance of an export license for the sale of the aircraft insofar as the Department of State is concerned. We are persuaded that the Secretary, Assistant Secretary Easum and officials in AF and L gave careful and thoughtful consideration throughout this case to the reservations

SECRET

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raised by you and others in the Department. Quite

4

clearly, the Secretary agreed with Assistant Secretary
and L
Easum that on the basis of the evidence and information
available to the Department the ^{issue of the legality of the sale turned upon} ~~decision whether or~~
a ^{political judgment as to the likelihood of} ~~misuse of the aircraft.~~
~~not to approve the sale of the aircraft was a matter~~
~~of judgment, not a legal issue.~~ S/P shares this view.

We wish to commend you for taking the initiative
to bring your views to the attention of the Secretary.
If you think further action should be taken on your
dissent message please let us know.

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN FULL

SECRET

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PAGE 01
ACTION 0P:02

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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2384

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 DAMASCUS 1482

DISSENT CHANNEL

6. SYRO-ISRAELI CONVERGENCE IN LEBANON CONTAINED POTENTIAL FOR SPILLING OVER INTO OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AN OVERALL REGIONAL SETTLEMENT. FIRST, IT GENERATED MOMENTUM AND PROMISED TO SOFTEN THE HARSH EDGE OF GENERALLY HOSTILE MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS. SECOND, IT RAISED PROSPECT THAT IN FUTURE STAGES OF NEGOTIATIONS WHEN PALESTINEAN ISSUE WOULD BE DELIBERATED, ISRAELIS COULD AGAIN FIND CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THEIR INTERESTS AND INTERESTS OF SAAG IN WORKING OUT ACCEPTABLE MANNER FOR PARTIES TO DEAL WITH PALESTINEAN PROBLEM AND IN PREVENTING EMERGENCE OF RADICAL PALESTINEAN STATE ON WEST BANK. THEIR SEARCH FOR A GEOGRAPHICAL ACCOMMODATION OF INTERESTS, PERHAPS SIGNIFICANTLY, SEEMED TO ADD NEW DIMENSION TO CURRENT FORMULATIONS OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF PEACE, WHEREBY ISRAELIS SEEKING RELATIVELY SELF-ENFORCING ACCORD THROUGH OPEN ACCESS TO NEIGHBORING SOCIETIES WHILE SYRIANS FOR THEIR PART DISPLAY VERBAL PREFERENCE FOR MORE STATIC ARRANGEMENT COMPRISING SIGNING OF TREATY ENDING STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, AGREEMENT ON DEMILITARIZATION AND STATIONING OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES BUT PERHAPS LITTLE ELSE. CONVERGENCE SUGGESTED THAT BOTH PARTIES HAD DISCOVERED SOME COMMON GROUND TO CONTAIN PERHAPS INHERENT VOLATILITY OF THIS REGION. TO SOME EXTENT, THEY WERE EVOLVING TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP

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PAGE 22 DAMASC 01482 02 OF 02 051150Z



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY HAD THEY BEEN AT PEACE, FOR EVEN A PEACE BASED UPON THE ISRAELI MODEL WOULD NOT HAVE GUARANTEED A COOPERATIVE RESPONSE TO INTERJAPAS CONFLICT IN THE LEVANT AND ELSEWHERE IN THE ABSENCE OF PEACE HINDERED CONVERGENCE TO EXTENT THAT COOPERATION IN LEBANON OF NECESSITY WAS IMPLICIT AND EXHIBITED RELIANCE UPON INTERMEDIARIES FOR EXCHANGING COMMUNICATIONS.

7. CURRENT SIGNS OF DIVERGENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON THREATEN TO DISRUPT PROGRESS ALREADY ACHIEVED AND COULD LEAD TO REGIONAL CONFLICT. WHAT IS DISTURBING, HOWEVER, IS THAT INITIAL SUCCESS OF ISRAELIS AND SOME ARABS TO COME SO VERY CLOSE TO WORKING OUT THEIR OWN REGIONAL PROBLEMS WITHOUT RESORTING TO BY NOW FAMILIAR FALLBACK TACTIC INTERPOSING SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF UN FORCES BETWEEN DISPUTANTS MAY BE PERMITTED TO DISSIPATE, LEAVING SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO SEEK FURTHER AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST WITH ISRAEL AND U.S. TO POSSIBLY WANE AS WELL.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

8. WILLINGNESS OF THE DEPARTMENT TO MAINTAIN OPEN MIND ABOUT INSERTION OF UN TROOPS INTO SOUTH LEBANON IS EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE WILL TO TAKE SOME RISKS TO RESOLVE SOUTH LEBANON ISSUE, BUT AS NOTED ABOVE PARA, I HAVE DOUBTS THIS IS MOST PROPER INVESTMENT OF OUR POLITICAL CAPITAL. I SUGGEST AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY THAT WILL HELP TO END DISORDER IN SOUTH AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ENHANCE SYRIA'S DESIRE TO ASSUME ACTIVE ROLE IN OVERCOMING NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES TO REACH COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WITHOUT SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO OVERALL SETTLEMENT. I PROPOSE THAT WE INVEST NECESSARY POLITICAL CAPITAL TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO TOLERATE LIMITED INSERTION OF SYRIAN ADP FORCES INTO SOUTH LEBANON TO RESTORE CENTRAL GOVT AUTHORITY TO THAT REGION/ AND TO OBTAIN SYRIAN CON-

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PAGE 03

DAMASC 01402 02 OF 02 061180Z

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

SENT TO CEASE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS AND PROVIDE TIMELY, DETAILED INFORMATION ON THEIR FORCES AND MISSIONS IN THE SOUTH. THIS WOULD NECESSITATE U.S. TAKING DIPLOMATIC LEAD TO FASHION ARRANGEMENTS SUITABLE TO BOTH SIDES TO BRIDGE GAP THAT HAS OPENED, BUT IT SEEMS WE COULD BUILD UPON COMMON GROUND THAT ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS MANAGED TO UNCOVER OVER PAST YEAR AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MODIFICATIONS IN PERCEPTIONS BETWEEN THESE TWO PARTIES. I DO NOT MINIMIZE THE DIFFICULTIES IN CONVINCING BOTH PARTIES TO FOLLOW THIS COURSE AFTER OUR UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT IN FEBRUARY. IT RISKS ANTAGONIZING THE ISRAELIS WHEN WE SEEKING THEIR COOPERATION TO RESUME SENSITIVE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD OVERALL SETTLEMENT. BUT THIS ANTAGONISM MAY BE SHORT-LIVED IF SYRIANS SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCT THEIR MISSION AND KEEP TO THE TERMS OF WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS ARE CONCLUDED. BASED UPON OUR EXPERIENCES OVER THE LAST YEAR, WE HAVE REASONABLE GROUNDS TO DEPEND ON SYRIAN PERFORMANCE. AND SINCE SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON HAS BEEN A MAJOR DETERMINANT OF ITS WILLINGNESS TO PLAY POSITIVE ROLE IN REACHING SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, POLITICAL CAPITAL INVESTED IN THIS STRATEGY WOULD STAND A REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF ADDING TO RATHER THAN DEPLETING OUR FUTURE NEGOTIATING ASSETS.

MURPHY

SECRET

~~DISSENT CHANNEL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

RELEASE IN PART
B6

S/S

February 24, 1976

~~SECRET~~
DISSENT CHANNEL

TO: The Secretary

FROM: S/P - Winston Lord

W ← Direct

Pakistan: A-7s and Nuclear Reprocessing

Attached is a Dissent Channel memorandum from [redacted] of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs which I am forwarding to you in line with the policy of bringing dissent messages to your attention. Since this paper covers matters that are likely to come up in your conversations with Bhutto on Thursday, you may wish to read the memorandum before then. NEA's briefing memorandum for the Bhutto meeting explores these issues in detail.

B6

[redacted] regrets the decision to permit a Pakistani Air Force team to inspect US aircraft production facilities, believing that this will generate strong pressures to sell offensive aircraft to Pakistan which is not in the US interests. He is particularly concerned over the "dangerous precedent" that is apparently being set by justifying foreign military sales on domestic US economic grounds.

B6

[redacted] urges that we make a determination not to sell offensive weapons such as the A-7 to Pakistan, irrespective of the PAF visit.

B6

Failing that, [redacted] urges that we extract a specific quid pro quo from the Pakistanis; viz., that if we sell them offensive aircraft, they must forego the acquisition of the nuclear reprocessing plant that they now intend to buy from France.

B6

Attachment:

Dissent Channel memorandum from [redacted]

B6

Drafted: S/P:TPThornton:vb Cleared: S/P-OFP: PJJ/lydon (draft)
x21744 2/24/76

~~SECRET~~
DISSENT CHANNEL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN FULL

~~SECRET~~

2/10/76

MEMORANDUM

TO : S/P - Mr. Winston Lord

FROM : PM - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL

The Secretary recently agreed to permit a Pakistani Air Force team to come to the United States to visit an LTV plant which manufactures A-7 aircraft. This sudden decision reverses a policy of many months, during which the Department has steadfastly rejected approaches both from the Pakistanis and the manufacturer requesting permission for such a visit. Our refusals stemmed from the clear policy enounced early last year which stipulated that we would be prepared to consider arms sales to Pakistan, but only for defensive weapons. The A-7 does not fit that definition.

I regret this reversal of policy. Although the Secretary has only agreed to a plant visit, it will not be perceived by many quarters as a very limited action. It will have the immediate consequence of forcing us to permit visits by Pakistani teams to other aircraft manufacturers (Northrop, Fairchild and Douglas) who manufacture comparable weapon systems. It will be perceived by the Pakistan Government, the Congress, the Indian Government and the manufacturers as the first step leading to an eventual decision to sell one or more of the various aircraft types.

Based on a cost-benefit analysis, the balance sheet would weigh heavily against the decision. The potential costs might be:

a) Continued pressure by the Pakistan Government and their supporters for approval of the sale of the aircraft.

b) Potential excuse for the Indians to further improve and modernize their forces with Russian equipment. It is the

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military judgment that the Pakistanis cannot achieve parity with the Indians and that further arms acquisition, particularly of an offensive nature, can only lead to increased tensions and not the stability that we hope to achieve.

c) Further restrictive legislation by Congress in order to prevent situations of this kind from recurring. The legislation under Congressional consideration now is already restrictive and burdensome. We should not invite further encroachments into Executive Branch legitimate spheres of action.

d) Pressure from manufacturers, particularly LTV, and their supporters for approval of aircraft sale.

On the benefit side, we might say that:

a) this action permits the US to maintain a positive relationship with GOP, although when one views the panoply of weapons that we are prepared to provide the Pakistani, it would appear that the plant visit cannot be central to maintaining good relationships.

b) The decision may gain support for other Administration initiatives from a small number of Senators who would view the visit sympathetically.

c) If the visit subsequently results in the sale of A-7, LTV will be able to keep its production line in operation and thereby save 15,000 jobs. It has been LTV's contention that the sale to Pakistan is essential if its plant is to remain in operation after this year.

It is this latter benefit which is of particular concern. It may be the only justification that has any basis in fact. It would however be the first instance in my memory at least in which a sale would be justified primarily on domestic economic grounds. If the Administration ever finds itself justifying sales of defense articles and services essentially on domestic economic grounds, then I think we can expect a major Congressional effort to fully eliminate any flexibility that might be available to the Executive Branch. In addition, even without the Congressional aspects, it would be poor foreign policy if arms transfers are to be dictated by domestic economic requirements.

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-3-

It seems to me that we must now face the prospect of two further decisions:

a) Preferably, we should conclude that the plant visit is the end of this process and that no sale of offensive weapon systems will be considered.

b) Failing to maintain that position, because of either domestic or Pakistani pressures, we must consider whether we can make a virtue out of necessity. The Pakistanis are interested in a reprocessing plant. We have raised serious objections to this scheme. If we must, we should trade authorization for the sale of an offensive aircraft (A-7 or A-10 or A-4) for assurances from GOP that it will not pursue the acquisition of a reprocessing plant. I am loathe to suggest trading one bad policy for another, but it may be that this is the price we will have to pay. Such a trade can at least be rationalized and might be acceptable to other interested parties such as Congress and India. If we are to consider this trade-off, then there is some urgency since IAEA will be reviewing the reprocessing plant sale proposal in the near future.

PM: :bpw
2/10/76 x23302

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RELEASE IN PART
B6

Nov. 11, 1976

To: Winston Lord, S/P [redacted]
From: [redacted], IO/LAB

B6

Subject: Dissent from the Dept's Policy on Flexitime

I dissent from the Dept's policy of not implementing flexitime. Other government agencies, including USIA (see attachments) have implemented it and employees are benefiting from the increased freedom to choose their working hours. The State Department, on the other hand, has not done anything to implement the authority given it by the Federal Government to establish flexible working hours. There are many bureaus where this would not only enhance working conditions for employees but also increase the efficiency of the operation. In IO, for example, during overseas conferences (where time differences make it likely that cables or phone calls will arrive outside our normal hours) or during the UNGA when early morning consultation is necessary before a session starts, it would be beneficial to have officers and/or staff on hand ^(early or late) on a regular or irregular basis. At present, this is done by asking people to work overtime or take comp time off at some later date. Flexitime would enable employees and supervisors to work out agreements that certain people would be on hand at 7:30 a.m. and leave for the day early in the afternoon, while others could work the "late shift". Similar arrangements could be made when transportation times or other factors make arrival and departure at other than established hours desirable.

The Dept's failure to implement flexitime denies employees

rights granted them by the Federal Government and which employees in other agencies enjoy. I suspect that the Dept's failure is partly caused by a lack of interest in enhancing working conditions for employees and partly by a subconscious feeling that there is something unique about the work of the State Dept which makes flexitime impossible to handle. From my own experience I can state there is nothing so mysterious or special about our work that we cannot work out flexible hours to the mutual satisfaction and benefit of both employees and supervisors.

You may wish to obtain from the Office of Financial Services a copy of the instruction which has been prepared for that office in using flexitime.

RELEASE IN PART B6

ACTION COPY

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BOHN 06573 01 OF 02 311453Z
ACTION SP-02

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BOHN 06573 01 OF 02 311453Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-08 ES-01 /800 V
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R 311445Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BOHN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BOHN 06573

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12065: GDS 03-31-87 (WOESSNER, WILLIAM M.) OR-M
SUBJECT: U.S. DISINFORMATION POLICY ON SOUTH LEBANON

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THIS IS A DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF 11 FAM 243.3 WRITTEN BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION, IN ADDITION TO AUTOMATIC DISTRIBUTION OF DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES AS PROVIDED BY 5 FAM 212.3C IS AS FOLLOWS: PA (FOR DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN), NEA, NEA/ARN, NEA/IAI, NEA/EGY, NEA/ARP, IQ/UDP, INR, INR/RNA, EMBASSIES AT TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND CAIRO, AND USUN.

3. USG INFORMATION POLICY ON SOUTH LEBANON, AS REFLECTED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESS BRIEFING OF MARCH 16, IS DESTRUCTIVE OF WHATEVER CREDIBILITY WE MAY YET HAVE ON MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS. THE PRESS SPOKESMAN'S RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING ISRAELI SUPPORT OF REBELS IN SOUTH LEBANON LED BY MAJOR HADDAD DEFY ACCEPTANCE BY ANYONE WITH EVEN THE SLIGHTEST KNOWLEDGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

4. SINCE AT LEAST 1977, THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN SUPPLYING, TRAINING AND ASSISTING THE SOUTH LEBANESE REBELS. SINCE THE ISRAELI INVASION OF SOUTH LEBANON IN MARCH 1978, THE ISRAELIS HAVE ALMOST FULLY CONTROLLED THEM. THE REBELS TODAY ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE ISRAELIS FOR WEAPONS, SUPPLIES, AMMUNITION, TRAINING, INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD. HADDAD HIMSELF IS FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIED BY ONE OR TWO ISRAELI "ADVISERS". HIS TROOPS ARE TRAINED IN NORTHERN ISRAEL. THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN MASSIVELY DOCUMENTED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS, AND IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE IN LEBANON AND IN ISRAEL.

5. THE DEPARTMENT'S DETERMINATION TO AVOID MENTIONING ISRAEL IN CONNECTION WITH MAJOR HADDAD'S MAD ESCAPADES IS ROOTED IN A HOARY AND FATUOUS POSITION OF MANY YEARS, TO WIT THE USG MUST IGNORE ISRAEL'S STIRRING THE POT IN LEBANON FOR THE SAKE OF THE "PEACE PROCESS". THE THEORY HAS BEEN - AND PERHAPS STILL IS - THAT THE PEACE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT THE UNITED STATES PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH MASSIVE ARMAMENTS, TO ASSURE ISRAEL OF OUR CONTINUED DEVOTION AND TO GIVE IT SUFFICIENT "CONFIDENCE" TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. IT APPARENTLY HAS MATTERED LITTLE THAT THE WEAPONS (OR OTHER WEAPONS, WHICH THEY REPLACE) ARE USED TO DELIBERATELY WREAK HAVOC IN LEBANON, DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO PROFESSED U.S. POLICY TOWARDS LEBANON.

6. OUR SILENCE ON HADDAD'S TRUE ROLE IS CONSISTENT WITH U.S. PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICIES ON OTHER QUESTIONS - ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN FIGHTING, AND DIRECT USE OF US-SUPPLIED WEAPONS IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE TERMS OF US-ISRAELI AGREEMENTS. WITHIN RECENT WEEKS, WE

HAVE REPEATED OUR "CONDEMNATION" OF PALESTINIAN "TERRORISM", WHEN PALESTINIANS KILL OR ATTEMPT TO KILL ISRAELIS; WHILE AT THE SAME TIME WE "DEPLORE THE VIOLENCE ON BOTH SIDES", WHEN ISRAELIS KILL PALESTINIANS (AND LEBANESE). ON POSSIBLE ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S. - WHICH COULD, UNDER THE LAW, LEAD TO A CUTOFF OF FURTHER ARMS DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL - WE HAVE SYSTEMATICALLY EVADED CLEAR ANSWERS TO CLEAR QUESTIONS OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS. WE ARE STEADFAST IN OUR HYPOCRISY.

7. THIS BANKRUPT UNITED STATES POLICY DEPENDS OBJECTIVELY ON THE PROPOSITION THAT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS BEST ACHIEVED INTER ALIA BY INSTRUMENTALLY FACILITATING AGGRESSION. WE MAY SUCCEED IN DECEIVING OURSELVES, BUT THE ARABS AND PALESTINIANS - WITHOUT WHOM PEACE IS IMPOSSIBLE - WILL NOT BE DECEIVED.

8. AT A TIME WHEN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS SYSTEMATICALLY SABOTAGING EVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A FUTURE "AUTONOMY" SOLUTION ON THE WEST BANK, A U.S. INFORMATION POLICY OF "HEAR NO EVIL SEE NO EVIL" TOWARDS ISRAELI INTERFERENCE IN LEBANON DEFIES EVEN TACTICAL RATIONALIZATION.

9. NOW IS AN EXCELLENT TIME TO BEGIN TO TELL THE TRUTH AS WE KNOW IT ON SOUTH LEBANON - ON HADDAD AND ON ISRAEL'S ROLE IN PROPPING HIM UP AND USING HIM. LET THE CHIPS FALL WHERE THEY MAY. THIS WOULD SERVE AN AUTHENTIC LONG-RANGE PEACE PROCESS; IT WOULD LEAD SOME SORELY NEEDED CREDIBILITY TO

B6

MR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM
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PAGE 01
~~ACTION SP-02~~

BONN 06573 02 OF 02 311451Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 ES-01 /004 W

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R 311445Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5983

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 06573

DISSENT CHANNEL

OUR PROFESSED SUPPORT OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OF LEBANON; AND IT WOULD BE HONEST. WOESSNER

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

FILE COPY

RELEASE IN PART
B6

February 15, 1978

OFFICIAL/INFORMAL
SECRET

*file
Dissent*

[Redacted]

Economic/Commercial Section
American Embassy
Jidda

Dear [Redacted]

Thank you for your patience in awaiting the outcome of the Administration's review of its terrorism policy, which was completed last month. In participating in this study over the past year, we found your dissent message helpful and a number of the points you raised were considered during the Administration's review. For the most part, the principles we've been operating under were reaffirmed by the Special Coordinating Committee.

On the question of ransom, Secretary Vance stated January 23, 1978 in his Congressional testimony on terrorism that: "we have made clear to all that we will reject terrorist blackmail; we have clearly and repeatedly stated our intention to reject demands for ransom or for the release of prisoners."

The question of US military capability to stage rescue operations was reviewed by the Special Coordinating Committee of the National Security Council and concerned agency heads are taking the appropriate steps to reassure themselves of this capability.

On the question of "retribution" against terrorists, we do believe that prosecution is an indispensable element in anti-terrorist efforts, but should naturally be carried out through established judicial channels.

SECRET
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SECRET

-2-

The United States is presently working to form a group of concerned governments which will seek out and urge more countries to ratify existing anti-hijacking conventions which provide for the punishment or extradition of hijackers. These conventions extend prosecutorial jurisdiction to countries in which a plane has been hijacked or in which a hijacked plane has ended its flight. As in the past, we will continue to press involved governments to fulfill their obligations to bring terrorists to justice.

I am enclosing a copy of the Secretary's recent testimony on terrorism. He has taken a strong interest in developing an effective policy to deal with terrorism.

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss your ideas with you. Thank you for using the Dissent Channel.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Director
Policy Planning Staff

Enclosure:

Copy of the Secretary's Testimony on Terrorism

SECRET

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PAGE 01 STATE 269660
ORIGIN EUR-12
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SY-25 MCT-01 AF-10 ARA-10
EA-10 NEA-10 A-01 PER-01 OPR-02 OC-06 CCO-00
SCS-03 EB-08 CA-01 IO-13 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-20
DODE-00 USSS-20 SSO-00 NSCF-00 USIE-00 INRE-20
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DRAFTED BY EUR/CE:WMWOESSKER:EM
APPROVED BY D - MR. CHRISTOPHER
EUR:JEGOODBY
A/SY:VDIKEOS
M/CT:JKARKASHIAN
EUR/P:WJGEERON
M/BREAD

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
~~SECRET~~ STATE 269660

INFORM CONSULS
E.O. 11652: 3DS
TAGS: ASEC, PINS
SUBJECT: PLANNED ATTACKS ON LUFTHANSA
REF: STATE 266580

1. THE FRG GOVERNMENT TODAY ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATE-
MENT: BEGIN TEXT: "QUITE RECENTLY THREATS TO ATTACK
GERMAN PASSENGER AIRCRAFT HAVE BECOME KNOWN. INDEPENDENTLY
OF THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TAKES
THESE THREATS SERIOUSLY, AS IT HAS ALL REPORTS OF DANGER

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 02 STATE 269660
OF RECENT DAYS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN
COMPREHENSIVE, EFFECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES IN ORDER TO PRE-
VENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST GERMAN AIRCRAFT. IN THIS
REGARD IT HAS NOT RESTRICTED ITSELF TO MEASURES WITHIN ITS
BORDERS. ALONG WITH THE PRECAUTIONS THAT EVERYONE CAN
RECOGNIZE, ENERGETIC ADDITIONAL MEASURES WERE EFFECTED.

UNDERSTANDING FOR THESE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IS
ASKED OF CITIZENS, AND ESPECIALLY OF FLIGHT PASSENGERS,
WHOSE SECURITY THESE MEASURES ARE PRIMARILY INTENDED TO
SERVE. END TEXT

2. POSTS SHOULD TAKE NOTE OF THIS STATEMENT AND BE
GUIDED BY IT IN CONSIDERING DISCRETIONARY TRAVEL BY
LUFTHANSA. HABIB

~~SECRET~~

RELEASE IN PART B6

SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

S/P:RFEINBERG:RYM
4/4/79 1X20B22
S/P:ALAKE

S/P:GFOX
S/IL:DG00DE

ARA:VPVAKY
P:FVARGAS

CLEARANCES

CLEARANCES

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE SANTIAGO

DISSENT CHANNEL [REDACTED] FROM S/P ANTHONY LAKE

E.O. 12065:GDS 4/4/85 (LAKE, ANTHONY)

TAGS: ELAB, CI

SUBJECT: ROLE OF THE AFL-CIO IN CHILEAN LABOR AFFAIRS

REF: SANTIAGO 1389

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT). FIRST, I WOULD LIKE AGAIN TO COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR EXPRESS WISHES AND STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION PROCEDURES, YOUR MESSAGE WAS CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS TO S/IL.

2. THROUGHOUT THE RECENT AFL-CIO INVOLVEMENT IN CHILEAN LABOR POLITICS THE USG HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE AFL-CIO IS A PRIVATE, INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATION, AND THAT THE USG WOULD NOT SEEK TO INTERFERE, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, IN ITS POLICIES TOWARD CHILE. WE HAVE ADHERED TO THIS STANCE EVEN IN THE FACE OF THE THREATENED BOYCOTT OF CHILEAN TRADE, DESPITE THE POTENTIAL ADVERSE FALLOUT SUCH A BOYCOTT MIGHT HAVE ON THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR MORE GENERAL POSTURE OF OPPOSITION TO ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS.

CLASSIFICATION

B6

ALD
RF RF
GF GF
VPVRF
DG RFB
FVAV

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

OPTIONAL FORM 185-A (OCR) 10 75
Formerly DS-322-A (OCR)
Dept. of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

3. WE DO, OF COURSE, CONFER REGULARLY WITH THE AFL-CIO ON ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN. IN THIS SPIRIT, THE DEPARTMENT CAN OFFER OUR ANALYSES OF HOW PARTICULAR ACTIONS THE AFL-CIO IS CONSIDERING MIGHT BE PERCEIVED IN A PARTICULAR COUNTRY OR SETTING. IN THIS VEIN, THE EMBASSY SUGGESTED THAT THE AFL-CIO OUGHT TO MAINTAIN ITS INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN CHILE AND ITS SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC LABOR LEADERS, BUT SHOULD AVOID BECOMING ENMESHED IN THE DEBATE OVER PARTICULAR ISSUES (REFTEL).

4. WE PERCEIVE A NUMBER OF PITFALLS, SOME OF WHICH THE EMBASSY MENTIONED IN REFTEL, TO AFL-CIO INVOLVEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE DETAILS OF CHILEAN LABOR LAW:

-- TO THE EXTENT THAT THE AFL-CIO IS PERCEIVED AS GIVING ITS BUENA VISTA (UNDERLINE) TO SPECIFIC GOC REFORMS, IT WILL BE OPEN TO THE ACCUSATION OF HAVING ACCOMMODATED ITSELF TO THE DICTATORSHIP.

-- IF CHILEAN LABOR BECOMES EXCESSIVELY DEPENDENT UPON AFL-CIO SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE, IT MAY FAIL TO DEVELOP ITS OWN INTERNAL STRENGTH AND JUDGMENT.

-- THE INTERNAL POLITICS WITHIN THE CHILEAN LABOR MOVEMENT ARE COMPLEX, AND DIFFERENT GROUPS WILL ATTEMPT TO USE THE AFL-CIO FOR THEIR OWN INTERESTS IN WAYS THAT THE AFL-CIO MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL OR FORESEE.

-- WHILE ONE CAN APPRECIATE THE DESIRE OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES TO MUSTER US ACTIVISM CONSISTENT WITH OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POSTURE, WE VERY MUCH WANT TO AVOID EXCESSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN CHILEAN POLITICS.

-- HIGHLY VISIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF US LABOR WITH PARTICULAR CHILEAN LABOR GROUPINGS MAY BE DETRIMENTAL, IN THE LONG RUN, TO THE INTERESTS OF THOSE VERY GROUPINGS WE MOST SYMPATHIZE WITH.

5. THESE OBSERVATIONS WARN AGAINST A HIGHLY VISIBLE AND DAILY INVOLVEMENT BY THE AFL-CIO, BUT CERTAINLY SHOULD NOT BE MISREAD TO SUGGEST A TOTAL DISENGAGEMENT. THE GOC IS CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT AFL-CIO REPRISALS SHOULD THE GOC FAIL TO MEET ITS MINIMAL DEMANDS, THUS PROVIDING CHILEAN LABOR WITH VERY USEFUL LEVERAGE IN ITS STRUGGLE WITH THE GOC. THIS THREAT CAN BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT DAILY, VISIBLE AFL-CIO ACTIVITY IN CHILE.

6. WE STRONGLY CONCUR WITH YOUR IDENTIFICATION OF UNION FREEDOMS AS BEING AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1974 - 257-1172

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Communication Sheet

OPTIONAL FORM 105-A (OCR) (10-75)
Formerly DS-322-A (OCR)
Dept. of State

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2

3. WE DO, OF COURSE, CONFER REGULARLY WITH THE AFL-CIO ON ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN. IN THIS SPIRIT, THE DEPARTMENT CAN OFFER OUR ANALYSES OF HOW PARTICULAR ACTIONS THE AFL-CIO IS CONSIDERING MIGHT BE PERCEIVED IN A PARTICULAR COUNTRY OR SETTING. IN THIS VEIN, THE EMBASSY SUGGESTED THAT THE AFL-CIO OUGHT TO MAINTAIN ITS INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN CHILE AND ITS SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC LABOR LEADERS, BUT SHOULD AVOID BECOMING ENMESHED IN THE DEBATE OVER PARTICULAR ISSUES (REFTEL).

4. WE PERCEIVE A NUMBER OF PITFALLS, SOME OF WHICH THE EMBASSY MENTIONED IN REFTEL, TO AFL-CIO INVOLVEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE DETAILS OF CHILEAN LABOR LAW:

-- TO THE EXTENT THAT THE AFL-CIO IS PERCEIVED AS GIVING ITS BUENA VISTA (UNDERLINE) TO SPECIFIC GOC REFORMS, IT WILL BE OPEN TO THE ACCUSATION OF HAVING ACCOMMODATED ITSELF TO THE DICTATORSHIP.

-- IF CHILEAN LABOR BECOMES EXCESSIVELY DEPENDENT UPON AFL-CIO SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE, IT MAY FAIL TO DEVELOP ITS OWN INTERNAL STRENGTH AND JUDGMENT.

-- THE INTERNAC POLITICS WITHIN THE CHILEAN LABOR MOVEMENT ARE COMPLEX, AND DIFFERENT GROUPS WILL ATTEMPT TO USE THE AFL-CIO FOR THEIR OWN INTERESTS IN WAYS THAT THE AFL-CIO MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL OR FORESEE.

-- WHILE ONE CAN APPRECIATE THE DESIRE OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES TO MUSTER US ACTIVISM CONSISTENT WITH OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POSTURE, WE VERY MUCH WANT TO AVOID EXCESSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN CHILEAN POLITICS.

-- HIGHLY VISIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF US LABOR WITH PARTICULAR CHILEAN LABOR GROUPINGS MAY BE DETRIMENTAL, IN THE LONG RUN, TO THE INTERESTS OF THOSE VERY GROUPINGS WE MOST SYMPATHIZE WITH.

5. THESE OBSERVATIONS WARN AGAINST A HIGHLY VISIBLE AND DAILY INVOLVEMENT BY THE AFL-CIO, BUT CERTAINLY SHOULD NOT BE MISREAD TO SUGGEST A TOTAL DISENGAGEMENT. THE GOC IS CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT AFL-CIO REPRISALS SHOULD THE GOC FAIL TO MEET ITS MINIMAL DEMANDS, THUS PROVIDING CHILEAN LABOR WITH VERY USEFUL LEVERAGE IN ITS STRUGGLE WITH THE GOC. THIS THREAT CAN BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT DAILY, VISIBLE AFL-CIO ACTIVITY IN CHILE.

6. WE STRONGLY CONCUR WITH YOUR IDENTIFICATION OF UNION FREEDOMS AS BEING AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

OPTIONAL FORM 185-A (OCR) 110-75
Formerly DS-322-A (OCR)
Dept. of State

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IN THAT VIEW WE AGREE, IN PRINCIPLE, WITH AFL-CIO ACTIVITIES THAT SEEK THE RAPID RESTORATION OF A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN CHILE. WE DETECT NO DISAGREEMENT REGARDING ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES, AND IF THE DEPARTMENT PERCEIVES PROBLEMS WITH CERTAIN TACTICS, THE AFL-CIO ITSELF WILL ULTIMATELY HAVE TO DECIDE WHICH POLICIES IT PREFERS TO FOLLOW.

7. I HOPE THESE COMMENTS ARE RESPONSIVE TO YOUR CONCERNS. THANK YOU AGAIN FOR SHARING YOUR VIEWS WITH US.44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

50185-201

RELEASE IN PART B6

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM *PK*

PAGE 01 AMMAN 09761 01 OF 03 081407Z
ACTION SP-02

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INFO OCT-01 COPY-01 ADS-00 ES-01 SVC-00 /005 V
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R 081401Z NOV 83
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6771

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 09761

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS : EAD SY JO
SUBJECT : TERMINATION OF AID PROGRAM IN SYRIA

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY:

[redacted] BY THIS MESSAGE EXPRESSES HIS CONCERN THAT PROPOSED AID APPARENTLY IMMINENT U.S. LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE SYRIA PROGRAM WILL, IF ENACTED, REQUIRE THAT AID DISAVOW FIRM COMMITMENTS AND OBLIGATIONS TO THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT (SARG), AND UNDER FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO CONTRACTORS, PREDATING THE ENACTMENT OF SUCH LEGISLATION. SUCH ACTIONS BY AID WILL (1) AND PERHAPS LITIGATION FROM THE SARG AND/OR CONTRACTORS, WITH AID - AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MORE BROADLY - LEFT IN A POSITION OF VULNERABILITY AND EMBARRASSMENT. SARG REACTION COULD, POTENTIALLY, INCLUDE NON-PAYMENT OF PREVIOUSLY DISBURSED AID LOAN BALANCES. FURTHER, UNILATERAL CANCELLATION OF FIRM FINANCIAL UNDERTAKINGS WILL SERVE AS A MOST UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT WITH RESPECT TO AID'S PROGRAMS, AND PERHAPS OTHER USG ACTIVITIES, WORLDWIDE. AN ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION IS THAT, ON A POLITICAL LEVEL, SUCH LEGISLATION CAN ONLY BE SEEN BY THE SARG AS HARSH, INDEED DRACONIAN, ESPECIALLY AS IT WOULD REQUIRE DENIAL TO THE SARG OF ABOUT DOLS 50 MILLION IN ALREADY INCURRED COSTS OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE FOR REIMBURSEMENT BY AID. SUCH ACTION BY THE USG WOULD SEEM OBVIOUSLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN TERMS OF ANY REMAINING POSSIBILITY OF INDUCING SARG COOPERATION TOWARD A LEBANON PEACE SETTLEMENT; AND ALSO IN TERMS OF ULTIMATE ESTABLISHMENT OF BETTER USG/SARG RELATIONS. FOR THESE REASONS, [redacted] RESPECTFULLY URGES THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESISTANCE TO SUCH LEGISLATION, PARTICULARLY AS IT WOULD REQUIRE NEGATION OF PRIOR USG COMMITMENTS. END SUMMARY.

3. BACKGROUND: BRIEFLY SKETCHED, LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE SYRIA PROGRAM IS NOW BEFORE THE U.S. CONGRESS. IT TAKES VARIOUS FORMS BUT THE INTENTION AND REQUIREMENTS ARE CLEAR: AID IS TO TERMINATE THE SYRIA PROGRAM AND DEOBLIGATE ALL REMAINING BALANCES. WITH THE MINOR EXCEPTION OF PARTICIPANT TRAINING, NO DISBURSEMENTS WILL BE PERMITTED FOLLOWING PASSAGE OF THE STATUTE. SO FAR AS THE RIA COULD DETERMINE DURING THE COURSE OF A WORKING-LEVEL TDY TO AID/V IN EARLY NOVEMBER, THERE IS NO EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESISTANCE TO SUCH LEGISLATION AND ITS EARLY PASSAGE, IN SOME FORM, IS CONSIDERED FAIRLY CERTAIN. INDEED, THE DRAFT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY STATES THAT THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT OBJECT TO SUCH LEGISLATION. YET CONSIDERABLE LEGAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS ARE PRESENTED BY THIS LEGISLATION, SOME OF WHICH MIGHT NOT HAVE COME TO THE ATTENTION OF SENIOR STATE/AID POLICY MAKERS. WHAT FOLLOWS IS AN OUTLINE OF SUCH PROBLEMS, AS SEEN BY [redacted] ELABORATION AND FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE LEGAL

ISSUES WILL BE AVAILABLE FROM GC/IE, WITH WHOM [redacted] HAS CONSULTED CLOSELY. TO EMPHASIZE, IT IS THE ABSENCE OF ANY APPARENT EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESISTANCE TO THIS LEGISLATION TO WHICH [redacted] RESPECTFULLY "DISSENTS."

4. LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH CONTRACTORS: THE IMMEDIATE LEGAL PROBLEM THIS LEGISLATION WILL POSE FOR AID IS THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION WILL REQUIRE AID TO ACT INCONSISTENTLY WITH ITS PREVIOUSLY ISSUED FINANCIAL UNDERTAKINGS. FIRST OF ALL, THE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT PROJECT AGREEMENTS WITH THE SARG DO NOT PERMIT AID TO TAKE TERMINATION ACTION WHICH WOULD AFFECT PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS TO THIRD PARTIES, I.E., CONTRACTORS. YET THE LEGISLATION WILL REQUIRE AID TO TERMINATE SUCH COMMITMENTS. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE PROBLEM IS THAT AID IS FUNDING - BUT IS NOT A PARTY TO A NUMBER OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN THE SARG AND U.S. FIRMS. AID HAS NO RIGHTS UNDER THOSE CONTRACTS TO ISSUE "STOP WORK" OR TERMINATION ORDERS; SUCH CAN COME ONLY FROM THE SARG. ON THE OTHER HAND, AID AS FINANCIER OF THE CONTRACTS HAS ISSUED LETTERS OF COMMITMENT (L/COMMS) TO THE U.S. CONTRACTORS. THESE, ON THEIR FACE, ARE STATED TO BE "GUARANTIES" OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT, IF THE CONTRACTORS PERFORM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACTS, THEY WILL BE PAID BY AID. ABOUT DOLS 18 MILLION REMAINS UNDISBURSED UNDER THESE L/COMMS. DESPITE THESE L/COMM GUARANTIES, THE LEGISLATION WILL REQUIRE THAT, SOMEHOW, AID NEGOTIATE AND SETTLE DEMOBILIZATION AND TERMINATION COSTS WITH THESE CONTRACTORS. IN ADDITION, ONE U.S. BANK IS HOLDING AN AID LETTER OF COMMITMENT, ON

NOTE BY GC/T: PARA 2 LINE 11 (N) OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

Dissent Channel

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let's get ususal rced 11/10/83 -
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Annals

as responsible for
coordinately response, also
affect distribute as appropriate
Remember J.R.'s interests

Shil
11/10/83

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 AMMAN 09761 02 OF 03 061409Z

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ACTION SP-B2

INFO OCT-01 COPY-01 ADS-80 ES-01 /805 V
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R 081401Z NOV 83
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6772

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 AMMAN 09761

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.D. 12356: N/A
TAGS : EAD SY JO
SUBJECT : TERMINATION OF AID PROGRAM IN SYRIA

THE STRENGTH OF WHICH THE BANK HAS ISSUED AN IRREVOCABLE LETTER OF CREDIT; UNILATERAL TERMINATION BY AID OF SUCH L/C WOULD SEEM LEGALLY IMPOSSIBLE AND COMPLETELY AT ODDS WITH COMMERCIAL BANKING PRACTICE - YET APPARENTLY REQUIRED BY THE LEGISLATION. FINALLY, SOME OF THESE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS HAVE BEEN PLEDGED BY THEIR HOLDERS, THE CONTRACTORS, AS SECURITY FOR LOANS; YET UNDER THE LEGISLATION, THE VALUE OF THE SECURITY, THE INSTRUMENT, WOULD BE DESTROYED OR SIGNIFICANTLY LESSENER. MAJOR ROUNDS OF DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS AND, PROBABLY, LEGAL PROBLEMS - ALL OF WHICH NEED NOT BE SPELLED OUT IN THIS CABLE - ARE IN SIGHT FOR AID.

5. LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH THE SARG: FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO NEGOTIATE TERMINATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF CONTRACTS TO WHICH THE SARG, NOT AID, IS THE OTHER PARTY, AND WHERE AID HAS RESERVED NO SUCH RIGHTS IN THE PROJECT AGREEMENT OR CONTRACTS, WILL BE TO PUT THE USG IN A DIFFICULT AND UNFAVORABLE LEGAL POSITION, SHOULD THE SARG CHALLENGE SUCH ACTION BEFORE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. COMPOUNDING THE USG'S POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES WILL BE A LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENT THAT NO DISBURSEMENT TO THE SARG ITSELF - AS OPPOSED TO TERMINATION DISBURSEMENTS TO CONTRACTORS - TAKE PLACE AFTER THE DATE OF THE LEGISLATION. THIS WILL MEAN THAT AID WILL HAVE TO DECLINE TO REIMBURSE THE SARG CLOSE TO DOLS 50 MILLION IN OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE COSTS, REPRESENTING FUNDS ALREADY SPENT BY THE SARG FROM ITS OWN RESOURCES ON THE STRENGTH OF THE COMMITMENTS BY AID IN THE RELEVANT PROJECT AGREEMENTS THAT AID WOULD MAKE SUCH REIMBURSEMENT. THE SOLE REASON FOR NON-PAYMENT OF THOSE COSTS WOULD BE THAT, PRIOR TO THE SARG'S ARRIVING AT THE POINT OF BILLING AID FOR THEM IN THE DUE COURSE OF BUSINESS, U.S. LEGISLATION INTERVENED. IT DOES NOT SEEM TOO STRONG TO STATE THAT A REFUSAL OF THE USG TO HONOR AN UNQUALIFIED FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO A RECOGNIZED SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT MAY BE HISTORICALLY WITHOUT PRECEDENT. ALSO, IT IS HARDLY IMCONCEIVABLE THAT THE SARG WILL ASSERT THAT SUCH ACTION BY THE USG, BEING OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE LOAN AGREEMENTS AND FRUSTRATING ACHIEVEMENT OF THEIR OBJECTIVES, RELIEVES THE SARG OF ANY OBLIGATION TO REPAY THE PREVIOUSLY DISBURSED BALANCES OF THOSE LOANS, A TOTAL OF ABOUT DOLS 125 MILLION. SUCH AN ASSERTION BY THE SARG, AND/OR CONTINUED SARG DEMANDS FOR PAYMENTS OF THE DOL 50M WILL LIKELY PROVE MAJOR LEGAL IRRITANTS IN FUTURE USG/SARG RELATIONS.

6. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS: OTHERS, OBVIOUSLY, CAN SPEAK ON THIS BETTER THAN [] AND POLITICAL FACTORS ARE NOT THE MAIN THRUST OF THIS DISSENT CABLE. IT WOULD SEEM BASIC, HOWEVER, THAT WHATEVER THE UNDERSTANDABLE ANGER AND RESENTMENT IN THE USG TOWARD THE SYRIANS OVER LEBANON AND OTHERWISE, THEIR ULTIMATE COOPERATION IN THE AREA REMAINS CRITICAL IF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS ARE TO

BE ACCOMPLISHED. FOR THE USG TO TERMINATE THE REMAINING BALANCES IN THE AID PIPELINE AT THIS TIME WOULD SEEM CLEARLY ANTAGONISTIC TO THE SARG AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE POLITICALLY EVEN IF DONE IN THE LIMITED MANNER PERMITTED UNDER THE PROJECT AGREEMENTS, I.E., SO AS TO AFFECT FUTURE COMMITMENTS ONLY. FOR THE USG TO GO BEYOND THIS, AND TO DECLINE TO HONOR PRIOR COMMITMENTS AS OUTLINED ABOVE, WOULD SEEM A CLEAR INVITATION TO INTENSIFIED SARG HOSTILITY, LIKELY TO LAST FOR YEARS.

7. PRECEDENT TO BE SET BY SUCH LEGISLATION: THIS HEADING NEEDS LITTLE ELABORATION BUT SHOULD BE A CAUSE FOR SIGNIFICANT CONCERN IN WASHINGTON. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, IF THEY CANNOT PROPERLY BE VIEWED AS BINDING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR STATED TERMS, BECOME OF GREATLY DIMINISHED VALUE AS DOES THE REPUTATION OF THE NATION DECLINING TO HONOR THEM. ON AN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE LEVEL, THE EFFECT OUTLINED ABOVE OF THE SYRIAN LEGISLATION CAN ONLY CAUSE OTHER GOVERNMENTS, AID FUNDED CONTRACTORS AND THOSE (SUCH AS BANKS) RELYING ON AID FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, TO QUESTION SERIOUSLY THE INTEGRITY OF AID'S UNDERTAKINGS - AN ALMOST UNHEALTHY POSTURE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL DONOR TO BE IN.

8. CONCLUSION: [] RESPECTFULLY URGES A STRONG EXECUTIVE BRANCH EFFORT TO DEFEAT SUCH LEGISLATION. AT A MINIMUM, GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE AND RESPECT THE USG HAS TRADITIONALLY ATTACHED TO HONORING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, AND TO AVOID MAJOR POTENTIAL LEGAL CONFLICTS

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 AMMAN 09761 03 OF 03 081411Z 9048
ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 COPY-01 ADS-00 ES-01 /005 W
-----172246 082015Z /72

R 081401Z NOV 83
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6773

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 AMMAN 09761

DISSIDENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS : EAID SY JO
SUBJECT : TERMINATION OF AID PROGRAM IN SYRIA

WITH THE SARG AND/OR AFFECTED CONTRACTORS, THE LEGISLATION SHOULD BE MODIFIED SO THAT TERMINATION ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN ONLY TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED UNDER THE RELEVANT AGREEMENTS AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS. IN ADDITION, EVEN SUCH MODIFIED LEGISLATION SHOULD BE CAREFULLY RECONSIDERED IN TERMS OF ITS POTENTIAL LIKELY IMPACT ON USG/SARG RELATIONS AND OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA.

9. PLEASE PASS DAMASCUS FOR AMB. PAGANELLI ONLY.

VIETS

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

OPTIONAL FORM 185 (OCR) (10-75)
Formerly DF 322 (OCR)
Dept. of State

RELEASE IN PART
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CLASSIFICATION
SPECIAL CHARGES

S/P:MACASEY
7/28/77 X297BL
APPROVE: S/P:TLAKE

NAME
TEL EXT
NAME

PER/PE - LNOEL
PER/G - CKINGSLEY
S/P - NNBOYER
S/P - RJHARRINGTON

CLEARANCES

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE MELBOURNE

ACTION ADDRESSES

INFO ADDRESSES

DISSENT CHANNEL

INITIALS

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ELAB, AS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: 1976 LABOR
REPORT FOR AUSTRALIA

REF: MELBOURNE 1270

FOR [] FROM LAKE - S/P

- I AM SORRY YOUR REFTEL WAS NOT ANSWERED SOONER BECAUSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR. PER/PE IS THE APPROPRIATE OFFICE TO DEAL WITH REGARDING YOUR OER. WE UNDERSTAND YOU ARE IN TOUCH WITH THEM AND WE HAVE GIVEN THEM A COPY OF REFTEL. WE WILL REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH PER ON THE MATTER.
- WITH RESPECT TO INCLUDING COPIES OF DISSENT MESSAGES IN YOUR PERSONNEL FILE, PER ADVISES THAT ONLY EVALUATIVE MATERIAL CAN BE ACCEPTED.

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CLASSIFICATION

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S/P:JAARZT:BDM
EXT. 29716 6-22-76
S/P:JAARZT

S/P-OFP:PJLYDON {DRAFT}

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE TEGUCIGALPA

DISSENT CHANNEL
FOR ONLY

E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: AIRGRAM A-22 DATED MARCH 29, 1976

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT AIRGRAM ON JUNE 17, 1976. MR. JEFFREY GARTEN OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR AIRGRAM HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE OPEN FORUM PANEL. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

JAA
JAA

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AIR	ARMY	NAVY	OSD
USIA	NSA	CIA	
10			

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

5030A
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Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files. FILE DESIGNATION

PRIORITY UNCLASSIFIED A-10315

HANDLING INDICATOR NO.

TO : All American Diplomatic and Consular Posts

RELEASE IN FULL

OCT 16 11 11 AM '72

FROM : Department of State DATE:

SUBJECT : CONGRESSIONAL TRAVEL

REF :

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

H
E. Burke
20 extra copies

The following instructions supersede the 1966 Handbook for Congressional Travel. Upon receipt of this instruction all copies of the Handbook should be destroyed. All future CODEL messages will refer to this airgram.

I Introduction

The Department of State welcomes visits abroad by Congressional delegations and individual Members of Congress. Such trips enable them to observe major developments in the world and to see at first hand the work of U.S. Officials responsible for carrying out American objectives and programs.

COPY FILED - PSM

Service to traveling Congressional delegations and Members of Congress is a major responsibility of all Missions. Each Mission should extend full courtesy as well as provide information on the country, help in arranging meetings with foreign officials, and any other desired assistance within its capability.

II Pre-Departure

Briefings

The Department makes every effort to provide country briefings for Congressional delegations (CODELS) prior to their departure. In some cases, as appropriate, USIA and/or other agencies may provide briefings in conjunction with the Department or separately.

POST ROUTING

TO:	Action	Info.	Initials
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OCM			
POL			
ECON			
CONS			
ADM			
AIO			
USIS			
FILE			

Action Taken:

(1)

Date:

Initials:

FORM 10-64 DS-323 UNCLASSIFIED For Department Use Only In Out

Drafted by: H:EBurke/ELKrizek:p
Drafting Date: 10/11/72 Phone No.: 21882 Contents and Classification Approved by: H - David M. Abshire

Clearances: IN DRAFT: A/BF:RMurray A:LOWens BF/FS:Mhines OC/P:JSagona AID/OLA:TGilliland USIA/IGC/CL:GMurchie

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Briefings are normally arranged through the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations (H). AID briefings are normally arranged through the AID Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA). USIA briefings are arranged through its Congressional Liaison Office.

Clearances

Clearance with the Department's Office of Congressional Relations (H) is required on every communication sent to the field concerning the schedules or desires of a Congressional delegation. This clearance is required in order to provide control and coordination of Congressional travel even though other offices may have primary responsibility for the actual travel of the CODEL. The Bureau of Administration (A) is responsible for the travel of the Appropriations Committees. Clearance from the appropriate geographic bureau is also required on the initial telegram and subsequent telegrams of a substantive nature.

AID communications regarding Congressional Travel are cleared with the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) as well as with appropriate AID geographic bureaus. Information copies of AID CODEL messages are supplied to H.

USIA will send to the Department's Office of Congressional Relations (H) information copies of any messages relating to a CODEL it may send to its USIS posts, but prior clearance with the Department is required only when indicated by the substance.

III Communications

CODEL will be the caption on all airgrams and telegrams concerning any Congressional trip. STAFFDEL will be used to define a Congressional staff trip. The second word in the caption will be for identification, i.e., CODEL SMITH (designating a single traveler, or, in the event of more than one traveler, the ranking majority member of the group).

The Department notifies posts of impending Congressional travel by telegram giving the purpose of the CODEL, composition of its members, itinerary and hotel requirements, and transmitting specific requests regarding in-country schedule. Upon receipt of the initial CODEL message the Chief of Mission

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3

or his Deputy should appoint a control officer (See Part IV). It is most important that all agencies represented at post be immediately notified of impending Congressional travel and where appropriate assist the Control Officer in arranging the in-country schedule. After the initial telegram the Department will continue to advise the posts by telegram of additional requests, changes in itinerary and other pertinent information. After the CODEL departs Washington it is the responsibility of the Control Officer to communicate directly with onward posts any changes in itinerary or scheduling (sending info copies to the Department).

In cases where the action on a CODEL is joint Embassy/USAID, USIS, etc., all messages should use the CODEL caption and not the Joint Caption such as "Embassy/USAID". If the control officer feels that the message should be passed to another agency his request should be included in the opening sentence in the text of the message.

IV Control Officer

The Control Officer is directly responsible to the Chief of Mission. He is expected to be free to prepare for the CODEL visit and to have the authority to call upon the resources of the post including members of the staff.

The Control Officer should coordinate with the appropriate members of the Mission staff to meet with the CODEL as soon as possible after arrival.

The Control Officer is responsible for the following:

Arrival: The Control Officer and/or other appropriate mission personnel should be on hand to greet the CODEL and facilitate entry and customs formalities.

Transportation: The Control Officer should coordinate and control the official or locally-hired transportation furnished on arrival and throughout the visit. If possible, the Department will inform the post in advance of the CODEL's transportation requirements. However, the post must determine the need of the CODEL upon arrival and be prepared to provide transportation (official or locally-hired) on a daily or hourly basis. When the CODEL is authorized use of local currencies from 19FT510 funds and the post is unable to provide official cars, locally-hired transportation is authorized chargeable to the 19FT510

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4

account. It is extremely important for accounting and reporting purposes that the Control Officer or the person responsible for obtaining locally-hired transportation inform the traveler in advance of the estimated cost of such transportation and obtain from the traveler a signed receipt. When using official transportation, and it is necessary to charge drivers overtime to the 19FT510 account, the traveler should also be informed in advance of the estimated cost and requested to sign a receipt.

Baggage: The Control Officer should insure that arrangements are made for the expeditious clearance through customs and prompt delivery of baggage to the CODEL's room.

Hotels: In requesting hotel accommodations, the term "best available" used in the Department's messages merely designates that the CODEL has not indicated any preference in hotel. The Control Officer should make every effort to obtain comfortable and convenient first class quarters at reasonable costs. It should be remembered that Congressional travelers are traveling in most cases on per diem and unless specifically requested, deluxe accommodations are not a necessity. To avoid delay, the control officer should arrange for pre-registration, if possible, or a simplified registration procedure in order that travelers may go directly to their rooms. The Department will inform the post if a control room is authorized for the CODEL.

Local Currency: Receipt Forms DS-1165, are to be signed by each member for all sums so advanced to him. In the case of a large delegation one individual will be authorized to sign for any additional funds required to pay for transportation and control room costs. Form DS-1165 should be given to travelers for all monies refunded to the Control Officer. (See Part VI for discussion of local currency account - 19FT510).

Miscellaneous Services: Services such as secretarial, interpreting, mail, special messenger, etc., may be requested. The traveler may also request assistance and advice for shopping, commissary and sightseeing. Post should accommodate these requests whenever possible.

Orientation Kit: Depending on the size and capabilities of the post, an orientation kit may be found useful in facilitating the visit of the Congressional traveler. The following is a suggested list of items that may be included in the kit as appropriate:

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5

Summary of administrative arrangements and facilities.

Organization of post, with names and telephone numbers of key officers including all agencies represented at post.

Program, if an in-country schedule has been prearranged.

Map of the city.

Basic data on the country, with separate geographic, historical, cultural, political and economic information.

In AID missions, basic briefing paper on the foreign assistance program.

Copy of USIA country data paper.

Key host government officials including biographies.

Points of historical or other interests.

Currency exchange card.

Shoppers tips.

Sightseeing suggestions.

List of recommended doctors.

List of American consulates and other US Government facilities in the country.

List of names and positions of foreign guests the group will be likely to meet at social functions.

List of US firms having branches in the city.

List of prominent Americans residing in the country.

Information sheet with suggestions on customs, tipping, transportation, language, churches, commissary, etc.

List of hotel assignments.

Short list of useful words and phrases.

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6

Passports: The Control Officer should check each passport to make certain that all visas for the onward itinerary have been obtained. If they have not, he should attempt to obtain them or notify the next post.

Change in Itinerary: The Control Officer should immediately notify the Department if the CODEL changes his itinerary in a way that affects his return to the United States.

Financial Arrangements: The Control Officer should notify the Budget and Fiscal Officer when the initial cable is received as to the financial arrangements and requirements. (See Part VI).

V Program Preparation

Program preparations should include, when appropriate, the participation of all agencies represented at the post and be approved by the Chief of Mission or his Deputy.

The objectives of the CODEL as set forth in the Department's communications are the primary basis for the programs at each post. However, the Department relies on the Control Officer's local knowledge in constructing a program that will benefit both the CODEL and the Department.

The formal program should include an appropriate briefing by the Chief of Mission, his Deputy or the Control Officer before any meetings with foreign government officials and other foreign nationals.

Staff members of the official party should be included in the program arrangements.

Sightseeing, church attendance, shopping, recreation and other personal activities will vary widely. Most of these should be arranged only at the option of the individual traveler. But what is available should be made known and offered. Important points to remember are:

It is important that the traveler's schedule not be over organized. Keep in mind that most individuals prefer a flexible schedule.

When preparing the program remember that, in most instances, travelers prefer to have a half-day free time (unscheduled) and perhaps a meal or two privately. Consider that members of a group may welcome a chance

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7

to occasionally break away from the other members. Scheduling of events for the day of arrival in particular should be kept light.

The Congress annually considers program authorization and appropriation bills for Foreign Assistance, USIA and Peace Corps activities. CODELS generally will be interested in seeing examples of these projects as well as meeting former participants who have traveled or studies in the United States.

When possible, the CODEL message will advise missions whether or not members of the delegation specifically desire press conferences or meetings with other elements of the local community such as local political opposition leaders, business and labor leaders, students and other individuals who may have potential for rapid growth or great public impact.

On occasion Members of Congress may suggest names of individuals they would like included in social functions.

Most Members may wish to meet American residents from their own states or districts particularly during a visit to a military installation.

Congressional visits to the posts afford a unique opportunity for Americans residing abroad to obtain a first hand and current observation of developments in the United States. Congressmen are exceptionally well informed on our domestic situation and in most instances would welcome an opportunity to give a briefing on important issues.

VI EXPENSES: Sources, Regulations, Handling

Use of Congressional Travel Account 19FT510

The Department has no jurisdiction over the expenditures incurred by authorized Congressional delegations.

The Department transmits to the post the Committee's authorization to disburse local currencies from the 19FT510 account to its members. The post is not, repeat not, permitted to disburse local currency to Congressional travelers without the receipt of such authorization from the Department of State. The authorization specifies the authorizing committee and where appropriate authorizes the daily local currency expenditure amount per CODEL member plus funds to cover local transportation costs.

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8

Very often, the traveler will change his itinerary enroute and travel to posts that were not on the distribution of the initial travel message. In such cases, it is necessary to notify the Department so that authorization to disburse funds may immediately be requested from the Committee Chairman.

The statutes governing the use of local currencies from 19FT510 for authorized Congressional travel limit the amounts of foreign currencies available in non-excess currency countries to the equivalent of \$50 per day local currency expenses per individual plus transportation costs. The law does not limit amount available to authorized Congressional travelers in excess currency countries.

Missions providing Congressional funds from 19FT510 should maintain a sufficient cash supply on hand for use by Congressional visitors at the post, and for distribution to subsidiary posts where such visitors may stop. The post must be ready to furnish on short notice any additional funds required by a delegation. Missions should notify the Department immediately if adequate funds are not available.

Amounts of 19FT510 funds in non-excess countries are distributed to each Congressional traveler according to the length of stay measured by \$50 per diem as mentioned above. The limit for subsistence in excess currencies countries is prescribed by the traveler. The disbursing officer at the post will provide Form DS-1165 for receipting of local currencies advanced and returned.

Form DS-1165 is prepared in quadruplicate, the original to be signed by the person receiving the funds, who should be given a duplicate copy. The original is sent to Washington, Financial Services (BF/FS), with the monthly Form FS-488; one is kept by the disbursing officer; and one is kept by the control officer. All Forms DS-1165 must show the appropriate committee which authorized the advances.

The mission should obtain from each individual traveler, or in the case of a group the individual authorized to sign for the group, written authorization for payment of bills such as car hire and telephone calls which may be received after departure of the group.

The detailed accounts of Congressional Travelers are strictly Congressional business.

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9

State Department or Other Government Agency Appropriated Funds

When State Department funds are utilized, regular travel orders are issued and payments for expenses are processed exactly as they are for Departmental or Foreign Service travelers.

When the travel is sponsored by the Department of Defense, portions of the official expenses may be borne directly by the military escort officer.

Travel expenses of Members of Congress or staff of the House Appropriations Committee are funded from appropriations by dollar advances made to members and staff prior to departure upon written authorization from the Committee Chairman. Control Officers should arrange to make currency exchanges promptly at point of arrival and plan to convert unused local currency to U.S. currency at time of departure.

In some instances, arrangements are made by the Committee Chairman with the Department prior to departure for advances from Embassy funds on a reimbursable basis. In such cases posts will be notified in advance by the Department and appropriate symbols and account numbers will be given. Accurate records must be kept for all sums so advanced. Such vouchers are returned to the Department for billing to authorizing committees for repayment. This is an unusual arrangement, and would occur only under extraordinary circumstances.

VII Escort Officer

On occasion, when requested by the Committee Chairman, the Department will provide an escort officer for Congressional trips.

Initial Steps

The escort officer's major responsibility is to assist in the substantive planning of the trip and to coordinate all details with the Department and the field.

The administrative details, itineraries, visas, passports, funding, etc., are handled by H-Congressional Relations. The escort officer will work closely with the Congressional Travel office clearing all communications and coordinating all administrative details.

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10

The escort officer will arrange appropriate geographic bureau briefing for the delegation before departure.

Press releases, prepared speeches and photographs are normally handled by the Congressional staff. However, the escort officer should be prepared to assist with the control officer in distribution of these items after arrival.

During the Trip

The escort officer will prepare and approve telegrams to all onward posts (info copies to the Control Officer and the Department) concerning all itinerary or schedule changes made after the group has left the United States. The Control Officer will at all times work through the escort officer and is responsible for supporting the escort officer in facilitating transmission of such messages and to follow through, if required, after the departure of the CODEL.

Only when authorization is received from the Chairman of the Committee will the escort officer's expenses be paid from the 19FT510 funds. The Department will transmit this authority to the field.

Congressional groups accompanied by military escort officers designated by the Department of Defense should also be assisted. Appropriate consideration should also be given to the crew of the military aircraft.

These delegations are usually handled by the military authorities who will send out communications through their channels. Every effort should be made to obtain from the military Attache timely and pertinent information in order to coordinate appropriate assistance. The Department will attempt to notify the post of Congressional travel handled by DOD.

VIII Miscellaneous

Diplomatic Pouch Facilities

Diplomatic Air Pouch facilities may be used for transmission of correspondence and packages of Members of Congress. Packages destined for Washington, D.C. may be transmitted without postage by diplomatic pouch. All packages forwarded by pouch facilities are to be registered. When pouching packages the Department should be advised in advance by cable of the registry number, pouch invoice number and the date that the package is dispatched. No liquids, incendiary materials,

INFORMATION

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11

explosives, firearms, ammunition, corrosives (such as but not limited to hydrochloric and sulphuric acids), radioactive substances, magnetic materials, fragile items and poisons may be forwarded by diplomatic pouch. Packages received in Washington will be forwarded immediately to the local deputy collector of customs for clearance, and the Congressman's office will be notified.

Packages to addressees outside of Washington must be forwarded through postal channels and have affixed appropriate United States or foreign stamps at the international rate.

Occasionally a traveler may wish to send an item too large for the pouch and therefore must be shipped via commercial means at the traveler's expense. In such instances the traveler should be informed in advance of the shipping cost.

Telegrams

Official telegrams originated by the traveler are sent in the same manner as State Department official traffic. Telegrams to non-governmental agencies or private individuals, which are not of an official nature, are to be sent as "interested party" messages.

ROGERS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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REB186

PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02

BOGOTA 02651 212342Z

RELEASE IN PART
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INFO OCT-01 ES-01 .190-00..7004.W...
-----212344Z 030830 /70
P 212018Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 060

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BOGOTA 2651

STADIS////////////////////

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: PROPOSED OPIC ANDEAN
INVESTMENT MISSION

REF: A) BOGOTA 1630; B) STATE 041319; C) STATE 054722

1. THIS MESSAGE IS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE DISSENT CHANNEL VIEW-
POINT (REF A) OF [REDACTED]
ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS. THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO
RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE.

2. REF A QUESTIONED THE POLICY JUSTIFICATION FOR OPIC
ORGANIZING A LARGE INVESTMENT MISSION TO VISIT COLOMBIA.
REF B ACKNOWLEDGED MY DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. REF C ANNOUNCES
THE ARRIVAL OF TWO OPIC REPRESENTATIVES IN BOGOTA ON MARCH
28 TO MAKE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INVESTMENT MISSION.

3. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO INSURE THAT THE RECIPIENTS
OF REF A ARE AWARE OF OPIC'S PLANS TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THIS
PROJECT AND TO SUGGEST THAT, IF REF A RESULTS IN A DECISION
AGAINST THE ADVISABILITY OF THE MISSION'S VISIT TO COLOMBIA,
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BOGOTA 02651 212342Z

IT WOULD BE EASIER TO IMPLEMENT THIS DECISION PRIOR TO THE
ARRIVAL OF THE ADVANCE TEAM, RATHER THAN AFTERWARDS.
SANCHEZ



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 180622
ORIGIN SP-02

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RELEASE IN FULL

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 /004 R

DRAFTED BY S/P: MACASEY; BDM
APPROVED BY S/P: ALAKE
S/P - A. DEPORTE
S/P: RJHARRINGTON
S/P-OF: NABOYER
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S/P ONLY

-----043286 021551Z /47

R 021240Z AUG 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 180622

DISSENT CHANNEL, FOR DOBRIN FROM LAKE S/P

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, FR, PINT, PGOV

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: USG RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH LEFT

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON USG RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH LEFT. ANTON DEPORTE OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF WILL BE COORDINATING A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISSENT CHANNEL PRACTICES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOU ON YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. CHRISTOPHER

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RELEASE IN PART
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12/14/76
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S/P:MECELY :BDM
EXT. 22562 4-22-77
S/P:PKREISBERG

ARA/PPC - MR. EINAUDI

ARA/CAR - MR. HEAVNER
LA/CAR - MR. WHEELER

S/P-OF - MR. BOYER

State - 091968

S/P ONLY

PRIORITY BRIDGETOWN

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, BB

SUBJECT: INCREASED STAFFING OF AID OFFICE

REF: BRIDGETOWN 2468

FOR [REDACTED] FROM TONY LAKE - S/P

PK
MECE
MR. E.
MR. H.
MR. W.
NAB

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1. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS MESSAGE AND WITH [REDACTED] CONCURRENCE (WHICH IS REQUESTED) PLEASE SEE STATE 091968 REPLYING TO [REDACTED]'S 2452.

2. LIKE THE DECISION AMONG THE PRINCIPAL OPTIONS OPEN TO THE USG IN HANDLING ITS RELATIONS WITH THE MICROSTATES OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN, THE DECISION ON THE LEVEL OF STAFFING THE RDO/C REMAINS OPEN. THE FINAL DECISION WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE POLICY DIRECTION CHOSEN IN CONNECTION WITH VIEWS OF THE NEW AMBASSADOR, AND WILL PROBABLY NOT BE TAKEN UNTIL AFTER THE PARM REVIEW IS COMPLETED.

3. THE PROPOSED INCREASED STAFFING DOES NOT APPEAR OUT OF LINE WITH THE SIZE OF THE PROGRAM, WHICH WAS INITIALLY QUITE SMALL BUT IS NOW INCREASING SUBSTANTIALLY. ONE NEW POSITION RESULTS FROM RELOCATING A REGIONAL CONTROLLER FROM HAITI AND REPRESENTS NO REAL INCREASE IN MANPOWER RESOURCES FOR PROGRAM PURPOSES. THE OTHER TWO NEW AMERICAN

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12

POSITIONS, TO ONE OF WHICH A NOMINATION HAS BEEN MADE, ARE DESIGNED TO MOVE PROJECTS FASTER AND TO DESIGN THEM BETTER, BOTH OF WHICH WILL BE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES IF THE CONTINUATION OF THE REGIONAL APPROACH THROUGH THE CDB IS DECIDED. THE PROJECTED LEVEL OF US FUNDING COMMITMENTS TO THE CDB IS HIGH ENOUGH TO PROVIDE A REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ADDITIONAL POSITIONS IN LIGHT OF AID EXPERIENCE WITH SIMILAR PROGRAMS ELSEWHERE. THE ALTERNATIVE OF USING MORE TDY VISITS HAS BEEN EXPLORED AND DISAPPROVED IN LIGHT OF BOTH THE LEVEL OF PROJECTED ACTIVITY AND THE DIFFICULTIES WITH COMMUNICATIONS INTO AND OUT OF THE AREA.

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPOSED COMPLEMENT INCREASE FOR RDO/C IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL AUSTERITY OF EMBASSY STAFFING IS ANOTHER ISSUE. THE PARM EXERCISE IS DESIGNED TO ADDRESS THIS KIND OF QUESTION AND WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO JUSTIFY BETTER STAFFING FOR THE EMBASSY PROPER. LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON STAFFING FLEXIBILITY WILL, OF COURSE, REMAIN AND THIS IS A SEVERE PROBLEM.

5. YOU ARE COLLECTIVELY COMMENDED FOR USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL. I APOLOGIZE FOR THE DELAY IN RESPONSE. YY

Tab B



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART B6

CONFIDENTIAL

November 13, 1975

To: S/P - Mr. Thornton

From: S/CCT - Robert A. Fearey

Subject: Dissent Message on Terrorism from [redacted]

B6

Pursuant to your memo of October 23 and our subsequent telephone conversation, the following information is provided on the points advanced by [redacted] in her October 20 "Dissent Paper on Department's Policy on Terrorism." The paragraph numbers below correspond with those in her memorandum.

1. As [redacted] states, the Department does not negotiate with terrorists. (By "negotiate" I mean bargain on ransom or other concessions.) She is also correct that the Department gives as its basic reason for this policy its belief that our refusal to negotiate with terrorists deters kidnappings.

With respect to [redacted] dissent arguments against this position, the US policy of not negotiating with or acceding to the demands of terrorists is in no sense a "slogan." It is a carefully considered policy which has proved its soundness over time. We seek to deny successes to terrorists so that the incentive to terrorists to seize Americans abroad, and foreign diplomats in this country, will be minimized. There is considerable evidence (which I can make available to you) that our no-ransom, no-concessions policy is widely known and believed by Palestinian and other terrorists, and that it is in fact helping to deter abductions. There is also convincing evidence that this policy has not been at the expense of the safe recovery of Americans who have been kidnapped, with the possible exception of the Khartoum case.

[redacted] says that the RAND study ("A Proposed Policy for Dealing with Hostage Incidents") showed that "a country's policy on terrorism...is the least significant factor in terrorists' planning, action and reaction", and that "there is no basis for

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alleging that the 'no negotiation' policy actually deters kidnappings." The RAND study is by no means as clear or positive in that view as [redacted] indicates. It states that the relationship between no-ransom, no-concession policies and subsequent terrorist actions is unclear, but it specifically recognizes that such policies do have deterrent value, though not as much, RAND alleges, as the USG has tended to believe.

B6

Re [redacted] allegation that the Department has ignored her earlier letters and memoranda, S/CCT files include a number of memoranda from my predecessors, Ambassadors Meyer and Hoffacker, to [redacted] responding to her criticisms and complaints, particularly in regard to the Khartoum incident and RAND's examination of that incident. I understand that Ambassador Hoffacker also offered to meet with [redacted] to discuss the issues but that she did not respond to the suggestion. [redacted] queries and proposals were not ignored; the file shows they were carefully answered. She has never approached me, in writing or in person, though I would of course have been prepared to see her.

In answer to [redacted] further points under dissent number 1, the RAND study was not commissioned as a result of [redacted] expressed views; it was commissioned because the Department wished the benefit of RAND's examination of and recommendations on USG policies and procedures in hostage cases. Far from the results of the study being thrown away because they do not fit the Department's preconceived notions, the study, of which the conclusions and recommendations section was received only a few weeks ago, is undergoing careful analysis in S/CCT prior to its submission with our views and recommendations to Mr. Eagleburger. A number of RAND's recommendations, put forward during the course of the study's preparation, have already been reflected in our terrorism policies and procedures as set forth in A-775, February 5, 1975, and A-4709, July 10, 1975.

2. [redacted] maintains that the Department punishes Ambassadors who successfully negotiate to save lives.

Saving lives is a major objective in any terrorist incident. But it is also important to pursue that objective by means which will minimize incentives to future terrorism. These two objectives are often in conflict, which is why we have carefully drawn policies and procedures, set forth in A-775 and A-4709, designed to achieve the hostage's safe release while at the same time denying success to the terrorists. There is no basis for [redacted] allegation that "the message is clear: save lives, ruin your own career." Ambassadors who helped to save American

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These really are loose
ends in
Ber Clarke case

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3.

hostages' lives in the Barbara Hutchison case in Santo Domingo, the Col. Morgan case in Beirut, and in other instances have had their contributions explicitly recognized in commendatory messages from the Secretary and other high Department officials.

3. [] alleges that the Department refuses even to finish the RAND hostage study project and related case studies. She charges, in effect, a cover-up by the Department of its handling of terrorist incidents, particularly Khartoum.

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The fact is that S/CCT has done everything possible to expedite completion and delivery of these studies. However, RAND found that a thorough job required more time than it had expected, and they and we have not wished to sacrifice quality for speed. The completed hostage study (though still not assembled in one piece and formally submitted) was received a few weeks ago. The case studies of individual terrorist incidents, such as the one in Khartoum, were not contracted for as a part of the hostage study but were prepared by RAND as working, source materials for the hostage study. S/CCT recently committed \$12,000 to enable RAND to up-grade these working materials to the status of "RAND Reports" (8 or 9 case studies, including the one on Khartoum, bearing RAND's formal approval) or "Working Notes" (4 or 5 case studies, not bearing this formal approval).

The Department has never refused to pay for these case studies, as [] alleges, but rather has pursued their completion and submission as rapidly as work on the basic, hostage study permitted. The Department has cooperated fully, with RAND in providing documents and participant witnesses to assist preparation of the case studies, to RAND's complete satisfaction. The only delays were when a few documents, notably some NODIS Khartoum cables, initially could not be found. As soon as they were found they were provided to RAND. There is no basis for [] allegation of an attempted Department cover-up, on Khartoum or any other incident.

[] charges that RAND's recommendations for changes in our terrorism policies were rejected by the Department and ordered to be rewritten in a form palatable to it, by watering down the conclusions and placing them in a separate annex.

S/CCT did at RAND's request review sections of its report as they were prepared, providing informal written comments and discussing them with RAND officials when they were in Washington.

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These discussions reflected RAND's and S/CCT's belief that the final RAND report would be most useful if its authors had the benefit of our reactions as preparation of the report proceeded. This interchange also permitted us to benefit from some of RAND's recommendations during the two years that the report was in preparation.

One RAND proposal, which [redacted] apparently has in mind, and which has never commended itself to S/CCT, is that the Secretary be asked to approve in advance a ransom option in instances when it appears that payment of a ransom might save an American life. This proposal was extensively discussed by S/CCT with the RAND study authors in the months prior to completion of their study, during which the RAND authors basically maintained their proposal in spite of S/CCT's arguments against it. Some three months ago it was agreed in one of these discussions that, because RAND's concept was that the ransom option should be known only to the Secretary and a few, top Department officials, and because both RAND and S/CCT wished the completed RAND report to be made widely available, RAND should submit its full reasoning underlying this proposal in a confidential letter to S/CCT. S/CCT would then use this letter in presenting the proposal to the Secretary (without S/CCT's support) for his consideration, while discussion of the proposal in the formal, widely available report would be confined to its more general aspects.

mistake
This confidential letter was subsequently received by S/CCT from RAND. By that time, however, the Secretary had publicly stated at Vail and Orlando that the US Government would never negotiate with terrorists, making it crystal clear that he would not entertain a ransom option proposal. RAND accordingly decided that a memorandum from S/CCT to the Secretary embodying the RAND proposal, without S/CCT's backing, would serve no useful purpose at this time. It accordingly withdrew the confidential letter and included its entire reasoning underlying the proposal in the conclusions and recommendations section of the final report. A copy of the confidential letter is nevertheless retained in S/CCT's files, with RAND's knowledge.

[redacted] also alleges that the first three sections of the RAND study, containing essentially background material and analysis, were not made available to officers handling hostage situations.

It is true that these sections were not initially distributed by S/CCT, because it was felt that such distribution should await

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receipt of the conclusions and recommendations section and Seventh Floor decision in disposition of the full report. After receipt of that section had been delayed, S/CCT made the initial sections available last July to a number of interested Department offices and to AFSA. I would have been glad to make them available to the AF/C Office Director had he asked for them or had I felt that they had useful relevance to our Stanford students case, which they did not.

Present S/CCT plans, subject to approval by M and receipt of the necessary copies from RAND, are to make the complete RAND study, including the recently received conclusions and recommendations section, available to all members of the Cabinet Committee/ Working Group to Combat Terrorism, on which 22 USG departments and agencies are represented. The study's title would also be included in the INR "Papers Available" circular, and would thus be available to all interested Department officers and to all Foreign Service Posts abroad.

not adequate

4. [redacted] alleges that the Department publicly disowns Ambassadors who use official resources to assist in negotiating the release of captives, such as shipment of ransom funds by pouch, storage of such funds in official safes, and "escorting of persons contacting kidnapers by US Embassy officials."

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These things were done in the Stanford students, or Patterson, cases, some with specific, prior Department approval (but not by the Secretary) and some with subsequent, tacit Department approval (but not by the Secretary). As earlier noted, there is no basis for Ms. Palmer's charge that the Department "disowns" Ambassadors who use "official resources" to assist in obtaining the release of captives, as long as the resources are properly used.

not adequate

5. [redacted] contends that the Department overdoes its public emphasis on our no-ransom, no-concessions policy, and that this over-emphasis impedes negotiations during hostage situations, to the detriment of the safe release of the hostages. She recommends that the US officials maintain silence on these policies during incidents.

Partly as a result of a recommendation by RAND during preparation of its hostage study, it is now a firm and accepted element of our terrorism policies and procedures, but not yet formally

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transmitted to the field*, that US officials will not publicly reiterate our no-ransom, no-concession policies during an incident. Our position during incidents is that these policies are well known, that their reiteration is therefore unnecessary, and (implicitly) that their reiteration might provoke retaliatory action by the abductors against the American hostage.

B6

6. [redacted] criticizes the US policy of refusing to deal directly with terrorists. She recommends that our posts be instructed "to take whatever steps are needed, directly or through the host government (depending on what will be most effective), to SAVE LIVES."

For the reasons indicated above, the USG does not negotiate with terrorists. The USG, on the other hand, has in the past and does now authorize USG officials to meet with terrorists or their representatives to secure information about the well-being of the hostages, to transmit mail and packages to them, and to urge their unconditional release. For the reasons earlier indicated, it is considered inadvisable for the USG to go beyond this, i.e., to enter into negotiations looking to concessions to terrorists. But our policy is explicitly designed to save lives -- the lives involved in a particular incident and the far larger number of lives of exposed Americans around the world who might be seized if the USG started to pay ransom or make political concessions.

7. [redacted] concluding recommendation is hard to follow but seems to be an appeal to eliminate consideration, from our release of hostages efforts; of our relations with other countries, good public relations, etc. and to concentrate exclusively on saving lives.

The USG must of course conduct all its activities, including saving the lives of American hostages abroad, in light of its foreign policy and public relations interests. There have nevertheless been instances, such as the Egan case in Argentina last March, when host governments have failed to act effectively to secure the safe release of American hostages and the USG has not

* A revision of Circular Airgram A-775 will be prepared as soon as a number of S/CCT-proposed clarifications of our terrorism policies and procedures have been approved by the Seventh Floor.

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7.

acted quickly and firmly to press such governments to take more effective action, or has failed to take over the release effort itself, when feasible. This problem was addressed, and necessary provisions made, in A-4709, July 10, 1975. The US has in effect taken over the effort to secure the release of the current American captives in Eritrea. But the problem can never be completely overcome. We will never be able to ignore our relations with host governments or with other governments, or our public relations interests, as we work to recover seized Americans abroad.

In her final "Conclusions" [redacted] refers to her efforts since 1971 to "push the Department away from its machismo-image self-concerns into an outward-looking policy which worries about hostages, rather than how the Department will look." She asks the Department "to find the moral courage to take the RAND study, admit past mistakes and issue a new policy instruction, which is simply: Keep quiet publically (sic); negotiate."

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As already noted, the USG does its utmost to secure the safe release of hostages consistent with the denial of successes to terrorists. We have had a good record in this effort. There have been very few terrorist incidents in which, even by the advantage of hindsight, we could have achieved better results through different policies and procedures, viewing the matter not only from the long-term, deterrence point of view but also from the point of view of the immediate purpose to save American hostage lives. It is not a matter of machismo-image self-concerns but of sound policies and procedures for the saving of American lives in both the short and long terms.

As for the RAND study, this, as already indicated, is now being analyzed by S/CCT preparatory to the submission of recommendations to M for any improvements of our existing terrorism policies and procedures which the RAND recommendations might indicate. While there will be one or two such recommendations, S/CCT does not perceive in the RAND report any basis for recommending important changes in our current terrorism policies. Except for its ransom option proposal, neither, it appears, does RAND.

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TELEGRAM

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y UPGRADING FM UNCLAS TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

USOM, BANGKOK

DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJ: STATEMENT OF OPPOSITION TO THE BOMBING OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

1. PENDING ESTABLISHMENT OF AID PROCEDURES FOR DISSENT, THIS
CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] USOM PROGRAM OFFICE.

2. (QUOTE) I, A UNITED STATES FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE OFFICER,
CURRENTLY SERVING WITH THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT (USOM) IN THAILAND, FORMALLY REGISTER MY OPPOSITION TO THE
RECENT MILITARY ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV).

3. I TAKE THIS POSITION AS I STRONGLY FEEL THAT THE BOMBING OF THE
DRV IS ADVERSE TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND CONSTITUTES
AN ANGRY AND INTEMPERATE REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES RATHER THAN
AN OBJECTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE ACT OF A GREAT NATION PROTECTING ITS
PERCEIVED INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

4. VIEWED FROM ITS VARIOUS ASPECTS OUR MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE
NORTH CAN ONLY SERVE TO AID THE DRV'S ATTEMPT TO TAKE OVER THE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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OUR COUNTRY HAS REACHED THE POINT THAT A MILITARY RETALIATORY REACTION IS THE ONLY WAY WE CAN RESPOND TO A CHALLENGE TO OUR INTERESTS. CERTAINLY, A GREAT NATION, IF IT IS TO REMAIN GREAT, MUST HAVE THE SELF-CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY TO ACT OBJECTIVELY AND WITH RESTRAINT. OUR POWER IS TOO GREAT FOR US TO ACT PEEVISHLY WITHOUT GIVING OUR CURRENT AND POTENTIAL FRIENDS CAUSE FOR ALARM. IF WE WANT PEOPLE TO TRUST US, AS THIS IS THE ONLY BASIS FOR TRUE FRIENDSHIP, THEN WE MUST EARN THAT TRUST BY BEHAVING AS A MATURE NATION CAPABLE OF FACING ADVERSE EVENTS WITHIN A CONFIDENT AND RATIONAL MANNER. AS I CAN SEE NO RATIONAL REASON FOR BOMBING THE DRV, I URGE A CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TO ONE PROHIBITING A U.S. MILITARY INCURSION INTO THE DRV, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE. (END QUOTE)
UNGER

NOTE: CLASSIFICATION UPGRADED TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PER RICHARD R PETERSON S/PC 5/5/72

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

(Open Forum Panel)

August 12, 1974

[Redacted]

Bangkok

Dear [Redacted]:

Your letter of July 26 was received and noted prior to the despatch of the dissent channel cable sent to you on August 8.

I appreciate your taking the time to set the record straight on the RED staff views on the reorganization issue. You can assure them that these were fully taken into account in the final preparation of the Washington response.

While the decision did not go as the staff had wished, I hope they understand that the policy issues they raised were carefully considered and that the reaffirmation of a strong US support of regional arrangements in Southeast Asia can be considered a useful attribute of the review that their cable elicited.

Sincerely yours,

C. William Kontos

C. William Kontos
Member
Policy Planning Staff

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RELEASE IN PART B6



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM

TO: S/P - Mr. Lord

FROM: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: Dissent Message: Ethiopian Government Request for Additional Military Sales

The decision which will be taken by the USG on the recent urgent request of the Ethiopian military government for an additional \$25 million in military sales will have an important impact on the future course of US-Ethiopian relations. While I believe that our overall military sales/assistance policy toward Ethiopia should be reviewed in light of the present situation (including careful consideration of the desirability of suspending all military sales and grants), I am limiting my attention in this memorandum to the question of new arms requests and not to shipment of material already "in the pipeline."

Approval of the junta's request for an additional \$25 million in military sales would, under present circumstances, constitute a clear signal of support for the current regime and hostility to the Eritrean and other internal forces which oppose it. For several reasons, I question whether any significant USG interests would be served by approving the request, and believe on the contrary, that US interests could be damaged by doing so.

First, our past support of the Ethiopian Government of Haile Selassie should not be seen as in any way requiring our support now of the provisional military government. Our past close relations with the Imperial Ethiopian Government were based on several concrete US national interests:

-- The Emperor's Government was pro-Western and provided moderate leadership in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World.

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-2-

-- The IEG was a bulwark against neighboring radical regimes in the Horn of Africa and against Soviet influence in the area. It was the only government in the Red Sea area friendly to Israel.

-- The IEG permitted us to establish important military communications facilities in Eritrea.

None of the above reasons, which justified our past military assistance to Ethiopia, are present today. The quid pro quo for Kagnew Station argument ended with the phase-out of most of our facilities there. Meanwhile, the public policy statements (many of which seem to reflect a growing influence of the People's Republic of China) of the present government indicate that it intends on building a radical socialist state. It has backed up these words with measures which are not in USG interest, including the nationalization of US firms with only vague promises of compensation. The military government hardly seems to be an effective counter to radicalism in the Horn--indeed, the present regime in the Sudan seems moderate by comparison. In addition, the present regime certainly does not give the appearance that it would be sympathetic toward Israel in the event of a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East.

Second, it is far from clear that even with stepped up aid, the present regime will be able either to control the situation in Eritrea or even maintain itself in power. The Eritrean insurgents are not the only group which would like to see the downfall of the present regime. The devoutly Christian, conservative peasantry of Tigre and Begemder Provinces (from whom Ras Menghesha's partisans are drawing support) and the Muslim Afars in the Danakil have no love for the socialistic junta, and a rekindling of the Galla/Somali opposition in the east is also possible.

Historically, transition periods in Ethiopia have frequently been prolonged, disorderly, and bloody. An almost Darwinian process seems to operate until a new strong personality emerges to weld the country together. It would seem wise for the USG not to get involved in this internal Ethiopian situation, particularly in view of the junta's policy orientation. While US prestige and credibility would not suffer seriously now from the defeat or overthrow of the junta, this danger would increase if we were to commit ourselves to the present regime.

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-3-

Under the present circumstances, new arms sales to the junta would be viewed as such a commitment. As Vietnam showed, once we do commit ourselves to military support of a regime, cutting it off becomes increasingly difficult--both in terms of our relations with the government concerned and of our efforts to avoid a diplomatic and/or military defeat.

On the basis of the foregoing, I have concluded that there are no substantial USG interests to be served by approving this sale. At the same time there are some important US interests which would be advanced by denying this request under present circumstances.

First, it has been the general policy of the USG to avoid the development of arms races in Africa, and as a result, our arms sales and grants in Africa have been very limited. The reasons which made Ethiopia an exception to this general policy passed away along with the demise of the previous regime and the phasing out of Kagnev Station. It would strengthen our general arms control policy toward Africa to extend our general policy to Ethiopia as well.

Second, a denial of this request would also be consistent with our past policy of not supplying arms to either belligerent party in African civil wars. This policy was followed, and in the long term has proved to have been a sound one, in the cases of conflicts in Nigeria, Sudan, and Chad. It would seem eminently sensible to apply it to the current civil war in Ethiopia as well.

Finally, blocking additional arms sales to the Ethiopian military government now probably affords the best hope of forcing it to seek a genuine negotiated settlement of the Eritrean question. Approving all or part of the current arms request would not increase our leverage in promoting such a settlement. We have leverage with the military junta now because of the past dependence of the IEG on US arms, and we should not hesitate to use it.

Making approval of the sale conditional on a public offer by the junta of some sort of autonomy for Eritrea plus guarantees of Eritrean civil rights is also unrealistic:

-- Given the prospect of obtaining more arms, the military junta would have little incentive to offer any form of autonomy

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-4-

for Eritrea that has a realistic chance of being accepted by the ELF. Any offer made as a condition of obtaining more arms is therefore likely to be merely a cosmetic gesture.

-- The record of the present and the previous Ethiopian regimes with regard to civil rights is scarcely creditable as shown by the 1970 "Keren Massacre," the execution of the "Sixty" last November, and the recent military actions against the civilian population of Eritrea.

Denial of the present request, however, might encourage the junta to make a genuine effort to seek a negotiated settlement. An offer to return to the status quo ante (i.e., Federation) would be a start, but unfortunately, given the hatreds engendered by 13 years of warfare, the ELF would probably not now accept it. A more realistic possibility for a settlement might be a nominally independent Eritrea minus the strategic Assab area which could be incorporated into Wollo Province and defended with less difficulty than the whole province.

In summary, while there is something to gain from denying the junta's request for additional military sales, increasingly deeper US military involvement in the current civil conflict in Ethiopia would not, in my opinion, provide a sound basis for future US-Ethiopian-Eritrean relations.

Suggested Distribution:

AF/E - Mr. Coote
ACDA/MEA/ET - Mr. Finegold
PM/SAS - Mr. Ladd

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~~SECRET~~ **RELEASE IN FULL** GOING TELEGRAM
Department of State

S/P

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APPROVED BY M:GHREAD
EUR: JEGOODBY
A/SY: VSTMARS
M/GT: KARKASHIAN
S/PRS: JTRATTNER (SUBS)
L/EUR: JCROOK
S/S-O: RPERITO

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: ASEC, PINS, GW

SUBJECT: PLANNED ATTACKS ON LUFTHANSA

REF: (A) STATE 266580; (B) BOHN 18669; (C) FRANKFURT 8499

1. ACTING UPON THE SECRETARY'S INSTRUCTION DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY READ TELEPHONED AMBASSADOR VON STADEN THIS EVENING AND MADE FOLLOWING POINTS TO HIM:
2. USG ASSESSES DANGER POSED BY TERRORIST ROCKET THREAT TO LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS MOST SERIOUSLY AND HAS NOW RECEIVED INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE FROM THIRD COUNTRY SOURCE WHICH REINFORCES THIS ASSESSMENT. LATTER HAS BEEN CONVEYED TO U.S. EMBASSY BOHN TO BE SHARED WITH FRG.
3. AS A RESULT, WE HAVE FELT COMPELLED TO ADVISE REPEAT ADVISE USG PERSONNEL TO REFRAIN FROM USING LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS UNTIL IMMEDIATE POTENTIAL DANGER POSED BY STATED THREATS HAS EASED.
4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE FEEL UNDER INCREASINGLY HEAVY OBLIGATION, RECENTLY EMPHASIZED IN GENERAL TERMS BY CONGRESS FOR SUCH SITUATIONS, TO SEE THAT AMERICAN TRAVELING PUBLIC IS ALERTED.
5. WE RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULT DILEMMA THIS POSES FOR FRG. AS FRG KNOWS FROM MOST RECENT INCIDENTS WE PLACE IMPORTANCE ON SOLIDARITY OF COORDINATED ACTIONS BY OUR GOVERNMENT IN THESE MATTERS.
6. IN THE SITUATION AT HAND DEPARTMENT URGES FRG TO PUT OUT A FIRST PUBLIC ADVISORY ITSELF AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON NOVEMBER 10.
7. AMBASSADOR VON STADEN ASKED NO SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS AND PROMISED TO CONVEY MESSAGE TO HIS GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY.
8. SUBSEQUENT TO READ/VON STADEN TELCON WE RECEIVED UNCLASSIFIED FAA SECURITY BULLETIN SENT INTER ALIA TO FRANKFURT FAA REPRESENTATIVE WHICH DESCRIBES TERMS OF MISSILE THREAT BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY GERMAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON AND LUFTHANSA SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE. BULLETIN DOES NOT, HOWEVER, PROVIDE FOR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES LIKELIHOOD OF THIS INFORMATION BECOMING PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE VERY SOON MUST BE

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM
8416

PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02
SANTO 05252 211717Z
INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /004 W
-----078959 211723Z /44

O 211700Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE-6135

RELEASE IN
PART B6

UNCLAS SANTO DOMINGO 5252

DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY FROM AID/OR.

DO NOT RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION

EO 11652 NA
SUB: NICARAGUA

1. I HEREBY WISH TO REGISTER MY DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT WITH APPARENTLY INEPT HANDLING OF US POLICY TOWARDS EVIDENTLY NATIONWIDE ATTEMPTS BY NICARAGUANS OF ALL POLITICAL PERSUASIONS TO DISLODGE UNPOPULAR, EXPLOITATIVE AND REPRESSIVE DICTATOR. DESPITE MY IGNORANCE OF WHATEVER BEHIND SCENES AND/OR DEEPLY CLASSIFIED U.S. ACTIONS MAY HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE IN FAVOR OF INSURGENTS, OUR FAILURE IS EVIDENT THROUGH PUBLICLY KNOWN SITUATION INDICATING GUARDIA IS GETTING CONTROL OF COUNTRY AFTER PERIOD OF FRUITLESS BLOODSHED AND DESTRUCTION. I CONSIDER HYPOCRITICAL US AND OTHER GOVTS. PIOUS CALLS FOR QUOTE TRUCE UNQUOTE AND QUOTE END TO BLOODSHED UNQUOTE. IF SOMOZA INDEED REMAINS IN POWER AND MOREOVER IS ABLE TO WREAK VENGEANCE ON INSURGENTS THEN I CONSIDER PRESIDENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY A HOLLOW MOCKERY. I BELIEVE THAT NICARAGUAN SITUATION REPRESENTED AND PERHAPS STILL REPRESENTS UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO INTERVENE FOR ONCE ON THE RIGHT REPEAT RIGHT SIDE. WHILE RECOGNIZING INTENTIONAL PROPAGANDA EXAGGERATIONS I FEEL DEEPLY SHAMED BY OPPORTUNITY FOR MOSCOW AND HAVANA RADIO EXPLOITATION OF WHAT TO MANY LATIN AMERICANS AND OTHER THIRD WORLDERS CAN ONLY APPEAR AS CONTINUED TACIT US SUPPORT FOR SOMOZA. AND I WOULD HOPE THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE NAME OF AMERICAN PEOPLE RECOGNIZES AND PAYS THE APPROPRIATE TRIBUTE TO THOSE COURAGEOUS NICARAGUANS WHO HAVE SACRIFICED AND CONTINUE TO SACRIFICE THEMSELVES ON THE ALTAR OF FREEDOM.
YOST

Handwritten signature/initials

B6

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN PART B6

S/P:EO'DONNELL:AG
04/09/81 EXT 2292
S/P:PWOLFOWITZ

S/P:DFORTIER

S/P/OF:GDRAIGNICH

ROUTINE

BONN

DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P WOLFOWITZ

E.O. 11652: GDS - 4/9/86 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL)

TAGS: NA

SUBJECT: YOUR RECENT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE


REFERENCE: BONN 06573

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. WE HAVE DISTRIBUTED COPIES TO THE SECRETARY, THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE COUNSELOR, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, AND THE VARIOUS OFFICES IN THE DEPARTMENT WHICH YOU REQUESTED. YOUR MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE EMBASSIES REQUESTED. CHARLES FAIRBANKS, POLICY PLANNING STAFF MEMBER, WILL COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. 44

B6
PW
EOD: [initials]
DF: [initials]
GD: [initials]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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REB105

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PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02

BEIRUT 01165 170017Z

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 190-00 170000 W
R 161517Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3348
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 1165 *William*

STADIS //

~~DISSENT CHANNEL FOR TONY LAKE AND RED AUSTIN FROM
AMBASSADOR~~ *cc sent*

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PROR, IS
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM DAMASCUS ON SYRIA,
ISRAEL AND LEBANON, CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE.

REF: (A) STATE 054167, (B) BEIRUT 0899

WE WELCOME SUPPORT IN ANY CHANNEL. HIP HIP FOR
PARKER

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INDICATE
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1977

FROM AMCONGEN MELBOURNE CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

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B6

ACTION:

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DISSENT CHANNEL

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1/b

E.O. 11652: N/A

cg

TAGS: ELAB.AS

chron

REF: L.O.U. STATE 17765A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: 1970 LAYON REPORT
FOR AUSTRALIA.

FOR DIRECTOR, POLICY PLANNING STAFF FROM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] POLITICAL OFFICER, MELBOURNE

1. Reftel states in part "after having explored your case in some depth, we do not see that you have been penalized for your dissent channel submission". Naturally I was glad to receive this information.
2. Regretably, however (although predictably) efficiency report

OF [REDACTED]	DRAWING DATE 6.2.77	TEL. EXT. 31	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: Consul General: [REDACTED]
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GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104


50153-101

prepared on me by Political Counselor Boggs and DCM Percival for period 3/9/76 - 5/15/77 positively reeks of reprisal. It is one of most vindictive dishonest and self-serving hatchet jobs I have ever seen. I realize this is serious charge but I consider it to be fully justified.

3. Since I do not know extent of S/P's authority to deal with cases of reprisals for dissent, principal purpose of this message is to request advice on most appropriate course to follow at this point (beyond completing Parts II and VI of OER). For example, should I continue to use dissent channel or should I direct subsequent communications to grievance board?

4. Would it be possible to place copies of relevant dissent channel messages in my personnel file?

BRAND



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Classification

FORM 4-68 FS-413A
CONTINUATION SHEET

Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 038592
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APPROVED BY S/P: NVELIOTES
S/P: RBFINN
S/P: NBOYER
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F. G.

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

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STADIS////////////////////
DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, SA

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE-POLICY ON KIDNAPPING OF
DIPLOMATS AND RANSOM

REF: JIDDA 1322

FOR [] FROM VELIOTES -S/P

THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT PAPER ON THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICIES ON KIDNAPPING AND RANSOM. MR. RICHARD FINN OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR PAPER HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR FOR THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN FOR THE OPEN FORUM AS WELL AS THE DIRECTOR FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED.
HARTMAN

B6

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PART B6

AIRGRAM

RS/R	REP	AF	ARA
EUR	EA	NEA	CU
INR	E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID	SY
S/IL	SCI		
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LAB	TAR	TR	XMB
AIR	ARMY	NAVY	OSD
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TO : Department of State

NO Distribution NO.
per S/P B Miletich
6/17/76

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS :

INFO :

DEPT PASS:

FROM : AmEmbassy TEGUCIGALPA

DATE: March 29, 1976

SUBJECT : Dissent Message

REF :
DISSENT CHANNEL

1. This airgram transmits a dissenting view submitted by _____ Economics Officer, American Embassy, Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

2. SUMMARY. In the world conflict of economic systems, we are competing with less than full effort, less than full effect. An unnecessarily weak link exists between U.S. economic philosophy and the U.S. program in some less developed countries. This contention is first presented in general, then in the micro-context of AID support of particular elements of Honduran agrarian reform. A specific solution is proposed and necessary criteria for the solution are defined briefly with a suggestion towards sharper delineation. Broader applicability to other elements of the Foreign Service is mentioned. Recommendations restate the discussion. END SUMMARY.

[Signature]
SANCHEZ

Enclosure a/s *[Signature]*

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FORM 3-70 DS-323

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JUN 17 3 23 PM '76
F A D R
DOCUMENT ANALYST

Drafted	gms	Drafting Date:	3-29-76	Phone No.:	243	Contents and	A/DCM
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Clearances:

LIMITED OFFICIAL USEThe Problem in General Context

The case can be overstated at its extremes but clearly a global conflict exists between the economic system utilized by the United States and that of the Soviet Union. No less than in arms, but in a far more subtle struggle, conflict is expressed between Western economic thought and Marxism economic ideology with competitive and sometimes mortal intent. This condition is less apparent in some arenas, such as the U.S. and the developed world, than in the southern tier. In less developed countries decisions between Western and communist economic forms are made daily in the new laws, programs and administrative and personnel selection. It is in the underdeveloped country capital such as Tegucigalpa, not in committed Washington or Moscow, where these choices weigh on the side of Western or communist economic philosophy.

The choices are not solely or even wholly economic given the supportable contention that in both the East and West economic philosophy fits closely to political philosophy. Expropriation of private property has a political-economic connotation: first, in the ownership of the means of production, but equally, in the political rights of the individual.

In Secretary of State Kissinger's statement before the Senate Committee on Finance on January 30, 1976, he touched broadly on U.S. responsibilities in a world changing economically. Then he stated, "Our economies, institutions, and daily lives are vulnerable to the economic policies of others."

Further in his statement he cited five initiatives of U.S. economic policy in the underdeveloped world and stated that, "In each of these areas we offered concrete solutions to developing country problems that are consistent with our own economic philosophy and our own economic interest."

This is insufficient; I contend that our economic philosophy and interest need more specific identification and application. Although equally involved are the economic, political and USIS sections of our embassies, the most obvious expression of U.S. economic policy in a number of LDCs is the U.S. AID effort.

Problem: AID Support of Agrarian Reform in Honduras

I am among those who believe that, despite shortcomings, the U.S. assistance program since World War II is the highest

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expression of the humanitarian, cooperative, productive will of the United States. My intent here is not to criticize the admirable efforts of my Government in providing assistance through AID, nor is it the purpose or proper use of this paper to impugn the capacity or dedication of any AID employees. Examples are chosen with no malice intended but rather are drawn to impart substance. Yet I feel strongly that the terms of reference which guide AID programs should be reviewed to give due attention to elements of U.S. economic philosophy.

Specifically, I must dissent with the present AID role, its support of portions of the Honduran agrarian reform law. The law is not all bad. In fact, major portions are hardly controversial in the Honduran conditions. But I aver that the law utilizes state ownership and control of much farm land, a significant portion of which will be expropriated from private holders, in order to create conditions of collectivization or state farms or "asentamientos" or "empresas asociativas" (or other bureaucratically more convenient designations) in which the rights of the individual farmer campesino who is adjudicated state controlled and expropriated lands will not receive or enjoy the economic or political benefits or motivations of private ownership.

Under the law, the campesino participant becomes a ward of the state, to function collectively in conformance with the state's directives. By failure to comply the campesino loses most of his rights and claims to the land. The campesino does not become at any point in the future an unconditional private owner of the land he works. Relevant sections of the law are articles 82, 83 and 93 (Annex).

While decreasing the acreage of private holdings through expropriation, the law does not increase the number of private holders. To the contrary, it authorizes the taking of even small holdings, less than five hectares. As the law is enforced, both the acreage and the absolute number of private farmers will be reduced. The acreage and control is taken by the state.

There are related and other grounds on which I believe the present law to be inimical to the economic development of Honduras, but the salient point here is its debilitating effect on private ownership vis-a-vis ascendancy of state ownership.

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3.

In the current parlance, AID has a "Congressional Mandate" to assist the rural poor. I believe that AID should have an equally valid "Congressional Mandate" to support the development of a modern private sector in the LDC. In the Honduran case: foster the successful development of a private farm sector for the campesino as opposed to a state system.

A Proposal Towards Solution

In view of the above, I propose that:

Our foreign economic assistance programs be screened through additional and formal judgmental criteria based upon U.S. political-economic philosophy.

This proposal is easily misstated or misinterpreted. To clarify:

- a.. It is not a proposal of "reward and punishment" to impose the totality of Western or U.S. economic (political or cultural) values upon recipients of aid. Apart from impracticability because such imposition would require a magnitude of resources beyond probability, imposition would be the denial of the very values we support. But we should support those values, not their antithesis.
- b. It can be argued that this proposal would make of AID a political weapon. To an extent this is true. Historically there have been periods when the U.S. withdrew diplomatic recognition and economic assistance because a recipient government did not meet criteria of being "democratic." Such withdrawals did not alter the lack of democracy, and the automatic political gambit on our part was correctly modified or abandoned in most cases.

Nonetheless, our assistance should avoid support of totalitarianism from the left or the right. It should actively assure support for democratic and individual values. By its nature, some assistance may be politically neutral: for example, construction of an access road to an agricultural area. However, it is difficult to see as politically neutral any assistance directed into elements of an agrarian reform program which are intrinsically statist in structure, however well-phrased the overall reform objectives may be. The proposal suggests judgmental selectivity, not dogma.

- c. The proposal can be viewed as more political than economic. Perhaps this is essentially true since a common current

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of economic thought in the U.S. conceives of economic theory as providing a slate of alternative options of policy which are then subject to a political decision process, such as legislative or executive policy or vote. Thereby, questions of the incidence of a tax or income distribution can be examined within the context of economic analysis but the decision to have progressive taxation or negative income tax is political. In this sense then, the proposal suggests the application of a political consideration as to the most beneficial economic philosophy serving U.S. national interest.

- d. Against the proposal, it might be argued that the substance is already part of the AID decision-making process, that any particular set of AID decision-makers will already have the suggested criteria in mind. Yet, what is "in mind" is subject to the hazards of the experience of the particular individuals. Also, there is an innate complexity to some projects which veils the programs of assistance from anyone not intimately concerned. For lack of specific criteria before the officers at all levels, the actual implementation of a project could easily be in violation of those criteria. In a given AID project, any proposed changes based upon considerations of U.S. economic philosophy can be arbitrarily ignored or irrationally responded to.

The only solution to these various weaknesses and problems is to have specific, formal judgmental criteria included in the evaluation of any particular project.

Economic Ideology Criteria Necessary for Solution

To formulate such criteria, what are the objectives and the relevant elements of U.S. economic philosophy to be applied? The generality of response is not difficult: we seek an effective productive system which is based upon individual freedom, private property, market determination of relative values, government participation to foster development and prevent abuses, and social responsibility exercised by all sectors relative to the human factors of production and society. However, such a statement needs great precision and wide acceptance.

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5.

Suggested Means for Sharper Delineation

To make this meaningful in a foreign policy context would require careful study. Our economic philosophy is not simple nor static. Who would draft an expansion of the Secretary's speech to define "our economic philosophy and our own economic interests"? But it is suggested that such a policy guide could be prepared in conference with qualified academic, business and administrative officials to the end of generalizing the criteria which are or should be the present substance of U.S. political-economic foreign policy content.

Broader Applicability

The economic philosophy criteria should reach out more broadly. Are there not countries in which Embassy, not just AID, but economic section, political section and USIS activities could include responsibility towards the development of a modern private sector? Some thoughts:

"Less developed country" connotes not only problems of rural and urban poor, education, nutrition, population control, et cetera. LDC also implies institutional problems within the economic structure. The private sector may be antediluvian feudal, pre-industrial, or robber-baron or other things, but none will be modern, nor usually or necessarily socially responsible. This returns to the initial point of departure for this paper, the economic ideological conflict. If the Honduran Government must choose between regulating (say) the private lumber industry or nationalizing it into a state corporation, will there be a regulateable private sector? Can the sector factually and convincingly show that it is institutionally involving a responsiveness to social needs? Are there even lines of communication open between the private sector and the government? In the Honduran case, the answer was negative to these questions as revealed by the nationalization action taken by the government.

Differentially among the LDCs, for each is different, are we supporting development and fostering natural institutional and individual allies for our economic philosophy? I believe the answer is in doubt for lack of the same criteria of guidance. Orientation and guidance on economic ideology is no less important for political, economic and information officers than it is for officials of AID.

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6.

Recommendations

Our foreign economic assistance should be screened through additional and formal judgmental criteria based upon U.S. political-economic philosophy.

Criteria to this end should be developed through consultation and conferences with qualified academic, business, and administrative officials so as to define, with dynamic content, our economic philosophy and our economic interests.

These criteria should be applied broadly as a substantive element of U.S. political-economic foreign policy.

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Annex 1

Agrarian Refor Law. Decree-Law 170, 8 January 1975.
Informal Translation

Article 82. Obligations of the Adjudicated.

- "a. To personally work the land, cultivate it or exploit it every year without interruption and in an efficient manner;
- b. Obey the dispositions of the regulations (issued under) this law that control the sale, taxing and transfer of the parcel or the rights of the land adjudicated;
- c. Contribute personally and economically to the labors and services of the common interest;
- d. Pay on time the notes of amortization of value of the parcel or of the unit adjudicated and comply with the obligations that are contracted with the institutions of technical and credit assistance;
- e. Belong to a cooperative or "empresa asociativa," if necessary under the plans and programs established by the National Agrarian Institute;
- f. Obey the directives of technical or administrative character that are issued by the National Agrarian Institute;
- g. Comply with legal norms for the conservation of natural resources."

Article 83.

"The non-compliance with any of the obligations of the previous article will be sufficient cause for the National Agrarian Institute to declare without value or effect the adjudication made.

If the National Agrarian Institute should order the disoccupation of the parcel, the adjudicated will have the right to receive payments he had made and the value of improvements he may have effected after deduction of pending credits.

If the action referred to in paragraph one is taken for amortization payment on the parcel, a lapse of 30 days will be permitted the beneficiary to make the respective payment."

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Annex
Page 2

Article 93.

"The adjudicated persons will receive a provisional title to accredit their position, which will be exchanged when deemed suitable for a definitive title of property. In those (definitive titles) there shall be incorporated the obligations established in Article 82, although they may not be expressly mentioned.

Provisional titles can be used as a guarantee with State financial institutions."

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
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Washington, D.C. 20520

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3/5/76

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DISSENT CHANNEL



Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State, Room 7317
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear :

Usually in responding to Dissent Channel messages I give the dissenter a fairly detailed rundown on the issues involved and how current policy is moving. In the present case, I think I should look to you for that sort of a briefing!

I understand that Tom Thornton kept in close touch with you in getting your views to the Secretary and, as you know, they continue to be live issues in our discussions with Mr. Sisco and the Secretary.

I appreciate you sending your views on this matter. They came at just the proper time and I hope you agree that they received full attention. I am not sure how the entire matter will come out but you have contributed in an important way to ensuring that the matter was fully aired.

Sincerely,

Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

Drafted: S/P: ~~TP~~ Thornton: vb
x21744:3/3/76

Clearance: S/P: ~~OFF~~ PLYdon

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TO SECSTATE W36000 4372

UNCLAS SEOU 05127

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: APER
SUBJECT: FAMILY EMPLOYMENT AT POST: SHARED AFM POSITIONS

THE ADDITION TO THE INTEGRITY THAT WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO BUILD INTO OUR VISA ISSUING PROCESS. AT THIS JUNCTURE WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT HAVING SAID ALL THIS THERE IS NO INTENT TO DOWNGRADE THE FSH CAREER TRACK. THERE IS ROOM FOR BOTH PROGRAMS AND IN OUR VIEW THE AFM PROGRAM, IF INTELLIGENTLY ADMINISTERED, CAN BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE TO THE DEPARTMENTS FIGHT AGAINST WASTE, FRAUD AND MISMANAGEMENT.

6. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT PROVIDE FOR THE SHARING OF AFM/FSH POSITIONS. WALKER

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED BY [REDACTED]

2. FOR SEVERAL YEARS THE DEPARTMENT HAS EXPRESSED AS POLICY MAKING EMPLOYMENT AVAILABLE TO THE DEPENDENTS OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL. THIS COMMENDABLE OBJECTIVE HAS RESULTED IN ESTABLISHING AMERICAN FAMILY MEMBER (AFM) POSITIONS AT MANY POSTS ABROAD, AS WELL AS THE CREATION OF PIT POSITIONS TO BE FILLED BY DEPENDENTS. EFFORTS HAVE EVEN BEEN MADE TO ESTABLISH A CAREER OF SORTS FOR DEPENDENTS, ENABLING THEM TO ACQUIRE SKILLS IN WASHINGTON OR ABROAD AND HAVE SOME REASONABLE EXPECTATION THAT THEY CAN BE UTILIZED AT FUTURE POSTS. DEPENDENT SPOUSES ARE EVEN ALLOWED TO ENROLL IN COURSES SUCH AS FSI'S CONSULAR COURSE TO IMPROVE THEIR VALUE TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE. THE GOAL AND RESULT OF ALL THIS ATTENTION TO THE EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS OF SPOUSES HAS BEEN TO TAP A POTENTIALLY VALUABLE PERSONNEL RESOURCE WHILE REDUCING ONE OF THE BARRIERS TO MANY AN OFFICER'S ACCEPTING AN ASSIGNMENT ABROAD -- THE UNLIKELIHOOD THAT HIS SPOUSE CAN FIND MEANINGFUL EMPLOYMENT.

3. AN ANOMALY IN THIS PROGRAM IS THAT IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE DESIRE OF MANY SPOUSES TO ACCEPT PARTTIME EMPLOYMENT AS AFMS. WHILE SOME POSITIONS ARE NOT AMENABLE TO BEING SHARED, OTHERS ARE, INCLUDING AT LEAST ONE IN THIS DRAFTING OFFICER'S SECTION. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT WE CANNOT HIRE TWO DEPENDENTS FOR ONE AFM/FSH POSITION, ALLOWING EACH TO WORK 20 HOURS A WEEK. A REVIEW OF THIS DECISION, WHICH WE CANNOT FIND EMBODIED IN ANY OF THE PERSONNEL REGULATIONS, IS REQUESTED.

4. A NUMBER OF THE WIVES AT THIS POST, ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH CHILDREN, OUTSIDE INTERESTS, OR REPRESENTATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, ARE NOT INTERESTED IN FULLTIME EMPLOYMENT, BUT WOULD WELCOME THE CHANCE TO BOTH MAINTAIN THEIR JOB SKILLS AND EARN ADDITIONAL INCOME BY WORKING PARTTIME IN AN EMBASSY AFM POSITION. WHILE PERMITTING SUCH EMPLOYMENT WOULD ENTAIL ADDITIONAL ACCOUNTING AND PERSONNEL WORK, THAT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AN INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM. THE ADVANTAGES TO THE MISSION WOULD APPEAR TO OUTWEIGH ANY DISADVANTAGES; THEY INCLUDE:

- A. IMPROVED FAMILY MORALE.
- B. THE POTENTIAL FOR ALLOWING MORE SPOUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE AFM PROGRAM, THUS REDUCING SOME OF THE RIVALRIES AND FRICTIONS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED AT POSTS OVER THE SELECTION OF PEOPLE TO FILL AFM JOBS.
- C. THE POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED CONTINUITY ON THE JOB AS THE AFMS COULD VACATION AT DIFFERENT TIMES AND EACH HALF OF THE JOE COULD BE FILLED AT A DIFFERENT TIME.

5. NOT THE LEAST CONSIDERATION AT THIS POST'S CONSULAR

B6

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE
IN PART B6

July 8, 1977

[Redacted]

Labor Affairs

Bureau of International
Organization Affairs
Room 5328, New State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear [Redacted]

This is a reply to your dissent message of June 13, 1977. Your dissent was directed toward the assessment contained in the State Department telegram 13540 which described the final text of Director General Blanchard's letter as a success.

As you are aware, since November 1975, the US policy towards the International Labor Organization has had the explicit goal of reforming the ILO's practices and procedures. One of the specific points of reform the US sought was an end to the practice of condemning a state for political reasons extraneous to the proper purpose of the organization. Likewise, we sought assurances that procedures amounting to due process would be employed to ensure that condemnations would be made only after the ILO had examined allegations with its own investigative machinery. The stated motive for our reform effort was the conviction that the ILO was no longer serving well the values it had been established to promote. The change in our policy was precipitated by the fact that the organization had condemned Israel's labor practices without complying with its own established procedures.

US strategy in pursuit of these goals called for us to stake out a forward position on several issues and to seek progress independently on all. We gave no indication of exactly how much or what kind of progress would be needed for us to stay in the ILO, but the unstated assumption was that we would not retreat from our forward positions.

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The Blanchard letter that you cite was an attempt to moderate the issue of a 1974 resolution that condemned Israel's practices without the normal prior investigation. We had sought to bury this issue; some Arab states were equally determined to keep it alive. The Department's assessment of Blanchard's letter was that an adequate compromise had been reached that would at least keep the Arab-Israeli issue from affecting our other efforts for reform.

You dissent from the Department's assessment of this letter as a success, and it may be that that assessment was premature. The letter was subsequently rejected by the Arabs, and our reform efforts fell short. Nevertheless, it is difficult to judge whether this outcome occurred because we were too moderate in our tactics or not moderate enough. You may be right that objections to the letter should have been voiced when it was read out in the Committee. However, if the session had achieved the results we wanted, our moderation might have been cited as crucial to the success. That this did not occur, we think, is not sufficient evidence to prove that the compromise contributed to our larger defeat.

Post-mortems on our strategy are, of course, necessary and useful, and we appreciate your offering your views through the Dissent Channel.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Director
Policy Planning Staff

~~SECRET~~
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

slp

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~~SECRET~~ BONN 18742

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, GW
SUBJECT: PLANNED ATTACKS ON LUFTHANSA

REF: STATE 269245

1. WE ASSUME THAT WE WILL VERY LIKELY BE RECEIVING MEDIA INQUIRIES ON USG POLICY AS REGARDS TRAVEL BY AMERICANS (OFFICIAL USG PERSONNEL AND PRIVATE CITIZENS) IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IF WE ARE SO APPROACHED, ONLY REPEAT ONLY ON AN IF ASKED BASIS, PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM DEPARTMENT WE PLAN TO CONFINE OURSELVES TO A BRIEF STATEMENT BASED ON REFTEL PARA 3 AND REFER INQUIRERS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION TO THE DEPARTMENT.

2. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP DEPARTMENT'S INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO ISSUING A PUBLIC STATEMENT AND DEALING WITH MEDIA QUERIES. IN THIS CONNECTION, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE FRG, WE URGE THAT THE DEPARTMENT MAKE THE POINT THAT WE ARE NOT IN ANY SENSE SINGLING OUT LUFTHANSA FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT. THAT IS TO SAY, WE WOULD REACT IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE SAME FASHION, TO A TERRORIST THREAT POSED TO ANY OTHER AIRLINE, INCLUDING US AIRLINES.

3. THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAS NOW ADVISED US THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER WISHES TO SEE THE AMBASSADOR ON THE LUFTHANSA MATTER ON AN URGENT BASIS AND AN APPOINTMENT HAS BEEN SET UP FOR NOON LOCAL TIME.
STOESSEL

~~SECRET~~

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AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RELEASE IN PART
B6

Nov. 11, 1976

To: S/P Winston Lord [redacted]

From: Io/LAB- [redacted]

B6

Subject: Dissent from the Dept's Policy of Having MED report privileged information to SY

The Medical Division has a set of operating procedures for MED which are in-house and not published in the FAM or any other place accessible to employees. One of these SOP's refers to the Executive Order on security clearances for government employees and states that all doctors examining State Dept employees will be on the lookout for information pertaining to the Executive Order and will report any such information to SY. This SOP is a gross breach of medical ethics requiring information given by a patient to a doctor to be held in confidence. Employees being examined in MED should be free to discuss any health problem without fear that this will be passed to SY. If employees were aware of the SOP they would presumably cease to reveal information to MED and while this would prevent MED reporting to SY it might endanger the employee's health, since the doctor's examination and diagnosis might be made on incomplete information.

I ask that MED be instructed by the DG to cease reporting to SY and that SY be instructed to refuse to receive any information from MED. If the Dept declines to make this change, then I request that a large sign be posted in the MED waiting room and in all consulting rooms, stating that MED reports to SY. Patients being examined overseas should also be informed of this. Perhaps the best way would be to have each employee sign a statement at the beginning of a medical exam. stating he is aware that MED reports to SY.

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PAGE 01 STATE 244561
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INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 /004 R

8250

DRAFTED BY S/P: RJNEITZKE: BMH
APPROVED BY S/P: ALAKE
S/P-OF: GFOX
S/P: RFEINBERG
ARA: NBOUTON
HA/HR: CBSALMON, JR.
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R 261742Z SEP 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

-----100280 271413Z /46

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DISSENT CHANNEL -- FOR [] FROM S/P-LAKE

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON NICARAGUA

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 5252

1. FIRST, I WISH TO COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISSENT CHANNEL PROCEDURES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE BUREAU OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR VIEWS WILL BE GIVEN PROPER CONSIDERATION IN OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE COMPLEX AND FAST CHANGING SITUATION IN NICARAGUA. CHRISTOPHER

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Department of State

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PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02

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BONH 15701 141651Z

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-----061060 141816Z /52

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FM AMEMBASSY BONH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9348

THE REASONS WHY THE DISSENT CHANNEL WAS ESTABLISHED
IN THE FIRST PLACE.

7. A PROMPT, SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO REFTEL A
IS REQUESTED.
YORK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONH 15701

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR S/P WOLFOWITZ

E.O. 12065: GDS 08-13-87 (YORK, CHARLES T) OR-M
TAGS: (NONE)
SUBJECT: U.S. DISINFORMATION POLICY ON SOUTH LEBANON

REF: (A) BONH 6573 DTG 311445Z MAR 81
(B) STATE 96526 DTG 151813 APR 81

1. (CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THIS IS A DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF 11 FAM 243.3 WRITTEN BY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION,
IN ADDITION TO AUTOMATIC DISTRIBUTION OF DISSENT
CHANNEL MESSAGES AS PROVIDED BY 5 FAM 212.3C IS AS
FOLLOWS: PA (FOR DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN), NEA,
NEA/ARH, NEA/IAI, NEA/EGY, NEA/ARF, IO/UNP, IHR,
IHR/RMA, EMBASSIES AT TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
AMMAN AND CAIRO, AND USUN.

3. INITIAL DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE (REF A) WAS
TRANSMITTED 31 MARCH. NON-SUBSTANTIVE INTERIM
RESPONSE FROM DEPARTMENT (REF B) WAS TRANSMITTED
15 APRIL. OVER FOUR MONTHS HAVE NOW ELAPSED,
WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE.

4. THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE ORIGINAL DISSENT
CHANNEL MESSAGE WAS SIMPLE: THE USG OUGHT TO
BE CANDID IN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE PRESS ABOUT
EVENTS IN SOUTH LEBANON. MUCH HAS HAPPENED
CONCERNING SOUTH LEBANON IN THE INTERVENING
PERIOD. USG POLICY ON THE ISRAELI-ARAB DISPUTE
MAY BE IN A DELICATE PHASE, AND MAY BE EVOLVING.
THE BASIC PROPOSITION OF THE DISSENT MESSAGE,
HOWEVER, IS NOT AFFECTED. WHATEVER THE DIRECTION
OF OUR POLICY, IT CAN ONLY BE HELPED BY HONEST
PUBLIC INFORMATION.

5. AS A FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM
RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING THE DISSENT CHANNEL,
I AM CONVINCED THAT ITS EFFECTIVENESS IS
UTTERLY DEPENDENT ON THE TIMELINESS OF DEPARTMENT
RESPONSES TO DISSENT MESSAGES. THE DISSENT CHANNEL
IS PRECISELY DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH FAST-MOVING
AND HOT ISSUES. AS MONTHS PASS WITHOUT RESPONSE,
AN ISSUE EVOLVES, AND THE TIMELINESS OF BOTH THE
DISSENT AND OF THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TEND TO
EVAPORATE.

6. WERE DELAY TO BECOME THE PATTERN FOR
DEPARTMENT RESPONSES TO DISSENT, THE DISSENT
CHANNEL AS AN INSTITUTION WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY
DESTROYED. THIS WOULD GO FAR TOWARDS DESTROYING THE
PRINCIPLE OF CREATIVE AND DISCIPLINED DISSENT
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AS A WHOLE. THIS
COULD IN TURN LEAD TO PROBLEMS WITH CONFIDENTIALITY
AND SERVICE DISCIPLINE, AND DEPRIVE DECISION-MAKERS
SOME OF THE BEST EXPERTISE AVAILABLE TO THEM.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

Department of State

PAGE 01 STATE 074560
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B6

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APPROVED BY S/P: WALAKE
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 074560

STADIS////////////////////
DISSENT CHANNEL, FOR [] FROM LAKE

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, XX

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY

REF: BUDAPEST 0437

1. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR A THOUGHT PROVOKING AND USEFUL DISSENT MESSAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. YOUR THINKING ON A WIDE VARIETY OF POINTS IS MUCH LIKE OUR OWN.

2. WE ARE WORKING ALONG A NUMBER OF LINES YOU SUGGESTED. THE SECRETARY IS CONSIDERING MAKING A SPEECH DEVOTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS. IN IT, HE MAY RAISE AND DISCUSS A NUMBER OF THE ISSUES YOU RAISED, SUCH AS THE TOOLS AVAILABLE TO US AND THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR PROMOTING RIGHTS. THESE ISSUES ARE ALSO BEING STUDIED INTENSIVELY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT AND THE RESULTING POLICY PAPERS SHOULD REACH THE FIELD SOON.

3. YOU IMPLICITLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICAL RIGHTS TO MORE CLEARLY ECONOMIC RIGHTS. WE ARE LOOKING AT THIS BECAUSE OF THE ATTENTION GIVEN

IT BOTH IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE NORTH-SOUTH CONTEXT AND IN THE RATIONALE FOR OUR POLICY IN BILATERAL AID AND IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. AS TO SETTING LIMITS ON US HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY, THE PRESIDENT DID THIS WHEN HE SAID, IN HIS MESSAGE TO PEOPLE OF OTHER NATIONS, THAT "WE WILL NOT SEEK TO DOMINATE NOR DICTATE TO OTHERS." WE ALSO INTEND TO MAINTAIN A BALANCE OF PUBLIC ACTION AND QUIET DIPLOMACY.

4. FINALLY, YOUR POINT THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ON RIGHTS ISSUES IS WELL TAKEN. SHOULD THE SECRETARY FINALLY DECIDE TO GIVE A HUMAN RIGHTS SPEECH, WE EXPECT IT WILL RECEIVE WIDE ATTENTION AND CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TO THE QUALITY AND EXTENT OF OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE PUBLIC AND CONGRESS WHICH HAS INCREASED AND IMPROVED MARKEDLY DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS.

5. AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL AND EFFECTIVE USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL ON THIS IMPORTANT SUBJECT.
VANCE

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S/P Dissent File

S/P:
MACASEY 2/18/77
S/P: NVELIOTES

S/P: RBFINN
S/P: NBOYER

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE JIDDA

STADIS/ DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, SA

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE-POLICY ON KIDNAPPING OF
DIPLOMATS AND RANSOM

REF: JIDDA 1322

FOR [] FROM VELIOTES -S/P

NV *[initials]*
MA *[initials]*
RBF *[initials]*
NB *[initials]*

B6

THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT PAPER ON THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICIES ON KIDNAPPING AND RANSOM. MR. RICHARD FINN OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR PAPER HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR FOR THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN FOR THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE DIRECTOR FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

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TO DIRECTOR OF STATE DEPARTMENT
FROM AMEMB MELBOURNE
TO DIRECTOR OF STATE DEPARTMENT

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DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR DISSEMINATION, POLICY PLANNING STAFF FROM
POLITICAL OFFICERS, MELBOURNE

[Redacted]

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TO DIRECTOR OF STATE DEPARTMENT
FROM AMEMB MELBOURNE
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: 1956 LABOR REPORT FOR AUSTRALIA

TO DIRECTOR OF STATE DEPARTMENT
FROM AMEMB MELBOURNE
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: 1956 LABOR REPORT FOR AUSTRALIA
[Illegible text]

TO DIRECTOR OF STATE DEPARTMENT
FROM AMEMB MELBOURNE
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: 1956 LABOR REPORT FOR AUSTRALIA
[Illegible text]

TO DIRECTOR OF STATE DEPARTMENT
FROM AMEMB MELBOURNE
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: 1956 LABOR REPORT FOR AUSTRALIA
[Illegible text]



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

OPTIONAL FORM 185 (OCR) (10-75)
Formerly DS-322 (OCR)
Dept. of State

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ARA/RPP:TBOWIE AA/LA:ECOY S/IL:DGGOOD CLEARANCES HA:MSCHNEIDER	NAME	S/P:OPEN FORUM:DKINNEY 4 6 8	NAME	CLEARANCES
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INFO PRECEDENCE INFO ADDRESSES

SPECIAL HANDLING
AIDAC: DISSIDENT CHANNEL - FOR. FROM S/P LAKE

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: AIFLD PROPOSAL FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO ORIT

REF: LA PAZ 8776

1. WE HAVE STUDIED YOUR MESSAGE OBJECTING TO THE GRANT OF US GOVERNMENT FUNDS TO ORIT ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT MAY DAMAGE THE IMAGE OF THAT ORGANIZATION SO MUCH AS TO OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS OF AN EXPANDED PROGRAM.

2. THE CONCERNS YOU EXPRESS WERE CONSIDERED BEFORE A DECISION WAS MADE. AFTER DISCUSSION AT THE TUNIS LABOR ATTACHE CONFERENCE WHERE YOU WERE PRESENT AND MADE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME POINTS, THE AID MISSIONS WERE ASKED FOR COMMENTS BY STATE CABLE 243004. OF THE TWENTY RESPONDERS, FOURTEEN SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL, ABOUT HALF WITH SOME KIND OF RESERVATION, AND SIX WERE NEUTRAL. ONE OF THE LATTER RECOMMENDED AGAINST ACTIVITIES IN THAT PARTICULAR COUNTRY. ONLY THE MISSIONS IN ARGENTINA AND BOLIVIA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT ORIT ACCEPTING USG SUPPORT.

3. PRESUMABLY THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS THEMSELVES WOULD BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO THE KIND OF DAMAGE YOU WARN OF. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ORIT EXECUTIVE BOARD CONSIDERED THE

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

OPTIONAL FORM 185-A (OCR, 10-75)
Formerly OS-322-A (OTR)
Dept. of State

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QUESTION BEFORE AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. AIFLD HAS ASSURED US THAT THEY ARE WORKING VERY CLOSELY WITH THE AFLACIO ON THE MATTER. THUS THOSE MOST CLOSELY AND DIRECTLY INVOLVED DO NOT SEEM TO FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF USG ASSISTANCE.

4. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (INCLUDING TRADE UNION RIGHTS) THAT CHARACTERIZES USG ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA. DEMOCRATIC LABOR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE AREA ARE WELL AWARE OF OUR ATTITUDES AND ARE IN SYMPATHY WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF US LABOR POLICY. THERE IS A NEW MOOD OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE AND WE THINK US ASSISTANCE TO ORIT CAN USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO WHAT THE US IS DOING IN THE LABOR FIELD. IF WE EXPECT AN AUTOMATIC UNFAVORABLE REACTION, WE ARE NOT DOING JUSTICE TO THE BENEFICIAL IMPACT OUR POLICIES AND OUR ASSISTANCE CAN HAVE.

5. WHILE THERE MAY BE DAMAGE TO THE ORIT IMAGE IN SOME REGIONS, PERHAPS FOR EXAMPLE IN BOLIVIA, THE CLEAR MAJORITY OF LABOR EXPERTISE FAVORS THE PROGRAM AND EXPECTS THE BENEFITS TO OUTWEIGH THE COSTS.

6. WE DO AGREE THAT THERE COULD BE A DANGER OF THE SUBSIDY'S BECOMING TOO LARGE AND CONTINUING OVER TOO LONG A PERIOD. WE INTEND TO GIVE THESE AND OTHER SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF THIS PROGRAM CAREFUL ATTENTION AS WE PROCEED WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

7. THANK YOU FOR SHARING YOUR IDEAS WITH US THROUGH THE DISSENT CHANNEL. YY

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PAGE 01 251211Z

46
ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSN-00 SS-15 SY-04 PM-03 INR-07 INRE-00

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FM NAVCOMMUNIT/ASMARA ETHIOPIA
TO CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
INFO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
USNMR SHAPE BE
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA ETHIOPIA
COMNAVTELCOM WASHINGTON DC
NAVCOMMSTA GREECE NEA MAKRI GR
AMCONSUL ASMARA ETHIOPIA
DIRNSA FT GEO G MEADE MD

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN //N03000//

ASMARA SITREP 0900Z (U)

1. (U) ALL TRACTS QUIET.

2. (SNF) THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE FEELINGS OF THE ETHIOPIANS TOWARDS AMERICANS AS OBSERVED BY NAVCOMMUNIT PERSONNEL, CONVERSATION WITH LOCAL NATIONAL EMPLOYEES, AND SECURITY GUARD COMMANDU POLICE PROVIDED BY LOCAL GOVIT. " WE ARE THREADING A NARROW LINE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. LOCAL POPULACE IN MARKET PLACE SEEMS FRIENDLY AND

PAGE TWO RUFLEFA0465 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

HELPFUL. SMALL BOYS VOLUNTEER TO WATCH (GUARD) YOUR CAR FOR NOMINAL TIP AND APPEAR TO BE SINCERE IN "WATCHING". ONE CRIPPLED MAN USES HIS MAKESHIFT CRUTCH TO WARD OFF PEOPLE WHO ATTEMPT CROWD AROUND CAR TO BEG. WE FLY SMALL U.S. FLAG FROM MOST CARS IN TOWN AND THEY DRAW A CROWD WHENEVER STOPS ARE MADE IN POORER SECTIONS AND AROUND MARKET. HOWEVER, LOCAL NATIONAL (LN)EMPLOYEES OF CLUB AND SOME COMMANDO POLICE (CP) HAVE ADVISED U.S. SAILORS, "YOU ARE DEAD IF YOUR GOVT PROVIDES ADDITIONAL AMMO AND MILITARY SUPPLIES TO ETHIOPIAN GOVT". WE SUSPECT MOST ARE ELF/PLF SYMPATHIZERS AND SOME MAY ACTUALLYBE MEMBERS OF ELF, WE HAVE ONE LN EMPLOYEE WHO HAS

~~SECRET~~

FORM DS-1052



Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 251211Z

STAYED OVERNIGHT AT TRACT B EVERYNIGHT A FIRE FIGHT ERUPTED IN TOWN BUT WHO RETURNS TO TOWN FROM WORK PRIOR TO CURFEW ON OTHER NIGHTS. ETHIOPIAN ARMY ATTITUDE: FOR PAST WEEK ETHIOPIAN TROOPS HAVE BEEN SURLY AND ARROGANT WHILE ARMED. RECENT PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN SAFE PASSAGE OF CISCO EMPLOYEES (U.S.) TO TRACT U WERE DETAILED IN SITREP. SOLDIERS AT CHECKPOINT SOUTH OF AIRPORT POINTED WEAPONS AT AMCIT AND APPEARED TO WANT TO SHOOT BUT RESTRAINED BY NCO. TROOPS TRAVELING THROUGH ASMARA IN QUECE-AND-A-HALVES WERE OBSERVED ON 19 FEB AND 20 FEB SINGING (CHANTING) IN UNISON "DEATH TO ALL ERITREANS" AND "UNITY

PAGE THREE RUFLEFAM465 S E C R E T NOFORN
FOR ETHIOPIA" AND FIRING THEIR WEAPONS RANDOMLY IN WHICH AT LEAST

SIX CIVILIANS (FOUR LN, TWO ITALJANS) WERE HIT. SOURCE OF LAST SENSURE: COP EMERSON, AMCONSUL; TWO CISCO EMPLOYEES SAW WOUNDED/ DEAD (WHICH UNKNOWN) IN STREET 20 FEB. THESE TROOPS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN RETURNING FROM RAIDS ON NEARBY VILLAGES AND RESPONDING TO GOE SPONSORED RALLIES/DEMONSTRATIONS OF ETHIOPIAN UNITY. STRUM RUM OK:

TROOPS IN SOUTH ETHIOPIA, WHEN BEING DISPATCHED TO ASMAKA, WERE TOLD BY OFFICERS THEY WERE GOING TO ERITREA TO KILL ERITREANS AND THAT

THEY WOULD COME BACK RICH. THIS EXPLAINS LOOTING OF VILLAGES DURING RAIDS AND SEARCHES FOR INSURGENTS NOW BEING CONDUCTED. ALSO HUNDREDS OF BUZZARDS NOW CIRCLING VILLAGE OF AZZECA AFTER LAST TWO W/ VS TLC BY ETH. ARMY.

SUMMARY: AT PRESENT ETHIOPIAN ARMY SEEMS LESS FRIENDLY TO U.S. THAN LOCAL NATIONALS AND SUSPECTED MEMBERS ELP.

3. (U) ELPA EMPLOYEES WERE OBSERVED W/ LOCAL TODAY DIGGING POST HOLES FOR POWER LINE FROM TRACT F TO CITY. THIS FIRST PROGRESS NOTED SINCE 17 FEB.

4. (U) THIS MESSAGE COORDINATED WITH AMCONGEN.

5 (U) NEXT SITREP 2100Z.

GDS-83

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~~SECRET~~

FORM NO 1000

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Department of State

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PAGE 01 STATE 158531
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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 ES-01 /803 R

DRAFTED BY S/P: HJONES: CJR

APPROVED BY S/P: PWARDMAN

M/NO: KRING (SUBS)

M/OGP: DRURSCH

M/COMP: LJURVIS (SUBS)

EAP/EX: EPOLMAN

M: RHOLAN

S/P: OPEN FORUM: JREINERTSON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 158531

DISSENT CHANNEL FROM S/P, P.V. RODMAN TO

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: APER

SUBJECT: FAMILY EMPLOYMENT AT POST: SHARED AFM POSITIONS

REF: SEOUL 5127

1. AS I MENTIONED LAST WEEK, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL, THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS, THE IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL, THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR IDEAS CONCERNING THE SHARING OF AMERICAN FAMILY-MEMBER POSITIONS BY TWO DEPENDENTS. WE ALL AGREED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO CREATE TWO HALF-TIME PIT POSITIONS FROM ONE FSH/AFM POSITION TO PRODUCE THE SAME RESULT.
2. TO DO THIS FULL TIME, THE POSITION TO BE SHARED WOULD HAVE TO BE REPROGRAMMED FOR TWO HALF-TIME PIT POSITIONS AND THE EMPLOYEES ENCUMBERING THE POSITION WOULD BE PITS. THE POST WOULD TAG THE FSH/AFM POSITION BEING REPROGRAMMED SO THAT IT COULD BE IDENTIFIED IF THE POST LATER WISHED TO REQUEST ITS REESTABLISHMENT AS A FULL-TIME FSH/AFM POSITION.
3. SINCE FTE IS ACCOUNTED FOR ACCORDING TO THE EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY OF THE EMPLOYEES, NOT OF THE POSITION ITSELF, FTE FOR THESE POSITIONS WOULD BE CHARGED AGAINST THE EAP BUREAU'S PIT FTE ALLOCATION. IF THE FTE ALLOCATION FOR PITS WERE INSUFFICIENT TO COVER ITS NEEDS, THE BUREAU COULD REQUEST A TRANSFER OF FTE FROM FSH FTE TO THE PIT CATEGORY.
4. THE JOB-SHARING APPROACH FOR AFMS COULD BE BENEFICIAL FOR FAMILY MORALE AND HOLDS THE POTENTIAL FOR ALLOWING MORE SPOUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN AFM PROGRAMS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WILL BE INCREASED PAPERWORK, A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY THAT A FULL-TIME FSH POSITION WAS "TEMPORARILY" CONVERTED TO TWO HALF-TIME PIT POSITIONS, AND POTENTIALLY HIGHER ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS FOR TWO EMPLOYEES RATHER THAN ONE, PROBLEMS PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED WHEN YOUR EMBASSY FIRST MADE THIS REQUEST.
5. THE DEPARTMENT WILL DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH SEOUL'S ADMIN COUNSELOR WHEN HE VISITS WASHINGTON.
6. ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN OUR MEETINGS ARE IN FAVOR OF SPLITTING THESE POSITIONS AND USING THEM FOR

TWO DEPENDENTS WHERE IT MEETS THE NEEDS OF THE POST. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT IT CAN BE DONE USING THE PIT CATEGORY. AT THIS POINT, THEN, THERE SEEMS NO NEED TO PRESENT THIS AS A FULL DISSENT CHANNEL CASE TO THE SECRETARY AND OTHER PRINCIPALS UNLESS YOU WOULD LIKE US TO DO SO.

7. I APPRECIATE YOUR BRINGING THIS ISSUE TO MY ATTENTION AND TO THE ATTENTION OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED. IF YOU BELIEVE WE CAN OR SHOULD DO ANYTHING FURTHER, PLEASE LET ME KNOW.
SHULTZ

PK

*LN.
→ Let me have this
back with dissent*

*msg, pls.
Dul
GI*

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 Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BONN 18771 01 OF 02 101526Z

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BONN 18771 01 OF 02 101526Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3022

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 18771

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: ASEC, PINS, GW

SUBJECT: PLANNED ATTACKS ON LUFTHANSA

REF: A) STATE 269245, B) BONN 18742

1. I HAD A HALF-HOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AT NOON TODAY. GENSCHER REFERRED TO YESTERDAY'S CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT AND VON STADEN AND EXPRESSED THANKS FOR OUR CONFIRMATION OF THE INFORMATION THE GERMANS HAD RECEIVED ABOUT POSSIBLE THREATS TO LUFTHANSA. HE ASKED IF THE ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ON THE CASE WHICH THE DEPARTMENT HAD MENTIONED TO VON STADEN WAS YET AVAILABLE. I SAID WE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED IT BUT WOULD GET IT TO HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. (SINCE MY MEETING WITH GENSCHER WE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION AND ARE NOW PASSING IT TO HIM.)

2. GENSCHER DESCRIBED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE EXTENSIVE ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES BOTH WITHIN GERMANY AND ABROAD THAT HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT. HE NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN DIFFICULTIES WITH ALGERIA AND SAID A DELEGATION HEADED BY A STATE SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WOULD BE GOING TO ALGERIA AT THE WEEKEND FOR MEETINGS ON THE SUBJECT. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, GENSCHER SAID LIBYA HAD PROVED MOST COOPERATIVE IN RESPONDING TO FRG REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN SECURITY MATTERS.

3. TURNING TO THE READ-VON STADEN CONVERSATION, GENSCHER REFERRED TO OUR INTENTION TO ADVISE US GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL TO REFRAIN FROM USING LUFTHANSA. HE ALSO NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE TRAVELING PUBLIC AS A FACTOR IN OUR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. GENSCHER SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FROM VON STADEN'S REPORTING THAT THE DEPARTMENT THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF THE FRG WERE TO ISSUE A WARNING NOTICE FIRST. HE COMMENTED THAT THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN WOULD NOT MAKE THINGS EASY FOR TERRORISTS, BUT OF COURSE NO ONE COULD GUARANTEE COMPLETE SAFETY FROM THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE THREATS. HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD US CONCERNS, HE STRESSED. IN THE MATTER OF A WARNING NOTICE TO THE US PUBLIC, HE MADE TWO POINTS. ONE, TERRORISTS WOULD SEE FROM THE ISSUANCE OF SUCH A WARNING THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO EXERT PRESSURES ON AIRLINES GENERALLY, INCLUDING US LINES. THIS WAS A FACTOR THAT WE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WISH TO CONSIDER. TWO, HE ASKED THAT, IN CONSIDERING WHETHER TO ISSUE A STATEMENT OF OUR OWN, WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE STATEMENT WHICH THE FRG WAS ABOUT TO ISSUE. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE READ-VON STADEN CONVERSATION THAT A FRG STATEMENT MIGHT ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR

A US ONE. (GENSCHER DID NOT, HOWEVER, SPECIFICALLY REQUEST THAT US NOT REPEAT NOT ISSUE A STATEMENT.) GENSCHER THEN READ ME THE TEXT OF THE GERMAN STATEMENT (SENT SEPTEL).

4. COMMENT: ON THE FRG STATEMENT, GENSCHER STRESSED THE POINTS THAT THE FRG TOOK THE THREAT SERIOUSLY AND THAT IT HAD INSTITUTED ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. HE THEN REITERATED HIS REQUEST THAT THE USG TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FRG STATEMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN ISSUED AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE READ-VON STADEN CONVERSATION.

5. I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT OUR CONVERSATION AND THAT I BELIEVED THE FRG STATEMENT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO US. I ADDED THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT WE PLANNED TO DO AS REGARDS A STATEMENT, BUT THAT I WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BONN 18771 02 OF 02 101523Z
ACTION SS-25

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 18771

EXDIS

THIS POINT AS SOON AS WE HAD ANYTHING TO ADD. I ASKED HOW SERIOUSLY THE FRG TOOK THE THREATS AND GENSCHER CONFIRMED THAT THESE WERE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY INDEED. I ASKED IF THE FRG HAD ANY MORE PRECISE IDEAS ON POSSIBLE TIMING OF A TERRORIST ATTACK. GENSCHER SAID THEY HAD RECEIVED DIFFERENT VERSIONS ON TIMING, ONE THAT AN ATTACK WOULD BE AFTER THE 15TH, ANOTHER THAT IT WOULD BE BEFORE THE 14TH. HE SAID HE WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT THE FORMER WAS THE MORE LIKELY POSSIBILITY, BUT HE DID NOT CLARIFY THE BASIS FOR THIS JUDGMENT.

6. GENSCHER WAS RELAXED AND CALM THROUGHOUT OUR MEETING, WHICH WAS JAMMED INTO A BREAK IN HIS BILATERAL TALKS WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DE GUIRINGAUD.

7. IN LIGHT OF MY MEETING WITH GENSCHER AND THE GERMAN STATEMENT, WE WILL, ONLY, REPEAT ONLY, IF ASKED, STATE THAT THE MATTER OF THE THREATS TO LUFTHANSA IS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON, AND WE WILL NOT, REPEAT NOT, PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTION, BASE A STATEMENT ON REF A PARA 3.

8. I HAVE NOW SEEN THE ADDITIONAL MATERIAL WHICH WE GAVE THE GERMANS AND HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT DOES NOT ADD APPRECIABLY OR SUBSTANTIVELY TO PREVIOUS INFORMATION AVAILABLE.
STOESSEL

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE
AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

7/15 | -
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Nov. 11, 1976

Dear Mr. Lord,

Thank you for informing me of the SY story in the newsletter, which will inform employees that their participation in third-party interviews is voluntary. The degree of resistance which SY has shown to admitting the voluntary aspect indicates how unenthusiastic SY is about informing employees of their rights. I can think of no reason why this information should not have been routinely communicated to employees, except that SY might then find employees not participating in interviews which would in turn mean that some SY officers would have to start doing some useful work instead of collecting gossip. A colleague of mine just read his SY file and found yards and yards of reports filled with such significant data as, "Mr X, s wife is short and fat."

In view of SY's reluctance in this field; and knowing that not all employee's will remember the newsletter story the next time they are interviewed by SY, could you find out whether the SY manual for SY officers is being amended to require SY to inform employees at the beginning of interviews of the voluntary nature of the situation? The SY manual now contains an indication that the interviews are voluntary, but the manual is classified and I suspect SY officers will continue not to inform employees unless SY specifically orders officers to do so as the first step in the interview. I would prefer that employees be asked to sign a statement along the lines: "At the beginning of an interview by SY Officer X, I was informed that my participation was voluntary."

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PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 205296
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DRAFTED BY: S/P:RJHEITZKE
APPROVED BY: S/P:RJHEITZKE
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DISSENT CHANNEL//

FOLLOWING REPEAT BUENOS AIRES 6275 ACTION SECSTATE 11 AUG 78.

QUOTE: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 6275

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS SHUM, AR, HPOL, PIHT
SUBJECT PROPOSED VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY ARGENTINE NAVY JUNTA MEMBER AND CINC MASSERA

REF: A USDAO MESSAGE 021233Z AUG 78 (NOTAL)
B BUENOS AIRES 5699; C) CNO 101415Z AUG 78

1. DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. THE FOLLOWING IS AN ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE PROPOSAL FOR THE US CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TO INVITE ARGENTINE NAVY JUNTA MEMBER ADMIRAL MASSERA TO THE US FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT, PREPARED BY POLITICAL OFFICER [REDACTED] THIS MESSAGE HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THIS MISSION AND IT REPRESENTS SOLELY A PERSONAL VIEW. DRAFTER DESIRES DISTRIBUTION TO ARA, HA, CNO AND USCINCSO.

2. ISSUE ----
RETIRING ARGENTINE JUNTA MEMBER AND NAVY CINC ADMIRAL MASSERA HAS REQUESTED A SERVICE TO SERVICE INVITATION FROM THE US CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS PRIOR TO HIS RETIREMENT ABOUT SEPTEMBER 15, 1978. THE US CNO'S RESPONSE TO THE INVITATION REQUEST (REF C) SHOULD HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT A NUMBER OF COMPLICATED POLITICAL FACTORS WHICH HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH WITHIN THE EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES BUT WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN ADDRESSED IN A MESSAGE TO THE DEPARTMENT NOR IN EMBASSY'S SHORT COMMENT TO THE MILITARY GROUPS MESSAGE TO THE CNO AND USCINCSO (REF B).

3. BACKGROUND ---
IN EARLY JULY NAVY DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL LUCHETTA APPROACHED EMBASSY ON POLITICAL LEVEL TO DISCUSS ARRANGING MEETINGS FOR ADMIRAL MASSERA WITH SENIOR USG OFFICIALS DURING PROPOSED PRIVATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AT CONCLUSION OF MASSERAS VISIT TO VENEZUELA. LOCAL PRESS IN MID JULY CARRIED STORY THAT MASSERA PLANNED TO UNDERGO EXTENSIVE MEDICAL EXAMINATION AT WALTER REED HOSPITAL. ON JULY 19 LUCHETTA CALLED ON AMBASSADOR REGARDING ARRANGING US MEETINGS AND IN ABSENCE DEPARTED ENCOURAGEMENT SAYING HE BELIEVED VISIT WOULD BE CANCELLED. SUBSEQUENTLY LUCHETTA INFORMED EMBASSY POLOFF THAT MASSERA VISIT HAD BEEN CALLED OFF ON: "RETEXT OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM EX. 1. HAS CREDIT REFUSAL.

RTW

NAVY THEN TURNED FROM EMBASSY TO US NAVY CHANNELS TO PURSUE THE INVITATION. THE NEXT DAY, ON JULY 20, ADMIRAL MASSERA INFORMED THE US NAVY'S MILITARY GROUP COMMANDER THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE AN INVITATION FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TO VISIT THE US AS HEAD OF THE ARGENTINE NAVY PRIOR TO HIS RETIREMENT ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1978. THE FOLLOWING DAY, ADMIRAL LUCHETTA REPEATED THE REQUEST FOR AN INVITATION TO US NAVY MILGROUP CHIEF.

ON AUGUST 3, AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION WITHIN THE EMBASSY A PERSONAL TELEGRAM FROM THE FORMER US NAVY MILGRP CHIEF TO THE CNO AND USCINCSO RECOMMENDING THAT MASSERA BE INVITED WAS RELEASED WITH A SHORT EMBASSY COMMENT OF NONCURRENCE (SEE PARA 5, REFTEL B). ON AUGUST 9, ADMIRAL LUCHETTA INFORMED POLOFF THAT IF ARGENTINE NAVY DID NOT RECEIVE POSITIVE REPLY WITHIN A WEEK TO THE REQUEST FOR AN INVITATION FOR ADMIRAL MASSERA, ARGENTINE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITAS EXERCISE WOULD BE CANCELLED. HE NOTED THAT ARGENTINE NAVY SAW UNITAS PRIMARILY AS A POLITICAL EVENT. ON AUGUST 01, SHORT MESSAGE FROM CNO TO NAVAL ATTACHE HERE WAS RECEIVED DECLINING TO ISSUE INVITATION ON BASIS OF EMBASSY'S COMMENT (REF C).

4. DISCUSSION ---

THE SURFACE ISSUE IS WHETHER ADMIRAL MASSERA SHOULD BE INVITED TO THE US AS A GUEST OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE UNDERLYING ISSUE IS HOW THE USG SHOULD DEAL WITH THE ARGENTINE NAVY AND THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL OPPOSITION (MASSERA BEING LEADING REPRESENTATIVE OF BOTH). THE PROBLEM FOR THE POLICY MAKER IS THAT EXTENDING THE INVITATION WILL DISTURB THE ARMY INNER CORE WHO HAVE THE FINAL SAY HERE; BUT NOT EXTENDING THE INVITATION WILL ANGER THE NAVY AND MASSERA WHO HAVE BEEN ADVOCATING INITIATIVES IN LINE WITH OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY OBJECTIVES.

5. THIS QUESTION IS FILLED WITH STRAWMEN ARGUMENTS. HERE ARE A FEW FOR EXTENDING THE INVITATION:

- A) NOT TO EXTEND THE INVITATION WILL BE SEEN BOTH AS ANOTHER SLAP AT THE NAVY AND FURTHER CONFIRMATION THAT THE USG AND THIS EMBASSY ARE TILTED TOWARDS THE ARMY'S VIDELA-VIOLA POWER CENTER.
- B) MASSERA IS THE MOST CAPABLE, RESOURCEFUL, INTELLIGENT, AND CHARISMATIC POLITICAL FIGURE IN ARGENTINA TODAY. HE IS ALSO AN OVERLY AMBITIOUS, PROMISE-THEN-ANYTHING POLITICIAN, WITHOUT ANY FIRM IDEOLOGICAL CAST.) THAT THE USG SHOULD CULTIVATE PROMINENT ARGENTINE OPPOSITION POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS AGREED. THIS EMBASSY HAS JUST RECOMMENDED THAT THE DEPARTMENT RECEIVE FORMER ARGENTINE PRESIDENT LANUSSE DURING HIS PRIVATE VISIT TO THE US AT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL DUE TO HIS IMPORTANCE AS A FUTURE POLITICAL LEADER (SEE BUENOS AIRES 5932). MASSERA IS MUCH MORE POLITICALLY IMPORTANT. HE HAS CAREFULLY CULTIVATED WIDE SUPPORT AMONG FORMER PERONISTS, TRADE UNION LEADERS, AND OTHER SMALLER OPPOSITION GROUPS. HE IS IMPORTANT AND SHOULD BE CULTIVATED, NOT OFFENDED.

C) MASSERA HAS TAKEN THE LEAD WITHIN THE JUNTA, AND (INCREASINGLY IN PUBLIC, TO SUPPORT KEY ISSUES TIED TO IMPROVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. SPECIFICALLY, HE HAS URGED THAT THE MILITARY FORCES RECOGNIZE PUBLICLY THEIR SECRET PRISONERS, THAT THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION BE INVITED TO VISIT ARGENTINA, THAT THE JUNTA HAND DOWN FIRM SENTENCES OR RELEASE PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION BY THE GOVERNMENT'S STATE OF SIEGE POWERS

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 205296

OR BY ITS BILL OF ATTAINDER AUTHORITY UNDER THE ACTA INSTITUCIONAL, THAT JACOBDO THERMAN BE RELEASED, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, HE HAS PUBLICLY PROPOSED THAT THE MILITARY SERVICE PUBLISH A LIST OF "THOSE KILLED IN BATTLE" IN THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION. MASSERA HAS TAKEN THESE POSITIONS BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THEY ARE GOOD POLITICAL ISSUES IN ARGENTINA, BUT THEY ARE ALSO PROPOSALS THAT WE SUPPORT AS KEY ELEMENTS IN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS EFFORTS HERE. A FLAT LOW-LEVEL REJECTION OF THE NAVY-TO-NAVY VISIT BY THE ONLY OFFICIAL IN THE JUNTA WHO INDEPENDENTLY HAS SUPPORTED A NUMBER OF OUR KEY POLICY CONCERNS HERE, INVITES (PERHAPS DEMANDS) LESS FUTURE EFFORT FROM HIM ON THESE ISSUES. WE SHOULD BE RECOGNIZING AND ENCOURAGING HIS ACTIONS.

D) ALTHOUGH THE ARMY WILL NOT BE PLEASED WITH A MASSERA INVITATION, IT WILL NOT BE A MAJOR DETERMINANT OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE US. IN COMPARISON TO THE US'S CLOSING DOWN THE EXIM WINDOW, ASSISTANT SECRETARY DEBIAIS'S STRAIGHT FORWARD TESTIMONY ON ARGENTINA ON AUGUST 9 AND THE UPCOMING RUIPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT WHICH WILL CLOSE THE MILITARY SUPPLY DOORS, AN INVITATION TO MASSERA WILL BE A SMALL EVENT FELT PRINCIPALLY AMONG THE ARGENTINE ARMY'S LEADERSHIP. BUT A REJECTION, UNLESS MOST CAREFULLY HANDLED, COULD WELL BE AN EMBITTERING EVENT FOR THE ADMIRAL.

6. RECOMMENDATION --

AMIDST ALL THE STRAWMEN, THERE IS ONE ARGUMENT WHICH STANDS OUT. GENTLEMEN (AND ESPECIALLY DIPLOMATS AND NAVAL OFFICERS) NEVER UNINTENTIONALLY INSULT. FOR OVER A MONTH, HERE AND IN WASHINGTON, THE ARGENTINE NAVY HAS BEEN SIGNALING FOR SOME SORT OF A MASSERA VISIT. WE ARE PROPOSING A CURT RESPONSE. SWEEPING ASIDE ALL THE ARGUMENTS, WE ARE ABOUT TO INSULT (PERHAPS UNINTENTIONALLY) THE ADMIRAL AND THE ARGENTINE NAVY. WE CAN DO BETTER.

THE CNO SHOULD PREFERABLY EXTEND THE INVITATION OR ALTERNATIVELY CONVEY A "GOLDEN TURNDOWN" WITH A PERSONAL LETTER AND/OR PHONE CALL EXPRESSING HOPE THAT FUTURE MEETINGS CAN BE ARRANGED WITH THE CNO AND SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS. IN ADDITION, THE CNO SHOULD CONSIDER AN EARLY INVITATION TO MASSERA'S SUCCESSOR, ADMIRAL LANDRUSCHINI (WHOSE DAUGHTER WAS RECENTLY KILLED IN BOHB ATTACK HERE).

7. CONCLUSION --

THE MAJOR ISSUE WHICH THIS RUSHED CABLE DOES NOT ADDRESS IS HOW THE USG SHOULD DEAL WITH OPPOSITION AND HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS IN ARGENTINA TO PROMOTE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER POLICY OBJECTIVES.

MASSERA IS OPENLY STARTING AN OPPOSITION MOVEMENT HERE. HE IS SPEAKING EVERYDAY, CAREFULLY SEPARATING HIMSELF FROM THE VIDELA GOVERNMENT ON TWO ISSUES--THE ECONOMY AND POLITICAL NORMALIZATION. HE, NO DOUBT, SEES A HIGH VISIBILITY VISIT TO THE US AS OF IMPORTANCE TO HIS POLITICAL PLANS. OUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY TAILORED BY THE FUTURE DIPLOMATIC PATHS WE WILL WISH TO FOLLOW HERE. AT A MINIMUM, WE SHOULD KEEP OUR OPTIONS OPEN.

OUR COLD SHOULDERING OF THE MASSERA INVITATION IS NOT THE SKILLFUL RESPONSE, I BELIEVE THE SITUATION DEMANDS. END HARRIS MESSAGE.
CASTRO

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN
PART B6

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S/P: CALLEGRONE:AG
8/17/81 EXT 22972
S/P: JROCHE

S/P: CFAIRBANKS

ROUTINE BONN

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [] FROM S/P ROCHE

E.O. 11652: GDS, 8/17/86 (ROCHE, JAMES)

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE - SOUTH LEBANON

REFERENCE : *Bonn 15901*

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE HAS STIMULATED CONSIDERABLE HEALTHY DISCUSSION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT. UNFORTUNATELY, SEVERAL MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON HAVE FORCED DELAYS IN PREPARING A COORDINATED REPLY ADDRESSING THE ISSUES YOU HAVE RAISED.

3. PLEASE ACCEPT OUR SINCERE APOLOGIES FOR THE UNDUE DELAY IN COMPLETING OUR SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. THE RESPONSE SHOULD BE READY SHORTLY.

4. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT THE DELAY IN NO WAY REFLECTS ANY DIMINUTION IN THE DEPARTMENT'S COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING THE PRINCIPLE OF CREATIVE AND DISCIPLINED DISSENT ENVISIONED IN THE DISSENT CHANNEL SYSTEM. YY

JR
CA
CF

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S/P ONLY

ROUTINE BUDAPEST

STADIS
DISSENT CHANNEL, FOR [REDACTED] FROM LAKE-S/P

E.O. 11652: N.A.

TAGS: SHUM, HU

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY

REF: A. BUDAPEST 437. B. BUDAPEST 747

I. I REGRET THAT, DUE TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR, YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY WAS NOT ACKNOWLEDGED UNTIL NOW. MR. GRANVILLE AUSTIN OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE COORDINATOR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. 44

TL
MAC *MAC*
GA *GA*
SV *SV*
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To SP [redacted] June 13, 1977
From [redacted] ILO Delegation, Geneva

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IN PART B6

I disagree with the Dept's telegram (135340) stating the agreement on the Blanchard letter is a success. I think it is a defeat, for the following reasons:

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I. Arab vs. US substantive objectives, on the Arab-Israeli issue: the Arabs won.

A. background/chronology :

1. the Director General's report as issued was acceptable to us, in the section dealing with this subject.
2. The Arabs wanted to keep the 1974 resolution alive, either by introducing a new resolution, or by having the Director General make some statement about it (see events in early May, when Arabs were trying to introduce a resolution before the May 15 deadline; see also Tripoli conference.)
3. The Arabs ultimately did not introduce a new resolution; therefore we must focus on the DG letter as it relates to the Arab objective of keeping the 1974 resolution alive.

Draft One was acceptable to us, but rejected by the Arabs.

Draft Two was rejected by us, but accepted by the Arabs (see reporting telegram, 4554 para 2, quoting USREP Horowitz' statement at staff meeting morning of June 9, in which he stated that a tripartite USDEL had told Blanchard that Draft Two was unacceptable because the wording gave life to the 1974 resolution; the Govt of Israel also had rejected it).

Draft Three was acceptable to us, but rejected by the Arabs. Draft Four was unacceptable to us, but accepted by the Arabs.

Draft Four became the final letter. We are on record as accepting it, by our silence when the President of the ILC asked if there were any objections.

B. Assessment: in the contest between the US and the Arabs to see whether the DG's statement on the issue (substitute for a resolution) would be theirs or ours, we lost, according to the statement of the USREP the morning of June 9, reporting the views of the tripartite USDEL. Subsequent to the issuance of the final letter, some press accounts have apparently said it was a victory for the US (even though the USREP in Geneva refused to comment - see USIS telegram of June 13). Also the Dept issued a telegram saying the Blanchard letter was a success. Neither the press nor the Dept was fully informed of the sequence of events and therefore these first-reaction comments are not necessarily final. I hope that when the Department is fully informed, and when it reads this dissent memo, the Department will re-assess the outcome on this issue and come to a different conclusion.

II. The second reason for saying the agreement on the letter is a defeat is that in the context of our reform efforts we have been urging our friends to stand by their principles and not give in to pressure or go along with bloc solidarity. The moderate Arabs agreed with us on Draft Three but the radical Arabs pressured them; the moderates gave in.

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the best scenario would have been the the DG's original report on the issue have been allowed to stand, with no supplementary statement letter. The ILC President would then either have had to rule any Arab resolution out of order, or give in to pressure and allow a resolution. Either way, we should have had a test case, which would have let us see how all countries, not just the Arabs, would behave. No doubt they are all greatly relieved at having been let off the hook by our

accepting the letter; they did not have to stand up and be counted, even though we had told them that we would be seeking their public support on this issue.

Again, a defeat for a basic US objective.

. Another defeat: we have been telling Blanchard that we expect to take strong stands to have the ILO adhere to basic principles. He had reached agreement on Draft Three and he had signed it as the "final" letter, and he had told the Arabs he could do no more. Under pressure from the Arabs, he gave in, which is the pattern he has followed in the past, surrendering to whichever bloc pushes him the hardest. Although the USREP has said the final letter was the best we could get, and anyway it was not our letter but Blanchard's, I disagree on both points: we do not know what would have happened if we had rejected Draft Four - we might have won; and in any case it was no longer Blanchard's letter from the time he first showed someone a draft and began making changes in response to pressure.

Since Blanchard caved in, this was a defeat. Also, our credibility was weakened since apparently the USREP and other members of the UDEL accepted a promise from Blanchard that in return for our going along with the Arab version of the letter, he would state in 1978 and 1979 that he had taken no more steps on the 1974 resolution. We therefore participated in his decision to go along with the Arabs and must share responsibility with him by our having entered into negotiations with him - shared in his ~~decision~~ decision to surrender to Arab pressure. We could have told him we rejected the letter, and let him deal with the consequences.

IV. Linkage; there is implicit in remarks made by the USREP at several staff meetings and reported in several telegrams that there is an informal but clear linkage between the final outcome on the Arab-Israeli letter and progress on Article 17, i.e., we held up any action on Article 17 in hopes the Blanchard letter would be acceptable to the Arabs and ~~that~~ we let the Arabs know that by our accepting the Arab language in the letter, they in turn should be helpful on Article 17.

This kind of linkage-bargain-package is precisely *what* we have been telling Blanchard and others is unacceptable because we want each issue treated on its merits.

DJT
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 ACTION SP-02 JIDDA 01322 181468Z

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C O N F I D E N T I A L JIDDA 1322

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SA
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE - POLICY ON KIDNAPPING OF
DIPLOMATS AND RANSOM

REF: JIDDA 057 JIDDA 1037

THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF
[REDACTED] IT IS REQUESTED THAT IT BE DIS-
TRIBUTED AT THE APPROPRIATE POLICY LEVELS IN THE
DEPARTMENT.

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SUMMARY: WHILE I SHARE THE CONCERN OF THE ORIGINATORS
OF REPEL, MY DEEP PERSONAL CONSIDERATION OF THE
DANGEROUS POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A POLICY THAT REWARDS
TERRORISTS OR KIDNAPPERS IN ANY WAY FORCES ME TO
EXPRESS THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND OPINIONS THAT CON-
FLICT WITH THE SUGGESTION OF RESPECTED COLLEAGUES TO
CHANGE THE PRESENT POLICY. I DO, HOWEVER, BELIEVE
THAT THE U.S. ANTI-TERRORIST POLICY HAS BEEN
REMISED IN THE LACK OF PUNITIVE AFTER-ACTION
WHICH, I FEEL, IS EXPECTED, WOULD ALSO DETER
TERRORISM AGAINST MY COLLEAGUES. END SUMMARY.

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PAGE 02

JIDDA 21322 161458Z

1. THERE WAS A TIME WHEN A PERSON WITH DUBIOUS CLAIMS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP, MOTIVATED A STATEMENT BY ONE OF OUR LEADERS, "I WANT PEROTICARIS ALIVE OR RASULLI DEAD," WHICH STRUCK A COMBINATION OF FEAR AND RESPECT IN THE HEARTS OF, RESPECTIVELY, FOES OR FRIENDS. THE RESCUE OF THE CREW OF THE MV YAGQUEZ RECENTLY, THOUGH AN ILL-HANDLED AND ILL-TIMED EXERCISE IN THE FAR EAST, CAUSED A BURST OF PRIDE FOR EVERY AMERICAN.

2. THE PAYMENT OF A RANSOM OR ACQUIESCENCE TO ANY DEMANDS FOR THE SAFE RETURN OF OUR PERSONNEL IN MY OPINION MAKES US Pawns AND CAN ONLY MAKE US MORE ATTRACTIVE AND VULNERABLE TRADING COMMODITIES FOR THE FRUSTRATED AND NON-FRUSTRATED MADMEN OF THIS WORLD. THE SACRIFICES, THUS FAR, TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NO RANSOM HAVE BEEN DEEP Hurts. I KNEW CURT MOORE, CLEO NOEL, AND BOB WARING WELL. FRANK MELOY, MY DCM IN ITALY, WAS THE ULTIMATE GENTLEMAN. ALL OF THESE AND THE OTHERS SACRIFICED FOR A PRINCIPLE WOULD BE DEEMED IF NOW THE POLICY WERE TO CHANGE. THEY DIED FOR SOMETHING. IT WAS NOT TO REWARD THE TERRORISTS OF THE PRESENT AND CERTAINLY NOT FOR THE TERRORISTS OF THE FUTURE. A CHANGE OF POLICY WOULD BE A MOCKERY TO THEIR MEMORIES, IF IT WERE TO ACCRUE IN ANY WAY TO THE ELEMENT OF RANSOM. WHETHER WE REALIZE IT OR NOT, WE ARE THE "SOLDIERS ON THE FRONT LINE" AS EULOGISTS HAVE POINTED OUT. WE SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE DANGERS AND BE ABLE TO ENDURE THE PROSPECT OF RISKS. WE ARE VOLUNTEERS IN A SENSE. THE ONLY THING I FEEL WORTHY OF IS TO ACCEPT THE SAME CONDITIONS IN THE HOPE AND BELIEF THAT THEIR SACRIFICE DEMONSTRATED THE USELESSNESS OF THE TERRORISM.

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PAGE 03 JIDDA 01322 161459Z

3. WHAT MORE CAN WE DO? THE CRISIS HERE MET WITH QUIET DIPLOMACY AND TENDER EXPRESSIONS OF REGRET, TINGED WITH DISMAY OF THE HORRORS. IN MANY CASES WE KNEW OR KNOW WHERE THE TERRORISTS ARE AND THE PERSONS IN POWER IN THE COUNTRY OF THE OFFENSE WHO LET THE MURDERERS GO ARE THE SAME, EXCEPT THAT THEY ARE NOW POTENTIAL AID RECIPIENTS. THE MISSING FACTOR IN OUR POLICY TO DETER TERRORISTIC CRIMES AGAINST OUR SERVICE AND OUR CITIZENS HAS BEEN ABSENCE OF ANY FORCEFUL RETRIBUTION. WE CAN STILL SPEAK SOFTLY BUT WE NEED THAT BIG STICK IN TODAY'S WORLD. FOR WHATEVER IT MIGHT BE WORTH, I SUGGEST AN OFFICIAL DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM, THE CREATION OF AN ELITE CORPS OF RESCUERS WITHIN OUR MILITARY SERVICES, THE ISSUANCE OF WEAPONS IN SPECIAL SITUATIONS TO MEMBERS OF OUR SERVICE AND BOLD PUBLICITY ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS THAT WE INTEND TO FIGHT BACK AND PROTECT EVERY AMERICAN, OFFICIAL OR PRIVATE, AND THOSE WHO SERVE US ABROAD SUCH AS THAT WONDERFUL PERSON [REDACTED] IN BEIRUT AND THE HUNDREDS OF OTHERS NOW COMMITTED TO US WITHOUT BENEFIT OF CITIZENSHIP.

B6

4. WHY THIS EMPHASIS ON RETRIBUTION? BECAUSE SOME TERRORISTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO PERFORM THEIR DEEDS NOT FOR MONEY OR RANSOM OR RELEASE OF CO-TERRORISTS, BUT TO DRAW THE WORLD'S ATTENTION TO WHAT THEY CONSIDER POLITICAL INJUSTICE OR FRUSTRATIONS. PERHAPS THE ONLY DETERRENT FOR THESE IS THE THREAT OF RETRIBUTION.

PORTER

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TERRORISM AGAINST MY COLLEAGUES. END SUMMARY.
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S/P: HJONES: CJR
5/18/84: X2972
S/P: P. RODMAN

S/P: JREINERTSON

PRIORITY SEOUL

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [] FROM S/P, PETER RODMAN

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: APER

SUBJECT: FAMILY EMPLOYMENT AT POST: SHARED AFM POSITIONS

REF: SEOU: 5127

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE DEALING WITH SHARED AFM POSITIONS AND FAMILY EMPLOYMENT AT POST.
2. BEFORE MAKING THE USUAL DISTRIBUTION OF YOUR MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY AND OTHER PRINCIPALS, WE ARE TRYING TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE YOU HAVE RAISED THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM HAS ALSO BEEN GIVEN A COPY OF YOUR MESSAGE AND IS MONITORING ITS RESOLUTION. MY SPECIAL ASSISTANT WILL BE WORKING ON IT DIRECTLY.
3. I HOPE TO BE BACK IN TOUCH WITHIN A WEEK OR SO. IN THE MEANTIME, I COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL.

HJ
PWR
JR

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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B6

send to NVB

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

June 1, 1977

*file
dissent*

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[Redacted]

American Embassy
Jidda

Dear [Redacted]

I think you deserve a word of explanation for our long delay in responding to your dissent message on terrorism sent last February.

As you know from our acknowledgment, I am the coordinator for a reply. We have been trying manfully to get a reply to Ambassador Porter's earlier message of January 25 and then we thought we would try our hand at a reply to you. Not having succeeded in answering the Ambassador, we are not getting very far in answering your message.

The terrorist experts are going to talk to Ambassador Porter this week when he is in the Department. We are about to undertake a review of terrorist policy and the ideas which you and he have sent us will naturally be considered. Your own interest in protecting Foreign Service personnel is of course a major priority in our consideration although exactly how we do this in a new policy remains to be worked out.

This is not an official reply to your message but you will be receiving one in due course. I thought you would like to know that although the Department is slow it rarely forgets.

Sincerely,

Richard B. Finn
Member
Policy Planning Staff

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Department of State

PAGE 01 STATE 000002
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E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: CGEN

SUBJECT: STATEMENT ON MOTOR TRAVEL IN SINALOA, MEXICO
FOR ACTION INS DUTY COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER
REFERENCE: DE WITT/HUDSON TELECON OF DECEMBER 31.

1. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS ISSUED A PRESS RELEASE CONCERNING THE RISKS TO AMERICAN TOURISTS OF MOTOR TRAVEL IN SINALOA, MEXICO. PLEASE RELAY THIS RELEASE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ALL INS AND CUSTOMS OFFICES ON THE U. S. - MEXICAN BORDER SO THAT USG OFFICIALS WILL HAVE AVAILABLE THIS INFORMATION FOR AMERICAN TOURISTS CONTEMPLATING MOTOR TRAVEL IN THE STATE OF SINALOA.

2. TEXT OF STATEMENT:
"MOTOR TRAVEL IN STATE OF SINALOA.

"WHILE LARGE NUMBERS OF AMERICANS HAVE SAFE AND ENJOYABLE VACATIONS IN MEXICO AND CAN EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO ENJOY THE TRADITIONAL MEXICAN HOSPITALITY, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF AMERICAN TOURISTS TRAVELING IN OR THROUGH THE STATE OF SINALOA IN WESTERN MEXICO.

"SINCE MAY 1976 THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL INCIDENTS INVOLVING HIGHWAY ROBBERY AND VIOLENT ASSAULT OF AMERICAN TRAVELERS BY ARMED BANDITS MOSTLY ON HIGHWAY 15 NEAR THE CITY OF CULIACAN IN THE STATE OF SINALOA. THESE INCIDENTS INCLUDE THREE DEATHS IN THE PAST MONTH AND TWO MOTORISTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED MISSING. GENERALLY MOTORISTS HAVE SUFFERED THE LOSS OF ALL OF THEIR POSSESSIONS INCLUDING THEIR VEHICLES.

"THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES. THE OFFICIALS OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT RECENTLY CONVEYED TO UNITED STATES EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN MEXICO CITY THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO INSTITUTE NEW MEASURES IMMEDIATELY TO ASSURE TOURISTS' SAFE AND PLEASANT TRAVEL' ACCORDING TO THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT THERE WILL BE A NEW AND UNIQUE SYSTEM OF TOURIST PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE FROM THE BORDER AT NOGALES THROUGH HERMOSILLO TO MAZATLAN. THE FEATURES OF THIS SYSTEM INCLUDE HANDOUTS TO TOURISTS AT THE BORDER INDICATING APPROPRIATE PLACES TO STAY AND HOW TO CONTACT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES FOR ASSISTANCE, AND IMMEDIATE INCREASE OF THE PATROLLING 'GREEN ANGEL' TOURIST ASSISTANCE UNITS FROM 5 TO 15.
ROBINSON

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5010-107
 JULY 1973 EDITION
 GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*Memorandum**Record copy*RELEASE IN PART
B6

TO : ARA/PPC - Mr. Peter Johnson

DATE: July 6, 1977.

FROM : ARA/CAR -

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SUBJECT: Procedures For Release of Unclassified and LOU Material

Presidential Review Memorandum NSC-29 directed that a new Executive Order be prepared to replace Executive Order 11652. Points to be considered by the drafting committee included:

- How to provide for the maximum release of information to the American public on government activities and policies consistent with the need to protect sensitive national security information;
- How to promote increased public access to this information through a more rapid and systematic declassification program;
- Overlaps between the new Executive Order and the Freedom of Information Act as amended and the Privacy Act; and
- Which information requires protection and for how long, and what criteria should be used in making this judgment.

In view of the above, I would appreciate receiving guidance on procedures for releasing unclassified and LOU material. I understand that unclassified material can be released by the appropriate office. I am not sure what "the appropriate office" is, and I would appreciate guidelines as to who can release unclassified cables, stating specifically what the procedure is for material originating here and overseas, as well as material which may involve more than one office.

The question is relevant to our handling of FOIA requests as well as in situations where an officer might wish to release an unclassified cable to a non-governmental body on his own initiative. This office recently refused to

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UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

release an unclassified memorandum on appeal under the FOIA. Our reason for doing so, while it may have been defensible, was clearly not grounded in a national security argument as contemplated by E.O. 11652, or the material would have been classified. In this regard, I would also appreciate guidelines on how LOU can be released. I understand that there may be legal doctrines of executive privilege which justify a refusal of unclassified and LOU material on other than statutory grounds.

Drafted by: ARA/CAR: DEHenderson:nhm:7/7/77

Clearances: ARA/CAR:RJSurber ARA/C R:TJChavner

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TO: AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
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SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENTIANE 4700

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INFO: HANDLING OF TERMINATION OF H. M. FOR LIGS
1. VIENTIANE 4683 (1915Z 05J) (P)
2. WASHINGTON 4645 (0815Z 05J) (P)
3. VIENTIANE 4683 (0815Z 05J) (P)
INFO: THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION OF A
NATURE THAT IS UNCLASSIFIED AND IS BEING
FORWARDED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
IT IS YOUR POLICY TO NOT DISCLOSE THIS
INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC.
THE INFORMATION IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS
ARE CONTAINED IN THE MESSAGE.
FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THIS TOPIC,
SEE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY
STATEMENT ON THE PROTECTION OF
PERSONAL INFORMATION.
UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE.

ON 22 JUNE 2400Z 01 07 75 (P)
US PURPOSES WE DRAFTED A DIPLOMATIC NOTE (P)
WHICH WE HAD INTENDED TO DELIVER TO THE
OFFICE OF THE
SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, WE RECEIVED THE
MINISTRY'S NOTE OF JUNE 26 (P) IN WHICH IS
RESULTING TERMS AND TERMS NOT ONLY THE
AID AND OTHER USG PROPERTIES BUT AN
ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE, WHICH
IT CONCLUDES WITH A DEMANDS ALL
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS AND DEMANDS
THAT MILITARY PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN
MILITARY ASSISTANCE BE SENT SOON AS
POSSIBLE. (WE BELIEVE POND'S NOTES
WERE USG HISTORY, BUT THERE IS NO
REASON WHY WE CANNOT POND'S NOTE TO
OUR ADVANTAGE. THE POND NOTE
SUGGESTED, AND SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION
(P) WITH

PAGE 1

LE TENER E
VIENTIANE 4700

THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S OFFICE BY
CABINET CONFIRMED THAT WE HAD NO
OBJECTION TO OUR RECEIVING A
RELEASE OFFICE SO LONG AS THAT OFFICE
HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH MILITARY
ASSISTANCE. IN LIGHT OF POND'S
ATTITUDE, WE NOW BELIEVE THERE IS
NEED FOR US TO POND'S A NOTE ON
THE SUBJECT.

PAGE 1
VIETNAM 4700

REIGN MINISTER'S CHIEF DE CASINO STATED THAT
HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO OUR MAINTAINING A DEFENSE
TECHNICAL OFFICE SO LONG AS THAT OFFICE HAD NOTHING TO
DO WITH MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
IN LIGHT OF POND'S ATTITUDE, WE NOW BELIEVE THERE IS
NEED FOR US TO DELIVER A NOTE ON THE SUBJECT. OUR
INTENTION, RATHER, IS TO REMAIN SILENT ON THE SUBJECT
UNLESS WE ARE ASKED BY MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OR MILITARY OFFICERS
SAY WE UNDERSTOOD FROM JUNE 22 NOTE THAT POND WANTS
A MILITARY ASSISTANCE TEAM.
DATE HAS INSTRUCTED THE ONE ATTACHED COMMENTARY RES-
POND IN VIETNAM TO STATE IF ASKED WHAT POND POLICY
EVENTS HIM FROM DEALING WITH ASSISTANCE MATTERS
TO THAT HE CAN ONLY TRANSMIT COMMUNICATIONS ON SUBJECT
THROUGH HIGH RANK OFFICIALS OUTSIDE LAOS. WE WOULD TAKE
CARE TO LINK WITH PRESS, IF ASKED.
WE BELIEVE THIS POSITION IS SOUND AND EMINENTLY
DEFENSIBLE. HOWEVER, IT STILL LEAVES QUESTION OF
UNPLANNED DELIVERIES OF FOOD AND LIMITED POL. THAT
MIGHT BE FINANCED FROM US TO THE LAOSI GOVT.
ON RICE, OUR ORIGINAL THINKING WAS THAT CONTINUED
DELIVERIES TO THE LAOSI AT RATE OF APPROXIMATELY

PAGE 02 VIETNAM 4700 01 02 02 02 02 02
1000 TONS PER MONTH FOR THREE MONTHS IS POSSIBLE
DANGER WAS ADVISABLE FOR TWO REASONS: (A) GREAT TAD
WAS ASSOCIATED WITH US FOR MANY YEARS AND HAD COME TO
DEPEND ON US FOR FOOD. TO END THIS DEPENDENCY WOULD
BE UNWISDOM AND HARMFUL. (B) WE MUST CONSIDER
MINIMIZE POTENTIAL EFFECT TO ELEMENTS OF OUR
PERSONNEL AND THOSE OF OTHER AGENCIES ON LAOS
WHICH WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO TURN TO US FOR
SUPPORT.
THE LONGER WE STAY IN LAOS, HOWEVER, THE STRONG
OUR CONVICTION GROWS THAT THERE IS A NECESSARY
ABILITY AND AMOUNTS TO OUR MAINTAINING AND
OFFERING TO A FORM OF RATION OR WE WOULD BE
IN SUCH A POSITION. IF THIS SITUATION IS
AND WE BELIEVE IT WILL, AT LEAST FOR TIME BEING, WE
MAY BE ABLE TO DO SO WITHOUT HAVING TO PAY A PRICE
OR RICE OR OTHER MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
HAPPEN

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NODIS
DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR FROM WOLFOWITZ

E.O. 12065: GDS

TAGS: PDIP, UNGA, CB, XC, SPEF

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL RESPONSE: US POLICY ON
KAMPUCHEAN RELIEF

REFS: (A) USUN NEW YORK 01086; (B) STATE 060012

1. YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE (REF A) WAS REVIEWED IN S, P, S/P, EA, R/P, AND IO.
2. AS YOU KNOW FROM REF (B), THE RATIONALE FOR OUR CURRENT POLICY IS THE HUMANITARIAN NEED TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF THE KHMER PEOPLE AND THE PREVENTION OF A DESTABILIZING

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PAGE 02 STATE 191043

INFLUX OF REFUGEES INTO THAILAND. WE ESTIMATE THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO CONTINUE RELIEF ASSISTANCE FOR A RELATIVELY BRIEF ADDITIONAL TIME BEFORE KAMPUCHEA REACHES THE POINT WHERE FAMINE AND MASS EXODUS ARE LESS LIKELY. THIS POINT SHOULD BE REACHED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR IF THERE IS A GOOD DECEMBER HARVEST, AS WE EXPECT. TO CEASE AID NOW, HOWEVER, COULD CAUSE A REVERSAL IN OUR EFFORTS JUST AT A TIME WHEN TERMINATION OF THE JOINT MISSION RELIEF PROGRAM IS IN SIGHT.

3. WITH REGARD TO FOOD AID, THE DEPARTMENT AGREES THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO CONTINUE SUCH RELIEF BEYOND THE POINT OF DIRE NECESSITY AND THAT THE KHMER MUST FEND FOR THEMSELVES AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, WE DEMUR FROM YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE "ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF THE RELIEF EFFORT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED" AND THAT NO FURTHER AID IS NOW JUSTIFIED. WHILE THE KHMER HAVE MADE REMARKABLE PROGRESS TOWARD FOOD PRODUCTION LEVELS ADEQUATE FOR SURVIVAL, THE FACT REMAINS THAT TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE THEY WILL PRODUCE IN 1981 ONLY 75 OF THEIR BASIC FOOD NEEDS. RICE PRODUCTION IN 1981 IS NOW PROJECTED TO FALL SOME 230-360,000 TONS SHORT OF MINIMUM NEEDS. WITHOUT LARGE AMOUNTS OF RELIEF FOOD AND PLANTING SEED AT LEAST THROUGH THE END OF THE YEAR, FAMINE WOULD LIKELY RETURN AND THE EFFORTS OF THE PAST TWO YEARS WOULD BE PUT AT RISK AND QUITE POSSIBLY LOST. NEVERTHELESS, OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO COMPLETE THE EMERGENCY RELIEF OPERATION BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. OUR PRESENT SUPPORT FOR LARGE RICE SEED DELIVERIES, IN FACT, IS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO BRING THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT INSIDE KAMPUCHEA TO A CLOSE BY THE END OF 1981. OUR OVERALL BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR THE PROGRAM ALSO REFLECT THIS OBJECTIVE: THE FY 1981 BUDGET OF \$68 MILLION WOULD DROP IN FY 1982 TO \$30 MILLION, MOST OF WHICH WOULD BE USED FOR FEEDING DISPLACED THAI AND KHMER

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PAGE 03 STATE 191043

BORDER REFUGEES. A SIZABLE PORTION OF ANY RESIDUAL ASSISTANCE DELIVERED TO THE BORDER WOULD SUPPORT THOSE DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN RESISTANCE TO THE VIETNAMESE.

4. WE HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY CAREFUL TO DRAW A SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN SURVIVAL ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER PEOPLE AND DEVELOPMENTAL AID WHICH WOULD DIRECTLY-SUPPORT CONSOLIDATION OF THE VIETNAMESE/HENG SAMRIN POSITION IN KAMPUCHEA. THE DEPARTMENT HAS CLOSELY MONITORED VOLAG APPLICATIONS FOR EMBARGO WAIVERS TO SEND MATERIALS TO KAMPUCHEA AND IN RECENT MONTHS HAS JOINED COMMERCE AND TREASURY IN REJECTING MANY APPLICATIONS INVOLVING APPARENTLY DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT CONSIDER OUR FOOD AND SEED AID TO BE DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE; TO ELIMINATE IT AS SUCH WOULD BE TO ATTEMPT TO GET AT THE VIETNAMESE BY STARVING THEIR VICTIMS. EVEN THE VERY MODEST EFFORTS TO PROVIDE SOME OTHER BASIC SERVICES TO THE KHMER ARE CALCULATED TO IMPROVE THEIR CHANCES FOR SURVIVAL RATHER THAN TO CREATE A MARKETABLE SURPLUS. ANIMAL HEALTH-PROGRAMS, FOR INSTANCE, ARE TO HELP FARMERS REBUILD THEIR

DEPLETED STOCKS OF DRAFT ANIMALS, WITHOUT WHICH RICE CANNOT BE PLANTED OR HARVESTED. FISHERIES SUPPORT AND ICE MACHINES ALLOW THE KHMER TO BEGIN TO OBTAIN SOME ESSENTIAL ANIMAL PROTEIN AND TO TRANSPORT IT FROM PLACE OF CATCH TO MARKET. AND THE ANTIMALARIAL PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO REGAIN GROUND LOST IN THE LAST FEW YEARS WHEN MANY WEAKENED MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN PERISHED FROM THIS DISEASE. WE DO THESE THINGS FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, OF COURSE, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE SURVIVAL OF THE KHMER SERVES THE INTERESTS OF THE US AND ITS ALLIES. WITHOUT THE KHMER PEOPLE THERE CAN BE NO KHMER RESISTANCE TO THE VIETNAMESE AND NO INDEPENDENT KAMPUCHEA IN THE FUTURE. THE SOVIETS AND VIETNAMESE WISH TO CONTROL CAMRODIA; THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THEY ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SURVIVAL OF A HEALTHY, SELF-RELIANT KHMER POPULATION. THAT IS WHY

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FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9457

ELECTIONS AND PUBLICLY DECLARES HE WILL STEP DOWN FROM OFFICE AT THAT TIME. ANYTHING LESS THAN THIS WOULD BE MORE THAN A GIANT LEAP AWAY FROM THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS THAT WE SUPPOSEDLY HOLD SO DEAR. THE USG SHOULD MAKE A CLEAR AND PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT WE DO NOT CONDONE THE SELF-IMPOSITION OF A PRESIDENT IN WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO RECOGNIZE AS A DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. BY FAILING TO DO THIS WE FORFEIT OUR RIGHT TO BE LEADERS OF THE FREE WORLD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GUATEMALA 4173

DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR ARA, HA/HR, IHR, S/P

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/10/86 (GONZALES, RAYMOND J.) OR-P
TAGS: CASC, PHIS, SHUH, GT
SUBJECT: US SHOULD CONDITION RECOGNITION OF PRESIDENCY OF RIOS MONTT

REF: GUATEMALA 285

1. ~~THE~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE DRAFTED BY

3. THE USG SHOULD NOT AND CANNOT RECOGNIZE WITHOUT COMMENT THE NEW PRESIDENCY OF GENERAL EFRAIN RIOS MONTT. TO HAVE RECOGNIZED THE MILITARY JUNTA THAT TOOK POWER MARCH 23 WAS TO STRETCH OUR CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY TO ITS LIMITS. IN THAT INSTANCE, HOWEVER, THERE WAS AT LEAST POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE CORRUPT LUCAS REGIME AND POWER WAS AT LEAST DIVIDED TO SOME DEGREE AMONG THE JUNTA MEMBERS. NOW WE HAVE NEITHER A REFLECTION OF POPULAR WILL NOR ANYTHING THAT RESEMBLES A DIVISION OF POWER. TO TRY TO PUSH THIS COUNTRY IN THE DIRECTION OF DEMOCRACY AFTER RECOGNIZING THE LEGITIMACY OF A RIOS MONTT PRESIDENCY WOULD BE AS HYPOCRITICAL AS SUDDENLY RECOGNIZING THE ARGENTINE'S CLAIM TO THE FALKLANDS JUST TO AVOID FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR OURSELVES. BOTH INSTANCES ARE BASED ON PRINCIPLES WE CANNOT BY METAPHORIZE THAT HIS ASCENDENCY WAS ALSO GAINED BY FORCE OF ARMS. HE HAS NO NATIONAL MANDATE, NO POPULAR WILL EXPRESSED BY A VOTE, ONLY THE TENUOUS SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY. AS LONG AS THE USG CONTINUES TO RECOGNIZE HEADS OF STATE IMPOSED ON THE CITIZENS OF A COUNTRY BY THE MILITARY POWERS, WE HAVE NOT COME FAR FROM THE DAYS IN WHICH WE RECOGNIZED FULGENCIO BATISTA, ANASTASIO SONDZA OR JUAN VICENTE GOMEZ.

IN ADDITION, THE USG SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT IN THE FIGURE OF RIOS MONTT WE ARE DEALING WITH A MAN WHO MAY NOT BE IN FULL POSSESSION OF HIS MENTAL FACULTIES. I HAVE PERSONAL AND RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT AN HOUR BEFORE HIS PRESS CONFERENCE OF YESTERDAY, JUNE 9, TO HAVE HIMSELF ANOINTED AS PRESIDENT, HE MADE A CALL TO HIS "CHRISTIAN CHURCH OF THE WORD" ASKING HIS ELDERS TO PRAY FOR HIM AS HE WAS ABOUT TO TAKE ON "GREAT POWERS." WHILE I HAVE NOTHING AGAINST PRAYER, I FEEL HE MAY GO SO FAR AS TO JUSTIFY INDISCRIMINATE KILLING IN JULY WHEN THE AMNESTY PROGRAM ENDS, BY MERELY ASKING HIS ELDERS TO JOIN IN PRAYER BEFORE THE SLAUGHTER. WE ARE DEALING HERE WITH A MAN WHO MORE AND MORE IS TAKING ON THE IMAGE OF A DESPOT WHO BELIEVES HE RULES BY DEVINE WILL. HE WILL NOT ONLY EMBARRASS THE USG IN THE FUTURE, BUT ALSO CAUSE GREAT HARM TO HIS PEOPLE AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. WE SHOULD WITHHOLD ANY IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION OR AID UNTIL HE SETS A SPECIFIC DATE FOR

AW

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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S/P ONLY
ROUTINE MELBOURNE
INFO ADDRESSES

STADIS
DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N-A.
TAGS: ELAB, AS
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE -- 1976 LABOR REPORT FOR AUSTRALIA
REF: MELBOURNE 413
FOR [] FROM LAKE-S/P
THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE REQUESTING REDISIGNATION OF "CANBERRA A-3" THE 1976 LABOR LABOR REPORT FOR AUSTRALIA AS A DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. THE AIRGRAM WHICH APPEARS TO BE YOUR MAIN DISSENT MESSAGE HAS NOT YET REACHED THE DEPARTMENT. FADRC HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO CONSULT WITH THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF UPON ARRIVAL OF THE MESSAGE IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE DESIGNATION. WE WILL NOTIFY YOU AS SOON AS THE DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE. 44

NOTES
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S/P:DDHELETTICH:DDM:
EXT. 22972 11-7-77
S/P:ALAKE

S/P:CFARRAR

S/P-OF:DSKINNEY

Bar for file if we don't already have one.

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE .LA PAZ

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: LA PAZ 5776

FOR [] FROM S/P-LAKE

AL
RS
CF
DSK

B6

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 31, 1977. MR. CURTIS FARRAR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISSENT CHANNEL REGULATIONS, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. 44



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

February 25, 1975

TO :

FROM : S/P - Winston Lord *W. Lord*

SUBJECT: Dissent Message: Ethiopian Government Request
for Additional Military Sales

B6

This will acknowledge receipt of your dissent memorandum of February 24, 1975. Mr. Herbert Spiro of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of substantive response to your memo.

In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your memorandum has been sent to the offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary and the Chairperson of the Secretary's Open Forum Panel. We have also sent copies to the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and, as you requested, to Mr. Coote (AF/E), Mr. Finegold (ACDA/MEA/ET) and Mr. Ladd (PM/SAS).

We commend your use of the Dissent Channel to give us the benefit of your analysis and will reply as soon as possible to your concerns.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN FULL

Title 22—Foreign Relations
CHAPTER I—DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUBCHAPTER A—GENERAL
[Departmental Reg. 108.711]
PART 6—FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Miscellaneous Amendments

§ 6.8 Appeals.

(a) Review of an initial denial under § 6.6(b) may be requested by the person who submitted the original request for a record. The review (hereinafter the appeal) must be requested in writing within 60 days of the date that the requester is informed either: (1) that the request is denied completely, or (2) that all records which are being furnished in response to his request have been released and he has been so informed.

(b) The appeal must be sent by certified mail to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Chairman, Council on Classification Policy, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. The time for decision on appeal begins on the date the appeal is actually received in the Office of the Assistant Secretary. The request shall include a statement of the circumstances, reasons, or arguments advanced for insistence upon disclosure of the originally requested record and a copy of the initial denial letter.

(c) The Council on Classification Policy shall decide the appeal; there shall be a written record of the reasons for the decision and the views of each member. The decision shall be communicated in writing to the requester by a letter from the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. If the decision is to withhold, the letter shall identify the exemption or exemptions exercised under § 6.4, the reason, and, if the Council is prepared to give further consideration notwithstanding expiration of the time allocated for decision, the letter shall so state and indicate when that consideration is expected to be completed.

ACTION COPY

~~SECRET~~
Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART B6

PAGE 01 ROME 21467 01 OF 02 221123Z
ACTION SP-02

4962

SYRIAN FORCES).

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-DC ES-01 /004 V
-----345724 221127Z /11
O 221115Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1160

- B) A DEMAND THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSACRE IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS ANSWER TO LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, AND THAT ISRAEL PROVIDE ALL ASSISTANCE TO THIS END.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 21467

- C) THE TEMPORARY RECALL OF OUR AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV.

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: FEPR, PIINT, HOPS, PLO, XF, IS, LE
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL: DISSIDENTING VIEW

6. CONCLUSION: THE ABOVE WOULD SERVE TO CONVINCING ISRAEL (AND BY EXTENSION OUR FRIENDS, AMONG WHOM FIGURE THE MODERATE ARAB LEADERS) THAT IT CAN NO LONGER COUNT ON U.S. SUPPORT WHEN IT ACTS IN A MANNER THAT WE HOLD CLEARLY CONTRARY TO OUR INTERESTS. TO REPLY THAT SUCH STEPS WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE IS AN UTTERLY EXHAUSTED ARGUMENT THAT UNDERCUTS OUR CREDIBILITY AND DIRECTLY SERVES THE INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO ARE OPPOSED TO OUR PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. CAMP DAVID-TYPE ENCOURAGEMENT IS NO LONGER EFFICACIOUS, SINCE ISRAEL APPEARS NOT TO PERCEIVE THAT ITS BEHAVIOR IN LEBANON IS HARMFUL TO THEM AND US, AND SINCE ISRAEL HAS REJECTED OUTRIGHT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CONSTRUCTIVE PEACE PLAN. WE MUST MOVE NOW, IN A BELIEVABLE FASHION, TO REASSERT OUR GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OUR INDEPENDENCE OF CERTAIN ISRAELI POLICIES AND OUR DETERMINATION TO ACT IN A MANNER UNEQUIVOCALLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS.

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1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THIS IS A MESSAGE BY [REDACTED] DISSIDENTING AGAINST CURRENT U.S. POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL. HE BELIEVES THAT THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 17 AT THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS OF SHAILA AND SABRA IN WEST BEIRUT UNDERSCORE THE NECESSITY OF RECONSIDERING OUR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. AS MATTERS STAND, OUR POLICY OF WALKING THE EXTRA MILE IS CAUSING SERIOUS DAMAGE TO U.S. INTERESTS ABROAD. WE MUST NOW APPLY FORCE WHERE IN THE PAST WE HAVE ATTEMPTED PERSUASION. END SUMMARY.

3. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT BEARS HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAGEDY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS. UNFORTUNATELY, AS ISRAEL'S PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT, THE UNITED STATES IS DEEMED INDIRECTLY AT FAULT. MANY OF THE ARMS USED BY THE PRESUMED PERPETRATORS OF THIS CRIME CAME INTO THEIR HANDS VIA ISRAEL, FOR WHOM WE ARE BY FAR THE MAIN SUPPLIER OF WEAPONS. TRUE OR NOT, NO ONE, INCLUDING OUR CLOSEST ALLIES, BELIEVES US WHEN WE DECLARE THAT OUR LEVERAGE ON ISRAEL IS LIMITED, NOT WHEN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN ANNUAL AID, ASSISTANCE, AND GRANTS ARE INVOLVED. WHAT IS NEEDED AT THIS TIME IS AN UNEQUIVOCAL SIGNAL TO THE WORLD THAT THE UNITED STATES -- THE GENERALLY ACKNOWLEDGED MASTER OF THE GAME IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- HAS HAD ENOUGH.

4. BARRING SUCH A SIGNAL, WE REOPEN THE DOOR TO SOVIET INTERFERENCE; WE GIVE STRENGTH TO THOSE WHO MAINTAIN, HOWEVER WRONGLY, THAT ISRAEL IS, IN FACT, PURSUING COVERT U.S. GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; AND WE TARNISH OUR IMAGE AS A SUPERPOWER WHOSE WORD CAN AND MUST BE BELIEVED. IT NO LONGER SUFFICES TO CURTAIL OUR ARMS DELIVERIES FOR A FEW WEEKS OR VOTE A CONDEMNATION IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL (THOUGH BOTH GESTURES ARE VALID AS FAR AS THEY GO). NOR DOES IT SUFFICE FOR THE U.S. TO DEMAND A CERTAIN BEHAVIOR OF ISRAEL. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION TO SEND THE MARINES BACK TO BEIRUT IS A STRONG FIRST STEP. NOW, IF AT LAST WE ARE TO WATCH GEARS TO WORDS, AS REGARDS ISRAEL PROPER, WE MUST UNDERTAKE TO FORCE COMPLIANCE ON TEL AVIV'S PART WITH OUR OVERALL GOAL OF ESTABLISHING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

5. THIS WRITER PROPOSES THAT SOME OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING BE GIVEN URGENT CONSIDERATION:

- A) A PARTIAL BUT SIGNIFICANT ARMS CUT-OFF TO ISRAEL UNTIL THE IDF HAS WITHDRAWN FROM THE CLEARLY UNDEFINABLE TERRITORY THAT IS CONCURRENT WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF

7. REQUEST DEPARTMENT CONSIDER REPEATING THIS CABLE

Find out who sends initial message

~~SECRET~~

RELEASE IN PART
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CONFIDENTIAL TFC975

PAGE 01 BUDAPE 00437 01 OF 04 101627Z
ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 (TFC) W
-----142023Z 028356 /43

R 100942Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TU SECSTATE WASHDC 7885

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 BUDAPEST 0437

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ---

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE; HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF POLITICAL OFFICER [REDACTED] THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE.

2. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE SUGGESTS THAT THE SECRETARY OF ST IN A MAJOR SPEECH SHOULD FOREFULLY SPECIFY A WIDE RANGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS USG INTENT UPON ADVANCING NTR. AT THE SAME TIME, SECRETARY WOULD DEFINE THE EXTENT USG ABLE USE TOOLS AVAILABLE TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TO ADVANCE THESE HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SPEECH WOULD ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE OUR IDEAL GOALS WITH PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES LEAVING WIDE SCOPE FOR U.S. ACTIONS SUPPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. ON THE ONE HAND, IT WOULD PROVIDE PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALE AND UNDERPINNING FOR SUPPORT OF SUCH GROUPS AS CHARTER 77 SIGNERS AND FOR VIGOROUS DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF HELSINKI FINAL ACT BASKET III PRINCIPLES. ON OTHER HAND, BY SETTING LIMITS ON U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY, IT WOULD (A) ATTEMPT TO AVERT SOVIET REACTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT WHICH COULD IMPDED DETENTE AS WELL AS SET BACK RELAXATION OF INTERNAL CONTROLS OF EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES AND (B) AVOID GENERATING MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH REGARD TO OUR INTENTIONS AMONG THE

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PAGE 02 BUDAPE 00437 01 OF 04 101627Z

VERY HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS WE ARE TRYING TO SUPPORT. A DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTIC OF U.S. POLICY STATEMENT WHICH IS BEING PROPOSED IN THIS MESSAGE IS THAT THE U.S. WOULD SET LIMITS ON ITS ACTIVE ADVOCACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THAT IS, IT WOULD LET IT BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD USG WOULD NOT DIRECTLY THREATEN EXISTING COMMUNIST AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS BY INSISTING UPON SUCH RIGHTS AS FREE ELECTIONS, UNRESTRICTED FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, AND UNRESTRICTED RIGHT TO STRIKE. AT SAME TIME, IT WOULD BE CREDIBLE AND FORCEFUL INDICATION OF U.S. INSISTENCE ON PURSUING FEASIBLE RPT FEASIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS GOALS. WHILE THIS MESSAGE IS WRITTEN PRIMARILY WITH PROBLEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN MIND, SECRETARY'S SPEECH DRAWING ON SAME PRINCIPLES COULD BE DRAFTED SO AS TO DELINEATE U.S. ATTITUDE WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD. END SUMMARY.

3. PROPOSED SECRETARY'S SPEECH ON HUMAN RIGHTS. U.S. COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND USE OF PRACTICAL MEASURES TO BRING THEM ABOUT WOULD BE FOCAL POINT OF A MAJOR POLICY ADDRESS BY SECRETARY. SECRETARY'S SPEECH WOULD DRAW ON IDEAS PUT FORWARD THIS TELEGRAM WHICH WOULD NEED BE APPROPRIATELY QUALIFIED AND DEVELOPED IN LONGER FORMAT FOR WORLDWIDE AUDIENCE. SECRETARY WOULD ANNOUNCE U.S. INTENTION TO ACTIVELY ENCOURAGE FOLLOWING: FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE; FREEDOM OF RELIGION; GREATER FREEDOM OF SPEECH (SEE PARA 4); FREEDOM FROM POLICE STATE METHODS INCLUDING POLICE BRUTALITY AND TORTURE, ARBITRARY ARREST AND FORCED EMIGRATION; FREEDOM TO EMIGRATE; FREEDOM TO TRAVEL; FAMILY REUNIFICATION; THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY; DISSEMINATION OF FOREIGN NEWS MATERIALS AND CESSATION OF JAMMING OF FOREIGN RADIO STATIONS WHICH DO NOT BLATANTLY ADVOCATE A CHANGE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM;

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PAGE 03 BUDAPE 00437 01 OF 04 1016272

ACCESS FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS; THE RIGHT TO PETITION, FOR EXAMPLE, AS EXERCISED BY CHARTER 77 MEMBERS; RIGHT TO EXPRESS LABOR GRIEVANCES; LEGAL DUE PROCESS; FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF RACE OR POLITICAL VIEWPOINT. WITH REGARD TO EACH OF THESE RIGHTS SECRETARY WOULD CALL ATTENTION TO COMMUNIST SHORTCOMINGS AND URGE REFORM.

4. SECRETARY WOULD USE LANGUAGE, HOWEVER, WHICH WOULD LEAVE IT UNDERSTOOD THAT USG WOULD NOT COMMIT ITS RESOURCES TO OR IN SUPPORT OF ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE BASIC POLITICAL SYSTEM OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY, INCLUDING COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. WHILE USG WOULD REMAIN COMMITTED TO ITS OWN DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND CONTINUE TO ARTICULATE THEM, SECRETARY WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR USG WOULD NOT USE ITS POWER TO DEMAND OR ACTIVELY SUPPORT WITHIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (A) THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE A POLITICAL PARTY; (B) THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN FREE ELECTIONS; (C) THE RIGHT TO STRIKE WHEN IT IS ILLEGAL ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED OR WHEN IT THREATENS THE EXISTING POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC ORDER; (D) FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY WHEN DIRECTED TO ACCOMPLISH (A), (B) OR (C) ABOVE; AND (E) FREEDOM OF SPEECH WHEN DIRECTED TO ACCOMPLISH (A), (B) OR (C) ABOVE (BUT NOT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL TO SAY IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION OR CORRESPONDENCE WHATEVER HE CHOOSES).

5. THESE SELF-IMPOSED RESTRAINTS WOULD AMOUNT TO AN AMERICAN UNDERTAKING NOT TO DIRECTLY CHALLENGE ALIEN POLITICAL SYSTEMS. TO BE PERCEIVED AS HAVING REAL MEANING, U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THESE RULES OF BEHAVIOR SHOULD BE ARTICULATED NOT VIA QUIET DIPLOMACY BUT PUBLICLY. THE FINAL THREE LIMITATIONS WE WOULD PUT UPON OURSELVES, AS ABOVE, COULD BE MORE FELICITOUSLY PHRASED. HOWEVER, THE POINT SHOULD NOT BE LOST THAT WE ACCEPT AS A RULE OF BEHAVIOR

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PAGE 04 BUDAPE 00437 01 OF 04 101627Z

NOT TO OFFICIALLY SUPPORT ACTIVELY OR EXPECT OTHER STATES TO PERMIT ACTIVITIES DIRECTLY THREATENING THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THEIR OWN GOVERNING SYSTEM. USG WOULD, OF COURSE, RETAIN ITS RIGHT TO JUDGE WHAT CONSTITUTED THREAT TO POLITICAL SYSTEM AND NOT CEDE THIS JUDGMENT TO SIVETS OR OTHERS. IN ANY CASE, USG WOULD BY NO MEANS BE RETREATING ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ON THE CONTRARY, THE PURPOSE OF A USG DECLARATION WOULD BE TO FACILITATE AND EXPAND HUMAN RIGHTS, DIRECTLY, NOW THOSE CITED PARA 3 ABOVE BUT INDIRECTLY, OVER LONG RUN POLITICALLY SENSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS AS WELL.

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HANDLING CLASSIFICATION MESSAGE REFERENCE NO.
CONFIDENTIAL A-009

TO: Department of State

3M/NO/ONE

COPY NO. 1 SERIES A

87 6 9 87 0

DEPT OF STATE

FROM: AmEmbassy BRIDGETOWN DATE: February 14, 1977

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean

49 REF: Caribbean Transition Paper

DEPT. DISTRIBUTION

ORIGIN/ACTION
SIP

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L	NEA	PER	PM
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STR	TAR	TRSY	USIA
XMB			

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DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM []
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

The Caribbean Transition Paper notes upcoming complete independence for the five Associated States, their serious economic problems, terms them "unviable" economically (and perhaps also politically) and holds that we should "minimize Cuban influence" by "our support for regional institutions and regional economic integration" as well as encouraging the British to remain the dominant regional influence. The paper states that "we do not now consider the Soviets to be seeking a military advantage in the area" but that the Cubans in the short run can be expected to "exacerbate our problems."

There are in the drafting officer's view four principal problems with the Transition Paper as it applies to the small islands. First, it is incorrectly predicated on their unviability as fully independent micro-states. Second, it holds out the appealing but unrealizable promise of keeping the British politically and economically engaged, in addition to increasing the role of other aid donors like Canada. Next -- and possibly the most important -- it proposes as our principal policy

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CLASSIFICATION

DRAFTED BY: ECON: [] :jb DRAFTING DATE: 2/14/77 PHONE NO. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM: JWS/ims

CLEARANCES: []

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A-009~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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tool a continuation of USG support for economic regionalism, "a once promising idea that has simply failed. Finally the paper almost completely ignores increasing Cuban activity in the area and lacks an assessment of Castro's future goals. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

* * * * *

Twice (pp 2, 4) the Transition Paper describes the Caribbean's future English-speaking mini-States as "unviable." Tempting as it is to thus characterize resource-barren islands averaging 150 square miles and 100,000 inhabitants, use of that adjective is a basic and relevant inaccuracy. The small islands -- independent or not, foreign aided or bankrupt -- are not going to just disappear, they and their peoples will continue to exist. (Relevant questions are rather at what level economically and under what political system.) But more important, calling them unviable tends to perpetuate a long-standing major error in our thinking about the Eastern Caribbean region. It leads us to assume that since these small islands can't survive in a solitary state, they somehow will be forced, if not by reason at least from necessity, to unite, form a federation or jointly find refuge under the wing of a new protector. This reasoning in turn supports our well worn and comfortable but erroneous conventional wisdom regarding the region: federation, common markets, increased regional cooperation, political and economic, are inevitable despite any short-term setbacks. Unfortunately, the trend is overwhelmingly away from unity, cooperation or often even plain civility between island leaders. It is argued in the paragraphs below that our failure to accept the existence of this unpleasant situation entirely robs us of any realistic possibility of promoting what relatively minor interests we have in the area.

Older perhaps than our misplaced faith in regional integration is our belief -- or at least hope -- that Britain will not abandon her Caribbean obligations (page 5). However, if Post reporting of the words of British officials in the area accurately reflect their government's thinking,

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the United Kingdom is busily if not obviously extricating itself as quickly as is decently possible from the relatively small (\$28 million annually) but continuous financial drain involved. Independence for the Associated States, working level British officials assure us, will not bring a cessation of UK aid. "Not immediately, that is," they add with a wry smile. The first paragraph on page nine reads: "We had made a deliberate policy determination that we should keep the colonial powers saddled with full responsibility for their remaining Caribbean dependencies, even after independence." This was and still would be a neat trick if it were possible. It isn't and we should recognize and accept that fact. The Canadians? Their aid is primarily conscience money and has little if any ulterior security interest component. But more to the point, the level is "fixed" and even without increasing domestic problems there is no reasonable prospect for their upping the ante. Other donors have and will continue to appear but they will all succumb to the convenience of using the CDB, a fact which will virtually guarantee that their aid will apply only with great delay and when finally effected, will do but little to meet the region's need for new jobs.

In concrete terms the support for regional economic integration advocated by the Transition Paper means support for the Caribbean Development Bank and CARICOM. The US has committed approximately \$42 million to the CDB since its organization in 1970. However, a surprisingly small portion of those funds have been lent or otherwise applied and it now appears that the CDB is receiving monies from several sources faster than it is able to lend already committed resources. Yet we are programming still more loan funds. (AID's Inspector General is planning to formally question the idea of new loans to the bank at this time, however.) The problem with the CDB is more basic than its inability to move loan funds. Beyond the problem of delays in lending the Bank is -- rightly or wrongly -- seen by small island leaders as basically unresponsive to their (admittedly often poorly articulated) needs. Therefore our continued sole reliance on the Bank is seen by them as our basic non-response to requests for meaningful assistance. This perception has obvious political ramifications.

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CARICOM has not only failed to achieve any visible progress toward political integration but its promising early steps toward economic integration are being eroded. Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago are angered at Guyanese and Jamaican import restrictions and the small islands are now publicly complaining that the common market concept is a pure rip-off by the big four. And given the regional trade patterns they are correct. It is sometimes argued that even with the pessimistic prognosis for CARICOM, there's no harm in our continued support of it. (Our support, once only moral, is slated soon to be financial via AID loans for two projects, common services and the regional food plan. Both projects make good economic sense but are destined to fail for political reasons.) No harm, that is, except wasted money and the much more serious loss of the opportunity to successfully further our interests by acting differently and with far more effective results.

Persisting in our policy of backing the elusive hope of regional economic and political integration as a solution to both the area's economic problems and our security goals is clearly convenient. It does not require us to take into account new realities and admit that developments in the region have not unfolded as we once thought they would. Further it does not demand we attempt the presumably painful process of engineering micro aid programs for micro island states. The present policy also unfortunately guarantees that we will stand no reasonable chance of realizing our admittedly negative security goals in the vacuum left by the departure of the British.

Cuban activities in Jamaica and Guyana are obviously far more important than the still minor efforts directed at the small islands. Nonetheless, Cuba's visibly increasing interest in the political vacuum caused by British steps to grant independence and retire should be recognized and assessed. The Transition Paper gives the possibly unintentional impression that their activities are seen by the Cubans as having limited nuisance value and not designed to gain decisive influence or outright control of one or more small island governments. This may well be the case but the question should be posed directly and an attempt made to answer it. "At least in the short term we can expect Cuba to exacerbate our problems with the Caribbean states" is valid enough

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when applied to Guyana and Jamaica; but for the smaller islands Cuba will not exacerbate our problems, it will -- if it wishes -- rather create them. And given the serious economic problems and our non-response to the islands' requests as well as the failure of regional institutions to act effectively, the Cubans face few if any serious hurdles. A Cuban attempt to transform one or more of the small islands into client states would cost little and could, if successful, go far to convince many that the historical tide is running in Cuba's direction.

This message has not, except in the form of assertions, presented evidence supporting its arguments that Britain has decided to call it quits, that the level of actual inter-island cooperation is declining and that the present island leaders value personal power over the faded dream of federation or real regionalism. That is to be found in the Post's past reporting. Neither has it dealt specifically with the already independent states of Barbados or Grenada, both of which present similar but also additional unique problems. It is to be emphasized that these exceptions to the Transition Paper's analysis and recommendations pertain only to the small islands of the Eastern Caribbean, not to the larger states.

The usual Department response to dissent messages is not necessary in this case. Instead, it is requested this airgram be provided to those who received the Transition Paper.


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*file
return
to S/P*

S/P:RJNEITZKE:BMH
8-14-78 X22972
S/P:JEFF GARTEN

S/P-OF-GFOX

S/P:RFEINBERG

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES

DISSENT CHANNEL -- FOR [] FROM S/P-GARTEN,ACTG.

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

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1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE "PROPOSED VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY ARGENTINE NAVY JUNTA MEMBER AND CINC MASSERA" DATED AUGUST 11. MR. RICHARD FEINBERG OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION PROCEDURES AND YOUR EXPRESS WISHES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, CNO AND USCINCSO. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dept. of State

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SPECIAL CHARGES		
S/P: SSESTANOVICH: JUNE		
12/16/89 EXT. 21964 EXT		
S/P: SUBBOSWORTH NAME		

TAGS 0732A
DISSENT - CAPTIVE

S/P: JAZRAEL NAME	2 S/P: PKAPLAN NAME
S/P: OF: JREINERTSON (INFO)	4 HA: CFAIRBANKS
EB/ONA: THAUSSER: ARANCES	6 P: DJOHNSON CLEARANCES
EUR/EEY: RCOMBS	

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY: CE WARSAW ON ADDRESSES

INFO PRECEDENCE INFO ADDRESSES

DISSENT CHANNEL
DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PE WIA

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: POLAND

REF: WARSAW 10656

1. FOLLOWING IS REPLY OF STEPHEN W. BOSWORTH, CHAIRMAN OF SECRETARY'S POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL, TO DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE OF [REDACTED] REFTEL. RESPONSE HAS BEEN CLEARED IN P, EUR, EB, AND HA.

2. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR [REDACTED]. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENTING VIEWS ON US POLICY TOWARD POLAND, WHICH HAVE BEEN WIDELY CIRCULATED AND READ WITH INTEREST. I AM WRITING TO OFFER YOU THE DEPARTMENT'S THINKING ON THE ISSUES YOU RAISE. AS YOU KNOW, LECH WALESZA'S RECENT STATEMENTS HAVE MADE THESE THE FOCUS OF A POLICY REVIEW.

6 THE CENTRAL QUESTION POSED BY YOUR CRITIQUE IS WHETHER
5 POLAND IS MORE LIKELY TO MOVE TOWARD LIBERALIZATION
4 AND PLURALISM IF WE PLAY ON POLISH VULNERABILITIES OR
3 IF WE EXPAND DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WITH THE WARSAW
2 REGIME. THIS IS NOT AN EASY QUESTION. IN YOUR VIEW,
1 A SANCTIONS POLICY MAY FOR A TIME PROVIDE A NECESSARY
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SYMBOL OF AMERICAN OUTRAGE, BUT IT HAS LITTLE CHANCE OF ACHIEVING LONGER-TERM OBJECTIVES. (TO SOME EXTENT, THEN, YOU AND WALESZA APPEAR TO AGREE.) ACCORDINGLY, YOU PROPOSE TO REPLACE IT WITH A STRATEGY OF "WEAKENING, UNDERMINING AND SUBVERTING THE GOP VIA MAXIMUM CONTACT WITH THE WEST."

ANY POLICY TOWARD POLAND HAS TO BEGIN WITH RESPECT FOR THE LIMITS OF US INFLUENCE, WHICH ARE VERY FORMIDABLE WHETHER WE ARE OFFERING INDUCEMENTS OR APPLYING PRESSURES. IN OUR VIEW, AND SEEMINGLY IN YOURS, THE JARUZELSKI REGIME CANNOT BE PERSUADED EXCLUSIVELY BY "CARROTS" TO SHARE POWER WITH OTHER SECTORS OF POLISH SOCIETY. COMMUNIST STATES, AS YOU KNOW, HAVE ENORMOUS RESOURCES FOR CONTROLLING THE ADVERSE INTERNAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCES. TO TAKE YOUR OWN PROPOSAL, IMF MEMBERSHIP FOR POLAND WOULD CERTAINLY LEAD TO PROTRACTED "IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS" AMONG FINANCIAL TECHNICIANS, BUT WHAT EFFECT CAN ONE SOBERLY CLAIM FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS IN POLISH SOCIETY AT LARGE? OUR ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOP IN 1981, AND THOSE OF WESTERN BANKS AS WELL, VIVIDLY DEMONSTRATED THE NATURE OF THIS PROBLEM AT A TIME OF MUCH GREATER OPENNESS AND PERMEABILITY IN THE POLISH SYSTEM THAN WE WILL SOON SEE AGAIN. ON THIS POINT, WALESZA WAS VERY ACUTE: "AS OF TODAY, THERE ARE NO CIVIC ENTITIES" TO GUARANTEE THAT WESTERN AID WOULD HAVE THE DESIRED IMPACT.

AT THE SAME TIME, YOU ARE DOUBTLESS RIGHT THAT A POLICY OF UNRELENTING PRESSURE WILL NOT ACHIEVE OUR GOALS EITHER. PRECISELY BECAUSE THE POLISH REGIME REMAINS POLITICALLY ILLEGITIMATE AND FACES A CONTINUING ECONOMIC CRISIS (PROBLEMS THAT IT CAN HARDLY HOPE TO SOLVE WITH MOSCOW'S HELP ALONE), WE NEED TO HOLD OUT A SET OF "CARROTS" THAT THE POLES CAN REACH THROUGH INCREMENTAL PROGRESS. INTERNAL STRAINS COULD WELL LEAD THE POLISH REGIME TO CONSIDER MOVING GRADUALLY FORWARD, AS LONG AS WE DO NOT RELIEVE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURES WITHOUT POLISH RESPONSIVENESS TO OUR CONCERNS. THIS COMBINATION OF PRESSURES AND INCENTIVES, IMPLEMENTED IN A PHASED MANNER, IS THE ESSENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD POLAND, AND WE BELIEVE IT BETTER PROTECTS OUR INTERESTS THAN THE MORE ONE-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH YOU APPEAR TO FAVOR.

OUR PRESENT VIEW, THEN, TAKES FOR GRANTED THAT INCENTIVES AND INCREASED CONTACTS CAN BE A USEFUL TOOL. AT THE SAME TIME, A BALANCED AND EFFECTIVE

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POLICY THAT MAKES USE OF THEM MUST ALSO REFLECT SEVERAL IMPORTANT CAUTIONS. FIRST, WE MUST BE CAREFUL THAT THEY SUPPORT, RATHER THAN UNDERCUT, VOICES FOR CHANGE INSIDE POLAND. WALESZA'S PRONOUNCEMENTS MAY PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR WESTERN POLICIES TO STRENGTHEN HIS POLITICAL POSITION, AND THE PRESIDENT HAS PLEDGED TO RE-EXAMINE THE SANCTIONS WITH THIS IN MIND. YET JUST AS CLEAR IN WALESZA'S REMARKS WAS HIS CONCERN THAT OUTSIDE AID WILL REDOUND TO THE GOVERNMENT'S ADVANTAGE.

SECOND, HOWEVER USEFUL AN EXPANDED US "PRESENCE" IN POLISH SOCIETY MAY BE, WE SHOULD NOT EXAGGERATE ITS IMPACT. BECAUSE POLAND IS RULED BY A DICTATORSHIP HOSTILE TO US, US INFLUENCE WILL ALWAYS BE RESTRICTED; BUT BECAUSE POLAND IS AT BASE A WESTERN SOCIETY, INTERNAL PRESSURES FOR REFORM WILL NOT CEASE. HOPES FOR LIBERALIZATION, THEREFORE, DO NOT REST ON OUR SHOULDERS ALONE.

THIRD, ON THE ECONOMIC POINTS YOU RAISE, LET ME NOTE THAT YOUR "MAXIMIZING" APPROACH IS POTENTIALLY QUITE COSTLY. AS YOUR IMF SUGGESTIONS INDICATE, TO MAXIMIZE CONTACTS ALSO COULD MEAN TO INCREASE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL RESOURCE COMMITMENTS. GIVEN THE STATE OF THE IMF, AND THE GROWING CLAIMS MADE ON IT BY GOVERNMENTS FRIENDLY TO US, ACCEPTANCE OF POLISH MEMBERSHIP WOULD HAVE TO BE SEEN AS A MAJOR STEP, IN NEED OF VERY CAREFUL, DISPASSIONATE JUSTIFICATION. AND GIVEN THE DISARRAY IN GOP ECONOMIC POLICY AND CONTINUING SOCIAL TENSIONS, NEW FUNDS COMMITTED BY THE WEST WOULD ARGUABLY BE WASTED. IT WILL NOT BE ENOUGH TO SAY THAT POLAND NEEDS HELP; SO DO MANY OTHERS WHOSE WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO MEET FUND OBLIGATIONS ARE MORE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED.

FINALLY, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE CHOICE OF A POLICY TOWARD POLAND HAS TO BE JUSTIFIED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OUR POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE AS A WHOLE. YOU BELIEVE THAT OUR SANCTIONS POLICY PRODUCES PUBLIC CONFUSION HERE AT HOME; ADMITTEDLY IT HAS INVOLVED CONSIDERABLE CONTROVERSY AND CRITICISM, FROM MANY QUARTERS. YET THE LONG-TERM CREDIBILITY OF OUR "DIFFERENTIATION" POLICY, AND WHATEVER PUBLIC SUPPORT IT CAN COMMAND, REQUIRE THAT WE SHOW RESULTS (EITHER IN FOREIGN POLICY INDEPENDENCE OR DOMESTIC LIBERALIZATION) WHEN WE CHOOSE TO DIFFERENTIATE IN FAVOR OF A MEMBER OF THE SOVIET BLOC. BY THIS STANDARD, POLAND'S RECENT HISTORY CALLS FOR A VERY

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CAUTIOUS US POLICY. OUR ABILITY TO FAVOR HUNGARY AND ROMANIA -- OR FOR THAT MATTER, YUGOSLAVIA -- DEPENDS ON PRESERVING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR POLICIES TOWARD THEM AND THE OTHER STATES OF THE REGION. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD ENGENDER PUBLIC CONFUSION ON A SCALE WE HAVE NOT SEEN; IT WOULD ALSO SEND A CONFUSING MESSAGE TO OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ABOUT HOW SERIOUSLY WE TAKE OUR OWN POLICY.

LET ME TURN NOW TO SOME OF YOUR SPECIFIC CONCERNS ABOUT RECENT US DECISIONS.

FIRST, YOU FELT THE MODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN FASTER, BROADER AND MORE COMPLETE. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, I BELIEVE THE REAL ISSUE HERE IS NOT QUITE AS GREAT AS YOU SUGGEST. THE DECISION TO BEGIN RESCHEDULING DISCUSSIONS WITH POLAND BY ADDRESSING THE STATUS OF THE 1981 RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT (AND SEEKING REPAYMENT OF ARREARAGES UNDER THAT AGREEMENT) IS THE VERY STEP THAT OTHER OFFICIAL CREDITORS IN THE PARIS CLUB HAVE WANTED US TO TAKE FOR AN ENTIRE YEAR. WE AND THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS AGREE THAT THIS IS THE PROPER POINT OF DEPARTURE BEFORE ADDRESSING THE RESCHEDULING OF 1982 OR 1983 DEBT, OR THE MUCH LARGER ISSUE OF POLAND'S FINANCIAL TIES WITH WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. THESE ISSUES ARE STILL AHEAD OF US, ALTHOUGH POLAND'S LIMITED ABILITY (NOT TO SPEAK OF WILLINGNESS) TO MEET EXISTING OBLIGATIONS MAY PROVE AN UNAVOIDABLE OBSTACLE TO ADDRESSING THEM IN ANY MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY WAY.

IN THIS SITUATION, ANY PROPOSAL TO JUMP QUICKLY ACROSS SEVERAL STAGES OF THE PROCESS TO THE ISSUE OF NEW CREDITS WOULD FACE MAJOR PRACTICAL OBSTACLES, NO MATTER WHAT THE PREFERENCES OF THE USG WERE. FOR THIS REASON, THROUGHOUT OUR LONG POLICY REVIEW, NEW CREDITS WERE NEVER CONTEMPLATED AS A FIRST STEP, TO BE GRANTED IN RESPONSE TO THE VERY SMALL MEASURES TAKEN BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT. OUR ALLIES HAVE NOT PROPOSED THAT WE DO OTHERWISE, AND FEW SEEM LIKELY TO DO SO THEMSELVES. THERE IS UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN FROM SOME OF THE SMALLER LEADERS WHO WANT ACTION ON MORE RECENT CREDITS, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO "RENEGING" ON THIS POINT BY THE US.

THIS HARDLY MEANS, HOWEVER, THAT OUR RESCHEDULING DECISION OFFERS POLAND NOTHING. WHILE THE WARSAW GOVERNMENT MAY VOICE GREAT (AND LOUD) DISSATISFACTION, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT IT EXPECTS THIS STEP TO BE

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THE BEGINNING OF A RETURN TO NORMAL FINANCIAL DEALINGS WITH THE WEST. AS SUCH, POLAND'S RELATIONS WITH WESTERN COMMERCIAL BANKS WILL EVENTUALLY BE MADE EASIER, AND ITS CHANCES OF GAINING PRIVATE CREDITS WILL GROW. THIS IS NOT AT ALL AN INSIGNIFICANT INCENTIVE.

AS FOR THE LESSER ISSUE OF FISHING RIGHTS, COMPLAINTS ABOUT OUR ACTION WERE AGAIN THE PREDICTABLE POLISH PROPAGANDA RESPONSE, BUT NATURALLY WE DO NOT TAKE SUCH PROTESTS AT FACE VALUE. THE GOP IS ENTIRELY FREE TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS ON JOINT VENTURES AND FORMALLY TO REQUEST A QUOTA. IT WILL DOUBTLESS CONTINUE TO DENOUNCE US AS IT DOES SO.

IN SUM, OUR POLICY IS BASED, AS I HAVE SAID, ON A NECESSARILY CAUTIOUS, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH: WE HAVE DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN SHORT- AND LONG-TERM GOALS, AND EXPRESSED OUR READINESS TO RESPOND TO REAL IMPROVEMENT INSIDE POLAND WITHIN EITHER TIME FRAME. THERE IS NO CERTAINTY OF EARLY RESULTS. THE MOST SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS WE CAN CONFER ON POLAND DEPEND ON WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS ARE CONFERRED ON THE POLISH PEOPLE. UNTIL THEN, IT IS NOT OUR CREDIBILITY, BUT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S, THAT IS AT STAKE.

AS CAUTIOUS AS IT IS, HOWEVER, I DON'T BELIEVE OURS IS A POLICY OF DESPAIR, AND I WOULD ENCOURAGE YOU NOT TO SEE IT IN THIS LIGHT EITHER. YOU ARGUE THAT CONDITIONS IN POLAND TODAY ARE BETTER THAN BEFORE AUGUST 1980. FRANKLY, MY OWN VIEW IS MORE SKEPTICAL: AFTER ALL, IN AUGUST 1980 THE CREATION OF SOLIDARITY AND THE FERMENT THAT WENT WITH IT WERE POSSIBLE; THEY DO NOT SEEM POSSIBLE TODAY, OR TOMORROW. YET IF YOU ARE RIGHT, THEN IT STRIKES ME AS PERHAPS TOO CATEGORICAL TO SAY THAT US POLICY IS "NOT WORKING." WHICHEVER OF US IS RIGHT, OUR TIME-HORIZONS CANNOT BE SHORT IN A CASE LIKE THIS.

NOT EVERY DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE, AS YOU CAN PROBABLY IMAGINE, STIRS REAL DISCUSSION AMONG THOSE WORKING ON THE ISSUE IT RAISES. YOURS DID, AND WE APPRECIATED HEARING YOUR VIEWS. SINCERELY, STEPHEN W. BOSWORTH
END TEXT.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3790



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DISSENT CHANNEL

3 0 11050 N A
SUBJ: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: 1976 LABOR REPORT FOR AUSTRALIA

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF
[REDACTED] POLITICAL OFFICER, MELBOURNE.
[REDACTED] REQUESTS THAT S/P DISTRIBUTE COPIES NOT ONLY
TO THOSE LISTED ON PAGE 4 OF DEPT'S A-309 BUT TO
MR DALE GOOD S/IL, MR DONALD S. HARRIS SA/RA AND
MR CHRISTOPHER A. SQUIRE SA/AMP.

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2. EMBASSY/CANBERRA HAS SUBMITTED A-3 DATED FEBRUARY 18, 1977 WHI
READS IN PART AS FOLLOWS:

"THE FOLLOWING 1976 LABOR REPORT FOR AUSTRALIA WAS
WRITTEN BY [REDACTED] POLITICAL OFFICER [REDACTED]
AND IS BEING FORWARDED TO THE DEPARTMENT WITHOUT
AMENDMENT AT HIS INSISTENCE. THE POLITICAL SECTION,
THE ECONOMIC SECTION, THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION AND
I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND DO NOT CONCUR IN MANY
OF ITS ASPECTS AND INTERPRETATIONS, WE FIND IT SUBSTANTIALLY
A DUBIOUS ANALYSIS, TENDENTIOUS AND, IN SOME INSTANCES,
FACTUALLY ERRONEOUS. WE DO NOT THINK IT IS A USEFUL
OR ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR SCENE.
THE EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON THE 1976 AUSTRALIAN LABOR SCENE
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PAGE 02 MELBOU 00413 232624Z

ARE CONTAINED IN AIRGRAM A-018 OF FEBRUARY 16, 1957....

HARGROVE"

3. FOR REASONS WHICH FOLLOW, PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO REQUEST THAT SUBJECT REPORT BE REDESIGNATED "DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE" UPON ARRIVAL IN DEPT.

A. AGREEMENT I THOUGHT I HAD WITH POLITICAL COUNSELOR IN CANBERRA (REACHED IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION) WAS THAT EMBASSY, HAVING FOUND (ACCORDING TO POLITICAL COUNSELOR) THAT MY ANNUAL LABOR REPORT (SENT IN FINAL FORM TO CANBERRA FROM MELBOURNE) CONTAINED ERRORS, WOULD UNDERTAKE TO CORRECT ERRORS IN COVERING AIRGRAM AND SUBMIT REPORT AS ENCLOSURE TO COVERING AIRGRAM.

B. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, FLATLY STATING AS A-3 DOES THAT I INSISTED THAT EMBASSY SUBMIT REPORT WITHOUT CHANGES COMPLETELY MISREPRESENTS MY POSITION WHICH WAS THAT, IF REPORT CONTAINED ERRORS, I HAD NO OBJECTION WHATSOEVER TO EMBASSY IDENTIFYING AND CORRECTING THEM VIA COVERING AIRGRAM.

C. HAD I TAKEN POSITION WHICH A-3 SUGGESTS I WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO DISSENT CHANNEL MONTH AGO (SINCE ANNUAL REPORT WAS DUE IN WASHINGTON FEBRUARY 1). HAD I LEARNED EARLIER THAN I DID THAT EMBASSY WAS SITTING ON REPORT PENDING PREPARATION OF COUNTER-REPORT I WOULD HAVE RESORTED AT ONCE TO DISSENT CHANNEL.

D. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, AT NO TIME DURING MONTH IN QUESTION DID EMBASSY ADVISE ME THAT IT WAS PLANNING TO SUBMIT MY REPORT UNDER COVER OF COUNTRY TEAM REJECTION SLIP. AT NO TIME DURING MONTH IN QUESTION DID EMBASSY ADVISE ME THAT IT WAS PREPARING ITS OWN COUNTER-REPORT. POLITICAL COUNSELOR DID NOT TELEPHONE ME TO LET ME KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON UNTIL FEBRUARY 17 (MY REPORT WAS DATED JANUARY 17) AND DID NOT GET COPY OF COUNTER-REPORT TO ME UNTIL FEBRUARY 22.

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E. HAVING NOW READ COUNTER-REPORT I HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO CONCLUDE THAT EMBASSY'S OBJECTION TO WHAT I PREPARED STEMS PRIMARILY FROM DISAGREEMENT WITH CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS, NOT WITH ANY MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT (WHICH, WHATEVER THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN, COULD HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH EASILY AND PROMPTLY IN ORIGINALLY-AGREED-UPON COVERING AIRGRAM). THIS BEING CASE, I AM FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO ACCOUNT FOR EMBASSY'S FAILURE TO CRITICIZE CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED IN OTHER REPORTS I HAVE PREPARED SINCE LAST MARCH, ESPECIALLY SINCE ANNUAL SUMMARY DOES LITTLE MORE THAN REPEAT AND CONFIRM CONCLUSIONS REACHED AND REPORTING DURING 1976. REREADING OTHER REPORTS WILL BEAR OUT THIS STATEMENT. END-USERS, OF COURSE, WILL JUDGE FOR THEMSELVES WHICH OF TWO ANNUAL REPORTS IS MORE COMPLETE, RELIABLE, PERCEPTIVE AND USEFUL.

F. AS I SEE IT, RESPONSIBILITY OF LABOR/POLITICAL OFFICER IS TO CALL THEM AS HE SEES THEM, ESPECIALLY IF HE IS CALLING THEM FROM GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OTHER THAN CAPITAL CITY. VALUE OF LABOR/POLITICAL OFFICER IS THAT, EVEN IF HIS OFFICE IS PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN EMBASSY, HE VIEWS DEVELOPMENTS FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE AND IS OFTEN IN POSITION TO PROVIDE CONTRASTING (BUT NOT NECESSARILY INVALID) INSIGHTS AND INTERPRETATIONS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT EMBASSY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OFFICERS HAVE AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS AND INTERPRETATIONS WITHOUT BEING SECOND-GUESSED BY LABOR OFFICERS AND THAT LABOR OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE SIMILAR OPPORTUNITIES. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING, OF COURSE, THAT NO OFFICER SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO SUBMIT DEMONSTRABLY ERRONEOUS INFORMATION.

4. IN VIEW OF FOREGOING I WOULD LIKE TO URGE THAT PROVISION BE MADE ON AGENDA OF FORTHCOMING LABOR OFFICER CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI FOR DISCUSSION OF ROLE OF LABOR/POLITICAL OFFICERS IN LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE OF LAST SEVERAL YEARS.
BRAND

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MELBOU 00413 230024Z



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

send to NVB

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

June 1, 1977

file dissent

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American Embassy
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Dear Mr. Eblan:

I think you deserve a word of explanation for our long delay in responding to your dissent message on terrorism sent last February.

As you know from our acknowledgment, I am the coordinator for a reply. We have been trying manfully to get a reply to Ambassador Porter's earlier message of January 25 and then we thought we would try our hand at a reply to you. Not having succeeded in answering the Ambassador, we are not getting very far in answering your message.

The terrorist experts are going to talk to Ambassador Porter this week when he is in the Department. We are about to undertake a review of terrorist policy and the ideas which you and he have sent us will naturally be considered. Your own interest in protecting Foreign Service personnel is of course a major priority in our consideration although exactly how we do this in a new policy remains to be worked out.

This is not an official reply to your message but you will be receiving one in due course. I thought you would like to know that although the Department is slow it rarely forgets.

Sincerely,

Richard B. Finn
Member
Policy Planning Staff

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S/P:UGARTEN
X-21494 9/23/76
S/P:RBARTHOLOMEW

AID/LA/CEN:ECARTER
S/P:NBOYER

ARA/LA/CEN:MWEISSMAN

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE GUATEMALA

ROUTINE TEGUCIGALPA

DISSENT CHANNEL
FOR ROBERT SHULER ONLY

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: REPLY TO DISSENT MESSAGE OF

REF: AIRGRAM A-22 DTD MARCH 29, 1976

1. WE SINCERELY REGRET THE DELAY IN RESPONDING TO YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. SUMMER VACATIONS AND PERSONNEL TRANSFERS INTERRUPTED THE INVESTIGATION PROCESSES. IN ADDITION, THEY CAUSED CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN THE CLEARANCE PROCEDURE.

2. IN YOUR MESSAGE YOU DESCRIBE THE HONDURAN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW AND AID'S SUPPORTING ROLE IN THE HONDURAN PROGRAM. YOU RAISE ESSENTIALLY TWO MAJOR ISSUES:

-- YOU SUGGEST THAT OUR FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS BE SCREENED THROUGH FORMAL JUDGMENTAL CRITERIA BASED UPON US POLITICAL-ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY.

-- YOU ALLEGE THAT AID'S SUPPORT OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN HONDURAS HAS HAD A DEBILITATING EFFECT ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP VIS-A-VIS STATE OWNERSHIP, AND HENCE IS NOT COMMENSURATE WITH US INTERESTS.

3. WE WILL ADDRESS EACH POINT IN TURN.

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4. FIRST, CONCERNING FORMAL JUDGMENTAL CRITERIA, WE CAN DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT ONLY IN PRINCIPLE, SINCE YOU DID NOT PROVIDE A PROPOSED TEXT OF ANY SPECIFIC CRITERIA. NEVERTHELESS, THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT DOES CONTAIN CONSIDERABLE GUIDANCE AS TO THE DIRECTION OF OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. FOR EXAMPLE, PARTS OF IT

-- MANDATE A CONCENTRATION ON ASSISTANCE TO THE RURAL POOR AND ON SPECIFIC SECTORS SUCH AS AGRICULTURE;

-- EMPHASIZE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR;

-- ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVES;

-- CALL FOR SUPPORT OF AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAMS INCLUDING "CONSOLIDATION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND WITH A VIEW TO INSURING A WIDER AND MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND."

5. FURTHERMORE, CONGRESS HAS SPECIFIED THAT BEFORE PROVIDING ASSISTANCE AID MUST EXAMINE "THE EXTENT TO WHICH A COUNTRY IS MAKING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REFORMS, SUCH AS TAX COLLECTION IMPROVEMENTS AND CHANGES IN LAND TENURE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL ENABLE IT TO ACHIEVE DEVELOPMENTAL OBJECTIVES MORE EFFICIENTLY AND JUSTLY."

6. THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF COURSE CONTAINS MUCH MORE IN THE WAY OF FORMAL GUIDANCE.

7. WE THEREFORE QUESTION WHETHER THERE IS A REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL FORMAL CRITERIA OF A GENERAL NATURE FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. ACTUALLY, AT A TIME WHEN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD ARE BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT AND INCREASINGLY COMPLEX, WE WOULD ARGUE FOR MORE, NOT LESS, FLEXIBILITY IN OUR BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. THIS OF COURSE IS NOT TO SAY THAT OUR POLICIES SHOULD UNDERMINE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS, BUT THAT THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, TOGETHER WITH OTHER PERIODIC GUIDANCE FURNISHED BY AID TO THE FIELD, APPEARS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO SERVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST, AND SUCH GUIDANCE APPEARS TO MEET YOUR OWN CONCERNS..

8. SECOND, THE HONDURAN CASE ITSELF CAN BE EXAMINED. THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT STATES THAT DEVELOPMENT PLANNING MUST BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH SOVEREIGN

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COUNTRY AND THAT UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED IN A COLLABORATIVE STYLE TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT GOALS CHOSEN BY EACH COUNTRY RECEIVING ASSISTANCE. ALTHOUGH AID ENCOURAGED THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM IN HONDURAS AND PROVIDED ASSISTANCE IN ITS DEVELOPMENT, THE LAW WAS FORMULATED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF HONDURAS AND EVOLUTION OF THE REFORM WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN CONSULTATION WITH RELEVANT HONDURAN INTEREST GROUPS. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT AID REQUIRED ITS LOCAL MISSION TO REVIEW PROVISIONS OF THE LEGISLATION, INCLUDING COMPENSATION AND APPEALS PROVISIONS, AND CONCLUDED THAT AID SUPPORT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE MANDATE.

9. WHILE AID IS MAINTAINING A CAREFUL AND CONTINUOUS EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM, THE RETURNS ARE OF COURSE NOT YET IN. AID'S VIEW IS THAT THE HONDURAN AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM HOLDS THE POTENTIAL TO EXPAND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND INCREASE INCOMES FOR THE RURAL POOR, BOTH OF WHICH ARE CLEARLY US POLICY OBJECTIVES. AID ALSO BELIEVES THAT THERE IS A BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE THAT THE HONDURAN LAND REFORM SETTLEMENTS WILL EVOLVE INTO PRIVATE COOPERATIVES, NOT STATE FARMS. FOR EXAMPLE, MANY OF THE SETTLEMENTS ARE ALREADY FUNCTIONING AS COOPERATIVES, EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY NOT YET ENJOY COMMENSURATE LEGAL STATUS.

10. WE HOPE THAT THIS MESSAGE ADDRESSES YOUR CONCERNS. WE AGAIN COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WELCOME ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS YOU HAVE ON THIS SUBJECT.44

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IN PART B6

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OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 008003
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STATE 008003

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ARA/RPP:TBOWIE
S/P:OPEN FORUM:OKINNEY
AA/LA:EGGY
S/IL:BG00D
HA:MSCHNEIDER

BENEFITS TO OUTWEIGH THE COSTS.

6. WE DO AGREE THAT THERE COULD BE A DANGER OF THE SUBSIDY'S BECOMING TOO LARGE AND CONTINUING OVER TOO LONG A PERIOD. WE INTEND TO GIVE THESE AND OTHER SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF THIS PROGRAM CAREFUL ATTENTION AS WE PROCEED WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

7. THANK YOU FOR SHARING YOUR IDEAS WITH US THROUGH THE DISSENT CHANNEL. CHRISTOPHER

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 008003

AIDAC, DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR [] FROM S/P LAKE

E.O. 11652; N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT:AIFLD PROPOSAL FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO ORIT

REF: LA PAZ 8776

1. WE HAVE STUDIED YOUR MESSAGE OBJECTING TO THE GRANT OF US GOVERNMENT FUNDS TO ORIT ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT MAY DAMAGE THE IMAGE OF THAT ORGANIZATION SO MUCH AS TO OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS OF AN EXPANDED PROGRAM.

2. THE CONCERNS YOU EXPRESS WERE CONSIDERED BEFORE A DECISION WAS MADE. AFTER DISCUSSION AT THE UHIS LABOR ATTACHE CONFERENCE WHERE YOU WERE PRESENT AND MADE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME POINTS, THE AID MISSIONS WERE ASKED FOR COMMENTS BY STATE CABLE 243004. OF THE TWENTY RESPONDERS, FOURTEEN SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL, ABOUT HALF WITH SOME KIND OF RESERVATION, AND SIX WERE NEUTRAL. ONE OF THE LATTER RECOMMENDED AGAINST ACTIVITIES IN THAT PARTICULAR COUNTRY. ONLY THE MISSIONS IN ARGENTINA AND BOLIVIA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT ORIT ACCEPTING USG SUPPORT.

3. PRESUMABLY THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS THEMSELVES WOULD BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO THE KIND OF DAMAGE YOU WARN OF. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ORIT EXECUTIVE BOARD CONSIDERED THE

QUESTION BEFORE AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. AIFLD HAS ASSURED US THAT THEY ARE WORKING VERY CLOSELY WITH THE AFL-CIO ON THE MATTER. THUS THOSE MOST CLOSELY AND DIRECTLY INVOLVED DO NOT SEEM TO FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF USG ASSISTANCE.

4. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (INCLUDING TRADE UNION RIGHTS) THAT CHARACTERIZES USG ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA. DEMOCRATIC LABOR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE AREA ARE WELL AWARE OF OUR ATTITUDES AND ARE IN SYMPATHY WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF US LABOR POLICY. THERE IS A NEW MOOD OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE AND WE THINK US ASSISTANCE TO ORIT CAN USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO WHAT THE US IS DOING IN THE LABOR FIELD. IF WE EXPECT AN AUTOMATIC UNFAVORABLE REACTION, WE ARE NOT DOING JUSTICE TO THE BENEFICIAL IMPACT OUR POLICIES AND OUR ASSISTANCE CAN HAVE.

5. WHILE THERE MAY BE DAMAGE TO THE ORIT IMAGE IN SOME REGIONS, PERHAPS FOR EXAMPLE IN BOLIVIA, THE CLEAR MAJORITY OF LABOR EXPERTISE FAVORS THE PROGRAM AND EXPECTS THE

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN FULL

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EXDIS

NOFORN

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR MARR ET US
SUBJECT: DISSENTING VIEW ON ETHIOPIAN MILITARY REPLENISHMENT REQUEST

REF ADDIS ABABA 2335

1. I WHOLEHEARTEDLY ENDORSE VIEWS ADVANCED REFTEL PARTICULARLY COMMENTS PARA 3. I FIND IT INCREDIBLE THAT WE HAVE YET TO DISCUSS ERITREAN INSURGENCY IN REAL TERMS WITH EPMG. SURELY WE CAN PRESENT OURSELVES AS MEDIATORS OR AT LEAST RAISE THE QUESTION, WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET DONE, BEFORE WE BLINDLY ACCEDE TO THE EPMG ARMS SUPPLY REQUEST.
SHERRY

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~~SECRET~~

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RELEASE IN PART
B6



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 15, 1976

MEMORANDUM

TO: IO/LAB -

FROM: S/P - Reginald Bartholomew, *RB* Acting

SUBJECT: Your Dissent Regarding Employee Rights in Security Interviews

B6

When Win Lord wrote you August 23 about two facets of your dissent message, which concerned three separate issues, he told you he would pursue further the matter of employee rights in security interviews. Since then he has initiated discussions on this matter with the Office of Security and with the Under Secretary for Management.

In your dissent message you referred to a letter you wrote the Director General in which you observed that Department employees have not been made aware that, in certain kinds of security interviews, "whether or not they answer questions about other employees is voluntary." And you suggested that employee rights in security interviews should be published in the Department's Newsletter.

I have been informed that, as a result of your suggestion, an article of the kind you suggested is being written and will appear soon in the Newsletter. May I, like Win, thank you again for using the Dissent Channel. The interest you have shown in employee rights and other aspects of the Department's policies and practices, and your use of the Dissent Channel in that regard have had definite, positive results.

Drafted: S/P: DkPeterson: gMcP
9/15/76 x20993

Clearances: M - Mr. McManaway
SY - Mr. Dikegs
S/P-OF - Mr. Boyer *MB*

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Department of State

**INCOMING
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PAGE 01 ROME 21467 02 OF 02 221122Z

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DISSENT CHANNEL

TO PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO AND
TUNIS. RABB

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE
IN PART B6

February 20, 1978

MEMORANDUM

TO : AF/E -
-
-
FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake
SUBJECT : Dissent Channel Memorandum on the Horn

B6

I have received your dissent memorandum on U.S. policy in the Horn. In order that your views can be considered prior to the February 21 SCC meeting on the issue, I have distributed copies to the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, and the Chairman of the Open Forum, as well as the Under Secretaries for Political Affairs and Security Assistance, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and the Director for Politico-Military Affairs. Dan Spiegel on my staff will be coordinating our reply.

I appreciate your using the channel and will be responding shortly to the issues you have raised.

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w/ SECRET ATTACHMENT



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 30, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO : ARA/CCA -

FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake *TL*

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Message

B6

This will acknowledge receipt of your dissent channel memorandum on decontrol and release of LOU and unclassified material. Cameron Hume of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. Copies of your memo have been distributed to the Secretary, the Executive Secretary and the Chairman of the Open Forum, as well as to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and the Legal Advisor. We commend your use of the dissent channel and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

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Department of State

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TO AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: LA PAZ 8776

FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P-LAKE

B6

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 31, 1977. MR. CURTIS FARRAR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISSENT CHANNEL REGULATIONS, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. VANCE



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EXDIS

~~SECRET~~ 9254

PAGE 01 ADDIS 02335 01 OF 02 271519Z

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 ADDIS ABABA 2335

EXDIS

NOFORN

DISSENT CHANNEL

R.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR MARK ET US
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN MILITARY REPLENISHMENT REQUEST;
DISSENTING VIEW

REF: (A) ADDIS 150; (B) NAVCOMUNIT ASMARA 250900Z FEB 75

1. THE UNDERSIGNED MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY, [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED], WISH TO DISSENT FROM RFFTEL A WHICH, WHILE LISTING SIX POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION RELATIVE TO THE ETHIOPIAN ARMS REQUEST, DID NOT MAKE POSITIVE RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHICH WAS THE BEST COURSE TO FOLLOW. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE ETHIOPIAN REPLENISHMENT REQUEST SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED IN ANY PART AT THIS TIME. WE CONCUR WITH PARA 3 OF RFFTEL, (DISADVANTAGES OF REJECTION) AND WE AWARE OF SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FOR THE "DIRG" POLICIES IN ERITREA IN PART AS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, AND THAT ETHIOPIAN UNITY IS OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE TO MANY ETHIOPIANS. A NEGATIVE RESPONSE COULD BE USED BY THE "DIRG" TO WHIP UP ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT AND FOR THIS REASON WE FEEL A DELAYING TACTIC IS MORE DESIRABLE THAN AN OUTRIGHT NEGATIVE RESPONSE AT THIS TIME. OUR POSITION IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING REASONS.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ADDIS 02335 01 OF 02 271519Z

A. EVEN THOUGH THE EPMG MAY BE TEMPTED TO SEVER ITS RELATIONS WITH US AS RESULT OF THIS DECISION, THIS WOULD ONLY BE HASTENING AN INEVITABLE CONFRONTATION WHICH, GIVEN OUR PROJECTION OF PROTRACTED ERITREAN CONFLICT, WILL BRING ADDITIONAL AND LARGER AMMUNITION REQUESTS. THE POLITICAL COST TO THE US, DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL, OF THESE INEVITABLE REQUESTS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO MEET. A NEGATIVE RESPONSE AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE, THEREFORE, APPEARS UNAVOIDABLE AND, AFTER HAVING PROVIDED SEVERAL SMALLER REQUESTS IN THE INTERIM, WE WOULD HAVE DESTROYED OUR CREDIBILITY AND ALIENATED BOTH THE ERITREANS AND THEIR ARAB ARMS SUPPLIERS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT BOTH THE PRC AND USSR HAVE TURNED DOWN ARMS REQUESTS BY THE PMAC. GIVEN SOVIET DESIGNS IN THE MID-EAST AND THE PRC GOAL OF LEADERSHIP IN THE THIRD WORLD BLOC, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EITHER WOULD RISK OFFENDING THE ARAB WORLD BY ARMING THE EPMG. SINCE OTHER POSSIBLE ARMS SOURCES SUCH AS FRANCE WOULD BE MORE EXPENSIVE AND GIVE SLOWER DELIVERY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE EPMG PROBABLY WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH ITS MAJOR AND CONTINUING SUPPLIER OF ARMS, THE

US. IN THIS REGARD, WE BELIEVE THAT THE US SHOULD CONTINUE SUPPLYING ETHIOPIA WITH ARMS NECESSARY TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, I.E. TANKS, PLANES, SIDEWINDERS, ETC. WE HAVE NOTED THAT OUR PAST POSITION AS ETHIOPIA'S MAJOR ARMS AND AID DONOR (28 MILLION DROUGHT RELIEF AID IN THE PAST 18 MONTHS, FOR EXAMPLE) HAS NOT ENHANCED OUR STATUS OR INFLUENCE WITH THE PMAC AND THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT FUTURE PROVISION OF ARMS WOULD NECESSARILY ACCOMPLISH THIS. WE BELIEVE THE US HAS TOO MUCH TO LOSE AND VERY LITTLE TO GAIN FROM SUPPLYING THE PMG WITH ARMS WHICH INEVITABLY WILL BE USED FOR ERITREAN OPERATIONS.

B. PMAC HAS A LIMITED FUTURE. THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT THE EPMG AND PMAC AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED HAVE AN EXTREMELY LIMITED LIFE EXPECTANCY. IMPENDING LAND REFORM, INTERNAL MILITARY DISUNITY, AND ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND REGIONAL DIVISIONS, HAVE CREATED AN EXTREMELY TENUOUS, UNSTABLE SITUATION. TO SUPPLY ARMS WITH A VIEW TO MAINTAINING INFLUENCE WITH SUCH A GOVERNMENT SEEMS FUTILE.

C. EPMG CANNOT WIN IN ERITREA. IN RESPONSE TO A SRF QUERY, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE FCO IN LONDON BELIEVES THAT ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE IS VERY LIKELY. WHILE THIS OPINION IS NOT YET SHARED

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FORM DS-1652

RELEASE IN PART
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August 21, 1976 *to ERP*

Mr. Lord,

in connection with the memo now in the works on SY and employee rights, I would like you to know that yesterday I was interviewed by a Civil Service Commission investigator and today by two FBI officers, about my colleagues. In both cases, the men began asking questions without mentioning my rights. When I asked, they all told me without a split second of hesitation, that the interview was voluntary and I need not answer. The FBI officers expressed astonishment that I would even ask; they said they hadn't informed me at the beginning of the interview because they assumed everyone knew this.

I bring these incidents to your attention because I understand SY is alleging that even if SY should be willing to "grant" us the right to remain silent, they can't ensure that other investigators will "go along" with this "new" right. It seems to me the shoe is on the other foot: the other agencies are already readily granting this right, when asked.

I suggest that SY grant this right, and that an announcement be placed in the Newsletter, the regulations and on bulletin boards, that in all interviews about colleagues, we have the right not to answer, and this applies to interviews by SY, the FBI or whoever.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

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Department of State

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 304751
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DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [] FROM S/P PAUL WOLFOVITZ

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PIINT, HOPS, PLO, XF, IS, LE
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: US POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL

REFERENCE : ROME 21467

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL, RECOMMENDING A SIGNIFICANT ARMS CUT-OFF TO ISRAEL AND OTHER MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO THE BEIRUT MASSACRES, RAISES SEVERAL BASIC AND IMPORTANT ISSUES WITH REGARD TO US-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND THE STANDING OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE DEPARTMENT SYMPATHIZES WITH YOUR SENSE OF FRUSTRATION. THE US HAS DIFFERED WITH ISRAEL ON NUMEROUS ISSUES IN RECENT YEARS, INCLUDING LEBANON, OCCUPATION POLICIES IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND MOST RECENTLY THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS ACTED CONTRARY TO CLEARLY STATED US WISHES ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, AND OUR CREDIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD HAS BEEN STRAINED. HOWEVER, THE US GOVERNMENT HAS THOROUGHLY REVIEWED ITS OPTIONS FOR AFFECTING

ISRAELI BEHAVIOR, AND HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE USE OF BROAD SECURITY-RELATED SANCTIONS AGAINST A CLOSE FRIEND LIKE ISRAEL WILL SIMPLY NOT ACHIEVE THE RESULTS WE DESIRE, PARTICULARLY SO IF APPLIED IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. AS OUR EXPERIENCES WITH TURKEY AND PAKISTAN DEMONSTRATE, ARMS EMBARGOES AGAINST FRIENDS DO NOT WORK PRECISELY BECAUSE WE SUPPORT AND BENEFIT FROM THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF OUR FRIENDS. THE U.S. WANTS STRONGER RATHER THAN WEAKER ALLIES. THEREFORE, AN AID CUTOFF DESIGNED TO SIGNIFICANTLY IMPAIR THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF A CLOSE FRIEND IS ABSOLUTELY CONTRARY TO U.S. INTERESTS. AN AID CUTOFF THAT IS NOT INTENDED TO SIGNIFICANTLY IMPAIR THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE AFFECTED STATE, BUT RATHER TO HUMILIATE THE GOVERNMENT, IS PRONE TO PRODUCE A DEFIANT, GO-IT-ALONE ATTITUDE THAT CAN LEAD TO BEHAVIOR EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE OF THAT WHAT WE DESIRE. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF ISRAEL, WHERE A VERY STRONG NATIONAL CONSENSUS TRANSCENDING ALL PARTY AFFILIATIONS EXISTS ON SECURITY QUESTIONS. ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE ISRAELI DEPENDENCE ON U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE WOULD RALLY ISRAELIS AND AMERICAN SUPPORTERS OF ISRAEL AROUND THE GOVERNMENT, EFFECTIVELY ENDING THE INTERNAL DEBATE OVER THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK PROVOKED BY THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 1 PEACE PROPOSALS. ANY ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD REGARD SUCH SANCTIONS AS A TEST OF ITS OWN CREDIBILITY, PARTICULARLY IF THEIR

PURPOSE IS SIMPLY AN OPEN-ENDED DESIRE TO ACCOMMODATE ARAB DEMANDS FOR U.S. TOUGHNESS AGAINST ISRAEL. GIVEN THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND STRONG NATIONAL CONSENSUS AND DETERMINATION, THE ISRAELIS COULD GO IT ALONE FOR A VERY LONG TIME. THE RESULTS WOULD BE DAMAGING NOT ONLY TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE REGION BUT TO OUR WORLDWIDE REPUTATION AS AN ALLY.

4. FACED WITH SUCH AN ISRAELI REACTION TO SANCTIONS, THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN BACKING DOWN (AND LOOKING IMPOTENT), OR ESCALATING THE SANCTIONS SUCH THAT ISRAEL'S CURRENT MILITARY EDGE WAS ACTUALLY ERODED. EVEN IF AMERICAN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION COULD BE SUSTAINED, A DOUBTFUL ASSUMPTION GIVEN THAT THE U.S. PUBLIC WOULD NOT

ACCEPT THE PUNISHMENT OF FRIENDS IN OTHER THAN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES), SUCH A POLICY WOULD AT A MINIMUM HARDEN THE NEGOTIATING POSITION OF THE MODERATE ARABS AND AT WORST TEMPT THE RADICAL ARABS AND THEIR SOVIET BACKERS TO EXPLOIT MILITARILY THE WEDGE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES. WE SHOULD NOT FOOL OURSELVES THAT WHAT ARAB RECOGNITION, DE JURE OR DE FACTO, CURRENTLY EXISTS OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST HAS BEEN THE PRODUCT OF ANYTHING OTHER THAN CONSISTENT U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI SECURITY OVER THE YEARS.

5. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT USE ITS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE TO MOVE ISRAEL IN DIRECTIONS IT MIGHT NOT OTHERWISE BE INCLINED TO GO. THIS HAS BEEN DONE SUCCESSFULLY SEVERAL TIMES IN THE RECENT PAST, SUCH AS WHEN THE U.S. ACHIEVED THE AUGUST 1970 AND OCTOBER 1973 CEASEFIRE, THE SINAI II AGREEMENT AND THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. WHAT THIS EXPERIENCE SHOWS, HOWEVER, IS THAT PRESSURE IS EFFECTIVE ONLY WHEN THE U.S. CHOOSES ITS GROUND VERY CAREFULLY, AND PURSUES GOALS THAT ARE CLEARLY DEFINED, LIMITED IN SCOPE (THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY IN IMPORTANCE), AND THOROUGHLY SUSTAINABLE IN MORAL AND POLITICAL TERMS. THIS IS WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SOUGHT TO DO IN HIS PEACE INITIATIVE OF SEPTEMBER 1. THE PRESIDENT ALSO STATED VERY CLEARLY HIS HORROR AT THE BEIRUT MASSACRES AND SUCCESSFULLY DEMANDED AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BEIRUT. IN ISSUES WHERE WE DO NOT SUPPORT ISRAELI POLICY, THE U.S. HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO STATE ITS OPPOSITION CLEARLY AND FIRMLY.

6. THE POTENTIALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS OF POORLY THOUGHT-OUT SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL ARE ILLUSTRATED BY THE SPECIFIC POLICY PROPOSALS MADE IN REFTEL. YOU RECOMMEND A "PARTIAL BUT SIGNIFICANT ARMS CUT-OFF TO ISRAEL UNTIL THE IDF HAS WITHDRAWN", ADDING PARENTHETICALLY THAT THIS SHOULD BE "CONCURRENT WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES". THE ISRAELIS HAVE ALREADY LEFT THE BEIRUT AREA. IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO USE SANCTIONS FOR A FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON IN THE ABSENCE OF SYRIAN MOVEMENT, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SYRIANS AND REMAINING PLO FORCES WOULD HAVE VERY LITTLE INCENTIVE TO WITHDRAW

FROM THE BEQAA VALLEY AND NORTHERN LEBANON. OUR PRESENT POLICY IS DESIGNED TO HELP THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON RESTORE ITS AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF THE COUNTRY. MUCH AS WE DISAPPROVED OF ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION OF WEST BEIRUT AND WERE SHOCKED BY THE SUBSEQUENT MASSACRES BY SOME IN THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS, THE IDF PRESENCE IS AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF LEVERAGE OVER THE SYRIANS THAT ESTABLISHES THE CONDITIONS FOR A NEGOTIATED, ORDERLY, AND MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL. WITHOUT SUCH A MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AND SPECIAL SECURITY PROVISIONS

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02

ALONG ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER, THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RESTORE ITS AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF THE COUNTRY AND THE AREA COULD EASILY RETURN TO THE CHAOS AND INSTABILITY THAT CREATED THE CRISIS IN THE FIRST PLACE.

7. YOUR SECOND RECOMMENDATION, THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSACRES IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS ANSWER TO LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, WILL PROBABLY COME ABOUT WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL ACTION ON OUR PART. THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS ARE CONDUCTING THEIR OWN INVESTIGATIONS. THE FINAL SUGGESTION OF RECALLING OUR AMBASSADOR WOULD NOT SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE AT THIS POINT IN THE PRESENT CRISIS, AND IS UNLIKELY IN ITSELF TO AFFECT U.S. STANDING WITH THE ARABS.

8. IN REACTING TO EVENTS LIKE THE BEIRUT MASSACRES, WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF OUR LONG-TERM GOAL OF IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE PROPOSALS THROUGH RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK. BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND ARABS HAVE STATED MAXIMAL OPENING POSITIONS THAT DIFFER IN IMPORTANT RESPECTS FROM THOSE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND IT WILL CLEARLY REQUIRE A PROLONGED EFFORT ON OUR PART TO BRING THEM TOGETHER. WHILE PURSUIT OF THIS OBJECTIVE WILL REQUIRE U.S. FIRMNESS WITH THE VARIOUS PARTIES, OUR IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT IS NOT TO SEEK CONCESSIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES BUT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH BROADER ARAB PARTICIPATION. ONE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF OUR CURRENT EFFORTS IS THE SECURING OF OUR DOMESTIC BASE. THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT THE PRESSURES AGAINST ISRAEL YOU SUGGEST WILL NOT ASSIST IN THIS EFFORT, BUT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 BUDAPEST 0437

E.O. 11652: GDS

DISSENT CHANNEL

6. LONG TERM COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC IDEALS.
IN SUGGESTED SPEECH SECRETARY COULD MAKE CLEAR THAT USG
ACCEPTS IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE THAT COMMUNIST STATES HAVE
POSED TO WEST IN GENERAL AND U.S. IN PARTICULAR. WE
SHALL CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE DEMOCRATIC IDEALS INCLUDING
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND A FREE ECONOMIC SYSTEM.
E WOULD HOPE TO CONVINCE COMMUNIST STATES TO EVOLVE
TOWARDS GREATER ACCEPTANCE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES ON
BASIS OF THEIR SELF-INTEREST IN RETAINING ALLEGIANCE
AND SUPPORT OF THEIR OWN PEOPLE. USG, SECRETARY WOULD
AFFIRM, WILL CONTINUE TO SUGGEST THAT COMMUNIST STATES
LIVE UP TO THE POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IDEALS EXPRESSED
IN THEIR OWN CONSTITUTIONS AND IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
THEY HAVE SIGNED. HOWEVER, HE WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE USG DOES
NOT HAVE ABILITY OR DESIRE BRING ABOUT THIS CHANGE BY
FORCE. IN ADDITION, USG RECOGNIZING VALUE OF LIMITED
COOPERATION WILL NOT CONDITION ITS DEALINGS WITH
COMMUNIST REGIMES ON A CHANGE IN THEIR BASIC POLITICAL STRUCTURE.
WHILE WE WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF
A COUNTRY TO BRING TO POWER THOSE WHO SHARE OUR BELIEF
IN DEMOCRACY, SHOULD GENUINE DEMOCRATIC FORCES COME TO
POWER IN OTHER COUNTRIES WE WILL LEND THEM OUR FULL
SUPPORT.

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PAGE 02

BUDAPE 00437 02 OF 04 101443Z

7. PRESERVING FREEDOM OF ACTION. AFTER THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH, AS BEFORE, THE U.S. WOULD STILL BE FREE TO CHOOSE IN SPECIFIC INSTANCES TACTICS IT WILL USE TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS IT ADVOCATES. SECRETARY IN SPEECH ITSELF MIGHT STATE OPENLY SOME CRITERIA BUT NOT SO SPECIFICALLY AS TO LIMIT OUR FLEXIBILITY. FOR EXAMPLE, SALT IS OF SUCH OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE WE WOULD PRESUMABLY NOT SACRIFICE IT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY. SECRETARY MIGHT WISH SAY SO. TYING OF MFN TO QUESTION OF JEWISH EMIGRATION HAS BEEN UNPRODUCTIVE IN CASE OF SOVIET UNION AND SECRETARY MIGHT ACKNOWLEDGE HIS DESIRE ABANDON THIS TACTIC IN HOPE OF ENCOURAGING FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION BY OTHER METHODS. ON OTHER HAND, SECRETARY COULD WARN, RETURN TO STALINIST REPRESSION WOULD PREVENT U.S. COOPERATION IN EXPANSION OF DETENIE AND LEAD TO LIMITATION OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION OR OTHER COMMUNIST STATES. FURTHER PROGRESS IS ESSENTIAL, SECRETARY MIGHT ADD, AND BY MEANS OF EXHORTATION AT BELGRADE, MOBILIZATION OF WORLD OPINION AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH HELSINKI SIGNATORIES, USG WOULD KEEP UP PRESSURE FOR SUCH TOPICALLY ALIVE ISSUES AS RIGHT TO PETITION, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND CONSCIENCE, FAMILY REUNIFICATION. SECRETARY WOULD LET IT BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IN EACH CASE WE WOULD WEIGH OUR OTHER POLICY INTERESTS AND OUR POWER TO ACT IN ADDITION TO OUR INTEREST IN FOSTERING OF HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE WE DECIDE ON WHETHER AND HOW TO SEEK A HUMAN RIGHTS GOAL.

8. ADVANTAGES OF SPEECH ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE POLICY SPEECH SUGGESTED HEREIN WOULD NOT GIVE AWAY ANYTHING. IT RATHER WOULD RECOGNIZE A BASIC REALITY THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT GRANT OR EXPAND "HUMAN RIGHTS" TO THE EXTENT OF THREATENING ABILITY TO GOVERN. IT WOULD AFFIRM CHANNELING OF U.S. EFFORTS TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF RIGHTS WHICH ARE ATTAINABLE OR NEAR ATTAINMENT NOW.

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PAGE 03

BUAPE 00437 02 OF 04 101443Z

WE HAVE ALREADY DEMONSTRATED LIMITS ON OUR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY IN HUNGARY IN 1956, IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968, IN KOREA, AND IN CHILE. IT IS TIME WE OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGE THOSE LIMITATIONS BEFORE SIMILAR DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES RESULT FROM CONFLICTS OVER POLITICALLY SENSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS. IN THE DRAFTER'S OPINION, SPEECH HE PROPOSING NOT IN CONFLICT WITH U.S. LEADERS' RECENT STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT SUPPLEMENTS THOSE STATEMENTS IN IMPORTANT WAY. TO EXTENT RECENT OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN CHARGED WITH BEING AMBIGUOUS AND SELF-CONTRADICTORY, SPEECH BEING SUGGESTED HEREIN WOULD HOPEFULLY DEFUSE THOSE CHARGES.

9. THE POLICY STATEMENT SUGGESTED HEREIN SHOULD ALSO ENABLE USG TO PURSUE DETENTE AND ENCOURAGE HUMAN RIGHTS SIMULTANEOUSLY. BY PLACING A LIMIT ON U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY, IT WOULD AVOID UNNECESSARILY PROVOKING CONFRONTATION AND A HARDENING OF SOVIET POSITION. BESIDES MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AWARE LIMITS OF OUR PRACTICAL SUPPORT, IT WOULD ENCOURAGE THEM TO CHANNEL THEIR EFFORTS IN SAME MANNER AS USG ALONG SAME CONSTRUCTIVE LINES AND INTO SAME AREAS OF POTENTIAL PROGRESS CITED PARA 3 ABOVE. SUGGESTED POLICY STATEMENT WOULD ENHANCE OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION RATHER THAN ACCUSATIVE CONFRONTATION AT BELGRADE THIS YEAR. IT WOULD THUS BE MORE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THERE AGREEMENT TO MEASURED EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. THE POLICY BEING SUGGESTED ESCHews VIOLENCE OR INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE. IT IS VALID FOR DICTATORSHIPS OF THE RIGHT AS WELL AS THE LEFT. IT RECONCILES PRACTICAL AND IDEALISTIC VALUES. IT WOULD INCORPORATE INCREASINGLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOVEREIGN COUNTRIES. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN SELF-PROCLAIMED PRINCIPLES AND WOULD CUT GROUND OUT FROM UNDER GOOD DEAL OF SOVIET OBJECTION TO USG STAND ON

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PAGE 04 BUDAPE 00437 02 OF 04 101443Z

HUMAN RIGHTS; FURTHERMORE, IF THE HUMAN RIGHTS WE
ARE FREE TO ADVOCATE UNDER THIS DOCTRINE WERE ACHIEVED,
TREMENDOUS IMPETUS WOULD BE GIVEN TO FURTHER DEMOCRATIZATION
OF COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS AND TOWARDS
EVENTUAL ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR MAXIMUM HUMAN RIGHTS GOALS.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

February 17, 1978

~~SECRET~~
DISSENT CHANNEL

TO: The Secretary
P - Mr. Habib

FROM: AF/E -

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy in the Horn

B6

If the US wishes to play an active and effective role in the Horn, we believe that the time has come to consider under what conditions the US will fulfill its commitment to assist Somalia with its requirements for the defense of its internationally recognized territory. The initial Ethiopian counter-attack has revealed that the Somali armed forces are over-extended and are in a poor position to defend either their gains in the Ogaden or the boundaries of the Somali Democratic Republic itself; we may assume that it is or will shortly be within the power of the Ethiopian army to invade Somalia and seize Hargeisa and perhaps Berbera. Both militarily and politically, the attractions of such an axis of counter-attack may prove irresistible. If this comes to pass, the Ethiopians and the Soviets will be in a position to dictate a peace, and the Western position in the Horn will be eroded almost to the vanishing point.

An invasion of Somalia will be perceived as an indication of US inability or unwillingness to respond effectively to the Soviet threat in the area. The Saudis, the Iranians, the Egyptians, the Sudanese and a number of other moderate African and regional states will be disheartened by such a chain of events. The leadership in some of these states which have staked considerable prestige in aligning themselves with the U.S. will inevitably be shaken by U.S. failure to respond and may succumb to domestic pressures to turn away from the West. This has grave regional and extra-regional consequences for our position.

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-2-

The Somalis and others have noted that although Somali rejection of the Soviets was followed by increased economic aid from the moderate Arabs and the West, vital military support from the United States or other Western powers was withheld. Therefore, except for antipathy to the Ethiopians and the Soviets, there is little incentive for any Somali government to follow a generally pro-Western, "neutral" policy. Without some Western support for Somali security, antipathy may not ultimately prove sufficient, and Siad, or his successors, may make what accommodation they can with what they perceive to be the real power in the area.

We have been unable to respond to Somali requests for assistance because we did not wish to be accused of supporting a war of aggression, and one which was in direct violation of the African principle of the inviolability of post-colonial boundaries. This obstacle to our support for Somalia will be removed as Somali troops in the Ogaden are driven out or withdrawn into Somalia itself. Our attempt to promote a negotiated solution, while laudable, is not likely to succeed since it depends on Ethiopian and Soviet cooperation, at a time when the military route is so promising.

Whatever the progress towards real negotiations, it remains in our interests to deter an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia with the resultant risk of Soviet domination of the Horn of Africa. While our moves should be coordinated with our allies, the short time we have in which to act argues for a direct US initiative to offer some real support for Somalia's territorial integrity once Somali units are out of the Ogaden. We suggest that an initiative should consist of a decision, discussed first with selected allies and then, if generally approved, presented to President Siad that:

-- We continue to support a negotiated solution, which might provide the inhabitants of the Ogaden with at least some measure of local control, and we believe that the GSDR should cooperate fully with the OAU mediation effort and should be prepared to agree to a compromise acceptable to both parties.

~~SECRET~~

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-3-

-- We share the Somali concern about Ethiopian violation of the borders of the Somali Democratic Republic. While we have been unable to assist Somalia militarily so long as units of the Somali National Army are operating within Ethiopian territory, when that situation no longer exists we are prepared to help deter any invasion of Somalia's recognized boundaries.

-- We will then be prepared to authorize as quickly as our procedures permit third-country transfers of US defensive weapons to Somalia.

-- We will then be prepared to signal our interest in the area by sending a US naval ship to call at an appropriate Somali port.

-- We will also be willing, if the GSDR desires, to send a military attache to the Embassy in Mogadiscio.

-- We would not, in principle, object if friendly nations wished to send deterrent forces to Somalia equipped with US weapons to support the defense of Somalia's internationally-recognized territory.

-- We would also be prepared immediately to begin discussions of the implementation of our earlier decision in principle to join with other friendly countries to supply Somalia with weapons to fill any gaps in its ability to defend its internationally-recognized territory.

-- All of these steps would be taken in the context of our friendly relationship with both Djibouti and Kenya and our continuing concern for their security and territorial integrity, as well as our continuing hope of improved relations with Ethiopia. We would expect the GSDR to offer the Government of Kenya public assurances that the GSDR will not support or take advantage of any moves which threaten the unity and integrity of Kenya.

We do not believe that those steps will give rise to much serious objection in Africa. They can be presented Bongo and the Nigerians as an incentive to Somalia to withdraw from Ethiopia. The EPMG can be expected to react critically to our moves when they become known. However, they will be somewhat constrained because we will be in the position of supporting the OAU principle of territorial integrity. While the EPMG may draw attention to the suddenness of this US willingness to support actively that principle when we were, in the EPMG view, rather passive supporters of it when Ethiopia was the victim, here, too,

~~SECRET~~

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-4-

the moves can be defended as steps taken to bring about the withdrawal of Somali units from the Ogaden so as to permit negotiations to go forward. In any event, we believe that if any Western influence in the region is to be preserved, we must take an unequivocal position at this crucial juncture to provide leadership and direction in order to stimulate the confidence of our friends in the area.

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

file dissent

RELEASE IN FULL

August 25, 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. John R. Dobrin
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Dobrin:

Thank you for your telegram of July 29 in the dissent channel. Members of the Policy Planning Staff and other officers of the Department who are concerned with French affairs have carefully reviewed the considerations you raise in support of your view that the US should avoid too close a connection with the Giscard-Gaullist coalition and should visibly increase its ties with the Socialist party.

There are no illusions in the Department about the difficulties confronting Giscard and his present government; or about the fact that a defeat of the left coalition may be widely viewed as at least as much a Chirac as a Giscard victory; or about the problems a Gaullist-dominated government might cause us. Notwithstanding all this, the judgment has been reached as a basis for policy that even a Gaullist-dominated government under a Giscard presidency is likely to be more compatible with US interests than a Socialist-Communist coalition government. This is so even in light of the strong case that might be made that the fastest road to a revival of centrism in France, which might serve both French and US interests, may lie -- albeit over a number of years -- in a victory of the left coalition and its subsequent disintegration rather than through a victory of the right.

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-2-

It is the judgment in Washington that a victory of the left is likely to have implications for foreign policy with which we would have problems and domestic policies which could prove more destabilizing, in a polarized France, than would a defeat of the left. You are familiar, I am sure, with the widely held views about the potentially disturbing effects of a left victory on French foreign policy and the concern that it might constitute an "example" in Italy, a blow to the Federal Republic's sense of community in a Western Europe of more or less like-minded regimes, and a threat to the strands of Atlantic and European cooperation which have been the basis of Western security and prosperity for the past 30 years.

On the domestic side, to which you devote most of your attention, few would dispute your view that there is a strong demand in France for change and reform and that there are risks in frustrating that demand indefinitely. On the other hand, you deemphasize the difficulties that a left government will face in trying to carry out reforms. Strong interests have blocked them for years and will not like them any better from a left government. One can foresee flight of capital, lower investment and other reactions which, in the present economic climate, could have disastrous effects on France's ability to maintain domestic order and carry out its international obligations.

The United States would welcome reforms that could help reduce the sharp polarization of the country. We recognize the obstacles to Giscard's achieving such reforms. But the present left coalition, partly because it includes the Communists, seems unlikely to be able to carry through meaningful change except at a cost in instability and uncertainty which would be excessive in terms of France's as well as our own interests. It is a question of weighing risks and making choices among them.

For these reasons, our course is to implement the general position which has been set out by the President and the Secretary: namely, to make clear that the US is

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-3-


not interfering in French internal affairs but that it is not indifferent to developments which might give the Communist party a major share in France's government. We recognize that France is perhaps the European country most nearly immune to US influence. But everyone agrees that the election will be close. Signs of US esteem for the Giscard regime might have some marginal but possibly important effect on the election; an apparent weakening of US concern about the implications of enhanced Communist influence in France could also have a significant impact on the election.

With respect to your recommendations, we understand that Mitterrand has reconsidered his plans to come to the US. Mitterrand may be disappointed that we were not able to commit the President to a meeting, although other senior U.S. officials would have been available, but he does not appear disposed to make a public issue of the matter. Neither are we.

In France our Embassy has a clear mandate to maintain and, to the extent compatible with our overall policy, to expand our contacts with the French Socialists at all levels. The various proposals you made in this regard are available to the Embassy and may well be of assistance to them.

This response to your message will be distributed to all those who received it and to the Embassy in Paris.

Sincerely yours,



Paul H. Kreisberg
Acting Director
Policy Planning Staff

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ROUTINE

TEGUCIGALPA

GUATEMALA

DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR [] ONLY

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: AIRGRAM A-22 DATED MARCH 29, 1976

JAA
JAA

B6

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT AIRGRAM ON JUNE 17, 1976. MR. JEFFREY GARTEN OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR AIRGRAM HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE OPEN FORUM PANEL. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

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TELEGRAM

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DISSENT CHANNEL; FOR [] FROM LAKE-S/P

E. O. 11652: N. A

TAGS: PFOR, XL

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE -- CARIBBEAN TRANSITION
PAPER

REF: BRIDGETOWN A-009

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR REQUEST, A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY WILL NOT BE PREPARED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE IDEAS YOU SET OUT IN YOUR MESSAGE ON THE CARIBBEAN TRANSITION PAPER PARALLEL VIEWS THE DEPARTMENT INCORPORATED IN RESPONSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE LATIN AMERICA PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR AIRGRAM HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, THE COUNSELOR, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL.

VANCE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

Dissent Channel Message

MEMORANDUM

September 15, 1977
9/16TO : S/P - Mr. Tony Lake
Director, Planning StaffFROM : ARA/CCA - SUBJECT: Decontrol and Release of LOU and Unclassified
Material

At the time of the OAS General Assembly in Grenada, I was taking a course in human rights at a local law school. When the unclassified reporting cable came in with the text of the resolution on human rights I wished to share it with my class. Because I had learned to my surprise, while doing an FOIA case, that the fact a document is unclassified does not mean it is part of the public domain, I made inquiries as to who could give me permission to release the cable to the public. FOIA told me that "the appropriate office" could authorize the release of unclassified cables but could not tell me who in the ARA hierarchy from a secretary to the Assistant Secretary could give me permission. FOIA also told me that all requests for documents had to come through its office as there are reproduction costs involved in releasing a document. When I stated that I wished to release the document on my initiative I was told that I "was going outside channels" and that I should talk to SY. I found SY equally unable to give me guidelines as to the rules for releasing unclassified and LOU material. Neither FOIA or SY could refer me to a regulation or an individual with the answer. I therefore drafted the enclosed memo to my ARA FOIA office. That office has not replied in writing, but has informed me that the answers to my questions are in 5 FAM 950, a position which was purportedly coordinated with SY and L/ARA.

It is obvious that 5 FAM 950 is hopelessly outdated and too vague to be any help. Section 952.1 stated that "among other things, information received through privileged sources and

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-2-

certain personnel, medical, investigative, commercial, and financial records shall be afforded physical protection comparable to that given "Confidential" material in order to safeguard it from unauthorized disclosure", and shall be marked LOU. In fact, instead of using LOU to protect the type of information listed, most offices appear to view it as a type of quasi security classification and mark LOU things the release of which might be harmful to national security but which do not seem to be quite harmful enough to rate the six-year protection of Confidential. LOU also ~~seems to be commonly used to protect things the disclosure of which could be embarrassing to an office or an individual.~~ 5 FAM 913 prohibits the classification of information "to conceal inefficiency of administrative error, to prevent embarrassment... or to prevent for any other reason the release of information which does not require protection in the interest of national security." Evidently these guidelines do not apply to the release of LOU or unclassified material. *not required*

In addition to abuse of LOU to protect people from embarrassment, LOU is also obviously used improperly to ~~protect information which should in fact be classified Confidential in the interest of national security.~~ Several months ago the Overseas Private Investment Corporation sent me a large number of LOU cables with the demand that I authorize their release by COB. OPIC attorneys insisted that this was not an FOIA case and that they did not want to go through the State FOIA office in order to save time. However, in view of the fact that the documents were to be used in a public hearing I had to review them under FOIA standards. I had to upgrade six of them to Confidential in order to protect them. L/ARA agreed with this approach. However, L/ARA also said that in view of the fact that the documents which I refused were refused under FOIA standards, the refusal letter had to be signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary, as in an FOIA case, even though my Office Director had the power to order the ~~release of the LOU cables which were in fact released.~~ This solution is not illogical but is nowhere expressed in any regulation, to my knowledge.

Since the advent of FOIA there does not seem to be any legal difference between LOU and unclassified. Title 22, Section 6.4 of the Foreign Relations Rules and Regulations lists eight categories of materials which can be protected

-3-

under FOIA standards, none of which are classified under an executive order as needing protection for national security reasons. Since LOU is not established by any executive order and since Title 22 applies the same rules of decontrol to both LOU and unclassified material, the only difference between LOU and unclassified is that one can receive a reprimand from SY for not protecting LOU material. This distinction seems to me to be wholly irrational as it means that one can receive a reprimand for not protecting something which by law cannot receive more protection in the face of a public inquiry than an unclassified piece of material.

11 A new definition of LOU should be developed which takes the present realities into account. Such issues as what effect the Privacy Act has on unclassified documents and what we should do about the CIA's and NSC's "For Official Use Only" category must be considered. There are also interesting side questions such as how to protect unclassified Dissent Channel messages. Title 22 and 5 FAM 5.90 have to be rewritten, taking into account the judicial interpretations of those regulations which have not been reflected by changed language.

I believe one sensible solution would be to state that anything which can or should still be protected by the FOIA or Privacy Acts or any other legal requirement should be classified LOU, a category which should be established on a government wide basis by executive order. All other uncontrolled material would be marked unclassified, with the understanding that unclassified means what a lay interpretation would imply now -- i.e. something which any employee can share with anyone.

Attachment:

As stated

Draft: ARA/CCA-
9/15/77:X21658

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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NOW DEBT-FREE. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF THIS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT WERE TO BE FOLLOWED BY A LOSS OF ORIT'S IMAGE AS AN ORGANIZATION INDEPENDENT OF ALL FORMAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING. ORIT HAS AN IMAGE PROBLEM NOW. THIS PROPOSAL WOULD ONLY AGGRAVATE IT. IT WOULD BE BETTER IN THE LONG RUN FOR ORIT TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO STRENGTHEN ITSELF THROUGH ITS OWN RESOURCES, EVEN IF THIS TAKES LONGER, THAN TO TAKE THE SHORT-CUT OF ACCEPTING USG FINANCING AT THE COST OF WHAT IMAGE ORIT DOES HAVE. TO BE ACCUSED OF BEING DOMINATED BY THE AFL/CIO IS FAR LESS DAMAGING THAN TO BE ACCUSED OF BEING CONTROLLED BY THE USG.
BOENER

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DISSEMINATION CHANNEL

AIDAC FOR GEORGE PHILLIPS, STATE FOR TOM BOWIE

REF: (A) STATE 249004, (B) LA PAZ 8775

1. SUMMARY: [REDACTED] OPPOSES AIFLD'S PROPOSAL FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO ORIT BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THAT POTENTIAL GAIN OF IMPROVING ORIT'S ABILITY TO STRENGTHEN LATIN TRADE UNIONS AND ORGANIZE MORE WORKERS DOES NOT OUTWEIGH THE DAMAGE THAT WILL ENSUE TO ORIT'S IMAGE IN LATIN AMERICA ONCE IT ACCEPTS SUPPORT FROM THE USG. END SUMMARY

2. FOR YEARS ORIT HAS BEEN CRITICIZED IN LATIN AMERICA FOR BEING DOMINATED BY AN AMERICAN LABOR ORGANIZATION, THE AFL/CIO. TO NOW CHANNEL USG FUNDS INTO ORIT VIA AIFLD WOULD OPEN THE DOOR FOR SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED CRITICISM OF ORIT AS AN ORGANIZATION DOMINATED NOT JUST BY THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT BUT BY THE USG ITSELF. THIS WILL BRING CHARGES FROM THE LEFT THAT ORIT IS CONTROLLED BY THE CIA. THIS CHARGE WILL BE CREDIBLE TO MANY INDEPENDENT LABOR ORGANIZATIONS SINCE ALMOST ONE HALF OF ORIT'S BUDGET UNDER AIFLD'S PROPOSAL (\$105,000 OF \$236,000) WOULD COME FROM THE USG (THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THE AFL/CIO CONTRIBUTION).

3. THE LABOR ATTACHE RECOGNIZES THAT CURRENT ORIT AFFILIATES ARE MORE CONCERNED WITH IMPROVING ORIT'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE THEM NECESSARY SERVICES THAN WHAT MAY BE THE SOURCE OF THE MONEY THAT PAYS FOR THESE SERVICES, AND HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE FOUR REGIONAL FIELD OFFICES TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE PROPOSED PROGRAM WOULD HELP ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF ASSISTING ORIT'S AFFILIATES TO STRENGTHEN THEMSELVES AND TO ORGANIZE MORE OF LATIN AMERICA'S UNORGANIZED WORKERS. HE ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT ORIT'S ENEMIES ON THE LEFT, PARTICULARLY CLAT AND THE COMMUNISTS, WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACK ORIT WHETHER USG FUNDING IS PROVIDED OR NOT. HOWEVER, HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT USG FINANCING AND THE CRITICISM THAT WILL ENSUE WILL HAVE ON LABOR GROUPS OF THE CENTER THAT ARE POTENTIAL ORIT AFFILIATES OR THAT PRESENTLY COOPERATE WITH ORIT. CRIT'S IDENTIFICATION WITH THE USG MAY MAKE THEM MORE RELUCTANT TO END THEIR INDEPENDENCE BY AFFILIATING OR COOPERATING WITH ORIT. THIS COULD RESULT IN THE ORIT AFFILIATES BEING ISOLATED ON THE RIGHT.

4. THE LABOR ATTACHE AGREES WITH THE AID COMMENT THAT "PROSPECTS" FOR PHASE OUT OF THE PROGRAM, ONCE ACCEPTED, ARE NOT CLEAR AT THIS POINT. IN FACT, PUT MORE STRONGLY, IT IS PROBABLE THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTED THERE WILL BE CONTINUING PRESSURE FROM ORIT, AIFLD AND THE AFL/CIO TO CONTINUE THE PROGRAM UNTIL SUCH TIME IN THE INDEFINITE FUTURE WHEN LATIN AMERICAN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS WOULD BE ABLE AND WILLING TO ASSUME THE COSTS OF THIS PROGRAM.

5. THE LABOR ATTACHE IS CONCERNED MOREOVER THAT, EVEN IF THIS PROGRAM WERE APPROVED FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME AND USG FINANCING WERE THEN WITHDRAWN, ORIT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE IDENTIFIED FOR MANY YEARS TO COME AS A LABOR ORGANIZATION TIED TO THE

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RELEASE IN
FULL

MANAGEMENT TALKS BEGIN ON FLEXTIME: Flexitime, which for some months has been a huge success in much of IOA, is being considered for use in other Agency units. AFGE 1812 Vice President Jo Campbell is coordinating AFGE 1812's participation in talks which will focus on general and individual element aspects of adopting flexitime. Talks have begun and in addition to Jo, AFGE 1812 representatives include Executive Committee member Abe Harris (IMV), VOA Steward Coordinator Manny Athanas (IBS), and rds Al Green (IBS), Heather Prosky (ICS), and Toni Zapata (IPS).

A SUCCESS AT USIA: It is virtually impossible to find anyone who is unhappy among the entire 109-member staff of the Agency's Finance Division, reports Vice President Jo Campbell. So far, USIA's experiment with flexible, self-selected departure times for employees has been limited to IOA/F, with 35 staffers beginning March 3 and the entire staff adopting it on August 20 of this year. At this time, no planning to request Flexitime.

1970
which is still in the experimental stage in USIA, was begun following negotiations with 312 officers early this year. The basic idea of Flexitime is to permit the employee to select time for arrival at work (7:45 a. m. to 9:45 p. m.) and for departure from work (6:30 p. m.,). All employees are required to work a full eight hour day and to be on duty from 8:15 to 4:30 p. m. (core time) except for the 45-minute lunch period. Employees are permitted to select when their workday will begin and end, on a day-at-a-time basis, to accommodate personal commitments such as doctor's appointments, car pools, shopping, bus schedules

The Finance Division Chief, say that Flexitime fits his personal preference for an early start with no disadvantages and has written a report on the experiment for IPT. A three-member Employee Committee takes the place of the supervisor in the administration of Flexitime. Employees sign-in and sign-out sheets which are turned over to a time clerk. The Committee acts as performing a "survey" function, rather than "acting as a watchdog."

Employees on Flexitime are equally enthusiastic. AFGE 1812 Treasurer Jim Johnson (IOA/FD) says, "I am one of those people who was here 15 or 20 minutes early every day, which is because of my bus schedule. Now I can leave a little earlier and get paid for my time. I'm here in the morning." In IOA/FA, AFGE 1812 Steward Lola Hoosier (also on the Employee Committee) reports: "It's wonderful and has helped me a couple of times. I used to have a doctor's appointment that made me a few minutes late, I'd have to take my doctor's leave. Now I just work the additional minutes to make my full eight hours. If you would like to have more time to do things in the afternoon. This way you can arrive early and leave early to get a little more daylight to do things . . . I potted flowers. I said at first there was no point to it because she came to work at quarter to nine. Now she comes in an hour early so that her car pool no longer has to wait for her."

RELEASE IN PART B6

Department of State

PAGE 01 WARSAW 10556 01 OF 01 077600
ACTION: ~~SECRET~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 07 WARSAW 10556

DISSENT CHANNEL

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: POLAND: CARROTS AND STICKS ARE NEEDED

REFS: (A) WARSAW 10252; (B) POZMAN 480; (C) KRANOV 1054; (D) STATI 313413

- 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
- 2. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [REDACTED] THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE.

3. U.S. POLICY TOWARD POLAND HAS WORKED ADMIRABLY SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW. OUR POLICY HAS REGISTERED AMERICAN MORAL OUTRAGE AT THE DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, AND THE SANCTIONS HAVE TREMENDOUS MORAL FORCE -- THEY TELL THE WORLD THAT WE CONDEMN THE POLICIES OF THE JARUZELSKI REGIME.

4. NOW HOWEVER, U.S. POLICY NEEDS TO BE MODIFIED SO THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO PROMOTE U.S. OBJECTIVES. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE U.S. SHOULD TRY:
-- TO SPLIT POLAND FROM THE SOVIET UNION,
-- TO STRENGTHEN THOSE GROUPS IN POLAND WHO SEEK TO LINK POLAND CLOSER TO THE WEST;
-- TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLAND;
-- TO DISTRACT OR PREOCCUPY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO REDUCE THEIR ADVENTURISM ELSEWHERE.
IN SHORT THE U.S. SHOULD BE WEAKENING, UNDERMINING AND SUBVERTING THE GOP VIA MAXIMUM CONTACT WITH THE WEST RATHER THAN ISOLATING AND STRENGTHENING IT. SUCH A POLICY REQUIRES MODIFYING THE SANCTIONS AS WELL AS PRECISE, FOCUSED RETALIATION FOR GOP HARASSMENT.

5. THE PRESENT U.S. POLICY PRODUCES THE OPPOSITE. OUR POLICY
-- IS DRIVING THE POLES CLOSER TO THE SOVIETS;
-- IS ENCOURAGING GOP POSITIONS THAT PLEASE THE SOVIETS, ALLOWING THEM TO FOCUS EFFORTS ELSEWHERE
-- IS DISCOURAGING THOSE WITHIN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WHO WOULD LIKE TO REDUCE, IF NOT END, U.S. - POLISH TENSIONS; AND
-- HAS HAD ONLY MARGINAL INFLUENCE ON THE TREATMENT OF POLISH CITIZENS BY THEIR GOVERNMENT
IN SHORT, THE PRESENT U.S. POLICY IS NOT WORKING

Person subject

6. UNALTERED SANCTIONS HAVE DECLINED UTILITY. THE SITUATION IN POLAND HAS CHANGED DURING THE LAST YEAR, AND INSISTING TO THE CONTRARY IGNORES REALITY. DAILY LIFE IS NOW SOMEWHAT BETTER AND FREER FOR MANY POLES THAN IT WAS DURING MARTIAL LAW. PROMISING TO CHANGE POLICY IF THE GOP ALTERS ITS STANCE, BUT THEN FAILING TO DO SO IN THE FACE OF CHANGES LOWERS THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR FUTURE PROMISES AND LESSENS OUR ABILITY TO BARGAIN WITH THE GOP DOWN THE ROAD. IN LATE SPRING THE USG DECIDED UPON A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH VIS-A-VIS POLAND. THE TWO PUBLICLY

KNOWN PREREQUISITES FOR THE WESTERN STEP WERE A SUCCESSFUL AND PEACEFUL PAPA VISIT, PLUS THE RELEASE OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF POLISH PRISONERS. NONE OF THESE CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN MET. THE USG SHOULD HAVE RESPONDED BY LIFTING MORE FULLY ONE OR MORE OF THE SANCTIONS. THE RECENT U.S. DECISION NOT TO DO SO IN EFFECT RENEGED, IMPOSED NEW CONDITION (DEFINITIVE GOP ACTION TO RESTORE THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE) AND ANNOUNCED A SANCTION (BLOCKING POLAND'S ENTRY INTO THE IMF) WHICH PREVIOUSLY HAD NOT BEEN PUBLICLY STATED.

7. IT CAN, OF COURSE, BE ARGUED THAT TOO LITTLE HAS CHANGED IN POLAND SINCE DECEMBER 13, 1981. POLISH GOVERNMENT REPRESSION CONTINUES, AND SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS REMAIN. POLAND IS, AFTER ALL, A COMMUNIST REGIME. HOWEVER, EVEN WITH THE MOST INTENSE WESTERN PRESSURE, THE U.S. CANNOT EXPECT THAT THE GOP WILL EVER BECOME A POPULAR, EVEN SEMI-DEMOCRATIC REGIME. THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE DEMONSTRATIONS ON SIGNIFICANT ANNIVERSARIES, EVEN IF THERE ARE NO MAJOR DISTURBANCES IN THE FUTURE. IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE GOP HAS WON POPULAR SUPPORT, ONLY THAT THE REGIME HAS CRUSHED THE OPPOSITION. WALESA AND HIS COLLEAGUES CONTINUE TO BE HARASSED. HOWEVER, HE IS FREE TO MEET THE WESTERN PRESS, TALK WITH VISITING SENATORS, AND HE DOES HAVE THE CHANCE TO GET HIS VIEWS ACROSS TO POLAND AND THE WORLD. DUBCEK WOULD WELCOME EVEN A FRACTION OF WALESA'S FREEDOM AND MEDIA ACCESS. IN OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WALESA WOULD BE A STATISTIC IN A LABOR CAMP. IF NOT IN A CEMETERY, WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT ALTHOUGH POLAND IN 1983 LOOKS BETTER IN COMPARISON TO 1981, HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS ARE STILL BETTER THAN IN PRE-AUGUST 1980.

8. UNCHANGED SANCTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO DRIVE THE POLES CLOSER TO MOSCOW AND WILL DO LITTLE TO CHANGE POLICY IN WARSAW. FURTHER REDUCING PERSONAL AND ECONOMIC CONTACTS WITH THE WEST ONLY PROMOTES GREATER RUSSIFICATION OF

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 03 WARSZAWA 1955 01 OF 02 171545Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 WARSZAWA 10654

DISSEMI CHANNEL

POLAND. MODIFYING THE SANCTIONS IS NOT MERELY A REWARD TO THE GOP FOR IMPROVED BEHAVIOR; RATHER, IT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE US RECOGNIZES ACTION AND RESPONSE; ONLY BY SUCH DEMONSTRATION CAN THERE BE ANY HOPE THAT OTHER, CONTINUED SANCTIONS, WILL INDUCE DESIRED POLISH RESPONSES.

9. GOP LEADERS CAN LOGICALLY CONCLUDE THAT GIVEN CURRENT US POLICY, NOTHING WITHIN THEIR CONCEPTION OF THE POSSIBLE CAN BE DONE TO ALTER THE US STANCE. THEY ARE NOT ABOUT TO DO ANYTHING WHICH WILL LET THE SPECTER OF "SOLIDARNOSC" RISE AGAIN. DANGLING POTENTIAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BENEFITS BEFORE THE GOP TO PERSUADE IT TO SEEN ACCOMMODATION WILL NOT CONVINCING THE GOP TO RISK A REPEAT OF AUGUST 1950. THAT ARGUMENT FAILED TO PERSUADE THE GOP IN THE SPRING OF 1952, AND IT WILL CARRY NO WEIGHT NOW, ESPECIALLY SINCE BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE BEEN RUINED AS A RESULT OF POLISH REACTION TO THE US. ON THE CONTRARY, THOSE ELEMENTS THAT MIGHT ARGUE THAT ECONOMIC NEEDS REQUIRE POLISH CONCESSIONS HAVE LITTLE OR NO SAY IN THIS REGIME. NO MATTER HOW BLEAK THE ECONOMIC REALITY, THE GOP WILL NOT UNDERTAKE REGIME-THREATENING RISKS IN THE FORM OF REDUCED INTERNAL POLITICAL CONTROLS, AS DEMANDED BY THE US. MOREOVER, THE GOP BELIEVES THAT IT CAN HAVE ITS CAVE AND EAT IT TOO. IT CAN PURSUE A FIERCE ANTI-US POLICY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY NEGOTIATE RESCHEDULING OF DEBTS WITH COMMERCIAL BANKS. IN SHORT, CURRENT US POLICY OFFERS NO REALISTIC INCENTIVES, NO CARROTS TO PERSUADE THE GOP TO ALTER ITS DOMESTIC POLICY OR TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE US.

10. PUNISHING POLAND AS A SURROGATE TARGET FOR THE SOVIETS DOES PUBLICIZE OUR CONTINUED HOSTILITY TO THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN WARSZAWA, BUT IT ALSO CONFUSES WESTERN PUBLICS, AND MAKES OUR OVERALL POLICY TOWARD EAST EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION APPEAR CONTRADICTORY, WITHOUT PRODUCING CONCOMITANT PLUSES IN OUR STRUGGLE WITH THE USSR. POLAND IS THE "SOFT UNDERBELLY" OF THE BLOC; A DIFFERENTIATED POLICY TOWARD POLAND IS ONE OF THE FEW AND SEVERAL MEANS THE WEST HAS OF NURTURING INTERNAL CHANGES TO UNDERMINE AND WEAKEN THE SOVIET GRIP. IT MAKES LITTLE SENSE TO ROUGHEN THAT HIDE TO MAKE POLAND AND THE SOVIET BLOC MORE IMPERMEABLE TO CORROSIVE WESTERN INFLUENCE. IN SUM, THE US SHOULD AT THIS TIME CONSIDER MODIFYING OR REMOVING SANCTIONS IN ORDER TO WEAKEN AND UNDERMINE THE GOP VIA MAXIMUM CONTACT. FOR EXAMPLE, RATHER THAN PREVENTING GOP MEMBERSHIP THE US MIGHT EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A GOP APPLICATION. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE APPLICATION, THE US AND OTHER WESTERN STATES WILL HAVE TO SEND NUMEROUS EXPERTS TO ALL PARTS OF POLAND REPEATEDLY TO CONDUCT IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH POLES IN ORDER TO OBTAIN AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. EVEN AFTER MEMBERSHIP HAS BEEN APPROVED NUMEROUS FOLLOW-UP VISITS WILL HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED IN ORDER TO VERIFY POLISH ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS.

11. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RECENT GOP MEASURES

AGAINST THE CONSULATES HERE AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES IS A TRIAL BALLOON. US FAILURE TO RETALIATE WILL INSURE THE GOP TO TAKE FURTHER MEASURES. ACCEPTING THE GOP HARASSMENT AS A JUSTIFIED RESPONSE TO OUR SANCTIONS AND RADIO BROADCAST AND THEREFORE NOT REACTING FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE "BULLY" NATURE OF A COMMUNIST REGIME. A CRITICAL TIME WILL BE JANUARY 1, WHEN ALL LOCAL EMPLOYEE'S WORK PERMITS EXPIRE. WE CANNOT AUTOMATICALLY ASSUME THAT THIS YEAR THE GOP WILL AGAIN BACK DOWN IN THE FACE OF THREATENED US COUNTERMEASURES. THE US SHOULD EXAMINE SOME APPROPRIATE COUNTERMOVES AND BEGIN IMPLEMENTING THEM NOW. (PERHAPS THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS CAN SUGGEST SOME PARALLEL HARASSMENT THAT WILL NOT REVERSE TO OUR DISADVANTAGE). AT THE SAME TIME THE US SHOULD CLEARLY EXPLAIN TO THE GOP THAT THE STEPS BEING TAKEN ARE IN RETALIATION FOR THE GOP'S ACTIONS AGAINST THE CONSULATES AND HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE LARGER, MORE IMPORTANT, ISSUE OF SANCTIONS AND BILATERAL RELATIONS.

12. IN SUM, EASING ON THE SANCTIONS AND RESPONDING FIRMLY TO GOP HARASSMENT MIGHT APPEAR CONTRADICTORY AT FIRST GLANCE. IN FACT, SUCH A FINE-TUNED POLICY OF CARROTS AND STICKS WILL DO MORE TO PROMOTE US OBJECTIVES AND MAKE THE GOP MORE AMENABLE TO FUTURE AMERICAN ACTIONS THAN THE CURRENT US POLICY. HOWEVER, BALANCE IS IMPORTANT. ONLY EASING SANCTIONS SIGNALS WEAKNESS, WHILE ONLY RETALIATING FOR THE GOP HARASSMENT IMPLIES A DESIRE TO LET RELATIONS DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER. DAVIS

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AIRGRAM

Per Tom, Malcolm
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S/PC-2

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TO : Department of State
 Department please PASS

INFO : BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, MOSCOW, PRAGUE, SOFIA, WARSAW
 NO Later Distribution Per Mr Richard R Peterson
 2-28273

FROM : Amembassy BELGRADE DATE: February 24, 1973

SUBJECT: Dissent Message **RELEASE IN PART B6**

REF : A-3559

DISSENT CHANNEL

This airgram transmits a dissenting view submitted by [redacted] B6
 [redacted] Consular Section.

A Policy Initiative--Elimination of Section 212(a)(28)(C)
 From the Immigration and Nationality Act

I urge the Department to take an active and vigorous lead within the Administration to formulate and have introduced an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act eliminating Section 212(a)(28)(C)--in essence, membership in a communist party or its affiliates--as a ground of ineligibility to receive a visa to the United States.

This section of the law which was born in the traumatic times of the early 1950's has outlived whatever usefulness it may have had. If it need be pointed out, one has to look only to the past year to see how dramatically and wisely our policy has changed toward those who are by definition "excludable"--along with, I might add, criminals, carriers of communicable diseases and prostitutes.

Furthermore, this section of the law has little effect in practice, thanks to pragmatic administrative measures which get around its awkward and untoward effects. For example, waivers are wisely and routinely granted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to permit members of communist parties to enter the United States as nonimmigrants. In addition, the Department of State humanely reaches findings of "involuntariness" in immigrant visa applications so regularly as to be almost pro forma.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafts [redacted] Contents and Classification Approved by: [redacted] B6
 Clears [redacted] DCM [redacted]

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Belgrade A- 132

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Beyond this, there is of course a persuasive body of thinking which argues that the exclusion from the United States of persons for the political beliefs they hold is disharmonious in the extreme with the philosophy of our Republic.

Therefore, at a time when I assume we are seeking bold, new ways to build mutual confidence in our greatly improving relations with the socialist countries, I believe that striking this anachronism from our laws (a) would be in our national interest, (b) would constitute no danger to our security, (c) would be truer to our national precepts, (d) would eliminate the costly and patently bureaucratic "waiver process", and (e) could have a profound symbolic effect in our relations with Eastern Europe and the world.

While I have held this belief for some time, it is in the euphoria of peace, in the spirit of the realistic and indeed inspiring foreign policy of this Administration, and emboldened by the anguish of having to apply daily this sorry statute that I offer my policy-making contribution--which dissents with our law--from this admittedly narrow vantage point in the Balkans.

E.O. 11652: GDS

FOON


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EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

5055

RELEASE IN PART B6

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

Dear

B6

Your thoughtful dissent message on Taiwan's future status and the impact of this issue on US China policy deserves commendation and comment. I regret the delay in so doing, but your effort has already achieved its main objective of stimulating deliberation here on this important aspect of the China problem.

We originally drafted our comments in the form of an airgram. Upon learning of your return to Washington, we decided that a letter would be more appropriate. However, to avoid further delay, we did not undertake the editorial revisions to reflect this change in format. Our comments follow below:


The debate in the Embassy and messages centers on the extent to which (1) the GROC may attempt to formalize a separate status for Taiwan in connection with any normalization of US/PRC relations, and (2) the USG might exert leverage on the GROC to minimize any resulting threat to US interests.

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Taiwan's Post-Diplomatic Status

Both the Embassy and the dissenting officer agree that possible US recognition of the PRC will lead Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to formalize "at least somewhat the ROC's separation from the mainland." The Embassy's basic assessment is that within the ROC's likely options -- ranging on the lower end from a fairly simple statement that the ROC exercises jurisdiction and sovereignty over Taiwan, regardless of Peking's claims, to upper-end formulations along

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~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

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~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

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the lines of the "one China, two governments" or "two states in one nation" -- something toward the lower end of this spectrum would be the probable ROC choice. On the other hand, [] argues that in the absence of fairly specific advance arrangements assuring continued US security and economic involvement with Taiwan, CCK may unilaterally declare a new status for his Government, departing in some way from the one-China principle and thereby jeopardizing normalization of US relations with the PRC.

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The picture as we see it is that the ROC's diplomatic options remain significantly limited but within these limits it will be able to make important choices in connection with any normalization of US/PRC relations.

We agree that Taipei does not have a serious "Soviet option" as long as two basic factors hold:

-- the USSR continues to see any prospect for reconciliation with a post-Mao leadership generation;

-- the ROC continues to identify its post-diplomatic viability (i.e., following a switch of diplomatic relations from ROC to PRC) with access to and some form of commitment from the US, and with continued economic relationships with Japan.

From Taipei's standpoint, even if the Soviets were interested (which they are not), such a rapprochement would be extremely provocative to the PRC at the same time that it would cast serious doubt on the US/ROC security link. Taipei would also be concerned about the effect on those segments of American public and political opinion which constitute its strongest remaining sources of support.

For much the same reasons, we generally agree with the Embassy that the ROC will feel constrained about changing the one-China principle. We share the Embassy's perspective that quite extreme and unforeseen changes -- putting even an unofficial US/ROC relationship into jeopardy at the same time as accentuating PRC interest in forceful reunification -- would be the necessary condition for a GROC declaration of

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independence. In the absence of such changes, the GROC can be expected to continue its generally cautious and prudent approach, as evidenced in its reaction to the shocks of recent years. As long as this leadership is left with a modicum of hope for the future, its policies will seek to realize such a hope rather than to satisfy emotions or prove bravery. The ROC leadership clearly realizes that a satisfactory future rests on some kind of continued US security and economic involvement and PRC forbearance. Thus fear of provoking the US and PRC will strongly inhibit the ROC from an outright declaration of independence or anything approaching so radical a departure.

However, we believe the GROC can be expected to review the question of its status in any post-diplomatic environment. Likely actions range from reasserting the status quo to possibly declaring jurisdiction over ROC-held territory without reference to the mainland. For example, the ROC reaction to a diplomatic switch could entail an affirmation of the ROC's traditional stand that the actions of others cannot affect ROC rights and interests. This would probably be combined with a carefully worded formula designed to comfort the public by referring to the ROC's continued firm control of Taiwan while avoiding raising Taiwan's status in a manner which might create problems with the US or PRC. Moreover, ROC efforts to bolster public confidence will be colored by awareness that the public looks to the US as the key to a satisfactory future.

These short-term choices have an additional virtue, from Taipei's standpoint, of not ruling out longer-term options -- be these a two states within one nation arrangement (tacit or explicit), or eventual negotiations. The Embassy postulates that ROC choice of negotiations in the near future would bring domestic crises and possibly civil disruption unless, it parenthetically notes, they were proposed in the hope of obtaining PRC agreement to Taiwan's separation. We see the ROC refusal to entertain negotiations as a product of the leadership's deeply ingrained suspicion and distaste of the PRC. If this were overcome, and we do not presently foresee this,

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we believe the ROC would not have insurmountable problems in conditioning its population to acceptance of negotiations. It would do so by depicting such negotiations as aimed at assuring the continuity of Taiwan's present social, economic and political system.

In more general terms, we are not persuaded that domestic opinion will be the primary motivation in CCK's decision-making. Hopefully, changes in the US relationship with Taiwan will not be so radical as to threaten a serious down-swing of ROC confidence and the island's stability. Under these circumstances and given continued strong KMT rule, there would be little reason for the ROC leadership to depart from its customary glancing attention to domestic opinion in the decision-making process. To the extent CCK does move to formalize ROC separateness, we expect him to do so more to maximize diplomatic flexibility with the US and the PRC than to respond to internal pressures. (This does not rule out, however, the GROC's justifying any shifts on domestic grounds, or CCK's being greatly influenced by filial obligations and the views of the ruling mainlander group, which continue to move against the direction of a separate ROC entity.)

US Leverage on the GROC

The above discussion leads to the conclusion that for the short term the GROC's overriding interest will be in maximizing its ties with the US and that, given its limited alternatives, it will accept an unofficial relationship which includes both a credible (but not necessarily contractual) US involvement in its security and a continuing, strong trade relationship. Provided we gave the ROC some grounds to do so, we think it likely that the ROC's basic reaction to a diplomatic switch would be to depict it as a formality which leaves the essentials of the Taiwan picture unchanged. We therefore see the ROC as concentrating on the US angle rather than Taiwan's juridical status in deciding on its reaction to the switch. Because of this strong ROC dependence, US leverage appears more than sufficient to counter ROC actions which may arguably jeopardize US interests, provided our views are articulated clearly and in timely fashion to the ROC.

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~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

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We see compelling reasons for not becoming engaged in helping to formulate Taiwan's future status along the lines suggested by [redacted]. First, we believe that any such attempt will inevitably lead to our involvement in mediating difficult-to-reconcile differences between ROC and PRC. In particular, we are not impressed with the prospects for succeeding in working out with the ROC a "temporarily divided state" formula, suggested (but not spelled out) by [redacted] which would not be provocative to the PRC -- even if it does not explicitly rebut the one-China principle.

B6

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Second, as a related point, we see far greater prospects of such a role interfering with US/PRC normalization than contributing either to that process or to a resolution of ROC/PRC differences. For example, taking a direct hand in working out Taiwan's status without reference to the PRC could provoke Peking to the point of risking an end to normalization and would inextricably and indefinitely saddle us with responsibility for Taiwan's future -- courses diametrically opposed to our present ones.

Third, it is worth reiterating that ROC fear of simultaneously provoking the US and PRC should continue to serve as a sufficient deterrent against ROC movement from de facto separateness (one of the possibilities foreseen by the Embassy) toward a two-China outcome (as feared by the dissent). This is particularly the case because the first condition has most of the advantages and few of the disadvantages of the remaining range of choices presently open to the ROC.

Contingency Planning

In addition to helping to clarify the important issues on Taiwan's future status and US leverage over the GROC, the dissent message has performed a valuable role in highlighting the need to plan against circumstances in which the ROC might pursue international recognition as an independent, sovereign state. These circumstances might include internal disorder in or increased Soviet threats to the PRC or a collapse of GROC confidence in the US commitment.

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As a transformed entity, the GROC could not reasonably be completely confident in a continued US interest in its security; the US, Japan and other countries with a stake in Taiwan's future would have to determine their response on the basis of the implications of such a radical ROC action for their interests at that time. In rational terms, the GROC would have to anticipate that any unilateral declaration of independence would run the risks of provoking flights of capital, attenuation of unofficial (including trade) ties and weakening US involvement in its security, a situation which could lead to serious instability in Taiwan. To minimize such risks, the ROC might conclude that prior consultations with the US were necessary. In that event, we would have the opportunity for forceful diplomatic intervention against such a radical step if, as now seems likely, we thought it damaging to our interests.

Sincerely,



Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

TEXT OF MESSAGE

RELEASE IN FULL

"Dear Jimmy

I have been disturbed, as I am sure you have been, at the outcome of the 63rd session of the International Labour Conference. I know that it will loom large in your consideration of continued American membership of the Organisation.

May I say that in my view the ILO, whatever its faults, remains, with its tripartite structure, a unique and powerful instrument of social reform. Through its investigatory powers, it can bring to account those governments which transgress human and trade union rights. It provided practical assistance to developing countries in improving living standards for working people. Its technical work in setting labour standards is of great importance. Two important new conventions were completed at the recent conference.

Part of the unique quality of the ILO lies in its universality. Without the United States it is difficult to see how its work could continue effectively: the organisation would be missing an essential part of the world community and the Western powers would lose their most powerful partner.

I recognise that the conference itself was very disappointing. Nonetheless, there have been some signs of progress over the last two years. The Organisation

/ has



has completed a considerable amount of useful technical work during that time. The Governing Body earlier this year made progress on the American suggestion for changes in Article 17 of the Standing Orders to cut down on condemnatory and irrelevant political resolutions. At the conference itself there were less political resolutions than before and indeed the work of the Resolutions Committee was satisfactory.

Although the report of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations was not adopted, it remains on the record and contains some valuable material and is more evenly balanced than many of its predecessors.

I would have been much happier if some of the other objectives of the West had been achieved in full. I should like to have seen the procedure for presenting resolutions amended: the 1974 Israeli resolution buried completely: and some diminution in political irrelevancies. But it would perhaps have been unrealistic to expect total success in one conference. Progress has been hindered by the use of procedural devices, but is still possible in 1978 and succeeding years on the issues of concern to the United States and like-minded nations.

We hope the US took comfort from the strong and unwavering support that was forthcoming from the Nine and other industrialised market economy countries.

I personally hope very much that you will be able to give due weight to those positive features which have emerged in ILO affairs over the past two years, and decide to

/ remain



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

remain with us in this important international
organisation.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Jim Callaghan"

RELEASE IN PART
B6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

December 19, 1978

TO: PA/FOI -

FROM: S/P - Anthony Lake ✓

SUBJECT: Your Dissent Channel Message on the
Classification Review Staff

B6

I would like to commend again your use of the dissent channel to raise questions concerning the implementation of the new executive order on classification. In this instance your memorandum was immediately forwarded to Mr. Read, who was able to read and consider it before making decisions regarding the establishment of the Classification/Declassification Center.

Your memorandum raises many issues, some of a procedural nature, some concerning the management of resources, and some regarding the substantive policy requirements of the new executive order on classification. As you are aware, the chief focus of the dissent channel should be substantive foreign policy issues, so I will deal briefly with the procedural and management questions you raise.

While your review of the process by which this decision has been reached is essentially correct, I think it is important to note that all viewpoints did in fact reach Mr. Read, including your own, and that he considered all before making a decision. While the CCP did forward a contrary recommendation to Mr. Read, it was proper for him to weigh all arguments and suggestions before exercising the responsibility to decide himself.

Concerning the question of administrative efficiency, it is easy to agree with your own position that an efficient operation could be managed either by the new Classification/Declassification Center or by PA. But, however judgments on possible efficiencies may have affected this decision, they could

-2-

not be given such weight as to result in a decision that would be counter-productive to efforts to achieve adequate implementation of the new executive order. The essential question you pose, therefore, is whether this decision by Mr. Read will ensure adequate implementation of the new executive order.

A careful reading of Mr. Read's decision memorandum indicates that many of your concerns are provided for by the new arrangements. While the Council on Classification Policy will be abolished, it is to be replaced in part by an appeals board chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs; in essence this is not different from the present arrangement. While the Classification/Declassification Center will be located in A, it will operate in a quasi-autonomous manner, using guidance developed by a committee that will include concerned regional and functional bureaus, including PA. The basic departure from the present arrangement, in which this function is performed by the CCP chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, is that the director of the Center will be the new chairman. In addition, the decision by Mr. Read to serve as the chairman of the Department Oversight Committee should accomplish a close involvement of the seventh floor in ensuring full implementation of the new order: PA, as well as L and A, is a member of this committee.

The concern you raise that new arrangements build on the expertise already acquired by PA is valid. It appears that these new arrangements adequately provide for drawing on that expertise. With regard to the particular point you raise about the transfer of this function having a "chilling effect" on PA's relations with journalists, there is no reason that such a result must follow. The Public Affairs Bureau will be represented on all of the committees dealing with implementation of the new executive order and thus well-positioned to ensure that no harm comes to the unified public relations program that the bureau has built. As you are aware, not all questions concerning the implementation of the new executive order are essentially public relations issues, but on the

-3-

implementation of the order in general and on those questions in particular, the Department will continue to look to PA for advice and guidance.

Although you would not have chosen the arrangements selected by Mr. Read, many of your concerns appear to have been provided for in those arrangements. I am sure that the timeliness and persuasiveness of your memorandum contributed to that result. The task ahead is to ensure that the spirit, as well as the letter, of the new executive order is fully implemented. We all hope that PA and the Classification/Declassification Center will work together toward that objective.

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DISSENT CHANNEL

TO: Amembassy TEGUCIGALPA

REF: Tegucigalpa 2313

1. Dept's policy with respect to present crisis in Burundi is in substantial agreement with [redacted]'s view as transmitted reftel.
2. As soon as the crisis erupted on April 29 with a coordinated Hutu attempt to overthrow the Tutsi regime, the USG tried to be helpful from both the humanitarian and political points of view. In response to requests from the Burundi Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services, and Caritas International, we supplied \$80,000 worth of relief supplies to help victims of the initial hostilities. We are reasonably certain that these supplies reached the intended recipients without discrimination against any ethnic group.
3. On the political side, we joined with other govts represented in Burundi in an appeal to the Burundi Govt to refrain from reprisals and repression against the Hutu majority. In view of the fact that we have no aid program in Burundi beyond a modest self-help program (\$35,000 in FY 72), and that traditionally the US has been

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identified with the Hutus because of American missionary activity, we felt that the most effective pressure on the regime to cease the repression would have to come from other African govts. We engaged in quiet diplomacy ^{Non-Armed?} with African leaders who are well known and respected in Burundi such as President Mobutu of Zaire, President Ould Daddah of Mauritania and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Apart from Mobutu who sent a special envoy to Burundi to urge moderation, all the other Africans appeared reluctant to interfere in what they considered an internal matter of a sovereign African state. The annual summit conference of the Organization of African Unity in June 1972 did not even discuss the problem.

4. As soon as it became clear that the distribution of humanitarian assistance was being controlled in such a manner as to deprive the Hutus in favor of Tutsis, we suspended all consideration of providing further aid. Other organizations such as the ICRC also suspended plans for providing assistance.

5. In late June, the Secretary General of the UN sent a mission to Burundi to determine the facts and to recommend courses of action. The mission was sent with

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our encouragement, and Embassy Bujumbura assisted the mission in obtaining an accurate picture of the situation despite Burundi Govt efforts to the contrary. We are now awaiting the Secretary General's reaction, and are encouraging his associates to move quickly because the killing and suffering continue.

6. In addition to the suffering within Burundi, a serious refugee problem has developed in neighboring countries, especially along Lake Tanganyika in eastern Zaire. Most of the refugees, including many Hutu students who escaped execution squads, are in terrible condition. The Dept has requested the posts in the area to focus on the problem and make recommendations. We have urged the UNHCR to take an urgent interest in the matter, and they have agreed to send a representative to the area immediately to coordinate assistance. The Catholic Relief Services is already working there, and the Dept gave that organization a grant of \$50,000 on July 14 to start the relief program going while we obtain more details.

7. Believe from the foregoing you will agree that USG doing the maximum within its limited capabilities to help the Hutus and encourage return to peaceful conditions.

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3/6/73 EXT 22972
APPROVED BY S/PC:WICARGO
S/S - MR. HARRY BARNES
T - MR. NEWMAN
AF - AMB. CLAUDE G. ROSS
AF/E - MR. WENDELL B. COOTE
S/PC - MR. HERBERT SPIRO

[Handwritten initials]

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TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINS ET

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL AIRGRAM FROM []
AND []

REF: ADDIS ABABA A-23 DATED FEB. 7, 1973; STATE 033073

1. DEPT. HAS RECEIVED WITH INTEREST THOUGHTFUL IDEAS
EXPRESSED IN REF AIRGRAM AND APPRECIATED THEM. THEY WILL
BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT DURING CONTINUING ASSESSMENT WERE
OF PROBLEMS ADDRESSED.

2. COUNTRY DIRECTOR LOOKS FORWARD TO DISCUSSION OF ISSUES
INVOLVED DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO ADDIS. ROGERS

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ADDIS 02335 02 OF 02 271534Z

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F. POSSIBLE REPRISALS AGAINST AMCITS. AS REF B MAKES CLEAR, IT IS HIGHLY LIKELY THAT AMERICANS IN ERITREA AND INDEED AMERICANS ELSEWHERE IN ETHIOPIA MAY BECOME TARGETS OF RETALIATION IF WE GRANT ANY PART OF THE ETHIOPIAN REPLENISHMENT REQUEST.

G. US WOULD BE REJECTING ITS FRIENDS. EMBASSY PERSONNEL, ESPECIALLY THE SIGNATORIES, HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN APPROACHED BY ETHIOPIANS FROM ALL WALKS OF LIFE REQUESTING THE USG TO REJECT OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, DELAY ANY DECISION ON THE ALREADY PUBLICIZED ETHIOPIAN MILITARY REPLENISHMENT REQUEST. IT IS REALIZED THAT THE EMBASSY'S USUAL CONTACTS ARE THOSE IN THE MORE AFFLUENT MODERN SECTOR (COMMERCE, BUREAUCRACY, ETC.) WHO PROSPERED UNDER THE OLD REGIME. HOWEVER, THEY REPRESENT A CROSS SECTION OF ETHIOPIA'S VARIED ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS. TO GRANT SUCH A REQUEST, THEY STATE, IS TO SUPPORT A GOVERNMENT DEDICATED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF EVERY VESTIGE OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN ETHIOPIA. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE PMAC IS A RADICAL LEFT-WING GROUP WHICH LACKS THE ABILITY AND EXPERIENCE NEEDED TO GOVERN, AND IS EXPENDING ALL ITS ENERGIES MERELY TO SURVIVE. IT IS ACTING RASHLY AND IRRATIONALLY IN THE HOPE THAT ITS RADICAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION SCHEMES CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE THE "DIRG" IS DESTROYED. IN THIS VIEW, THE PMAC IS A HIGHLAND AMHARA/GALLA GIGIATORSHIP WHICH, FOR ITS OWN SURVIVAL, IS EXACERBATING THE ETHNIC, REGIONAL AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES OF THE PEOPLES OF

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ADDIS 02335 02 OF 02 271534Z

ETHIOPIA. BY THESE ACTIONS, THE PMAC MAKES THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE PRESENT STATE OF ETHIOPIA MORE LIKELY IN THE MEDIUM OR LONG TERM.

H. FINALLY, MANY ARAB STATES, RADICAL AND CONSERVATIVE, WOULD BE AFFRONTED. BECAUSE OF OIL POLITICS, THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE RED SEA-PERSIAN GULF AREA, AND US EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, ONE OF OUR CHIEF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS HAS BEEN TO BUILD BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES. MANY OF THESE STATES ARE GIVING TACIT OR OVERT SUPPORT TO THE ERITREAN INSURGENTS. THEY HAVE ALREADY TAKEN AFFRONT AT THE BLATANT ANTI-ARAB, ANTI-MOSLEM THEME OF EPMG PROPAGANDA. WHILE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY OF THE MORE FRIENDLY ARAB POWERS WOULD COMPLETELY REORIENT THEIR FOREIGN POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF THE MILITARY REPLENISHMENT, IT WOULD MOST PROBABLY MUDDY THE WATERS OF BILATERAL RELATIONS FOR SOME TIME. SINCE AN ATTEMPT AT A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE "ERITREAN PROBLEM" IS LIKELY TO INVOLVE PROTRACTED CONFLICT, THIS BARR IN US-ARAB RELATIONS WOULD BE A RELATIVELY LONG-LASTING IRRITANT.

2. COSTS AND ALTERNATIVES

A. THE SIGNATORIES BELIEVE THAT THE COSTS OF A DEFERRED DECISION ON THE ETHIOPIAN REQUEST ARE SIGNIFICANTLY SMALLER THAN EITHER OF THE TWO OTHER ALTERNATIVES, I.E. GRANTING OF ALL OR PART OF OR REFUSING THE ETHIOPIAN REPLENISHMENT REQUEST. AS STATED ABOVE, ETHIOPIA HAS PROBABLY TRIED OTHER ARMS SOURCES AND FAILED. IN ADDITION, THE US HAS CONTINUALLY EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO HELP ETHIOPIA DEVELOP ECONOMICALLY. IN THAT REGARD A \$4 MILLION DROUGHT RELIEF AND REHABILITATION GRANT AGREEMENT HAS JUST BEEN SIGNED. ANOTHER \$4 MILLION R&R GRANT AWAITS THE ARRIVAL OF AMBASSADOR HUMMEL FOR SIGNATURE. THE FACT THAT A NEW AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WILL ARRIVE SHORTLY, ONE OF THE FIRST AMBASSADORS TO BE ACCREDITED TO THE POST-AMAN EPMG, IS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF US GOODWILL TOWARD THE CURRENT REGIME. AMASSADOR HUMMEL'S ARRIVAL AND HIS OBVIOUS DESIRE TO GET ACCLIMATED BEFORE TAKING ANY MAJOR DECISIONS PROVIDES A LOGICAL AND PLAUSIBLE REASON FOR POSTPONING A DECISION AT THIS TIME ON THE ETHIOPIAN REQUEST.

B. THE COST OF PROVIDING ALL OR EVEN PART OF THE ETHIOPIAN REQUEST IS OUTLINED IN F & G ABOVE.

C. THE SIGNATORIES BELIEVE THAT ALTHOUGH THE DELAYING ACTION

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 ADDIS 02335 02 OF 02 271534Z

MENTIONED ABOVE IS THE BEST POLICY, THE SECOND BEST IS A REJECTION FOR THE PRESENT OF THE ETHIOPIAN REQUEST. AS THE EMBASSY HAS NOTED BEFORE, THIS COULD RESULT IN THE EPMG REQUESTING THE US TO REDUCF OR TERMINATE ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS (PEACE CORPS, MAAG, AID, ETC.). WHILE SUCH AN ETHIOPIAN REACTION IS POSSIBLE, THE SIGNATORIES BELIEVE THAT GIVEN ETHIOPIA'S CURRENT DELICATE AND DIFFICULT SITUATION, THE PMAC WOULD REJECT SUCH A RADICAL REACTION. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT IN THE NEAR TERM US-EPMG RELATIONS WILL REMAIN COOL. GIVEN THE CONSIDERABLE ANTI-WESTERN, PRO-SOCIALIST BLOC PROPAGANDA IN THE MEDIA OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, THE UBIQUITOUS TEACHING OF MARXIST RHETORIC IN THE SCHOOLS AND "DIRG'S" STRONG RELUCTANCE TO DEAL PUBLICLY WITH US AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES, WE BELIEVE THAT LITTLE IN THE CURRENT NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WILL BE CHANGED BY A US REFUSAL.

3. THE SIGNATORIES BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES HAS A MAJOR ROLE TO PLAY IN ETHIOPIA AT THIS CRITICAL PERIOD. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN MAKE ITS GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO THE MAINTENANCE OF ETHIOPIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY NOT BY PROVIDING MORE ARMS AND AMMUNITION BUT BY COUNSELING BOTH SIDES TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. IF WE DID NOT RESUPPLY THE EPMG, THE PMAC MIGHT BE FORCED INTO A GREATER WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE AND COMPROMISE. WE BELIVE THE PRESENT SITUATION GIVES THE UNITED STATES AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO ASSUME THE ROLE OF PEACEMAKER, BUT ONLY PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ARMS TO ETHIOPIA. SHOULD THE DECISION BE MADE TO SUPPLY ARMS, WE FEEL THAT A MINIMUM PRECONDITION WHICH THE USG SHOULD ATTACH TO SUCH A DEAL IS A REQUIREMENT THAT THE EPMG OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE INSURGENTS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. SHOULD THE EPMG REFUSE THIS CONDITION, THE USG WOULD HAVE REASON TO REFUSE THIS OR ANY SURSEQUENT ETHIOPIAN REPLENISHMENT REQUEST.
WYMAN

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PAGE 01 STATE 272283

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TO AMEMBASSY ROME

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DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P PAUL WOLFOWITZ

B6

E. O. 12356 12356: DECLAS: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PLO, XF, IS, LE
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL

REFERENCE: ROME 21467

1. ~~G~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL. PER YOUR REQUEST THE MESSAGE WAS SENT OUT TO PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, CAIRO AND TUNIS. I HAVE NOT REPEATED THE CABLE TO BEIRUT WHICH IS CURRENTLY UNDER MINIMIZE. WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT, I HAVE DISTRIBUTED COPIES OF YOUR CABLE TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. WHEN COMMENTS FROM THESE OFFICES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED, A MEMBER OF MY STAFF WILL COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. DAM

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E.O. 11652IN/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: REPLY TO DISSENT MESSAGE OF ROBERT SHULER

REF: AIRGRAM A-22 DTD MARCH 29, 1976

1. WE SINCERELY REGRET THE DELAY IN RESPONDING TO YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. SUMMER VACATIONS AND PERSONNEL TRANSFERS INTERRUPTED THE INVESTIGATION PROCESSES. IN ADDITION, THEY CAUSED CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN THE CLEARANCE PROCEDURE.

2. IN YOUR MESSAGE YOU DESCRIBE THE HONDURAN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW AND AID'S SUPPORTING ROLE IN THE HONDURAN PROGRAM. YOU RAISE ESSENTIALLY TWO MAJOR ISSUES:

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PAGE 02

STATE 237962

4. YOU SUGGEST THAT OUR FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS BE SCREENED THROUGH FORMAL JUDGMENTAL CRITERIA BASED UPON US POLITICAL-ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY.

5. YOU ALLEGE THAT AID'S SUPPORT OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN HONDURAS HAS HAD A DEBILITATING EFFECT ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP VIS-A-VIS STATE OWNERSHIP, AND HENCE IS NOT COMMENSURATE WITH US INTERESTS.

6. WE WILL ADDRESS EACH POINT IN TURN.
4. FIRST, CONCERNING FORMAL JUDGMENTAL CRITERIA, WE CAN DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT ONLY IN PRINCIPLE, SINCE YOU DID NOT PROVIDE A PROPOSED TEXT OF ANY SPECIFIC CRITERIA. NEVERTHELESS, THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT DOES CONTAIN CONSIDERABLE GUIDANCE AS TO THE DIRECTION OF OUR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. FOR EXAMPLE, PARTS OF IT

1. MANDATE A CONCENTRATION ON ASSISTANCE TO THE RURAL POOR AND ON SPECIFIC SECTORS SUCH AS AGRICULTURE;

2. EMPHASIZE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR;

3. ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVES;

4. CALL FOR SUPPORT OF AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAMS INCLUDING "CONSOLIDATION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND WITH A VIEW TO INSURING A WIDER AND MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND."

5. FURTHERMORE, CONGRESS HAS SPECIFIED THAT BEFORE PROVIDING ASSISTANCE AID MUST EXAMINE "THE EXTENT TO WHICH A COUNTRY IS MAKING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REFORMS, SUCH AS TAX COLLECTION IMPROVEMENTS AND CHANGES IN LAND TENURE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL ENABLE IT TO ACHIEVE DEVELOPMENTAL OBJECTIVES MORE EFFICIENTLY AND JUSTLY."

6. THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF COURSE CONTAINS MUCH MORE IN THE WAY OF FORMAL GUIDANCE.

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PAGE 03 STATE 237862

7. WE THEREFORE QUESTION WHETHER THERE IS A REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL FORMAL CRITERIA OF A GENERAL NATURE FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. ACTUALLY, AT A TIME WHEN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD ARE BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT AND INCREASINGLY COMPLEX, WE WOULD ARGUE FOR MORE, NOT LESS, FLEXIBILITY IN OUR BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. THIS OF COURSE IS NOT TO SAY THAT OUR POLICIES SHOULD UNDERMINE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS, BUT THAT THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, TOGETHER WITH OTHER PERIODIC GUIDANCE FURNISHED BY AID TO THE FIELD, APPEARS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO SERVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST, AND SUCH GUIDANCE APPEARS TO MEET YOUR OWN CONCERNS.

8. SECOND, THE HONDURAN CASE ITSELF CAN BE EXAMINED. THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT STATES THAT DEVELOPMENT PLANNING MUST BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH SOVEREIGN

COUNTRY AND THAT UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED IN A COLLABORATIVE STYLE TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT GOALS CHOSEN BY EACH COUNTRY RECEIVING ASSISTANCE. ALTHOUGH AID ENCOURAGED THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM IN HONDURAS AND PROVIDED ASSISTANCE IN ITS DEVELOPMENT, THE LAW WAS FORMULATED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF HONDURAS AND EVOLUTION OF THE REFORM WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN CONSULTATION WITH RELEVANT HONDURAN INTEREST GROUPS. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT AID REVIEWED ITS LOCAL MISSION TO REVIEW PROVISIONS OF THE LEGISLATION, INCLUDING COMPENSATION AND APPEALS PROVISIONS, AND CONCLUDED THAT AID SUPPORT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE MANDATE.

9. WHILE AID IS MAINTAINING A CAREFUL AND CONTINUOUS EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM, THE RETURNS ARE OF COURSE NOT YET IN. AID'S VIEW IS THAT THE HONDURAN AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM HOLDS THE POTENTIAL TO EXPAND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND INCREASE INCOMES FOR THE RURAL POOR, BOTH OF WHICH ARE CLEARLY US POLICY OBJECTIVES. AID ALSO BELIEVES THAT THERE IS A BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE THAT THE HONDURAN LAND REFORM SETTLEMENTS WILL EVOLVE

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INTO PRIVATE COOPERATIVES, NOT STATE FARMS. FOR EXAMPLE, MANY OF THE SETTLEMENTS ARE ALREADY FUNCTIONING AS COOPERATIVES, EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY NOT YET ENJOY COMMENSURATE LEGAL STATUS.

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PAGE 01 STATE 057152
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S/P: RJHARRINGTON
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TO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

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STADIS////////////////////
DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, XL

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE -- CARIBBEAN TRANSITION
PAPER

REF: BRIDGETOWN A-009

FOR FROM DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY DESIGNATE MOOSE

I ENJOYED READING YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE. IT STRUCK ME AS
A WELL REASONED AND CHALLENGING POINT OF VIEW. BEST
REGARDS.
VANCE

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OLAB

EO 11652: NA
TAGS: ELAB, BL
SUBJECT- AIFLD - PROPOSAL FOR ASSISTANCE TO ORIT

IT

ED

MATA

REF: STATE 243004

1. MISSION HAS NO SERIOUS OBJECTIONS WITH AIFLD PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, MISSION DOES BELIEVE THAT SOME CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO POSSIBLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES TO ORIT'S IMAGE IN LATIN AMERICA SHOULD IT ACCEPT USG FUNDING. ORIT HAS BEEN CRITICIZED IN PAST FOR BEING DOMINATED BY AFL-CIO AND ACCEPTANCE OF USG FUNDING MAY SUBJECT IT IN FUTURE TO CHARGES FROM LEFT THAT IT IS DOMINATED BY USG.

2. LABOR ATTACHE DISSENTS FROM ABOVE IN BELIEF THAT DAMAGE TO ORIT'S IMAGE OUTWEIGHS ANY POSSIBLE BENEFITS FROM PROPOSAL. SEPARATE CABLE BEING SENT THROUGH DISSENT CHANNEL.
BOEKER

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PAGE 01 BUDAPE 00437 03 OF 04 101439Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 BUDAPEST 0437

E.O. 11652: GDS

DISSENT CHANNEL

10. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO A SPEECH. IT MIGHT BE SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO GIVE SOVIETS PRIVATE ASSURANCES OR SIGNALS THEY WOULD UNDERSTAND INSTEAD OF HAVING SECRETARY MAKE PUBLIC SPEECH. THIS WOULD, HOWEVER, LEAVE AMERICAN PUBLIC UNINFORMED AS WELL AS HUNGARIAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES ABROAD DANGEROUSLY CONFUSED WHILE AT SAME TIME PROBABLY NOT PROVIDING ENOUGH CLARITY AND ASSURANCES FOR SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES. WE COULD ALSO BE EMBARRASSED LATER IF SECRET ASSURANCES WERE LEAKED OR IF OPEN SIGNALS WERE SEIZED UPON AS EVIDENCE OF ADMINISTRATION BAD FAITH BY SEGMENTS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION.

11. IN ADDITION, IT COULD BE OBJECTED THAT USG COULD CONTINUE AS WE ARE, MAKING CAREFULLY PHRASED STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH IN THEMSELVES DO NOT CONSTITUTE THREAT TO SOVIETS, CZECHS, ETC. THIS IS REFUTED BY SAME ARGUMENTS IN PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH. MOREOVER, THERE IS REAL DANGER THAT IF EVENTS GET OUT OF HAND IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA OR ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE, AT THE LEAST, OUR CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT HELSINKI WOULD BE DERAILED, AT THE MOST, BELIEVE ITSELF COULD BE SET BACK. WE SEEK GRADUAL EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST EUROPE UNDER STABLE

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PAGE 02

BUDAPE 00437 03 OF 04 101439Z

BUT IMPROVING CONDITIONS NOT TO ENCOURAGE EXCESSIVE CHALLENGES WHICH MIGHT STRENGTHEN REPRESSIVE FORCES AND RETURN TO PAST.

12. FINALLY, IT COULD BE OBJECTED WE ARE TYING OUR HANDS BY RENOUNCING ANY OPTION TO INTERVENE TO BRING TO POWER A FRIENDLY DEMOCRATIC REGIME. THIS OBJECTION COULD BE MORE FORCEFULLY MADE WITH REGARD TO A THIRD WORLD STATE RESPONSE TO THIS IS: HOW OFTEN DO WE REALLY EXPECT TO INTERVENE IN THIS MANNER IN FUTURE? ALSO WE ARE FAR MORE LIKELY TO WISH TO USE ENUNCIATED POLICY AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-INTERVENTION, FOR EXAMPLE, IN KOREA AND CHILE. SECRETARY'S SPEECH, MOREOVER, COULD BE DRAFTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LEAVE US AS MUCH OF AN OPTION AS WE STILL RETAIN TO LAUNCH A COVERT OPERATION IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN A VITAL U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST IS AT STAKE.

13. DRAFTER IS AWARE POLITICAL PROBLEM WHICH REPRESENTED BY OPPOSITION LIKELY TO BE ENCOUNTERED FROM SOME SEGMENTS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TO SPEECH SUCH AS BEING PROPOSED. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVES IN VIEW ADVANTAGES CITED ABOVE, INCREASING PUBLIC RECOGNITION THAT U.S. POWER LIMITED, AND DEFENSIBILITY OF PROPOSED POLICY STATEMENT, SECRETARY SHOULD MAKE SUGGESTED SPEECH. SECRETARY AND USG LIKELY FACE JUST AS MUCH FLACK FROM SAME SEGMENTS PUBLIC OPINION BY ATTEMPTING FOLLOW UNSTATED POLICY OF ADVOCATING HUMAN RIGHTS WITHOUT ALWAYS BEING ABLE TO GIVE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS IN SPECIFIC CASES WHERE THEIR RIGHTS BEING VIOLATED.

14. HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES OF APPLICABILITY. SOME BRIEF NON-EXPERT COMMENTS ON APPLICABILITY OF POLICY DOCTRINE BEING SUGGESTED:

(A) CHARTER 77- CHARTER MEMBERS ARE CLEARLY ADVOCATING
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PAGE 03

BUDAPE 00437 03 OF 04 101439Z

SYSTEMIC CHANGE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHICH WOULD LEAD TO OVERTHROW OF CZECH REGIME. USG INSISTS UPON RIGHT TO PETITION AND STATE VIEWS AND TO PUSH FOR A LONG LIST OF SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS THEY MENTION. WE ARE OPPOSED TO JAILING OR EXILE OF CHARTER SIGNERS. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, EXPECT OR ASK CZECH GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT UNRESTRICTED FREEDOM OF SPEECH, UNRESTRICTED RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND RIGHT TO STRIKE FOR THIS ALMOST TANTAMOUNT TO CREATION OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION DESPITE DISCLAIMERS OF CHARTER SPONSORS. WE WOULD STILL NEED DETERMINE HOW, BEYOND PROPOSED SECRETARY'S SPEECH, WE ARTICULATE U.S. VIEWS ON CHARTER 77, IF AT ALL, BUT WOULD BE CLEAR WE WISHED REMAIN WITHIN PARAMETERS OF SUGGESTED SPEECH.

(B) CSCE - USG WOULD HOLD COMMUNIST STATES TO BASKET III AND PUSH FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WE ADVOCATE AT BELGRADE AND BEYOND. AT SAME TIME WE WOULD CLEARLY AND PUBLICLY DISAGREE WITH COMMUNISTS ON DISJUNCT GOALS WHICH WE WOULD CONTINUE ARTICULATE IN NON-AGGRESSIVE MANNER -- CHALLENGING COMMUNIST STATES TO CONTINUE PEACEFUL WAR OF IDEAS. WE WOULD ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH COMMUNIST STATES JOINTLY AND IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS STEPS BOTH SIDES CAN AGREE ON TO IMPLEMENT HELSINKI, INCREASE COOPERATION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS.

(C) WORKERS PROTESTS SUCH AS IN POLAND 1976 - U.S. OPPOSES POLICE BRUTALITY, INSISTS UPON WORKERS RIGHTS TO EXPRESS GRIEVANCES AND PETITION FOR CHANGE. U.S. CALLS FOR DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOR THOSE ACCUSED OF ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES. WHILE WE ACCEPT RIGHT OF POLISH GOVERNMENT TO SEE TO OBSERVANCE OF ITS LAWS AND PRESERVE ORDER, WE EXPECT COMPASSION AND MODERATION IN CARRYING OUT THIS TASK. AGAIN, WHETHER AND HOW SPECIFICALLY TO REITERATE OR SPELL OUT IN DETAIL OUR POLICY WOULD DEPEND ON ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION AT TIME.

(D) YUGOSLAVIA - WE BACK REQUEST FOR END TO DISCRIMINATION

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PAGE 04 BUDAPE 00437 03 OF 04 101439Z

IN ISSUANCE OF PASSPORTS.

(E) SOUTH AFRICA - USG INSISTS UPON END TO RACISM AND WILL DO ALL WE CAN TO BRING THAT ABOUT SHORT OF VIOLENT MEANS OR ACTIVE U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW EXISTING GOVERNMENTS.

(F) KOREA - U.S. PRESSES FOR ACCEPTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS BUT AS ELSEWHERE REFRAINS FROM SUPPORTING ACTIVELY EFFORTS TO CHANGE POLITICAL SYSTEM THERE. MOREOVER, IN PURSUING OUR POLICY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY WE MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION OUR IMPORTANT SECURITY INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA.

(G) SOVIET UNION - U.S. WOULD EMPLOY ANY PRODENT AND POTENTIALLY FURITFUL MEASURES AT ITS DISPOSAL TO INSURE FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY ARREST, AND SO FORTH.

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RELEASE IN FULL

S/P:MACASEY;BDM
EXT. 29716 8-1-77
S/P:ALAKE

S/P - A. DEPORTE
S/P-OF: NABOYER

S/P:RJHARRINGTON

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE PARIS

DISSENT CHANNEL, FOR DOBRIN FROM LAKE S/P

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, FR, PINT, PGOV

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: USG RELATIONS WITH THE
FRENCH LEFT

AL TL
MAC MSL
AD MSL
RJH OH
NAB MSL

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL
MESSAGE ON USG RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH LEFT. ANTON
DEPORTE OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF WILL BE COORDINATING
A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISSENT CHANNEL
PRACTICES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES
OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOU ON YOUR
USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS
POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

TAB 5

MEMORANDUM

August 23, 1976

TO: IO/LAB -

FROM: S/P - Winston Lord

SUBJECT: Your Dissent Regarding Certain
State Department Policies.

B6

I regret that I have been unable to give you an early reply to your dissent message of March 1. As you know from your discussions with Don Petterson of my staff, the delay has been a result of our effort to obtain the best possible response to the points you made regarding employee rights in security interviews. I am continuing to pursue this matter and hope to have something ready for you soon.

In the meantime, I would like, as you suggested, to respond to the other two issues you raised in your letter.

Export Licenses and Rhodesian Sanctions

The "courtroom proof" standard which was applied in the case of the export license for the sale of the DC-8 to Gabon was changed by the Departments of State and Commerce in the fall of 1974, according to the Bureau of African Affairs. I am also informed by AF that the change to a "believe-there-is-a-likelihood" standard was a result of the diversion of the Gabonese DC-8 to Rhodesia. AF notes that of course there can be no absolute guarantee that a product would not be diverted for Rhodesian use, and that there could be occasions when decisions would have to be made on the basis of a judgment based on such factors as indications of possible misuse on the one hand and, on the other, the degree of credence that should be given to guarantees given by a potential buyer. It is fair to conclude that, because of the Gabonese case, any judgment would be made with great care and deliberation.

-2-

Employee Access to CDC Files

I have been informed by the Office of Personnel that an article was placed in the June, 1976, Newsletter notifying employees that they have full access to their personnel files, including CDC files.

Once again, let me thank you for your continued constructive use of the dissent channel. Your memorandum, like the one you submitted last fall, has had some demonstrable results.

DRAFTED: S/P:DkPetterson:gMcP

CLEARANCES: AF/S:FWisner
PER:LRussell
S/P-OF:NaBoyer

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 10, 1978

[Redacted]

ARA/CCA, Room 3250
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

B6

Dear [Redacted]:

B6

Thank you for your dissent channel message on U.S. policy on the Spanish Sahara.

I assume that your dissent from, inter alia, "an effort to supply Morocco with military equipment which can be used outside its borders," refers to a proposed sale of OV-10 aircraft and Cobra helicopters. As you may know, after extensive consultations with the Congress, the Department has decided not to proceed with these transactions at this time.

As recently as last year, the U.S. Government affirmed its adherence to the principle of self-determination for the Western Sahara and has supported UN actions toward that end. In addition, the Arms Export Control Act limits the use of US-supplied equipment primarily to maintaining internal security and for legitimate self defense.

Our bilateral relations are also an important element in any decision that we make to sell arms to Morocco. Historically, Hassan has cooperated closely with us in pursuit of our strategic and diplomatic objectives in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa. Moreover, the King's courageous support for Sadat has been important in current efforts to achieve a Mideast peace settlement. Thus, while legal prohibition and past commitments require that we not sell equipment for the purpose of aggression, we also have strong interests in satisfying Morocco's legitimate defense needs.

Again, thank you for your thoughtful message. It is, in part, due to the concerns that you raise that we are not proceeding with the OV-10 transaction at this juncture.

Drafted:S/P:SCohen
Clearances:S/P:PKreisberg
PM:AKochanek
NEA:SBishop

Sincerely,

W. Anthony Lake
Director, Policy Planning Staff

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alice Howdall
SP
E-4

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PAGE 01 STATE 158435
ORIGIN SF-02

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(TFCE) P

DRAFTED BY S/P:TTHORNTON:HE
APPROVED BY S/P:PWOLFOWITZ
ARA/CA - MS. ANDERSON(SUPS)
IDCA/TDP - MR. SCONCE(SURS)
CFP - MS. HEAPHY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S,F,ARA,IDCA

-----110520 172019Z /38

R 091750Z JUN 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TC AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE

UNCLAS STATE 158435

DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR [] FPOM S/P WOLFOWITZ

B6

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: ENRG, TRGY, OS
SUBJECT: ALCOHOL FEASIBILITY STUDY

REF: SAN JOSE 3237

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE (REFTEL) ON THE TDP ALCOHOL FEASIBILITY STUDY. S/P HAS DISSEMINATED IT TO THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT AND CHECKED OUT THE POINTS THAT YOU MADE WITH THE RELEVANT BUREAUS.

2. YOUR CONCERN THAT THERE MAY NOT BE FINANCING AVAILABLE FOR THE OVERALL PROJECT IS WIDELY SHARED. OBVIOUSLY NOBODY CAN BE ABSOLUTELY SURE OF THE FUNDING OF THE PROJECT UNTIL ALL OF THE ASPECTS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED. AS YOU POINT OUT, HOWEVER, SCARCE TDP FUNDS SHOULD NOT BE USED

UNCLASSIFIED

WITHOUT REASONABLE INVESTMENT EXPECTATIONS, IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT TDP IS TAKING A VERY CLOSE LOOK AT THE INVESTMENT POTENTIAL (INCLUDING SOME INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST) BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO TAKE ON THE FEASIBILITY STUDY. IF IT TURNS OUT THAT THERE IS A REASONABLE POSSIBILITY FOR FUNDING THE PROJECT, THE FEASIBILITY STUDY WOULD BE A SENSIBLE NEXT STEP IN LOOKING AT A POTENTIALLY VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR COSTA RICAN DEVELOPMENT AND FOR AMERICAN TRADE.

3. TDP CONFIRMS, INCIDENTALLY, THE POINT MADE IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF REFTEL -- THAT THE STUDY SHOULD NOT DUPLICATE WORK ALREADY DONE, SINCE THERE ARE NO STUDIES AVAILABLE THAT EXAMINE THE USE OF ETHANOL IN DIESEL ENGINES OR THE COST TO COSTA RICA OF SUCH A CONVERSION.

4. IN SUM, THEN, YOUR CONCERNS HAVE BEEN RAISED AT THE POINTS WHERE DECISIONS ARE NOW BEING CONSIDERED, THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE ANY SUBSTANTIAL DISAGREEMENT OVER THEM, AND THEY WILL BE TAKEN INTO FULL ACCOUNT.

5. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT VIEWS SUCH AS THE ONE YOU SET FORTH IN YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE BE EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATED TO DECISION MAKING POINTS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, THIS SHOULD BE DONE THROUGH NORMAL REPORTING PROCEDURES WHICH ARE MORE RAPIDLY AND FULLY DISSEMINATED. ALSO, NORMAL REPORTING SHOULD BENEFIT FROM THE FULLEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF RESPONSIBLE VIEWS. IN USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL, IT IS IMPORTANT TO OBSERVE THE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDELINES OF JANUARY 19, 1977, AND THE PROVISIONS OF 2 FAM 101 AND 11 FAM 243. THESE SPECIFY THAT THE CHANNEL IS INTENDED TO BRING TO LIGHT POLICY VIEWS THAT MAY NOT OTHERWISE COME TO THE ATTENTION OF

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PAGE 23 STATE 158435

POLICYMAKERS, RATHER THAN FOR TRANSMISSION OF POSITIONS THAT THE CONCERNED MISSION WOULD BE WILLING TO SEND FORWARD IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF BUSINESS. STOESEL

OF - La Brie

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S/P: ABOHLEN:HDM
4/30/86 EXT. 78986
S/P: RHSOLOMON

OPEN FORUM: NLABRIE
S/P: JLWASHBURN

S/P: NLEDSKY

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [] FROM S/P DIRECTOR SOLOMON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, PARM

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM

REFS: A) 85 LONDON 21865 B) NEW DELHI 7706

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL PIECE ADVOCATING THAT THE US PROPOSE A FIVE YEAR BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING. YOU HAVE DONE A FINE JOB IN SCRUTINIZING SOME OF THE MOST COMMON ARGUMENTS AGAINST A TESTING MORATORIUM AND PROVIDING WELL-THOUGHT OUT COUNTER ARGUMENTS OF YOUR OWN. SINCE THE TIME YOU WROTE YOUR MESSAGE, MOREOVER, THE ISSUES YOU RAISE HAVE BECOME EVEN MORE TIMELY: GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAS EXTENDED THE ORIGINAL SOVIET MORATORIUM SEVERAL TIMES BEYOND ITS ORIGINAL EXPIRY DATE OF JANUARY 1, HAS REAFFIRMED HIS PROPOSALS TO RESUME CTB NEGOTIATIONS IN HIS JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL AND IS TRYING TO EMPHASIZE THE TEST BAN AS A PRIORITY TOPIC FOR THE NEXT US-SOVIET SUMMIT. A TEST BAN CONTINUES TO AROUSE GREAT INTEREST IN THE US: A RECENT CONGRESSIONAL

*RHS [initials]
AB [initials]
NL [initials]
NCL [initials]*

B6

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

March 27, 1978

Dear [redacted]

B6

This letter is in response to your dissent channel message concerning decontrol and release of Limited Official Use and unclassified material.

As you are aware, 5 FAM 952.1 describes the proper basis for the marking of any document Limited Official Use. "Certain official information and material which is not national security information and, therefore, cannot be classified, is nonetheless protected by law against disclosure." Several laws provide the basis for this protection. One main source of law to protect information against disclosure is the Privacy Act; thus the Biographic Register and personnel records are properly designated Limited Official Use. Another is found in Congressional legislation that protects trade secrets and various other information against unwarranted disclosure. The Freedom of Information Act recognizes several categories of information which can be withheld from public disclosure. This is not to say, of course, that all information which can be withheld should be designated LOU. According to the Foreign Affairs Manual, unless there is a legal requirement to protect information for reasons other than national security, it cannot properly be marked Limited Official Use.

There is absolutely no question but that the majority of documents marked Limited Official Use have not been designated on the basis of specific legal requirements.

[redacted]
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State.

B6

-2-

However, LOU remains a valuable designation because it affords a degree of protection to sensitive information which is not classified.

The classification system itself has been under review through the process of a Presidential Review Memorandum. This review will result in a new Executive Order on classification of national security information. The text of this order should be issued some time this Spring. The order generally defines more clearly and makes more restrictive the use of classification designations, and will make clear that other designations, such as "Limited Official Use" are not to be used to protect national security information.


While Limited Official Use is not a national security designation and therefore not a subject of the new Executive Order, it would be helpful if, at the time the State Department issues its implementing regulations and instructions to deal with the new Executive Order, the proper use of Limited Official Use is brought to the attention of classifying officers. In particular, it should be made clear that this designation should be used only when a specified legal or regulatory basis exists. Officers should also be aware that national security information should be classified as provided for in the new Executive Order. The regulations governing handling and storage of LOU material will also be reviewed at that time.

Your second question concerned the release of unclassified material. As you are aware Congress has provided in the Freedom of Information Act for standards and procedures to be used in releasing government material upon request. In response to this Congressional mandate, the Department drew up regulations to implement the law. The basic point in practice is that the proposed release should be authorized by the office that has the responsibility for the record in question. I am enclosing a copy of these regulations which answer your specific questions on FOIA procedures. If you have any particular complaints about the manner in which the Department responded to the request to release the reporting cable you spoke of, these regulations provide for an appeal of an initial denial.

-3-

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Classification Policy, Assistant Secretary Hodding Carter, so that your concerns about the improper use of the designation Limited Official Use can be dealt with in the process of updating State Department regulations to implement the new Executive Order on classification policy.

Sincerely yours,



Paul H. Kreisberg, Acting
Director, Policy Planning Staff

Enclosure:

As stated

*Cleared PA - to Blair
L - J Smith*

filed in

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B6

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S/P:NBOYER:GMCP
3/17/77 EXT. 29716
S/P:TLAKE

EA/ANP:CSQUIRE

S/P:RJHARRINGTON

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE MELBOURNE

STADIS
DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ELAB, AS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: 1976 LABOR REPORT FOR AUSTRALIA

REF: A. STATE 44780; B. CANBERRA A-3; C. MELBOURNE 0413

FOR [] FROM TONY LAKE, DIRECTOR, POLICY PLANNING STAFF

1. I HAVE NOW RECEIVED ALL OF THE REFERENCED DOCUMENTS AND REVIEWED YOUR REQUEST TO HAVE CANBERRA A-3 REDESIGNATED AS A DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. I HAVE DECIDED NOT TO DO SO. THE DISSENT CHANNEL IS INTENDED TO GIVE VOICE TO POLICY VIEWPOINTS WHICH CANNOT OTHERWISE BE EXPRESSED. SINCE THE EMBASSY TRANSMITTED THE MESSAGE IN QUESTION, I BELIEVE THE BASIC OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN FULFILLED AND THERE IS NO NEED TO RESORT TO THE DISSENT CHANNEL.

2. CANBERRA A-3 IS BEING DISTRIBUTED TO EA, INR, S/P, S/IL AND THE CIA. I BELIEVE THAT THIS MEETS YOUR BASIC REQUEST REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF YOUR REPORT. YY

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S/P: MELY, RJHARRINGTON: BDM
EXT. 22972 6-2-77
S/P: ALAKE

EB/OIA - MR. SMITH
S/P-OF: NBOYER

STATE 128474 3 JUN 77

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE BOGOTA

STADIS, DISSENT CHANNEL
FOR [REDACTED] FROM TONY LAKE, DIRECTOR, S/P

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: EINV, CO

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: OPIC ANDEAN INVESTMENT MISSION

REF: (A) BOGOTA 1639; (B) BOGOTA 2651

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO REVERSE THE DECISION TO SEND THE OPIC INVESTMENT MISSION TO BOGOTA. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE AT A HIGH LEVEL BETWEEN STATE AND OPIC HAD ALREADY BEEN REACHED PRIOR TO YOUR INITIAL DISSENT MESSAGE. BY THE TIME OF YOUR SECOND DISSENT MESSAGE, INVITATIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN ISSUED TO PRIVATE MEMBERS.

2. THERE WAS A DIVISION OF OPINION IN WASHINGTON OVER THE UTILITY OF THE MISSION. SOME FELT THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN OF SOME POSSIBLE VALUE AND THAT THE INCLUSION OF COLOMBIA SHOULD NOT BE OPPOSED IN VIEW OF VISITS TO ADJACENT COUNTRIES. GIVEN THE DIVERGING VIEWS ON THE UTILITY OF THE MISSION PLUS SOME STRONG FEELING FROM OPIC ITSELF, IT WAS DECIDED TO PROCEED. YOUR ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY WERE COGENT AND WELL EXPRESSED.

B6

AL
ME/RJH
RS
NB

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1 2

3. IT IS CLEAR IN RETROSPECT THAT YOU WERE CORRECT IN FORECASTING A VERY MODEST, AND FOR OPIC DISAPPOINTING, COLOMBIAN RESPONSE TO THE MISSION. THE POLICY ISSUE THAT UNDERLIES OPIC ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AREA IS NOW UNDER INTERAGENCY EXAMINATION. WE HOPE THAT THE EXPERIENCE GAINED WILL CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER PLANNING OF SUCH MISSIONS IN THE FUTURE, INCLUDING FULL CONSULTATION WITH THE FIELD.

4. I REGRET THE DELAY IN RESPONSE. YOU ARE COMMENDED FOR YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. ♪

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Smith

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B6

S/P-OFP:RFSMITH:BDM
3-4-75 EXT. 28790
S/P:SWLEWIS

S/P:HJSPIRO

S/P DISTRIBUTION ONLY

ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: ADDIS 2335

FOR [] [] AND []

SWL
RFS
HJS

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF REFERENCED DISSENT CABLE.

2. MR. HERBERT SPIRO OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF (S/P) HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR CABLE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, AND THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. COPIES HAVE ALSO BEEN SENT TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY; THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE; THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS; AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS.

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1 2.

4. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL
REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO YOUR CONCERN. 44

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RJH -- Attached is a draft
reply to [redacted] series of
dissent messages on Australian
Labor.

B6

Since he has resigned from the
Dept., I have written it in an
unclassified form. Have also
geared it to steer clear of
major flak from the Embassy and
to keep the desk officer from
between a rock and a hard place.

If you agree with this approach,
I'll send out for clearance.

*RJH - says OBEJ.
C. Au.*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

JAN 12 1975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DISSENT CHANNEL

December 24, 1975

To: The Secretary
From: S/P - Winston Lord *W*

Dissent Channel Memorandum on Terrorism

[redacted] has sent to me, through the dissent channel, a memorandum (Tab 1) dissenting from Department policy on hostage situations; her main argument is that we should abandon our current "no negotiations" policy and, instead, issue standing instructions that focus solely on the saving of lives in the given situation.

B6

[redacted] also takes issue with the Department on the Bev. Carter case, casts aspersions on the motives underlying Departmental policy, and alleges that the Department is keeping the RAND study on terrorism under wraps because it contains some portions that diverge from current policy.

B6

Because of the importance of the issue, I believe I should forward [redacted]'s memorandum to you despite its frankly unacceptable tone. It is an intolerant and poorly organized paper; it also fails to come up with useful specific recommendations. With the help of S/CCT, I have replied to her (Tab 2). We took particular care to investigate the charge concerning the RAND contract and find that [redacted] allegations are not justified. I have taken a more restrained tone in my reply than [redacted] deserves.

B6

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Attachments:

- Tab 1 - [redacted] dissent.
- Tab 2 - Reply to [redacted].

B6

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DISSENT CHANNEL

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PAGE 01 * BUDAPE 00437 04 OF 04 101933Z
ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 (TFC) W
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R 100942Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7888

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 BUDAPEST 0437

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

15. TIMELINESS. IN CONCLUSION, DRAFTER NOTES PROPOSED
SPEECH BY SECRETARY WOULD BE VERY TIMELY AT OUTSET OF
NEW ADMINISTRATION. INDEED, IT SHOULD NOT, IN DRAFTER'S
OPINION, BE LONG DELAYED IN VIEW OF CURRENT CIVIL RIGHTS
TRUOMOIL IN SOVIET UNION, POLAND, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND
FAST APPROACHING HELSINKI FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN BELGRADE.

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- CLEARANCES

AID - Mr Gillian (Mr. Sullivan)

NS 5940

EB - Mr. Katz (Mr. Boeker)

NS

EA - Mr Holbrook (Mr. Carney)

NS

S/P

Pike

~~OF - Mr Boyer~~

OF - Mr Boyer

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

RELEASE IN PART
B6

TO : ARA/PPC - Mr. Peter Johnson

PAGE(S)
MISSING

DATE: July 6, 1977

FROM : ARA/CAR -

B6

SUBJECT: Procedures for Release of Unclassified and LOU Material

Presidential Review Memorandum NSC-29 directed that a new Executive Order be prepared to replace Executive Order 11652. Points to be considered by the drafting committee included:

- How to provide for the maximum release of information to the American public on government activities and policies consistent with the need to protect sensitive national security information;
- How to promote increased public access to this information through a more rapid and systematic declassification program;
- Overlaps between the new Executive Order and the Freedom of Information Act as amended and the Privacy Act; and
- Which information requires protection and for how long, and what criteria should be used in making this judgment.

In view of the above, I would appreciate receiving guidance on procedures for releasing unclassified and LOU material. I understand that unclassified material can be released by the appropriate office. I am not sure what "the appropriate office" is, and I would appreciate guidelines as to who can release unclassified cables, stating specifically what the procedure is for material originating here and overseas, as well as material which may involve more than one office.

The question is relevant to our handling of FOIA requests as well as in situations where an officer might wish to release an unclassified cable to a non-governmental body on his own initiative. This office recently refused to

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OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN
PART B6

Department of State

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APPROVED BY S/P: MELY
S/P: RJHARRINGTON (DRAFT)
S/P-OF: NBOYER (DRAFT)
EB/IFD/OIA: RJSMITH
ARA/ECP: JO' MAHONY
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TO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE

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STADIS////////////////////////////////////
DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EINV, CO

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: OPIC ANDEAN INVESTMENT MISSION

REF: A. BOGOTA 2651

FOR

1. BUREAUS ACTIVELY CONCERNED WITH RESPONDING TO YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON THE PROPOSED OPIC ANDEAN INVESTMENT MISSION ARE AWARE OF THE PLANNED ARRIVAL OF THE OPIC REPRESENTATIVES ON MARCH 28. ALTHOUGH YOUR PARA FIVE REFTEL IS WELL-TAKEN, THE ADVANCE TEAM HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED AND IS EXPECTED TO DO SO. DISPATCH OF THE TEAM SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THAT SUGGESTION POSITED IN YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. WE EXPECT TO REPLY TO YOUR DISSENT VERY SHORTLY.
VANCE

B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE IN PART B6

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 10, 1975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - DISSENT CHANNEL



Dear :

I am replying to your timely and well reasoned dissent memorandum on the Ethiopian Government's request for additional military sales now -- i.e., before the announcement of our response to the Ethiopian request -- in order to assure you that the arguments you presented were taken into account during the intensive deliberations of the past two weeks. The Secretary read your memorandum.

In the course of the deliberations, there was general agreement with your contention that the reasons "which justified our past military assistance to Ethiopia" no longer obtain. There was also full appreciation of the precariousness of the current regime in Addis and its intentions of "building a radical socialist state." I agree with you also when you write that "It would seem wise for the USG not to get involved in this internal Ethiopian situation," but I doubt whether a limited ammunition resupply "would be viewed as such a commitment."

I also doubt whether "blocking additional arms sales . . . now probably affords the best hope of forcing it to seek a genuine negotiated settlement of the Eritrean question." Given the Ethiopian military government's recent record, I would expect any attempt to force it to negotiate to have quite the opposite effect. This does not mean, of course, that we should forego use of our continued access to the EPMG, and to such other governments as the Sudan's, to try to persuade it and the ELF to accept mediation offers. By totally rejecting their request, we would in all likelihood also cut off our access to them and thereby deny ourselves the opportunity to engage in this kind of persuasive effort. We would also appear to be in disagreement with the overwhelming black African consensus favoring the territorial

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DISSENT CHANNEL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - DISSENT CHANNEL

-2-

integrity and retention of existing boundaries of new and old states on the continent.

Our quandary arises, as you are well aware, from the fact that we encouraged Ethiopia to become completely dependent upon US arms supplies two decades ago, and our reliability in that kind of relationship would become doubtful, in the eyes of others, if we were to deny Ethiopia a resupply of ammunition at the very time when it needs it in order to maintain the country's territorial integrity. In such a situation, we have to be careful not to lose sight of our broader strategic interests, which include our reputation for reliability, while we focus on the narrower immediate question of the contending parties within Ethiopia and their outside supporters.

In any event and whatever the ultimate outcome, your memorandum, based upon your experience in Asmara and coming from your evident empathy with the local people, helped those who read it to clarify their thinking.

Sincerely,

Winston Lord

Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

P.S. Your memo was thoughtful, dispassionate and well-reasoned. It is a tough policy decision. Your views got to the key decision-makers and I think it is fair to say that, along with other efforts, has been having a policy impact - at least in terms of degree and emphasis. WJ

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RELEASE IN PART
B6

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S/P: MELY, RJHARRINGTON: BDM
EXT. 22972 6-2-77
S/P: ALAKE

EB/OIA - MR. SMITH
S/P-OF: NBOYER

STATE 128474 3 JUN 77

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE BOGOTA

STADIS, DISSENT CHANNEL
FOR [] FROM TONY LAKE, DIRECTOR, S/P

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: EINV, CO

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: OPIC ANDEAN INVESTMENT MISSION

REF: {A} BOGOTA 1639; {B} BOGOTA 2651

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO REVERSE THE DECISION TO SEND THE OPIC INVESTMENT MISSION TO BOGOTA. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE AT A HIGH LEVEL BETWEEN STATE AND OPIC HAD ALREADY BEEN REACHED PRIOR TO YOUR INITIAL DISSENT MESSAGE. BY THE TIME OF YOUR SECOND DISSENT MESSAGE, INVITATIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN ISSUED TO PRIVATE MEMBERS.

2. THERE WAS A DIVISION OF OPINION IN WASHINGTON OVER THE UTILITY OF THE MISSION. SOME FELT THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN OF SOME POSSIBLE VALUE AND THAT THE INCLUSION OF COLOMBIA SHOULD NOT BE OPPOSED IN VIEW OF VISITS TO ADJACENT COUNTRIES. GIVEN THE DIVERGING VIEWS ON THE UTILITY OF THE MISSION PLUS SOME STRONG FEELING FROM OPIC ITSELF, IT WAS DECIDED TO PROCEED. YOUR ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY WERE COGENT AND WELL EXPRESSED.

AL
ME/RJH
RS
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3. IT IS CLEAR IN RETROSPECT THAT YOU WERE CORRECT IN FORECASTING A VERY MODEST, AND FOR OPIC DISAPPOINTING, COLOMBIAN RESPONSE TO THE MISSION. THE POLICY ISSUE THAT UNDERLIES OPIC ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AREA IS NOW UNDER INTERAGENCY EXAMINATION. WE HOPE THAT THE EXPERIENCE GAINED WILL CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER PLANNING OF SUCH MISSIONS IN THE FUTURE, INCLUDING FULL CONSULTATION WITH THE FIELD.

4. I REGRET THE DELAY IN RESPONSE. YOU ARE COMMENDED FOR YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. 44

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PAGE 01 STATE 267351

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RELEASE IN PART B6

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TO AMCONSUL MELBOURNE

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DISSENT CHANNEL////////////////////////////////////

E.O. 11652, N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

FOR [] FROM S/P-LAKE.

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE COMMENTING ON
CANBERRA 7504. WE HAVE SENT COPIES OF YOUR COMMENTS TO
THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE OPEN FORUM, IN ADDITION TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN
SERVICE AND THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR INTERNATIONAL LABOR
AFFAIRS. VANCE

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B6

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ORIGIN SP-03

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APPROVED BY S/P:PBSWIERS
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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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DISSENT CHANNEL

Z.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OGEN PFOR
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: MOSCOW A-342, SEPTEMBER 5, 1974

FOR

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF REFERENCED AIRGRAM.
 2. MR. THOMAS SIMONS OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF (S/P) HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO THIS DISSENT MESSAGE.
 3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR AIRGRAM HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, AND THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. ADDITIONAL COPIES ARE BEING SENT TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.
 4. WE WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO YOUR VIEWS.
- END

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 STATE 134795

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APPROVED BY S/PIPB8WTERS

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TO AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

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DISSENT CHANNEL

Z.C. 11652
YAG8:XA/CM,APER
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: YAOUNDE 1876

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE REFERENCED
DISSENT CHANNEL TELEGRAM OF JUNE 13, 1974.

2. SINCE [] MESSAGE ADDRESSES AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTER (NORMALLY COVERED BY MECHANISMS OTHER THAN THE
DISSENT CHANNEL), WE HAVE ASKED MR. H. B. HOPKINS, DIRECTOR
OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND MANPOWER IN ACD, TO HELP
RESPOND TO THE QUESTION POSED.

3. OTHERWISE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRI-
BUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR TELEGRAM HAS BEEN CIR-
CULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF,
AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL.

4. WE WILL SEE THAT YOU RECEIVE A REPLY TO YOUR CONCERNS
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. KISSINGER

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DRAFT CABLE

ACTION TO: BANGKOK FOR EMBASSY, USOM and RED .

Subject: Reorganization of RED/USOM Relationships

Ref: A) State 107086; B) Bangkok 8679; C) Bangkok 11952

1. We have reviewed the reorganization proposed in ref A, the policy implications discussed in ref B and the Embassy comments contained in ref C, as well as the history of the regional programs and prospects for their future.
2. The Department and AID wish to reconfirm that it is US policy to support Asian regionalism and those Asian regional institutions which foster regional cooperation, understanding and interdependence. In part because of the success of the concept and the institutions which RED helped to foster, other bilateral and international donors have supported regional activities and the Asians themselves have come to recognize the value of regional cooperation in selected development areas and are devoting substantial resources to it. Hence, while we believe that the US need not in the future play as energetic a leadership role in regional activities, as it has in the past, a separate and distinct office supporting our relationships and contributions to Asian regionalism will continue to operate.
3. We believe that the operational and administrative arrangements described in ref. C are reasonable ones and need not adversely affect US support of regionalism in fact or in the eyes of the Asians. However, it must be clear to

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the regional organizations and the countries involved in them that the US continues to strongly support Asian regional activities and maintains in Bangkok a regional office through which the US will continue to support them. Changes that are being made in that office are internal and administrative and should not have any effect on the programs nor imply any diminution of our support of useful regional arrangements.

4. The questions raised in the "dissent cable" ref. B are serious ones and were given careful scrutiny and review. On balance we support the views proposed in Bangkok 11952 and assume they will prove satisfactory. Of course if the organizational arrangements in light of experience after an adequate trial, perhaps a year, prove to be less effective than anticipated, this shift can be reviewed at that time.

Drafted by:S/P:CWKontos

Authorized by:CWKontos

Clearance:

EA/AHummel
AID/Asia:AWHITE
AID/Asia:K.Rabin (info)
S/P:RSmith (info)

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TO AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES

MELBOURNE - FOR [] FROM S/P-LAKE.

CANBERRA - FOR EMBASSY FROM S/P - LAKE

REFS: (A) MELBOURNE 2530, (B) CANBERRA 8769,
(C) MELBOURNE 2555, (D) MELBOURNE 2559

1. THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT YOUR DISSENT MESSAGES ON THE "SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AUSTRALIAN ELECTIONS". MR. RICHARD FEINBERG OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISSENT CHANNEL REGULATIONS, YOUR MESSAGES HAVE BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM PANEL AS WELL AS TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, AND THE OFFICE OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS IN THE EAST ASIAN BUREAU.

WE WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. VANCE

MAC

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DISSENT CHANNEL

December 24, 1975

[Redacted]

IO/LABW
Room 5328

B6

Dear [Redacted]:

B6

Thank you very much for your dissent channel letter of October 20. It has taken us longer than usual to prepare a reply but I felt that, given the weighty issues involved, we needed to look into the matter very thoroughly before replying.

Since the issues that you raise fall in the area of responsibility of S/CCT, we asked Mr. Fearey to comment on them. With his permission, I am attaching a copy of his detailed and thoughtful reply, which formed one (but only one) of the inputs to our inquiry. Mr. Fearey's memorandum speaks for itself but institutionally, I can reaffirm one point that he makes: the original impetus for the RAND study did not come as a response to your memoranda but was originally generated independently in S/P. This staff has a long history of interest and involvement in the terrorism question.

The basic issue that you raise, relating to Departmental policy on negotiations and ransom, is one that is very much open to legitimate debate and your use of the dissent channel to put forth your views is entirely proper. Your views are being forwarded to the Secretary--despite the unacceptable tone of your presentation. I frankly do not have anything novel to add to the discussion beyond the positions outlined by you on the one hand and Mr. Fearey on the other. I cannot, however, let pass unchallenged the apparent premise of your letter--that the senior officials of the Department are risking the lives of others in pursuit of a "machismo-image" or as the result of blind adherence to slogans. You have every right to criticize policy and suggest alternatives. I think you have a parallel obligation to accept the fact that

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DISSENT CHANNEL

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others also are acting in good faith and have cogent and clearly set forth grounds for their position. There are profoundly agonizing choices involved and nobody has a monopoly on wisdom or morality. I believe your advocacy would be better served by sticking to policy issues rather than maligning the motives of officials who have to make anguishing choices.

I want to address myself specifically to your claim that the RAND study was "thrown away" and/or improperly influenced. We have gone to considerable pains to examine this allegation, discussing it at length with S/CCT, INR/XR, and, most importantly, with Brian Jenkins, the principal RAND researcher. We have come to the conclusion that there was a considerable amount of delay in completing the report, but not an undue amount in view of the complexity of the subject. Department officials did, by mutual agreement, provide RAND with informal comments as preparation of the report proceeded, expressing their views on matters of both substance and form (as is their right and obligation to do). But this never assumed a dimension that threatened the integrity of the product. Department officials reiterated to the RAND authors during these discussions that they wished RAND to present its own, considered views and recommendations, as called for by the contract. This was done, illustrated by RAND's submission of its ransom option recommendations notwithstanding S/CCT's contrary arguments. And it was RAND's decision that its proposals not be forwarded separately to the Secretary.

With regard to some specifics: we understand that the RAND policy recommendations will be published at the front of the final report and in a way fully acceptable to the RAND researchers. Completion of the case studies was delayed by priority work on the basic abductions report. Funds have been secured from LEAA and made available to RAND to publish about a dozen of them, including the Khartoum study. These steps were decided upon last summer.

Until we have the final RAND study in hand it is difficult to make any judgments about how widely it

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-3-

should be disseminated. It will be reviewed in S/P, however, and we will take an appropriate role in formulating dissemination policy.

The extent to which the recommendations of RAND or any other party will be turned into policy is a decision that will be made by the Secretary in consultation, as necessary, with the President. The conclusions of the RAND study will be available to the Secretary as will the divergent views of others, including yourself.

It is hardly surprising that there is a divergence of views on how to deal with an issue as complex and agonizing as the matter of hostage situations. The agony is felt by all, but perhaps especially by those who bear the ultimate responsibility. There is universal agreement that the purpose of policy must be to save lives. But there are legitimate differences on how best to save lives--lives immediately in jeopardy and other lives that could be endangered.

Sincerely yours,



Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

Attachment:

Mr. Fearey's Comments on Dissent
Message on Terrorism from

[Redacted]

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~~DISSENT CHANNEL~~

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February 23, 1977

From Headquarters
Mr. Anthony Lake
Director, Policy Planning Staff
S/P, Room 7813
Washington, D.C. 20520

FILE COPY

Ref to MAC

Dear Mr. Lake:

I refer to Mr. Veliotos' letter of February 18, 1977 in which he informed me that my paper on the Polisario Front guerrilla movement could not issue through the Dissent Channel as the paper is not a policy dissent, but an intelligence analysis.

I am disturbed over this apparent bureaucratization of the Dissent Channel. The suppression of information from the top levels of the Department, whether caused by disagreement with content, bureaucratic ineptness, or just plain carelessness, is as harmful as the suppression of substantive differences on policy. In this regard it is interesting to note the reaction to my earlier two part dissent message on the Spanish Sahara. Department officials disagreed with my shorter message focused on policy, yet found the longer message, which was essentially an intelligence analysis of Mauritania, helpful.

My rejected intelligence analysis of the Polisario Front contains the same sort of useful information and analysis as did my earlier paper on Mauritania. I have shared it with people on the working level but believe that the Assistant Secretaries of AF and NEA and perhaps the Secretary would be interested in reading the paper. I do not feel that I am burdening the system with this paper as the Middle East division of INR sent its last intelligence analysis on the Sahara as a memo to the Secretary before it was published verbatim as an intelligence report. My submission of this paper is at least partly to protest the fact that the African division of INR has not been sufficiently involved in analysis of the Spanish Sahara. In spite of the fact that Mr. Bartholomew's letter states that my paper on Mauritania "usefully broadened the context" of thinking on the Spanish Sahara, INR/RAF has no intention of publishing the paper to its normal audience.

I would simply carry a copy of the paper to the offices of the Assistant Secretaries and the Secretary with the request that it be read informally. However, such personages

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
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are surrounded by a coterie of staff assistants and aides whose function seems to be to cut off their bosses from any direct contact with sources of information. I understand that former Secretary Kissinger developed INR's Current Intelligence Staff because he felt cut off from first hand sources of information. That staff consists of junior officers who select raw intelligence to go to the Seventh Floor principals with no prior review by senior officers. It was this system which enabled me to forward the only accurate piece of intelligence on the June 1975 Italian regional elections which the Seventh Floor received. If I had depended on normal channels the information would never have been briefed, because of faulty analysis, fear of appearing too alarmist, and dedication to support of previous positions among the line bureaucracy.

The Dissent Channel can be a mechanism for unclogging the Department's constipated paper flow if it is opened up to pieces of raw traffic or analysis which are stuck in the system. It is easy to imagine abuses of such a system, such as the submission of weighty tomes on mini-subjects, or simply a stream of raw traffic which officers wish to push ahead of the line, but such abuses could be resolved when and if they occurred.

One solution to potential problems would be to drop the requirement that a substantive reply be drafted to messages not demanding it. For instance, in the present case I would send my paper forth with a note explaining that I was submitting it through the Dissent Channel because INR had been sitting on it for a year and because it contained information relevant to current policy considerations, referring to Nouakchott 362 of February 23, 1977. With no obligation to read past the title line the Secretary and Assistant Secretaries would suffer no burden and would yet be alerted to the fact that a disagreement was fulminating in the bowels of the bureaucracy about which they would not normally learn. Under the rules of the system the submitting officer would be protected from his immediate superiors by anonymity, while the Assistant Secretaries would be protected from a flood of unwanted paper because of a dissenting officer's knowledge that the item would go forward with a signed statement as to the justification for making an end run around the system.

Sincerely yours,



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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652; N/A
TAGS: EINV, CO
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: PROPOSED OPIC ANDEAN INVESTMENT MISSION

REF: (A) STATE 49832; (B) BOGOTA 2342; (C) STATE 23107

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [REDACTED] COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY FOR ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS. THE DEPARTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE.

2. DURING THEIR RECENT VISIT TO COLOMBIA, THE ADVANCE TEAM FOR A LARGE OPIC INVESTMENT MISSION AND AN EMBASSY OFFICER TALKED TO A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND LOCAL US AND COLOMBIAN BUSINESSMEN. FROM THE INFORMATION GATHERED, IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT GOC REGULATIONS STILL PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF OPIC'S INSURANCE AND DIRECT LENDING PROGRAMS OPERATING IN COLOMBIA AT THE PRESENT TIME. THE OPIC REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED THAT, NEVERTHELESS, THEY BELIEVED IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO INCLUDE COLOMBIA ON THE ITINERARY OF THE PROPOSED ANDEAN INVESTMENT MISSION. (SEE REF B FOR DETAILS).

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PAGE 02

BOGOTA 01039 221007Z

3. CONVERSATIONS WITH GOC OFFICIALS CONCERNING THE LOCAL CLIMATE FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT ESTABLISHED THAT OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POLICY REMAINS BASICALLY AS IN THE PAST-NEITHER REJECTING NOR ACTIVELY SEEKING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN GENERAL MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES. THE GOC ACCEPTS FOREIGN INVESTMENT THAT COMPLEMENTS ITS OWN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS, BUT ALSO REMAINS COMMITTED TO MINIMIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE ECONOMY. A RECENT CHANGE IN FINANCE MINISTERS MAY GIVE THE SUPERFICIAL IMPRESSION THAT A SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER INTEREST IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT EXISTS AMONG GOC DECISION MAKERS. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE, HOWEVER, AND THAT BASIC GOC POLICY REMAINS THE SAME AS IN THE PAST.

4. THE GOC ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT IS STILL CONSIDERED ON OF THE MOST RESTRICTIVE AMONG THE ANDREAN PACT MEMBERS. RECENTLY, NEWS ARTICLES IN THE COLOMBIAN PRESS HAVE ADDRESSED THE DIFFICULTY OF DOING BUSINESS IN COLOMBIA. "INCREDIBLE RED TAPE", AS ONE RESPECTED ECONOMIC MAGAZINE DESCRIBED IT, PRECEEDS ANY FOREIGN INVESTMENT APPROVAL.

5. GIVEN THE FACT THAT OPIC'S PROGRAMS ARE NOT OPERABLE IN COLOMBIA, COMBINED WITH THE GOC'S PASSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT, I QUESTION THE POLICY JUSTIFICATION FOR A US GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED INVESTMENT MISSION TO THIS COUNTRY. THE CASP, APPROVED BY VARIOUS WASHINGTON AGENCIES, CERTAINLY GIVES NO PRIORITY TO PROMOTING US INVESTMENT HERE. MOREOVER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ARGUE IN FAVOR OF THE MISSION ON EITHER THE BASIS OF IMPROVING TRADE OR SELLING THE CONCEPT OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT. THE US CURRENTLY HAS ABOUT 24 PERCENT OF THE COLOMBIAN IMPORT MARKET. PRIVATE INVESTMENT, AS A PHILOSOPHY, IS DEEPLY INGRAINED AND RESPECTED IN COLOMBIA.

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6. I BELIEVE THAT THE GOV AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN COLOMBIA ARE SUFFICIENTLY SOPHISTICATED TO MAKE THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT FOREIGN INVESTMENT THEY WANT TO ATTRACT. IN ADDITION, THE POTENTIAL US INVESTOR CAN CONSULT HIMSELF OF THE AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE THROUGH EXISTING PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE AND STATE.

7. IN SUMMARY, I QUESTION THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A US GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED MISSION TO COLOMBIA WITH THE SOLE PURPOSE OF PROMOTING US INVESTMENT HERE. I HOPE THAT CONCERNED WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL CAREFULLY REVIEW THE ADVISABILITY OF THIS MISSION IN LIGHT OF OUR PRIORITIES IN COLOMBIA AND THE CONSIDERATIONS MENTIONED ABOVE.
SANCHEZ

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

RELEASE
IN PART B6

PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02

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INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 /004 W
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R 140335Z DEC 77
FM AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4187
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MELBOURNE 2530

DISSENT CHANNEL

E O 11852 NA

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SIGNIFICANCE OF AUSTRALIAN
ELECTION

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS COMMENTS OF LABOR/POLITICAL OFFICER [REDACTED] ON EMBASSY/CANBERRA'S 8699 ENTITLED "AUSTRALIAN ELECTION AFTERMATH". EMBASSY FAILED TO GIVE [REDACTED] OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON 8699 IF IT HAD HE WOULD HAVE MADE OBSERVATIONS WHICH FOLLOW. [REDACTED] REQUESTS THAT S/P DISTRIBUTE COPIES OF THIS MESSAGE NOT ONLY TO THOSE LISTED ON PAGE 4 OF DEPARTMENT'S A-307 BUT TO MR. DALE GOOD S/IL AND MR. DONALD HARRIS EA/RA.

B6
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2. SUMMARY PARAGRAPH OF 8699 CONCLUDES WITH FOLLOWING HIGHLY MISLEADING STATEMENTS: "THE ALP, DECIMATED (SIC) ONCE AGAIN, MUST RETHINK ITS ESSENTIAL PHILOSOPHY. THERE IS NOW NO SERIOUS DOUBT THAT A GREAT MAJORITY OF AUSTRALIANS WERE STILL UNPREPARED TO EXPERIMENT ONCE AGAIN WITH GOUGH WHITLAM'S DISRUPTIVE BRAND OF TRADE UNION-DOMINATED SOCIALISM."

3. THESE STATEMENTS COMPLETELY IGNORE FOLLOWING VERY REVEALING AND SIGNIFICANT FACTS.

A. ALMOST 50 PERCENT (49.5 PERCENT) OF AUSTRALIAN VOTERS CAST FIRST PREFERENCE BALLOTS FOR EITHER ALP CANDIDATES (40.1 PERCENT) OR AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRAT CANDIDATES (9.4 PERCENT).

B. ONLY 48 PERCENT OF VOTERS CAST FIRST PREFERENCE BALLOTS FOR COALITION CANDIDATES: LIBERALS (38.3 PERCENT), NCP (9.7 PERCENT).

C. FAR FROM BEING "DECIMATED ONCE AGAIN" ALP NOT ONLY REMAINED AUSTRALIA'S LARGEST SINGLE PARTY (JUST AS IT WAS IN 1975 WHEN IT RECEIVED 42.8 PERCENT OF FIRST PREFERENCE BALLOTS TO LIBERALS' 42 PERCENT) BUT WIDENED GAP BETWEEN ITSELF AND LIBERALS FROM .8 PERCENT IN 1975 TO 1.8 PERCENT IN 1977. IN ADDITION, AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS WHILE WINNING NO HOUSE CONTESTS ALMOST EQUALED NCP VOTE NATIONWIDE.

4. COMMENT: WHILE IT MAY BE CLEAR THAT ELECTORATE WAS NOT PREPARED "TO EXPERIMENT ONCE AGAIN WITH GOUGH WHITLAM'S DISRUPTIVE BRAND OF TRADE UNION - DOMINATED SOCIALISM" IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT LESS THAN HALF OF ELECTORATE INDICATED DESIRE "TO EXPERIMENT ONCE AGAIN" WITH WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED "MALCOLM FRASER'S SOCIAL CONFRONTATIONIST BRAND OF BUSINESS-ORIENTED UNTRA CONSERVATISM." WHETHER OR NOT ELECTION RESULTS SUPPORT CONTENTION THAT ALP MUST NOW "RETHINK ITS ESSENTIAL PHILOSOPHY" (AS CONTRASTED WITH VARIOUS OTHER LESS FUNDAMENTAL STEPS) IS HIGHLY DEBATABLE.
WIDOUNO

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RELEASE IN PART B6

S/P:HJSPIRO:BDM
3-11-75 EXT. 22576
S/P:WLORD

AF:EMULCAHY

S/P-0FP:RFSMITH

S/P DISTRIBUTION ONLY

ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA, ASMARA

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, ET

SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN MILITARY REPLENISHMENT REQUEST

REF: {A} ADDIS 2335; {B} ASMARA 281.

FOR [] [] AND []

WL
HJS
EM
RFS

1. THE DEPARTMENT FOUND YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE TIMELY AND WELL REASONED. THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AGAINST GRANTING ETHIOPIAN REPLENISHMENT REQUEST AT THIS TIME WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED, ALONG WITH OTHERS, AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF DEPARTMENT IN THE COURSE OF THE DELIBERATIONS ON THIS IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT ISSUE.

2. DEPT AGREES THAT PREVIOUS RATIONALE FOR US MILAID TO ETHIOPIA NO LONGER APPLIES (REF A, PARA F) AND ALSO THAT QUOTE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE SUPPLIED ARMS TO ETHIOPIA IN THE PAST SHOULD NOT OBLIGATE US BEGIN SUPPLIED ITALICS INDEFINITELY AND IRREVOCABLY IN THE FUTURE END SUPPLIED ITALICS END QUOTE. FOR THESE REASONS, THE PROBLEM OF AMMO RESUPPLY WAS CONSIDERED IN A WIDER CONTEXT IN WHICH FOCUS WAS NOT SOLELY ON ETHIOPIA FOR ITS OWN SAKE BUT FOR ITS STRATEGIC LOCUS, AND IN WHICH OAU COMMITMENT TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFRICAN STATES AND US REPUTATION FOR RELIABILITY WERE MAJOR FACTORS.

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3. LIKE AUTHORS OF REF A AND CONGEN ASMARA IN HIS ENDORSEMENT {REF B}, DEPT. BELIEVES THAT BOTH REPEAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE URGED TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. ELF INSISTENCE ON EPMG'S AGREEMENT TO INDEPENDENCE OF ERITREA AS PRECONDITION TO NEGOTIATIONS IS JUST AS UNACCEPTABLE AS EPMG'S INSISTENCE ON COMPLETE RETURN TO FULL STATUS QUO ANTE RECENT HOSTILITIES. WE WILL NOW BE URGING BOTH SIDES TO NEGOTIATE. EPMG WILL BE TOLD DIRECTLY AND ELF WILL GET MESSAGE THROUGH FRIENDLY ARAB GOVERNMENTS. ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH PARTIES OF SUDANESE#MEDIATION OFFER SEEMS BEST CURRENT OPPORTUNITY IN THIS RESPECT.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE STRONGLY DOUBT THAT QUOTE IF WE DID NOT RESUPPLY THE EPMG, THE PMAC MIGHT BE FORCED INTO A GREATER WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE AND COMPROMISE END QUOTE {REF A. PARA 3}. PMAC'S RASH AND IRRATIONAL PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR RATHER SUGGESTS MORE NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO TOTAL REFUSAL OR ADDITIONAL DELAY IN AMMO RESUPPLY.

5. DEPT IS FULLY AWARE OF ATTITUDES OF ARAB STATES {REF A, PARA 1.A} AND HAS BEEN SOUNDING OUT MORE RESPONSIBLE ONES FOR THEIR READINESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO BRINGING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE NOTE SIGNIFICANCE OF FACT THAT EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT REPEAT NOT COME OUT IN FAVOR OF ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE. FRIENDLY ARABS, ESPECIALLY THOSE BUYING ARMS FROM US, UNDERSTAND OUR REASONS FOR BEING RESPONSIVE IN LIMITED WAY TO ETHIOPIAN AMMO RESUPPLY REQUEST. THIS IS UNDOUBTEDLY ONE REASON, THOUGH NOT ONLY ONE, FOR THEIR AMBIVALENCE ON THIS ISSUE. BUT THE US WOULD LOOK AND IN FACT BE FECKLESS IF WE DENIED A COUNTRY REPEAT COUNTRY, WHICH WE HAD ENCOURAGED OVER A PERIOD OF MORE THAN TWO DECADES TO BECOME COMPLETELY DEPENDENT UPON US FOR ARMS, AN AMMUNITION RESUPPLY AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN THE COUNTRY REQUIRES HELP IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THIS CONSIDERATION IS PARTICULARLY PERTINENT IN THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA AS OUR MAY 1953 MAP AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY COMPREHENDS USE OF MAP MATERIEL FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES.

6. US OBJECTIVE IS NOT SO MUCH QUOTE MAINTAINING INFLUENCE END QUOTE WITH CURRENT GOVERNMENT, ON WHOSE LIMITED FUTURE WE AGREE WITH DISSIDENT OFFICERS, AS IT IS TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR EVOLVING NEEDS FOR ACCESS, AND TO MAINTAIN OUR GENERAL REPUTATION FOR BEING STEADFAST OF PURPOSE AND FOR HAVING AN INFORMED UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE REGION AND ITS PEOPLES. YOUR DISSIDENT MESSAGE WAS PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN POSING THIS LAST ISSUE SHARPLY FOR POLICY-MAKERS. IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT YOUR VIEWS HAVE BEEN HAVING AN IMPACT ON THE SHAPING OF US POLICY. 44

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RELEASE IN PART
B6

October 20, 1975

To: S/P - Winston Lord [redacted]

From: IO/LAB [redacted]

B6

Subject: Dissent Paper on Dept's Policies on Terrorism

I dissent from the following:

1. The Dept proclaims that it will not negotiate with terrorists (see attached). The Dept gives as its reason that this policy deters future kidnappings.

Dissent arguments: this policy is nothing more than a slogan, like "don't give up the ship." The Rand study showed that (a) a country's policy on terrorism (regardless of what the policy is) is the least significant factor in terrorists' planning, action, and reaction.

The Rand study also showed there is no basis for alleging that the "no negotiation" policy actually deters kidnappings.

I have said a great deal more on this subject in letters, memos, etc., which the Dept has, but has ignored, other than to commission the Rand study and then throw away the results because they do not fit in with the Dept's pre-conceived notions.

2. The Dept punishes Ambassadors who successfully negotiate to save lives. See the ~~Bxxxxix~~ Beverly Carter episode.

Dissent arguments: since I believe that negotiating to save lives is not only desirable in itself, but usually shows a high degree of diplomatic skill plus physical and moral courage, I recommend that any official who does this should be praised ~~xxxx~~ publicly. Do you realize the effect the Carter episode will have on JS Govt officials? The message is clear: save lives, and ruin your own career.

3. The Dept refuses even to finish the Rand study project. The case studies, including the one on Khartoum, which was the major point of my original request for an independent study, have never been delivered to the Dept (even though they are finished) because the Dept refuses to pay for them. I am sure the Dept is afraid the case studies show some officials, including high-ranking ones, making errors which caused loss of life. Does no one have the guts to vet these studies and learn from them? Why are we punishing some one like Bev Carter, who succeeded, and covering up for the ambassadors who failed?

October 20, 1975

To: S/P -Winston Lord [redacted]

From: IO/LaB [redacted]

B6

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The most important part of the Rand study, e.g., the section containing recommendations for findings and for changes in policy, was rejected and ordered to be re-written in a form palatable to the Dept, by watering down the conclusions and placing them in a separate annex. So the end result has not yet appeared; and when it does, it will lack clarity and impact. Again, the Dept prefers to risk human lives rather than face the fact that its policies are imperfect.

The Dept does not even make the existing sections of the study available to officers handling hostage situations. When I was in AF/C during the Tanzania-Zaire case, the office director was not told of the studies and only saw them when I handed my own copies to him for his perusal. Note: one of the first conclusions of the Rand Study was that each new hostage situation was handled as if no previous experience was available. The Zaire case illustrated that perfectly.

Dissent: we need the Rand study, let's get it and use it.

4. The Dept publically disowns Ambassadors who use official resources to assist in negotiating the release of captives. See the Carter story. Yet Carter did not take any more use of resources than other Ambassadors have; in other cases, ransom money has been shipped by pouch, stored in official safes, and persons contacting kidnapers have been escorted by JS Embassy officials. If the Dept sticks with disowning Ambassadors who do this, then in future cases Ambassadors will hesitate to use such resources.

Dissent: all resources should be used to save lives.

5. The Dept insists on announcing on every possible occasion, (and on instructing posts to do the same) that we do not give in to blackmail, pay ransom or release prisoners. These phrases (especially "give in to blackmail") are negative in their impact on a hostage situation, and confuse not only the public (see the Egan case) but also impede negotiations even when the latter are going on privately. If we want to negotiate, but any agreement we make with the kidnapers (even if only publishing a letter from a hostage) is going to be interpreted as "giving in to blackmail", then we have two contradictory policies running head on into each other. As long as those instructions exist, posts in hostage situations are going to make the same mistake again and again, by immediately announcing " we don't give in to blackmail", just when the situation is most tense and when the greatest flexibility is needed.

Dissent: issue instructions to everyone, from the President in the White House (see Khartoum case) thru the Secretary of State (see the Tanzania case) on down to the lowliest clerk (not forgetting the Attorney General of the United States, who talked too much during a hostage situation when the post was very wisely maintaining total silence):

"when you have a hostage situation, close your mouth; don't say anything about our policy, other than that we desire to keep communications open. PERIOD."

6. The Dept gives first priority to working with and through the host government, and only as a last resort works directly with the terrorists. This is an artificial priority, which may make sense in any ordinary diplomatic situation but is irrelevant to a hostage situation, where the first priority is to save lives.

Dissent: instruct posts to take whatever steps are needed, directly or thru the host government (depending on what will be most effective) to save lives.

7. The Dept has many strands of policies entangling hostage situations: relations with foreign countries, good public relations, "image," etc. We are encumbered by all this, and distracted by it. The sole policy is SAVE LIVES.

Dissent: revise all instructions to eliminate ideas which are there solely for press relations purposes, and get down to the hard core. We are not running an advertising campaign, we are trying to issue instructions to save lives. These instructions should be as clear and simple and free of confusing "clutter" as the instructions in a first-aid kit which tell you how to stop someone from bleeding to death ("apply direct pressure to the wound")

Conclusion: I have been trying since 1971 to push the Department away from its machismo-image self-concerns into an outward-looking policy which worries about hostages, rather than how the Dept will look. I believe some lives may have been lost and others endangered by the Dept's refusal to move. I think the time has come to ask the Dept to find the moral courage to take the Rand study, admit past mistakes, and issue a new policy instructions, which is simply: "Keep quiet publically; negotiate."

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 CANBER 08699 01 OF 02 130631Z
ACTION EA-12

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CANBER 08699 01 OF 02 130631Z

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PH-05 H-01
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AUSTRALIAN VOTERS TO OPT FOR STABILITY AS OPPOSED TO ANOTHER SOCIALIST EXPERIENCE, SUCH AS THAT CONDUCTED BY GOUGH WHITLAM DURING THE YEARS 1972-75. FRASER SEES AUSTRALIA AS A WEALTHY AND PROSPEROUS COUNTRY WITH EVER-RISING EXPECTATIONS, AND WITH A MAJORITY OPPOSED TO CLASS CONFLICT. FRASER DELIBERATELY DOWNPLAYED POTENTIAL TROUBLESOME ISSUES DURING THE CAMPAIGN GOVERNMENT/UNION CONFRONTATION; THE MINING AND EXPORT OF URANIUM. HE EMPHASIZED TAX BENEFITS SCHEDULED BY THE L/HCP, WHICH LABOR THREATENED TO TAKE AWAY (THE "HIP POCKET NERVE" WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY SWUNG MANY VOTES). HE ALLEGED THAT WHITLAM'S "SOFTNESS" ON PROTECTION WOULD JEOPARDIZE MANY AUSTRALIAN JOBS, CITING WHITLAM'S 25 PERCENT ACROSS-BOARD TARIFF CUT WHICH WHITLAM APPLIED IN 1973, AND WHICH PARTIALLY ACCOUNTED FOR A LARGE RISE IN UNEMPLOYMENT. THIS ALLEGED "SOFTNESS" ON TARIFF PROTECTION ALSO COST WHITLAM VOTES AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS (E.G., THE U.S.W. AUTO WORKERS UNION CONTRIBUTED ONLY 1500 TO THE ALP DURING THE CAMPAIGN VERSUS A USUAL CONTRIBUTION OF AT LEAST \$10,000; TEXTILE WORKERS CONTRIBUTED NOTHING). ALP TAX AND TARIFF POLICY PERMITTED FRASER, ALONG WITH SOME ALP LEADERS, TO CLAIM PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT WHITLAM HAD LOST TOUCH WITH HIS ELECTORATE. THE NEW AND ASPIRING MIDDLE CLASS WAS MORE INTERESTED IN TAX CUTS AND LOWER INTEREST RATES FOR THEIR BURDENSOME MORTGAGES THAN THEY WERE IN WHITLAM'S CALL FOR SACRIFICES TO HELP THE UNEMPLOYED. WHILE THERE MIGHT BE RELATIVELY LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR MALCOLM FRASER, LABOR WAS NOT SEEN AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO SOLVE AUSTRALIA'S PROBLEMS. THIS LED BILL HAYDEN, HEAD APPARENT TO WHITLAM AS LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, TO NOTE THAT THE ALP FACED MANY PROBLEMS "NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH WAS A PROBLEM OF CREDIBILITY IN THE COMMUNITY."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 CANBERRA 8649

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN ELECTION AFTERMATH

REF: CANBERRA 8649

1. SUMMARY: THE MAGNITUDE OF PRIME MINISTER FRASER'S OVERWHELMING DECEMBER 10 ELECTION VICTORY GUARANTEES THAT U.S. BASIC INTERESTS IN AUSTRALIA WILL BE WELL PROTECTED FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT THREE YEARS. THE LIBERAL/NATIONAL COUNTRY PARTY COALITION GOVERNMENT HAS FOSTERED THE CLOSEST COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. ON POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES; HAS ACTED TO PROTECT THE SUBSTANTIAL U.S. INVESTMENT STAKE IN AUSTRALIA AND ENCOURAGED ACCESS FOR NEW U.S. INVESTMENT; HAS OPENED AUSTRALIAN URANIUM TO WORLD MARKETS, THUSSUPPORTING AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF U.S. ENERGY AND SAFEGUARDS POLICY; HAS GUARANTEED CONTINUED ACCESS TO AUSTRALIAN TERRITORY FOR ESSENTIAL JOINT DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS. THE L/HCP IS ROCK SOLID ON ANZUS, BASING ITS KEY FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS ON ANZUS' EFFECTIVE CONTINUATION. THE ONLY POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREA INVOLVES PROBABLE INCREASED PROTECTION AGAINST FOREIGN IMPORTS. THE ALP, DEBATED ONCE AGAIN, MUST RETHINK ITS ESSENTIAL PHILOSOPHY. THERE IS NOW NO SERIOUS DOUBT THAT A GREAT MAJORITY OF AUSTRALIANS WERE STILL UNPREPARED TO EXPERIMENT ONCE AGAIN WITH GOUGH WHITLAM'S DISRUPTIVE BRAND OF TRADE UNION-DOMINATED SOCIALISM. END SUMMARY.

2. THE L/HCP VICTORY WAS NOT EXPECTED. HOWEVER, IT WAS REMARKABLE THAT FRASER WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN HIS OVERWHELMING MAJORITY IN BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT WHILE BURDENED WITH AN EXTREMELY HIGH RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT, WHICH SHOWS ALL SIGNS OF GOING EVEN HIGHER, AND WITH AN ECONOMY, WHICH, ALTHOUGH IT SHOWS SOME EARLY SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT, REMAINS FLAT. THE MAIN REASON FOR FRASER'S LANDSLIDE VICTORY IS THAT HE READ HIS ELECTORATE CORRECTLY IN SPITE OF PARTY, EDITORIAL AND ELECTORATE OPPOSITION, FRASER DECIDED TO GO TO THE POLLS EARLY COUNTING ON THE BASIC CONSERVATISM OF A MAJORITY OF

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01
ACTION EA-12

CANBER 08699 02 OF 02 130656Z

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CANBER 08699 02 OF 02 130656Z

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R 130521Z DEC 77
 FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
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 CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

6. A FURTHER WORD NEEDS SAYING ABOUT MALCOLM FRASER. IT HAS BEEN CORRECTLY NOTED THERE IS LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR HIM. HE IS NOT POPULAR BUT THIS LACK OF POPULARITY WHICH STEMS FROM AN ABSENCE OF PERSONAL WARMTH AND CHARM SHOULD NOT OBSCURE OTHER CHARACTERISTICS IMPORTANT TO A CHIEF OF STATE. HE IS FIRST AND LAST CONCERNED WITH AUSTRALIA AND HER POSITION IN THE WORLD; HE IS UNCONCERNED WITH HIS LACK OF POPULARITY; HE IS STRONG WILLED AND PREPARED TO MAKE THE HARD DECISION AS HE SEES IT TO ACCOMPLISH HIS OBJECTIVE; AND HE IS RELIABLE IN THE EYES OF HIS PARTY. IT IS FELT BY MANY THAT HE WILL DOMINATE THE AUSTRALIAN SCENE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. ALSTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 CANBERRA 8699

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

3. THE FUTURE OF THE ALP IN AUSTRALIA IS SHADOWED. FRASER, IN HIS VICTORY SPEECH, CLAIMED THAT "I ALSO WANT TO COMMIT MY GOVERNMENT TO ANOTHER OBJECTIVE, TO REACH OUT BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF POLITICS, TO SEEK TO EMPHASIZE THOSE THINGS THAT OUGHT TO UNITE ALL AUSTRALIANS IN COMMON PURPOSE, AND IN COMMON OBJECTIVES, EMPHASIZING THOSE MATTERS WHICH MAKE AUSTRALIA A GREAT NATION. IF WE CAN DO THAT WE CAN LESSEN THE DIVISIONS BETWEEN US AND INCREASE THE SENSE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND COMMON PURPOSE." CERTAINLY FRASER'S WIN WILL BOOST BUSINESS CONFIDENCE AND PERHAPS FOREIGN INVESTMENT. SHOULD THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY IMPROVE DISCERNIBLY WITH A RESULTANT DROP IN UNEMPLOYMENT, THIS MIGHT ALSO ENABLE FRASER TO MODERATE SOME OF HIS HIGHLY CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL POLICIES, THEREBY GAINING EVEN GREATER ELECTORAL APPEAL.

4. IN SUM, FRASER HAS A FAIRLY GOOD CHANCE OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS TO PROVE THAT THE LIBERAL PARTY'S PHILOSOPHY WORKS. THIS WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR LABOR TO COUNTER. ABOVE ALL, THE ALP MUST BROADEN ITS BASE. AT PRESENT, LABOR IS THE POLITICAL ARM OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN AUSTRALIA, A HOME FOR GOVERNMENT WORKERS, THE INTELLIGENTSIA, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, AND OTHER "TRENDY" TYPES IN THE COMMUNITY. THIS PROVED MUCH TOO SMALL AN ELECTORATE IN 1977, ESPECIALLY WITH LARGE-SCALE DEFECTIONS FROM UNION RANKS.

5. BILL HAYDEN, CURRENTLY SHADOW MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND ONE OF SEVERAL ECONOMIC SPOKESMEN FOR THE ALP, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE ELECTED AS OPPOSITION LEADER TO REPLACE WHITLAM. HOWEVER, MANY ALP PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERS ALREADY DOUBT HAYDEN'S TOUGHNESS IN DEALING WITH FRASER AND WITH THE OLD LABOR PARTY WAR HORSES WHO NOW, WITH THE DEFEAT OF SO MANY BRIGHT YOUNG LABOR MODERATE CANDIDATES, MAKE UP SUCH A LARGE PORTION OF THE ALP'S PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERSHIP. HAYDEN WILL ENJOY A TRIAL PERIOD, A CHANCE TO PROVE HIMSELF. BUT THERE ARE ALREADY CALLS TO ELECT BOB HAWKE, PRESIDENT OF THE ALP AND THE ACTU, TO PARLIAMENT TO PREPARE HAWKE AS PARLIAMENTARY LEADER IN THE HOPE THAT HIS CHARISMATIC PERSONALITY MIGHT EVENTUALLY LEAD THE ALP OUT OF THE WILDERNESS.

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PAGE 01 STATE 054722

ORIGIN OPIC-06

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DRAFTED BY OPIC/ID/IA:BTMANSBACH

APPROVED BY EB/IFD/OIA:RJSMITH

EB/IFD/OIA:DHSTEBEING

ARA/ECP:JO MAHONY (SUBS)

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FM SICSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL CALI IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 054722

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: EINV

SUBJECT: ANDEAN MISSION - FINAL ADVANCE TRIP

1. CPIC DIRECTOR FOR LATIN AMERICAN INSURANCE, B. THOMAS
MANSEACH, ACCOMPANIED BY INSURANCE OFFICER, SUSAN MASHKES
PLAN WRAP UP ADVANCE TRIP TO ADDRESSEE POSTS ACCORDING
TO FOLLOWING SCHEDULE:

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, MIAMI TO QUITO VIA EU 075 ARRIVING
AT 12:30 PM.

FRIDAY, MARCH 18, QUITO TO GUAYAQUIL.

SATURDAY, MARCH 19, GUAYAQUIL TO QUITO.

SUNDAY, MARCH 20, QUITO TO LIMA VIA BN 911 ARRIVING AT
10:40 AM.

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PAGE 02 STATE 054722

TUESDAY, MARCH 22, LIMA TO LA PAZ VIA BN 979 ARRIVING AT
11:35 AM.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, LA PAZ TO SANTA CRUZ VIA LB 927
ARRIVING AT 12:35 PM. DEPART BOLIVIA ON MARCH 28.

SUNDAY, MARCH 28, LIMA TO BOGOTA VIA AV 082 AT 17:25 PM.

TUESDAY, MARCH 29, BOGOTA TO CALI VIA AV 111 DEPARTING AT
13:00 PM ARRIVING AT 13:45 PM.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, CALI TO MIAMI VIA BN 976 DEPARTING
AT 10:45 AM.

2. TEAM WILL REVIEW FINAL SCHEDULE WITH EMBASSY
PERSONNEL AND LOCAL HOSTS AS WELL AS MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR
HOTEL RESERVATIONS AND GROUND TRANSPORTATION.

3. BOGOTA: PURSUANT TO BOGOTA 2216, OPIC HAS CHANGED
BOTH DATE OF FINAL ADVANCE TRIP TO MARCH 28 AND 29 (SEE
ITINERARY PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE) AND DATE OF MISSION (MAY 16,
BOGOTA; MAY 17, CALI; MAY 18 BOGOTA, LATE AFTERNOON DE-
PARTURE FOR QUITO). REQUEST FOLLOWING APPOINTMENTS FOR
MARCH 28: (A) ANDI, CUERVO AND/OR GONZALEZ; (B) AACCLA.

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OSCAR BRADFORD; (C) APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, FREDY CASTANO UNLESS EMBASSY HAS PREFERABLE ALTERNATIVE.

4. QUITO: BECAUSE MAY 19, ASCENSION DAY, IS A HOLIDAY IN ECGOTA, VISITS TO COLOMBIA AND ECUADOR WILL BE REVISED. MISSION NOW PLANNING TO VISIT QUITO LATE AFTERNOON MAY 18 AND 19 AND GUAYAQUIL MAY 20. TRUST THAT THIS FURTHER CHANGE WILL NOT COMPLICATE MATTERS. IN FACT, REVISED SCHEDULE MAY PERMIT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF AACCLA TO PLAY MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN MISSION SCHEDULE.

REQUEST FOLLOWING APPOINTMENTS: (A) CENDES, TERAN AND MARCC BRAVO; (B) AACCLA, CARL NEWLANDS; (C) GOE, GALO MANTANO; (D) ROQUE CANADAS; (E) REPRESENTATIVE OF CICE; (F) ALSO WISH TO MEET WITH AMCONSUL IN GUAYAGUIL PLUS WHOEVER WILL HANDLE GUAYAQUIL MEETINGS. EMBASSY WILL RECALL THAT BOTH REPEAT BOTH CENDES AND NEWLANDS HAD

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PAGE 03 STATE 054722

OFFERED TO HANDLE GUAYAQUIL MEETINGS WITH NEWLANDS INDICATING THAT HE PREFERRED TO DO GUAYAQUIL ALONE RATHER THAN IN CONJUNCTION WITH CENDES.

5. LIMA: REQUEST THE FOLLOWING APPOINTMENTS: AACCLA, ALAN YOUNG OF B OF A. WILL DISCUSS LOCAL SPONSORSHIP UPON ARRIVAL PER LIMA 1849.

6. LA PAZ: REQUEST FOLLOWING APPOINTMENTS: (A) AACCLA, JAMES RAAF; (B) CEPB, JORGE LONSDALE OR HIS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DR. HUGO SAINZ TRIGO; (C) SUBMINISTER OF PLANIMIENTO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, TO DISCUSS BOTH FOREIGN GOVERNMENT APPROVALS AND GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP.

7. REQUEST FOLLOWING HOTEL RESERVATIONS:

QUITO - THE COION - MARCH 16, 17 AND 19.

GUAYAQUIL - (REQUEST AMCONSUL CHOOSE HOTEL) - MARCH 18.

LIMA - THE SHERATON - MARCH 20, 21.

LA PAZ - THE LIBERTADOR - MARCH 22.

SANTA CRUZ - THE HOLIDAY INN (LOS TAJIBOS) - MARCH 23.

ECGOTA - THE HILTON - MARCH 27 AND 28.

CALI - (REQUEST AMCONSUL CHOOSE HOTEL) - MARCH 29.

8. WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSIES CONCURRENCES AT EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

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PAGE 2

RELEASE IN PART B6

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DISSENT CHANNEL

S.O. 118001 GDS
TAGS: MILT PINS PREV AC
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGES; PROBABILITY OF CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA AND
THE SECURITY THREAT TO AMERICAN CITIZENS

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY

B6

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. ALTHOUGH PARSON AND MISCALCULATION COULD PRECIPITATE AN ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR, THE FAR MORE SERIOUS DANGER IS THAT EITHER FNLA OR MPLA WILL COME TO VIEW AN ALL-OUT MILITARY ATTACK ON ITS RIVAL AS NECESSARY FOR SELF-PRESERVATION. EXAMINATION OF THE NEAR TERM POLITICAL SITUATION STRONGLY INDICATES ONE OF THE TWO GROUPS WILL BE FORCED TO THIS CONCLUSION

BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. THE RESULTING FEASIBILITY OF OPEN WARFARE SUGGESTS THE USE ACT TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF AMBIT DEPENDENTS OF EMPLOYEES TO U.S. COMPANIES OPERATING HERE. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COMPANIES' HEADQUARTERS IN THE U.S. WOULD RESULT IN MOST REMOVING DEPENDENTS IN A MANNER CALCULATED TO AVOID CRITICISM OF EITHER THE COMPANY OR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. THE DRAFTING OFFICER DISAGREES WITH RECENT POST REPORTING WHICH MINIMIZES THE PROBABILITY OF A LARGE SCALE, SUSTAINED MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN FNLA AND MPLA IN LUANDA AND ELSEWHERE IN ANGOLA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. ALTHOUGH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE THAT CIVIL WAR WILL BREAK OUT PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 11,

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PAGE 02 LUANDA 22441 01 OF 02 221051Z

THE PROBABILITIES APPEAR SUFFICIENTLY HIGH FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO INFORMALLY ADVISE THE U.S. HEADQUARTERS OF COMPANIES OPERATING HERE TO BEGIN A STAGED WITHDRAWAL OF EMPLOYEE'S DEPENDENTS AIMED AT REDUCING THEIR NUMBER TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE BY MID-JULY AND DISCOURAGE THEIR RETURN UNTIL THE INTER-LIBERATION GROUP POWER STRUGGLE IS RESOLVED. UNLIKE SOME PRIOR EXPERIENCES WITH MAJOR URBAN VIOLENCE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE BUILDUP TO ALL-OUT WARFARE WILL BE PROGRESSIVE ENOUGH TO PERMIT EVACUATION. ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MPLA-FNLA FIGHTING MAY NOT PRACTICALLY AFFECT WHITE RESIDENTIAL AREAS, THIS IS FAR FROM CERTAIN.

4. INFORMALLY ADVISING U.S. COMPANIES TO BEGIN REMOVING DEPENDENTS IS NOT LIKELY TO RESULT IN LOCAL CRITICISM OF EITHER THE COMPANIES OR THE U.S. FOR PORTUGUESE MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS HAVE THEIR FAMILIES IN LUANDA AND MANY ADDITIONAL PORTUGUESE FAMILIES ARE HOLDING THEIR FAMILIES IN PORTUGAL UNTIL AFTER INDEPENDENCE. IN ADDITION, LIBERATION GROUP CONTACTS HAVE TOLD US THEY INTEND TO KEEP THEIR FAMILIES OUT OF ANGOLA UNTIL THE STRUGGLE IS RESOLVED.

5. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS PRESENT THE RATIONALE FOR PREDICTING A HIGH PROBABILITY OF CIVIL WAR PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE.

6. CIVIL WAR WILL BEGIN HERE BY EITHER A) MISADVENTURE FOLLOWED BY AN INABILITY AND/OR UNWILLINGNESS TO RESTORE ORDER; B) A DELIBERATE DECISION BY MPLA OR C) A DELIBERATE DECISION BY FNLA. MISADVENTURE IS NOT A SERIOUS DANGER UNLESS IT IS FOLLOWED BY THE NECESSARY UNWILLINGNESS OF ONE OF THE PARTIES TO STOP THE PROCESS.

7. NEITHER ROBERTO NOR NETO IS WILLING TO SEE THE OTHER ASSUME THE LEADERSHIP OF AN INDEPENDENT ANGOLA WITHOUT FIRST RECOURSE TO ALL THE POWER, MILITARY INCLUDED, THEIR RESPECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS POSSESS. IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO BELIEVE EITHER PREFERS TO WIN BY MILITARY FORCE, ONLY TO ASSUME THAT FOR EACH LEADER, VICTORY BY HIS ARCH RIVAL IS UNACCEPTABLE. IT FOLLOWS THAT EITHER NETO OR ROBERTO WILL RESORT TO AN ALL-OUT MILITARY PUSH WHEN HE PERCEIVES A CLEAR DANGER OF ULTIMATE DEFEAT IF HE DOES NOT ACT.

8. INDICATIONS ARE THAT IN A REASONABLY HONEST ELECTION (OR WITH DISHONESTY NETTING OUT TO ZERO) UNITA WOULD POLL 45-55

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PAGE 23 LUANDA 27441 21 OF 22 221251Z

PERCENT, FNLA 37-25 PERCENT AND MPLA 18-22 PERCENT. SINCE EACH PARTY NOW CONTROLS ONE-THIRD OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AN ABSENCE OF ELECTIONS AND A CONTINUATION OF THE ONE-THIRD EACH COALITION REPRESENTS A DEFEAT FOR UNITA, SALVATION FOR MPLA AND LITTLE RELATIVE CHANGE FOR FNLA. (GIVEN UNITA'S MINIMAL STRENGTH OUTSIDE THE SOUTH, A CANCELLATION OF THE ELECTIONS WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER A UNITA ATTACK IN LUANDA. UNITA MAY SECEDE WITH THE SOUTH BUT THAT QUESTION IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS MESSAGE.) THE DANGER, HOWEVER, ARISES FROM THE HOPE ROBERTO APPEARS TO HOLD THAT ELECTIONS WILL - THROUGH AN ALLIANCE OF FNLA AND UNITA - BRING MPLA AND NETO, RELEGATING THEM TO A FAR DISTANT SECOND PLACE BEHIND AN FNLA-UNITA COALITION HEADED BY ROBERTO HIMSELF. THEREFORE ROBERTO MUST VIEW A NO-ELECTIONS, ONE-THIRD TO EACH PARTY SOLUTION AS DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS MAIN AND PERHAPS ONLY CHANCE TO BE FINALLY RID OF NETO.

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UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

MISSION TO PAKISTAN

5025

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↓
for Action

Cable: USAIDPAK

HEADQUARTERS OFFICE
ISLAMABAD

March 21, 1973

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RELEASE IN PART B6

Mr. William I. Cargo
Director of Planning and Coordination
Room 7246
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Cargo:

In accordance with the procedure cited in the May 1972 Department of State Newsletter, I wish to record my dissent from the recently announced United States' decision to resume arms sales to Pakistan.

I understand that U. S. policy now permits arms sales which fall in any of the following three categories:

- Lethal items contracted for under the 1970 "one-time exception," but not yet delivered;
- Spare parts for lethal items previously furnished by the United States; and
- Non-lethal new items.

In my view, the lifting of the arms embargo seriously threatens the stability of the subcontinent, impairs U. S. credibility as a peacemaker, diminishes Pakistan's economic development, and jeopardizes our relations with both India and Bangladesh. My analysis appears in a memorandum dated December 7, 1972 on "Resumption of American Military Supplies to Pakistan" (copy attached herewith).

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Classified By *William A. Wolff*
Subject to General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Automatically downgraded at two
year intervals and declassified on
December 31, 1979

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Mr. William I. Cargo

Page 2

Supplementing that memorandum, I would further argue as follows:

I. The "Lethal-Non-Lethal" Distinction Is Spurious

In addition to the semantic problem of defining "non-lethal" end-use items, there is another difficulty which is often ignored. This is the fact that non-lethal items usually require lethal complements. Unarmed jeeps carry armed soldiers; airplane engines power planes which bomb and strafe. Therefore, an arms purveyor whose sales make possible a larger or more destructive military force cannot escape responsibility for the destruction which that force may unleash.

II. It Is Practically Impossible For The United States To Ensure That Its Military Supplies Will Not Be Used Against Other Friendly Nations Or Against The Recipient's Own People.

Regardless of restrictions which the U. S. may place on the use of items furnished, recent history has shown that the arming of two hostile allies leads to the use of these weapons against each other. We should avoid being identified with arms and equipment which again may wind up on a battlefield with another friendly power.

III. In The Militarily Competitive Atmosphere Of The Subcontinent, It Is Unrealistic to Expect That A Renewed Sales Program Will Not Contribute To An "Arms Race."

The U. S. Government has taken the laudable position that it does not intend to contribute to an "arms race." But our intentions may be irrelevant in the face of actual arms deliveries. I am told that the 300 armed personnel carriers supplied under the decision will create a positive imbalance in Pakistan's favor. Who is to say that the Indian military will not feel compelled to regain their advantage? Certainly, our intention to avoid an arms race could be implemented more effectively by a retention of the embargo.

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Mr. William I. Cargo

Page 3

IV. In A Poor Country Like Pakistan, Military Purchases Compete With Economic Development Programs. Hence The Resumption Of Military Sales Tends To Thwart Our Aid Objectives.

Pakistan is a country of scarce resources. More "guns" means less "butter." The expenditure of \$14 million for military supplies deprives the Pakistani people of an equal sum for development programs. The new supplies and spare parts will doubtless require heavy local cost commitments by the Government of Pakistan. Military expenditures set into motion their own multiplier effect.

Pakistan's overwhelming debt service problem is another reason to discourage military spending, which draws down foreign exchange. Moreover, the diversion of resources to the military is likely to have an adverse effect on Pakistan's ability to attract development aid. Given the fungibility of foreign exchange, the military sales authorized constitute an effective deduction from our current level of commodity assistance (\$60 million in FY 73).

On the basis of the foregoing, I respectfully dissent from the decision to lift the embargo and recommend that the U. S. arms policy for Pakistan be reconsidered in the near future.

Sincerely yours,



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Attachment: a/s

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Mr. Joseph C. Wheeler, Director

December 7, 1972

THRU: Dr. William A. Wolfers, Deputy Director

[Redacted]

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Resumption of American Military Supplies to Pakistan

Anticipating a GOP request for resumption of American military supplies to Pakistan, you asked me to prepare a succinct analysis of policy issues for possible consideration by the Country Team. On the basis of stated assumptions, I have considered two "most plausible" alternative courses of action in light of U. S. foreign policy, Pakistan foreign relations, and Pakistan domestic developments.

I. Assumptions

As a starting point, we assume that the next two years will see (1) continuation in power of the Bhutto Government; (2) at least gradual progress toward an Indo-Pak rapprochement, and (3) continued peaceful relations among the great powers. We also assume for discussion purposes that Congress will make no substantial changes in military sales legislation. ^{1/}

II. Possible Courses of Action

The USG could respond to a GOP request for military supplies in a number of ways depending upon (1) the scope of the request and (2) USG policy decisions. Assuming an open-ended request to remove existing restrictions on the supply of military hardware, USG policy options would include the following possible courses of action:

- 1) Unqualified supply (including sophisticated weapons)
- 2) Qualified supply:

^{1/} Note that these are all assumptions, not predictions.

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- a) excluding sophisticated weapons;
 - b) excluding "lethal" end-use commodities;
 - c) limited to spare parts for previously furnished USG equipment;
 - d) limited to procurement under licenses cancelled in October 1971.
- 3) Refusal to supply; (i. e., continuation of existing policy).

These options are not meant to exclude other possibilities. Options (1) and (2) for example could be varied by dollar and time limitations; used versus new equipment; definitions of "sophisticated" and "non-lethal" and credit or military aid terms. The possible limitations listed under option (2) could be imposed separately or in various combinations. For the sake of analysis, however, it would seem preferable to concentrate on the two "most plausible" of the possible courses of action. While assessment of plausibility is of course subjective, a review of U. S. arms supply policy in the subcontinent since 1965 suggests that the era of unqualified sales is over. ^{2/} Realistically, the policy-makers in Washington will probably choose between continuation of the current embargo (option(3)) and some form of qualified supply (option (2)). For clarity and brevity of presentation we will focus more specifically on a choice between no supply (NS) and supply limited to spare parts (SLSP).

^{2/} Between 1954 and 1965 the U. S. supplied Pakistan with arms worth between \$700 and \$800 million. "It sold India a modest amount of military equipment before 1962, and gave India arms worth about \$85 million between the 1962 conflict with China and the 1965 war with Pakistan." William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, (Praeger, 1972) at 323. MAP grant aid shipments of material to Pakistan and India terminated in September, 1965. Military equipment

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- 3 -

Footnote 2 - Continued

was shipped to both countries on a strictly sales basis under military supply policy announced in April 1967 confining shipments to spare parts for equipment supplied under the pre-1965 grant aid programs, and to non-lethal end-items such as communications equipment, cargo vehicles and transport aircraft. On October 1, 1970 the USG offered a "one-time exception" to the prohibition on the sale of lethal material of U. S. origin to Pakistan. According to DOD testimony, the offer was limited to four types of items: armored personnel carriers, interceptor aircraft, some obsolete light bombers, and a few patrol aircraft. Quantities were specifically stated and limited to replacement of similar items lost through normal wear out and accident. In April, 1971, the USG began to impose more severe limitations on deliveries to Pakistan beginning with a prohibition on the issuance of new or renewed Munitions List export licenses or shipments from military depots and culminating in late October with the cancellation of remaining valid licenses. On December 3, 1971 the USG applied a total embargo of military supply deliveries to India. Both countries remain under a total embargo on military supplies. Grant military training is however unaffected by the current policy. For FY 73 the DOD proposed grant training for Pakistan in the amount of \$243,000 and for India in the amount of \$234,000. See: testimony of General Seignous, H. R. Appropriations Committee Hearings, April 11, 1972, Part I, 759, 764, 794; Testimony of General Warren, H. R. Appropriations Committee Hearings, March 24, 1971, Part I, 215-16

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- 4 -

III. U. S. Foreign PolicyA. Pakistan

1. Discussion. Neither option will satisfy President Bhutto if he wants to rebuild his armed forces with new equipment rather than simply replace parts. Hence the immediate effect of either option may be to diminish somewhat the friendly relations we now enjoy with the GOP. There is little question that the NS policy would be received more unfavorably than the SLSP course. What may become more important than the initial impact however are succeeding events affected by the policy chosen.

2. Scenario^{3/}

a) NS Policy. With refusal to supply arms, U.S. announces commodity and fertilizer loans for FY 73. American image in Pakistan suffers a not setback on arms issue but one of mild intensity and short duration. Man on the street still remembers President Nixon's support during '71 Indo-Pak War. With gradually improving relations with India, arms supplies are regarded as desirable but not critical. President Bhutto is able to channel more funds to development programs on the ground that U.S. spares are unavailable. In effect, NS policy of USG becomes in a sense a "scapegoat" for Pak de-militarization. Pak military is bitter but Bhutto and Central Ministers are privately pleased with outcome.

b) SLSP Policy. The U.S. decision to resume the supply of spare parts is accepted in Pakistan as "the least they could do." There is little appreciation of the decision among the general public, but the military, desirous of new hardware, regard it as a "foot in the door." They expect that the USG, having lost its virginity, will be hard put to turn down future requests for new equipment.

3/ This "Scenario" and those which follow are simply designed to highlight issues for discussion. Like the assumptions above, they are not predictions of future events.

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B. India

1. Discussion. Continued Indo-Pak tensions make it inevitable that any USG policy decision effecting arms to Pakistan will elicit a strong reaction in New Delhi. Such reaction will likely occur in the midst of Indian efforts to improve relations with Washington.

2. Scenario.

a) NS Policy. USG refusal to supply military hardware to Pakistan, is widely heralded in India as a wise decision. Elements of the Indian Government who seek rapprochement with the Nixon Administration gain support for their cause.

b) SLSP Policy. The US decision in the face of continued arms embargo for India is widely regarded as an affront. The Indian press blurs distinction between supply limited to spare parts and unrestricted sales. Anti-American sentiment rises and rapprochement efforts are at least temporarily suspended. At diplomatic level, GOI ponders countering with similar arms request to Washington.

IV. Pakistan Foreign Relations

A. India

1. Discussion. Notwithstanding Pakistan's improved relations with India, there remains deep suspicion and distrust between the two nations. The threat of a renewed "arms race" lurks beneath the surface.

2. Scenario

a) NS Policy. Pakistan's inability to buy even spare parts from the US pleases the Indians, strengthening the hand of policy makers who desire to reduce India's dependence on the Soviet Union. The decision, however, prompts no immediate change in

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- 6 -

Indian supply policy as the Government watches to see whether Pakistan will find other supply sources.

b) SLSP Policy. India sees in the decision a capitulation of the Bhutto Government to the generals and a resurgence of Pakistani "militarism." The limited policy is regarded as only a first step in an American rearmament of Pakistan. The public views the arms decision as a breach of the Simla spirit. Both hawks and pro-Soviet officials and legislators in India find grist for their mills.

B. China

a) NS Policy. In the wake of the American decision, Pakistan approaches China for new hardware. The Chinese leaders profess eternal support for the Pakistani cause, promise to provide help in the future, but procrastinate on the question of deliveries.

b) SLSP Policy. China is not approached and exhibits no particular unhappiness with the USG decision.

V. Pakistan Domestic Developments

A. Political

1. Discussion. In the larger context of Pakistani politics the USG decision--one way or the other--would probably have an insubstantial effect. More dramatic scenes occupy the local stage. Yet it is important to consider the effect of the two options on Mr. Bhutto's position in the country, the role of the military establishment, and central-province relations.

2. Scenario

a) NS Policy. Outwardly the decision comes as a blow to the Bhutto Government which has patiently deferred its arms request until after the American Presidential election. With expecta-

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- 7 -

tions of USG "support" running high, Bhutto's prestige suffers a minor wound. Yet in fact, it is the Pak military which loses; their dependence upon American material is substantial. The generals' loss is Mr. Bhutto's gain. The diminishment in the President's public stature is more than offset by his increased internal power vis-a-vis the military establishment. Without equipment, Bhutto finds it easier to achieve military manpower cuts. Greater emphasis is placed on the spirit of Simla. At the same time, he has to contend with internal pressures to seek alternative supply sources. His response is to turn to China (with the unsatisfying results noted above). Finally, he arranges a meeting with Mrs. Gandhi to propose an arms free zone for the subcontinent. In Pakistan, advocates of increased Provincial autonomy regard a reduction in arms support of the central armed forces as fortuitous. For the Opposition, remembering the Dacca terror of last year, the military is a potential oppressor.

b) SLSP Policy. The USG decision is regarded as a minor victory by some; as a minor setback by others. In either case, it scarcely affects Mr. Bhutto's political image at home. The military leaders, although hoping for more are delighted to see the embargo lifted. With spares to put equipment back into service this year, they can look to the importation of new commodities from the US later on. They see the decision as the first step in the restoration of the US arms flow. Internally, their hand is strengthened with the civilian President. They feel they can resist his efforts to cut back military personnel on the ground that "someone has to operate the reactivated equipment." Provincial leaders grimace at the thought of an increasingly mobile central army.

B. Economic

I. Discussion. The economic effects of the supply decision are perhaps the most significant of all. For in Pakistan, the scarcity of resources makes "guns versus butter" decision-making a matter of vital concern. We should, therefore, consider the effects of arms supply upon Pakistan's internal economic priorities and her ability to attract foreign assistance.

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2. Scenario

a) NS Policy: With U.S. spares unavailable and the procurement of new equipment elsewhere beyond the nation's financial capacity, the Government begins to devote an increasing percentage of its resources to development. Holding his military advisors at bay, the President can respond to the rising expectations of his "people's constituency." Some of the social programs of the Bhutto Government begin to be implemented in 1973. Foreign aid donors are impressed with Pakistan's efforts and are delighted with the reduction of military expenditures. The country gets good marks (and higher aid pledges) at the 1973 Consortium meeting. Creditor nations take a more positive view of the forthcoming debt rescheduling. In the Pakistan bureaucracy, enlightened elements of the planning and development offices are encouraged in their development efforts. A new spirit of optimism in development circles begins to emerge.

b) SLSP Policy. The decision arouses anxiety among development-minded Pakistanis and foreign aid officials. Does it mean that Pakistan is opting for more guns and less butter? Is the confrontation with India policy being reasserted? (Some recall the President's ominous reference to "revenge" in his December Convention speech in Rawalpindi). Foreign aid donors look with disfavor on a Plan which relies on external assistance for more than fifty percent of the development budget. There is a tendency among donors to cut back on commodity assistance (perhaps the "most fungible" type of aid) on the ground that it provides foreign exchange support for military purchases. Pakistani economists and planners are disheartened by the decision and blame the United States for "arms-pushing."

VI. Some Final Comments

The above discussion and scenarios suggest that continuation of our present embargo policy is the preferred course. On balance, the negative effects of a resumption of arms sales--even those limited to spare parts--would appear to outweigh the benefits (limited to a short-run political advantage to the U.S. in Pakistan). Before concluding, however, it may be useful to examine briefly some of the "conventional wisdom" (CW) on the arms supply issue:

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-9-

CW: We need to bolster the defensive position of Pakistan against possible attack from outside the subcontinent.

This may have been the case during the height of the Cold War. But the argument is no longer valid. Not only is the danger of Communist aggression in the subcontinent less imminent today, but history has shown that the arming of two hostile allies leads to the use of those weapons against each other. Moreover, as Barnds points out, "the rationale for supplying arms to India and Pakistan lost its appeal as the political costs of the policy became too high after the 1965 war."^{4/}

CW: We have a moral obligation to service with spare parts the military hardware we provided to Pakistan in past years.

To speak of a moral obligation in servicing goods is to ignore the larger moral question of selling arms to a poor country, especially where there is a strong possibility of their being used against another poor country. Unless sales agreements or treaty obligations provide otherwise, the GOP has no legal basis to demand spares. In international issues such as this, rule of the shopkeeper has no place.

All of this is not to deny either the right or practical necessity of Pakistan to maintain an army. In the modern nation-state, armies have become a seeming attribute of sovereignty. Questions of military priorities and arms budgets are for individual governments to decide. Yet our policies should be designed to encourage reduction rather than expansion of military forces. While armies often perform social and developmental functions in developing countries, such is not the case in Pakistan where the constant threat of confrontation with India is uppermost.

^{4/} Barnds, Op. Cit., at 323.

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- 10 -

CW: If we refuse to furnish arms then some other country will.

That may or may not be so. As the scenarios suggest, President Bhutto may not be unhappy with an excuse for curtailing the ambition of his generals. Even a delay in procurement could positively affect the development decisions being made in Pakistan. Pakistan, like most governments, has its development-minded officials as well as its hawks. We need to support the former. But even if Pakistan finds some other source, we avoid being identified with arms which again may wind up on a battlefield with another friendly power.

cc:ARBaron, AD/DP

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(SOSIB)

Enc. B

RELEASE IN PART B6

Analysis of June 28 Note Verbale and Oral Statements
made by Personal Emissaries

The most recent indication of Bongo's lack of interest in maintaining good-faith relations was the behavior of his three "personal emissaries with plenti-potentiary powers" who tried to obtain the export license within 24 hours and when unsuccessful, called upon a Deputy Assistant Secretary in AF and made a number of false statements both orally and in writing. For example:

Roland Bru, the head of the delegation, stated that he was only the advisor to Bongo and knew nothing about airlines or airplanes; yet our files show him as a Director of the Air Transport Company of Gabon. Bru, a Foccart man, is bitterly anti-American.

M. Richon, another member of the delegation, a French Vice President of UTA, denied that UTA has maintained the first DC-8; yet UTA performed an engine change on the plane despite our efforts to prevent spare parts from reaching the DC-8. Richon is also with Foccart.

All three delegates denied any knowledge of the existence of the first DC-8, and responded with silence when asked if the plane was not being used by Affretair. Given the fact that all three Frenchmen are close advisors of Bongo, who has been several times told about the USG's concern about the use of the first DC-8 and who knows it is a factor in our delaying issuance of the license for the second plane, these denials are hardly credible.

The delegation presented a note discussing the history of Bongo's interest in acquiring the second plane (see Tab E). The note's false statements are rebutted below:

p. 2, pgh 2: EXIM did not offer any assurances of a favorable decision, since they have grave doubts about the use of the plane.

p. 2, pgh 5: Ambassador McKesson told Bongo during his visit in April that we had serious problems with the second plane because of the mis-use of the first plane; Bongo was very angry.

- 2.

p. 2, last pgh: we have explicitly stated our reservations, pertaining to mis-use.

p. 3, pgh 1: it was the USG which took the initiative to require documents establishing bona fide use of the second plane.

p. 3, pgh c: Bongo has told us orally that he plans to use the second plane to set up a competing airline, outside UTA.

pg. 3, pgh 2: Bongo did not inform OAU members, only the Secretary General who has no authority to make decisions. Moreover, the letters from the OAU officials simply acknowledge his having informed them of his intent to make the purchase; no approval was given.

pg. 2, last pgh: objections about Gabonese violations of sanctions were raised orally and in writing at the OAU summit.

pg. 4, pgh 1: Gabon's attachment to principles of African solidarity (e.g. support for sanctions) have frequently been shown to be non-existent.

pg. 4, last pgh: The "undoubtedly circumstantial incidents" could better be described as premeditated violation by the GOG of oral and written assurances to the USG concerning use of the first plane.

AF/C



9/24/74

B6

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RELEASE IN PART
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S/P:MACASEY:BDM
EXT. 29716 11-3-77
S/P:LAKE

S/P:CFARRAR

S/P-OF:DSKINNEY

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE MANILA

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: MANILA 17279

FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P-LAKE

AL TL
MAC WAK
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B6

B6

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 2, 1977. MR. CURTIS FARRAR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISSENT CHANNEL REGULATIONS, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL THE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YH

UNCLASSIFIED

file dissent



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

March 21, 1977

Dear [redacted]

B6

This letter is in reply to your dissent channel message of February 25 having to do with U.S. policy concerning participation by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in various international monetary organizations, chiefly the IMF, IBRD and ADB.

It is correct, as you indicate, that U.S. policy in recent months has been to treat as premature SRV participation in international fiscal activities which involve these organizations.

But it also is true that since the advent of the new Administration there has been considerable movement and change of direction with respect to this policy. The U.S. no longer opposes SRV membership in U.N. specialized agencies. It has dropped some restrictions involving shipping to the SRV. Perhaps most important from the point of view of your memorandum, the U.S. no longer will raise objections to loans and programs for the SRV undertaken by the multinational financial institutions such as you mention as long as the normal procedures and technical requirements applicable to any recipient country are met. It is our position that any assistance provided the SRV should be in conformity with the policies and procedures of the organization concerned. Such assistance must meet the particular institution's economic and technical criteria and the SRV must carry out fully its obligations to them. In this connection, we believe that Vietnam's experience with the IMF in coming months will serve as a useful indicator of the extent to which membership in IFI's fosters the liberalization you speak of. Vietnam's record with the IMF also will likely affect its prospects.

[redacted]

ASIA/DCS - Room 3311 D
Agency for International
Development
Washington, D. C. 20520

B6

- 2 -

for eventual project assistance from institutions with similar obligations, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. We are prepared to keep an open mind in regard to Vietnam's relationship with the IMF, but in the interim cannot prejudge our position on the merits of specific projects for which Vietnam may request assistance from other institutions in the future.

While U.S. policy at this writing is not totally contiguous with the proposals which you advance, it seems correct to say that the sense of your suggestions, and the direction U.S. foreign policy is moving on this matter, now essentially are in harmony. I would conclude therefore that the burden of your dissent message largely has been overtaken by events.

We thank you for your letter and appreciate your concern, which is one we all share, that efforts be made to improve and normalize relations between the U.S. and Vietnam.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Director
Policy Planning Staff

Clearances

S/P - Mr. Pike *PP*
EA - Mr. Carroll *RC*
EB/IFD/ODF - Mr. Adams *MC*
OFP - Mr. Boyer *7AD*

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IN FULL

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PAGE 01 STATE 314164 TOSEC 340167
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STATE 314164 TOSEC 340167

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SDPH

SUBJECT: PRESS ITEMS ON TRAVEL IN SINALOA

FOR COVEY FROM OPERATIONS CENTER

FOLLOWING ARE TWO UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL WIRE
STORIES ON TRAVEL IN SINALOA:

1. "DRIVING IN MEXICO BY JUAN WALTE: (FROM WASHINGTON)
"THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION TODAY WARNED AMERICAN
TOURISTS TO AVOID SEVERAL BANDIT-INFESTED HIGHWAYS IN
THE WESTERN MEXICAN STATES OF SINALOA AND BAJA CALIFORNIA.

"THE ASSOCIATION SAID IT WAS TOLD BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S
BUREAU OF SECURITY AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS THAT SINCE MAY,
HIGHWAY BANDITS HAVE MURDERED SEVERAL AMERICANS (INCLUDING
A FATHER AND DAUGHTER ON CHRISTMAS DAY) AND ROBBED AT
LEAST ANOTHER 18.

"THE BANDITS HAVE GENERALLY TAKEN ALL OF THE MOTORISTS'
POSSESSIONS, INCLUDING THEIR VEHICLES," AAA SAID.
"IN A SIMILAR WARNING A WEEK AGO, THE ASSOCIATION
URGED PRESIDENT JOSE LOPEZ PORTILLO TO ELIMINATE HAZARDS

FACING TOURISTS AND OTHERS TRAVELING IN MEXICO.

"SINCE THEN, THE SITUATION HAS GOTTEN WORSE FOR AMERICANS
IN THOSE MEXICAN AREAS ACCORDING TO A STATEMENT RELEASED
TODAY BY AAA.

"MOST OF THE INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED ON HIGHWAY 15, NEAR
THE CITY OF CULIACAN, IN THE NORTHWESTERN STATE OF
SINALOA. IN RECENT DAYS, THE MEXICAN ARMY HAS BEEN
CALLED IN TO STEM A WAVE OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN THAT
AREA.

"AAA, WHICH HAS MORE THAN 18 BILLION MEMBERS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA, QUOTED A STATE DEPARTMENT
SPOKESMAN AS SAYING THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT EVENTUALLY WILL
BE SUCCESSFUL IN CONTROLLING THE SITUATION.

"HOWEVER, IN ALL CANDOR, WE CAN ONLY ADVISE AMERICAN
MOTORISTS THAT FOR THE TIME BEING MOTOR TRAVEL THROUGH OR
IN SINALOA ENTAILS SUBSTANTIAL RISK," THE STATE
DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TOLD AAA. THE
ASSOCIATION ALSO LISTED AS RISKY SOME REMOTE HIGHWAYS
IN BAJA CALIFORNIA." (12/30/76 03:42)

2. (NO BYLINE)--WAZATLAN, MEXICO -- POLICE SAY A PASSING
POLICEMAN FIRED ON THE POSSIBLE KILLERS OF AN ILLINOIS
MINISTER AND HIS DAUGHTER CHRISTMAS DAY AS THREE MEN FLED
THE SCENE OF THE SLAYING.

"IN A REPORT PUBLISHED THURSDAY, SINALOA STATE POLICE
CHIEF ANDRES IBARRA ALBA SAID POLICEMAN MANUEL SARABIA
LEYVA SPOTTED THE PARTIALLY OVERTURNED CAR OF JOHN O.

GHARST, 69, OF EDGEWOOD, ILL., AS HE WAS PASSING ON A BUS.

"THE POLICEMAN JUMPED OFF THE BUS AND SAW AN ARMED MAN
TRYING TO CLIMB INTO A STATION WAGON WITHOUT LICENSE
PLATES, WHICH SPED OFF WITHOUT HIM.

"ARABIA LEYVA FIRED AT THE MAN, BUT MISSED, IBARRA ALBA
REPORTED. THE MAN ESCAPED INTO THE NEARBY UNDERBRUSH.

"INSIDE THE CAR, POLICE FOUND GHARST'S BODY AND THAT OF HIS
43-YEAR OLD DAUGHTER, LORELI GHARST BROWN, SLUMPED ON THE
FRONT SEAT.

"THEY HAD BEEN SHOT IN THE FACE FROM POINT-BLANK RANGE.

"IBARRA SAID NEARLY 100 ARMED POLICEMEN WERE CONTINUING
TO COMB THE WOODED, HILLY AREA FOR THE KILLERS. HOWEVER,
DENSE FOG IMPEDED THE HUNT.

"ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, THE STATION WAGON WAS SEEN IN A
GASOLINE STATION IN THE VILLAGE OF EL PALMITO, ABOUT 80
MILES EAST OF THIS PACIFIC PORT, WHERE GHARST AND HIS
DAUGHTER HAD STOPPED TO REFUEL THEIR RED AND WHITE
COMPACT CAR. THEY APPARENTLY WERE ON THEIR WAY TO
DURANGO FROM WAZATLAN.

"WITNESSES, THE REPORT SAID, SAW THREE LONG-HAIRED YOUTHS
IN THE STATION WAGON, ONE WEARING A US ARMY CAP, FOLLOW
THE GHARST VEHICLE.

"THE SLAYINGS OCCURRED JUST THREE MILES FROM THE GAS
STATION.

"GHARST, A FORMER TEACHER, AND HIS DAUGHTER, A TEACHER IN
THE ARCOLA, ILL., SCHOOL SYSTEM, WERE ON A MOTORING
TOUR OF MEXICO.

"MEANWHILE, THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, QUOTING
THE US STATE DEPARTMENT, THURSDAY WARNED THAT TRAVEL IN
SINALOA INVOLVED "SUBSTANTIAL RISK."

"ACCORDING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, SINCE MAY MORE THAN
18 HIGHWAY ROBBERIES INVOLVING AMERICANS HAVE BEEN
REPORTED IN SINALOA." (12/31/76 06:07)

ROBINSON

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TELEGRAM

PART B6

Department of State

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*Ben -
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[redacted]
dissent file*

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DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [redacted]

B6

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: EAID, BB, XL

SUBJECT: INCREASED STAFFING - RDO/C

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT TELEGRAM ON INCREASED STAFFING. MR. MICHAEL ELY OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED TO COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, COPIES OF YOUR CABLE HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERAMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE DIRECTOR OF AID, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS WHICH YOU HAVE SUBMITTED.
ROBINSON

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S *ML*

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LIMDIS

April 17, 1972

TO : The Secretary

FROM: S/PC - William I. Cargo *WIC*

Dissent: The Soviet Union and Vietnam

In accordance with established procedures, Mr. [redacted], EUR/SOV, has sent me the attached memorandum taking issue with current policy activities with respect to Vietnam in the context of their impact upon the US/Soviet relations. I have sent copies of Mr. Perry's memorandum to Alex Johnson, Marshall Green and Marty Hillenbrand. I believe the message should also be sent to the Chairman of the Open Forum Panel and I ask that you authorize me to do so.

B6

For S/PC, Joe Neubert will undertake to coordinate with EA and EUR an appropriate reply to [redacted]

B6

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to send a copy of [redacted] memorandum to the Chairman of the Open Forum Panel, ~~for such consideration as OFP may choose to give it.~~

B6

*Received
mally to S/S
S/S staff and S/S staff
WIC*

Attachment:

April 17 Dissent Memorandum

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

DISCUSS *WIC*

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Drafted: S/PC: JWN *WIC* Neubert:vc
x20358

Alex Johnson

[redacted] *is a good one. The views he has expressed have been carefully considered. WIC*

B6

TEL: 254-7494



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART B6

July 30, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Redacted]

B6

1800 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20550

Dear Mr. Greenberg:

Thank you for your thoughtful and cogent Dissent Message. It received wide distribution within the Department and many of the issues you raised were given careful consideration in our review of Alliance policy preceding the Versailles and Bonn Summits. It was useful to have your views as these deliberations took place and continues to be so as our Alliance policy evolves still further. Your general points regarding sanctions will be kept in mind as we develop our East-West policies and, certainly, many of your points are congruent with the President's recent decision on exports of energy technology to the USSR.

This having been said, the basic dilemmas you pose will continue to preoccupy members of the Department for some time to come.

Let me share with you the basic assumptions governing the Department's approach to Alliance relationships and East-West issues. First, the US strategic interest in maintaining a strong and effective alliance of free nations transcends both the frustration that we experience and the costs that we bear when Europeans follow political and economic policies that are incongruent with our own. Second, the broad commonality of interests between America and Western Europe -- in deterring Soviet aggression and preserving our democratic and free market economic systems -- is much more important than the various divergencies that arise over specific economic and security issues. Third, the United States cannot successfully "go it alone" -- whether through isolation or unilateralism -- in a hostile and dangerous world. Cooperation among the small fraternity of industrial democracies is more important than ever if America is to ensure its security and achieve its policy objectives in the complex world of the 1980s.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS 3, 7/30/92

-2-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Obviously, as in any alliance, there is a point at which the negative effects of divergent policies overcomes the positive aspect of the alliance itself. If this point of divergence were reached it would not be in our interests to maintain our alliance posture to the degree that we do today. Events of the last months have had an erosive effect on the solidarity and climate for cooperation within the Alliance and some voices in Congress and the public have begun to question the net value of the Alliance for U.S. interests. This having been said, we believe that the interests that unite the U.S. and the Europeans are far greater than the current transitory differences.

As you know very well from your service in Europe, current differences among the Allies are neither a new nor surprising feature of post-war Alliance history. Sixteen nations of differing size, wealth, geography, history, culture and power are bound to see their respective interests through national lenses; indeed, national differences generated two European civil wars earlier in the 20th century. What is truly remarkable about the Atlantic Alliance is not the frequent emergence of national differences, but the degree of Allied solidarity that has been manifest and the consequent peace and prosperity that two generations of Americans and Europeans have enjoyed.

As the President indicated at the Bonn NATO Summit, our ability to deal with diversity is the basic strength of the Alliance and the quality that most sets us apart from the Soviet Union in relation to its satellites. On any given set of issues, Alliance politics require us to weigh the costs and benefits of trying to press for European support. Too heavy-handed a US approach could cause other allies to pursue an even more independent and narrowly self-interested course of action.

That said, however, the benefits of allied collaboration can only be derived if our European partners do, in fact, cooperate. Thirty-seven years after WWII, this does not mean signing on the US dotted-line. Each of our allies has its own national interests and aspirations. But you are quite right in pointing out forcefully that there is room for considerable improvement in Alliance cooperation and that the US should seek greater European support of American policy goals--goals which are in the common interest.

-- NATO's conventional defense posture remains unsatisfactory, despite progress in the LTDP and the recent US/FRG Host-Nation Support Agreement. We regard the Bonn Declaration on Conventional Defense as a mandate for action.

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-3-

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-- Arms control must be pursued in a vigorous and realistic manner and the INF deployment element of the December, 1979 two-track decision must be implemented on schedule, unless the Geneva talks succeed before then.

-- Increased access to Western technology and credits has strengthened Soviet military power. Allied cooperation must be improved in this area. We intend to follow-up the Versailles admonition for greater prudence on East-West credits and the COCOM work limiting technology transfer.

-- European energy relationships with the Soviet Union have been of deep concern to the US, and the President's recent decision should communicate to our allies that we are serious in our concern about energy dependence on the USSR, Soviet access to hard currency and Soviet lack of responsiveness on the issue of repression in Poland.

We need to do better in developing common policies toward the Soviet Union: This will not be easy given differing appraisals of the detente experience of the 1970s and the national interests of the Alliance partners. The President has made clear that we will be focusing on Soviet deeds rather than words in formulating US policies. This will be very important in the area of sanctions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Jaruzelski regime in Warsaw.

In this perspective I believe the Administration is pursuing many of the goals that you advocate so vigorously in your Dissent Message. The major difference between us appears to be over the tactics most likely to achieve these objectives. But these tactical differences are important ones, with significant implications for both allied relations and broader US interests.

You are quite right that "the United States fought two major wars to stop Soviet-backed aggression in the Third World." I also note your point that the allies should not pursue "practices that make similar wars for the United States more likely and costly." The issue is how to gain allied support for US policies after a lengthy period of Soviet military build-up and in the face of Western economic difficulties and memories of earlier US vacillation.

This Administration is seeking to reverse these economic and military trends, at home and overseas. We must recognize that patience and determination are the twin ingredients of a diplomacy that can enlist the support of sometimes uncertain allies. We intend to persevere toward these goals, which

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appear to be consistent with your own. But the vitality of the Alliance, its importance to US interests, and the nature of the Soviet threat prevent me from supporting your pessimistic conclusion that "the United States must radically rethink the place of the alliance in its priorities and what the proper political, economic and public relations posture of the United States toward the Europeans should be, given present trends in Europe and the likely challenges facing the United States in the coming decade."

Trade-offs, whether implicit or explicit, are the very essence of diplomatic relationships, even among allies. But I cannot subscribe to your recommendation that we apply a policy of linkage with respect to the Europeans that, in its most extreme form, would make U.S. support for European defense contingent on European cooperation on economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. First, U.S. troops are in Europe to support our own security objectives, not just those of the Europeans. Second, once we start treating the Europeans like adversaries rather than allies--by applying the harsh forms of linkage that you seem to suggest -- we will have created the conditions for a self-fulfilling prophecy that none of us want to see come to pass.

On some of the specific measure that you suggest, let me respond by saying that:

-- The attention that you call to U.S. versus European contributions to NATO as percentages of G.N.P. must be counter-balanced with an appreciation of what is purchased with the European contribution. The Europeans provide the vast majority of the manpower deployed in the European theater on a regular basis (90% of NATO'S land forces; 80% of its naval forces and 75% of its air force). After 30 days of mobilization, the European allies would still provide 75% of the ground forces, 50% of the air forces, and 30% of the naval forces. The Europeans also provide a substantial part of the equipment, and a significant percentage of the infrastructure of NATO, thereby making a major contribution to the conventional deterrent to Soviet aggression.

-- Imposition of technology controls on exports to Western Europe in order to level greater European cooperation in implementing strategic controls on trade with the Soviet Union is likely not only to exacerbate alliance relationships but also to have a counter-productive, opposite effect in the economic sphere. The Europeans possibly would see it in their interests to attempt to develop their own substitutes for U.S. components

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PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02

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FOR EA/ANP, EA/RA, S/IL, S/P, AND DEPT. OF LABOR

EO 11652: NA
TAGS: ELAB, AS
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SIGNIFICANCE OF AUSTRALIAN ELECTIONS

REF: MELBOURNE 2530

1. REFTEL TRANSMITTED LABOR/POLITICAL OFFICER [REDACTED] S "DISSENT" COMMENTS ON CANBERRA'S REPORT "AUSTRALIAN ELECTION AFTERMATH." GIST OF [REDACTED] COMPLAINT IS THAT HE WAS NOT OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON IT.

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2. EMBASSY WISHES TO DRAW READERS' ATTENTIONS TO THE FACT THAT AUSTRALIA HAS JUST GONE THROUGH A FIVE-WEEK NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN WHICH WAS OVERWHELMINGLY DOMINATED BY LABOR AND ECONOMIC-RELATED ISSUES: THE POWER OF UNIONS, THE IRRESPONSIBILITY OF A SMALL NUMBER OF LEFTIST-ORIENTED UNION LEADERS, THE FRASER GOVERNMENT'S LABOR LEGISLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT, JOB-TRAINING SCHEMES FOR YOUNG WORKERS, THE ROLE OF MIGRANTS IN THE LABOR FORCE, REBATE OF THE "PAYROLL TAX" AS A MEANS OF STIMULATING EMPLOYMENT, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES SUCH AS THE IMPORTS-CAUSED DISPLACEMENT OF AUSTRALIAN WORKERS IN DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES, INFLATION, RE-STRUCTURING THE AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING SECTOR TO MAKE IT MORE COMPETITIVE, AND SO ON. DURING THIS FIVE WEEK CAMPAIGN, THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE REPORT FROM LABOR/POLITICAL ATTACHE [REDACTED], WHO IS RESIDENT IN MELBOURNE. EMBASSY ALSO WISHES TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE CONCURRENT LACK OF A SINGLE REPORT FROM LABATT OUTLINING, ANALYZING, AND COMMENTING UPON THE FRASER GOVERNMENTS RECENT LABOR LEGISLATION, WHICH WAS ENACTED IN THE LATTER PART OF AUGUST, AND WHICH HAD NO SMALL PART IN PROVOKING THE NATIONAL ELECTION IN THE FIRST PLACE.

3. IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF ANY REPORTING FROM THE LABATT DURING THE NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN, WE ARE DISMAYED TO NOW READ HIS PROTEST, ALMOST A FULL WEEK AFTER THE ELECTION, AT NOT HAVING BEEN OFFERED AN "OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT" UPON THE EMBASSY'S POST RPT POST-ELECTION REPORT.

4. FAR FROM SUPPORTING [REDACTED] S WELL-KNOWN VIEW THAT IT IS AN ERROR TO SHIFT THE LOCUS OF LABOR REPORTING FROM MELBOURNE TO CANBERRA, WE FIND BOTH THE ABSENCE OF LABOR/POLITICAL REPORTING DURING THIS ELECTION, AND [REDACTED] S COMPLAINT THAT HE WAS NOT OFFERED AN "OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT" ON CANBERRA'S REPORTING, TO BE PERSUASIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DECISION TO BASE [REDACTED] S SUCCESSOR IN CANBERRA -- WHERE HE WILL BE A FULL PARTICIPATING MEMBER OF THE COUNTRY TEAM.
ALSTON

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Department of State

PAGE 01 STATE 041319
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TO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

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STADIS////////////////////////////////////
DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: EINV, CO

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: PROPOSED OPIC ANDEAN INVESTMENT MISSION
REF: BOGOTA 1639 FOR [] FROM LAKE-S/P
THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ON THE PROPOSED OPIC ANDEAN INVESTMENT MISSION. MICHAEL ELY OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR PAPER HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES FOR ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS AND INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS.
WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED.
VANCE

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PAGE 01 ASUNCI 03645 090414Z
ACTION ~~SA-02~~

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12065; GDS: 8/7/85 [] OR-E
TAGS: SHUM, CU
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND CUBA

JH

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REF: (A) STATE 204763; (B) LAKE TO [] MEMO OF FEBRUARY 8, 1979; (C) [] DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES OF JUNE 5, 1979 AND NOVEMBER 22, 1978.

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPONSE OF AUGUST 6. DESIRED DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS THE SAME AS MY NOVEMBER 22, 1978 MESSAGE. RE PARAGRAPH 6 OF REF A, I ONLY SUGGESTED THAT USG BE "AGGRESSIVE" PROTECTING DUAL NATIONALS IN THE CASE OF ONE WHO WAS BEING TORTURED TO DEATH, WITH THE SUGGESTED ACTION BE THAT WE RAISE THE CASE AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY WITH GOC. WE ARE IN FACT BEING ALLOWED TO SEE ONE DUAL NATIONAL PRISONER AND IN HONEYMOON PERIOD AFTER OPENING OF INTERESTS SECTIONS WHEN CUBANS HOPED FOR FURTHER WARMING WE POSSIBLY COULD HAVE GOTTEN AGREEMTN TO SEE OTHERS.

3. " QUIET, PERSISTENT DIPLOMACY" IS CERTAINLY BEST TACK FOR DEALING WITH COUNTRIES WITH WHOM WE HAVE LITTLE LEVERAGE. ONE WAY TO INCREASE OUR LEVERAGE AND SPEED MOVEMENT OF CUBAN EMIGREES WOULD BE TO OPEN DIRECT COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS ON REGULAR SCHEDULES BETWEEN CUBA AND THE U.S.

4. ON QUESTION OF IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES FOR CUBANS AND OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1985 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU), REF B SAID "L IS NOW LOOKING INTO THE QUESTION OF THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE MOU AS AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION." ARE LEARNED ATTORNEYS OF L/ARA GOING TO GIVE US THE BENEFIT OF A MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN TIME TO DO ANY GOOD OR WILL THEY LET EVENTS TAKE THEIR COURSE AND THEN REACT WITH SAME MIXTURE OF HILARITY AND DISMAY AS THEY DID TO P'S DECISION ON THE DEPOSITS?

5. IT IS HIGHLY SATISFYING THAT ALMOST ALL CUBAN POLITICAL PRISONERS WILL BE FREED BY SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER, BASED ON PAST PERFORMANCE IT WILL TAKE THE USG YEARS BEFORE THEY ARE BROUGHT TO THE U.S. I AM SURE THAT OUR CONSULAR OFFICERS IN HAVANA HAVE GREAT EMPATHY FOR THE PRISONERS ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS. HOWEVER, TIME CONSUMING HAND HOLDING DOES NOT ALLEVIATE NEED FOR SYSTEMATIC PLANNING WITHIN WELL DEFINED POLICY FRAMEWORK COORDINATED WITH OTHER USG AGENCIES SUCH AS INS. USINT HAVANA DID NOT MAKE A SINGLE SUGGESTION AS TO HOW TO MORE RAPIDLY MOVE PERSONS OUT OF CUBA WHILE I WAS ON DESK AND I GATHER THEY STILL HAVE NOT COME UP WITH ANY IDEAS. TOUCHSTONE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF SUGGESTIONS BY INTER-AGENCY TEAM WILL BE SPEED WITH WHICH DUAL NATIONAL FAMILIES ARE REPATRIATED. CASTRO PROMISED TO LET THEM GO OVER A YEAR AGO AND USG HAS FAILED TO REMOVE IMPEDIMENTS TO THEIR TRAVEL SUCH AS CATCH-22 THAT THEY BE REQUIRED TO HAVE EXIT PERMIT IN HAND BEFORE THEY CAN BE FULLY PROCESSED FOR IMMIGRANT VISAS OR PAROLE.
DION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ REB703

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PAGE 01 LUANDA 00441 02 OF 02 221009Z

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R 220000Z APR 78
FM AMEMBENI LUANDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0453

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 LUANDA 0441

DISSENT CHANNEL

9. IF NETO REMAINS IN CONTENTION WITH A ONE-THIRD SLICE OF A POST-INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT, WHICH IN ROBERTO'S VIEW NEITHER MPLA'S POTENTIAL VOTES NOR ITS STILL SECOND PLACE MILITARY STRENGTH ENTITLE IT, FNLA MUST ACCEPT THE REAL POSSIBILITY THAT MPLA'S BETTER ORGANIZATION, MORE COMPETENT CADRE AND - MOST THREATENING - ITS INCREASING MILITARY STRENGTH MAY BRING IT ULTIMATE VICTORY.

10. THEREFORE, IT IS PROBABLE THAT FNLA WILL ACT MILITARILY AS SOON AS ROBERTO REALIZES ELECTIONS ARE TO BE INDEFINITELY POSTPONED, PARTICULARLY IF BY THAT TIME FNLA HAS FINALLY DECIDED THAT THE PORTUGUESE ARMY WILL NOT INTERVENE TO DENY IT A VICTORY. IN THAT REGARD, FNLA'S RECENT ATTACKS ON MPLA SERVED TO TEST PORTUGUESE ARMY INTENTIONS. (SINCE IT IS NOT CLEAR WHO "PROVOKED" FIRST, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT MPLA WAS ATTEMPTING TO GOAD FNLA INTO BATTLE ON THE PRESUMPTION THE PORTUGUESE ARMY WOULD TAKE THE MPLA SIDE.) THE RESULTS WERE ENCOURAGING TO FNLA AND WILL LEND SUPPORT TO THOSE ARGUING FOR AN EARLY MILITARY SOLUTION.

11. THE ABOVE RATIONALE FOR AN FNLA MOVE TO ALL OUT WARFARE IS BASED ON ELECTION "POSTPONEMENT," A STRONG PROSPECT IN VIEW OF BOTH THE REAL LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED AND THE PORTUGUESE HABIT OF VETOING ANYTHING STRONGLY OPPOSED BY MPLA. UNFORTUNATELY THE LOGIC ALSO WORKS IN REVERSE. IF SOMEDAY THERE WERE TO BE ELECTIONS NETO WOULD BE FORCED TO ACT, EITHER MILITARILY OR - AS IS INCREASINGLY THEORIZED - DENOUNCE THE ELECTIONS AS AN "IMPERIALIST TRICK" AND "GO UNDERGROUND."

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PAGE 22 LUANDA 22441 02 OF 02 221059Z

12. IT NOW APPEARS A VIRTUAL CERTAINTY THAT THE PORTUGUESE ARMY HERE WILL NOT INTERVENE TO STOP FALA-MPLA FIGHTING EVEN IF SO ORDERED BY LISBON. WHETHER IT WILL EFFECTIVELY PROTECT WHITE AREAS OF LUANDA IS LESS CLEAR. GIVEN THE RADICALIZED NATURE OF THE PORTUGUESE TROOPS AND APPARENT LACK OF FIRM CONTROL BY THEIR OFFICERS THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR IS PIECEMEAL DEPLOYMENT BY SOME INDIVIDUAL UNITS TO CORDON OFF THE WHITE AREAS, OPEN ACCESS TO THE AIRPORT AND PORT AND PROTECT THEIR OWN INSTALLATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE DANGER TO AMERICANS WILL NOT BE IN PROPORTION TO THE INTENSITY OF THE FIGHTING, IT WILL NONETHELESS BE HIGH ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY OUR ATTEMPTING TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN DEPENDENTS HERE BEFORE SERIOUS FIGHTING BEGINS.

13. THE OPERATIVE HEADS OF SOME AMERICAN COMPANIES CURRENTLY ASSESS THE SITUATION AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, SOME DON'T. MOST IF NOT ALL CONSIDER CIVIL WAR INEVITABLE BUT SOME ERR IN SEEING THE DANGER PERIOD AFTER INDEPENDENCE. SOME US AND OTHER FOREIGN COMPANIES HAVE BEGUN DISORDERED WITHDRAWALS. OTHERS, HOWEVER, SEE THE PROBLEM AS ONE OF MORALE AND HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE THAT WITHOUT FACING THE REAL PROBLEM, DEPENDENT SECURITY. NONE HOWEVER, WOULD balk at a PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWAL OF DEPENDENTS IF THE WORD CAME FROM THEIR HOME OFFICE. ON THE CONTRARY THEY WOULD BE RELIEVED TO HAVE THE DECISION TAKEN OUT OF THEIR HANDS. IF DEPENDENTS ARE WITHDRAWN THE WAR WON'T FOLLOW, THE LOSS IN MORALE AND FINANCIAL TERMS WILL BE SLIGHT COMPARED TO THE PROBABLE CASE. UNLESS IF SUSTAINED FIGHTING OCCURS BEFORE THE DEPENDENTS LEAVE. THE DANGER, RELATIVELY SLIGHT NOW, WILL INCREASE SHARPLY AS INDEPENDENCE APPROACHES. THE INTERVAL GIVES US A CHANCE TO TRY TO ENGINEER A LITTLE NOTICED REMOVAL WHICH STANDS A GOOD CHANCE OF SAVING AMERICAN LIVES.

KILLGREN

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PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02

MELBOU 02555 160532Z

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R 160345Z DEC 77
FM AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4191
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E O 11652 NA
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN AUSTRALIA-
PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS

REF: MELBOURNE 1929

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF LABOR/
POLITICAL OFFICER [REDACTED] WHO REQUESTS THAT S/P
DISTRIBUTE
COPIES NOT ONLY TO THOSE LISTED ON PAGE 4 OF THE DEPARTMENT'S
A-307 BUT TO MR. DALE GOOD S/IL AND MR. DONALD HARRIS EA/RA.
SEE REFTEL FOR BACKGROUND.

2. AS I PREPARE TO LEAVE MELBOURNE I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW
FINAL REMARKS ON THE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT SUBJECT OF INDUSTRIAL
UNREST IN AUSTRALIA. THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. DESPITE THE FRASER GOVERNMENT'S KNEE JERK POLICY OF PLACING
THE BLAME FOR INDUSTRIAL UNREST ALMOST ENTIRELY ON COMMUNISTS
AND OTHER IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED OR "IRRESPONSIBLE" OR
"GREEDY" ELEMENTS, THERE IS NO QUESTION WHATSOEVER IN MY MIND THAT
THE PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ISSUES IN AUSTRALIA AT THE PRESENT
TIME (EXCEPTING THE VERY SPECIAL URANIUM ISSUE) ARE ISSUES WHICH
WE IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD PLACE SQUARELY IN THE "BREAD
AND BUTTER" CATEGORY I. E. ISSUES BORN OF LEGITIMATE
DISSATISFACTION WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC
PIE IS BEING CUT UP AND APPORTIONED.

B. IN MY OPINION WE MAKE A VERY SERIOUS MISTAKE IN JUDGEMENT
WHENEVER WE JOIN THE EMPLOYERS AND THE NEWSPAPERS IN APPLAUDING
THE SIMPLE-MINDED AND SHORT-SIGHTED PRACTICE OF INVARIABLY BLAMING
THE SQUEAKING WHEEL FOR THE FACT THAT IT NEEDS OIL.

C. JUDGING IN PART FROM THE FRASER GOVERNMENT'S CRUELY PARTISAN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS PERFORMANCE DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS AND
IN PART FROM ITS PROBABLE ASSUMPTION THAT ITS RECENT ELECTORAL
VICTORY CONSTITUTED A VINDICATION OF THIS PERFORMANCE, I DOUBT
VERY MUCH THAT IT HAS WHAT IT WILL TAKE IN TERMS OF BASIC
SENSITIVITY OR THE ABILITY TO PERCEIVE THAT THERE ARE ALWAYS AT
LEAST TWO SIDES TO EVERY QUESTION TO MOVE SIGNIFICANTLY AWAY
FROM INDUSTRIAL CONFRONTATION AND TOWARD CONCILIATION AND CONSULTATION
DURING THE NEXT THREE YEARS.

D. UNFORTUNATELY, IF GOVERNMENT "UNION BASHING" WHICH HAS ALREADY
PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN PRODUCING AND EXACERBATING INDUSTRIAL
UNREST IN AUSTRALIA CONTINUES TO PLAY THE SAME ROLE DURING THE
NEXT THREE YEARS, THE PRINCIPAL BENEFICIARIES WILL CONTINUE
TO BE THE MORE MILITANT ELEMENTS WITHIN THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT
WHO THRIVE ON HARD LINE GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES AND POLICIES.

3. GIVEN THE FOREGOING I BELIEVE THAT ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRASER GOVERNMENT'S RECENT ELECTORAL VICTORY
WILL BE AN INDEFINITE CONTINUATION OF SERIOUS INDUSTRIAL
CONFRONTATION AND DISRUPTION.
BRAND

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE
IN PART B6

March 23, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO : AID/ASIA/PT -

FROM : S/P - Anthony *Ma*

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Message: Normalization of Relations with Vietnam -- Steps Along the Way

B6

This will acknowledge the receipt of your dissent paper on normalization of relations with Vietnam. Douglas Pike of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your paper has been circulated to the Offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and the Chairman of the Open Forum, in addition to the Assistant Secretaries for East Asian Affairs and Economic and Business Affairs and the Director of AID. We commend your use of the dissent channel and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

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November 27, 1978

TO: ARA/CCA -

FROM: S/P - Anthony Lake

SUBJECT: Your DISSENT CHANNEL Message Entitled
"The State Department and Human Rights
in Cuba"

B6

This will acknowledge receipt of your Dissent Channel message on the above topic. I have asked Richard Feinberg of the Policy Planning Staff to coordinate a substantive response to the issues you have raised. In accordance with your express wishes and stipulated distribution procedures, a copy of your message has been circulated to the Office of the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Executive Secretary of the Department, the Chairman of the Secretary's Open Forum, the Legal Adviser, the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, and the Director General of the Foreign Service. I strongly commend your use of the Dissent Channel and assure you that we will respond as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

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PAGE 01 MELBOU 02559 190218Z
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FM AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4193
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

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DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR EA/ANP, EA/RA, S/IL, S/P AND INR

E O 11652 N A

SUBJ: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SIGNIFIANCE OF AUSTRALIAN ELECTIONS

REF CANBERRA 8796

1. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (SECOND EDITION)
UNABRIDGED SAYS "DECIMATE" MEANS "1. TO TAKE THE TENTH PART OF.
2. TO SELECT BY LOT AND PUNISH WITH DEATH EVERY TENTH MAN
OF; AS TO DECIMATE A REGIMENT FOR MUNITY,. 3. TO DESTROY A
CONSIDERABLE PART OF; AS TO DECIMATE AN ARMY IN BATTLE; TO
DECIMATE A PEOPLE BY DISEASE."

2. EVEN CANBERRA 8796 DOES NOT ARGUE THAT THIS IS WHAT
HAPPENED TO THE ALP IN THE RECENT ELECTIONS.

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PAGE 01 LUANDA 00566 130222Z

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FM AMCONSUL LUANDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3549

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DISSENT CHANNEL??

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR AO
SUBJECT: MPLA AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA

REF: LUANDA A-20

1. THIS IS THE FIRST OF A THREE PART DISSENT FROM PORTIONS OF LUANDA'S ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT. THE DISSENTING OFFICER IS [REDACTED] IN THIS CASE A SUBSTANTIVE ANSWER DOES NOT APPEAR NECESSARY, HOWEVER THE DRAFTING OFFICER REQUESTS THAT THIS TELEGRAM BE MADE AVAILABLE TO DEPARTMENT OFFICERS WHO MUST DEVELOP ANGOLAN POLICY OPTIONS. (THE PROVISIONS OF 11 FAM 243 WERE NOT UTILIZED BECAUSE THE POLICY ASSESSMENT WAS NOT OPENED FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY OTHER OFFICERS PRIOR TO BEING SENT.)

B6

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR ANGOLA (REFAIR, P 5) STATES THAT "MPLA MUST NOT BE GROUND OUT OF EXISTENCE BY ARMED MIGHT (AND BECOME) AN ILLEGAL ORGANIZATION THAT WILL DISRUPT THE COUNTRY FOR YEARS TO COME." THE ASSESSMENT HOLDS OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MPLA REPLACING ITS PRESENT MARXIST LEADER, AGOSTINHO NETO, WITH ANOTHER MORE REASONABLE FIGURE WHO COULD LEAD THE PARTY "PEACEFULLY TO INDEPENDENCE." IN THE DRAFTING OFFICER'S OPINION, FAR FROM BEING HELPFUL TO OUR INTERESTS (OR THOSE OF ANGOLA) THE SURVIVAL OF MPLA, WHETHER LED BY NETO OR ANY OTHER REALISTIC POSSIBILITY, WILL ELIMINATE ANY CHANCE OF EVEN PARTIALLY ACHIEVING ANY OF OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES. END SUMMARY.

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PAGE 02 LUANDA 00500 130022Z

3. MPLA AND U.S. INTERESTS. MPLA PRESIDENT AGOSTINHO NETO IS A MARXIST AND - MORE IMPORTANT - IMPLACABLY AND EMOTIONALLY HOSTILE TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES. MPLA DOMINANCE HERE WOULD RESULT IN THE PROMPT AND UNCOMPENSATED NATIONALIZATION OF U.S. INVESTMENTS AND MOST LIKELY WOULD PRESENT THE SOVIETS WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACQUIRE A WEST AFRICAN FOOTHOLD. NETO HAS MOLDED MPLA IN ITS OWN IMAGE, DRIVING OUT AND OCCASIONALLY KILLING THOSE WHO DISAGREE. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NO HARD EVIDENCE THAT HIS SUBORDINATES SERIOUSLY FAULT EITHER HIS IDEOLOGY OR STRATEGY, NOR THAT ANY LEADERSHIP CHANGES ARE IMMINENT. (RECENT POST REPORTING, INCLUDING PAGE 5 OF THE ASSESSMENT, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT NETO WILL BE REPLACED SEEMS ENTIRELY BASED ON THE WISHFUL THINKING OF THE MPLA'S ANDRADE FACTION (ACTIVE REVOLT) DISSIDENTS, THEMSELVES LONG AGO EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY BY NETO. NETO APPEARS TO HAVE FIRM CONTROL OVER MPLA'S ARMY, PRESENTLY THE ONLY RELEVANT POWER BASE IN THE PARTY.

4. CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA OR COALITION? THE POSSIBILITIES HERE ARE NOW A) PRE-INDEPENDENCE CIVIL WAR RESULTING IN AT LEAST A TEMPORARILY FRAGMENTED ANGOLA WITH MPLA HOLDING LUANDA AND A CORRIDOR RUNNING EAST FROM THE CITY, OR B) NO CIVIL WAR UNTIL SOMETIME AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND MPLA SURVIVING AS AN EQUAL PARTNER IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE COALITION GOVERNMENT. IF THERE'S PROMPT CIVIL WAR AND PARTITION, FNLA AND UNITA FORCES SHOULD, GIVEN ENOUGH TIME, BE ABLE TO GRADUALLY REDUCE MPLA'S AREA AND ULTIMATELY DEFEAT IT INSIDE LUANDA. (IN THE INTERVAL U.S. INVESTMENT, LOCATED OUTSIDE THE AREA MPLA WILL INITIALLY CONTROL, WILL NOT BE VULNERABLE TO MPLA NATIONALIZATION.) HOWEVER, IF INSTEAD OF AN EARLY CIVIL WAR, MPLA SURVIVES AND LATER SUCCEEDS IN CONTROLLING ANGOLA, U.S. INTERESTS WILL BECOME UNPROTECTABLE.

5. MPLA STRATEGY. UNLIKE ITS TWO RIVALS MPLA LACKS A LARGE, UNCONQUERABLE GEOGRAPHIC BASE. (BY CONTRAST IT REMAINS UNLIKELY FNLA CAN BE DISLODGED FROM THE NORTH, NOR THAT UNITA CAN BE IN THE SQRH.) ALTHOUGH MPLA CANNOT CONTROL ANGOLA MILITARILY, IT COULD - AS A LAST RESORT - TAKE AND HOLD LUANDA AS WELL AS A SWATH OF COUNTRYSIDE APPROXIMATELY 50-100 MILES WIDE EXTENDING FROM LUANDA TO MALANGE AND PERHAPS BEYOND. (THIS WOULD NOT ENCOMPASS ENOUGH LAND TO FEED LUANDA.) THAT, HOWEVER, IS A DESPERATION OPTION, NOT A FIRST CHOICE NOR A

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PAGE 03 LUANDA 00500 130602Z

LIKELY PATH TO POWER. MPLA'S PREFERRED STRATEGY IS TO RETAIN ITS POLITICAL BASE THROUGH INCLUSION IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT AND BUILD FROM THERE TOWARD ULTIMATE TOTAL POLITICAL CONTROL. UNFORTUNATELY FOR THE U.S. ONCE IN A COALITION AND IF THEREBY SAFE FROM FNLA MILITARY ATTACK, MPLA'S SUPERIOR ORGANIZATION, MORE FOCUSED RUTHLESSNESS AND BETTER CADRE GIVE IT AN EXCELLENT CHANCE OF PREVAILING IN A LONG DRAWN OUT POLITICAL MILITARY POWER STRUGGLE.

6. MPLA'S GROWING MILITARY STRENGTH, THE PRECEDING ARGUMENT THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CIVIL WAR MPLA CAN ONLY HOLD LUANDA AN EASTWARD CORRIDOR IS BASED ON A SIGNIFICANT RECENT CHANGE IN THE ASSESSMENT OF ITS MILITARY STRENGTH. PRIOR TO THE LAST ROUND OF URBAN FIGHTING IT APPEARED THAT FNLA COULD WIN A SHOWDOWN IN LUANDA. THAT NOW SEEMS UNLIKELY. CONTINUED RELATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN MPLA'S MILITARY POWER COULD, IF FNLA DOESN'T FORCE THE ISSUE BEFORE THE CRITICAL POINT IN TIME, RESULT IN AN MPLA VICTORY COUNTRY-WIDE.

7. U.S. ACTION. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION THE DRAFTING OFFICER FEELS THAT AT A MINIMUM, THE U.S. SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION DESIGNED TO PROTECT MPLA FROM ITS ENEMIES. ANY SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO DISUADE FNLA FROM AN ATTACK ON MPLA WOULD BE FUTILE AS WELL AS NOT IN OUR OWN INTERESTS. FINALLY, LEAVING OUR INTERESTS ASIDE, WE SHOULD NOT THINK THAT RESTRAINING FNLA WOULD BE A HUMANITARIAN ACT. AN ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR IS INEVITABLE. THE LONGER IT IS POSPONED THE GREATER WILL BE THE COST IN LIVES AND THE LESS CHANCE OF IT BRINGING TO POWER A GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH WE CAN REASONABLY DEAL.

KILLORAN

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

RELEASE IN PART
 B6

March 14, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: S/P, Mr. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff.

FROM: ASIA/PT, [redacted] *Am*
 A.I.D.

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: Normalization of
 Relations with Vietnam -- Steps Along the Way

1. This memorandum presents a dissent channel viewpoint of [redacted] Director of Office of Philippines and Thailand Affairs, Asia Bureau, A.I.D. In addition to normal distribution to policy planning staff, I desire distribution to officers in the EA and EB Bureaus in State who deal with the subject matter. I intend to arrange for distribution within the Asia and PPC Bureaus of A.I.D.

2. I wish to associate myself with the dissent channel message dated February 15, 1977 on "US Policy towards the IMF, IBRD and ADB in Vietnam," by [redacted], Asia/DCS, A.I.D. [redacted] presents a convincing case for encouraging, rather than resisting, economic relationships between the SRV and the international financial institutions. Such contacts, he argues, will foster SRV "tendencies to pragmatism and openness." Certainly, if normalization is our ultimate goal (as I think it should be), those Vietnamese tendencies are worth cultivating. In a fast-changing and interdependent world it makes good sense for the United States not only to overcome the emotionalism and bitterness of past conflict but actually to promote Indochinese participation in the community of nations.

3. Supporting an SRV stake in the IFIs is a desirable step toward normalization. Amending our aid and PL 480 legislation is another. In the first instance, we should seek removal of all legislative constraints on other country trade and aid to Vietnam (in particular those contained in Section 620 (n) of the FAA and Section 103 (d) of PL 480). In

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current policy terms, both of these wartime provisions are essentially obsolete and should be repealed. Additionally, we should begin now to seek removal of the legislative prohibitions on aid to Vietnam. (In particular, Section 108 of the FY 77 Appropriation Act). Depending upon progress of the current U.S. delegation on MIA issues, bilateral assistance may be a distant possibility. Nevertheless an attempt now to seek repeal of the legislative prohibition would provide an opportunity for developing Congressional and public support for normalization. Prohibitions on aid were enacted in the immediate aftermath of the American withdrawal from Vietnam. If we are to begin healing the wounds of war we need to remove the constraints to that process.

A/PT: :mem
03/15/77

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DISSENT CHANNEL TO FROM LAKE

INITIALS
PHK
DR: JET

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SHUM, CU

SUBJECT: DISSENT MEMORANDUM OF JUNE 5 -

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT MEMORANDUM ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA. WE SENT COPIES OF YOUR MEMO TO HA, L AND CA PER YOUR REQUEST, AND, IN KEEPING WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S REGULATIONS ON DISSENT MESSAGES, THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER AMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE CUBA DESK, THE DIRECTOR OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF. RICHARD FEINBERG A MEMBER OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF WILL COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY...I AGREE TO COMMEND THEIR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. 44

Chambers

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2743

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJ: IAF OPERATIONS

1. SINCE 1973, THE INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION HAS PROVIDED SLIGHTLY LESS THAN \$500,000 IN GRANTS TO NINE ORGANIZATIONS OR PERSONS IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN WHO ARE ACTIVELY OPPOSED TO UNITED STATES REGIONAL INTERESTS. THE RECIPIENTS WERE:

- CARIBBEAN CONTACT (\$193,000)
- YORUBA (\$72,000)
- CADEC (\$180,000)
- CASTLE BRUCE (\$7,995)
- ANTIGUA CO-OP FARM (\$56,295)
- E. ANTIGUA CO-OP (\$75,273)
- CASTLE BRUCE (\$67,000)
- A. MARTIN (\$17,000)
- ALLIQUAGANA COMMUNE (\$3,000)

2. EVEN IF THE PRINCIPAL RATIONALE BEHIND THE CREATION OF THE IAF--THE DEPOLITIZATION OF A PORTION OF US AID -- IS ACCEPTED AS CORRECT, IT IS UNCLEAR TO THE DRAFTING OFFICER WHY A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF OUR ASSISTANCE TO THE AREA HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES WORKING AGAINST OUR REGIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GOALS. IAF GRANTEES TO DATE INCLUDE A CONSISTENTLY ANTI-US NEWSPAPER (CARIBBEAN CONTACT), AND INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS ATTEMPTED TO PURCHASE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FROM US MILITARY PERSONNEL (ROBERT CLARKE) AND AN ANTIGUAN PRO-CUBAN RADICAL (TIM HECTOR) WHO IS CONSIDERED BY THE ANTIGUAN AUTHORITIES TO BE OPERATING UNDER CUBAN DIRECTION. (THEY DON'T CONSIDER HECTOR IN THE PAY OF THE CUBANS SIMPLY BECAUSE GIVEN THE SIZE OF HIS IAF GRANT AND THE SMALL SIZE OF ANTIGUA, CUBAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY.) AMONG OTHER THINGS HECTOR ADVOCATES THE EJECTION OF THE US NAVAL FACILITY FROM ANTIGUA.

3. WHILE THERE MAY BE NOTHING WRONG PER SE WITH USG SUPPORT FOR GROUPS ADVOCATING NON-TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS TO LOCAL PROBLEMS, IT IS NOT AT ALL OBYIOUS WHY WE ARE FINANCIALLY SUPPORTING INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS ACTIVELY HOSTILE TO OUR OWN REGIONAL INTERESTS. CLEARLY SUCH SUPPORT IS AT THE LEAST HIGHLY CONFUSING TO THE STILL MODERATE, DEMOCRATIC AND PRO-US LEADERSHIP OF THE AREA'S SOON-TO-BE-INDEPENDENT SMALL ISLANDS. (IRONICALLY, IAF GRANTS HAVE, TO SOME EXTENT, UNDERMINED THE RADICAL CREDENTIALS OF THE RECIPIENTS WHO ARE OFTEN CONSIDERED BY THEIR RADICAL BROTHEREN AS HAVING BEEN COOPTED BY THE DEVIUS ORGANS OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM. A LOCAL RADICAL ONCE TOLD A US OFFICIAL THAT CADEC IS SOMETIMES CONSIDERED A "CIA FRONT".)

4. WE UNDERSTAND THERE IS A DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON THE IAF BOARD. IT WOULD THEREFORE APPEAR PRUDENT FOR AFFECTED EMBASSIES TO RECEIVE IN THE FUTURE THE NAMES OF POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS PRIOR TO THEIR FINAL SELECTION. THIS WOULD AFFORD POSTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON PROJECTED GRANTEES AND SUBSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE DEPARTMENT REP

OR THE BOARD TO VOTE IN A MORE INFORMED MANNER. AS IT STANDS NOW THE EMBASSIES INFORMATION ON IAF PROJECTS IS BOTH EXTREMELY SCANTY AND AFTER THE FACT.

5. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHAT, IF ANY, RESTRICTIONS IAF'S MANDATE IMPOSES ON AID TO PERSONS AND GROUPS HOSTILE TO THE US. FURTHER, DO IAF PROCEDURES REQUIRE AUDITING GRANTEES' ACTIVITIES TO AT LEAST ENSURE THAT FOUNDATION FUNDS ARE USED FOR STATED PURPOSES AND IF SO, HAVE THE RECIPIENTS CITED IN PARA ONE BEEN SO AUDITED? THE MORE BASIC QUESTIONS REMAIN, HOWEVER: FIRST, WHAT CAN BE THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE IAF'S PAST ACTIONS AND SECOND, DOES THE FOUNDATION INTEND TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING THESE TYPES OF RECIPIENTS.

6. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE AT LEAST THREE EMBASSIES IN THIS AREA HAVE (INFORMALLY VOICED SIMILAR SERIOUS OBJECTIONS TO IAF'S CHOICE OF GRANTEES. IN PREPARING AN ANSWER TO THIS MESSAGE IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO RETRIEVE THOSE COMMUNICATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON OTHER UNSUITABLE RECIPIENTS OF IAF FUNDS.
SIMMS

B6

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

March 27, 1978

Dear [redacted]:

B6

This letter is in response to your dissent channel message concerning decontrol and release of Limited Official Use and unclassified material.

As you are aware, 5 FAM 952.1 describes the proper basis for the marking of any document Limited Official Use. "Certain official information and material which is not national security information and, therefore, cannot be classified, is nonetheless protected by law against disclosure." Several laws provide the basis for this protection. One main source of law to protect information against disclosure is the Privacy Act; thus the Biographic Register and personnel records are properly designated Limited Official Use. Another is found in Congressional legislation that protects trade secrets and various other information against unwarranted disclosure. The Freedom of Information Act recognizes several categories of information which can be withheld from public disclosure. This is not to say, of course, that all information which can be withheld should be designated LOU. According to the Foreign Affairs Manual, unless there is a legal requirement to protect information for reasons other than national security, it cannot properly be marked Limited Official Use.

There is absolutely no question but that the majority of documents marked Limited Official Use have not been designated on the basis of specific legal requirements.

Mr. [redacted]
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State.

B6

-2-

However, LOU remains a valuable designation because it affords a degree of protection to sensitive information which is not classified.

The classification system itself has been under review through the process of a Presidential Review Memorandum. This review will result in a new Executive Order on classification of national security information. The text of this order should be issued some time this Spring. The order generally defines more clearly and makes more restrictive the use of classification designations, and will make clear that other designations, such as "Limited Official Use" are not to be used to protect national security information.


While Limited Official Use is not a national security designation and therefore not a subject of the new Executive Order, it would be helpful if, at the time the State Department issues its implementing regulations and instructions to deal with the new Executive Order, the proper use of Limited Official Use is brought to the attention of classifying officers. In particular, it should be made clear that this designation should be used only when a specified legal or regulatory basis exists. Officers should also be aware that national security information should be classified as provided for in the new Executive Order. The regulations governing handling and storage of LOU material will also be reviewed at that time.

Your second question concerned the release of unclassified material. As you are aware Congress has provided in the Freedom of Information Act for standards and procedures to be used in releasing government material upon request. In response to this Congressional mandate, the Department drew up regulations to implement the law. The basic point in practice is that the proposed release should be authorized by the office that has the responsibility for the record in question. I am enclosing a copy of these regulations which answer your specific questions on FOIA procedures. If you have any particular complaints about the manner in which the Department responded to the request to release the reporting cable you spoke of, these regulations provide for an appeal of an initial denial.

-3-

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Classification Policy, Assistant Secretary Hodding Carter, so that your concerns about the improper use of the designation Limited Official Use can be dealt with in the process of updating State Department regulations to implement the new Executive Order on classification policy.

Sincerely yours,



Paul H. Kreisberg, Acting
Director, Policy Planning Staff

Enclosure:

As stated

*Cleared PA - Blair
L - J Smith*



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RELEASE IN PART
B6

June 13, 1972

Director
Planning and Coordination
Room 7246
Department of State

Dear Sir:

You have recently been involved in a decision concerning employees who have married foreign nationals. The particular case I am concerned with involves a [redacted] [redacted] a communications and records assistant on my staff here in Guatemala. Your reply, State 103836, to a dissent cable sent by [redacted] was received by the subject employee and myself with considerable disappointment. I am therefore writing you this informal letter at my own initiative and without the knowledge of [redacted] since there remains in my own mind the question of whether the Department has addressed itself fully to the point of dissent originally expressed by [redacted] in his cable.

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I first wish to say that both [redacted] and myself fully support the Department's efforts to uphold uniform applicability of 3FAM629 and in no way expect an exception in the application of this policy as it affects [redacted]. We do, however, expect the Department to apply it's policy to only those persons which should be affected by 3FAM629. And this seems to be our point of difference. The Department appears to be interpreting 3FAM629.1-1b to read that "an employee assigned abroad who marries an alien will be transferred as quickly as feasible to the U.S.". However, this sentence continues to read "in order to provide the spouse an opportunity to become better acquainted with life in the U.S. and to acquire citizenship". Now, the wording of this sentence as it appears in 3FAM629 is obviously intended to benefit the spouse and is not intended to penalize the employee for marrying a foreign national. And in most instances this will be the case since most alien spouses are not naturalized in such a brief time span as was [redacted] and therefore would normally expect to return to the U.S. to accomplish this naturalization process. As you know, however, [redacted] is a naturalized citizen and well acquainted with the U.S. as pointed out in Mr. [redacted]'s cable to you. Additionally, Ambassador Bowdler has made a personal appeal while on consultation in the Department as well as having written a letter in which he

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- 2 -

expressed his view that [] does not need "Americanization". The Deputy Chief of Mission was not even aware that [] was a naturalized citizen until this matter was brought to his attention recently. The Mission in general has also expressed its opinion in an official cable that [] does not need "Americanization". It therefore seems to me that the Ambassador, the DCM and other officials of this Mission who have worked or known [] for nearly two years are in a better position to determine whether [] requires "Americanization" than the Department who is not at all acquainted with []

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In closing, I would like to ask you once again to take a very close look at the wording of 3FAM629 to be certain that the Department is absolutely satisfied with its interpretation of the alien policy as it applies to []. While I recognize your belief that a regular Departmental assignment is the best method of exposing a foreign-born spouse to the U.S., it, of course, is not the only method of exposure that can be affective.

B6

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I thank you for your time and patience in discussing this matter. I would sincerely appreciate an early reply and hopefully a reconsideration of your earlier decision to assign [] to Washington in the pouch room.

B6

Sincerely yours,

[]

B6

Guatemala City

RELEASE IN PART
B6



UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
MISSION TO PAKISTAN

*Rec'd
S/PC 3/26/73*

*T
↓
for Arch*

Cable: USAIDPAK

HEADQUARTERS OFFICE
ISLAMABAD

March 21, 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. William I. Cargo
Director of Planning and Coordination
Room 7246
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Cargo:

In accordance with the procedure cited in the May 1972 Department of State Newsletter, I wish to record my dissent from the recently announced United States' decision to resume arms sales to Pakistan.

I understand that U. S. policy now permits arms sales which fall in any of the following three categories:

- Lethal items contracted for under the 1970 "one-time exception," but not yet delivered;
- Spare parts for lethal items previously furnished by the United States; and
- Non-lethal new items.

In my view, the lifting of the arms embargo seriously threatens the stability of the subcontinent, impairs U. S. credibility as a peacemaker, diminishes Pakistan's economic development, and jeopardizes our relations with both India and Bangladesh. My analysis appears in a memorandum dated December 7, 1972 on "Resumption of American Military Supplies to Pakistan" (copy attached herewith).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By *William G. Wolfer*
Subject to General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Automatically downgraded at two

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. William I. Cargo

Page 2

Supplementing that memorandum, I would further argue as follows:

I. The "Lethal-Non-Lethal" Distinction Is Spurious

In addition to the semantic problem of defining "non-lethal" end-use items, there is another difficulty which is often ignored. This is the fact that non-lethal items usually require lethal complements. Unarmed jeeps carry armed soldiers; airplane engines power planes which bomb and strafe. Therefore, an arms purveyor whose sales make possible a larger or more destructive military force cannot escape responsibility for the destruction which that force may unleash.

II. It Is Practically Impossible For The United States To Ensure That Its Military Supplies Will Not Be Used Against Other Friendly Nations Or Against The Recipient's Own People.

Regardless of restrictions which the U. S. may place on the use of items furnished, recent history has shown that the arming of two hostile allies leads to the use of these weapons against each other. We should avoid being identified with arms and equipment which again may wind up on a battlefield with another friendly power.

III. In The Militarily Competitive Atmosphere Of The Subcontinent, It Is Unrealistic to Expect That A Renewed Sales Program Will Not Contribute To An "Arms Race."

The U. S. Government has taken the laudable position that it does not intend to contribute to an "arms race." But our intentions may be irrelevant in the face of actual arms deliveries. I am told that the 300 armed personnel carriers supplied under the decision will create a positive imbalance in Pakistan's favor. Who is to say that the Indian military will not feel compelled to regain their advantage? Certainly, our intention to avoid an arms race could be implemented more effectively by a retention of the embargo.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. William I. Cargo

Page 3


IV. In A Poor Country Like Pakistan, Military Purchases Compete With Economic Development Programs. Hence The Resumption Of Military Sales Tends To Thwart Our Aid Objectives.

Pakistan is a country of scarce resources. More "guns" means less "butter." The expenditure of \$14 million for military supplies deprives the Pakistani people of an equal sum for development programs. The new supplies and spare parts will doubtless require heavy local cost commitments by the Government of Pakistan. Military expenditures set into motion their own multiplier effect.

Pakistan's overwhelming debt service problem is another reason to discourage military spending, which draws down foreign exchange. Moreover, the diversion of resources to the military is likely to have an adverse effect on Pakistan's ability to attract development aid. Given the fungibility of foreign exchange, the military sales authorized constitute an effective deduction from our current level of commodity assistance (\$60 million in FY 73).

On the basis of the foregoing, I respectfully dissent from the decision to lift the embargo and recommend that the U. S. arms policy for Pakistan be reconsidered in the near future.

Sincerely yours,



Regional Legal Advisor

B6

Attachment: a/s

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RELEASE IN
PART B6

ACTION
COPY

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM
8391

PAGE 01 ASUNCI 02860 241955Z

ACTION SP-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6395

(file)

Done
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DISSENT CHANNEL////////////////////

FROM [] TO LAKE

B6

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SHUM, CU

SUBJECT: DISSENT MEMORANDUM OF JUNE 5 - []

B6

REF: STATE 158832

1. THANK YOU FOR REFTEL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. PER DISTRIBUTION OF
NOVEMBER 9 MEMO WOULD ALSO LIKE JUNE 5 MEMO SENT TO M. M/DG AND
H, AS WELL AS AMBASSADOR DICK CLARK.
WHITE

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4/14/77
~~March 29, 1977~~
dissent file
RELEASE IN
PART B6

Dear [REDACTED]

This letter is a reply to your memorandum of March 14, in the dissent channel, in which you associate yourself with the earlier dissent of [REDACTED] concerning participation by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in various international monetary organizations.

As we noted in a letter to [REDACTED], since the advent of the new Administration there has been considerable movement and change of direction with respect to this policy. The U.S. no longer opposes SRV membership in U.N. specialized agencies. It has dropped some restrictions involving shipping to the SRV. Perhaps most important from the point of view of your memorandum, the U.S. no longer will raise objections to loans and programs for the SRV undertaken by the multinational financial institutions such as you mention as long as the normal procedures and technical requirements applicable to any recipient country are met. It is our position that any assistance provided the SRV should be in conformity with the policies and procedures of the organization concerned. Such assistance must meet the particular institution's economic and technical criteria and the SRV must carry out fully its obligations to them. In this connection, we believe that Vietnam's experience with the IMF in coming months will serve as a useful indicator of the extent to which membership in IFI's fosters the liberalization you speak of. Vietnam's record with the IMF also will likely affect its prospect for eventual project assistance from institutions with

[REDACTED]
ASIA/PT - Room 6668
Department of State
Agency for International
Development
Washington, D. C. 20523

similar obligations, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. We are prepared to keep an open mind in regard to Vietnam's relationship with the IMF, but in the interim cannot prejudge our position on the merits of specific projects for which Vietnam may request assistance from other institutions in the future.

As perhaps you are aware, the US-Vietnamese relationship is now in a moment of flux and transition. We have agreed to meet the Vietnamese in substantive negotiations and probably these sessions will begin in the near future. It is too soon to know what exactly will be our policy on various issues, including existing legislative provisions, since so much depends on the Vietnamese negotiating strategy. But certainly it is safe to say the sense of the suggestions on economic relations made by Mr. Lewis and yourself, and the anticipated direction of U. S. foreign policy in this respect, are now essentially in harmony.

We thank you for your letter and appreciate your concern, which is one we all share, that efforts be made to improve and normalize relations between the U. S. and Vietnam.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Director
Policy Planning Staff

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO
ORIGIN **SP-92**
INFO OCT-21 7003 R

RELEASE IN
PART B6

66616
DRAFTED BY S/P-OPPIRFSMITH
APPROVED BY S/P:SWLEWIS
DIST: S/P DISTRIBUTION ONLY

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R 111938Z JUN 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 136379

DISSENT CHANNEL

FOLLOWING REPEAT BANGKOK 10630 ACTION SECSTATE DATED 11 JUN 75
QUOTET

~~SECRET~~ BANGKOK 10630

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: G08
TAGS: APER DISSENT
SUBJ: DISSENT MESSAGE

THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED]

REF: A. VIENTIANE 4138
B. STATE 133376
C. VIENTIANE 3943

1. SITUATION IN LAOS CLEARLY INDICATES NEED FOR NEW APPROACH.
2. U.S. TEAM IN VIENTIANE UNABLE NEGOTIATE ON REASONABLE BASIS BECAUSE PER REF. C THEY ARE AND HAVE BEEN IN POSITION OF HOSTAGES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 136379

3. REF A PARAS 2F AND 3 INDICATE THAT PCNU DOES NOT FEEL BOUND TO APPLY AID OR NAP COMMODITIES TO ORIGINALLY INTENDED PURPOSES,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

B6



4. IN ORDER TO REMOVE "HOSTAGE VALUE" OF PRESENT TEAM AND IN ATTEMPT MAXIMIZE U.S. PRESTIGE AND POSSIBLY SAVE SEVERAL MILLIONS OF DOLLARS AS WELL, RECOMMEND YOU TAKE FOLLOWING ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY:

A. HALT FLOW OF ALL COMMODITIES TO LAOS AID AND MAP PROGRAMS UNTIL SATISFACTORY SOLUTION REACHED.

B) NOTIFY PGNU IMMEDIATELY THAT NO U.S. OFFICIAL PRESENTLY IN LAOS FROM CHARGE CHAPMAN, ACTING DIRECTOR RAMSEY AND DATT ROUND THROUGH LOWEST CLERK, IS EMPOWERED TO NEGOTIATE OR TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS ON BEHALF OF U.S.G. FROM DATE OF SUCH NOTIFICATION ONWARDS, AND THAT A NEW NEGOTIATING TEAM WILL ARRIVE IN VIENTIANE WITHIN A FEW DAYS.

C. APPOINT NEW TEAM TO INCLUDE FOLLOWING:

- 1) MR. E.J. CLAPP - AID REGIONAL LEGAL ADVISOR.
- 2) MR. A.J. BENNETT - CONTRACT SERVICES OFFICER USAID/ALSO.
- 3) MR. R.L. KRANKER - CHIEF, BANGKOK OPERATIONS OFFICE, USAID/LAOS.
- 4) A COMPETENT SENIOR FSO - POSSIBLY FROM AMEMB BANGKOK BUT NOT FROM AMEMB VIENTIANE
- 5) A COMPETENT SENIOR MILITARY OFFICER, NOT NOW IN LAOS, BUT FAMILIAR WITH LAOS MAP PROGRAM.

5. [REDACTED]

TO PROCEED TO VIENTIANE TO CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS WITH PGNU. BELIEVE AS NEW TEAM WHICH HAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE TO SITUATION TO BE FULLY AWARE OF PROBLEMS, WE CAN DO NO WORSE THAN PRESENT NEGOTIATORS WHO ARE (ON AID SIDE AT LEAST) REACHING EXHAUSTION, AND ON EMBASSY/DAD SIDE TOO CLOSE FOR TOO LONG TO MAINTAIN FRESH PROSPECTIVE REQUIRED.

6. [REDACTED] HAS NECESSARY LEGAL EXPERTISE. [REDACTED] ARE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 STATE 136879

EXPERIENCED CONTRACT NEGOTIATORS. AS NEW TEAM ENTERING NEGOTIATION FRESH BUT AWARE, WE BELIEVE WE CAN OFFSET PGNU PRESSURE TACTICS.

7. I URGE YOUR IMMEDIATE ACTION TO AVOID FURTHER EROSION OF SITUATION.
WHITEHOUSE

KISSINGER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

TELEGRAM



OUTGOING TELEGRAM

OPTIONAL FORM 185 (OCR) (10-75)
Formerly DS-322 (OCR)
Dept. of State

RELEASE IN PART
B6

ACK	MRN	DTG	SIGNATURE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CLASSIFICATION

SPECIAL CHARGES

S/P: REFEINBERG: JRR	NAME
7/7/77 120822	TEL. EXT.
S/P: ALAKE FICE	NAME

ARA/ECP: RTAYLOR (DRAFT)

S/P: RHARRINGTON

CLEARANCES

S/P: NBOYER

NAME

CLEARANCES

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE PRIORITY BRIDGETOWN State 157623 DRESSES

INFO PRECEDENCE INFO ADDRESSES

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR FROM TONY LAKE S/P

INITIALS

AL

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E.O. 11652: GDR

TAGS: EAID

SUBJECT: IAF OPERATIONS

REF: STATE ~~1997~~ BRIDGETOWN 1030; BRIDGETOWN 1997

1. THE PROBLEMS RAISED IN YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ABOUT THE OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION (IAF) HAVE BEEN RAISED BEFORE ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. SEVERAL U.S. AMBASSADORS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER IAF ACTIVITIES.

2. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND OUR AMBASSADORS IN THE FIELD, IAF HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE TO ACCEPT THE ADVICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OR OF OUR AMBASSADORS REGARDING THEIR OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES. IAF BELIEVES COORDINATION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN FULLY ADEQUATE AND THAT STATE CAN MAKE ITS OPINIONS FELT THROUGH ITS THREE REPRESENTATIVES OR THE SEVEN-MEMBERS OF THE IAF BOARD OF DIRECTORS.

3. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE (IGA) CONCLUDED IN A RECENT EVALUATION THAT THIS POSITION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE IAF'S LEGISLATIVE CHARTER. THE INSPECTOR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

OPTIONAL FORM 105-A (OCR) (10-75)
Formerly DS-322-A (OCR)
Dept of State

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GENERAL CONSIDERS THAT THE AMBASSADOR MUST HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONTROL IAF WHEN IN HIS VIEW A PARTICULAR PROJECT MAY BE ADVERSE TO US INTERESTS.

4. THE IGA REPORT EVALUATED THE ADEQUACY OF THE COORDINATION PROCESS BETWEEN THE IAF AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. WHILE A NUMBER OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN TO IMPROVE COORDINATION, THE IGA OPINED THAT OUR EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION MAY NOT BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE ABSENCE OF A MORE THOROUGH REASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE IAF AND ITS RELATIONSHIPS TO OTHER U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. THE IGA REPORT, IN FACT, CALLS FOR SUCH A REASSESSMENT TO BE MADE BY THE CONGRESS.

5. IN VIEW OF THE IGA REPORT, THE DEPARTMENT HAS RECENTLY RECOMMENDED TO ONB THAT FUTURE BUDGET AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE IAF BE CONTINGENT ON SUCH AN ASSESSMENT.

6. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. YY

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CLASSIFICATION

RELEASE IN PART
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[Redacted]

B6



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

Classified
PH

February ²¹ 15, 1979

Conf. Sect. 21

[Redacted]
American Embassy
Asuncion, Paraguay

B6

Dear [Redacted]:

B6

I want to express my apologies for the delay in replying to your excellent dissent message.

Your message provoked a good deal of thought and debate on several tricky issues, although the inter-bureau process moved more slowly than it should have.

As I mention in my response, I do plan to keep tab on the progress made on these issues, and will keep you informed.

Thank you again for your thoughts and for your patience.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake

Anthony Lake
Director
Policy Planning Staff

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

RELEASE IN PART
B6

3/17

March 14, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: S/P, Mr. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff
FROM: ASIA/PT, [redacted] *Amid*
A.I.D.
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: Normalization of
Relations with Vietnam -- Steps Along the Way

B6

1. This memorandum presents a dissent channel viewpoint of [redacted] Office of Philippines and Thailand Affairs, Asia Bureau, A.I.D. In addition to normal distribution to policy planning staff, I desire distribution to officers in the EA and EB Bureaus in State who deal with the subject matter. I intend to arrange for distribution within the Asia and PPC Bureaus of A.I.D.

B6

2. I wish to associate myself with the dissent channel message dated February 15, 1977 on "US Policy towards the IMF, IBRD and ADB in Vietnam," by [redacted] Asia/DCS, A.I.D. [redacted] presents a convincing case for encouraging, rather than resisting, economic relationships between the SRV and the international financial institutions. Such contacts, he argues, will foster SRV "tendencies to pragmatism and openness." Certainly, if normalization is our ultimate goal (as I think it should be), those Vietnamese tendencies are worth cultivating. In a fast-changing and interdependent world it makes good sense for the United States not only to overcome the emotionalism and bitterness of past conflict but actually to promote Indochinese participation in the community of nations.

3. Supporting an SRV stake in the IFIs is a desirable step toward normalization. Amending our aid and PL 480 legislation is another. In the first instance, we should seek removal of all legislative constraints on other country trade and aid to Vietnam (in particular those contained in Section 620 (n) of the FAA and Section 103 (d) of PL 480). In

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GDS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

current policy terms, both of these wartime provisions are essentially obsolete and should be repealed. Additionally, we should begin now to seek removal of the legislative prohibitions on aid to Vietnam. (In particular, Section 108 of the FY 77 Appropriation Act). Depending upon progress of the current U.S. delegation on MIA issues, bilateral assistance may be a distant possibility. Nevertheless an attempt now to seek repeal of the legislative prohibition would provide an opportunity for developing Congressional and public support for normalization. Prohibitions on aid were enacted in the immediate aftermath of the American withdrawal from Vietnam. If we are to begin healing the wounds of war we need to remove the constraints to that process.

A/PT: :mem
03/15/77

B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PART B6

S/P-0FP:RFSMITH:BDM
6/11/75 28790
S/P:SWLEWIS

S/P - DPIKE

S/P DISTRIBUTION ONLY

ROUTINE BANKOK

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: BANGKOK 10830

FOR

SWL
RFS
DP

B6

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF REFERENCED DISSENT CABLE.
2. MR. DOUGLAS PIKE OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF (S/P) HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE.
3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR CABLE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, AND THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. COPIES HAVE ALSO BEEN SENT TO THE AID ADMINISTRATOR AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS. YOUR DISSENT HAS ALSO BEEN REPEATED TO VIENTIANE.
4. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO YOUR CONCERN. 44

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RELEASE IN PART
B6

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

OPTIONAL FORM 185 (OCR) (10-75)
Formerly DS-322 (OCR)
Dept. of State

ACK	MRN	DTG	SIGNATURE
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UNCLASSIFIED	CLASSIFICATION
	SPECIAL CHARGES

S/P:ETRAGY:AG	NAME
02/21/80 DATE EXT 29717	TEL. EXT.
S/P:PHKRETSBERG	NAME

1 OFFICE	NAME	2 OFFICE	NAME
3		4	
5 CLEARANCES		6 CLEARANCES	
7		8	

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY PRECEDENCE	LA PAZ	ACTION ADDRESSES
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INFO PRECEDENCE	INFO ADDRESSES
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SPECIAL HANDLING

FOR

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: XL

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL

REFERENCE: LA PAZ 1459

1. WE ARE WORKING ON REQUEST IN REFTEL AND WILL GET BACK TO YOU SOON.

2. APOLOGIES FOR DELAY.

YY

INITIALS

PHKTH.

DRFTER

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UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN
PART B6

PAGE 01 SANTIAGO 01223 01 OF 03 231659Z
ACTION SP-02

1333

SANTIAGO 01223 01 OF 03 231659Z

INFO OCT-01 CS-01 150-00 /024 W
-----001230 231718Z /41

R 231514Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0235

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 SANTIAGO 1223

DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: POLICY ON ADEQUACY OF OVERSEAS
SCHOOLS

REF: A. 77 SANTIAGO 9872; B. STATE 9559

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [] AND [] MR., AMERICAN EMBASSY, SANTIAGO, CHILE. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THESE VIEWS ARE ENDORSED BY THE LOCAL AFSA CHAPTER. WE ARE USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL BECAUSE THE STANDARDIZED REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS BASED THEREON HAVE BEEN DECLARED BEYOND THE COMPETENCE OF THE GRIEVANCE SYSTEM AND ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CONSULTATION UNDER E.O. 11656. WE REQUEST THAT DISTRIBUTION BE MADE TO THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY TO DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE READ, TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION JOHN THOMAS, TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS WILLIAM K. HITCHCOCK, TO AID ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR PROGRAM AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES DONALD MCCONNELL, TO THE OPEN FORUM PANEL, TO THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION, AND TO THE FAMILY LIAISON OFFICE.

2. SUMMARY. THIS MESSAGE DISSENTS FROM A DETERMINATION BY THE OVERSEAS SCHOOLS POLICY COMMITTEE, UPON THE ADVICE OF THE OFFICE OF OVERSEAS SCHOOLS AND WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE ALLOWANCES DIVISION, THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL NIDO DE AGUILAS (NIDO) IS AN "ADEQUATE" SCHOOL AS DEFINED IN SECTION 2716 OF THE STANDARDIZED REGULATIONS. WE DISSENT BECAUSE:

- THE DECISION IS BASED SOLELY UPON THE "MAJOR" CRITERION THAT A NORMAL CHILD ATTENDING NIDO CAN ENTER THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE IN A U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOL. IT IGNORES ALL OTHER CRITERIA;
- THE DECISION IGNORES THE MASSIVE EVIDENCE THAT NIDO IS NOT ADEQUATE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT, REPEAT NOT, "PROVIDE EDUCATIONAL CURRICULUM AND SERVICES REASONABLY COMPARABLE TO THOSE PROVIDED... IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE U.S.;" AND
- THE "MAJOR CRITERION" THAT A NORMAL CHILD CAN ENTER THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE IS ITSELF TOTALLY UNFAIR BECAUSE IT PLACES THE BURDEN OF ADEQUATE PREPARATION UPON THE STUDENT AND NOT UPON THE SCHOOL. END SUMMARY.

3. REFTEL (B) INFORMED EMBASSY SANTIAGO THAT THE OVERSEAS SCHOOLS POLICY COMMITTEE HAD REDESIGNATED NIDO (ALL GRADES) BECAUSE OF THE LOW NUMBER OF USG DEPENDENT CHILDREN THERE AND NOT, REPEAT NOT, ON THE GROUNDS OF THE INADEQUACY OF NIDO. THE FINDING OF NIDO "ADEQUATE" WE CONSIDER TO BE A GROSS EXAMPLE OF AN APPARENTLY UNAPPEALABLE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION BEING TAKEN FOR REASONS OTHER THAN AN EQUITABLE APPLICATION OF THE REGULATIONS.

4. FIRST, THERE IS THE ISSUE THAT THE DEPARTMENT BASED ITS CASE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE CONDITION THAT NIDO MEETS THE "MAJOR" CRITERION IN THAT ITS STUDENTS CAN ENTER THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE IN A U.S. SCHOOL. IF THERE IS A MAJOR CRITERION TO BE MET, THERE MUST BE OTHERS AS WELL. THESE OTHER CRITERIA MUST ALSO BE MET ACCORDING TO THE REGULATIONS, IF A SCHOOL IS TO BE CONSIDERED "ADEQUATE." "MAJOR," IN SHORT, DOES NOT EQUATE TO "SOLE" OR "ONLY," AND THAT IN OUR VIEW IS THE BASIC MISINTERPRETATION OF THE REGULATIONS WHICH REGRETTABLY GOVERNS THE OPERATIVE

PARAGRAPHS OF PETTL 6. IF THE "MAJOR" CRITERION WERE THE ONLY CRITERION, THEN ANY CRAMMING ESTABLISHMENT WITH TYPICAL CLASSROOMS AND TWO LABORATORIES, OR EVEN A SMALL INDEPENDENT OPERATION, WHICH MANAGED TO GET A FAIR PERCENTAGE OF ITS PRODUCT INTO REPUTABLE UNIVERSITIES OR THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, WOULD QUALIFY UNDER THE DEPARTMENT'S DEFINITION OF "ADEQUATE." WE ARGUE THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, AMERICAN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IS DISTINGUISHED BY ITS FOCUS ON THE SINGLE STUDENT AND NOT THE MERE CAPACITY TO GRABLY PUSH THE STUDENT TO THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE. ANY STUDENT'S SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM IS GIVEN VERY GREAT WEIGHT. SECOND ONLY TO ACADEMIC INSTRUCTION, IT IS CLEAR FROM THE WORDING OF THE REGULATIONS, THE RULE OF REASON AND SIMPLE EQUITY THAT A DEPARTMENTAL FINDING OF ADEQUACY CANNOT, REPEAT NOT, BE BASED SOLELY ON THE "MAJOR CRITERION."

5. SINCE THE DEPARTMENT HAS IGNORED THE OTHER CRITERIA, IT IS NECESSARY TO LOOK AT WHAT THESE OTHER CRITERIA ARE. SECTION 2716 OF THE STANDARDIZED REGULATIONS DEFINES AN "ADEQUATE SCHOOL" AS ONE WHICH PROVIDES "AN EDUCATIONAL CURRICULUM AND SERVICES REASONABLY COMPARABLE TO THOSE PROVIDED WITHOUT CHARGE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE U.S." THE REAL TESTS OF ADEQUACY ARE COMPARABILITY TO U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN CURRICULUM AND COMPARABILITY IN SERVICES. REF A SPELLS OUT IN DETAIL THOSE FACTORS WHICH ESTABLISH BEYOND ANY DOUBT THAT THE CURRICULUM AND SERVICES OF NIDO ARE NOT COMPARABLE TO U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS. THESE FACTORS INCLUDE: THAT THE LINGUA FRANCA (I.E., LANGUAGE OF COMMON USE) OF NIDO IS SPANISH

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~~SECRET~~ REB573

PAGE 01 VIENTI 04223 130524Z

RELEASE IN PART B6

10 ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 2004.W 026313

R-130430Z JUN 75
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4377

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 4223

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: APER DISSENT
SUBJ: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: STATE 136379

COUNTRY TEAM COMMENTS ON REPTEL

1. DISSENT IS AT THE HEART OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM AND WE THEREFORE WELCOME ANY VIEWS AND PROPOSALS DIFFERING FROM OUR OWN.

2. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF DIFFICULTIES WITH REF MESSAGE:

A. IT BOILS DOWN TO SIMPLE ASSERTION THAT PRESENT TEAM HERE HAS FALLEN ON ITS FACE AND THAT PROPOSED NEW TEAM CAN DO BETTER. IT DOES NOT EXPLAIN WHY, EXCEPT THAT WE ARE TIRED. A NEW TEAM WOULD BE JUST AS MUCH HOSTAGES AS THE OLD ONE.

B. IT AFFIRMS THAT NEW TEAM "CAN OFFSET" PGNU PRESSURE TACTICS. HOW IS NOT EXPLAINED. WE WOULD INDEED BE INTERESTED IN ANY FRESH IDEAS ON THE SUBJECT. [REDACTED] WE TRUST, APPRECIATES FACT THAT PRESSURES INVOLVED ARE NOT LIMITED TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE BUT COMPRISE A TOTAL CLIMATE, IN WHICH AMERICAN COMMUNITY HAS NO SENSE OF SECURITY.

C. IT TALKS OF FRESH PERSPECTIVE BUT GIVES NO INDICATION OF [REDACTED] OWN PERSPECTIVE.

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PAGE 02 VIENTI 04223 132524Z

D. ITS CONTENT SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT [REDACTED] VIEWS THE PROBLEM AS ESSENTIALLY A HARD-NOSE CONTRACT NEGOTIATION. IT ISN'T; THERE ARE LARGER EQUITIES INVOLVED AND LARGER OBJECTIVES TO BE SOUGHT. A STRAIGHT-FORWARD CONTRACT NEGOTIATION IS IN FINAL ANALYSIS BASED ON A MUTUALLY PERCEIVED QUANTIFIABLE BASIS. THIS IS NOT THE CASE HERE. THESE ARE ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A REDEFINITION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH LAOS.

B6

3. WHAT HAS THE PHYSICALLY EXHAUSTED AND INTELLECTUALLY WORN OUT TEAM TRIED TO DO?

A. TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF 1,166 AMERICANS ON MAY 11. WE HAVE DONE SO - SO FAR - AND REDUCED THAT NUMBER WITHIN ONE MONTH BY 90 PERCENT.

B. TO PROTECT U.S. PROPERTY - BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE. WE HAVE DONE WHAT WE COULD. WE HAVE SHIPPED OUT SO FAR 866,000 POUNDS OF PERSONAL EFFECTS. WE HAVE HELD FIRM ON TURNING OVER ONLY WHAT WAS CONTAINED IN PROJECT AGREEMENTS. WE ARE NEGOTIATING WHAT IS LEFT THAT BELONGS TO THE USG. IT MAY WELL BE THAT WE SHALL HAVE TO GIVE MORE THAN MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN THE CASE UNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD HAVE PERMITTED AN ORDERLY DISPOSAL OF USG PROPERTY.

C. TO PRESERVE THE OPTION OF MAINTAINING AT LEAST AN EMBASSY HERE. THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE U.S. FROM THIS COUNTRY INVOLVES MORE THAN SIMPLY OUR RELATIONS WITH LAOS WHERE MANIFESTLY OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE GREATLY REDUCED. IT INVOLVES, WE BELIEVE, THE WORLD'S PERCEPTION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ASIA. A WITHDRAWAL FROM HERE WILL BE VIEWED AS A FURTHER WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FROM ASIA. IT HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR RELATIONS NOTABLY WITH OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES, BUT MORE DISTANTLY WITH CHINA AND RUSSIA AS WELL.

4. THE CENTER OF OUR DIFFERENCE WITH [REDACTED] IS THAT THE DOES NOT SEEM TO APPRECIATE FACT THAT WE HAVE JUST GONE THROUGH THE OPENING STAGE OF A REVOLUTION. THE PATHET LAO ARE ABOVE ALL MOTIVATED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THEY WANT TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN REGIME AND THEY FULLY ACCEPT THE NECESSITY OF A CONSIDERABLE

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PAGE 03 VIENTI 04223 130524Z

REDUCTION IN THE PEOPLE'S STANDARD OF LIVING. THEY WANT WFD BUT ON THEIR OWN TERMS, TO BELIEVE THAT WE CAN SWAY THEIR LINE THROUGH "TOUGH" (ASSUMING OURS HAVE BEEN "SOFT" WHICH IS NOT WHAT THE LAO ARE SAYING). NEGOTIATING TACTICS IS TO MISUNDERSTAND THE SITUATION FUNDAMENTALLY. WHAT WE CAN DO, WHAT WE BELIEVE WE HAVE DONE, IS HOLD THE LINE AND KEEP THE FUTURE OPEN.
CHAPMAN

~~SECRET~~

RELEASE IN FULL

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UNCLASSIFIED

ADDL ADDRESSES

LA/MRSD:GPHILLIPS:JM
10/7/77: EXT: 29395
AA/LA:ECOY

ARA/RPP:JO GRADY:INFO
LA/PAN:HMARWITZ:INFO
LA/CAR:WHEELER:INFO

LA/DP:AMEYMAN:INFO
LA/CEN:RGARUFI:INFO
LA/SA:RWEBER:INFO

78 ACTION LA 16 CHRON 2 8 INFO PPC 5 AATA 2 ED 29P

ROUTINE Δ ASUNCION, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, BRIDGETOWN, GEORGETOWN,
GUATEMALA, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, MANAGUA, MEXICO, MONTEVIDEO, QUITO,
ROUTINE Δ RIO-DE-JANEIRO, SAO PAULO

AIDAC - ROCAP

E.O. 11652: N/A

EC
GI

TAGS:

SUBJECT: AIFLD - PROPOSAL FOR ASSISTANCE TO ORIT

AIFLD HAS MADE A PROPOSAL TO AID FOR A PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE TO ORIT INCLUDING EDUCATION AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TOTALLING 106,000 DOLLARS. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF THE MATTER WERE HELD AT THE TUNIS LABOR OFFICERS CONFERENCE. COPIES OF THE PROPOSAL AND AID/W EXPLANATORY COMMENTS THEREON WERE POUCHED TO ADDRESSEE MISSIONS ON OCTOBER 7. WE WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL FROM ALL ADDRESSEES TO REACH AID/W NO LATER THAN OCTOBER 31. 44

UNCLASSIFIED

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{CONT'D ADDRESSEES}

PANAMA, K&SSAN JOSE, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTO DOMINGO,
TEGUCIGALPA, BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS, NASSAU, ROCAP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN
PART B6

Department of State

PAGE 01 BRIDGE 01579 112015Z
ACTION SP-02

3579

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 /004 W
-----010710 112019Z /62

R 111600Z JUL 77
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3131

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRIDGETOWN 1579

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR TONY LAKE, S/P

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EAID
SUBJECT: IAF OPERATIONS

REFS: A) STATE 157623 B) BRIDGETOWN 1497 C) BRIDGETOWN 1030

MAS
(Action to N.B.)

1. THANKS FOR REF A. WHILE WE WERE AWARE THAT OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH IAF ACTIVITIES WERE UNFORTUNATELY NOT UNIQUE, WE DID NOT KNOW THAT THE PROBLEM WAS AS WIDESPREAD AS YOU DESCRIBE OR THAT IAF HAS TAKEN THE POSITION IT HAS.
2. WE UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S GENERAL PROBLEM WITH IAF AND THE DESIRE TO ACHIEVE A FINAL AND FORMAL RESOLUTION OF THE MATTER. HOWEVER OUR IMMEDIATE CONCERN, THAT WHICH PROMPTED REFS. B AND C, IS TO END THE PRESENT DAMAGING IAF PRACTICE OF USING USG FUNDS TO SUPPORT EASTERN CARIBBEAN INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS IN ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO OUR REGIONAL INTERESTS. WE AGAIN STRONGLY URGE THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S REPS ON THE IAF BOARD VOTE AGAINST THE CADEC GRANT (REF C). IF TIME PERMITS, OUR NEW AMBASSADOR, ONCE IN PLACE, COULD BE ASKED HIS OPINION OF THE WISDOM OF MAKING THE GRANT.
3. WHILE THE DEPARTMENT'S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ITS BASIC DISPUTE WITH IAF THROUGH THE OMB AND CONGRESS ARE UNDOUBTEOLY NECESSARY, WE SUSPECT THAT SUCCESS, IF IT COMES AT ALL, WON'T BE QUICKLY ACHIEVED. PERHAPS, THEREFORE, AN INTERIM FIX IS AVAILABLE. THE DEPARTMENT COULD ROUTINELY NOTIFY EMBASSIES OF PROPOSED IAF GRANTS AND IF IN THE AMBASSADOR'S OPINION THE PROPOSAL WAS UNWISE, THE DEPARTMENT REPS COULD VOTE NAY. IF INFORMED AND PERSUASIVE, THE STATE REPS CAN PROBABLY CONVINCE ONE OF THE OTHER BOARD MEMBERS TO JOIN THEM AND THUS KILL A QUESTIONABLE GRANT.

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UNCLASSIFIED Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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SAINTIA 01223 02 OF 03 2319212

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003114 2319542 /42

R 231514Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8236

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 3 SANTIAGO 1223

DISSENT CHANNEL

AND NOT ENGLISH; THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF TEACHERS ARE NOT TRULY COMPETENT IN ENGLISH; THAT THE LACK OF FULL ENGLISH COMPETENCE ON THE PART OF MOST STUDENTS REQUIRES TEACHERS TO PITCH THEIR CLASSROOM PRESENTATIONS TO THE LOWEST COMMON LEVEL WHICH ESPECIALLY IN ENGLISH AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COURSES IS WELL BELOW COLLEGE PREPARATORY LEVELS; THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL COLLEGE GUIDANCE COUNSELING; THE LACK OF A CAFETERIA; THE LACK OF A GYMNASIUM AND LIMITED SPORTS FACILITIES IN GENERAL; THE LACK OF A FULL, ORGANIZED SPORTS PROGRAMS OR INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE COMPETITION OTHER THAN ON AN AD HOC BASIS; THE INADEQUATE SCIENCE LABORATORY FACILITIES; THE LACK OF PUBLIC SPEAKING, DEBATE, FORENSICS AND THEATRE ARTS PROGRAMS; THE LACK OF AN AUDITORIUM WITH A STAGE, ETC. WE WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT THESE JUDGMENTS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF VIRTUALLY ALL EMPLOYEE PARENTS OF CHILDREN AT HIDO AND THAT THESE VIEWS ARE WIDELY HELD WITHIN THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND STRONGLY EXPRESSED BY MANY OF ITS LEADING MEMBERS.

6. THE ABOVE ELEMENTS OF INADEQUACY WERE ALL EXAMINED THOROUGHLY IN REF A. IN RESPONSE THE DEPARTMENT IN PARA 3 OF REF C STATES THAT "SCHOOLS ARE NOT WHICH WILL NOT HAVE EVERYTHING IN THE WAY OF PROGRAM, SERVICES, OR PLANT OF AN EXCELLENT AMERICAN SCHOOL" (BUT WHOSE STUDENTS CAN PROGRESS IN U.S. SCHOOLS OR COLLEGES) "ARE CONSIDERED TO FULFILL THE CONCEPT OF AN ADEQUATE SCHOOL." WE OBJECT STRONGLY TO THE REFERENCE TO "EVERYTHING" IN THE WAY OF CURRICULUM AND SERVICES AND THE REFERENCE TO "EXCELLENT" AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS. THIS RESPONSE FROM THE DEPARTMENT IS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN

LANE AND UNDERHANDED. OBVIOUSLY IF THE ONLY STANDARD OF COMPARISON IS SCHOOLS OF THE CALIBRE OF NEW TRIER HIGH SCHOOL OR THE BROOK HIGH SCHOOL OF SCIENCE, THEN MOST OVERSEAS SCHOOLS COULD NOT REASONABLY HOPE TO MEET THIS STANDARD. BY UNFAIRLY ASCRIBING THIS UNREALISTIC STANDARD OF COMPARISON TO ANYONE WHO QUESTIONS THE ADEQUACY OF AN OVERSEAS SCHOOL (IN THIS CASE TO US WHO QUESTION THE ADEQUACY OF HIDO), THE DEPARTMENT CAN WIN ANY ARGUMENT IT CHOOSES. IN FACT THE CURRICULUM AND FACILITIES WHICH ARE FULLY DESCRIBED AS INADEQUATE AT HIDO IN REF A ARE PRECISELY THAT CURRICULUM AND THOSE FACILITIES WHICH PARENTS COULD NORMALLY EXPECT TO ENCOUNTER IN A HIGH SCHOOL TO NO PARTICULAR DISTINCTION IN ANY ORDINARY SMALL TOWN, REAL "MAIN STREET," IN THE U.S. ONE OF THE REASONS WE PARENTS FEEL SO CHEATED IS BECAUSE WE HAD PRECISELY SUCH CURRICULUM AND FACILITIES IN OUR OWN HIGH SCHOOLS A FULL GENERATION AGO. AND IF WE WERE LIVING IN THE STATES NOW -- IN THE WASHINGTON AREA OR NOT -- OUR CHILDREN WOULD HAVE THE FULL RANGE OF THESE SERVICES AND CURRICULUM.

7. IN ADDITION TO DEPENDING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE "MAJOR CRITERION" ARGUMENT (PARA 4 ABOVE) AND IGNORING THE LACK OF CURRICULUM AND SERVICES (PARA 5 AND 6 ABOVE), THE DEPARTMENT CITES IN REF B POSITIVE REASONS WHY IT DETERMINED HIDO ADEQUATE. THE FACTORS CITED ARE MARGINAL AND TAKEN TOGETHER DO NOT REMOTELY COUNTERBALANCE WHAT IS MISSING IN HIDO'S CURRICULUM AND SERVICES. OUR COMMENTS ON THE SPECIFIC POINTS THE DEPARTMENT RAISES ARE:

-- DEPARTMENT STATES THAT IT WOULD NOT WISH TO IGNORE THE FACT THAT THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION HAS "ACCREDITED" HIDO. THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION IS NOT A U.S. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION NOR IS IT AN INSTITUTION OF ONE OF THE SEVERAL STATES. IT IS A REGIONAL

INSTITUTION FOR ACCREDITING SCHOOLS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE U.S. BUT -- AND THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT BUT -- THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION DOES NOT APPLY THE SAME RULES OF THE GAME TO OVERSEAS SCHOOLS THAT IT APPLIES TO SCHOOLS IN ITS REGION IN THE STATES. THE DEPARTMENT ITSELF IN PARA 4 OF REF B CITES THE KEY POINT IN THIS REGARD, NAMELY, "TEACHER CERTIFICATION IS NOT A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR ACCREDITATION BY THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION." WE BELIEVE THAT VIRTUALLY WITHOUT EXCEPTION EVERY STATE IN THE UNITED STATES REQUIRES TEACHER CERTIFICATION FOR ITS PUBLIC SCHOOLS. CERTAINLY THE STATES WHERE WE ARE FROM DO SO, AS DO THE JURISDICTIONS IN THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA WHERE OUR CHILDREN WOULD BE GOING TO SCHOOL WERE WE ASSIGNED TO THE DEPARTMENT. WHAT HAPPENS HERE IS THAT THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION ACCEPTS THE CERTIFICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE FOR TEACHERS AT HIDO. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE TEACHING STAFF AT HIDO, LACKING THE CAPACITY TO COMMUNICATE CLEARLY ON SOPHISTICATED MATTERS IN ENGLISH, WOULD NOT INDIVIDUALLY ACHIEVE TEACHER CERTIFICATION IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS EVEN THOUGH THEY DO HAVE CERTIFICATION BY THE GOV. HOWEVER, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION MADE CLEAR ON THEIR RECENT VISIT THAT ITS ACCREDITATION (OR ACCEPTANCE OF THE MEMBERSHIP) OF A SCHOOL DOES NOT IMPLY APPROVAL OF THE SCHOOL, NOR A FINDING THAT THE SCHOOL IS ADEQUATE. ON THE CONTRARY, ITS ACCEPTANCE OF A HIGH SCHOOL AS A MEMBER ACCORDING TO THE REPRESENTATIVE, SIMPLY MEANS THAT THE SCHOOL AS A MEMBER AND THE ASSOCIATION SHARE CERTAIN GOALS AND METHODS IN EDUCATION AND THAT THE SCHOOL IN QUESTION IS WORKING TOWARD THEM. WHAT WE KNOW, AND CAN READILY DEMONSTRATE IS THAT HIDO HAS NOT YET ACHIEVED THE GOALS TO WHICH IT IS PRETENDING TO SUBSCRIBE.

-- THE DEPARTMENT (PARA 5 OF REF B), AFTER CONCERNING THE INADEQUACY OF HIDO'S GUIDANCE COUNSELING, DECLARES THAT THIS INADEQUACY HAS NOT PREVENTED ITS GRADUATES FROM GETTING INTO "GOOD"

RELEASE IN FULL

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SD24

RELEASE IN PART B6

MEMORANDUM

SEP 16 1975

TO : EUR/EE - Mr. Nicholas Andrews

FROM : S/P - Samuel W. Lewis. *SWL*

SUBJECT: Inspection Report on Eastern Europe --
Requested Response on Recommendation #57

Recommendation #57 in the Inspection Report on our relations with Eastern Europe (Inspector's Memorandum on the consular function in Yugoslavia) was that the Department (S/P) should give [redacted] Consular Section, a reply to his dissent message of February 24, 1973.

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The attached letter and annexes were sent to [redacted] in June of 1974. The Chairperson of the Open Forum Panel who sent them out considered the packet to be a definite reply to [redacted] and to end the exchange of communications on the subject. [redacted] understood the June 11 material to be an interim reply, partly because it came on Open Forum rather than Department stationery, and expected a further response. He mentioned this expectation to the inspectors, and it was reflected in their Recommendation #57.

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[redacted] is now assigned in the Department. The current Open Forum Chairperson has informed him in conversation that no further reply to his original communication is planned. In the same conversation, [redacted] kindly consented to chair an informal Open Forum working group which will have a fresh try at reforming the obsolete portion of the visa law to which [redacted] raised objections from Belgrade.

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Attached to C17980074

Drafted: S/P: PJLydon: bdm
9-15-75

cc: [redacted]

B6

PAGE 01 MELBOU 02254 030107Z
ACTION SP-02

5680

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 /004 W
-----110407 030108Z /20

R 020315Z NOV 77
FM AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4119
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

RELEASE IN
PART B6

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MELBOURNE 2254

DISSENT CHANNEL

E O 11652 N/A
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: CONTRASTING VIEWS ON THE
RECENT VICTORIAN POWER STRIKE

REF CANBERRA 7504

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] POLITICAL OFFICER MELBOURNE. [REDACTED]
REQUESTS THAT S/P DISTRIBUTE COPIES NOT ONLY TO THOSE LISTED
ON PAGE 4 OF THE DEPARTMENT'S A-309 BUT TO MR. DALE GOOD S/IL
AND MR. DONALD HARRIS EA/RA.

2. CANBERRA'S 7504 FORWARDED THE TEXT OF MELBOURNE'S 2160
ON THE RECENT VICTORIAN POWER STRIKE TO THE DEPARTMENT ALONG
WITH THE EMBASSY'S COMMENTS. WHILE I WOULD BE GLAD TO PREPARE
A DETAILED REFUTATION OF THE EMBASSY'S COMMENTS (AND WILL DO SO
UPON REQUEST) THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO MAKE
A FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CANBERRA'S 7504
AS AN EMBASSY COMMUNICATION.

A. IT IS THE FIRST COMMUNICATION I HAVE SEEN (IN OVER
18 MONTHS IN MELBOURNE) WHICH CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY
EXPRESSES EMBASSY/CANBERRA'S VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA (A SUBJECT I BELIEVE EVERYONE WILL
AGREE IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, CONTROVERSIAL AND
COMPLEX).

B. IT DRAMATIZES THE FACT THAT INFORMATION AND INTERPRETATIONS
AVAILABLE IN CANBERRA ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FREQUENTLY PROMPT
OBSERVERS TO REACH RATHER CONSERVATIVE CONCLUSIONS (TO SAY THE LEAST)

C. IT CONSTITUTES (AT LEAST IN MY HUMBLE OPINION)
AS DAMNING AN INDICTMENT
OF THE RECENT DECISION TO TRANSFER THE U. S. LABOR OFFICER FROM
MELBOURNE TO CANBERRA AS A WELL-INFORMED CRITIC OF THIS DECISION
COULD HOPE TO SEE.

D. IT DEMONSTRATES (NOW THAT THE PRESUMABLY IRREVOCABLE DECISION
HAS BEEN MADE) THE NEED TO DEVELOP AND UTILIZE ALTERNATIVE WAYS
AND MEANS OF ENSURING THAT LABOR REPORTING FROM AUSTRALIA WILL
BE BASED ON SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN A CANBERRA-EYE-VIEW OF
WHAT IS HAPPENING AND WHY.
BRAND

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U.S. AID MISSION
TO LAOS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

July 7, 1975

RELEASE IN PART B6

Mr. Douglas Pike
Department of State
Policy Planning Staff (S/P)
Washington, D.C. 20523

Dear Mr. Pike,

This will acknowledge receipt of STATE 136378 of June 12, 1975 and STATE 155543 of July 2, 1975 concerning my dissent message, BANGKOK 10830 of June 11, 1975.

I agree that my recommendation for a new team has been overtaken by events. However, as the predictions I made in my dissent message have come true, I find it difficult to follow the reasoning which arrives at the conclusion that "there is no indication that a different negotiating team would have altered the outcome".

This statement is especially curious since, never having asked, the "appropriate authorities" cannot have known the approach intended by the suggested new team.

As my dissent was against the policy being followed at the time, the lack of interest in this point on the part of the policy makers raises the question of how a substantial argument was developed against the recommendation.

In this connection, I would also be interested in knowing the rationale employed in the determination to repeat my dissent message verbatim to Vientiane.

Mr. Douglas Pike

July 7, 1975

Your early response to the above, and any other background, you may provide as regards the final determination on adhering to existing policy, would be most welcome.

Yours sincerely,

[Redacted signature box]

APO San Francisco 96346

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

UNCLAS STATE 250052

DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: JAKARTA 13762

FOR AID DISSENTERS FROM LAKE-S/P

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON THE AID LIFESTYLE IN JAKARTA. MR. CURTIS FARRAR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISSENT CHANNEL PROCEDURES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE ADMIN STRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. VANCE

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UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 3 SANTIAGO 1223

DISSENT CHANNEL

AND NOT ENGLISH; THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF TEACHERS ARE NOT TRULY COMPETENT IN ENGLISH; THAT THE LACK OF FULL ENGLISH COMPETENCE ON THE PART OF MOST STUDENTS REQUIRES TEACHERS TO PITCH THEIR CLASSROOM PRESENTATIONS TO THE LOWEST COMMON LEVEL WHICH ESPECIALLY IN ENGLISH AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COURSES IS WELL BELOW COLLEGE PREPARATORY LEVELS; THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL COLLEGE GUIDANCE COUNSELING; THE LACK OF A CAFETERIA; THE LACK OF A GYMNASIUM AND LIMITED SPORTS FACILITIES IN GENERAL; THE LACK OF A FULL, ORGANIZED SPORTS PROGRAMS OR INTERSCHOOLISTIC LEAGUE COMPETITION OTHER THAN ON AN AD HOC BASIS; THE INADEQUATE SCIENCE LABORATORY FACILITIES; THE LACK OF PUBLIC SPEAKING, DEBATE, FORENSICS AND THEATRE PRIS PROGRAMS; THE LACK OF AN AUDITORIUM WITH A STAGE, ETC. WE WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT THESE JUDGMENTS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF VIRTUALLY ALL EMPLOYEE PARENTS OF CHILDREN AT HIDO AND THAT THESE VIEWS ARE WIDELY HELD WITHIN THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND STRONGLY EXPRESSED BY MANY OF ITS LEADING MEMBERS.

6. THE ABOVE ELEMENTS OF INADEQUACY WERE ALL EXAMINED THOROUGHLY IN REF A. IN RESPONSE THE DEPARTMENT IN PARA 3 OF REF C STATES THAT "SCHOOLS PERIOD WHICH WILL NOT HAVE EVERYTHING IN THE WAY OF PROGRAM, SERVICES, OR FACILITY OF AN EXCELLENT AMERICAN SCHOOL" (BUT WHOSE STUDENTS CAN PROGRESS IN U.S. SCHOOLS OR COLLEGES) "ARE CONSIDERED TO FULFILL THE CONCEPT OF AN ADEQUATE SCHOOL." WE OBJECT STRONGLY TO THE REFERENCE TO "EVERYTHING" IN THE WAY OF CURRICULUM AND SERVICES AND THE REFERENCE TO "EXCELLENT" AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS. THIS RESPONSE FROM THE DEPARTMENT IS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN

LANE AND UNDERHAND. OBVIOUSLY IF THE ONLY STANDARD OF COMPARISON IS SCHOOLS OF THE CALIBRE OF NEW TIER HIGH SCHOOL OR THE GROSS HIGH SCHOOL OF SCIENCE, THEN MOST OVERSEAS SCHOOLS COULD NOT REASONABLY HOPE TO MEET THIS STANDARD. BY UNFAIRLY ASCRIBING THIS UNREALISTIC STANDARD OF COMPARISON TO ANYONE WHO QUESTIONS THE ADEQUACY OF AN OVERSEAS SCHOOL (IN THIS CASE TO US WHO QUESTION THE ADEQUACY OF HIDO), THE DEPARTMENT CAN WIN ANY ARGUMENT IT CHOOSES. IN FACT THE CURRICULUM AND FACILITIES WHICH ARE FULLY DESCRIBED AS INADEQUATE AT HIDO IN REF A ARE PRECISELY THAT CURRICULUM AND THOSE FACILITIES WHICH PARENTS COULD NORMALLY EXPECT TO ENCOUNTER IN A HIGH SCHOOL TO NO PARTICULAR DISTINCTION IN ANY ORDINARY SMALL TOWN, REAL "MAIN STREET," IN THE U.S. ONE OF THE REASONS WE PARENTS FEEL SO CHEATED IS BECAUSE WE HAD PRECISELY SUCH CURRICULUM AND FACILITIES IN OUR OWN HIGH SCHOOLS A FULL GENERATION AGO. AND IF WE WERE LIVING IN THE STATES NOW -- IN THE WASHINGTON AREA OR NOT -- OUR CHILDREN WOULD HAVE THE FULL RANGE OF THESE SERVICES AND CURRICULUM.

7. IN ADDITION TO DEPENDING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE "MAJOR CRITERION" ARGUMENT (PARA 4 ABOVE) AND IGNORING THE LACK OF CURRICULUM AND SERVICES (PARA 5 AND 6 ABOVE), THE DEPARTMENT CITES IN REF B POSITIVE REASONS WHY IT DETERMINED HIDO ADEQUATE. THE FACTORS CITED ARE MARGINAL AND TAKEN TOGETHER DO NOT REMOTELY COUNTERBALANCE WHAT IS MISSING IN HIDO'S CURRICULUM AND SERVICES. OUR COMMENTS ON THE SPECIFIC POINTS THE DEPARTMENT RAISES ARE:

-- DEPARTMENT STATES THAT IT WOULD NOT WISH TO IGNORE THE FACT THAT THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION HAS "ACCREDITED" HIDO. THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION IS NOT A U.S. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION NOR IS IT AN INSTITUTION OF ONE OF THE SEVERAL STATES. IT IS A REGIONAL

INSTITUTION FOR ACCREDITING SCHOOLS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE U.S. BUT -- AND THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT POINT -- THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION DOES NOT APPLY THE SAME RULES OF THE GAME TO OVERSEAS SCHOOLS THAT IT APPLIES TO SCHOOLS IN ITS REGION IN THE STATES. THE DEPARTMENT ITSELF IN PARA 4 OF REF B CITES THE KEY POINT IN THIS REGARD, NAMELY, "TEACHER CERTIFICATION IS NOT A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR ACCREDITATION BY THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION." WE BELIEVE THAT VIRTUALLY WITHOUT EXCEPTION EVERY STATE IN THE UNITED STATES REQUIRES TEACHER CERTIFICATION FOR ITS PUBLIC SCHOOLS. CERTAINLY THE STATES WHERE WE ARE FROM DO SO, AS DO THE JURISDICTIONS IN THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA WHERE OUR CHILDREN WOULD BE GOING TO SCHOOL WERE WE ASSIGNED TO THE DEPARTMENT. WHAT HAPPENS HERE IS THAT THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION ACCEPTS THE CERTIFICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE FOR TEACHERS AT HIDO. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE TEACHING STAFF AT HIDO, LACKING THE CAPACITY TO COMMUNICATE CLEARLY ON SOPHISTICATED MATTERS IN ENGLISH, WOULD NOT INDIVIDUALLY ACHIEVE TEACHER CERTIFICATION IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS EVEN THOUGH THEY DO HAVE CERTIFICATION BY THE GOV. HOWEVER, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION MADE CLEAR ON THEIR RECENT VISIT THAT ITS ACCREDITATION (OR ACCEPTANCE OF THE MEMBERSHIP) OF A SCHOOL DOES NOT IMPLY APPROVAL OF THE SCHOOL, NOR A FINDING THAT THE SCHOOL IS ADEQUATE. ON THE CONTRARY, ITS ACCEPTANCE OF A HIGH SCHOOL AS A MEMBER ACCORDING TO THE REPRESENTATIVE, SIMPLY MEANS THAT THE SCHOOL AS A MEMBER AND THE ASSOCIATION SHARE CERTAIN GOALS AND METHODS IN EDUCATION AND THAT THE SCHOOL IN QUESTION IS WORKING TOWARD THEM. WHAT WE KNOW, AND CAN READILY DEMONSTRATE IS THAT HIDO HAS NOT YET ACHIEVED THE GOALS TO WHICH IT IS FREE TO SUBSCRIBE.

-- THE DEPARTMENT (PARA 5 OF REF B), AFTER CONCEDED THE INADEQUACY OF HIDO'S GUIDANCE COUNSELING, DECLARES THAT THIS INADEQUACY HAS NOT PREVENTED ITS GRADUATES FROM GETTING INTO "GOOD"

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INTERFERING WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR CHILDREN. MANY OF US IN
SANTIAGO FEAR JUST THAT.
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UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 3 SANTIAGO 1223-

DISSENT CHANNEL

U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES. ALL THIS MEANS IS THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE SO FAR THAT THE LACK OF COUNSELING HAS VISIBLY DAMAGED NIDO STUDENTS. ON THE STRENGTH OF THAT EXTRAORDINARILY ILLUMINATING EXAMPLE, GUIDANCE PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE NATION MIGHT AS WELL BE ABOLISHED, SINCE ROUGHLY THE SAME PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN, IN THE ABSENCE OF GUIDANCE PROGRAMS, WOULD STILL GET INTO ROUGHLY THE SAME KINDS OF INSTITUTIONS. INSTEAD, ADEQUATE GUIDANCE PROGRAMS ARE IN EFFECT THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES TO ENSURE THAT THE INDIVIDUAL REPEAT INDIVIDUAL CHILD APPLIES TO INSTITUTIONS MOST APPROPRIATE IN A VARIETY OF WAYS FOR THAT CHILD. WE CANNOT PROVE A NEGATIVE -- THAT WITH ADEQUATE GUIDANCE, NIDO GRADUATES IN EVERY CASE WOULD HAVE FOUND THEMSELVES IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES MORE APPROPRIATE FOR THEM THAN THE ONES THEY ACTUALLY ENTERED. WE SUSTAIN THE LIKELIHOOD, HOWEVER, THAT MANY MIGHT HAVE MADE A MORE APPROPRIATE SELECTION WITH ADEQUATE GUIDANCE, AND THAT SOME WOULD HAVE BEEN DISTINCTLY BETTER OFF THROUGH SUCH A PROGRAM. IN SHORT, WE CANNOT ACCEPT AS ADEQUATE FOR OUR CHILDREN A SCHOOL WITHOUT THE KIND OF ADEQUATE GUIDANCE PROGRAM IN EFFECT THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES.

-- THE DEPARTMENT NOTES THAT THE ACCREDITING TEAM CONSIDERED THE TESTING PROGRAM COMPREHENSIVE AND ADEQUATE (PARA 6, REF B) AS FAR AS COLLEGE ADMITTANCE IS CONCERNED. NIDO SIMPLY ADMINISTERS THE SAT PROGRAM, EVEN THAT IS NOT WHOLLY ADEQUATE AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THE TESTS WERE A WEEK LATE THIS YEAR AND IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO FILL IN ALL THE NECESSARY INFORMATION BECAUSE NIDO DID NOT HAVE ALL THE FORMS.

-- THE DEPARTMENT (PARA 7, REF B) LAUDS THE "INSTRUCTIONAL MEDIA CENTER." THIS IS A LIBRARY. IT IS, OF COURSE, ESSENTIAL TO HAVE A LIBRARY BUT IT IS IN THE BUILDING THAT USED TO BE THE CAFETERIA. NOW THERE IS NO CAFETERIA.

-- THE DEPARTMENT NOTES THAT THE SCHOOL PROVIDES ADEQUATE REPORTING TO THE PARENTS ON STUDENTS THROUGH REPORT CARDS AND CONFERENCES (PARA 8 OF REF B). THE FACT THAT NIDO HAS REPORT CARDS AND TEACHER CONFERENCES, WHILE GOOD IN AND OF ITSELF, HARDLY COMPENSATES FOR THE MANY INADEQUACIES NOTED IN PARA 5 ABOVE.

8. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE MAJOR CRITERION TEST AS ESTABLISHED IN EXPLAINING THE REGULATIONS IS ITSELF UNFAIR. THE QUESTION SHOULD NOT BE WHETHER A CHILD CAN MAKE IT TO THE NEXT HIGHEST GRADE -- PERHAPS HE OR SHE CAN DO SO BUT ONLY BECAUSE OF ENRICHMENT AT HOME, OR PERHAPS ONLY AT GREAT COST, OR PERHAPS ONLY BARELY. THE OPERATIVE QUESTION SHOULD BE WHETHER A CHILD SHOULD BE COMPELLED TO UNDERGO THE TRAUMA OF INADEQUATE PREPARATION IN THE ACADEMIC, THE ATHLETIC OR OTHER ASPECTS OF HIS OR HER SCHOOLING AS THE PRICE OF THEIR PARENTS' CHOICE OF CAREER. SURELY THE TEST SHOULD BE THE ADEQUACY OF THE SCHOOL AND NOT THE ADEQUACY OF THE CHILD.

9. IN OUR JUDGMENT THE ARGUMENTS ELABORATED ABOVE ESTABLISH THAT THE NIDO SCHOOL IS INADEQUATE UNDER ANY REASONABLE AND EQUITABLE APPLICATION OF THE TERM AND THAT AN OBJECTIVE OBSERVER OUTSIDE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ESTABLISHMENT WOULD SO DETERMINE. THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION CONTRADICTS SECRETARY VANCE'S PLEDGE OF ACTION TO MEET THE CONCERNS OF FOREIGN SERVICE SPOUSES AND FAMILIES AND CONFLICTS WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL'S INJUNCTION TO CONCENTRATE IN 1978 ON IMPROVED EMPLOYEE RELATIONS. NOTHING IS AS HARMFUL TO THE MORALE OF OUR WELL-EDUCATED FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL AS THE FEAR THAT THEIR CAREER CHOICE IS SERIOUSLY

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: AIFLD PROPOSAL FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO ORIT

REF: LA PAZ 8776

1. WE HAVE STUDIED YOUR MESSAGE OBJECTING TO THE GRANT OF US GOVERNMENT FUNDS TO ORIT ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT MAY DAMAGE THE IMAGE OF THAT ORGANIZATION SO MUCH AS TO OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS OF AN EXPANDED PROGRAM.

2. THE CONCERNS YOU EXPRESS WERE CONSIDERED BEFORE A DECISION WAS MADE. AFTER DISCUSSION AT THE TUNIS LABOR ATTACHE CONFERENCE WHERE YOU WERE PRESENT AND MADE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME POINTS, THE AID MISSIONS WERE ASKED FOR COMMENTS BY STATE CABLE 243004. OF THE TWENTY RESPONDERS, FOURTEEN SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL, ABOUT HALF WITH SOME KIND OF RESERVATION, AND SIX WERE NEUTRAL. ONE OF THE LATTER RECOMMENDED AGAINST ACTIVITIES IN THAT PARTICULAR COUNTRY. ONLY THE MISSIONS IN ARGENTINA AND BOLIVIA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT ORIT ACCEPTING USG SUPPORT.

3. PRESUMABLY THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS THEMSELVES WOULD BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO THE KIND OF DAMAGE YOU WARN OF. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ORIT EXECUTIVE BOARD CONSIDERED THE

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QUESTION BEFORE AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. AIFLD HAS ASSURED US THAT THEY ARE WORKING VERY CLOSELY WITH THE AFL-CIO ON THE MATTER. THUS THOSE MOST CLOSELY AND DIRECTLY INVOLVED DO NOT SEEM TO FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF USG ASSISTANCE.

4. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (INCLUDING TRADE UNION RIGHTS) THAT CHARACTERIZES USG ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA. DEMOCRATIC LABOR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE AREA ARE WELL AWARE OF OUR ATTITUDES AND ARE IN SYMPATHY WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF US LABOR POLICY. THERE IS A NEW MOOD OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE AND WE THINK US ASSISTANCE TO ORIT CAN USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO WHAT THE US IS DOING IN THE LABOR FIELD. IF WE EXPECT AN AUTOMATIC UNFAVORABLE REACTION, WE ARE NOT DOING JUSTICE TO THE BENEFICIAL IMPACT OUR POLICIES AND OUR ASSISTANCE CAN HAVE.

5. WHILE THERE MAY BE DAMAGE TO THE ORIT IMAGE IN SOME REGIONS, PERHAPS FOR EXAMPLE IN BOLIVIA, THE CLEAR MAJORITY OF LABOR EXPERTISE FAVORS THE PROGRAM AND EXPECTS THE BENEFITS TO OUTWEIGH THE COSTS.

6. WE DO AGREE THAT THERE COULD BE A DANGER OF THE SUBSIDY'S BECOMING TOO LARGE AND CONTINUING OVER TOO LONG A PERIOD. WE INTEND TO GIVE THESE AND OTHER SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF THIS PROGRAM CAREFUL ATTENTION AS WE PROCEED WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

7. THANK YOU FOR SHARING YOUR IDEAS WITH US THROUGH THE DISSENT CHANNEL. YY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 JAKARTA 13762

AIDAC

DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR GOVERNOR GILLIGAN, ADMINISTRATOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

SUBJECT: AID LIFESTYLE

REF: (A) STATE 237254, (B) STATE 183815, (C) STATE 183814, (D) STATE 136157.

1. THE BELOW LISTED U.S. EMPLOYEES OF USAID/INDONESIA WISH TO GO ON RECORD AS TAKING STRONG EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL TENOR OF MESSAGES WHICH HAVE EMANATED FROM AID/W OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS IMPLYING THAT OUR LIFESTYLE IS NOT IN KEEPING WITH AID'S PRIMARY PURPOSE OF HELPING THE POORER ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIETIES IN WHICH WE WORK. THE OFFENSE IS PARTICULARLY ACUTE IN A RECENT TELEGRAM FROM AID/W CONCERNING THE FY 79 CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION IN WHICH THE USAID IS ASKED TO LIST ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THIS MISSION TO QUOTE REDUCE THE APPEARANCE OF OSTENTATIOUS LIVING UNQUOTE. THE CLEAR SUPPOSITION IS THAT OUR LIFESTYLE IS EXCESSIVE, BOTH IN TERMS OF THE COUNTRY IN WHICH WE ARE WORKING AND BY COMPARISON WITH THE WAY WE WOULD LIVE IN THE UNITED STATES. MOREOVER, THE INNUENDO OF THE WASHINGTON MESSAGE IS THAT OUR DEDICATION TO HELPING THE RURAL POOR EXTENDS ONLY TO THE POINT WHERE OUR OWN CREATURE COMFORTS ARE THREATENED.

2. WHILE WE CANNOT SPEAK FOR OTHER USAIDS AROUND THE WORLD, THE FOREIGN SERVICE EMPLOYEES OF THIS MISSION CONSIDER THEMSELVES PROFESSIONALS DEDICATED TO THE JOB OF ASSISTING THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT WITH PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE WELL-BEING OF LARGE NUMBERS OF POOR PEOPLE.

3. MOST OF US LIVE IN JAKARTA, WHICH HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED AS AN UNHEALTHFUL POST. MANY OF US ALSO TRAVEL AND WORK IN AREAS WHICH ARE ISOLATED AND UNHEALTHFUL. INDEED, THE ABSENCE OF MEDICAL FACILITIES, EVEN IN THE CAPITAL CITY, NECESSITATED 32 TRIPS DURING THE PAST YEAR OUTSIDE OF INDONESIA BY EMPLOYEES AND/OR THEIR DEPENDENTS TO OBTAIN ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE. THOSE OF US WHO ARE BASED IN JAKARTA DO ENJOY ADEQUATE SCHOOLING FOR OUR CHILDREN; HOWEVER, JOBS FOR SPOUSES AND TEENAGERS ARE UNAVAILABLE AND THE FACILITIES FOR RECREATION ARE GREATLY INFERIOR TO THOSE AVAILABLE TO AMERICANS AT HOME. JAKARTA IS A SPRAWLING, TRAFFIC CHOKED, SMOGGY, DIRTY, AND AESTHETICALLY UNAPPEALING CITY. MOREOVER, LIVING HERE GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY OF PAYING SIGNIFICANTLY MORE FOR GROCERIES AND OTHER ESSENTIAL GOODS AND SERVICES THAN WHAT THEY WOULD COST IN THE UNITED STATES. ONLY A SMALL AMOUNT OF THE EXPENSE CONNECTED WITH MAINTAINING A HEALTHY BY BLAND EXISTENCE IN JAKARTA IS COVERED BY THE COST-OF-LIVING ALLOWANCE. IN ADDITION, MANY OF US FIND IT IMPORTANT TO SEE OUR FAMILIES IN THE U.S. MORE THAN ONCE EVERY TWO YEARS WHEN THE USG PROVIDES HOME LEAVE. TRAVEL TO THE U.S. FROM JAKARTA AND RETURN FOR AN EMPLOYEE AND TWO DEPENDENTS WILL COST ROUGHLY \$5 THOUSAND AND ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THIS WILL BE REIMBURSED IF THE EMPLOYEE DECIDES TO USE HIS R&R ALLOWANCE

4. OUR HOUSING VARIES FROM COMFORTABLE TO SLIGHTLY SHABBY AND EVEN THE NICER RESIDENCES WHICH ARE FAR FROM COMMODIOUS AND GENERALLY OF SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER STANDARD THAN HOUSES PROVIDED BY U.S. PRIVATE BUSINESSES ARE NOT IMMUNE FROM THE FREQUENT POWER AND WATER OUTAGES. ONE OF OUR EMPLOYEES HAS TRAPPED SIXTEEN RATS IN THE SECOND FLOOR BEDROOMS OF HIS HOUSING DURING THE PAST YEAR. ONLY THE MINIMUM OF FURNISHINGS IS PROVIDED BY THE USG. WHILE MOST OF US HAVE TWO TO THREE PERSONALLY PAID SERVANTS, IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT A RECENT SURVEY OF USAID EMPLOYEES SHOWED THAT SERVANTS ARE HIRED PRIMARILY FOR SECURITY AND HEALTH PURPOSES AND, GIVEN A CHOICE, THE MAJORITY WOULD BE WILLING TO SWAP THEIR GENERALLY UNTRAINED HIRED HELP FOR A FEW GOOD AMERICAN APPLIANCES.

5. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO GIVE YOU A MORE BALANCED VIEW OF HOW WE LIVE IN JAKARTA AND TO REQUEST YOUR INTERVENTION IN BRINGING TO A HALT TO THE FLOW OF MESSAGES WHICH IMPLY THAT EMPLOYEES OF THIS USAID ARE LIVING IN A MANNER WHICH IS UNSEEMLY AND BRINGS DISCREDIT TO THE USG AND AID.


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PAGE 01 JAKART 13762 02 OF 02 120648Z
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
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
FOR GOVERNOR GILLIGAN, ADMINISTRATOR

6. WHAT CONSTITUTES A LIFESTYLE APPROPRIATE TO AID'S PURPOSES HAS NOT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE BEEN DEFINED. MANY OF US MIGHT AT SOME POINT IN OUR LIVES BE WILLING, ON A TEMPORARY AND/OR VOLUNTEER BASIS TO ACCEPT LIVING CONDITIONS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW THE STANDARDS OF WESTERN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. FEW, HOWEVER, WOULD CONSENT TO SUCH CONDITIONS THROUGHOUT A WORKING CAREER OR DEPRIVE OUR FAMILIES IN LARGE MEASURE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION FOR REPEATED, EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME. WE DO NOT OPPOSE, OF COURSE, EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT OUR SUPPORT OPERATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT IN THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE MANNER CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING GOOD MORALE AND HEALTHY LIVING CONDITIONS FOR OUR EMPLOYEES AND THEIR FAMILIES. REASONABLE EFFORTS TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE WILL HAVE OUR ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT.

7. ENDORSEMENT OF THIS TELEGRAM HAS BEEN LIMITED TO DIRECT HIRE AMERICANS WITH 6 OR MORE MONTHS EXPERIENCE IN INDONESIA. THE FOLLOWING NAMES REPRESENT 93 PERCENT OF THOSE EMPLOYEES NOW AT POST WHO MEET THIS CRITERION:



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S/P: BDMILETICH: BDM:
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S/P: ALAKE

S/P: CFARRAR

S/P-OF: BSKINNEY

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already have
one.*

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ROUTINE .LA PAZ

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: LA PAZ 8776

FOR [] FROM S/P-LAKE

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CF
BSK

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 31, 1977. MR. CURTIS FARRAR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISSENT CHANNEL REGULATIONS, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

B6

Department of State

RELEASE IN FULL

RELEASE IN FULL

PAGE 01 STATE 237254
ORIGIN AID-44

4860

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EA-12 EUR-12 NEA-10 IO-14 PCH-02
EB-08 IGA-02 L-03 H-02 /120 RDRAFTED BY AA/SER: RCCHASE
APPROVED BY AA/SER: DGMACDONALD
AA/LEG: JSCHILL (DRAFT)
SER/MO: RNEWMAN (DRAFT)
MP/DPC: WJFRADENBURGDESIRED DISTRIBUTION
BT ACTION SER CHRON 1 3 4 8 INFO MP OL 4ASIA DM OPM SMO LA 8ASIA
AAID ES OMB TRSY 44P

-----010132 012355Z /70

R 011817Z OCT 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AID PRIN POSTSV
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT POUCH

UNCLAS STATE 237254

AIDAC, TO ALL AID MISSION REPS AND STAFF

BANGKOK FOR USAID AND RED

DAKAR FOR RDO AND OMVS COORD

DAR ES SALAAM FOR USAID AND RDOEA/ARUSHA

GUATEMALA FOR USAID AND ROCAP.

KARACHI FOR AAG
NAIROBI FOR USAID AND REDSO/EA

PARIS FOR UNESCO AND USOECD

ROME ALSO FOR AID OFFICE FRIULT

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: FY 1979 CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION

REF: A. STATE 183815 B. STATE 183814 C. STATE 136167.

1. PER REFS A AND B, MISSIONS HAVE BEEN URGED TO DIRECTLY ADDRESS GENERAL MISSION OPERATIONS TOWARD REDUCING OPERATING EXPENSES AND PER REF C, REDIRECTING LIFESTYLES TO MORE APPROPRIATELY REFLECT OUR ROLE IN HELPING THE POOR MAJORITY.

2. IN PUTTING FORTH OUR REQUEST TO THE CONGRESS FOR FY 1979 FUNDS IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE AN INVENTORY IN HAND OF SPECIFIC MEASURES TAKEN, OR COMMITTED, BY USAIDS.

3. PLEASE FORWARD BY NOVEMBER 30 A LIST OF ACTIONS TO CUT COSTS AND/OR THE APPEARANCE OF OSTENTATIOUS LIVING. THIS LIST SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY NO MORE THAN ONE SHORT PARAGRAPH OF DESCRIPTIVE MATERIAL AND AN ESTIMATE OF THE DOLLAR SAVING IN FY 1978, AND SUBSEQUENT YEARS AS APPROPRIATE. CHRISTOPHER

NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHED AMEMBASSY BEIRUT.

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 268301
ORIGIN SP-02

RELEASE IN PART
B6

9765

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /003 R

DRAFTED BY S/P: MACASEY: BDM
APPROVED BY S/P: ALAKE
S/P: CFARRAR
S/P-OF: DSKINNEY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S/P ONLY

R 091828Z NOV 77 -----040128 101025Z /11
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MANILA

UNCLAS STATE 268301

DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE


REF: MANILA 17279

FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P-LAKE

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 2, 1977. MR. CURTIS FARRAR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISSENT CHANNEL REGULATIONS, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL THE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. VANCE

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 066815
ORIGIN SP-02
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 /003 R

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PART B6

MA

DRAFTED BY S/P: MACASEY: BDM
APPROVED BY S/P: MELY
S/P: RJHARRINGTON (DRAFT)
S/P-OF: NBOYER (DRAFT)
EB/IFD/OIA: RJSMITH
ARA/ECP: JO' MAHONY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S/P ONLY

-----252142Z 112282 /70
O 252050Z MAR 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 066815

STADIS////////////////////////////////////
DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EINV, CO

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: OPIC ANDEAN INVESTMENT MISSION

REF: A. BOGOTA 2651

FOR

1. BUREAUS ACTIVELY CONCERNED WITH RESPONDING TO YOUR
DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON THE PROPOSED OPIC ANDEAN INVEST-
MENT MISSION ARE AWARE OF THE PLANNED ARRIVAL OF THE OPIC
REPRESENTATIVES ON MARCH 28. ALTHOUGH YOUR PARA FIVE REFTEL
IS WELL-TAKEN, THE ADVANCE TEAM HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO
PROCEED AND IS EXPECTED TO DO SO. DISPATCH OF THE TEAM
SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THAT
SUGGESTION POSITED IN YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE HAS BEEN OVER-
TAKEN BY EVENTS. WE EXPECT TO REPLY TO YOUR DISSENT VERY
SHORTLY.
VANCE

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REB196

PAGE 01

STATE 237862

ORIGIN SP-02

INFO OCT-01 180-00 ONY-00 7003 R

DRAFTED BY S/PINABOYERIRMC
APPROVED BY S/PINBARTHOLOMEW, ACTING
PER/RUSSELL
S/PINVELTOTES
ABAIWLUERO
S/IGIRYOST
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
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file

R 242200Z SEP 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

127944

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 237862

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652 N7A

TAGS: APER

SUBJECT: YOUR DISSENT MESSAGES

REF: BTN 1720, BTN 1750

FOR [REDACTED] FROM REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW
ACTING DIRECTOR S/P

B6

WE BELIEVE THE TWO REFERENCED MESSAGES AND THE MATTERS
THEY RAISE DO NOT FALL WITHIN INTENDED PURVIEW OF THE DISSENT
CHANNEL WHICH CONCERNS "VIEWS ON POLICY". IT IS, OF COURSE,
THE CLEAR POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT TO ENCOURAGE PRESENTATION
OF ALTERNATIVE POINTS OF VIEW ON POLICY ISSUES AND TO AVOID
ANY SANCTIONS ON INDIVIDUALS AS A RESULT OF EXPRESSING
DIFFERING VIEWS.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PAGE 02

STATE 237802



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE APPROPRIATE AREAS OF THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE CONSIDERING YOUR CASE AND THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND PURSUING IT FURTHER WITH YOU. IF YOU ARE SO INCLINED FOLLOWING THIS PROCESS YOU COULD PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER IN THE GRIEVANCE SYSTEM, WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE APPROPRIATE CHANNEL IN THIS CASE.

3. WE ARE, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO TALK FURTHER WITH YOU IF YOU WISH ABOUT YOUR CASE AND THE DISSENT CHANNEL. KISSINGER



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REB587

PAGE 01 BRIDGE 2468 151736Z
ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 7004 W

013430 /50 .45

R 141823Z DEC 76
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1834

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BRIDGETOWN 2468

DISSENT CHANNEL FROM [REDACTED]

B6

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: EAID, BB, XL
SUBJ: INCREASED STAFFING - RDO/C

REF: BRIDGETOWN 2454

1. THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED BY [REDACTED] IT HAS THE CONCUR-
RENCE OF [REDACTED]

B6

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2. REFTEL PROPOSES AN INCREASE IN THE STAFFING OF THE RDO/C WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A TOTAL OF FIVE US AND FOUR BARBADIAN/TCN EMPLOYEES. PRESENT STAFF CONSISTS OF TWO US AND TWO BARBADIAN EMPLOYEES. UNTIL JUNE OF THIS YEAR, AID DID NOT HAVE ANYONE ASSIGNED HERE ON A PERMANENT BASIS, AND THE AID PROGRAM WAS CARRIED ON BY A COMBINATION OF MONITORING ON THE PART OF THE EMBASSY'S ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL OFFICER AND TOY ASSIGNMENTS OUT OF WASHINGTON. DESPITE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RDO/C AND ASSIGNMENT OF TWO AID OFFICERS, THE TOY ASSIGNMENTS HAVE CONTINUED WITH MORE OR LESS THE SAME FREQUENCY.

3. THE AID PROGRAM IS A MULTILATERAL PROGRAM, ADMINISTERED OR TO BE ADMINISTERED THROUGH A NUMBER OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (COB). AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THERE IS NO LIKELY PROSPECT THAT THIS SITUATION WILL CHANGE. HOWEVER, BOTH DISBURSEMENTS AND THE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02

BRIDGE 22468 151735Z

COMPLEXITY OF THE PROGRAM ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE. IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT RDO/C ARGUES FOR THE PROPOSED INCREASE, WHICH, AS ALREADY NOTED WOULD MORE THAN DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES.

4. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH AN INCREASE--OR, INDEED, ANY INCREASE AT ALL--CAN BE SHOWN TO BE JUSTIFIED IN THE ABSENCE OF A BILATERAL PROGRAM. TO CONTEND OTHERWISE, IT SEEMS TO US, IS VERY LIKE ARGUING FOR AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ADMIRALS IN THE SWISS NAVY. OF THE THREE MAJOR ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH ANY AID PROGRAM - PROGRAMMING, IMPLEMENTATION, AND MONITORING - CDB OFFICIALS PLAY A CONSIDERABLE ROLE IN THE FIRST AND A PREPONDERANT ROLE IN THE SECOND, WHILE THE MONITORING OF THE PROGRAM UNTIL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RDO/C WAS CARRIED ON BY THE EMBASSY'S ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL OFFICER IN LESS THAN ONE-THIRD OF HIS TIME.

5. GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE AREA HAVE LONG ARGUED IN FAVOR OF MORE US AID AND OF AID ADMINISTERED ON A BILATERAL BASIS. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RDO/C ENCOURAGED THEM TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR HOPES HAD BEEN REALIZED, AND COMMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT, AT LAST, THE USG HAD RECOGNIZED BARBADOS' (OR GRENADA'S, OR DOMINICA'S) NEEDS HAVE BEEN HEARD FREQUENTLY IN RECENT WEEKS. DISABUSING EMBASSY INTERLOCUTORS OF THAT IDEA HAS INVARIABLY LED TO EXPRESSIONS OF DISAPPOINTMENT, SOME OF THEM INDICATING GENUINE BITTERNESS. ANY SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO RDO/C WILL INEVITABLY HAVE A SIMILAR EFFECT; I.E., LOCAL EXPECTATION WILL BE RAISED ONLY TO BE DASHED. MOREOVER, IT SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED THAT ULTIMATELY NOT ONLY BEWILDERMENT BUT ALSO SUSPICION WILL ATTEND REALIZATION OF THE FACT THAT RDO/C EXISTS DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A BILATERAL AID PROGRAM.

6. THE PROPOSED RDO/C INCREASE APPEARS WHOLLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE AUSTERITY IN GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS THAT HAS BEEN EMPHASIZED TO SUCH AN EXTENT IN RECENT YEARS. FOR EXAMPLE, THIS EMBASSY'S CONSULAR SECTION'S WORKLOAD HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY (IMMIGRANT VISA WORK HAS DOUBLED) IN LESS THAN A MONTH DUE TO THE RECENT AMENDMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

STATE TELEGRAM

PAGE 03 BRIDGE 02468 151735Z

NATIONALITY ACT, BUT THE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT YET AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL INCREASES TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION. THE MORALE IMPLICATIONS OF OVERSTAFFING IN ONE PORTION OF A MISSION AND UNDERSTAFFING IN ANOTHER NEED NOT BE SPELLED OUT.

7. A CO-DRAFTER OF THIS MESSAGE [REDACTED] HAS RECENTLY SUBMITTED A RELATED MESSAGE (BRIDGETOWN 2452) THAT ARGUES FOR A SWITCH TO BILATERAL AID FOR THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN. OBVIOUSLY SUCH A CHANGE -- HIGHLY UNLIKELY AT PRESENT -- WOULD REQUIRE AN INCREASE IN AID REGIONAL STAFFING. PORTER'S POSITION IS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF A BILATERAL APPROACH, THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION AT PRESENT FOR ANY AID STAFF INCREASE HERE.

DECONTROL UPON RECEIPT
BRITTON

B6

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MORE OR LESS THE SAME FREQUENCY.

3. THE AID PROGRAM IS A MULTILATERAL PROGRAM, ADMINISTERED OR TO BE ADMINISTERED THROUGH A NUMBER OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (COB). AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THERE IS NO LIKELY PROSPECT THAT THIS SITUATION WILL CHANGE. HOWEVER, BOTH DISBURSEMENTS AND THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



STATE TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN FULL

Dear Jim:

I appreciate your special and personal interest in the ILO and the U.S. position. This is an issue that also greatly concerns me.

We share your assessment that the ILO made significant progress in the months between the date of our November 1975 letter of intent to withdraw and the November 1977 Conference. Most heartening has been the new cohesion of the industrialized free market countries. I am particularly grateful for the solid support of your own countrymen.

JUNE

NOT TRUE

Whatever our decision, we view that support as a very solid achievement in our two year effort, and it will be fully reflected in our final assessment.

At the same time, as you point out, the June 1977 International Labor Conference was a real disappointment. We were not expecting victory across the board. We had hoped for concrete signs of continuing momentum on at least some of the issues. Except for your support, and that of other industrialized democracies--and I do not minimize this--I think you will agree that we failed to continue this momentum.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

We have repeatedly stated that we will review all of the factors involved before making a decision. Our assessment will include the full two-year record of our effort to reform, the views of our friends and the value of the work of the organization in achieving its goals. Obviously, the results of the Conference and the special atmosphere which prevailed will be a central factor.

Whatever we decide, I continue to believe that one mistake too often made by the West is our inability to engage in coordinated diplomatic approaches to developing countries on key issues in international organizations. For the last two years the United States made reform of the ILO an important item in its bilateral diplomacy. The lesson of the last two years seems to be that one country can do a great deal but not enough. I would therefore hope that whatever the U.S. decision, the EC-9 in particular can agree publicly that its governments intend to accord ILO reform an important place on their bilateral agenda in the future and to make an intense diplomatic effort to build on the core of support we already have.

As my colleagues have informed you, we plan to consult with you prior to any public announcement of a U.S. decision.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

Whatever the final outcome, we look forward to working closely with our British friends on international labor issues.

With warm wishes,

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASE IN FULL

Return to [unclear]

7820537
7820541

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1978

EXPEDITE

*TL
PHK
JG
TLT
10/25*

SERIES NO:
RF (rs)
M
CODE IV
per ek(rs)
10/25/78

TO: A. - Assistant Secretary Thomas
PA: - Assistant Secretary Carter
L - Deputy Assistant Legal Adviser Marks
M/DGP - Ambassador Barnes
M/MO - Mr. Malone

FROM: M - Ben H. Read *gwr*

SUBJECT: Classification/Declassification Center

Confirming my October 13 conversations with the Assistant Secretaries for A and PA, I have decided, after considering all of the memoranda and representations made, that we should now institute several reorganization moves. As required by Executive Order 12065, Section 5-404 (a), (b), and (c) separate responsibilities for operations, appeals, and oversight of all declassification matters should be set up as follows:

A. Operations

1. Guidelines, Policies, and Review for Classification/Declassification and Release.

A new Deputy Assistant Secretary will be appointed to A to be in charge of a new Classification/Declassification Center. The Center will be co-located with FADRC on the first floor. The DAS will be responsible for:

- All Departmental E.O. classification and declassification activities;
- Conducting an educational program on the new Executive Order;
- Deciding all formal declassification, release, and denial issues in the first instance;
- Providing appropriate staffing of all appeals and serving as a non-voting member of appeals panels;

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--Providing all Department reports and information required by the Information Security Oversight Office; and

--Representing the Department, with L when appropriate, on the Interagency Information Security Committee.

The staff of the center will include: Up to six new positions, including that for the new DAS; a portion of the current A staff dealing with Privacy Act matters; part of the FOI staff which will be transferred from PA*; an indeterminate number of positions to be transferred from the regional and functional bureaus which are presently used primarily for FOI declassification review purposes; and an indeterminate number of PIT positions, to be made up principally of retired Foreign Service Officers who may be organized to work on a split-day shift system or other part-time arrangements in sufficient numbers to accomplish the objectives of the Executive Order. The selection of the individual officers will be done in coordination with the bureaus.

The DAS in charge of the Center will operate in a quasi-autonomous manner in accordance with classification/ declassification guidelines and policies to be developed by a committee chaired by the DAS with representatives of the concerned regional and functional bureaus, including PA. The bureaus will propose substantive guidelines and policies for their respective areas for submission to the committee which will in turn review them and promulgate the final directives.

2. Request Processing and Maintenance of Classification Status.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations will be responsible for processing requests to provide all relevant information materials, furnish these materials to the Classification/Declassification Center for review, and maintain a record of all Department declassification decisions. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations will also identify and provide records to the Classification/

*One or two positions will remain in PA to staff appeals, if it proves necessary and desirable, four or five positions will be transferred to FADRC for request processing, and the rest to the Classification/Declassification Center.

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RELEASE IN PART
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April 17, 1972

To: S/PC - Mr. Cargo

From:

Dissent: The Soviet Union and Vietnam

Through the Department's established procedure I wish to submit my strongly held views on this critical subject.

I first sought to affect policy as it was being made. On April 8 I submitted to Mr. Richard T. Davies a draft memorandum from Mr. Hillenbrand to the Secretary, covering a draft memorandum for the Secretary to send to the President. During the week I asked about my drafts, and made several efforts to have them moved forward. Unfortunately Mr. Davies had to leave for Moscow before I could speak with him again, but I believe my assumption is correct that he judged my drafts would not express considered Departmental policy. I of course accept this as proper, but it is for this reason that I turn to the dissent channel. It is my conviction that profound American interests are being jeopardized by our present course in Vietnam insofar as it relates to the USSR. I wish to seek to affect our present policy in any way open to me. As a loyal Foreign Service Officer, I do not believe in leaking or in public dissent, but I do hope my views will be given due consideration.

A word about my credentials for commenting: I began studying Soviet affairs in 1951, have been in Soviet affairs continuously in the Foreign Service since 1959, served in Moscow from 1962 to 1964, and worked on the Soviet side of the Vietnam talks in Paris under both Harriman and Lodge from May 1968 to July 1969. I am now on the Soviet Desk.

B6

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THE SOVIET UNION AND VIETNAM

I will argue in this paper that the present U.S. course of action towards Vietnam places the Moscow summit in jeopardy and endangers American interests of far greater importance than the current military situation in Vietnam.

Keeping the Soviet perspective in mind, the following are the key developments leading to the present Vietnam situation:

(1) Out of the long history of the war, three fundamental facts stand out. First, the Soviet Union has always been committed to the DRV as a socialist ally. Second, the bombing of the DRV, launched when Kosygin was in Hanoi, always put the USSR in an acutely embarrassing situation, especially in the competition with Peking. Third, against Chinese wishes the Soviets worked to get the DRV and NLF to negotiate in Paris. Our policy of "Vietnamization" apparently looked to the Soviets like a turning of our backs on the Paris talks as a serious negotiating channel.

(2) Most recently, the President's trip to Peking exacerbated the USSR's problems in dealing with Hanoi. Competing with the PRC for influence, the Soviets condemned the PRC for ignoring or even betraying the Vietnamese cause. The continuation of Soviet aid to Hanoi was essential in the Sino-Soviet context, although there are strong indications that the USSR refused to give all that Hanoi wanted.

(3) Our new position on the Paris talks, taken by Hanoi to be a boycott, put Moscow--the advocate of the talks--in a weaker arguing position in Hanoi. The approach of the Moscow summit made it harder for the Soviets to show weakness in supporting Hanoi.

(4) The weight of the evidence strongly argues that Moscow did not encourage the present DRV offensive, but was in no position to dissuade Hanoi from launching it. Moscow was obligated to provide aid and express some support. Backing away from military aid commitments was a policy the Politburo could not have agreed on.

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At present our public signals to Moscow, followed by the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi, have put the Soviets in an acutely embarrassing position. In my opinion, we should not imagine that because of our opening to China we have the Soviets in a position of weakness from which they cannot afford to react to our moves. Almost the opposite is more likely true. Unless they are to look weak--to the world, and to each other within the Politburo--they will be forced to react. The potential loss for American interests, I believe, is much more serious than any loss we could suffer now in Vietnam.

I believe the Soviets see their own situation at present as follows: Their aid commitment to the DRV cannot be reneged upon. The Soviets do not control Hanoi. They must demonstrate loyalty, must work out their arms delivery policy from a poor negotiating position, and cannot impose political or military advice. In the absence of Paris negotiations or any move back towards the table in Paris, their influence is lessened, and the renewed bombing exposes Moscow to charges of "complicity with imperialism" in moving towards the summit. Larger Soviet purposes dictate continued attachment to the summit, especially the desire to keep up with Peking and not promote further U.S.-PRC rapprochement; but the pressures from the Vietnam situation are more immediate and may become inexorable. Once put on the spot as Hanoi's essential ally, the Soviets must live up to the commitment as a matter of priority over most other things. Cancellation or postponement of the summit would be a probable step, and if the military situation continued bad--if the bombing escalated--then stepped-up military aid measures would have to follow. Some U.S.-Soviet negotiations now in progress might be kept going for specific purposes, but the Soviets would be likely to move towards another "freeze" in U.S.-Soviet relations. This, I repeat, is how I believe the Soviets see their situation now.

I do not know if our current policy is aimed at Moscow as well as Hanoi. I suspect the Soviets think it is, because of the President's public statements over recent days. Regardless of whether our policy is aimed at Hanoi alone or at both Hanoi and Moscow, I would argue that the risks are more important than the possible gains. We have tried bombing before and it failed to accomplish our military aims, although the political damage to the United States around the world was incalculable. Even if our bombing attains short-term military ends, I

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strongly believe that a long-range U.S. policy in Indochina cannot be based upon it. My own conviction is that the potential benefits of concrete improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations, of East-West relations in Europe and elsewhere, enormously outweigh the short-term military advantages we hope to gain by our present course in Vietnam.

The fact is that we cannot compel the USSR to alter its own policy towards Vietnam or Hanoi's policy on the ground, and I believe those who know Vietnam better than I do would also say that our military pressure cannot compel Hanoi to alter its tactics except over a very limited time span. And meanwhile the harm to American interests elsewhere, beginning with our Soviet relationship, can be lasting and deep.

Therefore I would plead for a cessation of U.S. statements tending to put responsibility on the Soviet Union for events in Vietnam, and would urge an avoidance of the type of bombings of the DRV which might force the Soviets to take compensatory political or military steps.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MBABAN 1619 221748Z

15
ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 /015 W

041458

R 220950Z SEP 72
FM AMEMBASSY MBABANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3916
INFO AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY MASERU
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

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DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR 0/06

REF: (A) A-9235 (B) A-3559

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY
 DMC/CHARGE.

2. I STRONGLY PROTEST "ALL PARTIES" (REF A) AGREEING TO
DISENFRANCHISE ME AND OTHERS IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES IN
REPRESENTATION ELECTION UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11636. AFRICA
AND OTHER AREAS STAFFED THROUGHOUT WITH FSO-4/3 DCISM AND
PRINCIPAL OFFICERS MANY OF WHOM HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE
IN ATTEMPTS ACHIEVE IMPROVEMENT SUCH AS BY SERVICE ON TASK
FORCES AND IN DAILY PERFORMANCE PRESENT AND PREVIOUS POSI-
TIONS. AGREEMENT OF DEPARTMENT TO DEFINITION THESE OFFICERS
AS MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS AND CONSEQUENT EXCLUSION FROM BALLOT
PRIVILEGE SEEMS IMPLY AGREEMENT WITH THESIS THAT A PROGRAM
DIRECTOR IN FIELD IS IPSO FACTO A "TOOL OF MANAGEMENT" AND
THEREFORE INCAPABLE OF VOTING AN INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT. THIS
IS DEMEANING. IT IS ALSO DISCRIMINATING SINCE OFFICERS OF
SIMILAR OR HIGHER RANKS IN LARGER POSTS OR DEPARTMENT WHO
MAY BE IN SECTION CHIEF POSITIONS APPARENTLY WILL VOTE. IT
IS MY FOREIGN SERVICE TOO. FINALLY I BELIEVE THAT FIELD EMP-
LOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS HAS BENEFITED AND WILL CONTINUE
TO DO SO BY JUDGMENTS OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS WHO

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Rec'd 9-27-72

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pm

FORM OS-1652

B6



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MBABAN 01619 221048Z

HAVE EARNED ASSIGNMENT TO RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS IN FIELD. I
URGE DEPARTMENT TO CONTINUE CONSIDER FRANCHISE ELIGIBILITY
QUESTION IN LIGHT VERY EXISTENCE THIS TELEGRAM. IF I
WERE TOOL OF STATE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT OBVIOUSLY I WOULD
NOT SEND IT.

[Redacted]

B6

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FORM DS-1652

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B6

DISSENT ACTION FORM

Message

Type Telegram - Unclassified

Date June 13, 1974

Number 1876

Drafted by

Office or Post Area Development Office - Yaounde

B6

S/P Action

Date Received June 14, 1974

Action Officer Hopkins (AID)

Initial Distribution Secretary, Exec. Sec., S/P Director, OFP Chairman

Acknowledgment Sent Yes

Date 6-24-74

Number of Message State ~~134795~~

Further Action: State 148830 (7-10-74) noted pouching of Hopkins response

Final Disposition:

Final Report Sent to Drafter

Date 7-10-74

Number of Message Letter

OFP Action

Initial Notification _____

Action: Passed immediately to Peter Swiers who deferred action because of administrative nature of message. Called Mr. Hopkins in AID for guidance

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B6

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REA805

PAGE 01 BANGKO 08679 291033Z

41
ACTION SP-03

INFO OCT-01 /004 W

069916

R 290912Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3668


LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BANGKOK 8679

DISSENT CHANNEL

EO 11652/ NA
TAGS: AORG, EAID, TH
SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION OF RED-USOM RELATIONSHIPS

REF: STATE 107086

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTING BY:



JR., ACTING DIRECTOR, RED
PUTY DIRECTOR, RED
ASST. FINANCIAL AND MANAGEMENT OFFICER
IOR ENGINEERING ADVISOR
IONAL DEVELOPMENT ADVISOR
REGIONAL FINANCIAL AND MANAGEMENT OFFICER
ONG PROJECT OFFICER
ITAL PROJECTS DEV. OFFICER
, ASSISTANT PROGRAM OFFICER
EGIONAL PROGRAM OFFICER
REGIONAL RESEARCH OFFICER
REGIONAL PROGRAM EVALUATION OFFICER

B6

2. SUMMARY: IN THE SPIRIT OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IS ENCOURAGED WHEN SUBSTANTIVE POLICY ISSUES ARE AT STAK

WE ARE TRANSMITTING HEREWITH THE COLLECTIVE VIEWS OF THE FOREGOING RED STAFF REGARDING THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PLACING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL ACTIVITIES IN NINE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ONE OF THE SIX U.S. BILATERAL AID MISS-

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PAGE 02 BANGKO 08679 291033Z

IONS OF THE REGION, E.G. USOM/THAILAND. THESE VIEWS ARE OFFERED ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT DISCREET AND EFFECTIVE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL COOPERATION BY ASIANS IS STILL WITHIN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN THIS AREA. IF THIS PRESUMPTION IS CORRECT, THEN

WE FAIL TO SEE HOW SUCH INTERESTS CAN BE MAINTAINED UNDER THE ADMIN

TRATIVE ARRANGEMENT OUTLINED IN PARA (2) REFTEL. WE OFFER THESE VIEWS ON THE BASIS OF OUR LONG COLLECTIVE EXPERIENCE

IN REGIONAL AND ALSO BILATERAL PROGRAMS IN ASIA AND OTHER REGIONS. WE BELIEVE THESE OPINIONS ARE AN OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT SINCE MOST OF THE STAFF SIGNING THIS CABLE WILL BE LEAVI

FOR NEW ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS. IN GOOD CONSCIENCE WE FEEL COMPELLED TO POINT OUT OUR STRONG RESERVATIONS AND CONCERN THAT WHAT ASIANS HAVE COME TO IDENTIFY AS SYMPATHETIC U.S. SUPPORT OF ASIAN REGIONALISM IS ABOUT TO BE COMPROMISED UNDER THE RUBRIC OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONVENIENCE OR BUREAUCRATIC EFFICIENCIES.

IF WITHIN REVISED U.S. POLICY INTERESTS IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT

THE U.S. BEST DIVORCE ITSELF FROM A MEANINGFUL ROLE IN SUPPORTING REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THIS AREA, THEN OF COURSE, THE FOLLOWING VIEWS HAVE NO BASIS. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HERE DO NOT QUESTION THE DESIRABILITY OF RED AND USOM SHARING A SINGLE PHYSICAL LOCATION AND APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FACILITIES WHICH MIGHT PRODUCE FISCAL SAVINGS. END SUMMARY.

3. SINCE ITS INITIATION IN 1966, THE U.S. REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OFFICE FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA (RED) HAS BEEN OPERATED BY A SMALL GROUP OF SIXTEEN OFFICERS WORKING WITH REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

SINCE THEIR INCEPTION IN NINE ASIAN NATIONS. IT HAS DEVELOPED A PROGRAMMING METHODOLOGY WITH A VIEW TO GIVING ASIANS FULL RESPONSIB

ILITIES IN PROGRAM DESIGN AND PROJECT OPERATIONS, AND BUILT INTO THESE MONITORING AND EVALUATION TECHNIQUES TO BE CARRIED OUT BY ASIAN RECIPIENTS AS WELL AS BY THE USG AS ONE OF SEVERAL DONORS. TH

STRATEGY HAS ACCOMPLISHED THE BASIC GOAL OF BUILDING ASIAN REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS. THIS WAS DONE FOR THE MOST PART DURING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR. A MAJOR MODIFICATION OF U.S. PARTIC

IPATION IN ASIAN REGIONAL UNDERTAKINGS COULD AT THIS TIME CONVEY THE IMPRESSION TO ASIANS THAT PERHAPS THE WHOLE U.S. MOTIVATION WAS BUT

A DIVERSIONARY MEASURE WHILE WE WERE MILITARILY INVOLVED IN INDOCH-

INA. *17 We view the change outlined in Para (2) RefTel as such a major*
AT WE VIEW THE CHANGE OUTLINED IN PARA (2) REFTEL AS SUCH A MAJOR

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PAGE 03 BANGKO 08679 291033Z

MODIFICATION. WE FIND THE PROPOSAL OUTLINED THERE INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT AND UNLIKELY TO PROVE WORKABLE. WE DO NOT SEE HOW RED CAN CONTINUE AS A QTE SEPARATE OFFICE UNQTE, WITH DISTINCT PROGRAMS IN NINE COUNTRIES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME HAVING ITS QTE DIRECTOR UNQTE REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE BILATERAL AID MISSION TO THAILAND. WE ARE AWARE OF THE WORKING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEvised BETWEEN AID'S REGIONAL AND BILATERAL PROGRAMS IN AFRICA AND CENTRAL AMERICA, AND HAVE ALWAYS SCRUTINIZED RED'S STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS WITH A VIEW TO DEVISING BETTER ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS IF SUCH SEEMED FEASIBLE. HERE IN BANGKOK MOST EMBASSIES HAVE EITHER A COUSSELLOR OR FIRST SECRETARY IN CHARGE OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS. THE USG, WHICH THROUGH RED HAS BEEN AT THE FOREFRONT IN FORMULATING MULTILATERAL REGIONAL UNDERTAKINGS BOTH THROUGH INFORMAL MEETINGS OF SUCH OFFICERS AND IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS CONVENED BY THE REGIONAL GROUPINGS

WITH WHICH RED WORKS, NOW CHOOSE TO DOWNGRADE ITS POSITION OF COUNSELLOR OF EMBASSY FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS, ELIMINATE THE INDEPENDENCE

AND IDENTITY OF THE OFFICE IT CREATED TO ASSIST REGIONAL UNDERTAKINGS IN THIS AREA, AND PLACE ITS REGIONAL PROGRAMS (COVERING NINE COUNTRIES) UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ITS BILATERAL AID MISSION TO THAILAND. IN OUR JUDGEMENT THE ASIAN AND DONOR COMMUNITY INTERPRETATION GIVEN SUCH A MOVE CAN ONLY BE THAT THE U.S. IS NOW RELEGATING REGIONAL COOPERATION TO A MUCH LOWER PRIORITY.

5. WE ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED OVER RED'S WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MEKONG COORDINATING COMMITTEE (MCC) AND THE TWENTY-NINE NATIONS

WORKING WITH THIS REGIONAL GROUP. THAILAND'S DOMINANCE WITHIN MEKONG BASIN AFFAIRS HAD LONG BEEN A SOURCE OF IRRITATION TO THE OTHER RIPARIAN STATES. LATELY THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN AMELIORATED THROUGH THAI AND MCC INITIATIVES. IF THE USG NOW PUTS ITS PARTICIPATION IN MEKONG BASIN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE DIRECTOR OF ITS BILATERAL AID MISSION IN THAILAND, THEN THIS WILL PROBABLY BE VIEWED BY ALL RIPARIAN STATES AS U.S. ACCEPTANCE AND SUPPORT OF THAI HEGEMONY IN MEKONG AFFAIRS. THE CONCERN HERE IS ESPECIALLY NOTUWORTHY IN CONSIDERING THAI/LAO RELATIONSHIPS. THE LAO ARE EXTREMELY SENSISTIVE IN ALWAYS SEEMINGLY EMERGING AS THE LOSER IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE THAI. THE NEW COALITION GOVERNMENT IN LAOS WOULD PROBABLY PLACE FAR GREATER SIGNIFICANCE UPON U.S. PARTICIPATION IN MEKONG AFFAIRS BEING HANDLED THROUGH THE U.S. BILATERAL AID MISSION TO THAILAND THAN THE OTHER RIPARIANS, BUT ALL ALONG WITH DONOR NATIONS CAN BE

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PAGE 04 BANGKO 08679 291033Z

EXPECTED TO SPECULATE AS TO THE UNDERLYING USG POLICY MOTIVES BEHIND SUCH A MOVE. WITHIN OTHER ASIAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THE INTERPRETATION OF THE INEGRATION OF THE U.S. REGIONAL OFFICE INTO THE U. S. BILATERAL MISSION TO THAILAND WILL RANGE FROM DOUBTS CONCERNING UNDERSTOOD U. S. COMMITMENTS TO ONGOING REGIONAL PROGRAMS

TO QUESTIONING REGARDING THE EXPECTED CONTINUING ROLE OF THE USG IN REGIONAL ACTIVITIES. WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT ANY COOPERATING CATION WILL BELIEVE THAT THIS SUBORDINATION OF THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR TO A BILATERAL DIRECTOR WAS PROMPTED BY RELATIVELY SMALL FINANCIAL SAVINGS OR BUREAUCRATIC EFFICIENCIES, BUT RATHER THAT IS IT IN FACT A MAJOR POLICY SHIFT WHICH WILL CAUSE THEM TO RETHINK THEIR OWN APPROACHES TO REGIONALISM.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT THE REORGANIZATION OUTLINED IN THE REFTEL SERVES NEITHER U. S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE REGION NOR THE INTERESTS OF THE ASIAN NATIONS CONCERNED. WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE TREATED AS A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN USG POLICY, AND AS SUCH SUBJECTED TO THE ANALYSIS WHICH IT DESERVES.
MASTERS

Dist. of State:

RELEASE IN FULL

ACA	183815	050920Z AUG 7	SIGNATURE
UNCLASSIFIED		CLASSIFICATION	SPECIAL CHAR.
DAA/SER:RCCHASE		NAME	
6/4/77:X20966		TEL EXT	
A/AID:JOHN J. GILLIGAN			

2

AA/SER:DGMACDONALD	SER/MP:WJFRADENBERG {PHONE}
AA/AFR:WHNORTH {PHONE}	AA/NE:BLANGMAID {PHONE}
AA/LA:EWCOY {PHONE}	AA/ASIA:DCOHN {PHONE}

2348 SER AID, ES, MP, AFR, NE, LA, ASIA, SASIA, DL, DMB, TRSY

PRIORITY LIST G

AIDAC TO ALL MISSION DIRECTORS AND AID REPS FROM GILLIGAN

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: FY 1978 OPERATING EXPENSES

1. I CALL FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION AND REQUEST YOUR DIRECT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN DEALING WITH THE CRITICAL SITUATION WE FACE WITH RESPECT TO OUR OPERATING EXPENSE BUDGET FOR FY 1978.

2. REVISED REQUESTS FOR FY 1978 RECENTLY SUBMITTED BY ALL MISSIONS TOTAL APPROXIMATELY 18 MILLION DOLLARS MORE THAN WAS SUBMITTED BY MISSIONS LAST YEAR AND INCLUDED THEN IN THE CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION FOR FY 1978. THIS CONSTITUTES APPROXIMATELY A 33 PERCENT INCREASE. WE FORESEE ADDITIONAL INCREASES PRINCIPALLY FOR FIELD-RELATED COSTS NOT REFLECTED IN YOUR RECENT SUBMISSIONS TOTTALLING SOME 6 MILLION DOLLARS. FINALLY, THE CONGRESS COULD ADOPT HOUSE AND SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE REDUCTION PROPOSALS OF SOME 14 MILLION DOLLARS. IN THAT EVENT, THE CURRENT OVERALL BUDGETARY REQUESTS FOR OPERATING EXPENSE FUNDS COULD EXCEED THE LEVEL WHICH THE CONGRESS PROVIDES BY 38 MILLION DOLLARS.

3. I AM PREPARED TO SEEK FROM THE CONGRESS THE OPERATING EXPENSE FUNDS WE REQUIRE TO SUPPORT OUR PROGRAMS, BUT WILL

JJG
RCC
DGM
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DC
WJF

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DO SO ONLY WHEN I AM PERSONALLY ASSURED THAT WE HAVE TAKEN ALL APPROPRIATE STEPS TO MANAGE OUR O.E. FUNDS TIGHTLY. I THEREFORE ASK YOUR PERSONAL AND IMMEDIATE COOPERATION IN A RIGOROUS BELT-TIGHTENING EXERCISE. A COMPANION MESSAGE TO THIS ONE FOLLOWS WITH THE REVIEWS AND ACTIONS YOU WILL NEED TAKE AT YOUR RESPECTIVE MISSIONS.

4. I ASSURE YOU AID/W WILL BE SUBJECTED TO THE SAME REVIEW AND AUSTERE MEASURES WE MUST ESTABLISH THROUGHOUT THE AGENCY. YOU KNOW THAT I HAVE ISSUED DIRECTIONS TO TEMPORARILY FREEZE HIRING OF NEW PERSONNEL. I HAVE ALSO DIRECTED MR. MACDONALD, AA/SER, TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO RESTRICT WASHINGTON ACTIVITIES FUNDED FROM THE OPERATING EXPENSE BUDGET.

5. IN SUMMARY, I WANT TO ENSURE THAT THE AGENCY HAS PRUDENTLY CONSTRUCTED ITS OPERATING EXPENSE BUDGETS FOR FY 1978 AND FY 1979, HAS ELIMINATED ALL FAT AND ESTABLISHED A NON-OSTENTATIOUS PROFILE OF LIFE STYLES AT ALL POSTS. YY

UNCLASSIFIED

LIST G AID AIRGRAMS AND TELEGRAMS

SEND TO:

LIST G

5 ABIDJAN	5 GUATEMALA	3 NIAMEY
4 ACCRA	9 ISLAMABAD	2 NOUAKCHOTT
5 ADDIS ABABA	8 JAKARTA	3 NDJAMENA
2 AMMAN	5 KABUL	
1 ANKARA +	2 KARACHI	2 OUAGADOUGOU
3 ASUNCION B	4 KATHMANDU	5 PANAMA
2 BAMAKO	1 KHARTOUM	5 PARIS +
5 BANGKOK	2 KIGALI	6 PORT AU PRINCE
2 BANGUI	3 KINGSTON	2 QUITO
2 BISSAU	5 KINSHASA	5 RABAT
5 BOGOTA	2 LAGOS	3 ROME +
2 BRASILIA	5 LA PAZ	4 SANA
1 BRIDGETOWN	5 LIMA	5 SAN JOSE
2 BUJUMBURA	1 LISBON	5 SAN SALVADOR
4 CAIRO	1 LOME	4 SANTIAGO
2 COLOMBO		5 SANTO DOMINGO
1 CONAKRY	5 MANAGUA	4 SEOUL
1 COTONOU	5 MANILA	
5 DACCA	2 MBABANE	5 TEGUCIGALPA
4 DAKAR	2 MEXICO	2 TEL AVIV +
9 DAMASCUS	5 MONROVIA	
4 DAR ES SALAAM	3 MONTEVIDEO	4 TUNIS
1 FREETOWN	12 NAIROBI	2 USUN NEW YORK
1 GENEVA +	5 NEW DELHI	4 YAOUNDE
3 GEORGETOWN		

CAPTIONS

3 BANGKOK FOR USOM AND RED

3 DAKAR FOR RDO AND OMVS COORD

3 DAR ES SALAAM FOR USAID AND RDOEA/ARUSHA

5 GUATEMALA FOR USAID AND ROCAP

2 KARACHI FOR AAG

2 NAIROBI FOR USAID AND REDSO/EA

8 PARIS FOR UNESCO AND USOECD

3 ROME ALSO FOR AID OFFICE FRIULI

72 POSTS (90 & 254 CYS W/CAPTIONS)

+INDICATES ADDITIONS TO
AWIDE COMBUTERIZED LISTCLASSIFICATION

6/29/77

RELEASE IN FULL

183814	050919Z AUG 7	SIGNATURE
UNCLASSIFIED		
DAA/SER:RCCHASE		
B/4/77:X20966		
AA/SER:DGMACDONALD		

2

AA/AFR:WHNORTH (PHONE)
 AA/LA:EUCOY (PHONE)
 SER/MP:WJFRADENBERG (PHONE)

AA/NE:BLANGMAID (PHONE)
 AA/ASIA:DCOHN (PHONE)
 (C) FRANCES

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION SER. FY ASIA ASIA LA AFR NE VP OM SMO

PRIORITY

AIDAC, TO ALL MISSION DIRECTORS AND AID REPS FROM MACDONALD

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: FY 1978 OPERATING EXPENSES

1. THE ADMINISTRATOR HAS SENT YOU A SEPARATE MESSAGE ON THE IMPENDING DIFFICULTIES FACING US WITH RESPECT TO OUR FY 1978 OPERATING EXPENSE BUDGET.
2. WITH RESPECT TO ANNUAL FY 1978 MISSION ALLOTMENT REQUIREMENTS, YOU SHOULD SUBMIT A RESPONSE BY COB AUGUST 12, WHICH HIGHLIGHTS THE EFFECTS OF REDUCTIONS FROM RECENT MOB SUBMISSION IN MISSION ALLOTMENTS AT THREE SUCCEEDING LEVELS, 10 PERCENT, 20 PERCENT AND 30 PERCENT. REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN PERSONNEL LEVELS (U.S. OR FOREIGN NATIONALS) ONLY AFTER HAVING MADE ALL POSSIBLE CUTS IN OTHER SUPPORT CATEGORIES SUCH AS CANCELLATION OR DEFERRAL UNTIL FY 1979 OF REPLACEABLE EQUIPMENT AND FURNITURE PROCUREMENTS; DECREASE IN ALL OPERATIONAL TRAVEL EXCEPT THAT CRITICAL TO PROGRAM SUPPORT; CONTRACT PERSONNEL; ETC.
3. THE RESPONSE SHOULD RANK ORDER EACH IDENTIFIABLE REDUCTION BY SEPARATE CATEGORY CORRESPONDING AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE TO OBJECT CLASSES. FOR EXAMPLE:

DGM
 RCC
 WHN
 BL
 EUC
 DC
 WJF

CLASSIFICATION

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TOTAL BUDGET 600,000 DOLLARS

RANK	CATEGORY	REDUCTION
1	SUPPLIES AND MATERIALS	1,000
2	LOCAL OPERATIONAL TRAVEL	6,000
3	INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONAL TRAVEL	5,000
4-7	OTHER CATEGORIES (TO BE IDENTIFIED)	48,000
-	10 PERCENT REDUCTION SUBTOTAL	60,000
8	CANCELLATION OF RESIDENTIAL EQUIPMENT	10,000
9	DEFERRAL OF RESIDENTIAL EQUIPMENT	30,000
10	SERVICE CONTRACT FOR LOCAL SALARY SURVEY	3,000
11-15	OTHER CATEGORIES (TO BE IDENTIFIED)	17,000
-	20 PERCENT REDUCTION SUBTOTAL	120,000
16	ENGINEER POS. NO. ... ASSIGNMENT	35,000
17	PROGRAM OFFICER POS. NO. ... ASSIGNMENT	20,000
18	INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONAL TRAVEL	2,000
19	OTHER CATEGORIES	3,000
-	30 PERCENT REDUCTION SUBTOTAL	180,000

4. EACH MAJOR LEVEL OF REDUCTION SHOULD INDICATE WHERE APPROPRIATE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS AND/OR STAFF HEALTH, SAFETY AND MORALE. THESE STATEMENTS WILL BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED IN MAKING ANY SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS ON THIS MATTER. ALSO TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WILL BE WHETHER A MISSION PROGRAM IS GROWING OR DECLINING. PLEASE TREAT THEM HONESTLY AND WITHOUT HYPERBOLE. ALSO NOTE THE RESPECTS IN WHICH SUCH ACTIONS WOULD IMPACT ON THE FY 1979 MISSION ALLOTMENT REQUIREMENT.

5. NOTE THAT CURRENT SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE MARK-UP CONTAINS A STRONG INJUNCTION AGAINST FUNDING U.S. DIRECT-HIRE STAFF FROM PROGRAM FUNDS. AT THIS TIME MISSIONS NEED NOT SHIFT COST BURDEN OF SUCH STAFF, IF ANY.

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TO OPERATING BUDGET, BUT BE SURE NOT TO ASSUME ANY REDUCTIONS CITED IN RANKING EXERCISE COULD BE ASSUMED UNDER PROGRAM ACCOUNTS.

6. AS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, IT APPEARS A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR IN OUR FY 1978 PROBLEM IS PRIOR UNDERESTIMATES OF OUR REQUIREMENTS, PARTICULARLY DUE TO THE IMPACT OF LOCAL INFLATION. WE MUST AVOID A RECURRENCE OF THIS IN FY 1979. OUR REVIEW OF MISSION SUBMISSIONS SINCE 1975 SHOWS THAT TOTAL MISSION ALLOTMENT REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN UNDERESTIMATED BY AN AVERAGE OF 30 PERCENT ANNUALLY. PLEASE INDICATE WHAT INFLATION FACTOR (IF ANY) YOU HAVE ASSUMED FOR VARIOUS OBJECT CLASSES IN BOTH FY 1978 AND 1979, AND, IF YOUR ANALYSIS SO INDICATES, PROVIDE US UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE LATTER YEAR.

7. WITH RESPECT TO FY 1977, CAREFULLY ANALYZE YOUR REQUIREMENTS FOR THE REMAINING TWO MONTHS OF THE YEAR AND, AFTER APPLICATION OF THE MOST RIGOROUS STANDARDS OF ECONOMY, CABLE AID/W BY AUGUST 15 WITH ADVICE OF ANY FUNDS IN EXCESS OF YOUR ABSOLUTE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. 44

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LIST G / TO MEMORANDUMS AND TELEGRAMS

SERIALS

LIST G

5 ABIDJAN	5 GUATEMALA	3 NIAMEY
4 ACCRA	9 ISLAMABAD	2 NOUAKCHOTT
5 ADDIS ABABA	8 JAKARTA	3 NDJAMENA
2 AMMAN	5 KABUL	
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4 CAIRO	1 LOME	4 SANTIAGO
2 COLOMBO		5 SANTO DOMINGO
1 CONAKRY	5 MANAGUA	4 SEOUL
1 COTONOU	5 MANILA	
5 DACCA	2 MBABANE	5 TEGUCIGALPA
4 DAKAR	2 MEXICO	2 TEL AVIV +
9 DAMASCUS	5 MONROVIA	
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3 GEORGETOWN		

CAPTIONS

3 BANGKOK FOR USOM AND RED

3 DAKAR FOR RDO AND OMVS COORD

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5 GUATEMALA FOR USAID AND ROCAP

2 KARACHI FOR AAG

2 NAIROBI FOR USAID AND REDSO/EA

5 PARIS FOR UNESCO AND USOECF

3 ROME ALSO FOR AID OFFICE FRIULI

72 POSTS (90 & 254 CYS W/CAPTIONS)

+INDICATES ADDITIONS TO
AWIDE COMPUTERIZED LISTCLASSIFICATION

6/27/77



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

*S/P
dissent
file*

February 18, 1977

TO : - ASIA/DCS-AID
FROM : Nicholas Veljotes - S/P
SUBJECT : Dissent Message, U.S. Policy Toward the
IMF, IBRD, ADB in Vietnam

B6

This will acknowledge the receipt of your dissent paper on the Department's policies on the IMF, IBRD, and the ADB in Vietnam. Mr. Douglas Pike of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your paper has been circulated to the offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff and the Chairperson of the Open Forum Panel, in addition to the Assistant Secretaries for East Asian Affairs and Economic and Business Affairs and the Director for AID. We commend your use of the dissent channel and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

cc: S: The Secretary
S/S: Mr. Borg
S/P: Mr. Lake
AID: Mr. Gillian
EA: Mr. Holbrooke
EB: Mr. Katz
OF: Mr. Boyer

RELEASE IN PART B6

CONFIDENTIAL
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 098500
ORIGIN SP-02

0091

INFO OCT-00 AOS-00 ES-01 /003 R

DRAFTED BY S/P-EO DONNELL: AG
APPROVED BY S/P-J ROCHE
S/P: EDOUGLAS
S/P: MMINTON
S/OF: GDRAGNICH

R 170305Z APR 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

-----036676 170559Z /16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 098500

~~DISSENT CHANNEL-FOR~~ [REDACTED] FROM S/P PAUL WOLFOWITZ

E. O. 12065: GDS-4/15/86 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL)

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: YOUR RECENT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REFERENCE: USUN 01086

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE CONCERNING US POLICY ON KAMPUCHEAN RELIEF. WE HAVE DISTRIBUTED COPIES TO THE SECRETARY, THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE COUNSELOR, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT, COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS, THE OFFICE OF REFUGEE PROGRAMS, EA/VLC-MR. ANDERSON, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM. MARK MINTON, MEMBER OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, WILL COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE.

3. I COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. HAIG

B6

CONFIDENTIAL

| 136267 | 131807Z JUN 7 |

RELEASE IN FULL

FOR
ADDEE'S
PLDS
CAPTIONS

15

UNCLASSIFIED

AA/SER: DGMACDONALD
DB/10/77 EXT. 29888
A/AID: JOHN J. GILLIGAN

DA/AID: RHNOOTER
SER/PM: FSIMMONS {SUBS}
SER/MO: STHORNBURG {SUBS}

A/AID: WPARKS {DRAFT}
SER/LR: EBOORADY {DRAFT}
SER/MP: PDROHAT {DRAFT}

7S ACTION SER CHRON 1 2 3 4 8 10 INFO MP AFR 15 NE 15 4ASIA 16 OM 1

ROUTINE A LIST G

AIDAC FOR ALL MISSION DIRECTORS, A.I.D. REPRESENTATIVES

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: LIVING STANDARDS OF A.I.D. OVERSEAS PERSONNEL

REF: STATE 080342

1. ON APRIL 9, 1977 I SENT ALL FIELD POSTS A MESSAGE PROVIDING GUIDANCE ON PROGRAM DIRECTIONS FOR FY 1979. IN THAT MESSAGE I INDICATED MY INTEREST IN THE CHARACTER OF THE LIFE STYLES WHICH WE PURSUE OVERSEAS, AND SUGGESTED THAT I WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH FURTHER VIEWS.

2. I WANT TO YOU TO KNOW OF MY STRONG PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS THAT A.I.D. STAFF FOLLOW LIFE STYLES WHICH REFLECT RESTRAINT AND DEMONSTRATE SENSITIVITY TO THE POVERTY OF THOSE WE SEEK TO HELP. I EXPECT YOU TO SET THE TONE FOR YOUR ENTIRE STAFF IN THIS RESPECT.

3. THE QUESTION IS MORE THAN ONE OF THE IMAGE OF A.I.D. IT GOES TO THE MANNER IN WHICH OUR EMPLOYEES CONDUCT THEMSELVES. WE AMERICANS ARE A WEALTHY PEOPLE COMPARED TO MOST OF THE PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRIES WHERE WE WORK. INEVITABLY, OUR VERY PRESENCE STRIKES A CONTRAST BETWEEN OUR LIVING STANDARDS AND THE POVERTY IN WHICH THE POOR MAJORITY OF THE WORLD LIVE. FOR THAT REASON AND GIVEN THE VERY NATURE

JJG
DGM
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OF OUR GOAL TO ALLEVIATE THOSE CONDITIONS, IT IS ESPECIALLY INCUMBENT ON OUR STAFF THAT THEY AVOID EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF OSTENTATION.

4. DURING MY RECENT TRIP ABROAD, I WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE CALIBER AND QUALITY OF THE PEOPLE WE HAVE OVERSEAS AND THE OFTEN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH MANY OF YOU WORK AND LIVE. NONETHELESS, I WANT TO BE CERTAIN THAT THERE BE SCRUPULOUS ADHERENCE TO OUR POLICIES WHICH HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN SO OBSERVED.

5. I LOOK DIRECTLY TO YOU TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP AND SET AN EXAMPLE TO YOUR STAFF IN CARRYING OUT THE AGENCY'S COMMITMENT TO HARD WORK AND A MODEST LIFE STYLE. I ALSO EXPECT YOU TO BE PERSONALLY KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE AGENCY'S EXISTING POLICIES ON LIVING STANDARDS IN A.I.D. HANDBOOK 23 AND TO ASSURE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THESE POLICIES. BEYOND THE SPECIFICS IN THE HANDBOOK, HOWEVER, I LOOK TO YOU TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP TO YOUR ORGANIZATION TO ENSURE THAT A.I.D. EMPLOYEES COMPORT THEMSELVES IN A MANNER BEFITTING OUR ROLE IN HELPING THE POOR MAJORITY.
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ADDITIONAL CAPTIONS

AND HEADS OF OTHER A.I.D. ORGANIZATIONS OVERSEAS FROM THE
ADMINISTRATOR

ADD: DESIRED DIST : SMO 2 LA 06 BASIA 4 AAID ES LR PERS 4 89P.

LIST G AID AIRGRAMS AND TELEGRAMS

SEND TO:

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- 5 ABIDJAN
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- 2 BANGUI
- 2 BISSAU
- 5 BOGOTA
- 2 BRASILIA
- 1 BRIDGETOWN
- 2 BUJUMBURA
- 4 CAIRO
- 2 COLOMBO
- 1 CONAKRY
- 1 COTONOU
- 5 DACCA
- 4 DAKAR
- 9 DAMASCUS
- 4 DAR ES SALAAM
- 1 FREETOWN
- 1 GENEVA +
- 3 GEORGETOWN

- 5 GUATEMALA
- 9 ISLAMABAD
- 8 JAKARTA
- 5 KABUL
- 2 KARACHI
- 4 KATHMANDU
- 1 KHARTOUM
- 2 KIGALI
- 3 KINGSTON
- 5 KINSHASA
- 2 LAGOS
- 5 LA PAZ
- 5 LIMA
- 1 LISBON
- 1 LOME
- 1 LONDON +
- 5 MANAGUA
- 5 MANILA
- 2 MBABANE
- 2 MEXICO
- 5 MONROVIA
- 3 MONTEVIDEO
- 12 NAIROBI
- 5 NEW DELHI

- 3 NIAMEY
- 2 NOUAKCHOTT
- 3 NDJAMENA
- ~~5 OGD PARES~~
- 2 OUAGADOUGOU
- 5 PANAMA
- 2 PARIS
- 6 PORT AU PRINCE
- 2 QUITO
- 5 RABAT
- 2 ROME +
- 4 SANA
- 5 SAN JOSE
- 5 SAN SALVADOR
- 4 SANTIAGO
- 5 SANTO DOMINGO
- 4 SEOUL
- 1 TAIPEI +
- 5 TEGUCIGALPA
- 2 TEL AVIV +
- 2 TRIESTE
- 4 TUNIS
- 2 USUN NEW YORK
- 4 YAOUNDE

CAPTIONS

- 3 BANGKOK FOR USOM AND RED
- 3 DAKAR FOR RDO AND OMVS COORD
- 3 DAR ES SALAAM FOR USAID AND RDOEA/ARUSHA
- 5 GUATEMALA FOR USAID AND ROCAP
- 2 KARACHI FOR AAG
- 2 NAIROBI FOR USAID AND REDSO/EA
- 2 PARIS FOR UNESCO

+INDICATES ADDITIONS TO AWIDE COMPUTERIZED LIST

2 TRIESTE FOR AIDROFRI

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72 POSTS (90 & 254 CYS W/CAPTIONS)

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INCOMING
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PAGE--01 MANILA 17279 01 OF 02 020418Z
ACTION SP-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7283

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 MANILA 17279

AIDAC

FOR ADMINISTRATOR GILLIGAN

E. O. 11652: N/A
SUBJ: AID DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS AN AID DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF
AD/PO.

2. DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION.

3. "RECENT CABLE TRAFFIC ON PROJECTS UNDER THE OFFICE OF PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT IMPLIES THAT CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF PROJECT DEVELOPMENT IS BEING INTENSIFIED. IF, AS ADMINISTRATOR AND OTHERS HAVE REPEATEDLY REPRESENTED, AID/W DOES HAVE A POLICY DECENTRALIZING THE TIGHT CONTROL

HERETOFORE ENJOYED BY AID/W, THEN EITHER THE MESSAGE IS NOT GETTING PAST THE ADMINISTRATOR'S DOOR OR THERE HAVE BEEN SECOND THOUGHTS.

4. CASE IN POINT: STATE 251258-WHEREIN PID ON "A FUND FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT" PROJECT, SENT TO AID/W IN MAY, IS STILL BOTTLED UP BECAUSE ONE OFFICE HAS EXERCISED ITS VETO, ASKING US TO SHUFFLE OUR FEET UNTIL "SPECIFIC CONCERNS HAVE BEEN FORMULATED." DRAFTER WHILE ON HOME LEAVE IN JULY SPENT TWO WEEKS IN AID/W ANSWERING

QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSING PROJECT. WHEN TWO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS WERE RAISED AT THE APAC MEETING, THE DRAFTER, BACK HOME, SPENT ANOTHER WEEK

WRITING REPLY, AND WE ARE NO CLOSER TO DECISION. CENTRALIZED CONTROL IS AGAIN THE WINNER WITH THE FIELD PROJECT MANAGER BOBBING ABOUT LIKE

PUPPET ON A STRING.

incorrect reference

5. CASE IN POINT: STATE 283549, WHILE RAISING TWO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON REAL PROPERTY TAX PROJECT, TONE AND DIRECTION IS CLEAR: THE FIELD IS PEOPLED WITH PLEASANT BUT INCOMPETENT GENERALISTS WHO NEED VERY CLOSE SUPERVISION LEST THEY DO SOMETHING IRRATIONAL. ISSUES POP UP THAT

SEEM TO COME OFF THE WALL BUT WHICH MUST BE ANSWERED, RESEARCHED, REFUTED AND RESTATED OR THE PROJECT FALLS. THE ISSUE, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE NEUTRAL BENEFITS OF THE TAX, ARISES APPARENTLY FROM LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY TAX ITSELF WHILE OTHER QUESTIONS DEMEND, ALMOST TO POINT OF HARASSMENT, A RANGE OF DETAIL, QUANTIFICATION, EVENT CONTROL AND PREDICTION THAT ARE NAIVE IN THEIR ASSERTION

AND DESTRUCTIVE IN THEIR NECESSITY. HOW WE CAN RESPOND TO THESE DEMANDS FOR DETAIL WHILE STILL ATTEMPTING CARRY ON THE WORK AT HAND RE-ENACTS CLASSIC DILEMMA OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL VERSUS FIELD OPERATION

IN WHICH ONLY CENTRALIZERS WIN. CABLE APPEARS TO HAVE MADE USUAL ROUND


OF SIGN-OFFS, REQUIRING EACH OFFICE TAKE A GOOD HARD SWING THUS SHOWING THEMSELVES TO BE ALERT, IMAGINATIVE AND HARD NOSED. THIS PERFORMANCE NEARLY DUPLICATES SUPERLATIVE JOB OF LAST YEAR, STATE 297439, ON RURAL SERVICE CENTER PROJECT IN WHICH THERE WERE 21 SIGN-OFFS AND 21 QUESTIONS.

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THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL

June 11, 1974

[Redacted]

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American Consul
American Embassy
Belgrade

Dear [Redacted]

B6

You may well have lost all patience with the Dissent Channel by now. I'm not sure that any of us could blame you after this inordinate delay.

To make a long story short - and it has been a very long and byzantine process - our sleuths have unearthed the action taken on your airgram. We are chagrined on two points: first, responses were apparently done up fairly promptly but lost(!) and, second, the outcome brings us back to square one.

No one in SCA or S/P has been able to explain to us why it had to take so long to find out what, if anything, had been done in your behalf. Every individual with whom we spoke seemed well-intentioned and concerned. Alf Cooley and Vern Penner of SCA were particularly helpful and finally tracked down the attached.

By now, you are probably totally disillusioned with the efficacy of the Dissent Channel. If not, you might wish to test the changing waters in SCA with a re-submission of your proposal. Alternatively, you might wish to consider casting your thoughts in the form of a short article for OPEN FORUM.


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Mike Michaud is editor of this new in-house journal and both he and I would be pleased to help you disseminate your views thusly. (See attached information sheet on OPEN FORUM)

That said, thank you so much for your gallant forbearance. Do stop by our offices if and when you're in Washington.

Yours sincerely,



Sandy Vogelgesang
Chairperson

Enclosures: LOU Package from SCA
Information Sheet on OPEN FORUM

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Linda White

TO : Ms. Mary Ann Casey S/P

DATE: April 21, 1977

FROM :  PPC/PDA/SPA

B6

SUBJECT: April 11, 1977 Dissent Channel Memo

1. I failed to list the three attachments at the end of the memo, and I would appreciate it if the following could be added:

"Attachments: a) March 1977 issue of the Foreign Service Journal; b) March 15, 1977 memo to Hohn R. Eriksson; c) List of the El Salvador Education Sector Analysis documents."

2. As you know, the proposed abolishment of the Sector Analysis Division in the Latin American Bureau is one of the issues dealt with in the memo. I have argued that the policy implications of this decision have not been fully considered. Yesterday I was told that a cable informing the missions that the division is being abolished has been circulated in the Bureau and is about to be sent.



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PAGE 01 CANBER 07504 01 OF 03 280903Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1634
INFO AMCONSUL MELBOURNE

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EO 11652: NA

TAGS: ELAB, PINT, AS

SUBJ: VICTORIA POWER WORKERS END ELEVEN-WEEK STRIKE

1. EMBASSY FORWARDS HEREWITHE, AS A MATTER OF INTEREST TO WASHINGTON READERS, THE FOLLOWING REPORT ON THE VICTORIA POWER WORKERS' STRIKE PREPARED BY [REDACTED]. I DO NOT RPT NOT CONCUR WITH ANUMBER OF CONCLUSIONS IN THE REPORT. EMBASSY'S COMMENTS ARE ADDED AT THE END OF THIS TELEGRAM.

2. "MELBOURNE 2160

1. OVER 2000 STATE ELECTRICITY COMMISSION (SEC MAINTENANCE WORKERS HELD A MEETING ON OCT 25 AT WHICH THEY VOTED BY A LARGE MAJORITY TO RETURN TO WORK IMMEDIATELY SO AS TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR A FULL-SCALE ARBITRATION COMMISSION "WORK-VALUE" REVIEW OF THEIR BASIC AWARD.

"2. DURING THE REVIEW, WHICH WILL TAKE AT LEAST TWO MONTHS TO COMPLETE, THE COMMISSION WILL CONSIDER UNION AND SEC ARGUMENT FOR AND AGAINST THE PROPOSITION THAT THE VALUE OF THE MAINTENANCE WORKERS' CONTRIBUTION TO SEC OPERATIONS HAS INCREASED ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY INTRODUCING A NEW AND MORE FAVORABLE AWARD.

"3. IMPLICIT IN THE STRIKERS' DECISION TO RETURN

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PAGE 02 CANBER 07504 01 OF 03 280903Z
TO WORK WITH NO EXTRA CASH IN HAND WAS THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE "WORK VALUE" REVIEW WILL END WITH A FAVORABLE COMMISSION DECISION WHICH WILL PROVIDE INTER ALIA FOR RETROACTIVE WAGE INCREASES.

"4. LABATT COMMENT: THE STRIDENT AND UNRELENTING ANTI-UNION PROPAGANDA WHICH HIGHLIGHT THE POWER STRIKE HAS MADE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR OBSERVERS NOT ON THE SCENE IN THE LATPOBF VALLEY TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN FACT AND FANTASY. NEVERTHELESS, THE STRIKE PROVIDES A GOOD EXCUSE FOR TRYING TO PRESENT A MORE BALANCED PICTURE WITH A FEW GENERAL AND SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS OF THE SORT WHICH RARELY RECEIVE THE ATTENTION THEY DESERVE. THESE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

"A) THAT DESPITE CONVENTIONAL BELIEFS TO THE CONTRARY, PEOPLE WHO WORK VERY HARD FOR MODEST OR RELATIVELY LOW WAGES RARELY, IF EVER, PARTICIPATE IN OR SUPPORT LONG

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STRIKES FOR FRIVOLOUS OR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS.

"B) THAT THERE ARE TIMES (AND HISTORY - INCLUDING U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN HISTORY - IS REPLETE WITH EXAMPLES) WHEN THE ONLY SELF-RESPECTING WAY TO GO ABOUT EXTRACTING JUSTICE OR EVEN ATTENTION FROM INFLEXIBLE OR INSENSITIVE ORGANIZATIONS OR SYSTEMS IS BY RESORTING TO EXTREME OR UNUSUAL MEASURES (SUCH AS DISRUPTIVE STRIKES).

"C) THAT PRIMITIVE AND PROSCRIPTIVE LAWS ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR "GOOD FAITH" BARGAINING IF ONE'S GOAL IS TO RESOLVE (RATHER THAN EXACERBATE) SERIOUS INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES.

"D) THAT ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL REASONS COMMUNISTS AND OTHER LEFT-WING MILITANTS SOMETIMES DO WELL IN NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENTS IS BECAUSE THEY MAKE SURE THEY ARE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THOSE WHO AT LEAST APPEAR TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FLIGHT OF THE LITTLE MAN.

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PAGE 03 CANBER 07504 01 OF 03 280903Z

"E) THAT, REGARDLESS OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES, THE FRASER GOVT NEVER TAKES THE SIDE OF AUSTRALIAN CITIZENS WHO ARE TRADE UNIONISTS AGAINST THOSE WHO ARE EMPLOYERS. OR, TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, THAT THE FRASER GOVT CLEARLY BELIEVES THE MOST APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR THE FEDERAL GOVT TO PLAY IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IS A PRO-EMPLOYER ADVERSARY ROLE.

"F) THAT THE FEDERAL AND VICTORIAN GOVTS, THE SEC, AND THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION BEAR AT LEAST AS MUCH OF THE BLAME AND RESPONSIBILITY AS THE UNIONS AND THE STRIKERS FOR ONE OF THE MOST COSTLY AND DISRUPTIVE STRIKES IN RECENT AUSTRALIAN HISTORY IF ONLY BECAUSE THEY HAD THE MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE ALONG THE LINES OF THE INTERIM SETTLEMENT THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE 11-WEEK COURSE OF THE STRIKE. THE FACT THAT THEY CHOSE NOT TO EMPLOY THEM WHILE FRONT PAGE HEADLINES AND LEAD EDITORIALS WERE DAILY BLAMING "GREEDY" AND "IRRESPONSIBLE" STRIKERS FOR DESTROYING THE VICTORIAN ECONOMY RAISES SERIOUS QUESTION ABOUT THE IMPARTIALITY AND VIABILITY OF AUSTRALIA'S ARBITRATION-BASED INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS IN TIMES OF UNUSUAL STRESS. CUPRAH."

3. EMBASSY COMMENT:

A) IT IS TRUE, AS LABATT NOTES, THAT PEOPLE WHO WORK VERY HARD FOR MODEST OR RELATIVELY LOW WAGES RARELY PARTICIPATE IN OR SUPPORT LONG STRIKES FOR FRIVOLOUS OR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS. IT IS ESPECIALLY TRUE, AS HE NOTED EARLIER, THAT THE TEMPELS WHICH WERE AROUSED BY THE LATROBE VALLEY STRIKE MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FACT FROM FICTION. WHETHER BY IDEOLOGICAL BIAS OR SIEER PREJUDICE, PRESS REPORTING ON THE LATROBE VALLEY STRIKE HAS BEEN SO UNANIMOUSLY AGAINST THE STRIKE LEADERSHIP THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE NOT ACTUALLY ON THE SCENE TO GET A FEEL FOR ITS ATMOSPHERE.

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BUT IT WOULD BE MISLEADING TO DEROGATE THE IDEOLOGICAL UNDER-
PINNING OF THE DISPUTE: NOT ONLY ARE THE SEC WORKERS NOT

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PAGE 04 CANBER 07504 01 OF 03 280903Z

RPT NOT PAID "MODEST OR RELATIVELY LOW WAGES" -- THEIR WAGES

ARE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH THAT THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION

COMMISSION (THE THEORETICALLY IMPARTIAL GROUP WHICH HAS

BECOME AUSTRALIA'S PRINCIPAL LABOR DISPUTE-RESOLVING

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PAGE 01 CANBER 07504 02 OF 03 280915Z

ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 EB-00 INR-07 LAB-04
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1635

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 3 CANBERRA 7504

BODY) DECLINED TO GIVE THE STRIKE LEADERSHIP THE ADDITIONAL \$40 PER WEEK IT SOUGHT, WHEN, AS PART OF THE MEDIATION EFFORT, THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION WAS PERSUADED TO REVIEW ITS AWARD, IT DID SO AND REAFFIRMED ITS ORIGINAL DECISION AGAINST THE WAGE INCREASE. (AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE MAJORITY OF SEC WORKERS ON STRIKE EARN SOMEWHERE IN THE \$160-180 PER WEEK RPT WEEK RANGE, NOT COUNTING ADD-ONS.) WITH RESPECT TO IDEOLOGY, IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE LEADER OF THE STRIKE, SAMMY ARMSTRONG, IS AN OPENLY-ADMITTED MILITANT COMMUNIST (THAT IS, A FULL, DUES-PAYING, CARD-CARRYING MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF AUSTRALIA), AS ARE HIS TWO PRINCIPAL ASSISTANTS. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE MADE SUCH USE AS THEY CAN OF THE STRIKE, ALTHOUGH NATIONALLY-PROMINENT COMMUNIST TRADE UNION LEADERS SUCH AS JOHN HALFPENNY MUST HAVE HAD SOME SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO COMMUNIST STANDING THROUGH ASSOCIATION WITH WHAT HAS BEEN A PATENTLY INDEFENSIBLE AND UNSUPPORTABLE STRIKE BY THE SEC WORKERS IN LATROBE VALLEY.

B) WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT SOMETIMES THE ONLY WAY TO REMEDY INJUSTICE OR INSENSITIVITY BY ORGANIZATIONS OR SYSTEMS IS BY RESORTING TO EXTREME MEASURES, THAT HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN THE CASE IN THE LATROBE VALLEY DISPUTE.

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PAGE 02 CANBER 07504 02 OF 03 280915Z

THERE IS AN ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION SYSTEM, SET UP PRECISELY TO RESOLVE THIS SORT OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE, WHOSE WORKING WAS TWICE REJECTED OUT-OF-HAND BY THE COMMUNIST-LED MILITANTS AMONG THE LATROBE VALLEY UNION LEADERSHIP. BOB HAWKE, PRESIDENT OF THE ACTU (AND AUSTRALIAN LABOR'S MOST RENOWNED "CONCILIATOR") ENTERED THE DISPUTE AT THE REQUEST OF BOTH THE VICTORIA STATE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, AND HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WERE REJECTED BY THE COMMUNIST-LED MILITANTS. BY THE END OF THE 11-WEEK STRIKE, SUCH "INFLEXIBILITY AND INSENSITIVITY" AS HAD BEEN SHOWN WAS COMING MORE FROM THE STRIKE LEADERS (WHO APPEARED TO HAVE FOUND THEIR PRINCIPLE -- THAT THEY HAD BEEN ON STRIKE FOR ELEVEN WEEKS OVER A \$40 PER WEEK WAGE INCREASE, AND THEY

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DIDN'T THINK THEY COULD GO BACK TO WORK WITHOUT LOSING FACE UNLESS THEY GOT IT) THAN FROM EMPLOYERS. THE STRIKERS HAVE NOW BEEN PERSUADED TO GO BACK WITHOUT THEIR \$48 PER WEEK BY THE CRUSHING LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION, THE OVERWHELMING REACTION OF THE PEOPLE OF VICTORIA AGAINST THEM, THE FINALLY-UNIFIED STANDS OF THE VICTORIA AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS, AND THE UTTER FAILURE OF EITHER ACTU PRESIDENT HAWKE, OR THE ACTU AS AN ORGANIZATION, OR THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION AS A BODY, TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIMS.

C) IT IS TRUE BEYOND QUESTION THAT PRIMITIVE AND PROSCRIPTIVE LAWS ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR "GOOD FAITH" BARGAINING IF ONE'S GOALS ARE TO RESOLVE (RATHER THAN EXACERBATE) SERIOUS INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES. AND IT IS FURTHER TRUE, AS [REDACTED] IMPLIES, THAT "GOOD FAITH" BARGAINING CANNOT REALLY BE SAID TO BE PARTICULARLY WIDESPREAD IN AUSTRALIAN LABOR PRACTICES, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS WHICH ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS COMMENTARY. WHAT HAS SHONE BRILLIANTLY THROUGH THE LATROBE VALLEY AND OTHER MAJOR

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PAGE 03

CANBER 07504 02 OF 03 280915Z

RECENT AUSTRALIAN LABOR DISPUTES IS THE CONTEMPT WITH WHICH A SEGMENT (BUT NOT BY ANY MEANS ALL -- OR EVEN NECESSARILY A MAJORITY) OF AUSTRALIAN LABOR UNION LEADERSHIP REJECTS "ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION" ON THE IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDS THAT ANYTHING LESS THAN COMPLETE CAPITULATION TO ITS DEMANDS IS A VICTORY, NO MATTER HOW SMALL, FOR "MANAGEMENT" (OR "CAPITALISM", OR "THE BOSSES", OR EVEN MORE PEJORATIVE TERMS). THE MILITANTS AMONG THE RADICAL COMMUNIST UNION LEADERS SIMPLY REJECT THE PRINCIPLES OF COMPROMISE WHICH, BY DEFINITION, ARE THE ELEMENTS OF "GOOD FAITH" BARGAINING AS WE KNOW IT IN THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS A FURTHER RADICAL IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING AMONG MILITANT COMMUNIST UNION LEADERS -- THE SEARCH FOR A MEANS OF DESTROYING "CAPITALISM", IN WHICH IT INCLUDES VESTIGES OF SOCIALISM: FAR FROM BEING OWNED BY PRIVATE ENTERPRISE ("THE CAPITALIST PIGS", AS THE MILITANTS MIGHT HAVE IT), THE SEC IS OWNED BY THE STATE OF VICTORIA, AND THUS, BY DEFINITION, IS THE PROPERTY OF "THE PEOPLE" AND PRESUMABLY RESPONSIVE TO THEIR NEEDS.

D) THAT "ONE OF THE REASONS COMMUNISTS AND OTHER LEFT-WING MILITANTS SOMETIMES DO WELL IN POLITICAL AND INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENTS" IS THAT THEY APPEAR TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT "THE LITTLE MAN" IS BOTH TRUE AND A TRUISM.

E) THE STATEMENT "THE FRASER GOVT NEVER TAKES THE SIDE OF AUSTRALIAN CITIZENS WHO ARE TRADE UNIONISTS AGAINST THOSE WHO ARE EMPLOYERS, OR, TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, THE FRASER GOVT CLEARLY BELIEVES THE MOST APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR THE FEDERAL GOVT TO PLAY IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IS A PRO-EMPLOYER ADVERSARY ROLE" IS SUFFICIENTLY TENDEROUS TO MAKE REPUTATION A BIT UNNECESSARY. IT IS WORTH, HOWEVER, NOTING MINISTER FOR EMPLOYMENT STREET'S COMMENT

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IN PARLIAMENT DURING THE DEBATE ON THE GOVERNMENT'S LABOR
DISPUTES BILL ON OCTOBER 19TH:

"A VERY REAL DANGER ARISES WHEN A UNION, IN PURSUIT OF
SOME LIMITED OR SELF-INTERESTED GOAL, IS ABLE TO IMPOSE
CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP AND DISLOCATION ON THE
ENTIRE COMMUNITY. OVER THE PAST YEAR WE HAVE EXPERIENCED

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PAGE #4 CANBER 07504 02 OF 03 280915Z

THE CRIPPLING EFFECT OF STRIKES...AND ARE WITNESSING
TODAY THE FRIGHTENING CAPACITY OF A RELATIVELY SMALL
GROUP OF UNIONISTS IN THE VICTORIAN POWER INDUSTRY TO
WREAK HAVOC ON AN ENTIRE COMMUNITY. SUCH SITUATIONS
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PAGE 01 CANBER 07504 03 OF 03 280919Z

ACTION EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-03 CIAE-00 COME-00 EB-08 INR-07 LAB-04
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DEMAND THAT ACTION BE TAKEN. IT IS PARAMOUNT THAT UNIONS
RECOGNIZE THEIR OBLIGATIONS AND THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS
OF THE AUSTRALIAN PEOPLE AS A WHOLE."

IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE ELECTRIC COMPANY SHOULD NOT HAVE
THE RIGHT TO CUT OFF POWER TO AN ENTIRE STATE BECAUSE THEY
HAVE BEEN DENIED AN INCREASE IN POWER RATES, SO TOO THERE
IS A DEVELOPING CONSENSUS IN AUSTRALIA THAT UNIONS SHOULD
NOT HAVE THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT TO SHUT OFF POWER TO AN
ENTIRE STATE WHEN THEY HAVE BEEN DENIED A WAGE INCREASE--
WHEN THEIR DISPUTE HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE ARBITRATION
MECHANISM AND BEEN TURNED DOWN, BEEN RESUBMITTED AND TURNED
DOWN AGAIN, HAD THE NATIONAL ACTU PRESIDENT RECOMMEND TERMS
FOR SETTLEMENT AND TURNED HIM DOWN AS WELL*

F) FINALLY, IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, IT CAN HARDLY BE
SAID THAT THE FEDERAL AND VICTORIA GOVERNMENTS, THE SEC,
AND THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION FAILED TO USE THE MEANS AT
THEIR DISPOSAL TO RESOLVE THIS PARTICULAR DISPUTE, SINCE
EVERY RECOURSE (SHORT OF COMPLETE CAPITULATION TO THE
UNIONS' DEMANDS) WAS TRIED -- IN FUTILITY BECAUSE ARMSTRONG
AND HIS CLIQUE CHOSE TO USE THIS STRIKE AS A TEST OF MANHOOD.
THE AUSTRALIAN BODY POLITIC IS NOT GENERALLY UNSYMPATHETIC
TO UNION AND WORKER NEEDS, ESPECIALLY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE
INFLATION THIS COUNTRY HAS EXPERIENCED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL

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PAGE 02 CANBER 07504 03 OF 03 280919Z

YEARS. THAT THE LATROBE VALLEY DISPUTE VERY QUICKLY LOST,
ALMOST COMPLETELY, WHATEVER SHRED OF PUBLIC SYMPATHY IT MIGHT
HAVE HAD (DISREGARDING COMPLETELY THE MEDIA, SINCE THEY ARE
PRESUMED TO BE BIASED ANYWAY...), IS CERTAINLY AT LEAST
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE MILITANTLY COMMUNIST
LEADERSHIP OF THE LATROBE VALLEY STRIKE FAILED TO PER-
SUADE ANYONE OTHER THAN THEMSELVES THAT THEY HAD A CAUSE.
THEIR ONLY VICTORY, IN FACT, MAY TURN OUT TO BE THE PER-
VERSE ONE OF PROVOKING THE BACKLASH THEY PERHAPS HOPED
TO EVOKE -- PRESUMABLY PROVING THAT SOCIETY IS REAC-
TIONARY AND 'IPSO FACTO' AGAINST THE WORKING CLASS. IF
THAT WAS SAMMY ARMSTRONG'S HOPE, HE CERTAINLY CAME PRETTY
CLOSE TO BRINGING THE LATTER PART OF IT ABOUT.

ALSTON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 STATE 173088

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DRAFTED BY EA/LC:JDROSENTHAL:DTM
APPROVED BY EA:RHMILLER
EA/TB:GBROBERTS (DRAFT)
AID:MHUNTINGTON (DRAFT)
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TO AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, PFOR, US, LA

SUBJECT: MILITARY RICE FOR LAOS

REFS: A. VIENTIANE 4871; B. VIENTIANE 4897; C. STATE
159715; D. STATE 147521; E. BANGKOK 14717

BANGKOK ALSO FOR

1. WE ENDORSE YOUR PROPOSED HANDLING OF MAP RICE PROCUREMENT AND DELIVERIES AS DESCRIBED REFS A AND B. WHILE OUR FEELING AT PRESENT IS THAT DELIVERIES SHOULD TERMINATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND PROBABLY NOT EXTEND BEYOND AUGUST IN ANY CASE, WE RECOGNIZE YOUR NEED FOR MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY AND LEAVE MATTER TO YOUR JUDGMENT WITHIN EXISTING GUIDELINES CONTAINED REFS C AND D, INCLUDING FUND LIMITATIONS OF LATTER;

2. FOR BANGKOK: WE APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO EXPEDITE

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AND ASSIST IN THIS MATTER. KISSINGER

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SPECIAL HANDLING

DISSENT CHANNEL

FROM WILLIAM I. CARGO, DIRECTOR, S/P/C

REF: HALIFAX A-81 AND A-83

AS DISSENT CHANNEL INTENDED FOR INTERNAL EXPRESSION OF VIEWS, LOW CLASSIFICATION OF HALIFAX A-81 AND A-83 WILL BE MAINTAINED BEYOND AUGUST 1. YY

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TO AMEMBASSY MANILA

UNCLAS STATE 268301

DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: MANILA 17279

FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P-LAKE

B6

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 2, 1977. MR. CURTIS FARRAR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISSENT CHANNEL REGULATIONS, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL THE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. VANCE

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PART B6

PAGE 01 STATE 039887
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TO AMEMBASSY MANILA

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS:N/A

SUBJECT:DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: MANILA 17279

FOR [] FROM S/P LAKE

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2. THE ASIA BUREAU IS REVISING REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCEDURES, WITH THE INTENTION OF ASSURING ACTION ON PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS (PID'S) WITHIN 15 WORKING DAYS AND ON PROJECT PAPERS (PP'S) WITHIN 20 WORKING DAYS.

3. UNDER THESE REVISED PROCEDURES, PROJECT COMMITTEE MEETINGS WILL BE HELD WITHIN 10 DAYS OF THE RECEIPT OF THE PROJECT DOCUMENT. IF PROJECT COMMITTEE FINDS DOCUMENT NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR ASIA PROJECT APPROVAL COMMITTEE (APAC) REVIEW, THE COMMITTEE WILL CONSULT DIRECTLY WITH AA/ASIA

TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO BE TAKEN. WHERE PROJECT DOCUMENTS ARE FOUND SATISFACTORY FOR APAC REVIEW, PROJECT COMMITTEE WILL PRODUCE ISSUES PAPERS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APAC MEETING WHICH IS TO BE CONVENED NOT LATER THAN SEVEN DAYS FOLLOWING PROJECT COMMITTEE MEETING IN THE CASE OF A PP AND 15 DAYS IN THE CASE OF A PID.

4. THE APAC MEETINGS HAVE BEEN STREAMLINED. APAC DELIBERATIONS ARE LIMITED TO SUBSTANTIVE POLICY AND PROGRAMMATIC ISSUES. REVISED APAC PROCEDURES PROVIDE FOR THE CLEARANCE IN SUBSTANCE BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE APAC FINDINGS AND DECISIONS PRIOR TO THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING. ASIA/PD DRAFTS THE CABLES COMMUNICATING THE APAC FINDINGS AND DECISIONS WHICH WE NOW DISPATCH TO THE FIELD WITHIN 3 WORKING DAYS FOLLOWING THE MEETING. THE ONLY CABLE CLEARANCES REQUIRED ARE THE AID COUNTRY DESK OFFICER'S AND PPC'S IF APPROPRIATE.

5. ASIA/PD INTENDS TO ASSURE THAT ACTION IS TAKEN WITHIN THE TIME FRAMES STATED ABOVE AND THAT ALL RELATED ACTIONS NECESSARY FOR THE AUTHORIZATION OF A PROJECT, E.G., CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION, OLSC REVIEW OF LOAN PROPOSALS, ARE APPROPRIATELY SCHEDULED AND CARRIED OUT.

6. ALTHOUGH THESE PROPOSED REVISIONS CANNOT CURE ALL ILLS, THEY CAN HELP GENERATE TIMELY DECISIONS, ELIMINATE LENGTHY SIGN-OFF PROCEDURES, AND AVOID TENDENCIES TO FORMULATE QUESTIONS AD INFINITUM.

7. AS YOU MAY KNOW, THE ADMINISTRATOR ESTABLISHED A TASK FORCE TO EXAMINE AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON AID PROGRAM PROCEDURES AT THE END OF AUGUST. AMONG THE SUBJECTS OF THE TASK FORCE REPORT, WHICH IS ALMOST READY FOR SUBMISSION TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, ARE THE SETTING OF AID LEVELS EACH YEAR, CURRENT PROJECT DOCUMENTS AND PROCEDURES AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF DELEGATING ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FIELD.

8. IT IS NOT AID'S INTENTION TO REDUCE PHILIPPINE FUNDING LEVELS BY BUREAUCRATIC MANIPULATION OF PROJECT APPROVALS. WE REALIZE THAT THE DATA AVAILABLE IN CERTAIN CASES MAY NOT ALWAYS MESH WITH WASHINGTON'S NEEDS. IN SUCH INSTANCES, WE RELY PARTICULARLY ON THE EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE OF FIELD EXPERTS SUCH AS YOURSELF FOR AN INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION OF AVAILABLE FIGURES.

9. YOU MENTIONED THE NEED FOR CLEARER DIRECTIONS ON SUCH ISSUES AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POOR MAJORITY. WE

INFORMED AND WILL WORK TO ENSURE THAT POSTS ABROAD RECEIVE ALL CLARIFICATIONS AS WELL AS ANY PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS ON THESE ISSUES AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

10. THE CONCERNS YOU EXPRESSED IN YOUR MESSAGE ARE IMPORTANT ISSUES AND WE APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THEM WITH YOU. THANK YOU FOR USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL. VANCE

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ROUTINE MANILA

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS:N/A

SUBJECT:DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: MANILA 17279

FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P - LAKE

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December 3, 1974

RELEASE IN PART B6

The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The following is my dissenting view in accordance with State Department Airgram A-3592 of May 21, 1974.

SUMMARY:

In the prosecution of U.S. policy in Thailand the official U.S. (Embassy and Military) posture of supplication vis-a-vis the RTG is not only self-defeating, but is wholly out of keeping with either good bargaining techniques or the factual situations we have faced in the past or face today. While this approach has not been totally unproductive, its dollar costs have been grossly higher than necessary, and more important, it established the basis for many of the present-day USG political problems in Thailand. These problems are being exacerbated by the continuation of weak negotiating practices and an almost cavalier attitude towards costs and waste, particularly on the part of the U.S. Military.

DISCUSSION:

There is now and has been over the years in our dealings with the RTG a clear failure on the part of our senior civilian and military officials to recognize the value of the U.S. presence in Thailand to the RTG. This weakness has been quite naturally played upon by the RTG at every opportunity, particularly in their dealings concerning the U.S. Military in Thailand. The theory that "unless we do everything the RTG wants they will throw us out" has long been and still is espoused as the official Embassy position, and is neither based on fact nor is it supportable by circumstances. On the political side such a position has resulted in precedents which have actually weakened

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our position. The lack of a Status of Forces agreement being one of the more serious problems in this connection. From the financial point of view, consistently weak negotiating tactics have cost the U.S. Taxpayers far in excess of what would be justifiable, or necessary, to attain our foreign policy goals.

EXAMPLES (Of what can be accomplished):

1) In September 1973, the RTG waived its earlier instituted requirement for payment of export premium and reserve set-aside taxes on USG multi-million dollar procurements of Thai rice in support of our program in Laos. This waiver was the culmination of actions initiated independently by USAID/Laos with the RTG - actions taken out of urgent need for the rice and frustration with continued procrastination on the part of the U.S. Embassy in Thailand, whose (then) counselor for Economic Affairs at one point actually suggested that the USG pay the taxes, rather than raise the "unpleasant" question to a high enough level within the RTG to allow for a solution. USAID/Laos' refusal to pay the taxes, and direct USAID/Laos "unofficial" contact with the RTG forced the Embassy to arrange an "official" meeting between USAID/Laos' representative, the Embassy Counselor for Economic Affairs, and the responsible RTG official. When thus approached at the decision-making level, the RTG official determined the USG rice feeding program was to be treated as a "joint AID program between the USG and the RTG on behalf of the RLG," with resultant savings to date of more than US\$ 3 million. In spite of the foregoing, as late as July 1974 the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok refused to acknowledge this RTG attitude, and to use same in negotiations with the RTG concerning USG programs in Laos.

2) In July 1974 the Express Transport Organization of Thailand (ETO) agreed to a transit-truck rate for USAID/Laos cargo between Sattahip and Laos which is Bht. 1110 (US\$ 54.50) per ten ton truck lower than ETO's original asking price and is Bht. 1441.40 (US\$ 70.66) per ten ton truck lower than the rate now being paid by the U.S. Military for the same service over the same route. The present U.S. Military rate is based on a renegotiation of the Military/ETO agreement effected at about the same time as was the USAID/Laos/ETO agreement. Discussions with U.S. Military Contracting Officer and Embassy officials revealed on the military side an attitude of indifference and the claim that "the ETO is a monopoly - we can't do anything about their overcharges."

The USAID/Laos/ETO agreement followed nearly two years of negotiations during which time ETO operating level negotiators refused to reduce their (excessive) demands, and numerous requests for assistance

- 2 -

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from the U.S. Embassy proved fruitless. The satisfactory conclusion was reached within less than two months following USAID/Laos' determination that the oft-requested assistance from the U.S. Embassy was simply not to be forthcoming. Accordingly direct contact was made between USAID/Laos and a senior ETO official. The considerable concession in rate granted by the ETO was based on the fact that the ETO - as an RTG Agency, agreed to consider, and ultimately recognized the mutuality of USG/RTG interest in the USG/Laos program, the very point the U.S. Embassy has consistently rejected as being a valid bargaining position.

The success of both of the foregoing negotiations proves several important points:

- 1) The RTG does recognize the importance of our presence and programs in support of anti-communist elements in contiguous countries and is prepared to cooperate when the "chips are down."
- 2) By no means is the USG forced to comply blindly with unreasonable demands by RTG agencies. All demands are negotiable, and chances for positive results increase proportionately with the level of approach within the RTG.

There is no doubt that not all of the U.S. desires are politically or otherwise acceptable to the RTG. However, I contend that more often than not, recalcitrance or unreasonable demands on the part of RTG officials, particularly operating level personnel, results more from the fact that they have correctly assessed the lack of bargaining ability and simple naivete on the part of our diplomatic and military teams here, and not because, as a matter of RTG policy, major U.S. objectives in this part of the world are significantly out of line with those of the RTG.

The recent visit to Laos of the RTG Foreign Minister Charoonphan Israngkur is a perfect case in point. When confronted with a complaint about U.S. bases on Thai soil he made it quite clear to the Lao that while the RTG does "not want American military forces to be stationed in its territory . . ." the RTG " . . . does not wish to see the military forces of any other nations stationed in Laos either."¹ Obviously the RTG considers it necessary that some U.S. presence in Thailand

¹ USIS translation "Foreign Minister Charoonphan Israngkur's News Conference (Don Muang Airport Nov. 8, 1974)"

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continue at least for the present time, since according to Foreign Minister Charoonphan, withdrawals "depend on the situation outside our country and whether there will be any developments which would have repercussions on the stability and security of our country." ^{1/} This was certainly the attitude of the former (Thanom) regime, and, it is clearly the attitude of the present RTG.

It is a fact that while political power is presently in the hands of civilians, some of whom are not particularly pro-U.S., the raw power in Thailand is still in the hands of the Thai Military which organization has been and continues to be in favor of continued U.S. Military presence in Thailand. Moreover, many highly placed individuals within both the Thai Civilian Bureaucracy and Military organizations are connected with business ventures which reap substantial profits from goods and services supplied to the U.S. Military. ^{2/} Official and unofficial (U.S. Military personnel and their dependents) expenditures in Thailand during the first eleven months of CY '74 amounted to US\$ 160,000,000 ^{3/} or about 8% of Thailand's foreign exchange surplus. It is obvious that a complete and/or precipitous withdrawal of U.S. Military personnel would not be suitable to either the Thai Military (as an organization receiving many operating benefits from the U.S. Military presence) the RTG from a strictly national economic view, or to the numerous politically powerful civilian and military individuals whose business interests would be negatively affected by the loss of the substantial market the U.S. Military represents. In this connection, it should also be recognized that even one of the severest Thai critics of the U.S., former Foreign Minister Dr. Thanat Khoman has made it clear ^{4/} that removal of U.S. troops and bases is not expected to be immediate, and that the military should be replaced by a "similar number of businessmen, educators, doctors and scientists." The implication being that Thailand is well aware of the economic impact of the U.S. Military presence, and the negative effect on the Thai economy of a complete withdrawal without a concurrent replacement source of income.

¹ USIS translation "Foreign Minister Charoonphan Israngkur's News Conference (Don Muang Airport Nov. 8, 1974)"

² Embassy BKK Airgram A243 6/30/72

³ MACTHAI

⁴ Address to American Chamber of Commerce, February 20, 1974

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CONCLUSION:

The naivete evidenced by our Embassy and Military staff in dealings with the RTG has seriously undermined our efforts in Thailand and has achieved results only at costs far greater than necessary.

RECOMMENDATION:

Reassess our Military requirements in Thailand. Make every effort to reduce our presence unilaterally. Understand that requirements of ours also have Military and economic value to the RTG. Recognize that these are real values and that they involve a mutuality of political interests as well as significant financial interest on official and unofficial levels, and employ this knowledge positively in negotiations with the RTG. Abandon the "hat in hand" approach whereby we feel we must continually prove our worth to the RTG. That is to say, negotiate with the knowledge that we do represent both political and economic assets to the RTG and to many of the individuals within the RTG with whom we negotiate. Put our negotiations on a businesslike basis and in so doing, bring into our dealings with the RTG a greater degree of practicality than heretofore exhibited.

Sincerely yours,



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cc: Director of Policy Planning Staff
Executive Secretary

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: MANILA 17279

FOR [] FROM S/P LLAKE

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TELEGRAM

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RELEASE IN
PART B6

DRAFTED BY S/P MACASEY
APPROVED BY S/P TLAKE
S/P: MELY
S/ NBOYER
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S/P ONLY

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R 241657Z FEB 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 041319

STADIS////////////////////////////////////
DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: EINV, CO

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: PROPOSED OPIC ANDEAN
INVESTMENT MISSION
REF: BOGOTA 1639 FOR [] FROM LAKE-S/P
THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ON
THE PROPOSED OPIC ANDEAN INVESTMENT MISSION. MICHAEL
ELY OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR
IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR PAPER
HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING
STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES FOR ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS AND
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS.
WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY
AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED.
VANCE

B6

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

Dissent Channel Message

MEMORANDUM

September 15, 1977.

TO : S/P - Mr. Tony Lake
Director, Planning Staff

FROM : ARA/CCA - *[Handwritten signature]*

SUBJECT: Decontrol and Release of LOU and Unclassified Material

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At the time of the OAS General Assembly in Grenada, I was taking a course in human rights at a local law school. When the unclassified reporting cable came in with the text of the resolution on human rights I wished to share it with my class. Because I had learned to my surprise, while doing an FOIA case, that the fact a document is unclassified does not mean it is part of the public domain, I made inquiries as to who could give me permission to release the cable to the public. FOIA told me that "the appropriate office" could authorize the release of unclassified cables but could not tell me who in the ARA hierarchy from a secretary to the Assistant Secretary could give me permission. FOIA also told me that all requests for documents had to come through its office as there are reproduction costs involved in releasing a document. When I stated that I wished to release the document on my initiative I was told that I "was going outside channels" and that I should talk to SY. I found SY equally unable to give me guidelines as to the rules for releasing unclassified and LOU material. Neither FOIA or SY could refer me to a regulation or an individual with the answer. I therefore drafted the enclosed memo to my ARA FOIA office. That office has not replied in writing, but has informed me that the answers to my questions are in 5 FAM 950, a position which was purportedly coordinated with SY and L/ARA.

It is obvious that 5 FAM 950 is hopelessly outdated and too vague to be any help. Section 952.1 stated that "among other things, information received through privileged sources and

-2-

certain personnel, medical, investigative, commercial, and financial records shall be afforded physical protection comparable to that given "Confidential" material in order to safeguard it from unauthorized disclosure", and shall be marked LOU. In fact, instead of using LOU to protect the type of information listed, most offices appear to view it as a type of quasi security classification and mark LOU things the release of which might be harmful to national security but which do not seem to be quite harmful enough to rate the six-year protection of Confidential. LOU also seems to be commonly used to protect things the disclosure of which could be embarrassing to an office or an individual. 5 FAM 913 prohibits the classification of information "to conceal inefficiency of administrative error, to prevent embarrassment... or to prevent for any other reason the release of information which does not require protection in the interest of national security." Evidently these guidelines do not apply to the release of LOU or unclassified material. *non sequitur*

In addition to abuse of LOU to protect people from embarrassment, LOU is also obviously used improperly to protect information which should in fact be classified Confidential in the interest of national security. Several months ago the Overseas Private Investment Corporation sent me a large number of LOU cables with the demand that I authorize their release by COB. OPIC attorneys insisted that this was not an FOIA case and that they did not want to go through the State FOIA office in order to save time. However, in view of the fact that the documents were to be used in a public hearing I had to review them under FOIA standards. I had to upgrade six of them to Confidential in order to protect them. L/ARA agreed with this approach. However, L/ARA also said that in view of the fact that the documents which I refused were refused under FOIA standards, the refusal letter had to be signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary, as in an FOIA case, even though my Office Director had the power to order the release of the LOU cables which were in fact released. This solution is not illogical but is nowhere expressed in any regulation, to my knowledge.

Since the advent of FOIA there does not seem to be any legal difference between LOU and unclassified. Title 22, Section 6.4 of the Foreign Relations Rules and Regulations lists eight categories of materials which can be protected

-3-

under FOIA standards, none of which are classified under an executive order as needing protection for national security reasons. Since LOU is not established by any executive order and since Title 22 applies the same rules of decontrol to both LOU and unclassified material, the only difference between LOU and unclassified is that one can receive a reprimand from SY for not protecting LOU material. This distinction seems to me to be wholly irrational as it means that one can receive a reprimand for not protecting something which by law cannot receive more protection in the face of a public inquiry than an unclassified piece of material.

11 A new definition of LOU should be developed which takes the present realities into account. Such issues as what effect the Privacy Act has on unclassified documents and what we should do about the CIA's and NSC's "For Official Use Only" category must be considered. There are also interesting side questions such as how to protect unclassified Dissent Channel messages. Title 22 and 5 FAM 5.90 have to be rewritten, taking into account the judicial interpretations of those regulations which have not been reflected by changed language.

I believe one sensible solution would be to state that anything which can or should still be protected by the FOIA or Privacy Acts or any other legal requirement should be classified LOU, a category which should be established on a government wide basis by executive order. All other uncontrolled material would be marked unclassified, with the understanding that unclassified means what a lay interpretation would imply now -- i.e. something which any employee can share with anyone.

Attachment:

As stated

Draft: ARA/CCA-
9/15/77:x21658

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART B6

July 17, 1975

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
UNCLASSIFIED

[Redacted]
American Consulate General
Luanda, Angola

B6

Dear [Redacted]

As you are aware, very shortly after you sent your dissent channel telegram (Luanda 440) the security situation in Luanda deteriorated to the point that dependents of American citizens, both government and private, were evacuated. Until then, Mr. Herbert Spiro of my office had been consulting with officers in AF about the content of your message. With the changed circumstances, however, a substantive decision based on your dissent was no longer necessary.

Nevertheless, I believe it appropriate to commend you for making use of the dissent channel and to assure you that your telegram was circulated to the highest levels in the Department.

Sincerely,

Winston Lord

Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

P.S. I regret the delay in this follow-up acknowledgement. This was not brought to my attention. Thank you for your message which proved, in many respects, to be

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prophetic indeed.

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PAGE 01: NEW DE 02312 1012512

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ACTION SP:02

INFO OCT-01 08:01 7004.4 003022

P. 190949Z FEB 78
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NEW DELHI 2312

DISSENT CHANNEL//

R.O. 116521 GDS
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY []
[] REGIONAL LEGAL ADVISOR, ACTING AID DIRECTOR
[] CONCURS IN THIS DISSENTING VIEW.

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2. SUMMARY: USG SHOULD NOT ONLY RETAIN EMBARGO ON SUBCONTINENT BUT ADOPT SIMILAR EMBARGO POLICY WITH RESPECT TO COUNTRIES AND REGIONS WHERE PRIMARY US INTEREST IS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. AMONG OTHER NEGATIVE EFFECTS, IDENTIFICATION OF USG WITH ARMS SALES TO POOR COUNTRIES TENDS TO: (1) ENHANCE STATUS OF MILITARY OVER CIVILIAN OFFICIALS; (2) ENCOURAGE "GUNS" OVER "BUTTER" DECISION-MAKING; (3) GENERALIZE DEVELOPMENT-MINDED ELEMENTS OF BUREAUCRACY; AND (4) ASSOCIATE USG WITH POSSIBLE LATER USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST DISSIDENT POPULATION OR FRIENDLY COUNTRY. CURRENT ISSUE OVER ARMS TO PAKISTAN OUGHT TO RAISE BROADER QUESTION OF "WHY SELL ARMS TO ANY POOR COUNTRY" RATHER THAN NARROWER ONE OF "WHY TREAT PAKISTAN AS SOLE EXCEPTION TO WORLDWIDE SALES POLICY." END SUMMARY.

3. PUTTING TO ONE SIDE POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON INDO-US RELATIONS, INDO-PAK RAPPROCHMENT AND REGIONAL TRANQUILITY (WHICH I ASSUME HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED BY US POLICY MAKERS), RESUMPTION OF US ARMS SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN RAISES A BROADER QUESTION OF POLICY WHICH MAY NOT HAVE RECEIVED THE ATTENTION IT DESERVES. SIMPLY PUT, WHY SHOULD WE SUPPLY ARMS TO ANY COUNTRY IN WHICH OUR PRIMARY INTEREST IS DEVELOPMENTAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 NEW DE 02312 1010012

RATHER THAN POLITICAL-SECURITY ORIENTED? THE "CURIOUS" EXCEPTION TO WORLDWIDE USG ARMS SUPPLY POLICY WHICH THE SECRETARY NOTED WITH RESPECT TO PAKISTAN QUESTIONS THE WISDOM OF THE GENERAL RULE AS WELL AS THE RATIONALE OF THE SOLE EXCEPTION. WHAT IS THE REASON FOR PERMITTING US SALES OF SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO COUNTRIES WITH PREDOMINATELY POOR POPULATIONS?

-- TO SUPPORT THEIR LEADERS VIZ. IMPATIENT GENERALS' UNSOUND EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT FANCY HARDWARE ONLY WHETS THE MILITARY APPETITE FOR MORE AND NEWER ITEMS. WITH RESPECT TO PAKISTAN, I WOULD JUDGE THAT MR. BHUTTO HAS ENHANCED HIS POWER MORE BY CLIPPING GENERALS' WINGS AT CRITICAL POINTS THAN BY TRYING TO "SATISFY" THEM. IF THIS IS SO, WE MAY BE DOING BHUTTO ULTIMATELY A GREATER SERVICE BY DENYING ARMS THAN BY SUPPLYING THEM.

-- TO PROVIDE MERELY WHAT OTHERS WOULD DO IF WE DIDN'T, AGAIN UNSOUND. ANY POOPY GROWING ASIA COUNTRY COULD MAKE THE SAME STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPIUM TRADE. WHERE IS THE EVIDENCE THAT POOR COUNTRIES WOULD BUY ELSEWHERE TO THE SAME EXTENT AND TO THE SAME DEGREE OF SOPHISTICATION IF WE REFUSED TO SELL? IN ANY EVENT THE ARGUMENT OVERLOOKS THE POTENTIAL EMBARRASSMENT OF HAVING US ARMS DEPLOYED AGAINST A DISSIDENT CITIZENRY OR A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY FRIENDLY TO THE US.

-- TO EARN NEEDED FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR THE UNITED STATES. LET US HOPE THAT OUR NATIONAL FORTUNES HAVE NOT SUNK TO THE POINT THAT THEY DEPEND UPON TRAFFIC IN LETHAL WEAPONRY. BUT IF THEY HAVE, LET US BE HONEST ENOUGH TO OURSELVES TO STATE THE CASE OPENLY.

4. AGAINST THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM CITED ABOVE, I SEE AT LEAST FOUR IMPORTANT REASONS FOR EXTENDING THE ARMS SALE EMBARGO POLICY TO ALL COUNTRIES IN WHICH OUR PRIMARY INTEREST IS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS OPPOSED TO POLITICAL-SECURITY:

A. ARMS SALES TEND TO ENHANCE THE STATUS OF MILITARY AS OPPOSED TO CIVILIAN LEADERS. AS THE GENERALS' INTERNAL POWER AND PRESTIGE INCREASE SO DOES THE RISK OF COUPS, MILITARY ADVENTURISM AND REPRESSION. WHILE WE CANNOT PREVENT ALL THIS FROM HAPPENING, WE DON'T HAVE TO

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PAGE 03 NEW DE 02312 191001Z

ASSOCIATE WITH IT.

B. ARMS SALES TEND TO ENCOURAGE "GUNS" OVER "BUTTER" DECISION MAKING, THEREBY REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR AID PROGRAM AND THWARTING OUR DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES. ONE WONDERS WHAT THE "SPREAD EFFECTS" ARE IN A POOR COUNTRY FOR EACH NEW ITEM OF MILITARY HARDWARE. CERTAINLY THE LOCAL COSTS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT AND UTILIZE IMPORTED ARMS REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT DRAIN ON RESOURCES OTHERWISE AVAILABLE FOR DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES.

C. ARMS SALES TEND TO DEMORALIZE DEVELOPMENT-MINDED SEGMENTS OF THE BUREAUCRACY. IN MOST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES A NUMBER OF DEDICATED OFFICIALS AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT WORK HARD TO GET RATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES THROUGH THEIR BUREAUCRATIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS. WE SUPPORT THEIR EFFORTS WITH DEVELOPMENT AID; WE UNDERCUT THEM WITH ARMS SALES.

D. ARMS SALES TEND TO EMBARRASS US (MORALLY AND POLITICALLY): WHEN US ARMS ARE USED AGAINST FRIENDLY NATIONS OR AGAINST THE RECIPIENT'S OWN PEOPLE. RECENT HISTORY IN THE SUBCONTINENT IS PROOF ENOUGH OF THAT FACT.

E. FOR THESE REASONS, I RECOMMEND THAT ANY FINAL DECISION TO RELAX THE ARMS SALE EMBARGO IN THE SUBCONTINENT BE DELAYED UNTIL THE BROADER QUESTION OF ARMS SALES TO POOR COUNTRIES IN GENERAL IS CAREFULLY REVIEWED. I WOULD HOPE THAT IN THE PROCESS OF REVIEW, SOME RATIONAL CRITERIA FOR US ARMS SUPPLY POLICY WORLDWIDE WOULD EMERGE.
SCHNEIDER

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 134795

ORIGIN SP-03

INFO OCT-01 ES-02 /000 R

DRAFTED BY S/P/OFF/ISVOSELGSANG
APPROVED BY S/P/IBSMTERS

Z 24:46Z JUN 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

003781

UNCLAS STATE 134795

DISSENT CHANNEL

Z.O. 11652;
TAGS:XA/CM;APER
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: YAOUNDE 1678

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE REFERENCED
DISSENT CHANNEL TELEGRAM OF JUNE 13, 1974.

2. SINCE [REDACTED]'S MESSAGE ADDRESSES AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTER (NORMALLY COVERED BY MECHANISMS OTHER THAN THE
DISSENT CHANNEL), WE HAVE ASKED MR. H.B. HOPKINS, DIRECTOR
OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND MANPOWER IN AID, TO HELP
RESPOND TO THE QUESTION POSED.

3. OTHERWISE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIC-
BUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR TELEGRAM HAS BEEN CIR-
CULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF,
AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL.

4. WE WILL SEE THAT YOU RECEIVE A REPLY TO YOUR CONCERNS
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. KISSINGER

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BONN 07342 021449Z

RELEASE IN
PART B6

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ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 AMAD-01 ES-01 /004 W
-----251205 021859Z /53

R 021420Z APR 82
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5651

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 07342

DISSENT CHANNEL FROM ALLEN GREENBERG TO S/P PAUL WOLFONITZ

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/2/88 ()

B6

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL ON SANCTIONS AND THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE

REF: STATE 86605

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON DISTRIBUTION OF MY DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE.
 3. I REQUEST YOU RECONSIDER YOUR DECISION TO WITHHOLD DISTRIBUTION TO ACDA AND USICA SINCE IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THE DISSENT CHANNEL SERVES THESE AGENCIES, AND THE MATTERS DISCUSSED ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THESE AGENCIES. I BELIEVE THEY SHOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE VIEWS.
 4. I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR COORDINATED SUBSTANTIVE REPLY TO MY MESSAGE.
- BURNS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN FULL

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ASIA/PD:JSCHNEIDER:FV
10/11/77:EXT. 58960
AA/ASIA:JHSULLIVAN

DAA/ASIA:MHBADLER
ASIA/PT:VLELLIOTT {DRAFT}
PPC/DPRE:PMATHESON {DRAFT}
ASIA/PD:MMPEHL -TR/EHR:RUMHOEFER

ASIA/PD:ARLOVE
ASIA/DP:RMEEHAN {DRAFT}
ASIA/PD:JRMCCABE {DRAFT}
GC/ASIA:CSTEPHENSON {DRAFT}

LT ACTION BASIA CHRON 2 3 4 8 INFO IIA PPC GC GCFLD 4ASIA GCASIA
AATA ED FTA 30P
PRIORITY MANILA

AIDAC

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: REAL PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION PROJECT PAPER

REF: {A} MANILA 14695, {B} STATE 283549

1. SUMMARY: APAC, CHAIRED BY THE AA/ASIA, ON SEPTEMBER 29 REVIEWED THE REAL PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION (RPTA) PP; THE COMMITTEE DECIDED TO WITHHOLD APPROVAL OF PROCEEDING WITH DLSC CONSIDERATION AND LOAN AUTHORIZATION AT THIS TIME. APAC IS COGNIZANT THAT A REAL PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM IS A POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT SOURCE OF REVENUE FOR LOCALLY GENERATED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND IS GENERALLY AN APPROPRIATE AREA FOR AID INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT/IMPROVEMENT ACTIVITIES. APAC FURTHER RECOGNIZES THAT FROM A LOCAL BUDGETARY PERSPECTIVE IT MAY NOT BE DESIRABLE TO EARMARK TAX REVENUES COLLECTED FOR SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES. HOWEVER, THE PROJECT APPROACH, AS FORMULATED IN THE PP, IS UN-DULY PROVISIONAL IN THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE EQUITABLE COLLECTION AND EVENTUAL PROGRAMMING AND EXPENDITURE OF TAX REVENUES ON APPROPRIATE LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. ACCORDINGLY, THE COMMITTEE BELIEVED THAT THE PROJECT DID NOT REASONABLY DEMONSTRATE THE

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12

DIRECT AND POSITIVE BENEFITS TO LOW-INCOME PEOPLE AS THE AID TARGET GROUP. SINCE THE PRESENT PROJECT IS LARGELY A FOLLOW-ON TO THE PILOT ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED UNDER PDAP, THE COMMITTEE FURTHER FELT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO EVALUATE THOSE PDAP ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO PROCEEDING WITH WIDE-SCALE IMPLEMENTATION OF RPTA. ALTHOUGH THE CY 1976 PROPERTY TAX DATA FROM PDAP MUNICIPALITIES MAY NOT BE FULLY AVAILABLE, A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE SOME OF THE NECESSARY INFORMATION ON {A} COLLECTION COSTS, {B} COLLECTION RATES, {C} CAPACITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO EFFECTIVELY PROGRAM REVENUES, {D} EXPENDITURES OF FUNDS ON DEVELOPMENT, WELFARE OR OTHER TYPE ACTIVITIES WHICH DIRECTLY BENEFIT THE POOR, AND {E} IMPACT OF TAX ON POOR. WE ARE AWARE OF THE PROGRAMMATIC REASONS FOR MAINTAINING A TIMELY IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE; WE ARE PREPARED TO RESCHEDULE REVIEW OF THE PROJECT BY NOVEMBER FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS REQUESTED BELOW. END SUMMARY.

2. THE COMMITTEE AGREED THAT THE FOLLOWING ISSUES/ CONCERNS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY THE MISSION:

A. CAN WE ASSUME THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE CAPACITY TO ENFORCE REAL PROPERTY TAX LAWS FROM A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE GIVEN THE APPARENT ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE CENTRAL BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION WITH FINANCIAL CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE VESTED INTEREST AND TRADITIONAL INFLUENCE OF A LARGE-LANDHOLDING CLASS IN THE PHILIPPINES? IF NOT, TO WHAT EXTENT CAN AND SHOULD A PRIMARY INSPECTION/MONITORING APPARATUS BE STRUCTURED WITHIN THE PROJECT TO OVERSEE THE EQUITABLE COLLECTION AND EVENTUAL PROGRAMMING AND EXPENDITURE OF TAX REVENUES ON APPROPRIATE LOCAL DEVELOPMENT, ETC., PROJECTS? AN EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PDAP ACTIVITIES GENERALLY AND OF THE PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION PROCEDURES DEVELOPED UNDER PDAP ACTIVITIES IN PARTICULAR WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD.

B. RE PROJECT BENEFICIARIES:

{1} COMMITTEE EMPHASIZED THAT PROJECT MUST BE BENEFICIARY POSITIVE RATHER THAN BENEFICIARY NEUTRAL AS INDICATED IN THE PP. THE COMMITTEE FURTHER QUESTIONED WHETHER, IN FACT, THE PROJECT MAY PRESENTLY BE BENEFICIARY NEGATIVE. IF THE RESIDENTIAL AND AGRICULTURAL AREAS TAXED ARE PRIMARILY COMPRISED OF

1470

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RENTAL OR TENANT PROPERTIES, THEN THE POOR MAY BEAR A DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGH PERCENTAGE OF THE TAX BURDEN IN THE FORM OF HIGHER RENTS. THE COST OF TAXES ON COMMERCIAL PROPERTY WOULD PRESUMABLY ALSO BE PASSED ALONG TO CONSUMERS IN THE FORM OF HIGHER PRICES. FURTHER, IF THE POOR ARE GENERALLY NON-SAVERS, THEN PROPERTY TAX CHARGES MAY DIVERT PERSONAL INCOME FROM OTHER NECESSITIES TO TAX PAYMENTS. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVED THAT MISSION/GOP PROJECTIONS OF THE BREAKDOWN OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP PER VALUE AND INCOME CLASS WOULD BE USEFUL IN ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON THE POOR. THE COMMITTEE ALSO SUGGESTED THE MISSION SEE IF UPDATED MATERIAL IS AVAILABLE PER TABLE E, PP. P. 100.

{2} FURTHER, IF PROPOSED PROPERTY TAX RECEIPTS ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY LINKED TO DISBURSEMENTS BUT RATHER FEED INTO GENERAL OPERATING FUNDS ON THE LOCAL LEVEL, THEN WHAT INDICATION DO WE HAVE THAT THE POOR WILL BENEFIT FROM PROJECT ACTIVITIES AT A LATER DATE? IN PILOT AREAS, IS EXPENDITURE DATA AVAILABLE TO SHOW WHAT PROPORTION OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES GO TO DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS? CAN ESTIMATES BE MADE OF INCREMENT TO DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES WHICH MIGHT REASONABLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO RPTA? IF NOT, HOW CAN MEASURE OF GOAL ACHIEVEMENT PROPOSED P. 56 BE ACCOMPLISHED?

C. THE PROJECT PAPER INDICATES THAT THE ANNUAL INCREASED REVENUES PER TAXING UNIT WOULD AVERAGE APPROXIMATELY DOLS. 21,250 FOR DISTRICTS AND DOLS. 12,450 FOR MUNICIPALITIES. SINCE A HIGH PORTION OF THE INCREASED REVENUES ARE AGGREGATED ON A PROVINCIAL LEVEL {PP, P. 20}, THE COMMITTEE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE RELATIVELY SMALL INCREMENTS TO LOCAL REVENUE, VIS-A-VIS HIGH PROJECT COSTS AND UNCERTAIN BENEFITS TO THE POOR, SUFFICIENTLY JUSTIFY PROCEEDING WITH THIS PROJECT.

D. WE SUGGEST THAT THE MISSION UPDATE THE PROJECT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN ANNEX XII AND PROVIDE NARRATIVE EXPLANATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TABLES C, D AND E. MISSION SHOULD NOTE PER TABLE B THAT ACTIVITY COSTS DO NOT END IN FY 1981 AS INDICATED; OPERATING COSTS (INCLUDING EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE, SALARIES, AND OTHER COLLECTION COSTS) WHICH ARE INCURRED TO MAINTAIN RPTA ACTIVITIES AT THE NEW LEVEL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS PROJECT COSTS FOR PURPOSES OF EVALUATING CASH FLOWS IN "ECONOMIC" ANALYSIS. AID/W CALCULATIONS, USING ESTIMATES OF THOSE

1470

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COSTS, INDICATES A FINANCIAL COST: BENEFIT RATIO SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN THAT PROVIDED IN THE PP.

E. A RECENT IBRD PUBLICATION, PHILIPPINES-RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, AUGUST 1977, INDICATES THAT CURRENT GOP ACTIVITIES HAVE SUCCEEDED IN INCREASING LOCAL PROPERTY TAX REVENUES (INCLUDING MANILA AND CEBU) BY 69% PER CENT FROM 382 MILLION PESOS IN 1975 TO AN ESTIMATED PESOS 646 IN 1977. THIS SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE PHILIPPINES IS MOVING AHEAD SUCCESSFULLY WITHOUT AID INTERVENTION AND THAT THE RPTA COLLECTION SYSTEM IS APPARENTLY MORE EFFICIENT THAN THE PP ASSERTS; THEREFORE, THE COMMITTEE QUESTIONED WHETHER AID INVOLVEMENT AT THIS TIME IS ANB NECESSARY ON AS WIDE A SCALE AS PROPOSED.

F. CAN IT BE DETERMINED THAT SUFFICIENT LOCAL CURRENCY GENERATED BY INCREASED PROPERTY TAX, AND FUNNELLED THROUGH THE PROVINCES, WILL BE AVAILABLE, AT THE RIGHT TIMES, TO SUPPORT THE EXPENDITURES REQUIRED UNDER THE RURAL SERVICE CENTERS, BARANGUAY WATER AND RURAL ROADS II PROJECTS? WHAT ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE IF THE RPTA PROJECT IS EITHER NOT APPROVED OR DELAYED? IN ADDITION, IF PROJECT DOES PROCEED, AN INTERIM REPORT (PP, P. 87) INDICATED THE MISSION'S INTENTION TO ASSURE FUNDS FROM RPTA WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO OTHER AID PROJECTS BY OBTAINING SOME KIND OF GOP COMMITMENT. WHAT ARE CURRENT PLANS IN THIS REGARD?

G. THE COMMITTEE FURTHER EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE SIZE AND OPERATION OF THE SERIES OF GRANT AND LOAN PAYMENTS TO THE LOCAL TAXING UNITS (PP, PP. 17-18, 20) WHICH REPRESENT 45 PER CENT OF TOTAL PROJECT COSTS. THESE PAYMENTS INCLUDE THE "SEED MONEY" GRANT AND TWO POSSIBLE SUBSEQUENT LOANS - THE FIRST LOAN IS LINKED TO SUCCESSFUL TAX MAPPING, RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND COLLECTIONS, AND THE SECOND AS AN INDUCEMENT TO ACHIEVE HIGH COLLECTION RATES. THE COMMITTEE SPECIFICALLY QUESTIONED:

{1} ON WHAT BASIS DID MISSION CALCULATE THE AMOUNTS FOR THESE REIMBURSEMENT AND INCENTIVE PAYMENTS WHICH ARE SEEMINGLY HIGH VIS-A-VIS ANTICIPATED PER-ANNUM INCREMENTS TO LOCAL REVENUE AND WHICH, APPARENTLY, ARE NOT TIED TO ANY CLEARLY SPECIFIED ACTIVITIES OR USE? WHAT SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES WOULD THE MISSION EXPECT THE LOAN AND GRANT FUNDS TO BE USED FOR?
 {2}—WHAT IS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PROVIDING INCEN-

1470

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15

{2} WHAT IS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PROVIDING INCENTIVE PAYMENTS WHEN THE INCREASED REVENUE ALONE WOULD SEEMINGLY PROVIDE LOCAL TAXING UNITS SUFFICIENT INCENTIVES TO IMPLEMENT THE RPTA SYSTEM AND ACHIEVE HIGHER COLLECTION RATES?

{3} WHAT IS THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE AMOUNT OF AID FUNDS FLOWING TO THE LOCAL TAXING UNIT, THE EXPENDITURES BY THE UNIT, AND THE SIZE OF THE UNIT?

{4} TO WHAT EXTENT MIGHT THE DIRECT AMOUNT REIMBURSEMENT FINANCING OFFSET HOST COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS AND WHAT ARE THE INTERNAL PROJECT CONTROLS TO PREVENT POSSIBLE DOUBLE FINANCING OF COSTS EXPECTED TO BE COVERED BY THE GOP?

{5} TO WHAT EXTENT WOULD ESTABLISHED AID RULES GOVERNING FINANCING OF GOODS AND SERVICES BE APPLIED (E.G., SOURCE RULES AND AUDITS)?

3. USAID MAY BE ABLE TO STRENGTHEN BENEFICIARY IMPACT BY PROVIDING A NARRATIVE AND POSSIBLY STATISTICAL SECTION ON ANTICIPATED EFFECT OF THIS PROPOSED PROJECT ON REVENUES REALIZED FROM THE SCHOOL TAX 3/4 PER CENT ADD-ON AND THEIR USE FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN LOCAL EDUCATION WHICH DIRECTLY BENEFIT THE POOR. 44

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

RELEASE IN PART
B6

TO : S/P, Mr. Anthony Lake
Director, Policy Planning Staff

DATE: February 15, 1977

FROM : ASIA/DCS, [redacted]
A. I. D.

B6

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: U.S. Policy towards the IMF, IBRD, and ADB
in Vietnam

This memorandum presents a Dissent Channel viewpoint of myself, [redacted] of the Development Coordination Staff, Asia Bureau, AID. I desire distribution, in addition to the Policy Planning Staff, to officers in the EA and EB Bureaus of State who deal with its subject matter. I intend to arrange for distribution within ASIA and PPC in AID myself.

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My purpose is to dissent from recent U.S. policy towards the involvement of the IMF, the IBRD, and the ADB in Vietnam and to recommend an alternative for the future. This policy has been to oppose such involvement: first, we voted against the assumption by the newly united Vietnam of the membership formerly held by South Vietnam when the question came before the Executive Boards of all three institutions last September; and, subsequently, we voiced technical objections to a compensatory financing facility, amounting to 50% of its quota, extended to Vietnam by the IMF in January. This opposition contrasts, incidentally, with our acceptance of a similar role by these institutions in Laos, despite a change in government there virtually as complete as that in Vietnam.

My contention is that the above policy regarding Vietnam was contrary to the U.S. interest which, as distinct from the question of what the Vietnamese deserve, is our sole legitimate concern. The U.S. interest lies instead in the encouragement of meaningful involvement in Vietnam by these institutions. For association with them, especially the IMF, is a matter not just of gaining resources but also of coming under significant liberalizing influences, economically speaking. And insofar as their economy is not bound to other socialist countries, either administratively or doctrinally, the Vietnamese are more likely to be open to constructive economic and political relationships with non-socialist countries, including to some extent the United States.

My reasons for saying that the IMF et al. are a significant liberalizing influence come out of working with their officials over a number of years on several countries, especially in Indochina. They are as follows:

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- 2 -

1. The IMF has a commitment, rather more thorough-going than our own, to market-oriented economic policies. In connection with the economic difficulties encountered by various member countries it has consistently advocated reliance on market forces rather than administrative controls. To be sure, the direct application of this orientation in centrally operated economies is limited. But it has a socialist counterpart in "pragmatism", which the IMF authorities have been concerned to detect and encourage in both Laos and Vietnam and which is the touchstone of their assessments of economic prospects in those countries.
2. IMF officials, in particular Paul Chabrier, Chief of the Southeast Asia Division, appear to have developed real rapport with the present authorities in Vietnam, which they visited last June and again in December. This rapport is remarkable in view not only of their market orientation but also of their close association with the previous, U.S.-supported governments in Indochina as well as with ourselves. They report that the Vietnamese intend to pursue an "independent" economy, not tied to either camp, and that their pragmatism is evidenced by their relative emphasis on agriculture as opposed to heavy industry, their promotion of exports including those to non-socialist countries, and their receptivity to foreign investment. Further, they have agreed to accept an IMF mission next May or June for an Article XIV consultation, which customarily involves extensive disclosure of data and review of economic policies and plans. Laos, incidentally, has declared itself still not prepared for an Article XIV consultation. Continued involvement by the IMF et al. in Vietnam could be expected to reinforce these tendencies to pragmatism and openness.

The primary implication of the arguments put forward here is not for the past but for the future. This is that instead of opposing a priori the extension of further assistance to Vietnam by the IMF, the IBRD (which currently has an appraisal mission in country), or the ADB, we keep an open mind towards the outcome of the impending Article XIV consultation and similar occasions. We would still not be obliged to accept pro forma participation in the consultation by the Vietnamese, with only limited disclosure of data, as satisfactory. If, however, it goes beyond that and gives evidence of sincerity, we should at least tacitly support additional assistance by the above institutions there.

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- 3 -

The objective of our previous massive efforts in Vietnam, military and economic, may reasonably be regarded as not particularly to dominate the country politically or to exploit its resources for our own benefit but instead to maintain there a government with which we could have constructive relations. Insofar as we are concerned about Vietnam's relations with its non-communist neighbors and its treatment of its own population, and perhaps also its role in the international economic order, this objective continues to be relevant. Through the involvement of the IMF et al. in Vietnam we may still achieve some part of it, in that thereby the Vietnamese are in touch with people with whom we are in touch. This may fall far short of our original objective, but the cost to us would fall even farther short of what we were previously spending. And if the question of bilateral assistance, which this discussion does not deal with, should arise, the involvement of the IMF et al. in Vietnam would seem an advantageous means of testing the water.

cc: ASIA/DCS, Glenn A. Lehmann
ASIA/PT, L. Michael Hager
PPC/IA, Norman Mosher
AA/ASIA, Michael H. B. Adler

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Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652 Automatically
Downgraded at Two Year Intervals and
Declassified on February 15, 1983.

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PAGE 01 BRIDGE 01750 152057Z

ACTION 8P-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 190-00..990-00..Z006.W.

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DISSENT CHANNEL????????????????????????????????????

EO 11652: NA
TAGSI APER
SUBJECT: RETALIATION FOR DISSENT



JUT

REF BTN 1718

I, THROUGH THE DIRGEN CHANNEL (REFTEL), THE AMBASSADOR PRESENTED HIS GROUNDS FOR HIS HAVING REQUESTED BY TRANSREQ. I CONSIDER THESE GROUNDS INCORRECT AND BELIEVE HIS REQUEST TO BE LARGELY A RETALIATION FOR MY HAVING BEEN COMMENDED BY THE DEPARTMENT FOR THE EXPRESSION OF DISSENT TO A CASP PRESENTATION BY THE EMBASSY. I CITE THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATIONS TO DOCUMENT BY POSITION:

A) BTN A-12, WHICH IS THE EMBASSY'S CASP SUBMISSION, UPON WHICH MY DISSENT FROM THE EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATIONS IS NOTED IN THE COVERING AIRGRAM.

B) BTN A-33, AN AIRGRAM I DRAFTED SETTING FORTH MY REASONS FOR DISSENT FROM THE EMBASSY'S CASP RECOMMENDATIONS.

C) LETTER OF COMMENDATION OF JULY 1 FROM ARA/CAR DIRECTOR HEAVNER TO ME IN WHICH HE COMMENDS ME FOR HAVING COMMUNICATED MY DISSENT TO WASHINGTON AND INFORMS ME THAT THE POSITIONS

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PAGE 02 BRIDGE 01750 152057Z

1. HAD TAKEN IN DISSENT WERE ADOPTED BY WASHINGTON.

0) BTN 1382, IN WHICH THE AMBASSADOR ATTEMPTS TO PROHIBIT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED LETTER OF COMMENDATION FROM BEING PLACED IN MY PERFORMANCE FILE, ATTEMPTS IN EFFECT TO EXPUNGE IT FROM THE RECORD BY ADVERSE COMMENT.

2. IN HIS TELEGRAM TO THE DIRGEN, THE AMBASSADOR MAKES ONE MOST SERIOUS CHARGE WHICH I WISH TO TAKE UP NOW: IN PARAGRAPH 3 HE WRITES, CONCERNING THE PERIOD OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS: "THE POLEP IS NOT FUNCTIONING, AND HAS NOT BEEN FOR SOMETIME." THIS IS DEMONSTRABLY INCORRECT. I DRAFTED THREE LONG ANALYTICAL TELEGRAMS ON THE GENERAL ELECTIONS THAT WERE TO BE HELD ON SEPTEMBER 2, TWO DURING THE CAMPAIGN (BTN 1591 ON AUGUST 20 AND BTN 1672 ON SEPT 1) AND ONE AFTER THE CAMPAIGN (BTN 1732 OF SEPTEMBER 18). THE TWO DURING THE CAMPAIGN WERE THE PRODUCT OF MY CLOSE OBSERVATION OF IT, THROUGH ATTENDANCE AT ALL-NIGHT POLITICAL RALLIES AND CONTACT WITH POLITICAL LEADERS AND OBSERVERS AND ORDINARY BARBADIANS. IN THESE TELEGRAMS I ACCURATELY PREDICTED THE OUTCOME. TO GIVE THE AMBASSADOR HIS DUE, HE WAS, AS HE SAID, ACTIVE IN DRAFTING ON THE ELECTIONS. HE DRAFTED EIGHT TELEGRAMS, ALL AFTER THE ELECTION, FOUR OF WHICH TRANSMITTED THE TEXTS OF ARTICLES IN THE TRINIDAD GUARDIAN (BTN 1698, 1702, 1703 AND 1719) AND TWO THE TEXTS OF ARTICLES IN THE ADVOCATE-NEWS (BTN 1699 AND 1701). ONE OF THESE SIX NEWSPAPER TEXT TRANSMISSIONS HAD A COMMENT.

3. IF THE CONCEPT OF DISSENT IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE IS TO PROSPER, RETALIATION FOR ITS EXPRESSION MUST NOT BE TOLERATED.

4. REQUESTED DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DISSENT CHANNELS S/IG, ARA. BRITTON

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RELEASE IN PART B6

(6) A1

HANDLING	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	MESSAGE REFERENCE NO. A 251
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TO: Department of State
 JUN 16 1 47 PM 1976
 INFO: USIA, Mr. Kenneth Towery (IOP)
 FROM: AMEMBASSY, ROME
 E.O. 11652: N/A
 TAGS: PINT, IT
 SUBJECT: ITALY: June 20 and Beyond

Action cancelled
Action taken
 DATE: June 4, 1976
Initial action June 18 1976
Initial Office
Director's Office
file

REF: 11 FAM 243
 STATE 209583
 Rome 7066 (301557Z Apr 76 Annual Policy Assessment)
 State 126429 May 23. (TOSEC 130172 Italian electoral Prospects)

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XMB			

This message transmits a dissenting view submitted by [redacted] USIS.

SUMMARY. OUTLINE OF THE PRESENT DILEMMA. PCI INFLUENCE AND THE CHANCES OF "KEEPING THEM HONEST." THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVING THE LEVEL OF DIALOGUE WITH PROGRESSIVE ELEMENTS OF THE DC AND DEMOCRATIC LEFT. A PLEA FOR A LONG-RANGE APPROACH TO LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS, AND LESS EMPHASIS ON SHORT-TERM PAYOFFS.

1. A Dilemma of Heroic Proportions.

Italy's perennial crisis can be explained most simply by the failure of the society to develop modern institutions to deal with a wide range of complex modern problems. The blame for this failure cannot be laid entirely on the Christian Democrats, the Americans, the Communists, or on any other handy whipping boy, but none who have been involved are entirely blameless. The vital element for US policy, however, is not in avoiding blame for past errors or taking credit for past

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CLASSIFICATION

DATE: [redacted]	DRAFTING DATE	PHONE NO.	CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
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successes (and there have been plenty of both), but in working out a sophisticated and purposeful policy to protect our endangered and very important interests here. The basic premise of this paper is that the policies on which we have relied up to now, however well they may have served us in the early post-war period, are no longer adequate to meet the changed situation of 1976 and beyond.

2. US Policy- Now and Later

American policy starts from the premise that the key problem facing the US is how to keep the Communists from becoming part of the Parliamentary national majority-- in other words, how to keep them out of power. But the real problem is how to cope with a situation in which the Communists are already in power in a de facto sense and likely to make further gains in the future.

The problem is compounded by the fact that the Communists are strong enough to block any political or economic initiatives they do not favor, and can similarly bring other initiatives to fruition by offering their cooperation. Thus, they will be an integral part of the national decision-making process for the foreseeable future. This will be true even if they do not enter the national government.

3. US Interests, and the PCI Challenge

These will be best served by a policy which encourages the Communists to remain within the democratic framework, and discourages them from actions which would weaken Italy's traditional commitments and orientation to NATO, the EEC, Western Europe, and the US. Since the Communists will not be strong enough to impose their will even if they make further substantial gains in the June 20 elections, the prospects for success of such a policy are realistic. For one thing, the DC will remain a mass party of approximately equal size to the PCI, and the other smaller parties will provide a further bar to ultimate PCI hegemony. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, the prospect of Communist control, as opposed to influence, is remote. It is also difficult to see how PCI participation in national decision-making can provide ready solutions to intractable problems. The myth of PCI wonder working has yet to be challenged effectively, but some of the veneer would quickly wear off if the Communists were held accountable for aspects of governmental performance.

Second, the PCI is nothing if not prudent. The Party is also concerned about US hostility. It would not be difficult to make very clear to the PCI what we regard as acceptable behavior from them in the national arena, and what means we might be prepared to use to discourage them from straying from that behavior.

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Having come so far toward its ultimate goal of achieving national power, the PCI would most certainly be unwilling to risk these gains in a confrontation with the United States and its formidable economic and political influence. In this sense, it is ironic that the United States might have more influence in such a situation on the PCI than it has had recently on the Christian Democrats, who have ignored our exhortations to revitalize and have used our support principally to hold onto the reins of power and, where possible, enrich themselves. The carrot and stick approach to the PCI outlined here would hold out to the Communists the establishing of regular contacts and the tacit agreement not to take actions which might be detrimental to Italy, especially in the economic and security spheres, as long as PCI behavior remained within certain acceptable limits.

These suggestions, which would involve a basic change in US policy, are based on the premise that there is no way the PCI can presently be excluded from the national decision-making process, even if they do not formally enter the government.

4. The Other Parties

OK The Christian Democrats, despite their wretched performance in recent years and their uncertain future, still remain the political party with by far the strongest potential base of support. We should therefore not abandon our attempts to assist the party to modernize and reform itself, but should make these attempts more credible and tangible. Exhortations have been fruitless, and cosmetic approaches which assume that the DC would do better if only it had better public relations are short-sighted. Our inability to disassociate ourselves from the discredited DC leadership has been an inexplicable mistake, and our failure to engage the Christian Democrats as a whole in any kind of dialogue which goes much beyond exalting the American way of life and "blood" ties between Italians and Americans is disappointing.

As for renewal, we might well ponder the unpleasant prospect that the quickest and most likely way for the DC to renew itself would be for it to have the experience of being out of power for a few years. However, such an eventuality would hardly be in our interests, nor is it very likely, given the strength of the Christian Democrats and the strong probability that they will be in a position to demand a central role in any coalition likely to emerge from the forthcoming elections. Further, a government coalition without the DC would carry grave risks, but it is perhaps too much to hope for genuine revitalization while the DC still controls many of the mainsprings of power.

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Regarding the other democratic parties, it should not be difficult to establish more meaningful contacts, especially with the democratic left, than our half-hearted and disorganized efforts up to now have permitted. This is true even though the quixotic Socialists (PSI) continue to be shrill and disappointing, and the elitist but impressive Republicans (PRI) seem incapable of developing a mass base. The nearly moribund Liberals (PLI) and the scandal-tainted Social Democrats (PSDI) should also be watched for signs of resurgence, but the short-term expectation is that they will continue to be minor fringe parties, of interest mostly to those who insist on analyzing Italian politics solely in terms of parliamentary arithmetic and the juggling of potential coalitions. In a situation where there are two mass parties of nearly equal strength, however, the role of the smaller parties cannot be ignored, even though their own philosophies and programs are largely overshadowed.

Approaches to these parties which emphasize short-term payoffs and "action programs" to bring about immediate developments favorable to American interests, and which ignore the obstacles to achieving such results, can be expected to have little impact. The dangers to American interests in Italy emanate from long-term processes which we have ignored far too long. The solutions to the situation in which Italy finds itself and which poses a real danger to our interests, must similarly be long-term.

5. NATO.

The biggest danger posed by PCI participation in government is not in its acquiring one or two domestic ministries, but in weakening Italy's commitment to the Atlantic alliance and in undermining the system of voluntary mutual consultation and cooperation which has developed over the years. It should not be difficult to safeguard any NATO secrets or plans in the event that Communists enter the Italian government, but the real question of Italy's basic orientation in such a situation is more serious. However, if one accepts the assertion that the PCI is already a part of the political, social, and economic decision-making process in Italy, then it follows that the best way to deal with that party is to exert every effort to insure that it operates within the democratic framework and does nothing to neutralize Italy. Neither such an approach, nor the establishment of more meaningful contacts with the PCI, need signify either US approval of or ultimate accommodation with the PCI. Indeed, both of these attitudes are largely irrelevant if US influence is no longer sufficient to make the withholding or granting of one or the other a decisive force in Italian affairs. However, as outlined above, the innate caution of the PCI, its fear of American hostility, and its unwillingness to risk the gains it has so laboriously constructed,

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offer substantial opportunities for a constructive American influence on PCI behavior.

6. CONCLUSION.

The general assertions offered above can hardly do justice to the complexities of Italy in June 1976. But if these opinions have any validity, the following conclusions might be pertinent:

a. a continuation of the present situation is not in American interests, even if the PCI does not enter the government. This is because the DC is growing weaker and shows no signs of reinvigoration, and the PCI is growing stronger. It will most certainly be part of any governing formula even if it does not formally enter the government.

b. The trend of rising PCI strength is not irreversible, but the conditions for reversing it have not emerged. Meanwhile, Italian economic, political, and social life is deteriorating slowly while the two mass parties struggle for supremacy, with clear-cut victory for either an unlikely prospect.

c. The US is not in a position to prevent the PCI from entering the government arena, but it does have important potential leverage on PCI behavior which should be tested.

d. The US should recognize that Communist influence in Italy, however undesirable from our standpoint, is well-established at all levels of society. It will not diminish merely because the US withholds its blessings. On the other hand, lack of US approval is still an important brake on the PCI making further dramatic or sudden gains. With such a situation, American policy should avoid doing anything that would make it easier for the PCI, but on the other hand should establish purposeful direct contacts with various levels of the Party. The purpose of these contacts, which would have to be prudently and skillfully managed, would be above all to delineate the limits of behavior beyond which the PCI would be incurring the opposition of the US and risking their considerable post-war gains. In return for consistent and acceptable PCI actions to preserve Italy's fundamental orientation, the US, preferably in concert with Italy's European allies, would tacitly agree to refrain from actions which could be harmful to Italy's economy or social and political processes.

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for exploitation. It is also conceivable that, if the PCI continues to gain, Berlinguer's communism might someday be preferable to that of someone more traditional and dogmatic.

To those who contend that the mere establishment of more contacts with the PCI would be enough to bring them to power, one can only point out that rigid American opposition has neither prevented the PCI from achieving steady growth nor respectability in the eyes of the majority of the Italian electorate.

e. Efforts to upgrade the level of dialogue with the other democratic parties, especially the more progressive Christian Democrats and the democratic left, must be a top priority. It would certainly not be in our interests to have the DC out of power and in opposition, but if that unlikely event were to occur, it might offer the most realistic possibility for a genuine DC revitalization. Certainly it is not probable that a mass party with many sources of support like the DC, even considering its fractiousness, would "disintegrate" if out of power, as some doomsday analysts contend.

f. Our long-range approach to Italy should be to help it through this complicated stage of the modernization process as painlessly as possible. But we need more serious study and analysis in order to do this intelligently.

Finally, there is no denying that American interests in Italy are in danger. But there is not yet cause for alarm or justification for over-reaction. Italy is not yet "lost"-- (like China it is not ours to lose)-- and, maybe we can even say that it has been "found" after years of being taken for granted while its social problems grew more complex.

While risk is inherent in any change of policy or approach, American power is still the strongest outside force impinging on Italian life. If a more prudent, pro-democratic, and broad-based application of our influence were to replace our narrow and traditional anti-communist alliance with a discredited governing class, there is good reason to believe that this will help to insure that Italy continues to make a positive contribution to the Western alliance and remains one of our closest allies.

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SPECIAL HANDLING
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E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, MORG, MILI, CG
SUBJECT: DISSBT CHANNEL

B. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSSENT MESSAGE
"RECOMMENDATION FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ZAIRE" DATED
JUNE 2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION
REGULATIONS YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES
OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND UNDERHAIRMAN
SECRETARY OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE BUREAU
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS. MARINNE
SPIEGEL OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED
COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. WE COMMEND
YOUR USE OF THE DISSSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS
PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. 44

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HJ apt Action on 7/19
MAS to clear on 7/31
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RESP. TEL to go 8/1

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 176232

51
ORIGIN SS-14

INFO OCT-01 /015 R

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APPROVED BY S/PC:WICARGO
S/S: MR. BARNES
M/DG: MR. BLACKBURN
06

RRP

R 271326Z SEP 72
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TO AMEMBASSY MBABANE

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DISSENT CHANNEL

FROM DIRECTOR S/PC

SUBJ: DISSENT MESSAGE FROM MBABANE ON EXECUTIVE
ORDER 11636

REF: MBABANE 1619

1. THIS CABLE ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT
CHANNEL MESSAGE CONTAINED IN MBABANE 1619. THE VIEWS
EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE WILL RECEIVE FULL ATTENTION
IN THE DEPARTMENT. INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THIS TELEGRAM
HAS BEEN MADE TO THE ACTING SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
MANAGEMENT, THE COUNSELOR, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
FOREIGN SERVICE, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT,
AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM PANEL.

A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY TO REFTEL WILL BE SENT FOLLOWING
DEPARTMENTAL DISCUSSIONS. IRWIN

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Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 01086

~~DISSENT CHANNEL~~

E.D. 12065 GDS 4/1/81 (MIRKPATRICK, JEANE) OR-M

THOS. EGEN, OGEN, SREF

SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY ON KAMPUCHEAN RELIEF

- REF: (A) STATE 69012, (B) ROME 5802, (C) 79 STATE 214268,
- (D) 78 A-2939, (E) 2 FAM 101, (F) 11 FAM 243,
- (G) STATE 18146, (H) 75 STATE 162802,
- (I) STATE 55781, (J) USUN 757, (K) USUN 671,
- (L) USUN 690, (M) BANGKOK 13267, (N) STATE 57806,
- (O) BANGKOK 16677, (P) BANGKOK 16781,
- (Q) BANGKOK 16749, (R) BANGKOK 16476, (S) STATE 82375

IC - ENTIRE TEXT)

-- SUMMARY (DRAFTER OF THIS MESSAGE:)

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO OFFER A CRITIQUE OF CURRENT U.S. POLICY ON KAMPUCHEAN RELIEF WITH A VIEW TO EITHER (A) ACHIEVING CERTAIN SPECIFIC ADJUSTMENTS AND CLARIFICATIONS IN OUR POLICY AND APPROACH TO THE KHMER RELIEF EFFORT OR (B) MAKING IT INCUMBENT UPON THE DEPARTMENT TO DEVELOP A FAR MORE CREDIBLE DEFENSE OF OUR CURRENT CONFUSED POLICY THAN IS NOW THE CASE. I BELIEVE THERE ARE INDEFENSIBLE INCONSISTENCIES NOT ONLY WITHIN OUR POLICY AND PRACTICE ON THE KHMER RELIEF EFFORT BUT ALSO BETWEEN THAT POLICY AND OUR CURRENTLY EMERGING GLOBAL POLICY STANCE TOWARD THE ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR PROXIES. FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE AND CORRECT THIS SITUATION WILL UNDERMINE OUR LARGER INTERESTS AND PURPOSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA; IT COULD ALSO PROVE EMBARRASSING WERE WE TO HAVE TO DEFEND THE SITUATION DELINEATED IN THIS MESSAGE BEFORE PROBING SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN WHO MIGHT WANT TO SEE OUR RESOURCES USED MORE EFFECTIVELY. WITH THIS MESSAGE I AM EXERCISING MY RIGHT TO QUESTION OUR POLICIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES AND PURPOSES OUTLINED IN REFS (C) THROUGH (H).

2. THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO THE CORE ASPECTS OF OUR CURRENT POLICY ON THE KAMPUCHEAN RELIEF PROGRAM AS PRESENTED IN THE STATEMENT BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, MR. SHEP LOWMAN AT THE 6 MARCH 1981 DONORS MEETING ON KAMPUCHEAN RELIEF (REF U) IN NEW YORK AND A RESPONSE BY THE DEPARTMENT (REF A) ON 18 MARCH TO CRITICISM OF OUR POLICY EXPRESSED BY MR. SORENSON OUR FODAG IN ROME (REF B). MY CRITIQUE OF OUR POLICY FOCUSSES ON WHAT I BELIEVE ARE LAPSES IN PERCEPTION REGARDING (A) THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA, (B) THE NATURE OF THE APPEALS FOR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE AND THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR THEREOF, (C) THE ADVERSE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF CONTINUING THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY

NOW UNDERWAY AND (D) THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR KEEPING MAJOR AND TELLING PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE AND THEIR SOVIET PROTECTORS.

3. REASONABLE MEN WITH DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES, KNOWLEDGE AND, YES, BIASES WILL OFTEN VIEW EVENTS AND THEIR POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS DIFFERENTLY. SUCH MAY BE THE CASE WITH REGARD TO THE KHMER RELIEF PROGRAM. IN ANY EVENT, I BELIEVE THAT WE NEED TO RECONSIDER THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECT OF OUR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE TO KAMPUCHEA, PARTICULARLY, IN VIEW OF VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS TO ESTABLISH AN INDOCHINESE FEDERATION FULLY UNDER THEIR CONTROL AND FULLY SELF-SUFFICIENT, AND OUR INTERESTS IN KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON THEM TO WITHDRAW FROM KAMPUCHEA. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE CROSSED THE LINE FROM SAVING THE KHMER PEOPLE TO SAVING VIETNAMESE COLONIALISM IN INDOCHINA. AT THIS POINT, THEREFORE, I ALSO BELIEVE CONTINUING WITH OUR CURRENT POLICY IN KAMPUCHEA, IS TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM THAT WE HAVE REAFFIRMED MOST RECENTLY IN STATE 82375. END SUMMARY.

4. A CRITIQUE OF U.S. POLICY ON KHMER RELIEF

A. THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

THE UH KHMER RELIEF TEAM LEADERS, UNICEF AND OTHER OBSERVERS FROM THE PRESS WHO VISITED KAMPUCHEA IN THE LAST YEAR HAVE ALL AGREED

B6

IMPORTANT

Paul
This guy is right

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 USUN N 01086 02 OF 06 0723512
ACTION SP-02

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USUN N 01086 02 OF 06 0723512

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ON ONE VERY ESSENTIAL FACT, ONE UNABASHEDLY STATED ON 6 MARCH BY UNICEF'S OUTGOING PHNOM PENH TEAM LEADER, KURT JANSEN:

-- "AS OF NOW THERE IS NO MORE FAMINE OR HUNGER IN KAMPUCHEA BUT POVERTY IS STILL UNBELIEVABLE."

JANSEN BASED HIS ASSESSMENT ON 5,000 KM OF TRAVEL IN ALL BUT THREE OF KAMPUCHEA'S PROVINCES (THOSE 3 CONTAIN ONLY 2% OF THE POPULATION).

5. NOBODY QUESTIONED THIS CONCLUSION AT THE 6 MARCH MEETING. INDEED, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS CONGRATULATED ITSELF ON THE MAGNIFICENT SUCCESS OF ITS RELIEF EFFORT. WE HAVE SAVED THE KHMER PEOPLE FROM STARVATION. THE FOOD PRODUCTION INCREASE OVER THE PAST YEAR HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS "FANTASTIC". A STUDY OF THE NUTRITION PROFILE OF KHMER CHILDREN WAS QUOTED AS HAVING SHOWN THAT 77.6 OF THE CHILDREN WERE "GOOD" TO "VERY GOOD" WHILE LESS THAN 3 WERE "VERY POOR". CLEARLY, THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF THE RELIEF EFFORT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. CONSIDERABLE POVERTY REMAINS, TO BE SURE, BUT THIS IS A CONDITION COMMON TO ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; IT IS A CONDITION, MOREOVER, OF FAR GREATER MAGNITUDE AND SEVERITY IN AFRICA THAN IN KAMPUCHEA. THE RELIEF EFFORT, HOWEVER, IS CONTINUING WITH A SHIFT IN ITS OBJECTIVES.

6. NOW THE ARGUMENT PUT FORWARD BY SIR ROBERT JACKSON, UNICEF, THE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND OTHERS, IS THAT THE CAMBODIANS ARE STILL STANDING ON THE EDGE OF A CLIFF. THERE IS A NEED TO OBTAIN FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND ENSURE ITS STABILITY. WE ARE TOLD THAT IF WE DON'T COME FORWARD WITH TRACTORS, FUEL, BREEDING ANIMALS, ANIMAL HEALTH CARE, FISHERIES SUPPORT, MORE SEED, AN ANTI-MALARIA PROGRAM AND ICE MACHINES, THE MOMENTUM NOW GAINED WILL BE LOST, FOOD PRODUCTION WILL SLIDE BACK AND THERE WILL BE A NEW RUSH OF PEOPLE TO THE BORDER. WE ARE TOLD THE MARGINS ARE TOO NARROW FOR US TO GAMBLE ON FUTURE SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

7. THE THAI AMBASSADOR, HOWEVER, CUT THROUGH THIS SMOKESCREEN, RIGHT TO THE HEART OF THE MATTER. DELIVERING HIS SPEECH TO THE 6 MARCH MEETING IN MEASURED TONES, HE ADMITTED THAT THE SITUATION WAS STILL FRAGILE AND THEN REMINDED EVERYONE WHO CARED TO LISTEN OF THE BASIC REALITY:

-- "IT HAS BEEN TWO YEARS SINCE THE VIETNAMESE
-- INVASION. THE DIFFICULTIES IN KAMPUCHEA
-- TODAY ARISE LESS BECAUSE OF ANY SHORTFALL
-- IN OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE THAN FROM THE CONTINUED
-- DISLOCATIONS CAUSED BY THE CONTINUED FIGHTING

-- BETWEEN INVASION FORCES AND KHMER FORCES
-- RESISTING THEM. SO LONG AS THIS SITUATION
-- CONTINUES WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE PROBLEMS
-- OBTAINING SELF-SUFFICIENCY. THAT PARTY AND
-- ITS PROTECTOR, THE USSR, SHOULD CONTRIBUTE MORE
-- TO THE RELIEF EFFORT. WE HAVE MORE OF A
-- RIGHT TO EXPECT THIS THAN THEY DO TO EXPECT
-- MORE FROM US. WE HAVE DONE OUR PART. WE ARE
-- ABSOLUTELY OPPOSED TO ANY ASSISTANCE THAT
-- EVEN TOUCHES ON DEVELOPMENT. WHERE THERE IS ANY
-- QUESTION, THAT PROGRAM SHOULD BE CUT IMMEDIATELY.
-- THE PRIORITIES FOR ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE AS
-- FOLLOWS: (1) CAMBODIANS IN HOLDING CENTERS IN
-- THAILAND, (2) VICTIMS OF FIGHTING ON THE BORDERS,
-- (3) THAI VILLAGERS WHO HAVE BEEN AFFECTED."

8. WHEN THE U.S. ADDRESSED THESE ISSUES IT BECAME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT WE VIEW THE ISSUE OF RELIEF VS DEVELOPMENT AID DIFFERENTLY THAN DO THE ASEAN STATES AND MOST OTHER MAJOR DONORS. WE ALSO APPEAR FAR LESS CONCERNED THAN OTHER DONORS ABOUT THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WORKING FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY. IRONICALLY, AMONG THE DONORS, ONLY THE INDIANS REFERRED FAVORABLY TO THE U.S. STATEMENT, PARTICULARLY, FOR ITS LACK OF POLITICAL COMMENT. MORE IMPORTANT THAN DIFFERING WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, HOWEVER, IS THAT WE ARE ALSO LESS CAREFUL IN DETERMINING REALITY IN INDOCHINA AND, THEREFORE ARE IN CONFLICT WITH OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS THERE AND ELSEWHERE. INDEED, ONE OF THE MOST REMARKABLE LAPSES IN THE ENTIRE MEETING OCCURRED WHEN THE U.S. SPOKE - IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE THAI AMBASSADOR. WE DID NOT ADDRESS THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM OR

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INCOMING
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PAGE 01 USUH H 01066 03 OF 06 072351Z
ACTION SP-02

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USUH H 01066 03 OF 06 072351Z

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EVEN MAKE ANY APPEAL TO THE VIETNAMESE OR SOVIETS TO DO MORE THEMSELVES. HDR DID WE AT LEAST ACKNOWLEDGE THE THAI OBSERVATION THAT WHETHER OR NOT THE WHIEER FALL OFF THE CLIFF DEPENDS MORE ON THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF THE FIGHTING THAN WHAT RELIEF AGENCIES DO.

9. INSTEAD, THE UNITED STATES' STATEMENT ALL BUT UNQUESTIONABLY ACCEPTED THE RATIONALE PUT FORWARD BY UNICEF, THE JOINT MISSION TEAM AND SIR ROBERT. THOUGH WE DID SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TRACTORS WERE NOT NECESSARY, WE DID NOT REPEAT NOT EVEN RULE THESE OUT. WE ARGUED INSTEAD THAT THE PEOPLE MUST BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES. IF WE ALLOW KAMPUCHEA TO FALL BACK THERE WILL BE CONSEQUENCES FOR US ALL. THE JOINT MISSION MUST ENSURE SELF-SUFFICIENCY BY 1982. WE DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR WHAT WE WOULD DO IF SELF-SUFFICIENCY IS NOT ACHIEVED; INDEED, THE DOOR IS LEFT OPEN FOR MORE ASSISTANCE BEYOND 1981. AT NO POINT DID WE QUESTION THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT THINGS WILL GET WORSE IF WE DON'T DO MORE OR EVEN DISCONTINUE WHAT WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST.

10. IN REALITY, HOWEVER, THERE ARE EXCELLENT REASONS FOR QUESTIONING THOSE ASSUMPTIONS. TO BEGIN WITH, THE MOMENTUM TO DATE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED WITHOUT TRACTORS, IMPORTED BREEDING ANIMALS, ICE MACHINES, ETC. WHY CAN'T IT CONTINUE AND EVEN ACCELERATE PROVIDING THE VIETNAMESE LEAVE THE KHMER PEOPLE TOTALLY ALONE IN THEIR NATURAL RICE BASKET IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURES AND PURPOSES OF TWO UN RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR JUST SUCH AN END TO THE CONFLICT THERE? EVEN MORE CURIOUS IS OUR CONTINUED RELIANCE ON THE ASSUMPTION SO OFTEN STATED ON 6 MARCH AND REITERATED BY THE DEPARTMENT. (REF A) THAT BY NOT DOING MORE OURSELVES TO ENSURE SELF-SUFFICIENCY WE RUN A HIGH RISK OF KAMPUCHEA'S SLIPPING BACK TO ITS 1979 CONDITION WITH THE ATTENDANT DELUGE OF REFUGEES TO THE THAI BORDER. THIS IS CARELESS THINKING. KAMPUCHEA IN 1981 IS NOT KAMPUCHEA IN 1979. KAMPUCHEA IN 1979 HAD JUST SUFFERED THREE PLUS YEARS OF POL POT AND ALMOST A YEAR OF DEVASTATING FIGHTING WITH VIETNAMESE FORCES. THAT IS NOT, BY THE RELIEF AGENCIES' OWN ADMISSION, THE CASE IN 1981. CROPS ARE BEING PLANTED. AT LEAST UP UNTIL HARVEST, THERE IS LESS INTERFERENCE IN WHAT THE FARMERS DO THEMSELVES. LEFT ALONE THEY WILL MORE THAN SURVIVE AND KAMPUCHEA COULD INDEED BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT.

11. THE ASSUMPTION THAT MALNUTRITION WILL RETURN ALSO NEEDS TO BE EXAMINED. MALNUTRITION IS NOT STARVATION OR FAMINE. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO CERTAINTY IT WILL RETURN ANYWAY TO A DEGREE MORE SEVERE THAN ELSEWHERE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD. NATURE IS HELPING. KAMPUCHEA IS NOT A WASTELAND. BANANAS, OTHER FRUITS, COCONUTS, ALL GROW. ALL ARE PROBABLY FLOURISHING. HOW MUCH HAVE WE REALLY FACTORED THESE IN? THE FAO REPORT BARELY MAKES PASSING REFERENCE TO THESE ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF NUTRITION - NOR DOES THAT REPORT OR ANYONE ELSE EVEN MENTION

THE VERY LIKELY PROBABILITY THAT MOST OF THE KHMER FARMERS (WITH PERHAPS A FEW ISOLATED DISTRICT-SIZE LOCATIONS) ARE STORING AWAY MORE RICE AND SEED THAN THEY ARE REPORTING TO THE AUTHORITIES. AND IF THE FARMERS AREN'T SAVING SEED BECAUSE THEY MAY BE TOO CLOSELY CONTROLLED, SURELY THE AUTHORITIES ARE, IF ONLY TO ENSURE THAT THE OCCUPYING ARMY DOES NOT GO HUNGRY. ONE IS, IN SUM, HARD PUT TO CONCLUDE THAT THE BURDEN OF CONSOLIDATION AND ACHIEVING SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN KAMPUCHEA SHOULD REST WITH AMERICANS OR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY; CLEARLY, IT SHOULD REST WITH THE SOVIET AND VIETNAMESE IMPERIALISTS.

12. B. RELIEVING THE BURDEN OF IMPERIALISM.

THERE IS A CURIOUS LAPSE IN OUR PERCEPTION REGARDING THE ADDITIONAL ELEMENT OF VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION AND AGGRESSION AS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO ACHIEVING SELF-SUFFICIENCY. MOREOVER, WE ARE MISSING MAJOR OPPORTUNITIES TO KEEP THE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE AND THE SOVIETS. THE LAPSE IS REINFORCED BY OUR OWN MISSION IN BANGKOK. A 7 MARCH CABLE (BANGKOK 13267) STATES:

"WE AGREE THAT FUEL FOR CAMBODIA IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM AFFECTING PRODUCTION AS OUTLINED IN THE FAO REPORT. IF THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT, THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD SHOULD TRY TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT."

THIS IS AN INCREDIBLE STATEMENT. MORE INCREDIBLY, IT IS NOW REINFORCED BY THE DEPARTMENT'S REPLY (REF A) TO MR. SORENSON'S CABLE (REF B). THE DEPARTMENT CONCLUDES, "THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AND NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE VIETNAMESE AND/OR THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE OR EVEN WILLING TO STEP INTO THE GAP IF WE PULL OUT."

13. WE ARE COMPLETELY IGNORING SEVERAL VERY RELEVANT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 USUN N 01086 04 OF 06 072351Z
 ACTION SP-02

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USUN N 01086 04 OF 06 072351Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 ES-01 /004 V
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FACTS AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITIES TO AT LEAST MAKE SOME VERY TELLING POLITICAL POINTS WITH REGARD TO SOVIET-VIETNAMESE BEHAVIOR. THE SOVIETS ARE AN OIL-SURPLUS COUNTRY. MORE IMPORTANT, IT IS THEIR SURROGATE, THE VIETNAMESE, WHO ARE OCCUPYING KAMPUCHEA AND TRYING TO ESTABLISH A VIETNAMESE PUPPET IN AN UNASSAILABLE POSITION. THOSE SAME VIETNAMESE ARE ADEQUATELY SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIETS WITH ALL MANNER OR WAR MATERIAL - INCLUDING FUEL FOR THEIR ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS - AND ARE FREE TO PURSUE THE MILITARY SOLUTION TO THEIR PROBLEM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAVING SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF SURVIVAL OF A PEOPLE, IS NOW ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF ACHIEVING SELF-SUFFICIENCY DESPITE THE CONTINUING AGGRESSION. INDEED, BANGKOK HAS MORE RECENTLY EVEN TOPPED ITS REMARKABLE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WE SUPPLY FUEL BY ARGUING ON MARCH 20 IN BANGKOK 1564Z THAT WE SHOULD PROVIDE "RICE SEED EVEN BEYOND THE AMOUNT THAT WOULD THEORETICALLY BE NECESSARY FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY."

14. THERE IS A SAD IRONY HERE. UN ORGANIZATIONS, VOLUNTARY AGENCIES, WESTERN DONORS GATHER IN NEW YORK AND ELSEWHERE TO STRUGGLE WITH ISSUES RELEVANT TO MEETING THE BASIC HUMAN NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE OF KAMPUCHEA WHILE THE VIETNAMESE PURSUE THEIR WAR AND, INDEED, ARE ABSOLVED OF THE NEED TO CONTRIBUTE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO KAMPUCHEA BECAUSE, AS THE JOINT MISSION TEAM AND SIR ROBERT PUT IT, "THEY HAVE SUFFERED NATURAL DISASTERS AT HOME AND NEED FOOD EVEN MORE THAN CAMBODIA." NO ONE ASKED WHY THEY DIDN'T REMOVE THEIR FORCES AND DEAL WITH THEIR OWN PROBLEMS AT HOME.

15. REMARKABLY, BANGKOK IN REF R REPORTS ON VIETNAMESE FEELERS IN HONG KONG TO EXPORT 500,000 MT OF RICE! BANGKOK OFFERS TWO EXPLANATIONS:

"WHILE ON THE FACE OF IT THIS TRANSACTION WOULD SEEM BIZARRE, GIVEN VIETNAM'S FOOD DIFFICULTIES, THE LOCAL SOURCE SAID THERE ARE TWO PLAUSIBLE IF CONJECTURAL EXPLANATIONS: FIRST, RATHER THAN SHIP RICE SURPLUSES FROM SOUTH TO NORTH VIETNAM ON A LOW-CAPACITY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, IT MIGHT BE MORE EFFICIENT (AND PROFITABLE) FOR THE SRV TO EXPORT THIS RELATIVELY HIGH-QUALITY RICE FROM THE SOUTH, AND USE THE EXPORT PROCEEDS TO BUY A MUCH LARGER QUANTITY OF POOR-QUALITY RICE FOR DELIVERY IN THE NORTH. A SECOND POSSIBILITY IS THAT THIS RICE IS NOT FROM THE HARVEST IN THE SOUTH, BUT HAS BEEN FURNISHED THROUGH SOVIET ASSISTANCE (POSSIBLY PURCHASED IN THAILAND), AND THE SRV IS KEEN ON EXCHANGING IT ABROAD FOR CASH AND FOR LOWER-QUALITY RICE DELIVERED IN THE NORTH."

BANGKOK SAYS IT IS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE REPORT BUT ADMITS THAT "STRANGER THINGS HAVE HAPPENED IN VIETNAM." WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONFIRM THIS REPORT. IF IT IS TRUE, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR ASSISTANCE TO THE KAMPUCHEAN RELIEF EFFORT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO ALL.

16. NOWHERE IN THE WORLD HAVE FOREIGN DONORS AND INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES LED BY THE UN APPLIED MORE CONCENTRATED

HUMAN TALENT AND EFFORT TO RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE THAN IN KAMPUCHEA. NO ONE SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE THAT FOOD, LIKE MONEY, IS FUGIBLE. THUS, EVEN AS THESE OUTSIDERS LABOR, THE VIETNAMESE AND THE PUPPET THEY CREATED CONTINUE TO DEFY UN RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING, WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES, A PEACE CONFERENCE AND PEACEFUL, INTERNATIONALLY-SUPERVISED ELECTIONS.

17. AN EVEN MORE IRONIC ASPECT OF THIS TRAGEDY IS THAT THE US IS PART OF THE EFFORT. WE ARE CARRIED ON BY THE INERTIA OF OUR PAST WELL-PLACED HUMANITARIAN CONCERN TO SAVE A PEOPLE AND NOW, HIDING BEHIND ALL MANNER OF EUPHEMISMS, (I.E., INSTEAD OF ICE PLANTS THE JOINT TEAM CALLS FOR "ICE MACHINES") ARE ALL BUT WILLY-NILLY ACQUIESCING TO ASSISTANCE EFFORTS AND REQUESTS THAT ARE SUPPORTING THE CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS OF THE VIETNAMESE PUPPET REGIME. I BELIEVE WE ARE CARELESS IN OUR ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF OUR EFFORT, THE GENUINE NEEDS AND THE GAINS TO THE SOVIETS AND VIETNAMESE. WE ARE NOT OBLIGED TO HELP THEM "CONSOLIDATE" TO USE JIM GRANT'S WORDS, OR TO OBTAIN "SELF-SUFFICIENCY", WHICH WILL THEN MEAN THAT THE VIETNAMESE CAN DIVERT RICE FROM THE RICE BOWL OF KAMPUCHEA TO THE BELLIES OF THE VIETNAMESE TROOPS WHO OCCUPY THAT RICE BOWL AND TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS IN VIETNAM ITSELF.

18. THUS, CONTINUING AS WE ARE IN KAMPUCHEA TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY FOR A VIETNAMESE COLONY IS CONTRARY TO OUR POLICY TOWARD ASSISTING VIETNAM AS IT IS SO ELOQUENTLY STATED IN STATE 82375:

"THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE UNCONSCIONABLE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO A COUNTRY WHICH SQUANDERS ITS OWN RESOURCES FORCIBLY OCCUPYING THE TERRITORY OF ITS NEIGHBOR."

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 USUN N 81026 05 OF 06 072352Z

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USUN N 01056 05 OF 06 072352Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5446

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SINCE FOOD, RICE SEED, BREEDING ANIMALS, ICE MACHINES, FUEL AND MOTOR TRANSPORT ARE ALL FUNGIBLE (AND DIVERTIBLE), THE ASSISTANCE WE PROVIDE TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY DOES ACTUALLY HELP THE VIETNAMESE ESTABLISH THE STABILITY OF THEIR PUPPET IN KAMPUCHEA, AND, CLEARLY ITS EVENTUAL DE FACTO ACCEPTANCE BY THE WORLD COMMUNITY WHICH WILL DEFEND PRINCIPLES ONLY WHEN THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT COST IN BLOOD, SWEAT OR TEARS. IN THIS SITUATION, HOW CAN SUCH ASSISTANCE BE ANY LESS UNCONSCIONABLE THAN THAT WE OPPOSE FOR VIETNAM ITSELF?

19. WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF DIVERSION, THE DEPARTMENT STATES THAT "IN TWO YEARS OF VERY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THAT POSSIBILITY, WE HAVE YET TO ENCOUNTER SOLID EVIDENCE THAT IT TAKES PLACE." THIS STATEMENT SIMPLY IGNORES HOW EASILY RICE COULD BE DIVERTED WITHOUT OUR KNOWING IT. AFTER ALL, THERE ARE NO OBSERVERS AT EVERY POINT IN THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM. MOREOVER, IF THE VIETNAMESE WAR TAUGHT US ANYTHING, IT TAUGHT US HOW EASY IT IS TO INFILTRATE MEN AND MATERIAL ACROSS BORDERS OR BETWEEN VILLAGES IN INDOCHINA. WOULD BAGS OF RICE BE ANY MORE DIFFICULT?

20. THE UN, OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DONOR COUNTRIES ARE SEVERELY CONSTRAINED TO FIND RESOURCES TO MEET DISASTERS AND BASKET CASES ALL OVER THE GLOBE, MOST GLARINGLY ON THE PAKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN BORDER AND IN AFRICA. THE DEPARTMENT'S ASSERTION (REF A) THAT OUR CONTRIBUTION WILL NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER RELIEF EFFORTS IS SIMPLY UNBELIEVABLE. IT DEFIES ECONOMIC LOGIC. WHY

COULDN'T RESOURCES NOW POORLY USED IN KAMPUCHEA BE ADDED TO THOSE DESTINED FOR AFRICA OR RESERVED FOR OTHER MORE DIRE EMERGENCIES IN THE FUTURE? OTHER DONORS FIND THAT ASSISTANCE TO KAMPUCHEA AFFECTS THEIR RESOURCE AVAILABILITY. ARE WE DIFFERENT? THUS, I AM FORCED TO SUGGEST THAT IF KAMPUCHEA IS AT THE PRECIPICE, SURELY THE PEOPLE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND THE SAHEL ARE HANGING BY THEIR FLESH-BARE FINGER-TIPS OVER THAT PRECIPICE! THERE IS ALSO A HOST OF OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHICH STAND AT THE SAME PRECIPICE, IN THE SAME CONDITION AS KAMPUCHEA, I.E., STRUGGLING TO OBTAIN SELF-SUFFICIENCY. BUT THEIR GOVERNMENTS ARE NOT CONDEMNED BY A UN RESOLUTION AND THEY ARE MOST PROBABLY NOT UNDER OCCUPATION BY A FOREIGN ARMY WAGING A WAR THAT COMPROMISES THE EFFECTIVE USE OF OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE WHETHER FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF OR PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO CONSOLIDATE SELF-SUFFICIENT PRODUCTION.

21. FINALLY, THERE ARE TWO OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE EQUATION THAT BEAR ATTENTION: (A) THE THAI AMBASSADOR'S PRIVATE OBSERVATION TO CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE US DELEGATION AFTER THE 6 MARCH MORNING SESSION BROKE FOR LUNCH, AND (B) SIR ROBERT JACKSON'S VIEWS RE PRK RECOGNITION. FIRST, THE THAI AMBASSADOR TOLD US THAT "THIS IS A DELICATE TIME WHILE WE ARE TRYING TO GET AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE GOING IN KAMPUCHEA. WE MUST KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE. FRANKLY, WE DISAGREE WITH YOUR APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA. THE MORE THEY

SOLIDIFY THEIR POSITION, THE LESS WILLING THEY WILL BE TO NEGOTIATE."

22. SECOND, SIR ROBERT'S VIEWS RE THE HENG SAMRIN GOVERNMENT ARE WORTHY OF SPECIAL CONCERN NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THEIR FUTURE IMPLICATIONS BUT ALSO AS AN EXPLANATION FOR THE DISDAIN EXPRESSED BY SIR ROBERT REGARDING THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN OUR DELIBERATIONS. STATE 57806 REMINDS US OF SIR ROBERT JACKSON'S REMARK IN GENEVA THAT THE REGIME IN PHNOM PENH "NEEDS TO BE RECOGNIZED" FOR THE RELIEF PROGRAM TO CONTINUE. SIR ROBERT IS OPERATING IN AN INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL VACUUM. IT IS CLEAR HOW WHY HE CAN SO CAVALIERLY RIDICULE THE DONORS' REPRESENTATIVES FOR BRINGING IN POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS BECAUSE THEY ARE ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS AND THEN URGE THEM TO PURGE THEMSELVES OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS. HOW DOES ONE IGNORE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN A PROBLEM CREATED BY OPPOSING POLITICAL INTERESTS AND ARMED CONFLICT? SIR ROBERT WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO DELINEATE THE LEGITIMATE RELIEF NEEDS AND SEPARATE THEM FROM DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS THAT SHOULD PROPERLY REMAIN THE PROVINCE OF THE HENG SAMRIN GOVERNMENT AND ITS SUPPORTERS THE VIETNAMESE AND THE USSR SIMPLY BECAUSE HE IGNORES THE AGGRESSION INVOLVED AND ALL THE PRINCIPLES ATTENDANT THERETO. HE ACCEPTS THE REGIME AS LEGITIMATE NOW AND IN TRUTH DOESN'T WANT TO DRAW DISTINCTIONS RE RELIEF VS. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.

23. CONCLUSION. WE NEED MORE DISCIPLINE IN OUR EFFORT TO CLARIFY WHAT IS HAPPENING WITH REGARD TO THE SO-CALLED RELIEF EFFORT IN INDOCHINA TODAY AND HOW IT RELATES TO OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY INDICATES THAT IN KAMPUCHEA WE ARE NOW ATTEMPTING TO BRING A COUNTRY BACK FROM A PRECIPICE THAT RESULTS PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF A WAR BETWEEN OPPOSING FACTIONS, ONE OF WHICH IS SUP-

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PAGE 01 USUN N 01006 06 OF 06 0723522
ACTION SP-02

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USUN N 01006 06 OF 06 0723522

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WELL AS TO OUR NEW OVERALL POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET
UNION AND ITS PROXIES AS I UNDERSTAND THEM. END CONCLU-
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PORTED BY AN INVADING ARMY. PURSUING THIS WAR OCCUPIES MOST IF NOT ALL OF THEIR "CREATIVE" TALENT WHICH, IF THEY REALLY CARED, COULD OTHERWISE ADDRESS REAL DEVELOPMENT NEEDS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR OWN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

24. HAVING AVERTED STARVATION AND EVEN CATALYZED CONSIDERABLE FOOD PRODUCTION, IT MAKES NO SENSE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OR THE US TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXERCISE THAT IF IT CONTINUES WILL END UP WITH A DE FACTO ACCEPTANCE OF THE HENG SAMRIN GOVERNMENT AND VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION. IN SUCH A SITUATION WE ARE NOT SAVING THE KHMER NATION; WE ARE MERELY RELIEVING THE VIETNAMESE OF THE BURDEN OF THEIR IMPERIALISM.

25. THE US SHOULD TOTALLY DISASSOCIATE ITSELF FROM THIS EFFORT BY DECIDING UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT WE WILL PROVIDE NO MORE ASSISTANCE FOR USE IN KAMPUCHEA BEYOND THAT IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED. WE SHOULD ACCEPT THE OBSERVATION ATTRIBUTED TO WFC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MAURICE WILLIAMS, IN ROME 5506, THAT, "NOTHING PROMOTES INTEREST IN FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY LIKE THE PROSPECTS OF HAVING IT CUT OFF". WE SHOULD ALSO STATE FOR THE RECORD THAT THE PROPER PRIORITIES FOR ASSISTANCE AS WE VIEW THEM ARE AS FOLLOWS: REFUGEES IN CAMPS IN THAILAND, BORDER FEEDING AS THE THAI PREFER, AFFECTED THAI, AND LIMITED SEED AND FOOD FOR DISTRIBUTION IN KAMPUCHEA BUT ONLY TO PREDETERMINED LOCATIONS WHERE AN EMERGENCY (I.E., LIFE OR DEATH) SITUATION CAN BE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED WITH DISTRIBUTION MONITORED BY UN PERSONNEL. WE SHOULD EVEN SUGGEST PERCENTAGES FOR ALLOCATING OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THESE PRIORITY AREAS. MOREOVER, WE SHOULD ADAMANTLY OPPOSE EFFORTS TO SUPPLY TRACTORS, FUEL OR ICE MACHINES TO KAMPUCHEA AND SHOULD PUBLICALLY CALL ON THE VIETNAMESE AND USSR TO DO MORE. SPECIFICALLY, WE SHOULD ASK THEM TO ALLOCATE FUEL AND TRACTORS IF THESE ARE SO NECESSARY. WE EVEN COULD NOTE IN PASSING THAT THEY HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO TURN THEIR WAR MACHINES INTO PLOW SHARES. INDEED, WOULDN'T ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS BE MORE EFFECTIVE TRANSPORTERS OF RICE THAN THE AVERAGE TRUCK, GIVEN THE SAD STATE OF KAMPUCHEA'S ROAD SYSTEM? THE SOVIETS AND THEIR SURROGATES, AS THE DEPARTMENT POINTS OUT, WILL PROBABLY NOT RESPOND, BUT THIS SHOULD NOT DETER US FROM CONTINUING TO MAKE THEM PAY SOME POLITICAL PRICE FOR THEIR IMPERIALISM.

26. WE SHOULD SUFFER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN ONCE SELF-SUFFICIENCY IS OBTAINED: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL BE ASKED TO LEAVE, OR PERMITTED TO REMAIN ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT WE PROVIDE ACCESS TO GOODS AND SERVICES NECESSARY TO SUPPORT VIETNAMESE INTERESTS IN KAMPUCHEA. WE CAN DELUDE OURSELVES FOREVER ABOUT SAVING THE KHMER NATION. WHAT WE ARE SAVING NOW IS A VIETNAMESE COLONY. INDEED, THE KHMER WILL HAVE FAR LESS FREEDOM AND IDENTITY AS A NATION UNDER THE VIETNAMESE THAN EITHER THEY OR THE VIETNAMESE HAD UNDER THE FRENCH. FAILURE TO DISASSOCIATE OURSELVES NOW IS ABSOLUTELY INCONSISTENT WITH AND CONTRARY TO OUR INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN SEA AS

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251258 | 192109Z OCT 7 |

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ASIA/PD:DWENDEL:JK
10/19/77:58856
ASIA/PD:MMPEHL

ASIA/TR:RUMHOEFER {DRAFT}
ASIA/DP:RMEEHAN

ASIA/PT:VLELLIOTT {PHONE}

7S ACTION BASIA CHRON 2 4 6 8 INFO PPC 4ASIA FM 24P

PRIORITY MANILA

AIDAC

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: FUND FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PID

REF: {A} MANILA 16245; {B} MANILA 15888

PID APPROVAL CABLE WAS CIRCULATED TO APAC MEMBERS FOR DRAFT CLEARANCE ON OCTOBER 6. ISSUE REGARDING CONCEPTUAL CLEARNESS OF PID HAS BEEN RAISED BY ASIA/DP. FINAL CLEARANCE OF PROJECT HAS BEEN HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL THIS ISSUE IS CLARIFIED. WILL SEEK ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM MISSION OR PROCEED WITH CABLE WHEN SPECIFIC CONCERNS HAVE BEEN FORMULATED. 44

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DW
RM

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| 251258 | 142139Z OCT 7 |

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ASIA/PD:DWENDEL:JK
10/19/77:58856
ASIA/PD:MMPEHL

ASIA/TR:RUMHOEFER (DRAFT)
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7S ACTION BASIA CHRON 2 4 6 8 INFO PPC 4ASIA FM 24P

PRIORITY MANILA

AIDAC

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REC-5
RM

Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01
ORIGIN SP-02

STATE 244561

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DRAFTED BY S/P: RJNEITZKE: BMH
APPROVED BY S/P: ALAKE
S/P-OF: GFOX
S/P: RFEINBERG
ARA: NBOUTON
HA/HR: CBSALMON, JR.
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S/P ONLY

-----100280 271413Z /46

R 261742Z SEP 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

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DISSENT CHANNEL -- FOR [] FROM S/P-LAKE

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON NICARAGUA

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 5252

1. FIRST, I WISH TO COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISSENT CHANNEL PROCEDURES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE BUREAU OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR VIEWS WILL BE GIVEN PROPER CONSIDERATION IN OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE COMPLEX AND FAST CHANGING SITUATION IN NICARAGUA. CHRISTOPHER

B6

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PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02

SANTO 05252 211717Z

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INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /004 W
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FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6135

UNCLAS SANTO DOMINGO 5252

DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY FROM [REDACTED] AID/DR.

DO NOT RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION

EO 11652 NA
SUB: NICARAGUA

MR

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IN PART
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I. I HEREBY WISH TO REGISTER MY DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT WITH APPARENTLY INEPT HANDLING OF US POLICY TOWARDS EVIDENTLY NATIONWIDE ATTEMPTS BY NICARAGUANS OF ALL POLITICAL PERSUASIONS TO DISLodge UNPOPULAR, EXPLOITATIVE AND REPRESSIVE DICTATOR, DESPITE MY IGNORANCE OF WHATEVER BEHIND SCENES AND/OR DEEPLY CLASSIFIED U.S. ACTIONS MAY HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE IN FAVOR OF INSURGENTS, OUR FAILURE IS EVIDENT THROUGH PUBLICLY KNOWN SITUATION INDICATING GUARDIA IS GETTING CONTROL OF COUNTRY AFTER PERIOD OF FRUITLESS BLOODSHED AND DESTRUCTION. I CONSIDER HYPOCRITICAL US AND OTHER GOVTS. PIOUS CALLS FOR QUOTE TRUCE UNQUOTE AND QUOTE END TO BLOODSHED UNQUOTE. IF SOMOZA INDEED REMAINS IN POWER AND MOREOVER IS ABLE TO WREAK VENGEANCE ON INSURGENTS THEN I CONSIDER PRESIDENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY A HOLLOW MOCKERY. I BELIEVE THAT NICARAGUAN SITUATION REPRESENTED AND PERHAPS STILL REPRESENTS UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO INTERVENE FOR ONCE ON THE RIGHT REPEAT RIGHT SIDE. WHILE RECOGNIZING INTENTIONAL PROPAGANDA EXAGGERATIONS I FEEL DEEPLY SHAMED BY OPPORTUNITY FOR MOSCOW AND HAVANA RADIO EXPLOITATION OF WHAT TO MANY LATIN AMERICANS AND OTHER THIRD WORLDERS CAN ONLY APPEAR AS CONTINUED TACIT US SUPPORT FOR SOMOZA. AND I WOULD HOPE THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE NAME OF AMERICAN PEOPLE RECOGNIZES AND PAYS THE APPROPRIATE TRIBUTE TO THOSE COURAGEOUS NICARAGUANS WHO HAVE SACRIFICED AND CONTINUE TO SACRIFICE THEMSELVES ON THE ALTAR OF FREEDOM.
YOST

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

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Dissent file

August 5, 1977

Dear Mr. Robinson:

This letter is in response to your dissent channel message of April 11 and your follow-up analysis of May 10 regarding the decision to abolish the Sector Analysis Division in AID's Latin America Bureau. In reviewing the history and rationale of sector analysis programs, it is clear that improved sector analysis is important to progress in meeting "Basic Human Needs" objectives and that the experiences of the past years in the conduct of sectoral analyses have taught us a great deal about appropriate methodologies and managerial strategies for obtaining the maximum policy relevance from the work once it is completed. The crucial questions are how much time and money should be spent to produce what kinds of output, and how best to organize to get the kinds of output desired.

On both of these questions there is broad agreement on many of the points you raise. AID's Latin America Bureau and AID in general are allocating the bulk of available funds mainly to "Purpose C" as you define it (relatively quick policy-relevant sector examinations or "sector assessments"). Aside from a few projects, such as those in Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, which were initiated in the former LA Sector Analysis Division, there are no activities in the "Purpose B" category (broader and more comprehensive sector analyses performed by AID and aimed at determining optimum policy) or "Purpose A" category (same scope as "Purpose B" but involving host country institutions with the objective of internalizing the process). AID recognizes, however, that many of the assessments of the past -- highly qualitative as opposed to quantitative -- are not sufficient. AID has also made a clear decision to decentralize the sector analysis function,


Agency for International
Development
Washington, D.C. 20520

B6

-2-

in keeping with Administrator Gilligan's announced intent of avoiding an overly large bureaucratic concentration in Washington. I understand there is also awareness, however, that missions need some important backstopping support in sector analysis from Washington.

Will decentralization as it is being envisioned effectively undermine the prospects for useful sector analysis? This is, as you suggest, a real danger. Current studies underway in Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, however, suggest that AID field missions working with local counterparts can produce useful and timely results while building host country skills in the process. The Dominican Republic example is doubly interesting, from the point of view of your comments on how to pay for sector analysis, since it was begun under the centralized funding approach but has not been transferred to the Mission and the second stage will be carried out as a Mission funded activity.


At the same time it must be recognized, as you do, that the LA Sector Analysis Division initiated these two projects and they continue to draw on AID analysts and Census Bureau consultants who acquired considerable experience in the Division. This illustrates the need for back-up from Washington that you emphasize. AID officials are aware of this need. State 071531 (enclosed), for example, contains an ambitious plan and budget for improving and updating agricultural sector assessments which in some cases involve multi-year, basic efforts that would appear to come close to "Purpose B" or "Purpose A" type sector analysis.

Nonetheless, the issues you have raised continue to be important. The need for sector analysis assistance and the associated need for Washington backstopping applies to every region and thus to AID as a whole. These issues seem especially pertinent in view of current efforts to develop a new US development assistance strategy. I believe that you use of the dissent

-3-

channel has increased the awareness of these issues by AID officials. I thank you for your letter and encourage you to continue to bring your experience and your ideas to bear in raising these issues through normal channels in AID.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Director
Policy Planning Staff

Enclosure:

State 071531

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

FILE COPY

DISSENT CHANNEL

Ref to MAC

February 24, 1977

TO: INR/RAF -

B6

Dear :

I refer to your letter of February 23, suggesting certain changes in the nature of the Dissent Channel which would result in S/P circulating your intelligence analysis as a document in this channel.

As you may know, the Dissent Channel is available to all employees of State, AID, USIA and ACDA. In cooperation with the Chairman of the Open Forum, we recently reviewed the role of the Dissent Channel in the context of other channels which exist to encourage in-house dialogue and creativity. As a result of this review, we confirmed that the subject matter of this unique channel should be limited to substantive policy dissents. There is enclosed a copy of the Department Notice dated January 19, 1977 which was circulated following this review.

Given the differences of view over the proper role of the Dissent Channel, I doubt you will be satisfied with this reply. I accept that your views on this matter are strong and sincere. Those of us with the responsibility for trying to make the Dissent Channel an effective tool in the policy formation and review process are equally strong and sincere in our belief we are right. Under the circumstances, there does not appear to be much point in continued correspondence on the subject. On my part, I am prepared to acknowledge that we have "agreed to disagree."

As I mentioned in my letter of February 18, we are fully prepared to process in the normal way any

DISSENT CHANNEL


DISSENT CHANNEL

- 2 -

new paper you may wish to prepare expressing specific differences with US policy on the subject of your paper and/or offering alternative approaches.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Nicholas A. Veliotis
Deputy Director
Policy Planning Staff

Enclosure:

As stated

DISSENT CHANNEL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

A

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reply to Prime Minister
Callaghan on the ILO

Attached is a suggested reply from the President to the July 8 letter of Prime Minister Callaghan on the subject of U.S. intentions regarding our future membership in the International Labor Organization.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Draft reply
2. Letter from Prime Minister Callaghan

IO:GADalley:fej ^{PTer}
7/15/77 x-20520

Concurrence: S/IL - Mr. Good

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS

needed IO/LA/B

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-2-

I wish to use this same memo to dissent from the recent telegrams (Tab C) which also refer to our appreciation of support from the West. I recommended changes in the telegrams to reflect the points made in the preceding paragraphs, but was unsuccessful and I therefore declined to provide IO/LAB clearance. I believe the telegrams not only do not state fully and accurately the degree of support received from IMEC but also that these telegrams will undercut our efforts to get real solid support in the future.

Attachments:

As stated.

MP
IO/LAB:APalmer:of

cc:IO:GADalley

IO:JBaker

UNP:GHelman

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

File in...

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4/22/77

MEMORANDUM

TO : PPC/PDA/SPA -

B6

FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake /s/

SUBJECT : Dissent Paper

This will acknowledge the receipt of your dissent paper containing two proposals concerning the Sector Analysis Division of A.I.D. Theodore Moran of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your paper has been circulated to the Offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and the Chairman of the Open Forum, as well as the Director of A.I.D. We commend your use of the dissent channel and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

Clearances: S/P - RHarrington (draft)
S/P - NBoyer (draft)
S/P - TMoran



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Washington, D.C. 20520

file

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B6

August 5, 1977

MEMORANDUM

To: S/P - Mr. Lake
Through: S/P - Mary Ann Casey
From: S/P - Theodore H. Moran *THM*
Subject: [redacted]'s Dissent Message

B6

Here is the response to [redacted]'s dissent message.

There is a genuine interest in "sector analysis" in AID, but there is a feeling in some quarters that Robinson's interpretation of how it should be done is too time-consuming, expensive, and non-policy relevant.

I have told him that I will try to get him in touch with people who are sympathetic to his ideas, and if the problem is merely him they can tell him.

In any case, the points he raises are being reconsidered in AID and the whole debate should now be taken out of the dissent channel.

Attachment

Clearances: AID - Mr. Eriksson *THM*
ARA - Ms. Peters *THM*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

*File
Dissent +*

MEMORANDUM

May 4, 1977
sf

To: Theodore Moran
Policy Planning Staff

From:
PPC/PDA/SPA

B6

Subject: Attached Cable: "L.A. Sector Analysis Activities
and Support"

Attached for your information, is the subject cable, and my April 21 memo to Mary Ann Casey. I assume that, at the appropriate moment, I will be given the opportunity to communicate my views concerning what I perceive to be errors, oversights, and inconsistencies in the statement of "rationale", "mode of implementation", and other parts of the cable, particularly with respect to their bearing on the immediate and long-range issues of my April 11, 1977 Dissent Channel memorandum.

cc: Mary Ann Casey

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PAGE 01 STATE 237143

ORIGIN SP-02

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652IN/A

TAGSIOGEN

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE [REDACTED] JANUARY 20, 1974 TO DIRECTOR OF S/P
E.O. STATE 236874

B6

1. THE DEPARTMENT HAS COMPLETED ITS REVIEW OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE TO THE DIRECTOR OF S/P CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL VISITS, OWING TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ISSUES YOU RAISED, YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS WERE REVIEWED PERSONALLY BY THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT AND BY KEY OFFICERS IN THE BUREAU OF CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, THE OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER AND THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF.

2. CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING CONGRESSIONAL VISITS ARE SET FORTH IN DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR A-10316 OF OCTOBER 16, 1972. THE CONTENTS OF THIS AIRGRAM HAVE RECENTLY BEEN REVIEWED AND UPDATED AND ARE TO BE PUBLISHED SHORTLY AS

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PAGE 02 STATE 237143

A NEW SECTION OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL.

3. OBVIOUSLY, QUESTIONS THAT ARISE AT POST OVER THE LEGALITY OR ILLEGALITY OF CARRYING OUT A CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST ARE OF INTEREST TO THE DEPARTMENT. EVEN THOUGH THE DEPARTMENT IS EAGER TO FACILITATE CONGRESSIONAL VISITS, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS OR

MISSIONS HONOR ANY REQUEST WHICH THEY KNOW VIOLATES U.S. OR LOCAL LAWS. IF POSTS ARE IN DOUBT AS TO THE LEGALITY OF A REQUESTED ACTION, THEY SHOULD REFER THE MATTER TO THE DEPARTMENT FOR ADVICE. THE DEPARTMENT WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THESE QUERIES.



4. THE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT AGREE WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT OFFICERS SHOULD HONOR CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS MADE BY CONGRESSMEN OR MEMBERS OF CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS THAT EMBASSY PERSONNEL CONSIDER UNETHICAL OR IMPROPER. THEY NEED NOT FEEL COMPELLED TO HONOR THESE REQUESTS. OFFICERS HAVE SAID NO IN THE PAST; NO DOUBT THEY WILL SAY NO IN THE FUTURE. SOME OF THESE DECISIONS WILL NOT BE EASY. HOWEVER TO REFER THESE DECISION TO WASHINGTON IS NOT ONLY IMPRACTICAL BUT DIMINISHES THE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH THE DEPARTMENT EXPECTS OFFICERS TO EXERCISE. IN THE EVENT OFFICERS HAVE DOUBTS WHETHER OR NOT TO COMPLY WITH THESE REQUESTS, THEY SHOULD CONSULT WITH THEIR SUPERVISOR OR THE PRINCIPAL OFFICER AT POST.

5. WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR SUGGESTIONS FOR TIGHTENING THE PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING CONGRESSIONAL VISITS. THE DISSENT CHANNEL WAS CREATED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELICITING SUCH SUGGESTIONS. WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT YOU AND OTHER FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL ARE INCREASINGLY USING THIS CHANNEL TO BRING YOUR CONCERNS TO THE DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION. INGERSOLL

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S/P:ALAKE

S/P:OPEN FORUM:DSKINNEY

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE MANILA

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS:N/A

SUBJECT:DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: MANILA 17279

FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P - LAKE

ALP
MHB:CF
DSK *DSK*

B6

1. THE ISSUES IN YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE MIRROR CONCERNS AID ITSELF HAS ABOUT EXTENSIVE LAYERING AND PROTRACTED WAITING PERIODS. AS A RESULT OF THOSE CONCERNS, AID IS TAKING STEPS TO ELIMINATE LENGTHY DELAYS AND STREAMLINE THE PROCEDURES FOR PROJECT REVIEW AND APPROVAL.

2. THE ASIA BUREAU IS REVISING REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCEDURES, WITH THE INTENTION OF ASSURING ACTION ON PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS {PID'S} WITHIN 15 WORKING DAYS AND ON PROJECT PAPERS {PP'S} WITHIN 20 WORKING DAYS.

3. UNDER THESE REVISED PROCEDURES, PROJECT COMMITTEE MEETINGS WILL BE HELD WITHIN 10 DAYS OF THE RECEIPT OF THE PROJECT DOCUMENT. IF PROJECT COMMITTEE FINDS DOCUMENT NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR ASIA PROJECT APPROVAL COMMITTEE {APAC} REVIEW, THE COMMITTEE WILL CONSULT DIRECTLY WITH AA/ASIA

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102

TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO BE TAKEN. WHERE PROJECT DOCUMENTS ARE FOUND SATISFACTORY FOR APAC REVIEW, PROJECT COMMITTEE WILL PRODUCE ISSUES PAPERS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APAC MEETING WHICH IS TO BE CONVENED NOT LATER THAN SEVEN DAYS FOLLOWING PROJECT COMMITTEE MEETING IN THE CASE OF A PP AND 15 DAYS IN THE CASE OF A PID.

4. THE APAC MEETINGS HAVE BEEN STREAMLINED. APAC DELIBERATIONS ARE LIMITED TO SUBSTANTIVE POLICY AND PROGRAMMATIC ISSUES. REVISED APAC PROCEDURES PROVIDE FOR THE CLEARANCE IN SUBSTANCE BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE APAC FINDINGS AND DECISIONS PRIOR TO THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING. ASIA/PD DRAFTS THE CABLES COMMUNICATING THE APAC FINDINGS AND DECISIONS WHICH WE NOW DISPATCH TO THE FIELD WITHIN 3 WORKING DAYS FOLLOWING THE MEETING. THE ONLY CABLE CLEARANCES REQUIRED ARE THE AID COUNTRY DESK OFFICER'S AND PPC'S IF APPROPRIATE.

5. ASIA/PD INTENDS TO ASSURE THAT ACTION IS TAKEN WITHIN THE TIME FRAMES ~~NOTED~~ STATED ABOVE AND THAT ALL RELATED ACTIONS NECESSARY FOR THE AUTHORIZATION OF A PROJECT, E.G., CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION, DLSC REVIEW OF LOAN PROPOSALS, ARE APPROPRIATELY SCHEDULED AND CARRIED OUT.

6. ALTHOUGH THESE PROPOSED REVISIONS CANNOT CURE ALL ILLS, THEY CAN HELP GENERATE TIMELY DECISIONS, ELIMINATE LENGTHY SIGN-OFF PROCEDURES, AND AVOID TENDENCIES TO FORMULATE QUESTIONS AD INFINITUM.

7. AS YOU MAY KNOW, THE ADMINISTRATOR ESTABLISHED A TASK FORCE TO EXAMINE AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON AID PROGRAM PROCEDURES AT THE END OF AUGUST. AMONG THE SUBJECTS OF THE TASK FORCE REPORT, WHICH IS ALMOST READY FOR SUBMISSION TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, ARE THE SETTING OF AID LEVELS EACH YEAR, CURRENT PROJECT DOCUMENTS AND PROCEDURES AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF DELEGATING ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FIELD.

8. IT IS NOT AID'S INTENTION TO REDUCE PHILIPPINE FUNDING LEVELS BY BUREAUCRATIC MANIPULATION OF PROJECT APPROVALS. WE REALIZE THAT THE DATA AVAILABLE IN CERTAIN CASES MAY NOT ALWAYS MESH WITH WASHINGTON'S NEEDS. IN SUCH INSTANCES, WE RELY PARTICULARLY ON THE EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE OF FIELD EXPERTS SUCH AS YOURSELF FOR AN INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION OF AVAILABLE FIGURES.

9. YOU MENTIONED THE NEED FOR CLEARER DIRECTIONS ON SUCH ISSUES AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POOR MAJORITY. WE

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| 3

RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THE FIELD FULLY INFORMED AND WILL WORK TO ENSURE THAT POSTS ABROAD RECEIVE ALL CLARIFICATIONS AS WELL AS ANY PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS ON THESE ISSUES AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

10. THE CONCERNS YOU EXPRESSED IN YOUR MESSAGE ARE IMPORTANT ISSUES AND WE APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THEM WITH YOU. THANK YOU FOR USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL. YY

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: EINV. CO
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES; PROPOSED OPIC ANDEAN
INVESTMENT MISSION

REF: (A) STATE 49832; (B) BOGOTA 2348; (C) STATE 23107

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF
ECONOMIC AND
COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS. THE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT
DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE.

2. DURING THEIR RECENT VISIT TO COLOMBIA, THE ADVANCE
TEAM FOR A LARGE OPIC INVESTMENT MISSION AND AN EMBASSY
OFFICER TALKED TO A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND
LOCAL US AND COLOMBIAN BUSINESSMEN. FROM THE INFORM-
ATION GATHERED, IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT GOC REGULATIONS STILL
PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF OPIC'S INSURANCE AND DIRECT
LENDING PROGRAMS OPERATING IN COLOMBIA AT THE PRESENT TIME.
THE OPIC REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED THAT, NEVERTHELESS, THEY
BELIEVED IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO INCLUDE COLOMBIA ON
THE ITINERARY OF THE PROPOSED ANDEAN INVESTMENT MISSION.
(SEE REF B FOR DETAILS).

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B6

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PAGE 02

SOGOTA 21639 221507Z

3. CONVERSATIONS WITH GOC OFFICIALS CONCERNING THE LOCAL CLIMATE FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT ESTABLISHED THAT OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POLICY REMAINS BASICALLY AS IN THE PAST-NEITHER REJECTING NOR ACTIVELY SEEKING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN GENERAL MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES. THE GOC ACCEPTS FOREIGN INVESTMENT THAT COMPLEMENTS ITS OWN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS, BUT ALSO REMAINS COMMITTED TO MINIMIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE ECONOMY. A RECENT CHANGE IN FINANCE MINISTERS MAY GIVE THE SUPERFICIAL IMPRESSION THAT A SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER INTEREST IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT EXISTS AMONG GOC DECISION MAKERS. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE, HOWEVER, AND THAT BASIC GOC POLICY REMAINS THE SAME AS IN THE PAST.

4. THE GOC ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT IS STILL CONSIDERED ONE OF THE MOST RESTRICTIVE AMONG THE ANDREAN PACT MEMBERS. RECENTLY, NEWS ARTICLES IN THE COLOMBIAN PRESS HAVE ADDRESSED THE DIFFICULTY OF DOING BUSINESS IN COLOMBIA. "INCREDIBLE RED TAPE", AS ONE RESPECTED ECONOMIC MAGAZINE DESCRIBED IT, PRECEEDS ANY FOREIGN INVESTMENT APPROVAL.

5. GIVEN THE FACT THAT OPIC'S PROGRAMS ARE NOT OPERABLE IN COLOMBIA, COMBINED WITH THE GOC'S PASSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT, I QUESTION THE POLICY JUSTIFICATION FOR A US GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED INVESTMENT MISSION TO THIS COUNTRY. THE CASE, APPROVED BY VARIOUS WASHINGTON AGENCIES, CERTAINLY GIVES NO PRIORITY TO PROMOTING US INVESTMENT HERE. MOREOVER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ARGUE IN FAVOR OF THE MISSION ON EITHER THE BASIS OF IMPROVING TRADE OR SELLING THE CONCEPT OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT. THE US CURRENTLY HAS ABOUT 24 PERCENT OF THE COLOMBIAN IMPORT MARKET. PRIVATE INVESTMENT, AS A PHILOSOPHY, IS DEEPLY INGRAINED AND RESPECTED IN COLOMBIA.

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PAGE 03

ROGDTA 01639 221527Z

6. I BELIEVE THAT THE GOV AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN COLOMBIA

ARE SUFFICIENTLY SOPHISTICATED TO MAKE THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT FOREIGN INVESTMENT THEY WANT TO ATTRACT. IN ADDITION, THE POTENTIAL US INVESTOR CAN SUTIL HIMSELF OF THE AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE THROUGH EXISTING PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE AND STATE.

7. IN SUMMARY, I QUESTION THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A US GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED MISSION TO COLOMBIA WITH THE SOLE PURPOSE OF PROMOTING US INVESTMENT HERE. I HOPE THAT CONCERNED WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL CAREFULLY REVIEW THE ADVISABILITY OF THIS MISSION IN LIGHT OF OUR PRIORITIES IN COLOMBIA AND THE CONSIDERATIONS MENTIONED ABOVE.
SANCHEZ

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RELEASE IN PART B6

EE ELMER E
5 VIENTIANE 4871

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AGE 01 VIENTI 04871 171130Z

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W AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

O AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY

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NFO SECSTATE WASHDC 4813

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIENTIANE 4871

BANGKOK FOR MASTERS AND [REDACTED]

.O. 11652: GDS

AGS: MASS, FPOR, LA, US

UEJ: MAP RICE FOR LAOS

REF: A) VIENTIANE 4740

B) DAO 994 (101000JUL75) NOTAL

C) VIENTIANE 4700.

D) BANGKOK 13231

E) STATE 147521

F) VIENTIANE 4773.

G) DAO 112 (1504400JUL75) NOTAL

H) BANGKOK 14097

I) STATE 159715

COUNTRY TEAM'S DECISION TO CONTINUE DELIVERY OF RICE THROUGH JULY IS BASED ON RATIONALE GIVEN IN REF C WHICH REMAINS VALID AND TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION RECENT CHANGES IN LAOS SITUATION. REF I CONCURRED WITH COUNTRY TEAM'S ASSESSMENT AS STATED IN REF C.

COUNTRY TEAM IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCATION FOR RICE DELIVERIES TO LAOS TAKING INTO

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AGE 02 VIENTI 04871 171130Z

CONSIDERATION JUNE RICE UNDELIVERED TO DATE AND JULY

RICE SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY. UPDATED REQUIREMENTS

WILL BE PROVIDED TO INCLUDE NECESSARY CANCELLATIONS

OF JUNE RICE NLT 25 JULY. ALSO, FOR YOUR INFORMATION,

WE ARE CONSIDERING CANCELLING UNDELIVERED JULY RICE

NLT 15 AUGUST. WE WILL ADVISE YOU OF ANY NECESSARY

ACTION ON YOUR PART.

B6

TIME. AS THE LAOTIAN SITUATION IS EXTREMELY FLUID
WE MUST HAVE CAPABILITY TO REACT QUICKLY AND MEET
SITUATION AS IT DEVELOPS.

WE ARE REVIEWING MEANS TO STRENGTHEN SUPERVISION/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

SEE ELMER E
5 VIENTIANE 4871

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CERTIFICATION OF DELIVERIES AS REFERRED TO IN REF H,
PARA 2 AND 3, AND ORIGINALLY OUTLINED IN REF B,
PARA 4. REF G PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT UNDER THE
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ALL RICE IS DELIVERABLE WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF LUANG PRABANG AND PAKSE. FOR JULY,
THIS WOULD BE 725.9 MT OUT OF 1043.1 SCHEDULED; NOT
84 MT PER REF H. HOWEVER, RICE FOR LOCATIONS WHERE
IT CANNOT BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY FROM THAILAND WILL
ROUTED TO VIENTIANE AND RELEASED TO FAR WHO WILL BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION.

HAVE SEEN THAI EMBASSY NAVARAT WHO INSISTED MATTER
MUST BE WITH MINECON AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN REFERRED
TO MFA. HE SUGGESTED MR. MASTERS NEVERTHELESS CALL
MFA AND SORT IT OUT; HE WAS RELUCTANT TO SEND TELE-
GRAM (OUT OF LAZINESS?), DESPITE FACT HE APPEARED
TO COGNIZE POTENTIAL SERIOUSNESS OF DELAY IN RICE
DELIVERIES.

HAPMAN
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AN

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Dev —

DRAFT TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART B6

*To type in
final file.
D*

ACTION: AmEmbassy BANGKOK

DISSENT CHANNEL

TAGS : PFOR

SUBJ : Dissent Message

REF : Bangkok 16004

FOR BANGKOK

B6

1. This message concerns your second dissent, the matter of suspension of deliveries to Laos of petroleum products and rice under the U.S. Military Assistance Program.

2. Status of the program at this moment is as follows: Our economic and military assistance programs to Laos have been terminated, and Congress has prohibited further aid for the current fiscal year. Prior to June 30, for reasons discussed in the correspondence you referred to, and other correspondence as well, such as Vientiane 4372, the Department approved Embassy Vientiane's recommendation that a portion of the remaining FY 75 funds be used to finance MAP POL and rice for a July increment only. This increment would have been fully delivered long since had not unforeseen delays in Thailand intervened. Embassy Vientiane indicates that the deliveries of this rice should be completed *by mid-September* and has repeatedly recommended that these deliveries be completed. All POL deliveries

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-2-

have already been completed.

3. The Department's decision to continue for a limited time deliveries of MAP rice and POL to Laos was predicated upon major political and humanitarian factors raised in Vientiane 4897 as late as July 19 (your ref B). This cable restressed the "still very tense and uncertain situation" in which the Mission found itself, and underlined the broad social impact in Laos which the rice delivery question had acquired. That cable sketched a plausible chain of events through which a more abrupt rice cutoff such as you recommended could have jeopardized chances of maintaining the mission and assuring the security of its personnel. Since these last points were and are central goals of our policy in Laos, they have prevailed over the strong considerations raised in paras 6, 9 and 10 of your cable.

4. With regard to the future, the Lao government has been informed that there will be no further shipments of POL and no further shipments of rice after deliveries of the July increment have ended. All other US aid to Laos has been terminated^{at} and there are no present plans for new assistance. Moreover, for your information, we are in the process of taking steps to liquidate certain other specific aspects of past aid programs for Laos.

5. For all these reasons, while your general point

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-3-

of view regarding aid to Laos does constitute our official policy, your ^{proposal} ~~dissent~~ concerning specifically the residual rice deliveries ^{could be approved for implementation,} ~~was not accepted as such.~~

6. Once again we commend you on the use of the dissent channel.

D.P.
S/P: DPike *MT*
EA/LC: MHenderson/JDRosenthal:dtm
9/2/75 x23132

Clearances: EA - Mr. Habib *(draft)*
EA - Mr. Miller *(draft)*
S/P - DFP - Mr. Lydon *752*

Approve: *WMA* S/P - *JWhewis*

W

FORM DS 322(OCR)

-6 OCT 72 18 39Z

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POL 7 GERW

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EUR/CE: BAFLATIN:FPS
10/05/72 EXT 28957
EUR: RFESSENDEN

EUR/CE: JSSUTTERLIN
E/OA/AN: MHSTYLES

JIS JOR
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RRP
DISSENT - BERLIN-2055

PRIORITY BONN

PRIORITY BERLIN, LONDON, MOSCOW, NATO, PARIS

SUBJ: FUTURE OF BERLIN AIR SERVICES

REF: A) BERLIN 1608; B) BERLIN 1637; C) BONN 13312;
D) BERLIN 1699

1. DURING HIS RECENT WASHINGTON VISIT BERLIN SENATOR FOR FEDERAL AFFAIRS HORST GRABERT DWELT AT LENGTH ON THE SENATE'S CONCERN ABOUT THE WAY THE CIVIL AVIATION SITUATION IS DEVELOPING IN BERLIN. GRABERT CRITICIZED THE BONN GROUP AIR STUDY AS "TWO MONTHS TOO LATE," AND REPEATED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE CURRENT SAS AND AUA EFFORTS TO SECURE NORTH-SOUTH OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS FROM THE GDR WILL NOT SUCCEED. (IN THIS CONNECTION, HE CONVEYED AN SAS COMPLAINT THAT IT IS POINTLESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GDR WITHOUT THE TECHNICAL HANDOVER INSTRUCTIONS THE THREE POWERS HAVE NOT YET PROVIDED. (THE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT YET RECEIVED COPIES OF THE REVISED DRAFT PROMISED IN BONN'S 12162.)

2. GRABERT PRESSED FOR EARLY FOUR POWER TALKS ON AIR SERVICES FOR THE BERLIN AREA, ON THE GROUND THAT NO SUCCESS WAS LIKELY IN OPENING WEST BERLIN TO NON-ALLIED INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS UNTIL AN UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED WITH THE SOVIETS. HE WARNED THAT THE FRG MIGHT FIND IT EVER HARDER TO JUSTIFY THE RETENTION OF A SUBSIDIZED IGS SERVICE AS THE GERMAN TAXPAYERS NOTE THE GROWING USE OF SCHOENEFELD FOR ALL OTHER TRAFFIC. OBSERVING THAT MODERN AIR'S PROBLEMS WITH BULGARIA (REFTEL D) MIGHT END IF

REF: BAF

JSS/SS, MHS

R AV 9 BUL-GERW

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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

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MODERN AIR WERE TO AGREE TO SPLIT 50 PERCENT OF THIS LUCRATIVE BUSINESS WITH BULGARIAN CARRIERS AND APPLY FOR GDR PERMISSION TO FLY TO AND FROM WEST BERLIN OUTSIDE THE CORRIDORS. GRABERT ASSERTED THAT A RECENT BARR-FALIN DISCUSSION ON THIS PARTICULAR PROBLEM REVEALED SOVIET READINESS TO TALK ABOUT SUCH SPECIFIC TOPICS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE ENTIRE AIR PICTURE--IF THE THREE POWERS ARE ALSO READY FOR SUCH TALKS.

3: DEPARTMENT OFFICERS REMINDED GRABERT THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF A SECURE AND VIABLE CORRIDOR SERVICE IS VITAL FOR THE FUTURE OF BERLIN. IN THE US VIEW IT WOULD NOT IN ANY EVENT BE A PROPITIOUS TIME TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH THE SOVIETS (IF INDEED IT WERE TO BE RAISED AT ALL) BEFORE WE HAVE COMPLETED FOUR POWER NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE UN ENTRY OF THE TWO GERMANY'S, WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED WITH FOUR POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED. WHILE WE AGREED ON THE DESIRABILITY OF BRINGING INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS INTO WEST BERLIN, AND HAD WORKED HARD TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE, WE DID NOT THINK THAT THE VALUE OF SUCH FLIGHTS WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT PREJUDICE TO THE CORRIDORS. GRABERT ASSERTED THAT THE CORRIDOR REGIME IS ALREADY BEING MISUSED FOR NON-IGS TRAFFIC (E.G., MODERN AIR FLIGHTS TO EASTERN EUROPE) AND EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL UNDERSTANDING FOR THE SOVIET COMPLAINT THAT THE CORRIDORS WERE NOT ORIGINALLY INTENDED FOR SUCH USE. DEPARTMENT OFFICERS EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAVE AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF ALLIED FLIGHTS USE THE CORRIDORS. GRABERT'S DEFINITION WOULD RULE OUT NOT ONLY MAT FLIGHTS TO BULGARIA, BUT AIR FRANCE FLIGHTS TO PARIS. IN OUR VIEW, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WE COULD OBTAIN ANYTHING BETTER THAN THE PRESENT CORRIDOR ARRANGEMENTS IN TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ENSURING WEST BERLIN'S VIABILITY AND SECURITY.

4. GRABERT THOUGHT THAT FRG-GDR AIR TALKS SHOULD BE COMMENCED IMMEDIATELY, REPEATING HIS EARLIER ARGUMENTS THAT TIME WAS NOW OF THE ESSENCE BECAUSE THE GDR MIGHT SHORTLY BE WINNING OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS THROUGH ICAO MEMBERSHIP THAT IT WOULD NOW HAVE TO GAIN THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRG. DEPARTMENT OFFICERS POINTED OUT TO GRABERT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ADHERENCE TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION (WHICH APPLIES "AUTOMATICALLY"--WITH SOME LIMITATIONS-- ONLY TO NON-SCHEDULED SERVICES) AND THE INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE TRANSIT AGREEMENT (WHICH COVERS SCHEDULED SERVICES-- BUT HAS BEEN JOINED BY ONLY TWO COMMUNIST STATES.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

FORM DS 322A(OCR)

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND}. GRABERT EXPRESSED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE GDR PROBABLY WOULD ALSO JOIN THE LATTER AGREEMENT. (FYI. THE DEPARTMENT IS NOW STUDYING THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A MOVE ON ALLIED AIR TRAFFIC.) ASKED WHAT INCENTIVE THE GDR WOULD HAVE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRG FOR ENCOURAGING LOCAL COMPETITION FOR SCHOENEFELD, GRABERT REPLIED THAT INTERFLUG URGENTLY NEEDS OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS ACROSS THE FRG TO MOST OF THE IMPORTANT AIR MARKETS IN WESTERN EUROPE; THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT ALSO BE WILLING TO OFFER THE THREE POWERS A "BETTER" CORRIDOR REGIME IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THIS GDR COMMERCIAL INTEREST. GRABERT INSISTED THAT WITHIN A FEW YEARS LUFTHANSA WOULD BE FLYING IGS SERVICE TO SCHOENEFELD IF SOME ARRANGEMENT WERE NOT MADE WHICH WOULD PERMIT LUFTHANSA TO FLY TO WEST BERLIN.

5. DEPARTMENT OFFICERS EMPHASIZED THAT LUFTHANSA IGS FLIGHTS TO SCHOENEFELD, IF IN COMPETITION WITH ALLIED CORRIDOR SERVICE COULD PREJUDICE THE VIABILITY OF THE ALLIED CARRIERS, WHICH WOULD STILL BE SUBJECT TO THE 10,000 FOOT RESTRICTION. THIS WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF BERLIN OR, IN OUR OPINION, OF THE FRG. THE ALLIES HAD ALREADY AGREED TO LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS TO TEGEL ENROUTE TO MOSCOW. EFFORTS TO THIS END WITH THE SOVIETS COULD BE PURSUED BY THE FRG. FOR THE LONGER FUTURE WE DID NOT NECESSARILY RULE OUT REGULAR LUFTHANSA CORRIDOR FLIGHTS EVEN IF SOME GDR ROLE WERE INVOLVED. BUT WE WOULD WISH TO STUDY VERY CAREFULLY ALL OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A CHANGE BEFORE MAKING ANY DECISIONS.

6. ALTHOUGH THE DEPARTMENT SHARES THE SENAT'S PESSIMISM CONCERNING GDR COOPERATION IN NON-CORRIDOR FLIGHTS TO WEST BERLIN, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOENEFELD AS AN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT POSES A CRITICAL THREAT TO THE WELL-BEING OF WEST BERLIN. IN FACT THE AVAILABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE AT SCHOENEFELD SHOULD PROVIDE AN EXTRA CONVENIENCE FOR WEST BERLINERS AS LONG AS ACCESS TO THE EAST GERMAN AIRPORT IS RELATIVELY FREE, AS NOW. IN OUR VIEW, COMMON WESTERN INTERESTS WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY ENTERING AVIATION TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION-AT-THE-TIME-- ONCE WE HAVE SECURED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT-POSSIBLE- UNION AT THIS TIME NOR DO WE FAVOR FRG/GDR CIVIL AIR DISCUSSIONS ON BERLIN SERVICE. ONCE WE HAVE SECURED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE DEPENDABLE REAFFIRMATIONS OF QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS AND THE PRESERVATION OF WORKABLE PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES, WE MIGHT RECONSIDER THIS ASSESSMENT. THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE COMMENTING LATER ON THE VARIOUS SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED BY REFETELS B AND C CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIED AND FRG ROLES IN

450

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

FORM DS 322A (OCR)

CONFIDENTIAL

STEP 4

BERLIN AVIATION. GDS. hhhh

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FORM DS 322(OCR)

UNCLASSIFIED

S/P-0FP - SVOGELGESANG
7/10/74, EXT. 28790
S/P - PBSWIERS

RELEASE IN PART
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ROUTINE YAOUNDE

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: XA/CM, APER
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE
REF: STATE L#134795, YAOUNDE 1876

PBS
SV SV

1. WE ARE POUCHING TODAY THE RESPONSE TO [REDACTED] DISSENT CHANNEL TELEGRAM BY H. B. HOPKINS, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND A#MANPOWER IN AID.

B6

2. SHOULD [REDACTED] WISH THE OPEN FORUM PANEL TO PURSUE THIS MATTER FURTHER IN HIS BEHALF, AS PER OUR LETTER OF JULY 10, 1974, HE SHOULD TELEGRAM OR WRITE THE PANEL IN CARE OF S/P-0FP, ROOM 7310, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.YY

UNCLASSIFIED

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BANGKO 13111 140832Z

15
ACTION SP-03

INFO OCT-01 ES-02 /006 W

R 140756Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5898

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BANGKOK 13111

DISSENT CHANNEL

R.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: AORG, EAID, TH
SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION OF RED/USOM RELATIONSHIPS

REF: A. STATE 173613
B. BANGKOK 8679
C. BANGKOK 11952

1. RED STAFF APPRECIATES THE DEPARTMENT'S AND AID/W'S REVIEW OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN UNDERTAKING NEW ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN RED AND USOM AT THIS TIME. CONCUR THAT THE MECHANICS OF IMPLEMENTING THESE NEW ARRANGEMENTS AS OUTLINED IN REF (C) SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE REVIEW SUGGESTED IN PARA (4) REF (A) AFTER ONE YEAR. THIS SHOULD BE A SUFFICIENT TRIAL PERIOD IN WHICH TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS OF ANY OF THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS CITED IN THE DISSENT CABLE, SHOULD THESE MATERIALIZE, AND TO DEVISE WHATEVER ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOMMODATION THEY MAY REQUIRE. ACCORDINGLY SUGGEST THAT DEPARTMENT AND AID/W BASED TEAM BE SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE SUCH EVALUATION ON AUGUST 15, 1975.
KINTNER

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Art Hummel
ad white
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29126 Reply needed?
Am 6/24
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FORM DS 322(OCR)

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OFF:LLOWENSTEIN:JB
07/05/74 EXT 23852
S/P:BSWIERS

USIA (FOR IAA ONLY) (INFO)

PRIORITY PRETORIA

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OEXC; SF
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM [REDACTED] CAO

FBS
LL/2

B6

REFS: (A) PRETORIA 2857; (B) PRETORIA 2911

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE (REFTEL A) AND AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS (REFTEL B).
2. OFF HAS BEEN STUDYING OVERALL U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA IN LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL AND ELSEWHERE. ACTION ON REFTEL (A) DELAYED BY SHORT WEEK BUT BEING GIVEN PRIORITY ATTENTION. ACTION OFFICER IS WILLARD A. DE PREE, S/P.

DECONTROL: GDS: YY

RELEASE IN PART B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/P: CALLEGRONE: AG
03/31/82 EXT 22972
S/P: PWOLFOWITZ

ROUTINE BONN

DISSENT CHANNEL FROM S/P PAUL WOLFOWITZ TO

E.O. 11652: GDS, 3/31/88 (WOLFOWITZ, RMUL)

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL ON SANCTIONS AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON SANCTIONS AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. PER YOUR REQUEST, THE MESSAGE WAS SENT TO THE ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS COLLECTIVE WHICH INCLUDES USNATO. I HAVE ELECTED NOT TO REPEAT THE CABLE TO USICA AND ACDA AT THIS TIME. THE DISSENT CHANNEL SERVES AS AN IN-HOUSE MECHANISM FOR DEALING WITH POLICY ISSUES AND I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IN THIS INSTANCE THE CABLE NEED BE REPEATED TO THE OTHER FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCIES INDICATED. HOWEVER, I AM WILLING TO RECONSIDER THIS DECISION IF YOU PREFER.

3. INSIDE THE DEPARTMENT I HAVE DISTRIBUTED COPIES OF YOUR CABLE TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS. WHEN COMMENTS FROM THESE OFFICES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED, A MEMBER OF MY STAFF WILL COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY.

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Ms. Mary Ann Casey S/P

April 21, 1977

PPC/PDA/SPA

B6

April 11, 1977 Dissent Channel Memo

1. It failed to list the three attachments at the end of the memo, and I would appreciate it if the following could be added: "Attachments: a) March 1977 issue of the Foreign Service Journal; b) March 15, 1977 memo to Hohn R. Eriksson; c) List of the El Salvador Education Sector Analysis documents."

2. As you know, the proposed abolishment of the Sector Analysis Division in the Latin American Bureau is one of the issues dealt with in the memo. I have argued that the policy implications of this decision have not been fully considered. Yesterday I was told that a cable informing the missions that the division is being abolished has been circulated in the Bureau and is about to be sent.

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PART B6

PAGE 01 STATE 054187
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STADIS////////////////////
DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [REDACTED] FROM TONY LAKE S/P

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE : SYRIA, ISRAEL AND
LEBANON: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

REF: DAMASCUS 1482

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ON "SYRIA, ISRAEL AND LEBANON: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE". MR. GRANVILLE AUSTIN OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH AND EMBASSY BEIRUT. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED.
VANCE

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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Department of State

PAGE 01 STATE 145829
ORIGIN SP-02

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DRAFTED BY S/P: GSAUSTIN: VB
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

~~SECRET~~ STATE 145829

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XF

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SYRIA, ISRAEL AND
LEBANON: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

REF: DAMASCUS 1482; STATE 54187

FOR [] FROM PAUL KREISBERG, ACTING DIRECTOR, S/P

1. I'M SORRY THAT SO MUCH TIME HAS ELAPSED SINCE OUR
INTERIM RESPONSE TO YOUR DISSENT. YOUR MESSAGE HAS
RECEIVED ATTENTION IN NEA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE DEPARTMENT.

2. OUR THINKING HAS BEEN SIMILAR TO YOURS IN MANY WAYS.
AS YOU ARE PROBABLY AWARE, WE EXERTED MAJOR EFFORTS IN
NOVEMBER OF 1976, AS WELL AS IN LATE JANUARY AND EARLY
FEBRUARY, TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS THAT IT WAS IN THEIR
INTEREST TO ALLOW A LIMITED MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN ADF FORCES
INTO SOUTH LEBANON TO CONTAIN THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE
THERE AND TO ESTABLISH THE AUTHORITY OF THE SARKIS
GOVERNMENT.

3. WE TRIED OUT ON THE ISRAELIS A VARIETY OF FORMULAS
SIMILAR TO YOUR PROPOSALS. LIKE YOU, WE HAD SOME HOPES

THAT THE TACIT ISRAELI-SYRIAN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT SYRIA'S
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON WOULD REMAIN. BUT WITH
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE IN OCTOBER 1976 AND
AS SYRIAN MILITARY PRESSURES UPON THE PALESTINIANS BEGAN
TO EASE AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE ISRAELIS APPARENTLY
DECIDED THEY COULD NOT TOLERATE A SYRIAN MILITARY
PRESENCE BEYOND THE LITANI RIVER.

4. AT AN EARLIER STAGE IN THE CONFLICT, ISRAELI LEADERS,
SUCH AS PEREZ, HAD CONDITIONED THE ISRAELI PUBLIC TO
ACCEPT A LIMITED SYRIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON.
THEY DID NOT DO SO AFTER OCTOBER 1976, AND PARTLY AS
A RESULT, ISRAELI PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE
SOUTHWARD MOVE OF SYRIAN FORCES GREW. ISRAELIS ALSO
FEARED, AND WANTED TO FRUSTRATE MOVES THAT COULD BE
INTERPRETED AS IMPLEMENTING THE SO-CALLED "GREATER SYRIA"
CONCEPT.

5. WE APPRECIATED HEARING YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS
DIFFICULT QUESTION. THANK YOU FOR USING THE
DISSENT CHANNEL. CHRISTOPHER

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RELEASE IN PART B6

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PAGE 01 OF 03 STATE 165409
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FOLLOWING REPEAT KINSHASA 6083 ACTION STATE JUN 06.

QUOTE: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KINSHASA 6083

DISSENT CHANNEL

FROM POLITICAL COUNSELOR [redacted]

DRAFTER DESIRES DISTRIBUTION TO P, AF, HA, E

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/5/65 (REHOLE, ROBERT) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, MORG, MILL, EGEN, EAID, CG
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ZAIRE

REF: A) 5 FAM 212.30, B) KINSHASA 5669 (78),
C) LUBUMBASHI 635, D) KINSHASA 5027, E) STATE 134453,
F) KINSHASA 3955

1. SUMMARY: AFTER 28 YEARS AS A FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, I AM RETIRING. WHILE SUCH DECISIONS ARE ALWAYS THE RESULT OF A COMBINATION OF FACTORS, A BASIC ELEMENT IN MY CASE IS A DEEP-SEATED OPPOSITION TO THE U.S. POLICY OF SUPPORTING THE CORRUPT, OPPRESSIVE AND INCOMPETENT MOBUTU REGIME. I CANNOT BELIEVE IN A POLICY BASED ON THE PATENTLY FALSE ASSUMPTION THAT MOBUTU IS CAPABLE OF IMPLEMENTING INDISPENSABLE REFORMS. OUR IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY DISASTER IS ONLY THE MOST RECENT EVIDENCE THAT MAINTAINING SUCH INTIMATE TIES WITH A REGIME IN DECOMPOSITION MEANS THAT ITS SUCCESSOR FEELS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO BE FUNDAMENTALLY ANTI-AMERICAN. AS POLITICAL COUNSELOR IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN KINSHASA, I FEEL IT IS MY DUTY TO PROTEST AGAINST THE CONTINUATION OF THIS POLICY IN ZAIRE WHEN BETTER ALTERNATIVES ARE AVAILABLE. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE U.S., LET FRANCE AND BELGIUM PLAY THE LEADING ROLE IN ZAIRE WHICH THEY DESIRE WHILE WE SHARPLY REDUCE OUR PRESENCE IN ZAIRE AS WE AWAIT THE COLLAPSE OF THE MOBUTU REGIME. END SUMMARY.

2. "THE DEGREE OF CORRUPTION AND INEPTITUDE OF THE MOBUTU REGIME HAS REACHED THE POINT WHERE INTERNAL REFORM IS FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES IMPOSSIBLE--WITNESS THE LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMS ANNOUNCED BY MOBUTU IN JULY 1977 AFTER THE FIRST SHABA WAR AND RELATED REFORMS PROMISED ON EVEN EARLIER OCCASIONS. (U) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT MOBUTU WILL FIND A WAY TO SABOTAGE EXTERNALLY-IMPOSED REFORMS WHICH THREATEN TO REDUCE HIS POWER AND FINANCIAL PREROGATIVES. THE (U) INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION IS THAT MOBUTU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO REVERSE THE DECLINE OF HIS POLITICAL FORTUNES, AND THAT HIS REGIME WILL, SOONER OR LATER, BE OVERTHROWN. THE LONGER MOBUTU HANGS ON, THE GREATER THE DANGER OF A REVOLUTIONARY UPHEAVAL GIVING RISE TO A RADICAL, ANTI-U.S. REGIME ALONG ANGOLAN, ETHIOPIAN, OR CUBAN LINES."

3. FAR FROM BEING CAUCASIOUS OR INNOVATIVE, THIS LINE OF REASONING IS SO WIDELY HELD AS TO BE ALMOST A CLICHE AMONG WELL-INFORMED OBSERVERS BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE U.S.

GOVERNMENT. THE WORDS COULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY ANY OF THE EXPERTS ON ZAIRE WHO TESTIFIED BEFORE THE HOUSE AFRICAN SUB-COMMITTEE LAST FEBRUARY: STEPHEN WEISSMAN, CRANFORD YOUNG, GUY GRAH, OR DAVID GOULD. IN POINT OF FACT, THEY ARE TAKEN FROM THE SUMMARY OF MY EARLIER DISSENT PAPER WRITTEN APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AGO (REF 6). THEY ARE REPEATED HERE SIMPLY BECAUSE THE PREDICTIONS REGARDING MOBUTU'S ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO AVOID REFORM HAVE BEEN PROVED CORRECT.

4. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ZAIRE HAS BEEN BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE MOBUTU REGIME CAN BE CAJOLED--OR, MORE REALISTICALLY, FORCED--INTO MAKING THE BASIC POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC REFORMS NECESSARY FOR ITS SURVIVAL. THE FACTS SUGGEST OTHERWISE. SHABA REGION, WHERE THE FIRST AND SECOND SHABA WARS FOUND THEIR POLITICAL EPICENTRE, REMAINS SULLEN AND DISCONTENTED. THE ZAIREAN ARMED FORCES (FAZ), IRREGULARLY AND INADEQUATELY PAID AND FED, REMAIN AS CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ TERMED THEM: "A RAPACIOUS RABBLE." MOBUTU HAS SUCCESSFULLY DELAYED THE SIGNING OF THE IMF STANDBY AGREEMENT, THE KEY TO BRINGING SOME SORT OF RATIONALITY INTO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY, BECAUSE IT WOULD PLACE SOME LIMITS ON HIS CONTINUED ABILITY TO LOOT THE NATION.

5. POLITICAL REFORM REQUIRES THE REINTEGRATION OF SHABA REGION BACK INTO THE ZAIREAN BODY POLITIC SO AS TO REMOVE THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE 1977 AND 1978 SHABA WARS. BY SO DOING, SHABA III MAY BE PREVENTED. IN LARGE MEASURE BECAUSE OUR BELGIAN AND FRENCH ALLIES REFUSE TO JOIN US IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE MOBUTU REGIME TO OFFER MEANINGFUL CONCESSIONS TO SHABA, ONLY A FEW COSMETIC CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE. SHABA TODAY IS UNDER WHAT AMOUNTS TO A MILITARY OCCUPATION BY FOREIGN (MOROCCAN AND SENEGALESE) TROOPS AND ZAIREAN SOLDIERS OF NON-SHABAN ORIGIN. NO WONDER THE REGION REMAINS UNRECONCILED.

6. THE EXPATRIATE POPULATION IN THE KEY MINING SECTOR IS FRIGHTENED BY WHAT IS LIKELY TO OCCUR WHEN THE MOROCCAN AND SENEGALESE TROOPS ARE REMOVED DURING THE THIRD QUARTER OF THIS YEAR. THEIR APPREHENSIONS ARE TWOFOLD. CONSIDERING THE FAZ TO BE NO BETTER ABLE TO GUARD THE COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY TODAY THAN IN 1977 AND 1978, EXPATRIATES FEAR A RENEWED INVASION BY THE EX-KATANGAN GENDARMES. THANKS TO THE RAPPROCHMENT BETWEEN ANGOLA AND ZAIRE, THEY PROBABLY EXAGGERATE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A RENEWED INVASION IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MOROCCANS AND SENEGALESE LEAVE. HOWEVER, THEIR JUDGMENT CONCERNING THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE FAZ IS ALMOST CERTAINLY CORRECT.

7. THE EXPATRIATES' SECOND AND MORE IMMEDIATE FEAR IS OF THE DEPRADATIONS TO BE EXPECTED FROM FAZ TROOPS ONCE THE RESTRAINING HAND OF THE FOREIGN SOLDIERS IS REMOVED. OUR LUBUMBASHI CONSUL REPORTS THE EXPATRIATES TO BE IN A STATE OF "NEAR PANIC" OVER THE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION (REF C). IF SOMETHING DECISIVE IS NOT DONE TO REPLACE THE MOROCCANS AND SENEGALESE WITH A CREDIBLE SECURITY FORCE, OUR CONSUL PREDICTS THE ACCELERATION OF THE "LETHAL LEANAGE" OF VITALLY-NEEDED EXPATRIATES. UNFORTUNATELY, ZAIRE HAS NO CREDIBLE SECURITY FORCE TO SEND TO SHABA OR ANYPLACE ELSE.

8. THE KEY TO MILITARY REFORM IS TO SEE THAT FAZ REGULAR TROOPS AND ITS PARA-MILITARY GENDARMES ARE PAID AND FED ADEQUATELY AND WITH SUFFICIENT REGULARITY SO THEY DO NOT HAVE TO EXTORT FROM THEIR FELLOW CITIZENS IN ORDER TO LIVE. WESTERN EFFORTS TO RETRAIN AND RE-EQUIP FAZ UNITS HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THIS FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE. CURRENT SALARY LEVELS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY SOLDIER, NCO, OR COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER TO FEED A FAMILY AT EVEN THE LOWEST SUBSISTENCE

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PAGE 02 OF 03 STATE 185409

STATE 185409

LEVEL. ACCORDING TO ZAIRIAN CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL BABIA, THE AVERAGE ZAIRIAN SOLDIER HAS 7 TO 10 DEPENDENTS. TO FEED A FAMILY OF THAT SIZE WOULD REQUIRE 300 ZAIREES JUST FOR TWO BAGS OF A STAPLE FOOD LIKE DRIED MANIOC, TO SAY NOTHING OF THE COST OF PROTEIN FOOD, FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES, AND OTHER ESSENTIALS, SUCH AS CLOTHING. EVEN WITH THE PAY RAISE EFFECTIVE MAY 1, 1979, THE ZAIRIAN EQUIVALENT OF A PFC IS PAID ONLY 90 ZAIREES, A FIRST-SERGEANT 130 ZAIREES, AND A CAPTAIN 440 ZAIREES A MONTH (REF D1). IN ADDITION, WHAT THE RANK AND FILE ACTUALLY RECEIVE IS OFTEN MUCH LESS THAN THEIR WAGES AS A RESULT OF THE GREED AND/OR INCOMPETENCE OF THEIR OFFICERS. SOME MAKE ENDS MEET BY ENGAGING IN PETTY COMMERCE, BUT MANY RESORT TO THEFT.

9. WHILE MOST FAZ UNITS ARE NOT SO FORTUNATE, THE BELGIAN AND FRENCH OFFICERS TRAINING THE NEW FAZ UNITS SEE TO IT THAT THEIR TROOPS ARE PAID AND FED. HOWEVER, IN THE VIEW OF THEIR BELGIAN AND FRENCH INSTRUCTORS, THESE NEW UNITS WILL QUICKLY BECOME INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM OTHER FAZ UNITS ONCE THEY FINISH TRAINING. THE ZAIRIAN SOLDIER TODAY REMAINS WHAT HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN: A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO HIS UNARMED FELLOW CITIZENS AND NO DETERRENT TO ANY REASONABLY DETERMINED FORCE OF WOULD-BE INVADERS.

10. WESTERN HOPES FOR ECONOMIC REFORM HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE INSTITUTION OF AN IMF STANDBY AGREEMENT AS A NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR FURTHER PROGRESS. PRESIDENT MOBUTU SUCCESSFULLY POSTPONED THE SIGNING OF THE IMF AGREEMENT REACHED LAST JANUARY TO THE POINT WHERE THE FUND NOW TAKES THE POSITION THAT CONDITIONS HAVE CHANGED AND A NEW STANDBY AGREEMENT MUST THEREFORE BE NEGOTIATED. BELGIUM AND FRANCE HAVE EXPRESSED GRUDGING ADMIRATION FOR THE U.S. REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE NEW AID AGREEMENTS UNTIL AN IMF STANDBY AGREEMENT IS IN PLACE. THEY THEMSELVES QUICKLY ABANDONED THE POLICY AGREED TO IN BRUSSELS LAST YEAR WHEREBY THE WESTERN BIG THREE WOULD USE AID AS A LEVER TO FORCE ECONOMIC REFORM ON ZAIRE. INSTEAD OF HOLDING BACK ON NEW AID PROGRAMS TO INDUCE THE GOZ TO SIGN THE STANDBY, THEY NEGOTIATED A SERIES OF BILATERAL AID AGREEMENTS WITH ZAIRE WHICH (COMBINED WITH THE RISE IN THE PRICE OF COPPER AND COBALT) ALLOWED THE MOBUTU REGIME TO AVOID ACCEPTING THE RESTRAINTS UPON WHICH THE IMF INSISTS. FRANCE, IN DEED, HAS HELD NOTHING BACK TO DELIVER AS A REWARD WHEN AND IF THE IMF STANDBY IS FINALLY SIGNED.

11. BELGIAN AND FRENCH ADMIRATION FOR U.S. INSISTENCE UPON ECONOMIC REFORM WAS PREMATURE. NOW THAT THE U.S. HAS DECIDED TO BEGIN NEGOTIATING A NEW PL-480 AGREEMENT (REF E) -- THE LARGEST SINGLE COMPONENT OF OUR AID PROGRAM -- U.S. POLICY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO LITTLE MORE THAN PIOUS EXHORTATIONS. GIVEN THE U.S. RECORD OF NEVER HOLDING MOBUTU'S FEET TO THE FIRE, OUR FORMAL DECLARATIONS THAT ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS DOES NOT IMPLY A COMMITMENT TO SIGN WILL BE GENERALLY DISBELIEVED -- NOT JUST BY ZAIRIANS BUT ALSO BY THOSE AMERICAN OFFICIALS REPRESENTING THE U.S. IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

12. TO SAY THAT U.S. POLICY IN ZAIRE IS IN DISARRAY IS TO EMPLOY A EUPHEMISM. EVERY MAJOR U.S. POLICY PAPER -- FARM, GORK, GOALS AND OBJECTIVES, BUDGETARY SUBMISSIONS FOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID -- SINCE THE 1977 FIRST SHABA WAR HAS BEEN PREDICATED ON THE BELIEF THAT REFORM IS BOTH AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY AND SUSCEPTIBLE OF ACHIEVEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, EVEN THOSE OBSERVERS MOST SYMPATHETIC TO ZAIRE AND ITS RULING CLIQUE HAVE FELT THAT OUTSIDE PRESSURE IS A SINE QUA NON, NOT JUST FOR MEANINGFUL REFORM BUT ALSO FOR THE VERY SURVIVAL OF THE REGIME. UNFORTUNATELY, THE U.S. HAS JOINED BELGIUM AND FRANCE AND ABANDONED THE POLICY OF USING AID AS A

PRESSURE TACTIC TO FORCE THE MOBUTU REGIME TO ALLOW THE IMMENSE NATURAL WEALTH OF THIS COUNTRY TO BE USED FOR DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INSTEAD OF THE FURTHER ENRICHMENT OF THE RULING ELITE.

13. EVEN HAD WE NOT BACKTRACKED ON OUR DEMAND THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR FURTHER AID AWAIT THE SIGNING OF A NEW IMF STANDBY AGREEMENT, IT MUST BE ADMITTED THAT PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC REFORM WERE HARDLY PROMISING. ZAIRE HAD FAILED TO LIVE UP TO THE TERMS OF THE PREVIOUS IMF AGREEMENT; WHY SHOULD IT BE EXPECTED TO LIVE UP TO A NEW ONE? SUCH CONDUCT IS HARDLY SURPRISING WHEN ONE RECALLS THAT THE REGIME'S ULTIMATE LEADER, PRESIDENT MOBUTU, WHEN ADDRESSING A LARGE BODY OF PARTY STALWARTS IN KINSHASA'S MAIN STADIUM ON MAY DAY 1976, PUBLICLY CHIDED THEM FOR THEIR CLUMSY SPECULATIONS AND THEN ADVISED THEM TO "STEAL CLEVERLY." THEY HAVE FOLLOWED HIS ADVICE. AS A RESULT, THE MASS OF THE POPULATION HAS BECOME EVER MORE IMPOVERISHED. TODAY, THERE IS MUCH ACUTE MALNUTRITION AND SOME ACTUAL STARVATION IN PARTS OF ZAIRE. THESE ARE NOT LIMITED TO AREAS HIT BY LAST YEAR'S DROUGHT, BUT ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE VAST AREA OF THIS COUNTRY.

14. THE VIRTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONTINUING TO DEFEND THE VALIDITY OF THE FORMULATION THAT REFORM IS BOTH NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE HAS CAUSED SUPPORTERS OF CURRENT POLICY TO USE ANOTHER ARGUMENT TO JUSTIFY THE CONTINUATION OF OUR CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN THIS COUNTRY. ADMITTING THAT THE MOBUTU REGIME IS INCAPABLE OF REFORM, THEY THEN ARGUE THAT CONTINUED MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID IS NECESSARY TO "STAY IN THE GAME." IT IS THE ANTE, THEY SAY, TO ALLOW THE U.S. TO STAY IN THE HIGH-STAKES POKER GAME THAT WILL TAKE PLACE WHEN MOBUTU FALLS. IN ADDITION TO NOTING THAT THE GAME WHICH REQUIRES US TO HAVE THE LARGEST SINGLE U.S. MISSION IN BLACK AFRICA IS NO PENNY ANTE AFFAIR, ONE MAY WONDER WHAT WILL HAPPEN WHEN THE TABLES ARE CLEARED. TO CONTINUE WITH THIS METAPHOR, IRAN AND ETHIOPIA ARE ONLY THE LATEST INDICATIONS THAT HIGH PROFILE SUPPORT FOR AN UNPOPULAR, CORRUPT REGIME SUGGESTS THAT THE U.S. MAY NOT EVEN BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEW POKER PARTY WHICH WILL BEGIN WHEN THE MOBUTU REGIME IS OVERTHROWN.

15. THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES TO CONTINUING WITH OUR PRESENT POLICY OF COMBINING FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE MOBUTU REGIME WITH HOMILIES IN FAVOR OF REFORM. AS UNDER SECRETARY NEWSON SAID IN HIS MARCH 22 PRINCETON SPEECH: "THERE WILL COME TIMES... WHEN WE MUST ACCEPT--AS WE DID IN IRAN--THE REALITY OF THE WEAKNESS OF A FRIENDLY REGIME." "THE UNITED STATES, AS A NEW NATION, STARTED A PATTERN OF RADICAL POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE WORLD. AS A RESPONSIBLE MAJOR POWER IN A FAR MORE COMPLEX WORLD, WE CANNOT INSTIGATE CHANGE. WE SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE AFRAID OF IT OR FEEL THAT, IN THE LONG RUN, CHANGE IS CONTRARY TO OUR INTERESTS."

16. THE MOST PROMISING ALTERNATIVE POLICY IS THE ONE THAT STEMS LOGICALLY FROM THE REFUSAL OF BELGIUM AND FRANCE TO JOIN US IN PUTTING EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON MOBUTU TO REFORM. SINCE THESE TWO NATIONS HAVE CONTINUED TO SHOW THEMSELVES WILLING TO BACK THE MOBUTU REGIME WITH ALL ITS IMPERFECTIONS, THE U.S. COULD AND SHOULD WISH THEM WELL IN THEIR ENDEAVOR WHILE FOLLOWING A TOTALLY DIFFERENT TACK. THE U.S. SHOULD END ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, DRASTICALLY CUT BACK AND SOON ELIMINATE ITS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, SHARPLY REDUCE THE SIZE OF ALL ELEMENTS OF ITS DIPLOMATIC MISSION AND LIMIT ITS ACTIVITIES IN ZAIRE LARGELY TO THOSE OF WATCHFUL WAITING.

17. BELGIUM AND FRANCE WOULD, OF COURSE, VIGOROUSLY OPPOSE SUCH A CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY AT THE SAME TIME, THEY WOULD

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PAGE-03 OF 03 STATE 165409

NOT HAVE TO FOLLOW SUIT. FOR ALL OF ITS VISIBILITY, U.S. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE MOBUTU REGIME IS RELATIVELY SMALL IN COMPARISON WITH THAT GIVEN BY OTHER DONORS. ITS ABOLITION WOULD BE A PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW TO THE REGIME, BUT WOULD HAVE LITTLE ECONOMIC IMPACT. THUS, IT WOULD BE QUITE FEASIBLE FOR BELGIUM AND FRANCE TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE REGIME. THEY ARE ALMOST CERTAIN TO DO SO; FOR BELGIUM AND FRANCE HAVE MUCH GREATER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN ZAIRE THAN DOES THE U.S.

18. AN END TO OUR AID PROGRAMS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME THAT THE U.S. WAS NO LONGER WILLING TO BACK MOBUTU. SUCH A POLICY MOVE WOULD BE WELCOMED BY VIRTUALLY ALL POLITICALLY-AWARE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE COUNTRY AS WELL AS IN EXILE ABROAD. (SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE APRIL 7 REMARKS OF FOUR PROMINENT LEGISLATORS, REF F). ONCE THE CURRENT REGIME FALLS, THIS POLICY WOULD GUARANTEE THAT POWERFUL VOICES WOULD BE RAISED IN FAVOR OF ZAIRE CONTINUING TO LOOK TO THE WEST, IN PARTICULAR TO AMERICA, FOR HELP AND LEADERSHIP. IN IRAN, ETHIOPIA, ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE, THE WEST WAS SO IDENTIFIED WITH THE UNACCEPTABLE STATUS QUO THAT TURNING ELSEWHERE SEEMED THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE. THIS NEED NOT BE THE CASE IN ZAIRE.

19. THE POLICY ALTERNATIVE DESCRIBED ABOVE WOULD ALLOW THE WEST TO HAVE THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS. IT ONLY REQUIRES A CHANGE OF MENTAL GEARS TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE WEST NEED NOT SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE AND FOLLOW ONE POLICY EVERYWHERE IN AFRICA. AS LONG AS THE CURRENT REGIME REMAINS IN POWER, WESTERN INTERESTS WILL BE WELL SERVED BY BELGIUM AND FRANCE. WHEN THAT REGIME FALLS, THE U.S. WILL BE IN A POSITION TO REPLACE BELGIUM AND FRANCE AS THE GUARDIAN OF THOSE WESTERN INTERESTS. BELGIUM AND FRANCE WILL BE SO IDENTIFIED WITH THE EXCESSES OF THE MOBUTU REGIME AS TO BE UNACCEPTABLE PARTNERS, AT LEAST INITIALLY, FOR ITS SUCCESSOR. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT. DAVIS
UNQUOTE VANCE

Is this what we want?

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PAGE 01 STATE 179972

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INFO OCT-01 /015 R

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DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJ: OBJECTION TO EXCLUSION FROM REPRESENTATION ELECTION
FROM DIRECTOR S/PC
REF: 1) A-9235 2) MBABANE 1619

WE APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS CONCERNING YOUR DISENFRANCHISEMENT
BUT REF AIRGRAM STATEMENT ON AGREEMENT OF "ALL PARTIES"
WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT E.O. 11636 CLEARLY EXCLUDED
CHIEFS OF MISSION AND PRINCIPAL OFFICERS UNDER SECTION
2(C)(3) AND DEPUTY CHIEFS OF MISSION UNDER SECTION 2(C)(4).
THE ONLY DISCRETIONARY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED
PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS. COMMISSION HAS SINCE
ADDED PRINCIPAL PERSONNEL OFFICERS TO EXCLUDED LIST. ROGERS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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IN PART B6PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 054339
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APPROVED BY S/P: RJHARRINGTON
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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT~~SECRET~~ STATE 054339STADIS//////////
DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [] FROM LAKE - S/SP

FOL REPEAT DAMASCUS 1482 ACTION SECSTATE DTO 5 MAR.

QUOTE

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 1482

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 13652: GDS
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SYRIA, ISRAEL AND LEBANON;
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [] POLITICAL OFFICER. THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE, AND SUGGESTS THAT DISTRIBUTION INCLUDE NEA, NEA/ARH, INR, EMBASSY DAMASCUS AND EMBASSY BEIRUT.
2. PARTIAL CONVERGENCE OF SYRO-ISRAELI INTERESTS OPERATIVE IN LEBANON FOR APPROXIMATELY PAST YEAR HAS BEGUN TO SHOW SIGNS OF SERIOUS SLIPPAGE. PRIOR TO RECENT HABATIYAH AFFAIR INCREMENTAL INSERTIONS OF SYRIAN TROOPS INTO LEBANON AND THEIR SHIFTS AROUND COUNTRY WERE TOLERATED BY ISRAELIS -- SUBSEQUENT TO VIGOROUS EXCHANGES AMONG PARTIES FACILITATED BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN GOOD OFFICES -- AND REFLECTED UNDERLYING COMMON INTERESTS OF BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA IN FORESTALLING ESTABLISHMENT OF WHAT THEY VIEWED AS RADICAL, PALESTINIAN-DOMINATED REGIME IN LEBANON. ISRAELI UNWILLINGNESS TO TOLERATE SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT TO HABATIYAH SIGNALLED WAVING OF SYRO-ISRAELI CONVERGENCE AND ENTRANCE INTO NEW PHASE OF LEBANESE CRISIS IN WHICH SYRIAN AND ISRAELI ACTIONS POTENTIALLY GOVERNED BY DIVERGENCE OF MUTUAL INTEREST.
3. SYRO-ISRAELI DISHARMONY IN SOUTH LEBANON APPEARS TO HAVE INITIALLY CAUGHT DAMASCUS BY SURPRISE. WHETHER OR NOT BOTH SIDES CONSCIOUSLY REALIZED FULL IMPORT OF RELATIONSHIP OF PARTIAL MUTUALITY WHICH HAD DEVELOPED SINCE EARLY 1976, SYRIANS HAD BECOME RELATIVELY ACCUSTOMED TO GENERAL PATTERN OF ACTIVITY IN LEBANON WHICH MAINTAINED SOME PREDICTABILITY: STIMULUS INCREMENT OR SHIFT OF SYRIAN GROUND FORCES IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING CONDITIONS AMONG LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS), CRISIS (ISRAELIS, SYRIANS AND LEBANESE COMMUNICATED WITH EACH OTHER OFTEN THROUGH U.S. AND JORDANIAN GOOD OFFICES TO APPLY EXISTING TACTIC GROUND RULES TO NEW SITUATION), AND PERCEPTION (GENERAL ISRAELI ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT MOST RECENT STIMULUS DID NOT UNDOUBLY THREATEN THEIR UNDERLYING INTERESTS AND AIMED AT RESTRICTING LEBANESE LEFTIST-PALESTINIAN COALITION). ATTAINMENT OF SUCCESSIVE PLATEAUS OF UNDERSTANDING REACHED OUTER LIMIT OF THIS INFORMAL AND MAKESHIFT PROCESS WHEN SYRIAN FORCES BELONGING TO ADF ENTERED NABATIYAH.

4. SYRO-ISRAELI DIVERGENCE IN HABATIYAH AFFAIR AND RESULTING DISORDER IN SOUTH HAVE VEXED ASAD REGIME AND OTHER OBSERVERS AS WELL. FROM DAMASCUS VANTAGE POINT, EXPLANATION OF RECENT DIFFICULTIES CAN BE SUMMARIZED RATHER BRIEFLY: SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS COOPERATED IN LEBANON, BUT ISRAELIS WERE UNWILLING TO COOPERATE TO ASSIST SYRIA TO IMPLEMENT POST-ARAB SUMMIT GOAL OF EXTENDING SARKIS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY INTO SOUTH LEBANON, WHERE ISRAELIS PERCEIVE PRESENCE OF SYRIAN ADF TROOPS AT HABATIYAH AND BEYOND AS THREAT TO THEIR NORTHERN BORDERS, A THREAT MAGNIFIED BY ISRAELI ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

5. I BELIEVE THIS ALTERED STATE OF AFFAIRS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT OUR GREATER REGIONAL INTERESTS IN SEVERAL WAYS, MOST DIRECTLY BY UNDERMINING SYRIA'S WILLINGNESS TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN BRINGING PALESTINIANS INTO SETTLEMENT PROCESS ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES AND TO EXPLORE WITH SOME CONFIDENCE FURTHER ACCOMMODATION TO ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE IN REGION. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROCESS WHICH SECRETARY KISSINGER HELPED NURTURE FOLLOWING OCTOBER 1973 WAR AND WHICH SEEMED TO STALL WITH SIGHING OF 1975 SHAIH ACCORD PICKED UP SOME MOMENTUM IN MUTATED FORM ON SYRO-ISRAELI FRONT BEGINNING IN 1976 ALONG LINES SUMMARIZED ABOVE PARA 3. IN UNPLANNED AND UNEXPECTED MANNER, SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS IN MOST OF EXTREME VIOLENCE AND MOUNTING PRESSURES GROPED TOWARD REGIONAL ACCOMMODATION IN LEVANT. ACCUSTOMED BY YEARS OF STERILE POLITICAL DEBATING AND INTERMITTENT WARFARE TO REGARD EACH OTHER WITH SUSPICION AND HOSTILITY, THEY SUDDENTLY FOUND THEMSELVES CONFRONTED BY COMMON DANGER, THE THREAT OF A RADICAL STATE ON THEIR BORDERS. DESPITE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED FOREBODINGS, ISRAEL ULTIMATELY PERMITTED ABOUT 30,000 SYRIAN TROOPS TO ENTER LEBANON, AND DESPITE FEARS THAT ISRAELIS MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR MILITARY WEAKNESS ON GOLAN, ASAD WHEN HE DETERMINED IT WAS NECESSARY DEPLETED HIS GOLAN FRONT OF SOME MECHANIZED, INFANTRY AND MISSILE BRIGADES TO MEET WHAT HE PERCEIVED AS GREATER THREATS IN LEBANON AND ON IRAQI BORDER. WHILE BOTH PARTIES RECEIVED OUR INPUT BEFORE THEY REACHED THEIR DECISIONS, AT EACH CRISIS POINT THEY ULTIMATELY RISKED RELYING UPON THEIR OWN PERCEPTIONS OF MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST TO EVOLVE A STRATEGY THAT SUCCEEDED.

6. SYRO-ISRAELI CONVERGENCE IN LEBANON CONTAINED POTENTIAL FOR SPILLING OVER INTO OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AN OVERALL REGIONAL SETTLEMENT. FIRST, IT GENERATED MOMENTUM AND PROMISED TO SOFTEN THE HARSH EDGE OF GENERALLY HOSTILE MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS. SECOND, IT RAISED PROSPECT THAT IN FUTURE STAGES OF NEGOTIATIONS WHEN PALESTINIAN ISSUE WOULD BE DELIBERATED, ISRAELIS COULD AGAIN FIND CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THEIR INTERESTS AND INTERESTS OF SYRIA IN WORKING OUT ACCEPTABLE MANNER FOR PARTIES TO DEAL WITH PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND IN PREVENTING EMERGENCE OF RADICAL PALESTINIAN STATE ON WEST BANK. THEIR GROPPING FOR A GEOGRAPHICAL ACCOMMODATION OF INTERESTS, PERHAPS SIGNIFICANTLY, SEEMED TO ADD NEW DIMENSION TO CURRENT FORMULATIONS OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF PEACE, WHEREBY ISRAELIS SEEKING RELATIVELY SELF-ENFORCING ACCORD THROUGH OPEN ACCESS TO NEIGHBORING SOCIETIES WHILE SYRIANS FOR THEIR PART DISPLAY VERBAL PREFERENCE FOR MORE STATIC ARRANGMENT COMPRISING SIGHING OF TREATY ENDING STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, AGREEMENT ON DEMILITARIZATION AND STATIONING OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES BUT PERHAPS LITTLE ELSE. CONVERGENCE SUGGESTED THAT BOTH PARTIES HAD DISCOVERED SOME COMMON GROUND TO CONTAIN PERHAPS INHERENT VOLATILITY OF THIS REGION. TO SOME EXTENT, THEY WERE EVOLVING TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY HAD THEY BEEN AT PEACE, FOR

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 054333

EVEN A PEACE BASED UPON THE ISRAELI MODEL WOULD NOT HAVE GUARANTEED A COOPERATIVE RESPONSE TO INTER-ARAB CONFLICT IN THE LEVANT AND ELSEWHERE IN THE ABSENCE OF PEACE HINDERED CONVERGENCE TO THE POINT THAT COOPERATION IN LEBANON OF NECESSITY WAS IMPLICIT AND EXHIBITED RELIANCE UPON INTERMEDIARIES FOR EXCHANGING COMMUNICATIONS.

7. CURRENT SIGNS OF DIVERGENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON THREATEN TO DISRUPT PROGRESS ALREADY ACHIEVED AND COULD LEAD TO REGIONAL CONFLICT. WHAT IS DISTURBING, HOWEVER, IS THAT INITIAL SUCCESS OF ISRAELIS AND SOME ARABS TO COME SO VERY CLOSE TO WORKING OUT THEIR OWN REGIONAL PROBLEMS WITHOUT RESORTING TO BY NOW FAMILIAR FALLBACK TACTIC INTERPOSING SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF UN FORCES BETWEEN DISPUTANTS MAY BE PERMITTED TO DISSIPATE, LEAVING SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO SEEK FURTHER AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST WITH ISRAEL AND U.S. TO POSSIBLY WANE AS WELL.

8. WILLINGNESS OF THE DEPARTMENT TO MAINTAIN OPEN MIND ABOUT INSERTION OF UN TROOPS INTO SOUTH LEBANON IS EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE WILL TO TAKE SOME RISKS TO RESOLVE SOUTH LEBANON ISSUE, BUT AS NOTED ABOVE PARA. 1 I HAVE DOUBTS THIS IS MOST PROPER INVESTMENT OF OUR POLITICAL CAPITAL. I SUGGEST AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY THAT WILL HELP TO END DISORDER IN SOUTH AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ENHANCE SYRIA'S DESIRE TO ASSUME ACTIVE ROLE IN OVERCOMING NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES TO REACH COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WITHOUT SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO OVERALL SETTLEMENT. I PROPOSE THAT WE INVEST NECESSARY POLITICAL CAPITAL TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO TOLERATE LIMITED INSERTION OF SYRIAN ADF FORCES INTO SOUTH LEBANON TO RESTORE CENTRAL GOVT AUTHORITY TO THAT REGION; AND TO OBTAIN SYRIAN CONSENT TO CEASE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS AND PROVIDE TIMELY, DETAILED INFORMATION ON THEIR FORCES AND MISSIONS IN THE SOUTH. THIS WOULD NECESSITATE U.S. TAKING DIPLOMATIC LEAD TO FASHION ARRANGEMENTS SUITABLE TO BOTH SIDES TO BRIDGE GAP THAT HAS OPENED, BUT IT SEEMS WE COULD BUILD UPON COMMON GROUND THAT ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS MANAGED TO UNCOVER OVER PAST YEAR AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MODIFICATIONS IN PERCEPTIONS BETWEEN THESE TWO PARTIES. I DO NOT MINIMIZE THE DIFFICULTIES IN CONVINCING BOTH PARTIES TO FOLLOW THIS COURSE AFTER OUR UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT IN FEBRUARY. IT RISKS ANTAGONIZING THE ISRAELIS WHEN WE SEEKING THEIR COOPERATION TO RESUME SENSITIVE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD OVERALL SETTLEMENT. BUT THIS ANTAGONISM MAY BE SHORT-LIVED IF SYRIANS SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCT THEIR MISSION AND KEEP TO THE TERMS OF WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS ARE CONCLUDED. BASED UPON OUR EXPERIENCE OVER THE LAST YEAR. WE HAVE REASONABLE GROUNDS TO DEPEND ON SYRIAN PERFORMANCE. AND SINCE SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON HAS BEEN A MAJOR DETERMINANT OF ITS WILLINGNESS TO PLAY POSITIVE ROLE IN REACHING SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, POLITICAL CAPITAL INVESTED IN THIS STRATEGY WOULD STAND A REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF ADDING TO RATHER THAN DEPLETING OUR FUTURE NEGOTIATING ASSETS.

MURPHY

UNQUOTE VANCE

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February 23, 1977

from Henderson
 Mr. Anthony Lake
 Director, Policy Planning Staff
 S/P, Room 7813
 Washington, D.C. 20520

FILE COPY*Ref to NSC*

Dear Mr. Lake:

I refer to Mr. Veliotos' letter of February 18, 1977 in which he informed me that my paper on the Polisario Front guerrilla movement could not issue through the Dissent Channel as the paper is not a policy dissent, but an intelligence analysis.

I am disturbed over this apparent bureaucratization of the Dissent Channel. The suppression of information from the top levels of the Department, whether caused by disagreement with content, bureaucratic ineptness, or just plain carelessness, is as harmful as the suppression of substantive differences on policy. In this regard it is interesting to note the reaction to my earlier two part dissent message on the Spanish Sahara. Department officials disagreed with my shorter message focused on policy, yet found the longer message, which was essentially an intelligence analysis of Mauritania, helpful.

My rejected intelligence analysis of the Polisario Front contains the same sort of useful information and analysis as did my earlier paper on Mauritania. I have shared it with people on the working level but believe that the Assistant Secretaries of AF and NEA and perhaps the Secretary would be interested in reading the paper. I do not feel that I am burdening the system with this paper as the Middle East division of INR sent its last intelligence analysis on the Sahara as a memo to the Secretary before it was published verbatim as an intelligence report. My submission of this paper is at least partly to protest the fact that the African division of INR has not been sufficiently involved in analysis of the Spanish Sahara. In spite of the fact that Mr. Bartholomew's letter states that my paper on Mauritania "usefully broadened the context" of thinking on the Spanish Sahara, INR/RAF has no intention of publishing the paper to its normal audience.

I would simply carry a copy of the paper to the offices of the Assistant Secretaries and the Secretary with the request that it be read informally. However, such personages

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
- 2 -

are surrounded by a coterie of staff assistants and aides whose function seems to be to cut off their bosses from any direct contact with sources of information. I understand that former Secretary Kissinger developed INR's Current Intelligence Staff because he felt cut off from first hand sources of information. That staff consists of junior officers who select raw intelligence to go to the Seventh Floor principals with no prior review by senior officers. It was this system which enabled me to forward the only accurate piece of intelligence on the June 1975 Italian regional elections which the Seventh Floor received. If I had depended on normal channels the information would never have been briefed, because of faulty analysis, fear of appearing too alarmist, and dedication to support of previous positions among the line bureaucracy.

The Dissent Channel can be a mechanism for unclogging the Department's constipated paper flow if it is opened up to pieces of raw traffic or analysis which are stuck in the system. It is easy to imagine abuses of such a system, such as the submission of weighty tomes on mini-subjects, or simply a stream of raw traffic which officers wish to push ahead of the line, but such abuses could be resolved when and if they occurred.

One solution to potential problems would be to drop the requirement that a substantive reply be drafted to messages not demanding it. For instance, in the present case I would send my paper forth with a note explaining that I was submitting it through the Dissent Channel because INR had been sitting on it for a year and because it contained information relevant to current policy considerations, referring to Nouakchott 362 of February 23, 1977. With no obligation to read past the title line the Secretary and Assistant Secretaries would suffer no burden and would yet be alerted to the fact that a disagreement was fulminating in the bowels of the bureaucracy about which they would not normally learn. Under the rules of the system the submitting officer would be protected from his immediate superiors by anonymity, while the Assistant Secretaries would be protected from a flood of unwanted paper because of a dissenting officer's knowledge that the item would go forward with a signed statement as to the justification for making an end run around the system.

Sincerely yours,



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THRU ; Mr. Joseph C. Wheeler, Director
Dr. William A. Wolfner, Deputy Director

December 7, 1972

[Redacted]

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Resumption of American Military Supplies to Pakistan

Anticipating a GOP request for resumption of American military supplies to Pakistan, you asked me to prepare a succinct analysis of policy issues for possible consideration by the Country Team. On the basis of stated assumptions, I have considered two "most plausible" alternative courses of action in light of U. S. foreign policy, Pakistan foreign relations, and Pakistan domestic developments.

I. Assumptions

As a starting point, we assume that the next two years will see (1) continuation in power of the Bhutto Government; (2) at least gradual progress toward an Indo-Pak rapprochement, and (3) continued peaceful relations among the great powers. We also assume for discussion purposes that Congress will make no substantial changes in military sales legislation. ^{1/}

II. Possible Courses of Action

The USG could respond to a GOP request for military supplies in a number of ways depending upon (1) the scope of the request and (2) USG policy decisions. Assuming an open-ended request to remove existing restrictions on the supply of military hardware, USG policy options would include the following possible courses of action:

- 1) Unqualified supply (including sophisticated weapons)
- 2) Qualified supply:

^{1/} Note that these are all assumptions, not predictions.

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- 2 -

- a) excluding sophisticated weapons;
 - b) excluding "lethal" end-use commodities;
 - c) limited to spare parts for previously furnished USG equipment;
 - d) limited to procurement under licenses cancelled in October 1971.
- 3) Refusal to supply; (i. e., continuation of existing policy).

These options are not meant to exclude other possibilities. Options (1) and (2) for example could be varied by dollar and time limitations; used versus new equipment; definitions of "sophisticated" and "non-lethal" and credit or military aid terms. The possible limitations listed under option (2) could be imposed separately or in various combinations. For the sake of analysis, however, it would seem preferable to concentrate on the two "most plausible" of the possible courses of action. While assessment of plausibility is of course subjective, a review of U. S. arms supply policy in the subcontinent since 1965 suggests that the era of unqualified sales is over. ^{2/} Realistically, the policy-makers in Washington will probably choose between continuation of the current embargo (option(3)) and some form of qualified supply (option (2)). For clarity and brevity of presentation we will focus more specifically on a choice between no supply (NS) and supply limited to spare parts (SLSP).

2/ Between 1954 and 1965 the U. S. supplied Pakistan with arms worth between \$700 and \$800 million. "It sold India a modest amount of military equipment before 1962, and gave India arms worth about \$85 million between the 1962 conflict with China and the 1965 war with Pakistan." William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, (Praeger, 1972) at 323. MAP grant aid shipments of material to Pakistan and India terminated in September, 1965. Military equipment

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- 3 -

Footnote 2 - Continued

was shipped to both countries on a strictly sales basis under military supply policy announced in April 1967 confining shipments to spare parts for equipment supplied under the pre-1965 grant aid programs and to non-lethal end-items such as communications equipment, cargo vehicles and transport aircraft. On October 1, 1970 the USG offered a "one-time exception" to the prohibition on the sale of lethal material of U. S. origin to Pakistan. According to DOD testimony, the offer was limited to four types of items: armored personnel carriers, interceptor aircraft, some obsolete light bombers, and a few patrol aircraft. Quantities were specifically stated and limited to replacement of similar items lost through normal wear out and accident. In April, 1971, the USG began to impose more severe limitations on deliveries to Pakistan beginning with a prohibition on the issuance of new or renewed Munitions List export licenses or shipments from military depots and culminating in late October with the cancellation of remaining valid licenses. On December 3, 1971 the USG applied a total embargo of military supply deliveries to India. Both countries remain under a total embargo on military supplies. Grant military training is however unaffected by the current policy. For FY 73 the DOD proposed grant training for Pakistan in the amount of \$243,000 and for India in the amount of \$234,000. See: testimony of General Seignous, H. R. Appropriations Committee Hearings, April 11, 1972, Part I, 759, 764, 794; Testimony of General Warren, H. R. Appropriations Committee Hearings, March 24, 1971, Part I, 215-16

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- 4 -

III. U. S. Foreign Policy

A. Pakistan

1. Discussion. Neither option will satisfy President Bhutto if he wants to rebuild his armed forces with new equipment rather than simply replace parts. Hence the immediate effect of either option may be to diminish somewhat the friendly relations we now enjoy with the GOP. There is little question that the NS policy would be received more unfavorably than the SLSP course. What may become more important than the initial impact however are succeeding events affected by the policy chosen.

2. Scenario ^{3/}

a) NS Policy. With refusal to supply arms, U.S. announces commodity and fertilizer loans for FY 73. American image in Pakistan suffers a net setback on arms issue but one of mild intensity and short duration. Man on the street still remembers President Nixon's support during '71 Indo-Pak War. With gradually improving relations with India, arms supplies are regarded as desirable but not critical. President Bhutto is able to channel more funds to development programs on the ground that U.S. spares are unavailable. In effect, NS policy of USG becomes in a sense a "scapegoat" for Pak de-militarization. Pak military is bitter but Bhutto and Central Ministers are privately pleased with outcome.

b) SLSP Policy. The U.S. decision to resume the supply of spare parts is accepted in Pakistan as "the least they could do." There is little appreciation of the decision among the general public, but the military, desirous of new hardware, regard it as a "foot in the door." They expect that the USG, having lost its virginity, will be hard put to turn down future requests for new equipment.

^{3/} This "Scenario" and those which follow are simply designed to highlight issues for discussion. Like the assumptions above, they are not predictions of future events.

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-5-

B. India

1. Discussion. Continued Indo-Pak tensions make it inevitable that any USG policy decision effecting arms to Pakistan will elicit a strong reaction in New Delhi. Such reaction will likely occur in the midst of Indian efforts to improve relations with Washington.

2. Scenario

a) NS Policy. USG refusal to supply military hardware to Pakistan, is widely heralded in India as a wise decision. Elements of the Indian Government who seek rapprochement with the Nixon Administration gain support for their cause.

b) SLSP Policy. The US decision in the face of continued arms embargo for India is widely regarded as an affront. The Indian press blurs a distinction between supply limited to spare parts and unrestricted sales. Anti-American sentiment rises and rapprochement efforts are at least temporarily suspended. At diplomatic level, GOI ponders countering with similar arms request to Washington.

IV. Pakistan Foreign Relations

A. India

1. Discussion. Notwithstanding Pakistan's improved relations with India, there remains deep suspicion and distrust between the two nations. The threat of a renewed "arms race" lurks beneath the surface.

2. Scenario

a) NS Policy. Pakistan's inability to buy even spare parts from the US pleases the Indians, strengthening the hand of policy makers who desire to reduce India's dependence on the Soviet Union. The decision, however, prompts no immediate change in

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- 6 -

Indian supply policy as the Government watches to see whether Pakistan will find other supply sources.

b) SLSP Policy. India sees in the decision a capitulation of the Bhutto Government to the generals and a resurgence of Pakistani "militarism." The limited policy is regarded as only a first step in an American rearmament of Pakistan. The public views the arms decision as a breach of the Simla spirit. Both hawks and pro-Soviet officials and legislators in India find grist for their mills.

B. China

a) NS Policy. In the wake of the American decision, Pakistan approaches China for new hardware. The Chinese leaders profess eternal support for the Pakistani cause, promise to provide help in the future, but procrastinate on the question of deliveries.

b) SLSP Policy. China is not approached and exhibits no particular unhappiness with the USG decision.

V. Pakistan Domestic Developments

A. Political

1. Discussion. In the larger context of Pakistani politics the USG decision--one way or the other--would probably have an insubstantial effect. More dramatic scenes occupy the local stage. Yet it is important to consider the effect of the two options on Mr. Bhutto's position in the country, the role of the military establishment, and central-province relations.

2. Scenario

a) NS Policy. Outwardly the decision comes as a blow to the Bhutto Government which has patiently deferred its arms request until after the American Presidential election. With expecta-

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- 7 -

tions of USG "support" running high, Bhutto's prestige suffers a minor wound. Yet in fact, it is the Pak military which loses; their dependence upon American material is substantial. The generals' loss is Mr. Bhutto's gain. The diminishment in the President's public stature is more than offset by his increased internal power vis-a-vis the military establishment. Without equipment, Bhutto finds it easier to achieve military manpower cuts. Greater emphasis is placed on the spirit of Simla. At the same time, he has to contend with internal pressures to seek alternative supply sources. His response is to turn to China (with the unsatisfying results noted above). Finally, he arranges a meeting with Mrs. Gandhi to propose an arms free zone for the subcontinent. In Pakistan, advocates of increased Provincial autonomy regard a reduction in arms support of the central armed forces as fortuitous. For the Opposition, remembering the Dacca terror of last year, the military is a potential oppressor.

b) SLSP Policy. The USG decision is regarded as a minor victory by some; as a minor setback by others. In either case, it scarcely affects Mr. Bhutto's political image at home. The military leaders, although hoping for more are delighted to see the embargo lifted. With spares to put equipment back into service this year, they can look to the importation of new commodities from the US later on. They see the decision as the first step in the restoration of the US arms flow. Internally, their hand is strengthened with the civilian President. They feel they can resist his efforts to cut back military personnel on the ground that "someone has to operate the reactivated equipment." Provincial leaders grimace at the thought of an increasingly mobile central army.

B. Economic

1. Discussion. The economic effects of the supply decision are perhaps the most significant of all. For in Pakistan, the scarcity of resources makes "guns versus butter" decision-making a matter of vital concern. We should, therefore, consider the effects of arms supply upon Pakistan's internal economic priorities and her ability to attract foreign assistance.

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-8-

2. Scenario

a) NS Policy. With U.S. spares unavailable and the procurement of new equipment elsewhere beyond the nation's financial capacity, the Government begins to devote an increasing percentage of its resources to development. Holding his military advisors at bay, the President can respond to the rising expectations of his "people's constituency." Some of the social programs of the Bhutto Government begin to be implemented in 1973. Foreign aid donors are impressed with Pakistan's efforts and are delighted with the reduction of military expenditures. The country gets good marks (and higher aid pledges) at the 1973 Consortium meeting. Creditor nations take a more positive view of the forthcoming debt rescheduling. In the Pakistan bureaucracy, enlightened elements of the planning and development offices are encouraged in their development efforts. A new spirit of optimism in development circles begins to emerge.

b) SLSP Policy. The decision arouses anxiety among development-minded Pakistanis and foreign aid officials. Does it mean that Pakistan is opting for more guns and less butter? Is the confrontation with India policy being reasserted? (Some recall the President's ominous reference to "revenge" in his December Convention speech in Rawalpindi). Foreign aid donors look with disfavor on a Plan which relies on external assistance for more than fifty percent of the development budget. There is a tendency among donors to cut back on commodity assistance (perhaps the "most fungible" type of aid) on the ground that it provides foreign exchange support for military purchases. Pakistani economists and planners are disheartened by the decision and blame the United States for "arms-pushing."

VI. Some Final Comments

The above discussion and scenarios suggest that continuation of our present embargo policy is the preferred course. On balance, the negative effects of a resumption of arms sales--even those limited to spare parts--would appear to outweigh the benefits (limited to a short-run political advantage to the U.S. in Pakistan). Before concluding, however, it may be useful to examine briefly some of the "conventional wisdom" (CW) on the arms supply issue:

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-9-

CW: We need to bolster the defensive position of Pakistan against possible attack from outside the subcontinent.

This may have been the case during the height of the Cold War. But the argument is no longer valid. Not only is the danger of Communist aggression in the subcontinent less imminent today, but history has shown that the arming of two hostile allies leads to the use of those weapons against each other. Moreover, as Barnds points out, "the rationale for supplying arms to India and Pakistan lost its appeal as the political costs of the policy became too high after the 1965 war." ^{4/}

CW: We have a moral obligation to service with spare parts the military hardware we provided to Pakistan in past years.

To speak of a moral obligation in servicing goods is to ignore the larger moral question of selling arms to a poor country, especially where there is a strong possibility of their being used against another poor country. Unless sales agreements or treaty obligations provide otherwise, the GOP has no legal basis to demand spares. In international issues such as this, rule of the shopkeeper has no place.

All of this is not to deny either the right or practical necessity of Pakistan to maintain an army. In the modern nation-state, armies have become a seeming attribute of sovereignty. Questions of military priorities and arms budgets are for individual governments to decide. Yet our policies should be designed to encourage reduction rather than expansion of military forces. While armies often perform social and developmental functions in developing countries, such is not the case in Pakistan where the constant threat of confrontation with India is uppermost.

^{4/} Barnds, Op. Cit., at 323.

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- 10 -

CW: If we refuse to furnish arms then some other country will.

That may or may not be so. As the scenarios suggest, President Bhutto may not be unhappy with an excuse for curtailing the ambition of his generals. Even a delay in procurement could positively affect the development decisions being made in Pakistan. Pakistan, like most governments, has its development-minded officials as well as its hawks. We need to support the former. But even if Pakistan finds some other source, we avoid being identified with arms which again may wind up on a battlefield with another friendly power.

cc:ARBaron, AD/DP

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PAGE 01 STATE 289304
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RAISED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF YOUR MESSAGE. WE EXPECT SOME
OF THEM TO BE ADDRESSED AT THE NEXT PRC MEETING. VANCE

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APPROVED BY S/P: ALAKE
S/P: JGARTER
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 289304

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PO

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: US AID TO POLAND

REF: (A) WARSAW 8467; (B) WARSAW 8179; (C) WARSAW 8192

TO FROM S/P DIRECTOR LAKE

B6

1. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND HAVE REVIEWED YOUR MESSAGE (REF A) ON US AID TO POLAND. WHILE IT ARRIVED TOO LATE FOR CONSIDERATION BEFORE THE NOVEMBER 22 PRC MEETING ON POLAND, I WILL ENSURE THAT IT IS INCLUDED IN THE BRIEFING MATERIAL SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT'S REPRESENTATIVES AT THE PRC FOLLOW-ON MEETING, WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN EARLY DECEMBER UPON THE RETURN OF SECRETARY KREPS.

2. BY NOW, YOU MAY HAVE READ STATE 282717 (EXDIS), WHICH SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 22 PRC MEETING AND REFERS TO FOLLOW-ON WORK. YOU ALSO MAY HAVE SEEN STATE 279079, IN WHICH ASSISTANT SECRETARY VEST AND I INDICATED OUR APPRECIATION TO AMBASSADOR DAVIES FOR THE TWO EXCELLENT WARSAW CABLES (REFS B AND C).

THEY CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUES BEFORE THE PRC. AS WE STATED, DISAGREEMENT EXISTED -- AND CONTINUES TO EXIST -- ON SOME OF THE DETAILED ISSUES. YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE DEALS WITH SOME OF THESE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS -- ESPECIALLY THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF US ASSISTANCE.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULT POLISH FINANCIAL SITUATION AND THE PROBLEMS THAT ENSUE FROM POLAND'S INEFFECTIVE POLITICO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM. SECRETARY KREPS IS SEEKING FURTHER DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE POLISH ECONOMY AND INDEBTEDNESS TO ASSIST US IN OUR FURTHER POLICY DELIBERATIONS. WE CERTAINLY DO NOT INTEND AN INDEFINITE SUBSIDIZATION OF THE POLISH ECONOMY. RATHER, WE WILL MAKE WHATEVER DECISIONS ARE NECESSARY BASED ON OUR OWN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE SITUATION. THIS WOULD INCLUDE REINFORCING POLISH EFFORTS TO STABILIZE ITS ECONOMY. IT ALSO WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE DANGERS OF INSTABILITY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, WHICH FORM THE CORE OF US POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE, AS DEFINED IN PD-21.

4. WE SHALL CERTAINLY KEEP IN MIND THE QUESTIONS YOU

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

B/M

RELEASE IN PART
B6

February 18, 1977

CONFIDENTIAL/DISSENT CHANNEL

FILE COPY

TO: INR/RAF - [redacted]

Ref to MAC

B6

Dear [redacted]:

I am replying to your letter of February 7 to Mr. Lake since he is currently in the Middle East. I can appreciate the time and effort you invested in preparing this paper. I have, however, the same problems with your latest proposed submission through the Dissent Channel that we had with your earlier, original submission on the Polisario Front:

Your latest paper is not a policy dissent, but an intelligence analysis.

As you recall we worked with you to help shape the earlier paper so that it had sufficient policy content to be considered in the Dissent Channel. This process led to Mr. Bartholomew's letter of February 1. As you know, the dissent channel is a vehicle for the expression of disagreement on substantive matters. It should not and cannot be used for the dissemination of papers being developed in the regular course of a bureau's business. Under the circumstances, it would not be appropriate to accede to your request for distribution of this paper to the addressees listed in your letter of February 7. I am, therefore, returning the material you sent to Mr. Lake. Should you have a substantially new dissent on our policy in the former Spanish Sahara we will be pleased to receive it in the Dissent Channel and accord it full consideration.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/DISSENT CHANNEL

- 2 -

As concerns distribution of your paper to those officers who have expressed an interest in it, I would suggest that you explore the possibility of making copies available to them on an informal basis with the understanding that this represents your personal efforts and does not represent an official INR product. In my experience, such informal sharing of views and information is a generally accepted standard practice in the Department.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Nicholas A. Veliotis
Acting Director
Policy Planning Staff

P.S. As concerns "informal" sharing of views, I have kept a copy of your paper for the information of officers in S/P who may be interested in reading it. I will, of course, return this copy if you desire.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART B6

July 18, 1977

7/19 1400

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: S/P - Mr. Lake

FROM: IO/LAB - A 20

SUBJECT: Dissent from Letter to President Carter to Prime Minister Callaghan

B6

I dissent from the proposed reply from President Carter to Prime Minister Callaghan (see Tab A) because the letter says we had solid support from the UK (and other Western countries), and in fact we did not.


The attached memo (Tab B) shows that the support received was minimal, and only in response to the US threat of withdrawal. The British and others know this, and will wonder at our sudden gratitude for their "solid" support when only three weeks ago in Geneva they had to be goaded into even the most pro forma effort, and in fact abandoned us in the last hours of the conference.

The proposed letter is itself evidence of this situation when it thanks the UK for its "solid support" but then makes the point that the UK did nothing to give the ILO priority in its own foreign policy. We had been urging this action by the UK from the time Ambassador Silberman called on Mr. Callaghan (then Foreign Minister) in early 1976. Therefore, for the UK to ask the US to stay in, after the UK had been inactive, calls for a very different kind of reply. I urge that the letter be rewritten to express appreciation only of the UK and other Western votes, and then go on to make the point about lack of other activity.

I would like to add that, aside from the fact that we have not had solid support, for us to have President Carter state that we did have this support would allow our allies to "get off the hook" from doing any more in the future, since they can point with pride to the Presidential statement as proof of the splendid effort they have already made.

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GDS

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THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL

July 10, 1974

[Redacted]

AID
American Embassy Yaounde

B6

Dear Mr. Fell:

Least mail service to Yaounde lag unduly, we have sent a telegram today apprising you of the attached response to your Dissent Message of June 13.

If Mr. Hopkins' reply and the attendant regulations do not suffice, we hope that you will feel free to contact us further.

We might, for example, have the Panel's sub-group in AID address this question as part of its varied substantive and administrative concerns. Bob Berg (PPC/DPRE, Room 3938) and Linda Lowenstein (ASIA/SA, Room 6927) are the Co-Directors of the AID Open Forum Panel and would be pleased to hear from you on this or any other AID-related matter.

Yours sincerely,

SU

Sandy Vogelgesang
Chairperson

cc: Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Swiers
Ms. Lowenstein
Mr. Berg

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PAGE 01 OF 04 STATE 082376
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APPROVED BY S/P: JROCHE

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 12065: N/A

TAGS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SANCTIONS AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

1. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [REDACTED] THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE, AND SUGGESTS DISTRIBUTION TO USIATD, US EUROPEAN EMBASSIES, ACDA, AND USIS.
3. SUMMARY: THE NET EFFECT OF US SANCTIONS AFTER AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND IS THE LOSS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF US/SOVIET TRADE TO OTHERS AND AN ACrimonious DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES ON RELATIONS WITH EUROPE. SANCTIONS AS A MEANS OF LIMITING - OR AT LEAST NOT ADDING TO - SOVIET ABILITY TO COMMIT AGGRESSION IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND SHOULD BE VIGOROUSLY PURSUED. THE POLICY FAILED TO DATE BECAUSE:

- WE DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR TO OURSELVES AND OTHERS WHAT SANCTIONS ARE SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPLISH;
- WE MISREAD EUROPEAN MOTIVES IN UNDERMINING US/AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS AND BUILDING THE GAS PIPELINE;
- WE EXECUTED SANCTIONS POLICY IN A WEAK, INCONSISTENT, AND UNTHRESHING MANNER.

THE DIFFERENCES WE HAVE WITH THE EUROPEANS OVER SANCTIONS GO TO THE HEART OF THE ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP AND REFLECT LONG-TERM DIVERGENCES OF GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS. EXPECTING EUROPEANS TO SACRIFICE PERCEIVED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR AN ABSTRACT ALLIANCE UNITY IS UNREALISTIC, AS IS AMPLY PROVED BY THEIR BEHAVIOR AFTER AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND. TO THE EXTENT THAT EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS DIVERGE, THE US MUST BE PREPARED TO DEVISE AND NEGOTIATE APPROPRIATE TRADE-OFFS. IN ATTEMPTING TO PAPER OVER INEQUITIES IN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS, THE DEPARTMENT RISKES HAVING EUROPEAN POLICY PREEMPTED BY THE CONGRESS THROUGH ANOTHER HANSFELD AMENDMENT. END SUMMARY.

4. WHY WE NEED SANCTIONS: SYMBOL OR SUBSTANCE --

THE UNITED STATES WEAKENED AND CONFUSED ITS SANCTIONS POLICY AT THE OUTSET BY MIXING SYMBOLIC AND PUNITIVE MEASURES WITH GENUINE STRATEGIC CONCERNS. IF OUR PURPOSE IN REACTING TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IN DECEMBER 1979 WAS TO SIGNAL DISPLEASURE ONLY, THEN IT WAS CORRECT AND COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL TO WORK WITHIN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH PRODUCED AN EXEMPLARY CONDEMNATION SUPPORTED BY A LARGE MAJORITY. WHERE US POLICY GOT OFF TRACK WAS THE UNBUE EMPHASIS PLACED IN NATO ON THE OLYMPIC BOYCOTT AND OTHER SYMBOLIC ACTS, WHICH ALLOWED OUR NATO PARTNERS TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE CENTRAL MATTERS OF RAISING DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND LIMITING STRATEGICALLY OBJECTIONABLE TRADE. NATO IS NOT A WORLD FORUM BUT A DEFENSE ALLIANCE; AND TO THE EXTENT IT DOES NOT REACT SUBSTANTIVELY TO SOVIET PROVOCATION, IT MERELY NULLIFIES ITS OWN SYMBOLIC ACTS.

5. WHAT SHOULD BE UNDERSCORED WITH NATO ALLIES ON SANCTIONS IS THAT INCREASED ACCESS TO WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND CREDITS HAS DEMONSTRABLY ADDED TO THE CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR PROXIES TO COMMIT AGGRESSION. BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN CHEAP CREDITS AND MOUNTAINS OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY PROVIDED THE EAST BLOC DURING THE SO-CALLED DETENTE PERIOD HAVE INCREASED RATHER THAN MODERATED SOVIET EXPANSIONIST APPETITES. THE CASE WAS MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR BY THE USE DURING THE AFGHANISTAN INVASION OF KAMA RIVER PLANT HEAVY VEHICLES, MANUFACTURED WITH THE LATEST WESTERN EQUIPMENT PURCHASED THROUGH SUBSIDIZED CREDITS. THE ARGUMENT IS NOT THAT SANCTIONS ARE NEEDED TO REINFORCE OTHER SIGNALS OF DISPLEASURE, OR THAT SUCH MEASURES WOULD RESULT IN A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN. BLUNTLY STATED, IT IS THAT THE UNITED STATES FOUGHT TWO MAJOR WARS TO STOP SOVIET-DACKED AGGRESSION IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND IT IS UNACCEPTABLE FOR ALLIES TO CONTINUE PRACTICES THAT MAKE SIMILAR WARS FOR THE UNITED STATES MORE LIKELY AND COSTLY. IT IS ASTONISHING THAT TWO YEARS AFTER AFGHANISTAN, AND A WEALTH OF INFORMATION ON HOW WESTERN TRADE IN STRATEGIC AREAS STRENGTHENS THE SOVIETS, THE UNITED STATES HAS STILL NOT MADE ITS CASE FOR SANCTIONS CLEAR TO PUBLICS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. MOREOVER, WE SEEM TO BE REPEATING THE SAME MISTAKES AFTER THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN POLAND.

EUROPEANS CAN BE JUDGED BY THEIR ACTIONS AFTER THE US/ AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS:

- NOTWITHSTANDING PUBLIC PLEDGES BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND PRESIDENT GISCARD NOT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR US BUSINESS LOST THROUGH SANCTIONS, THE GERMANS AND FRENCH PROMPTLY SIGNED UP THE TWO MAJOR INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS THE US HAD FOREGONE: A STEEL PLANT AND AN ALUMINUM MILL OF APPROXIMATELY ONE BILLION DOLLARS TOTAL VALUE;
- THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY QUADRUPLED ITS GRAIN SALES TO THE SOVIETS IN 1980 TO TWO MILLION TONS, THEREBY JOINING WITH AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND ARGENTINA AS MAJOR UNDERCUTTERS OF THE US GRAIN EMBARGO;
- TOTAL EUROPEAN TRADE WITH THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO RISE. WEST GERMAN BILATERAL TRADE, FOR INSTANCE, ROSE FROM 14 BILLION DM IN 1979 TO 15.35 BILLION DM IN 1980.

7. WHILE THIS WAS HAPPENING, THE US SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN THE VIEW THAT IT WAS EUROPEAN WEARINESS OR OPPORTUNISM THAT PROMPTED UNDERMINING OF US SANCTIONS; AND, IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO PRESERVE THE FACADE OF ALLIANCE UNITY THAN OUSIBLE OVER TRADE. NO PROMINENT AMERICAN OFFICIAL VENT ON RECORD THAT SUCH BEHAVIOR WAS

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PAGE 02 OF 04 STATE 082376

STATE 082376

UNACCEPTABLE, MUCH LESS WARN OF A POSSIBLE US REACTION. EUROPEAN LEADERS VISITING WASHINGTON WERE PERMITTED TO BLANDLY CLAIM WITHOUT CONTRADICTION THAT THEY WERE NOT PURSUING BUSINESS AS USUAL WITH THE SOVIETS WHILE PUBLISHED STATISTICS SHOWED THE REVERSE. US HOPES WERE FOCUSED ON THE NATO PLEDGE TO RAISE REAL DEFENSE SPENDING BY THREE PER CENT AND TO EXPAND COCON STRATEGIC CONTROLS THROUGH THE SO-CALLED HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR PROPOSAL. THE EUROPEANS WERE SOON TO SHRUG BOTH ISSUES OFF, LEAVING THE US NOTHING TO SHOW FOR ITS LABORS AND FOREBEARANCE. THEY DREW THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SPONGY US POSTURE, AND THE STAGE WAS SET FOR POLAND AND THE GAS PIPELINE.

8. THE CASE OF WEST GERMANY AND THE GAS PIPELINE IS A PARTICULARLY REVEALING INSTANCE OF HOW US POLICY HAS BEEN MISDIRECTED. IN MARCH 1980 - JUST FOUR MONTHS AFTER THE AFGHANISTAN INVASION - THE GERMAN CABINET TOOK THE KEY DECISION TO ALLOW UP TO 30 PER CENT OF DOMESTIC GAS USE TO BE OF SOVIET ORIGIN.

UNDER GERMAN LEADERSHIP, A EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM OF GAS COMPANIES EVENTUALLY PUT TOGETHER A PACKAGE WHICH WILL PROVIDE WESTERN EUROPE WITH 40 BILLION CUBIC METERS OF SOVIET GAS PER YEAR, ASSURE 15 BILLION DOLLARS OF EUROPEAN EQUIPMENT SALES AND DOUBLE SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNING IN THE COMING DECADE - THE BIGGEST EAST/WEST DEAL IN HISTORY. WHEN THE SIZE AND NATURE OF THE DEAL EVENTUALLY BECAME KNOWN TO THE US, CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT THE THREAT OF SOVIET ENERGY BLACKMAIL. THE GERMANS MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN RESPONSE:

-- GERMANY NEEDS THE GAS, AND NO OTHER SOURCE IS AVAILABLE;

-- THIRTY PER CENT SOVIET GAS PRESENTS NO BLACKMAIL-PROBLEM SINCE IT WOULD LARGELY BE USED IN INDUSTRIES AND UTILITIES THAT COULD EASILY SWITCH TO ALTERNATIVE FUELS;

-- THE MATTER IS NOT A GERMAN GOVERNMENT CONCERN SINCE IT IS A PURELY COMMERCIAL DEAL WITH NO OFFICIAL SUBSIDIES INVOLVED.

ALL OF THE ABOVE SUBSEQUENTLY PROVED TO BE FALSE, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THE US EVER GET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. TO THE EXTENT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE GAS REQUIREMENTS, THEY WERE BASED ON A CONTINUATION OF A 10-15 PER CENT PER YEAR INCREASE IN GAS CONSUMPTION EXPERIENCED IN THE 70'S, WHEN GAS WAS CONSIDERABLY CHEAPER THAN ANY ALTERNATIVE FUEL. HOWEVER, GAS CONSUMPTION IN GERMANY DROPPED SHARPLY IN 1980 AND 1981 - PARTICULARLY IN INDUSTRIAL USE; AS THE STEEP RISE IN GAS PRICES MADE RESIDUAL FUEL OIL AND COAL CHEAPER ALTERNATIVES. GAS COMPANIES, THUS, AT PRESENT HAVE DIFFICULTY IN MARKETING THE GAS VOLUMES THEY HAVE UNDER CONTRACT, AND NOW THEY WILL DISPOSE OF THE ADDITIONAL 10.5 BILLION CUBIC METERS PER YEAR OF SIBERIAN GAS THAT WILL COME ON STREAM IN THE MID-80'S IS NOT EASILY ANSWERED. THE ONLY LIKELY OUTLET IS THE HOME-HEATING MARKET, ALTHOUGH EVEN HERE NUMEROUS COMMUNITIES ARE COMPLAINTING ABOUT EXCESSIVE COSTS. THE PROBABLE OUTCOME IS THAT THE 30 PER CENT LIMIT WILL BE

GOVERNMENT TO SUBSIDIZE GAS SALES. AS TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT CLAIM THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SUBSIDIES ON EQUIPMENT SALES, THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN FLATLY CONTRADICTED BY ISSUANCE LAST YEAR OF SEVERAL BILLION ON LOW INTEREST

CREDITS (AKA PLAFOND B) TO GERMAN MANUFACTURERS, IN ADDITION TO GOVERNMENT-BACKED CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR ALL PIPELINE EXPORTS. THUS, THE WORST CASE SCENARIO FOR GERMAN ENERGY DEPENDENCY HAS EMERGED AS THE MOST LIKELY: WELL OVER 30 PER CENT RELIANCE ON SOVIET GAS, CONCENTRATED IN THE HOME-HEATING SECTOR, AND ALL BOUGHT WITH TAXPAYERS' MONEY.

9. WHY, DESPITE THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, DO THE GERMANS SO TENACIOUSLY CLING TO THE PIPELINE EVEN AFTER POLAND AND MOUNTING US DOMESTIC CRITICISM? IT IS NOT MERELY A QUESTION OF SHORT-TERM JOB CREATION, SINCE THE GOVERNMENT IF IT WERE SO MINDED COULD EXPAND THE DISTRICT HEATING, NUCLEAR AND COAL SECTORS TO ABSORB AT LEAST AN EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF WORKERS TO COVER THE SAME ALLEGED ENERGY NEED. THE KEY FACTOR IS THE POLITICAL DIMENSION, RELATED TO GERMAN CONCERNS THAT SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS - AND HENCE EAST/WEST TRADE - WOULD DRY UP WITH THE EXPECTED LOSS OF SOVIET OIL EXPORT CAPABILITY IN THE MID-80'S. TO THE GERMANS, THE EXISTENCE OF SIGNIFICANT TRADE WITH THE EAST IS A MEANS TO KEEP THE SOVIETS QUIESCENT AS REGARDS WESTERN EUROPE, AND PERMIT FURTHER MANEUVERING ROOM WITH THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. THE UNITED STATES FAILED TO SEE THAT THE GAS PIPELINE WAS NOT PRIMARILY AN ENERGY SUPPLY OR ECONOMIC MATTER TO THE GERMANS. WHEN THE US FINALLY BECAME ORGANIZED ENOUGH TO SEND A DELEGATION TO GERMANY IN LATE 1981 TO TRY TO STOP THE PIPELINE, ITS SOLE ARGUMENT THAT THERE ARE SUFFICIENT NON-SOVIET GAS SOURCES AVAILABLE TO MEET ALLEGED NEEDS NATURALLY FELL ON DEAF EARS.

10. REDRESSING ALLIANCE INEQUITIES --

THE SANCTIONS ISSUE ILLUSTRATES AND DEFINES FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE LAST DECADE. THE UNILATERAL US NUCLEAR GUARANTEE - THE GLUE THAT ONCE HELD THE ALLIANCE FIRMLY TOGETHER - IS NOW VIEWED BY MOST EUROPEANS AS ONLY A PARTIAL ANSWER TO THEIR SECURITY NEEDS; AND TO GROWING NUMBERS, IT IS LESS OF A DEFENSE THAN A THREAT OF NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST. THE SECURITY POSTURE OF EUROPE NOW CONSISTS OF A BALANCE BETWEEN COMMITMENT TO NATO AND ACCOMMODATION TO SOVIET INTERESTS, MOST IMPORTANTLY EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF TRADE AND CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS. THERE ARE VARIATIONS AMONG NATO ALLIES ON THE EMPHASIS OF THIS BALANCE; IN THE KEY CASE OF WEST GERMANY, THE DEFENSE BUDGET ALMOST EXACTLY MATCHES ITS VOLUME OF EAST/WEST TRADE.

11. IN THE PAST DECADE, THE THREAT OF AN OUTRIGHT SOVIET INVASION OF WESTERN EUROPE HAS CONTINUALLY RECEDED, WHILE SOVIET APPETITE FOR ADVENTURISM IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS MARKEDLY INCREASED. TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE, EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET/AMERICAN COMPETITION IN THE THIRD WORLD ARE COLORED BY THE NEED TO JUSTIFY EUROPE'S INTERMEDIARY POSITION. IT IS NOT A COINCIDENCE THAT EUROPEAN INDIGNATION OVER ALLEGED AMERICAN-BACKED ATROCITIES IN EL SALVADOR REACHED A PEAK SHORTLY AFTER THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. ANOTHER SUCH PEAK HAS ALSO OCCURRED FOLLOWING THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN POLAND. "EUROPE NEEDS EL SALVADOR AS THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF AFGHANISTAN," ADMIT SOME OF THE FRANKER EUROPEANS. WHILE, OF COURSE, THE LEFTISTS LEAD THE ATTACK, THE POLICIES OF MOST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS REFLECT THE PREVAILING ATTITUDE. IN THE CARIBBEAN, THE EUROPEANS HAVE WITHDRAWN AMBASSADORS AND AID PROGRAMS FOR EL SALVADOR, AND REFUSED TO SEND OFFICIAL ELECTION OBSERVERS TO THAT COUNTRY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THEY SUPPLY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO NICARAGUA AND, AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF FRANCE, MILITARY

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PAGE 03 OF 04 STATE 082376

STATE 082376

ASSISTANCE AS WELL. AND WHILE INSISTING WITH A HIGH MORAL TONE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ATTEMPTING TO FORCE A MILITARY SOLUTION ON THE BASIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE REGION, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DUMPS SUBSIDIZED SUGAR ON THE WORLD MARKET AND, THEREBY, MAKES ECONOMIC RECOVERY FOR MANY OF THE NATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. IT IS, OF COURSE, NOT ONLY IN THE CARIBBEAN BUT IN MANY OTHER AREAS IN THE WORLD WHERE EUROPEANS COUNTERMINE THE AIMS OF RADICAL AND ANTI-AMERICAN FORCES - FROM ENCOURAGEMENT OF PLO INTRANSIGENCE TO CONTINUED TRADE, INCLUDING MILITARY ITEMS, TO OADDAFI. EVEN IN THE MUCH TOUTED CASE OF THE IRANIAN SANCTIONS, A CLOSE READING OF THE TRADE STATISTICS WILL REVEAL THE TRUE NATURE OF ALLEGED EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES. WEST GERMAN FIRMS, FOR INSTANCE,

DURING THE IRAN EMBARGO.

12. ALL OF THE FOREGOING DOES NOT SIGNIFY THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS. IT IS UNQUESTIONABLY IN US INTEREST THAT WESTERN EUROPE BE PRESERVED FROM SOVIET DOMINATION, AND UNDOUBTEDLY A LARGE MAJORITY WOULD PREFER THEIR PRESENT DEMOCRACY AND PROSPERITY TO THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL PEJURY OF COMMUNISM. HOWEVER, THE US MUST RADICALLY RETHINK THE PLACE OF THE ALLIANCE IN ITS PRIORITIES, AND WHAT THE PROPER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE EUROPEANS SHOULD BE, GIVEN PRESENT TRENDS IN EUROPE AND THE LIKELY CHALLENGES FACING THE UNITED STATES IN THE COMING DECADE.

13. IN REVIEWING HISTORY OF THE POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS, IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT RELY ALONE ON APPEALS TO CONSCIENCE OR ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY TO INFLUENCE EUROPEAN BEHAVIOR. EXCEPT FOR INCONSEQUENTIAL SYMBOLISM, THE EUROPEANS HAVE GONE STRAIGHT AHEAD IN PURSUING THEIR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS WITH THE SOVIETS AS IF AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND NEVER HAPPENED. THE FAILURE OF THE BUCKLEY MISSION ON FINANCING, THE RASHISK MISSION ON THE GAS PIPELINE, THE HATO CONSULTATIONS ON POLISH SANCTIONS, AND NUMEROUS OTHER US INITIATIVES ON COCON AND THE LIKE IN THE YEARS SINCE AFGHANISTAN CAN BE TRACED TO THE LACK OF ANY CLEARLY DEFINED US POSITION IN THE EVENT OF EUROPEAN INTRANSIGENCE.

14. IT IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS PAPER TO DETAIL A NEW EUROPEAN POLICY, BUT RATHER TO STIMULATE US POLICY-MAKERS TO THINKING IN NEW WAYS ABOUT EUROPE AND, IN PARTICULAR, INTRODUCING THE HERETOFORE LACKING ELEMENT OF TRADE-OFFS AND LEVERAGE. AMERICAN POLICY CAN NO LONGER BE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF PERFECTLY ALIGNED ALLIED INTERESTS EXCEPT IN THE INCREASINGLY REMOTE CASE OF A DIRECT SOVIET ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE. THE US MUST NOW TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT IN MANY--PERHAPS THE MAJORITY--CRUCIAL ISSUES IN THE COMING DECADE, EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN INTERESTS WILL CLASH, AND THAT US LEVERAGE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE THE EUROPEANS CAN INFLICT. AMONG THE MANY URGENT QUESTIONS THAT NEED TO BE VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT ARE:

COMMITMENT TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE -- HATO WAS FOUNDED WHEN WESTERN EUROPEAN GNP WAS HALF THAT OF THE US. WESTERN EUROPEAN GNP IS NOW 25 PER CENT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE US, AND ALMOST TRIPLE THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IS THE US THIRTY-TWO BILLION DOLLAR PER YEAR US CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE STILL JUSTIFIED? SHOULD THE AMOUNT AND NATURE OF THE US CONTRIBUTION

BE SUBJECT TO ANNUAL REVIEW AND BE DIRECTLY LINKED TO EUROPEAN RESTRAINT IN STRATEGIC TRADE WITH THE SOVIETS, AND IN OTHER AREAS OF US INTEREST?

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER -- THE EUROPEANS HAVE REPEATEDLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER EXPANSION OF STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS BEYOND PRESENT NARROW COCON DEFINITIONS, AND THEIR METHODS OF ENFORCING SUCH CONTROLS ARE AT BEST QUESTIONABLE. WEST GERMAN, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS YET TO PROSECUTE REPEATED COCON VIOLATORS, AND ITS TRADE WITH EAST GERMANY ENTIRELY ESCAPES COCON CONTROLS. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AT THIS POINT CONSIDER IMPOSING TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS ON EXPORTS TO WESTERN EUROPE?

WHEAT SALES -- THE EUROPEANS ACCUSE THE US OF HYPOCRISY IN RESUMING WHEAT SALES WHILE CALLING FOR A STOP TO STRATEGIC INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS AND THE GAS PIPELINE. MANY AMERICANS SEEM TO AGREE, FORGETTING THAT EUROPE WAS ONE OF THE MAJOR UNDERCUTTERS OF THE AFGHANISTAN GRAIN EMBARGO. WILL UNILATERAL STOPPING OF WHEAT SALES AGAIN LEAD TO ANY DIFFERENT RESULT? SHOULD THE US DIRECT WHEAT EXPORTS TOWARD PENETRATING TRADITIONAL MARKETS OF EMBARGO UNDERCUTTERS WITH LONG-TERM BILATERAL CONTRACTS AT SUBVENTIONED PRICES, IF NECESSARY?

POLAND DEFAULT -- A POLISH DEFAULT WILL HIT THE EUROPEANS CONSIDERABLY HARDER THAN THE US. SHOULD THIS BE USED AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO RESTRAIN SUBSIDIZED EUROPEAN LOANS AND OFFICIAL GUARANTEES ON EXPORTS TO THE SOVIETS?

GAS PIPELINE -- SOME AMERICANS ARE NOW COUNSELING US ACQUIESCENCE TO THE GAS PIPELINE IN THE NAME OF SANCTITY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS. CAN THIS BE A SERIOUS ARGUMENT WHEN THE MAJOR BENEFACIOR IS A COUNTRY WHOSE AVOWED PURPOSE IS THE OVERTHROW OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM? CAN THE UNITED STATES COUNTENANCE THE TIMING OF SUCH MAJOR DEALS BASED TRANSPARENTLY ON THE

WITH US COMPETITORS SHORTLY BEFORE THE AFGHANISTAN INVASION, AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE PIPELINE CONTRACT WITH THE WEST GERMANS OCCURRED ONE MONTH BEFORE POLISH MILITARY CRACKDOWN. SHOULD THE US REAFFIRM ITS EXTRATERRITORIAL CONTROLS ON PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY, AND SHOULD WE REEXAMINE OTHER POINTS OF LEVERAGE SUCH AS US RIGHTS ON WEST BERLIN GAS SUPPLY?

CONSULTATIONS -- THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE ALLIANCE HAVE BROUGHT A VERITABLE FLOOD OF EUROPEANS TO WASHINGTON. ARE INCREASED CONSULTATIONS, BY THEMSELVES, A WAY OF RESOLVING OR MERELY WASHING REAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, AND DELAYING THEIR RESOLUTION? WOULD A MORE RESERVED US POSTURE TOWARD CONSULTATIONS REDUCE THE TEMPTATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS TO POSE AS UNWANTED INTERMEDIARIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIETS?

PUBLIC RELATIONS -- DOES THE CONTINUAL INTONING OF ALLIANCE UNITY AT PRACTICALLY ALL COSTS SERVE US INTERESTS IN EUROPE? WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, FIVE OUT OF SIX WEST GERMANS STILL BELIEVE THE GAS PIPELINE IS A GOOD DEAL, IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE SPOKEN OUT EARLY AND CLEARLY ABOUT THE UNDERMINING OF AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS, THE UNDERLYING MOTIVES OF THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT IN PURSUING THE PIPELINE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A US REACTION. WOULD A DETAILED US PUBLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN GERMANY HAVE A SOBERING EFFECT?

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PAGE 04 OF 04 STATE 082376

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS -- THE EUROPEANS HAVE AN ENORMOUS APPETITE FOR US BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON ARMS CONTROL, AND US PARTICIPATION IN ALL MANNER OF MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS THE EGE AND THE CSCE. IN THE PAST, THE US HAS USUALLY ACCEDDED TO EUROPEAN WISHES. SHOULD THE TIMING AND NATURE OF FUTURE US PARTICIPATION IN SUCH ACTIVITIES HENCEFORTH BE RELATED TO EUROPEAN RESTRAINT AND COOPERATION ON MATTERS VITALLY AFFECTING US INTERESTS?

15. THE ABOVE DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO SWING EUROPEAN POLICY TOTALLY OR EVEN LARGELY IN LINE WITH US OBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, THE EXERTION OF LEVERAGE SHOULD HAVE A MODERATING EFFECT ON EUROPEAN BEHAVIOR WHICH IS NOW MOSTLY ABSENT. AND EVEN IF THIS TOUGHER POLICY HAS NO PERCEPTIBLE RESULT, THE LESSENING OF US DIPLOMATIC FIXATION ON EUROPE AND THE GRADUAL TRANSFER OF US FORCES OUT OF EUROPE SHOULD PROVIDE THE US A BETTER POSTURE TO MEET IMMINENT SOVIET THREATS TO US SECURITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE MID-EAST, AND ELSEWHERE IN THE THIRD WORLD.

SEVERAL INFLUENTIAL SENATORS HAVE ALREADY PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF INTRODUCING ANOTHER HANSFIELD AMENDMENT AT THE NEXT SESSION OF CONGRESS, AND THE PRESENT MOOD IN CONGRESS IS SUCH THAT THIS MEASURE COULD PASS BY A LARGE MAJORITY. THE DEPARTMENT IS, THUS, WORKING AGAINST TIME TO FORESTALL A MOVE THAT WOULD PROVOKE AN OUTRIGHT RUPTURE WITH EUROPE AND A LOSS OF WHATEVER LEVERAGE POSSIBILITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO US. THE BEST, AND PERHAPS THE LAST, OPPORTUNITY FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO STOP ANOTHER HANSFIELD AMENDMENT WILL COME DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO EUROPE NEXT JUNE. THE QUESTION DEPARTMENT POLICYMAKERS SHOULD NOW ASK THEMSELVES IN PREPARING FOR THE NEXT NATO SUMMIT IS WHETHER IT WILL BE THE STANDARD TYPE OF "SUCCESS" AT THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR, OR WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WILL BE PROVIDED THE REAL OPTIONS HE NEEDS TO CONVINCE THE CONGRESS - AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE - THAT US POLICY TOWARD EUROPE IS STILL IN THE RIGHT HANDS. BURNS
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PAGE 01 MANAGU 01906 01 OF 03 151524Z

42
ACTION SP-03

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INFO OCT-01 (SP-06, SS-02, ARA-03,) W

123980

R 151430Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4141

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 MANAGUA 1906

DISSENT CHANNEL

EO 11652 GDS
TAGS: PINT NU
SUBJ: DISSENT MESSAGE ON GON PRESS CENSORSHIP

REF: STATE 096033, MANAGUA 1851

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSIDENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY JAMES R. CHEEK, CHIEF OF THE POLITICAL SECTION AND [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH THE ANALYSIS AND SOME OF THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED DIFFER FROM THOSE TRANSMITTED IN MANAGUA 1851, THE MESSAGE IS INTENDED PRIMARILY TO BE AN ALTERNATIVE, AND IN THE AUTHORS' VIEW MORE BALANCED AND RESPONSIVE REPLY TO THE DEPARTMENT'S REQUEST FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF THE GON'S IMPOSITION OF PRESS CENSORSHIP, WHICH WAS CONTAINED IN STATE 096033. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE USG/NICARAGUAN RELATIONS, THE DRAFTERS BELIEVE THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD HAVE THE BENEFIT OF THEIR VIEWS. THE DRAFTERS REQUEST THAT DISTRIBUTION INCLUDE ARA, ARA/CEN, ARA/CEN/N AND ANY OTHER OFFICES OR AGENCIES THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS APPROPRIATE.

2. SUMMARY: THE GON'S IMPOSITION OF CENSORSHIP ON APRIL 24 APPEARS TO BE PRIMARILY A PRODUCT OF ITS FRUSTRATION, ANGER AND UNEASINESS AFTER ALMOST EIGHT WEEKS OF BITTER CONFRONTATION WITH STRIKING HOSPITAL WORKERS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. GON FRUSTRATION RESULTED FROM ITS FAILURE TO DEFEAT THE STRIKE DESPITE ITS BEST EFFORTS AND THE PERSONAL INTERVENTION OF GENERAL SOMOZA. THIS FRUSTRATION

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29



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PAGE 02 MANAGU 01906 01 OF 03 151524Z

CREATED ANGER WHICH WAS ACERBATED BY UNRELENTING ATTACKS IN OPPOSITION LA PRENSA AND OTHER MEDIA. FRUSTRATION AND ANGER GAVE BIRTH TO UNEASINESS WHICH WAS NURTURED BY SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE INCREASING STRENGTH OF ITS OPPONENTS, SUSPICIOUS THAT THEY WERE RECEIVING OUTSIDE SUPPORT, AND FOREBODINGS OF A GENERAL STRIKE AND POSSIBLE VIOLENCE. IN THIS MOOD, THE GON OPTED FOR CENSORSHIP AS A SIMPLISTIC SOLUTION TO ITS STRIKE DIFFICULTIES. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW PRECISELY TO WHAT EXTENT, THE GON AND GENERAL SOMOZA'S DECISION COULD HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY OTHER FACTORS PRESENT AT THE TIME: FORCES WHICH HAVE NEWLY EMERGED SINCE THE EARTHQUAKE TO PRESS FOR CHANGE WERE BEGINNING TO ACT IN CONCERT TO SUPPORT THE STRIKE. THREATS OF VIOLENCE AND ASSASSINATION WHICH HISTORICALLY HAVE FLAMED NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS WERE AGAIN PRESENT IN THIS ELECTORAL PERIOD. LA PRENSA WAS NOT ONLY FANNING THE FLAMES OF THE STRIKE BUT ALSO ATTACKING TABOOS SUCH AS THE PERFORMANCE OF GENERAL SOMOZA AND THE NATIONAL GUARD FOLLOWING THE EARTHQUAKE AND THE LEGALITY OF THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS.

THE IMPOSITION OF CENSORSHIP WAS PERCEIVED BY THE GON AS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO USE OF ARMED FORCES TO DEAL WITH ANTICIPATED VIOLENCE. IN OUR VIEW, THE BLEND OF ALL THESE INGREDIENTS UNDER THE PRESSURES OF THE STRIKE SITUATIONS PRODUCED CENSORSHIP.

3. AS IT WAS IMPOSED, CENSORSHIP PROVED TO BE A RATHER IMPERFECT AND IN SOME RESPECTS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WEAPON. SHORTLY AFTER CENSORSHIP WAS IMPOSED, THE STRIKE ENDED. SETTLEMENT OF THE STRIKE, HOWEVER, CAME BECAUSE THE GON GAVE THE WORKERS WHAT THEY WANTED. THE EMBARRASSMENT AND DAMAGING EFFECTS OF CENSORSHIP STRONGLY STIMULATED THE GON TO SEEK A QUICK SOLUTION. CENSORSHIP BROUGHT LA PRENSA SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD AND GAVE EDITOR CHAMORRO RENOWN AS A CHAMPION OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN NICARAGUA. IRONICALLY THIS MAY SERVE OVER THE LONG RUN TO ENHANCE CHAMORRO. CENSORSHIP ALSO KNOCKED THE PRIVATE SECTOR OFF THE FENCE IT WAS STRADDLING DURING THE STRIKE AND FORCED IT TO BECOME PUBLICLY INVOLVED IN THE SITUATION.

4. THE FORCES DEPLOYED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE STRIKE WERE MANY OF THOSE IDENTIFIED IN OUR CURRENT CASP AS EMERGING AND INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT INFLUENCES ON POST-EARTHQUAKE NICARAGUAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE. THESE FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A GROWING ROLE, AND IF THE GON IS TO PEACEFULLY INCORPORATE THEM INTO

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PAGE 03 MANAGU 01906 01 OF 03 151524Z

THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IT MUST DEMONSTRATE MORE FLEXIBILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE LESS READINESS TO EMPLOY DRASTIC MEASURES. END SUMMARY.

5. IN EXAMINING THE IMPOSITION OF CENSORSHIP ONE MUST TAKE A HARD LOOK AT THE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE HOSPITAL STRIKE AFTER NEARLY EIGHT WEEKS OF BITTER CONFRONTATION WHEN THE GON MADE ITS APRIL 24 CENSORSHIP DECISION.

A. THE GON -- THE GON'S INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE STRIKE, WHICH HAS BECOME ALMOST AUTOMATIC, WAS TO DECLARE IT ILLEGAL AND ORDER THE STRIKERS BACK TO WORK, WHEN THIS FAILED, THE GON ENTERED NEGOTIATIONS WITH AN OFFER OF A 10 PERCENT INCREASE WHICH IT UPPED TO 15 PERCENT DURING THE THIRD WEEK, BELIEVING THE STRIKERS' DEMANDS TO BE EXCESSIVE, UNWILLING TO GO FURTHER DESPITE INDICATIONS THAT 25 PERCENT MIGHT DO THE TRICK, AND APPARENTLY FEELING THAT TIME WAS ON ITS SIDE THE GON DUG IN TO WIN THE STRIKE ON ITS TERMS AND THE BATTLE WAS JOINED. FOR FOUR WEEKS NO REAL NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE. DURING THIS TIME THE GON COMMITTED ALMOST ALL OF ITS.

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PAGE 01 MANAGU 01906 02 OF 03 151558Z

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ACTION: SP-03.

INFO: OCT-01 (SP-06, SS-02, ARA-03,) W
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R 151430Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4142

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 MANAGUA 1906

DISSENT CHANNEL

MEDICAL MANPOWER RESOURCES IN AN ATTEMPT TO FILL THE BREACH AND WHEN THIS FAILED TOYED WITH VARIOUS SCHEMES FOR CREATING ADDITIONAL "INSTANT" MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO PERMANENTLY REPLACE THE STRIKERS. GENERAL SOMOZA ALSO CARRIED THE ISSUE INTO HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN DENOUNCING THE STRIKERS AND THREATENING THEM WITH LOSS OF THEIR JOBS AND LICENSES IF THEY DID NOT GIVE IN. AS THE LIBERAL PARTY CONVENTION APPROACHED AND THESE TACTICS HAD BROUGHT NO RESULTS, THE GON ON APRIL 24 ONCE AGAIN TRIED NEGOTIATIONS AND INCREASED ITS OFFER TO 20 PERCENT. ALTHOUGH THE OFFER WAS NOT ACCEPTED, IT BROUGHT THE TWO PARTIES VERY CLOSE TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT EVENTUALLY PROVED. THE GON, HOWEVER, FELT THAT IT HAD DONE ITS BEST AND WOULD GO NO FURTHER. FRUSTRATED AT THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE STRIKERS AND ITS PATIENCE WORN THIN BY THE PROLONGED CONFRONTATION, THE GON SOUGHT OTHER MEANS TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION.

B. THE STRIKERS -- THE STRIKERS STARTED FROM A FAIRLY WEAK POSITION. ALTHOUGH HOSPITAL SALARIES WERE LOW AND INFLATIONARY PRESSURES HIGH, ABOUT HALF OF THE WORKERS DID NOT JOIN THE STRIKE. THE STRIKERS WERE INITIALLY GOING IT ALONE RATHER THAN FOLLOWING IN THE WAKE OF A POWERFUL CONSTRUCTION WORKERS' (SCAAS) STRIKE, AS IN THEIR LAST WALKOUT, AND FEW COULD HAVE ENJOYED THE PROSPECT OF A LONG LOSS OF PAY SO SOON AFTER THEIR EXTENDED STRIKE IN MID 1973. THE STRIKERS, HOWEVER, WERE NOT WITHOUT ASSETS. THEY ENJOYED FAIRLY WIDESPREAD PUBLIC SYMPATHY, AND UNDER GON PRESSURE THEY ACQUIRED AN ALL-IMPORTANT DO-OR-DIE DETERMINATION. THEY ALSO HAD ALLIES. THE SOCIAL CHRISTIANS PROVIDED THEM VALUABLE LEGAL AND NEGOTIATING ASSISTANCE, AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC ORIENTED

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24



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PAGE 02: MANAGU 01906 02 OF 03: 151558Z

INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN PROMOTION (INPRHU) FURNISHED THEM A HEAD-QUARTERS AFTER THE GOVERNMENT EVICTED THEM FROM THE HOSPITALS. LA PRENSA AND SOME POPULAR RADIO STATIONS GAVE THEM A SYMPATHETIC FORUM WHICH WAS ONE OF THEIR MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPONS IN ASSAULTING THE GON POSITION. AS THE STRIKE WORE ON AND BECAME A MORE BITTER AND DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH GENERAL SOMOZA THESE ASSETS INCREASED. SCAAS EXPANDED ITS SUPPORT, RAISING CONSIDERABLE FUNDS FOR THE STRIKERS, PROMISING SYMPATHY STRIKES AND EVEN FORMING AN UNPRECEDENTED ALLIANCE WITH ITS SOCIAL CHRISTIAN RIVAL (CTN) TO COORDINATE SUPPORT OF THE EFFORT. THE STUDENTS DID THEIR BIT TO HELP RAISE FUNDS AND STAGED PUBLIC SUPPORT DEMONSTRATIONS. THE CHURCH SECTOR OBVIOUSLY WISHED TO STAY CLEAR OF THE STRIKE, ALTHOUGH SOME MEMBERS PRIVATELY EXPRESSED SYMPATHY WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STRIKERS AND REPORTEDLY SURREPTITIOUSLY SLIPPED FUNDS TO THEM. UNDER PRESSURE FROM LABOR BUT UNWILLING TO OFFEND THE GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS WITHHELD PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM BOTH SIDES. THE STRIKERS' CAMP ALSO BECAME THE NATURAL REFUGE FOR POLITICAL GROUPS OPPOSED TO SOMOZA AND EVEN THE PAGUAGA CONSERVATIVES ISSUED A WEAK STATEMENT WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED AS SUPPORTING THEM. LA PRENSA, FOR ITS PART, CONTINUED TO DRAMATIZE THE PROBLEM AND TO DEFEND THE WORKERS' POSITION. WITH ALL OF THIS BACKING THE STRIKERS NATURALLY DID NOT LACK FOR FUNDS TO SUBSIST AND HOLD OUT. WHETHER AN ALLEGED LARGE SOCIAL CHRISTIAN CONTRIBUTION THROUGH INPRHU WAS ACTUALLY USED TO SUPPORT THE STRIKE HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN; HOWEVER, IF IT DID EXIST, IT IS DIFFICULT TO RATE IT AS DECISIVE GIVEN

THE AVAILABILITY OF OTHER SOURCES. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE STRIKERS HAD ADEQUATE SUPPORT TO HOLD OUT AND THEIR STRENGTH WAS TENDING TO INCREASE AS THE STRIKE PROGRESSED. THUS ON APRIL 24 THEY WERE IN A POSITION TO REFUSE THE GON'S 20 PERCENT OFFER AND CONTINUE RESISTANCE UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT MET THEIR TERMS.

6. GIVEN THIS POSITION OF FORCES ON APRIL 24, ONE CAN UNDERSTAND THE GON'S CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION CONFRONTING IT. THE VICTORY WHICH IT SOUGHT WAS BEING DENIED. INSTEAD, THE TRIKE WAS SPREADING TO OTHER SECTORS, POSING THE THREAT OF BURGEONING INTO A GENERAL STRIKE. THE CONFRONTATION HAS BECOME A RALLYING POINT FOR THE VARIED OPPONENTS OF GENERAL SOMOZA, AS THEY ENTHUSIASTICALLY EMBRACED THIS COMMON CAUSE, AND IT HAD EVEN AROUSED TRADITIONAL FEARS OF "OUTSIDE SUPPORT." THE GON, HAVING BEEN FORCED TO GIVE

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34



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PAGE 01 MANAGU 01906 03 OF 03 151842Z

42
ACTION SP-03.

INFO OCT-01 (SP-06,SS-02,ARA-03,) W

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FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4143

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 MANAGUA 1906

DISSENT CHANNEL

GIVE THE WORKERS WHAT THEY WANTED (AS IT EVENTUALLY DID) THE END OF THE STRIKE WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. WE BELIEVE, FOUR IMPORTANT OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE GON'S DECISION TO IMPOSE CENSORSHIP WERE THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE GON AND GENERAL SOMOZA ARE OPERATING PRPEN AMBIENCE IN WHICH THEY MUST MEET THE HEAVY REQUIREMENTS OF RECONSTRUCTION WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY DEALING WITH NEW FORCES WHICH ARE EMERGING ON A BROAD FRONT TO PRESS THEIR DEMANDS. THESE FORCES, WERE BEGINNING TO ACT TO AN EXTENT IN CONCERT TO SUPPORT THE STRIKE. BY DENYING THESE FORCES ACCESS TO INFORMATION REGARDING THE STRIKE, CENSORSHIP COULD HAVE BEEN VIEWED AS A WAY OF SHORT CIRCUITING COORDINATION AMONG SCATTERED STRIKE SUPPORTERS.

B. THE UNREST AND THREATS OF VIOLENCE AND ASSASSINATION WHICH HISTORICALLY HAVE PLAGUED NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS ARE AGAIN PRESENT AS THE SEPTEMBER 1974 CONTEST APPROACHES. GENERAL SOMOZA'S TIGHTENING OF HIS ALREADY STRINGENT SECURITY MEASURES AND SECLUSION IN A BULLETPROOF GLASS BOOTH AT PUBLIC RALIES ARE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE DEGREE OF HIS CONCERN--THE CENSORSHIP COULD HAVE BEEN ANOTHER.

C. LA PRENSA, ALWAYS A THORN IN SOMOZA'S SIDE, WAS PRESSING EVEN DEEPER, NOT ONLY FANNING THE STRIKE FLAMES BUT ALSO ATTACKING TABOOS SUCH AS THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GUARD AND SOMOZA FOLLOWING THE EARTHQUAKE AND THE LEGALITY OF THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS. THE CENSORSHIP COULD HAVE HAD CONSIDERABLE APPEAL AS A WAY TO WREAK VENGEANCEON PUBLISHER CHAMORRO AND HOPEFULLYTEACH HIM A LESSON.

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29

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PAGE 02 MANAGU 01906 03 OF 03 151842Z

7. SINCE HIS ACCESSION TO POWER IN 1987 GENERAL SOMOZA HAS CONSCIOUSLY AND PRIDEFULLY AVOIDED THE USE OF FORCE TO DEAL WITH DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. HE FULLY REALIZES THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE THIS COULD MEAN FOR NICARAGUA AND HIS PERSONAL REPUTATION. IF HE HAD COME TO VIEW FORCE AS HIS ONLY OTHER ALTERNATIVE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION, HE WOULD UNDERSTANDABLY CHOOSE CENSORSHIP.

8. THE FOREGOING ANALYSIS OF THE GON'S IMPOSITION OF MEDIA CENSORSHIP, WHICH SYNTHESIZES REPORTING IN NUMEROUS MESSAGES OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, PORTRAYS THE GON AS CONFRONTING A COMPLEX ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEM UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. IT DEPICTS THE FAILURE OF THE GON TO RESOLVE THE STRIKE PROBLEM THROUGH TRADITIONAL CARROT AND STICK METHODS. THIS FAILURE PRODUCED A FROWING FRUSTRATION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT WHICH PROBABLY DISTORTED ITS PERCEPTION OF THE STRIKE SITUATION TO THE POINT OF VISUALIZING IT AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE GON'S POSITION.

HOWEVER, THE ANALYSIS ALSO REVEALS OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WEIGHTING ON THE GON. THUS, WHILE CENSORSHIP COULD HAVE BEEN EMBRACED AS A SIMPLISTIC SOLUTION TO THE STRIKE IT OFFERED THE ADDED ATTRACTION

OF SERVING OTHER PURPOSES (AS NOTED PARA 7). VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT, THE CENSORSHIP PROVED TO BE A LESS THAN PERFECT, POSSIBLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, WEAPON.

9. THE CENSORSHIP AS IMPLEMENTED CONTRIBUTED TO SETTLEMENT OF THE STRIKE BUT HARDLY AS THE GON MUST HAVE INTENDED. HAVING HOISTED ITSELF ON THE EMBARRASSING AND DAMAGING RETARD OF CENSORSHIP THE GON WAS FORCED TO SEEK QUICK RESOLUTION OF THE STRIKE AS A WAY DOWN. THE GON THEREFORE PROMPTLY RETURNED TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE TO OFFER THE STRIKERS MORE LIBERAL TERMS. SINCE THESE MET THE STRIKERS' KNOWN MINIMUM DEMANDS, A SETTLEMENT WAS IMMEDIATELY FORTHCOMING. ALTHOUGH HERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE CENSORSHIP SERVED TO BEND THE STRIKERS, IT DID SERVE AS A CONVENIENT FACE-SAVING DEVICE FOR THE GON'S CAPITULATION.

10. IRONICALLY, THE GON'S USE OF CENSORSHIP AS AN EXPEDIENT TO DEAL WITH ITS ADVERSARIES, PARTICULARLY LA PRENSA'S CHAMORRO, IN THE SHORT RUN MAY SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THEM IN THE LONG RUN. THE CENSORSHIP BROUGHT LA PRENSA FAIRLY BROAD SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD WHICH MAY PROVIDE THE NEWSPAPER,

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16



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 MANAGU 01906 03 OF 03 151842Z

ALREADY NICARAGUA'S LARGEST AND MOST POPULAR, AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENHANCE ITS DOMINANT MEDIA POSITION. THE CENSORSHIP AS IMPLEMENTED ALSO GAVE A RENOWN TO CHAMORRO AS A CHAMPION OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN NICARAGUA WHICH MAY SERVE TO ENHANCE HIS STATURE AND MAKE HIM AN EVEN BOLDER OPPONENT.

11. ADDING TO THE IRONY, IMPOSITION OF THE CENSORSHIP ALSO SERVED TO KNOCK THE PRIVATE SECTOR OFF THE FENCE IT WAS ATTEMPTING TO STRADDLE. WHILE THE PRIVATE SECTOR HAD BEEN ABLE TO AVOID OPEN INVOLVEMENT IN THE STRIKE IT COULD NOT EVADE THE ISSUE OF CENSORSHIP WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECTED ITS OWN ECONOMIC INTERESTS. INTERVENING ON BEHALF OF LA PRENSA AS A MEMBER FIRM, THE CHAMBER OF INDUSTRIES (CADIN) PETITIONED THE MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT ITS OPERATION, NOTING LA PRENSA'S CLAIM THAT THE CENSORSHIP WAS DAMAGING THE NEWSPAPER AS WELL AS THE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN GENERAL. THE PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (INDE) SECONDED THIS APPEAL. WITH ITS BUSINESS AT A STANDSTILL, THE CHAMBER OF CONSTRUCTION ALSO REPORTEDLY PROMISED TO APPROACH THE GOVERNMENT TO OFFER ITS GOOD OFFICES.

12. THE GONIS RESORT TO CENSORSHIP CAME AS A RESULT OF ITS FAILURE TO HANDLE THE STRIKE SITUATION BY LESS DRASTIC MEANS. THE FORCES DEPLOYED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE STRIKE WERE MANY OF THOSE IDENTIFIED IN OUR CURRENT CASP AS EMERGING AND INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT INFLUENCES ON POST-EARTHQUAKE NICARAGUAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE. THESE FACTORS WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A GROWING ROLE, AND IF THE GON IS TO PEACEFULLY INCORPORATE THEM INTO THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES--MAKE THEM ITS PARTNERS RATHER THAN ITS ANTAGONISTS--IT MUST DEMONSTRATE GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND IMAGINATION THAT IT SHOWED DURING THE HOSPITAL STRIKE CONFRONTATION. PRESUMING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL LEARN FROM HIS EXPERIENCE, IT SHOULD NOT ALLOW FUTURE STRUGGLES OVER WAGE INCREASES TO ESCALATE TO THIS LEVEL. INSTEAD IT SHOULD REGAIN SOME OF ITS FORMER FINESSE AND ADOPT A MORE LIBERAL AND FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE TOWARD FUTURE DEMANDS FROM LABOR AND OTHERS PRESSING FOR CHANGE.
WARNER

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FORM --



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

Signature

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R. Smith

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February 3, 1975

[Redacted]

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USAID/Laos

Dear [Redacted]

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I am writing at the request of the Secretary in response to your letter of December 3 to him in which you expressed your dissenting views with regard to US-Thai official relations.

Your letter has been read with a great deal of interest. Most of the comments and observations have received careful consideration; there is no fundamental disagreement with your basic recommendations. The Department shares the view that negotiations with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) must be conducted in a business-like manner. In this regard, I would like to emphasize we have never taken the position that "unless we do everything the RTG wants they will throw us out"; but in the conduct of our relations with Thailand, it has been necessary, on occasion, to recognize certain political and social realities which exist and require an accommodating policy.

Our dealings with the Express Transport Organization (ETO) provide an illustrative example of the problems we confront in Thailand. As you know, ETO is a government-sponsored operation with monopoly privileges in certain categories of land transportation, including sole right to haul US Government freight. Unfortunately, we have incurred extra costs as a result of our inability to contract with any trucking firm other than the ETO. We do not like to pay these extra costs and have made our disapproval known to the RTG. We have had to weigh the actual financial costs we incur against the potential political and other costs which might be involved in seeking to force removal of ETO's excess charges. To date, the conclusion has been that the latter far exceeds the former. However, we will--without identifying the source of our information--investigate the discrepancy which you indicate exists between what USAID/Laos pays

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
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and what the US military pays ETO for the same service over the same route. You may be sure that efforts will be undertaken to bring the latter into conformity with the USAID/Laos rate, if circumstances do warrant such action:

You also mentioned, as a second example of how to deal with the RTG, the successful negotiations of USAID/Laos in obtaining a Thai waiver of its export premium and taxes on US shipments of Thai rice in support of our program in Laos. We agree that this is an example of effective negotiation, and we will call it to the Embassy's attention as a useful precedent.

Again, I wish to thank you on the Secretary's behalf for your initiative in bringing these matters to our attention. It is through such actions that a stronger and more self-reliant foreign service can be created.

Sincerely,



Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

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PAGE #1 OF #2 STATE #71531
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LA/DR/RO:DCRALL (DRAFT)
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LA/CLM:EGARUFF (DRAFT)
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- TO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
- AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
- AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
- AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
- AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
- AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
- AMEMBASSY LIMA
- AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
- AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
- INFO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
- AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
- AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
- AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
- AMEMBASSY QUITO
- AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
- AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
- AMEMBASSY PANAMA

UNCLAS STATE #71531

AIDAC GUATEMALA FOR FOCAF

E.O. 11652: C/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ASSESSMENTS

1. WITHIN THE PAST YEAR EACH AID MISSION HAS EVALUATED ITS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (DAP) TO APPRAISE ITS VALIDITY IN LIGHT OF THE AGENCY'S REVISED DAP GUIDANCE (AID/O CIRC. A-246, 5/28/76). THE GUIDANCE REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DAP AS THE AGENCY'S PRIMARY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING DOCUMENT AND CALLED FOR THREE COMPONENTS: AN ANALYTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE POOR MAJORITY; AN ASSESSMENT OF EACH PRIMARY SECTOR OF ACTIVITY; AND A DAP SUMMARY STRATEGY STATEMENT.

2. MISSION APPRAISALS OF THEIR DAPS' RELEVANCE ACCOMPANIED THE FY 1976 ANNUAL BUDGET SUBMISSIONS (ABS). SOME USAIDS CONCLUDED THAT THEIR DAPS ARE STILL VALID; OTHERS PROVIDED AN OUTLINE FOR PROPOSED REVISION, A TIMETABLE FOR THE REVISION, AND AN ESTIMATE OF AID/M AND/OR CONTRACT ASSISTANCE NEEDED. THE LATIN AMERICA BUREAU SUPPORTS THE PREMISE THAT AN ANALYTICAL DSP BASED ON EMPIRICAL DATA IS VITAL TO THE SELECTION OF THE TARGET SUBGROUPS AND DEVELOPMENT OF COST-EFFECTIVE PROGRAM STRATEGIES TO ASSIST THE RURAL POOR.

3. TO THIS END THE BUREAU HAS PREPARED GUIDELINES FOR AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ASSESSMENTS TO HELP THE USAIDS MEET THEIR DAP REQUIREMENTS. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THESE GUIDELINES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN AID/M ENDORSEMENT OF THE PRIORITY OF THIS COMPONENT OF THE DAP RELATIVE TO OTHER

MENTS. IT DOES REFLECT THE POSITION, HOWEVER, THAT AN ANALYTICALLY SOUND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IS VITAL IN VIEW OF OUR INCREASING FOOD AND NUTRITION COMMITMENT TO THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

4. AID/M RECOGNIZES THAT USAIDS WILL HAVE DIFFERENT NEEDS DEPENDING ON INFORMATION ALREADY AVAILABLE. THE QUALITY OF EXISTING ASSESSMENTS AND THE SIZE AND FUTURE OF AID PROGRAMS. BASED ON THESE CONSIDERATIONS, FOUR GENERAL LEVELS OF EFFORT AND FINANCING HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED:

5. LEVEL A: A SIX-MONTH EFFORT IN WHICH NO PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION IS UNDERTAKEN. THIS LEVEL IS APPROPRIATE WHEN EXISTING INFORMATION, DATA AND ANALYSIS ARE ADEQUATE TO ADDRESS EFFECTIVELY THE ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES; OR, WHEN AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT IS UNDERTAKEN IN ANTICIPATION OF A MORE THOROUGH ASSESSMENT AT A LATER DATE. THE FUNDS REQUIRED, (EXCLUSIVE OF AID DIRECT-HIRE INPUTS) ARE ESTIMATED AT 50,000 TO 100,000 DOLS.

6. LEVEL B: A TWELVE-MONTH EFFORT REQUIRING LIMITED PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS APPROPRIATE FOR THE IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF CONSTRAINTS CONFRONTING PRE-IDENTIFIED TARGET SUBGROUPS. THIS LEVEL IS SUITABLE WHEN A COUNTRY IS RELATIVELY SMALL AND HOMOGENEOUS; WHEN DATA COLLECTION POSSIBILITIES ARE LIMITED, WHEN FUTURE AID PROGRAM LEVELS ARE LIKELY TO BE RELATIVELY SMALL OR WHEN EXISTING INFORMATION IS ADEQUATE BUT PARTIAL. THE FUNDS REQUIRED ARE ESTIMATED AT 150,000 TO 300,000 DOLS.

7. LEVEL C: AN EIGHTEEN-MONTH EFFORT FOR A COUNTRY REQUIRING SUBSTANTIAL PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS AIMED AT IDENTIFYING THE TARGET SUBGROUPS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED CONSTRAINTS. THE FUNDS REQUIRED ARE ESTIMATED AT 350,000 TO 500,000 DOLS.

8. LEVEL D: A MULTI-YEAR SECTOR ASSESSMENT/ANALYSIS FOR COUNTRIES OF HIGHEST PROGRAM PRIORITY, WHERE BASIC STATISTICAL INFORMATION IS SCARCE. THE FUNDS REQUIRED ARE ESTIMATED AT 500,000 DOLS. AND OVER.

9. GIVEN THIS BASIC FRAMEWORK, THE BUREAU RECOMMENDS THAT MISSION AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ASSESSMENTS BE PERFORMED

ROUGHLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULE IN PARAGRAPH 10. THIS SCHEDULE DOES NOT REPRESENT A FINAL DETERMINATION BUT RATHER REFLECTS THE BUREAU'S BEST ESTIMATE OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY SITUATIONS AND NEEDS. LA/DR/RO WOULD WELCOME THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH THE MISSIONS QUESTIONS OF TIMING, FUNDING LEVELS AND FUNDING MECHANISMS.

10. WITH RESPECT TO FUNDING MECHANISMS, LEVEL C AND D ASSESSMENTS REFLECT MIGHTY MAGNITUDES OF EFFORT LARGE ENOUGH TO SUGGEST THE DESIRABILITY OF BILATERAL PROJECT AGREEMENTS. THE ASSUMPTION REFLECTED IN THE SCHEDULE IS THAT PROJECT AND HOST-COUNTRY FUNDS WOULD JOINTLY FINANCE PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION EFFORTS AND THAT TECHNICAL SUPPORT FUNDS WOULD THEN BE USED TO WEIGH THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXISTING INFORMATION AND THE DATA WHICH HAVE BEEN COLLECTED FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES AND FOR PUTTING TOGETHER THE MISSION ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT. THESE PROJECTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO AID/M IN THE ANNUAL BUDGET SUBMISSIONS.

11. THE BUREAU FULLY RECOGNIZES THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED GUIDELINES WHICH ARE BEING APPROACHED TO THE MISSIONS TODAY AND DOES NOT EXPECT CURRENT USAID BUDGETS AND PERSONNEL LEVELS TO ABSORB COMPLETELY THE COST AND TIME OUTLAYS REQUIRED BY ASSESSMENT-RELATED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES. AID/M IS PREPARED TO SUPPLEMENT TECHNICAL SUPPORT ALLOCATIONS AND NOTIFY CONGRESS OF THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL PROJECT FUNDS IN FY 78 IN APPROPRIATE CASES. IN ADDITION, LA/DR/RO IS INCREASING ITS BACKSTOPPING CAPA-

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PAGE #2 OF #2 DIRECT-HIRE AND RSSAI TO ASSIST THE MISSIONS IN THE DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES.

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ABOVE, PLEASE ADVISE HOW YOUR MISSION FORESEES IMPLEMENTING THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT COMPONENT OF THE DAP REQUIREMENTS OR WHAT CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRE FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH AID/TA BEFORE REACHING SUCH A DECISION.

13. SCHEDULE.

FT COUNTRY	ESTIM. FUNDING LEVEL	ESTIMATED TECH. SUPPORT	FUNDING PROJECT	COMPONENTS HOST COUNTRY	1982 \$ DOLS. TOTAL
77 EL SALVADOR	B	225			225
-- FT SUBTOTAL		225			225
78 GUATEMALA	C	75	270	90	435
-- CARIBBEAN REGIONAL	B	175			175
-- BOLIVIA	A, D	75	270	90	435
-- HAITI	A, D	75			75
-- DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	A		75		75
-- PERU	B	225			225
-- FT SUBTOTAL		625	405	270	1740
79 BOLIVIA	D		400	125	525
-- HAITI	D		400	125	525
-- HONDURAS	C	75	270	90	435
-- FT SUBTOTAL		75	1070	340	1445
80 BOLIVIA	D	75	250	95	420
-- HAITI	D	75	250	95	420
-- NICARAGUA	B	225			225
-- FT SUBTOTAL		375	500	190	1065
TOTAL		1300	2455	400	4555

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AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
FO SECSTATE WASHDC 4832
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIENTIANE 4897

BANGKOK ALSO FOR [REDACTED]
PT FOR RAMSEY, USAID/LAOS
O. 11652: GDS
GS: MASS, PFOR, US, LA
BJ: MILITARY RICE FOR LAOS
F: VIENTIANE 4700

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WE MAY NOT HAVE CONVEYED THE STILL VERY TENSE AND UNCERTAIN
SITUATION IN WHICH WE FIND OURSELVES: TWO EMBASSY COMPOUNDS
MAIN OCCUPIED; AN INCIPIENT THREAT FROM ROYAL AIR LAO
EMPLOYEES PRECLUDES USE OF U.S. AIRCRAFT; IMPLICATIONS OF
CUT-OFF ARE BEGINNING TO BE FELT, AT SAME TIME AS REAL-
IZATION IS DAWNING THAT THERE MAY BE NO FUTURE AID; THERE ARE
SERIOUS FOOD SHORTAGES (ACCORDING TO VOA AND BBC, LAOS HAS
ASKED FOR \$12 MILLION IN FOOD AID FROM U.S.); THE CHANGE IN
POLITICAL ORDER IS PROCEEDING WITH ATTENDANT WIDESPREAD
CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY AMONG LAO.

IN THIS CONTEXT, DELIVERIES OF RICE ARE NOT A TECH-
NICAL PROBLEM. WE HAVE COMMITTED OURSELVES FOR JULY. TO
DELAY FURTHER, OR MORE SERIOUSLY TO CANCEL OUT, COULD

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WE HAVE BROAD REPERCUSSIONS: IT WOULD GIVE A PALPABLE ISSUE
FOR LPP TO ATTACK US IN WHATEVER WAY THEY CHOSE, AND ON THIS
MATTER THEY WOULD HAVE BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT. THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DOUBLE-DEALING AT A TIME WHEN LPP ARE CARRYING RESPONSIBILITY
FOR DETERIORATING SITUATION COULD SHIFT PART OF THIS
RESPONSIBILITY TO US AND WOULD CERTAINLY NOT IMPROVE
OUR CHANCES OF MAINTAINING THIS MISSION, NOR
THE PROSPECT OF INSURING THE SECURITY OF ITS PERSONNEL.

HAPMAN

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FORM DS 322(OCR)

ACK MRN DTG SIGNATURE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CLASSIFICATION SPECIAL CHARGES

S/PC:RRPETERSON:JK NAME
9/26/72 0X22972 TEL EXT
S/PC:UICARGO NAME

S/S: MR. DARNES NAME CLEARANCES
M/DG: MR. BLACKBURN NAME CLEARANCES

DEPT OF STATE DISTRIBUTION
ROUTINE ESSENCE MBABANE ACTION ADDRESSES
INFO PRECEDENCE INFO ADDRESSES

DISSENT CHANNEL CAPTIONS

FROM DIRECTOR S/PC
SUBJ: DISSENT MESSAGE FROM MBABANE ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 11636
REF: MBABANE 1619
1. THIS CABLE ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE CONTAINED IN MBABANE 1619. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE WILL RECEIVE FULL ATTENTION IN THE DEPARTMENT. INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THIS TELEGRAM HAS BEEN MADE TO THE ACTING SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, THE COUNSELOR, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM PANEL.
2. A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY TO REFTEL WILL BE SENT FOLLOWING DEPARTMENTAL DISCUSSIONS. YY

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DG/EM: TRBYRNE S/PC: WICARGO CLEARANCES S/PC: RPETERSON CLEARANCES

DESIRED RESTRICTIONS

ROUTINE PRIORITY MBABANE ACTION OFFICER

INFO PRECEDENCE INFO ADDRESSES

SPECIAL HANDLING DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJ: OBJECTION TO EXCLUSION FROM REPRESENTATION ELECTION FROM DIRECTOR S/PC REF: 1) A-9295 2) MBABANE 1619

WE APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS CONCERNING YOUR DISENFRANCHISEMENT BUT REF AIRGRAM STATEMENT ON AGREEMENT OF "ALL PARTIES" WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT E.O. 11636 CLEARLY EXCLUDED CHIEFS OF MISSION AND PRINCIPALS & OFFICERS UNDER SECTION 2(C)(3) AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION UNDER SECTION 2(C)(3) AND DEPUTY CHIEFS OF MISSION UNDER SECTION 2(C)(4). THE ONLY DISCRETIONARY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS. COMMISSION HAS SINCE ADDED PRINCIPAL PERSONNEL OFFICERS TO EXCLUDED LIST. 44

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0138
INFO USIA WASHDC

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PRETORIA 2857

E.O. 11652: GDS
TARSI DECX, SF
SURJ: DISSENT MESSAGE

DIASSENT CHANNEL

REF: (A) PRETORIA 2663 (B) PRETORIA 2787

STATE FOR: AF & CU/AF

USIA FOR: IAA

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY
[REDACTED] CAO.

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2. NIH SHOULD BE REQUIRED AS MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY TO SHOW THAT POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS DESCRIBED IN REFTEL A AWARDED WITHOUT RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. RACIAL COMPOSITION OF SELECTION COMMITTEE, POSITIVE PROOF THEIR EFFORTS MAKE AWARE SCIENTISTS ALL RACIAL GROUPS AVAILABILITY SUCH AWARDS, RACIAL BREAKDOWN APPLICATIONS RECEIVED AND AWARDS MADE, ALL OF WHICH POST UNWARE, ARE RELEVANT FACTS IN DETERMINING IF THIS PROGRAM FREE FROM RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES.

3. FEEL A STRONGER PUBLIC STANCE THAN DESCRIBED REFTEL B RE PASSPORT REFUSALS MORE CONSONANT WITH CULTURAL EXCHANGE POLICY AS ARTICULATED "TO DEMONSTRATE SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR HAVE-NOT MAJORITY" ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 PRETOR 02867 281543Z

"EMBASSY DEEPLY REGRETS REFUSAL PASSPORTS KGWARE, CACHALIA, MAHOMED, OUTSTANDING LEADERS THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES. IN EFFORTS TO KEEP LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS OPEN WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND TO ENABLE INTERESTED AMERICANS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND CONTEMPORARY SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT INVITED CRITICS AS WELL AS ADVOCATES OF SAG POLICIES TO TAKE PART IN EXCHANGE PROGRAMS. WHENEVER CRITICS OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES ARE NOT ALLOWED TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY, THIS DENIES AMERICAN PUBLIC SPECTRUM OPINION REGARDING SOUTH AFRICA AND MAKES DIFFICULT FOR AMERICAN GOVERNMENT MAINTAIN OPEN DOOR POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA. WE REGRET ALSO THAT INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED NOT ENTITLED HAVE REASONS FOR REFUSALS OR DAY IN COURT TO BRING OUT FACTS AND DETERMINE IF SAG ACTED IN ARBITRARY MANNER, WHICH ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE, AS WELL AS TO UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE. SHOULD AT SOME FUTURE DATE PASSPORTS MRS. KGWARE, MESSRS. MAHOMED, CACHALIA BE GRANTED, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA STANDS READY RE-NEW OUR INVITATION VISIT OUR COUNTRY, WHERE THEY WILL BE MADE MOST WELCOME."

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PAGE 01 MANILA 17279 01 OF 02 020418Z
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RELEASE IN
PART B6

R 020340Z NOV 77
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7283

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 MANILA 17279

AIDAC

FOR ADMINISTRATOR GILLIGAN

E.O. 11652: N/A
SUBJ: AID DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS AN AID DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF

2. DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION.

3. RECENT CABLE TRAFFIC ON PROJECTS UNDER THE OFFICE OF PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT IMPLIES THAT CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF PROJECT DEVELOPMENT IS BEING INTENSIFIED, IF, AS ADMINISTRATOR AND OTHERS HAVE REPEATEDLY REPRESENTED, AID/W DOES HAVE A POLICY DECENTRALIZING THE TIGHT CONTROL

HERETOFORE ENJOYED BY AID/W, THEN EITHER THE MESSAGE IS NOT GETTING PAST THE ADMINISTRATOR'S DOOR OR THERE HAVE BEEN SECOND THOUGHTS.

4. CASE IN POINT: STATE 251258 WHEREIN PID ON "A FUND FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT" PROJECT, SENT TO AID/W IN MAY, IS STILL BOTTLED UP BECAUSE ONE OFFICE HAS EXERCISED ITS VETO, ASKING US TO SHUFFLE OUR FEET UNTIL "SPECIFIC CONCERNS HAVE BEEN FORMULATED." DRAFTER WHILE ON HOME LEAVE IN JULY SPENT TWO WEEKS IN AID/W ANSWERING

QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSING PROJECT. WHEN TWO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS WERE RAISED AT THE APAC MEETING, THE DRAFTER, BACK HOME, SPENT ANOTHER WEEK

WRITING REPLY, AND WE ARE NO CLOSER TO DECISION. CENTRALIZED CONTROL IS AGAIN THE WINNER WITH THE FIELD PROJECT MANAGER DOBBING ABOUT LIFE

PUPPET ON A STRING.

5. CASE IN POINT: STATE 283549, WHILE RAISING TWO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON REAL PROPERTY TAX PROJECT, TONE AND DIRECTION IS CLEAR: THE FIELD IS PEOPLED WITH PLEASANT BUT INCOMPETENT GENERALISTS WHO NEED VERY CLOSE SUPERVISION LEST THEY DO SOMETHING IRRATIONAL. ISSUES POP UP

THAT SEEM TO COME OFF THE WALL BUT WHICH MUST BE ANSWERED, RESEARCHED, REPUTED AND RESTATED OR THE PROJECT FALLS. THE ISSUE, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE NEUTRAL BENEFITS OF THE TAX, ARISES APPARENTLY FROM LACK OF

UNDERSTANDING OF ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY TAX ITSELF WHILE OTHER QUESTIONS DEMAND, ALMOST TO POINT OF HARASSMENT, A RANGE OF DETAIL, QUANTIFICATION, EVENT CONTROL AND PREDICTION THAT ARE NAIVE IN THEIR ASSERTION

AND DESTRUCTIVE IN THEIR NECESSITY. HOW WE CAN RESPOND TO THESE DEMANDS FOR DETAIL WHILE STILL ATTEMPTING CARRY ON THE WORK AT HAND RE-ENACTS CLASSIC DILEMMA OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL VERSUS FIELD OPERATION

IN WHICH ONLY CENTRALIZERS WIN. CABLE APPEARS TO HAVE MADE USUAL ROUND

OF SIGN-OFFS, REQUIRING EACH OFFICE TAKE A GOOD HARD SWING THUS

SHOWING THEMSELVES TO BE ALERT, IMAGINATIVE AND HARD NOSED. THIS PERFORMANCE NEARLY DUPLICATES SUPERLATIVE JOB OF LAST YEAR, STATE 297439, ON RURAL SERVICE CENTER PROJECT IN WHICH THERE WERE 21 SIGN-OFFS AND 21 QUESTIONS.

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ACTION SP-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7204

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 MANILA 17279

6. AID/W HAS PUSHED QUANTIFICATION TO A LIMIT UNJUSTIFIED IN ITS VALUE AND DEBILITATING IN ITS RESULTS. WE ARE, AFTER ALL, WORKING IN AREAS WHERE THE GATHERING OF STATISTICS AND THE KEEPING OF VERIFIABLE RECORDS IS A LONG WAY FROM PERFECTION DEMANDED BY AID/W. OUR WORK, OF NECESSITY, IS BASED ON LIMITED, OFTEN CONFLICTING SET OF DATA INFORMED BY OUR OBSERVATIONS, EXPERIENCE AND EVALUATIONS. AND THE MORE FIGURES WE SEND TO AID/W, THE MORE WE ARE DUNNED BECAUSE SOMETHING IS MISSING. THE INVOLVED, COMPLICATED AND DISTORTING PROGRAM PROCESS UNDER WHICH WE WORK, COUPLED WITH CENTRALIZED DEMAND FOR REFINED DATA AND MORE PREDICTIVE MODELS, COMPOUNDS THE PROCESS AND TURNS PROJECT MANAGERS AND TECHNICIANS INTO DATA CLERKS AND INTERPOLATORS. A REVIEW OF STATE 251470 EVIDENCES THIS SEEMINGLY INSATIABLE DEMANDS FOR QUANTIFICATION, CONTROL, AND PREDICTIVE MECHANISMS.

7. THE RISE IN HARASSING CABLE TRAFFIC FROM AID/W UNSPECIFIC PHILIPPINE PROJECTS FLAG, IN MY MIND AT LEAST, A DEEPER INTENTION OF AID/W TO GO AFTER PHILIPPINE PROGRAM. IF THIS YOUR INTENT WHY NOT APPROACH IT AS MATTER OF POLICY INSTEAD OF KICKING THE PROJECTS AROUND AS THOUGH WE WERE PARTIES TO A FRATERNITY HAZING; IF YOU MUST, REDUCE OVERALL COMMITMENTS DIRECTLY AND LET THE MISSION PROCEED ON PROJECT BY PROJECT BASIS. THE HARASSMENT, THE PROFESSIONAL DEBASEMENT AND NEGATIVE CLIMATE CREATED IN PROJECT MANAGERS AND TECHNICIANS BY WAY OF PRESENT PROCESS NOT WORTH THE CANDLE.

8. IF YOU ARE SERIOUS ABOUT DECENTRALIZATION, ABOUT ENHANCING FIELD OPERATIONS THEN

- A. REORGANIZE THE BUREAUS TO REDUCE CLEARANCE PROCESS.
- B. ELIMINATE RULE OF COMPLETE UNANIMITY WHERE ONE WITHHELD SIGN-OFF CAN VETO PROJECT OR THE ACTION.
- C. RULE OUT GADFLY QUESTIONNAIRE BY WHICH EVERY QUESTION THAT COMES OFF THE WALL IS INCLUDED IN OUTGOING CABLE.
- D. AMELIORATE RAVAGES OF QUANTIFICATION BY INSTITUTING SELECTIVE CRITERIA BASE FOR INCLUSION IN PJD'S AND PP'S.
- E. REVAMP INDIVIDUAL MISSION POLICY BY ESTABLISHING COUNTRY LEVELS THROUGH MISSION OBJECTIVES INSTEAD OF DOING IT THROUGH SELECTIVE BADGERING OF INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS.
- F. GIVE US CLEARER DIRECTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE POOR MAJORITY, PARTICIPATION, ETC. AS THESE TRANSLATE IN DELINEATION OF BENEFICIARIES AND PROJECT DESIGN.

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PAGE 01 STATE 107488
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DRAFTED BY S/P: GSAUSTIN
APPROVED BY S/P: ALAKE
ARA - MR. DEVINE (DRAFT)
D/HA - MR. SNEIDER (DRAFT)
M/DG - MR. LISSFELT (SUBSTANCE)
S/P-OFF: NABOYER
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
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O 130247Z MAY 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 107488

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, SHUM, US, ES

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
GOES

DISSENT CHANNEL, FOR [REDACTED] AND OTHER
SIGNATORIES OF REF A FROM ANTHONY LAKE - S/P

B6

REF: (A) SAN SALVADOR 1732; (B) STATE 087800;
(C) STATE 098384; (D) STATE 105097

1. YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE PRESENTED A CONVINCING CASE BASED ON SOUND REASONING AND EXPRESSED IN CLEAR LANGUAGE.
2. LARGELY AS A RESULT OF YOUR CABLE, THE DEPARTMENT HAS ADOPTED A MODIFIED VERSION OF YOUR OPTION 4. AMBASSADOR LOZANO'S DEPARTURE IS BEING DELAYED ONE MONTH. DEPARTMENT ALSO MAKING PLANS FOR A DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TO MAKE A FIRM PRESENTATION ON US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY TO LEAVE NO DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF THE HIGHEST OFFICIALS IN THE GOES THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN CONVEYING THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY AND NOT HIS PERSONAL VIEWS. (REF C AND D). IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE GOES UNDERSTAND THIS, AS YOUR MESSAGE POINTS OUT.
3. I UNDERSTAND THAT AMBASSADOR LOZANO HAS SHARED WITH YOU THE CONTENT OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT AS CONVEYED TO HIM IN REF C.
4. FURTHER, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DEVINE ADVISED SALVADOREAN AMBASSADOR HERE ON MAY 9 THAT USG UNABLE TO SUPPORT \$90 MILLION IDB LOAN FOR EL SALVADOR ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS AND THAT WE SUGGESTED DEFERRAL THIS ITEM FROM IDB AGENDA. DEVINE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS POSITION WAS TOTALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ON HUMAN RIGHTS MADE BY AMBASSADOR LOZANO IN SAN SALVADOR.
5. I REITERATE THE DEPARTMENT'S APPRECIATION OF YOUR TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. CHRISTOPHER

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PAGE 01 STATE 231990
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DRAFTED BY S/P: MACASEY: BDM
APPROVED BY S/P: JGARTEN, ACTING
S/P-OF - MR. KINNEY
S/P: RJHARRINGTON
S/IL: DGOOD
EA/RA: DHARRIS
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 231990

DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, ELAB, AS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN AUSTRALIA

FOR [] FROM GARTEN - S/P, ACTING

I. THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN AUSTRALIA. COPIES OF YOUR REPORT HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS, THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, AND THE EAST ASIA REGIONAL AFFAIRS LABOR ADVISOR. THANK YOU FOR BRINGING THESE REPORTS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE DEPARTMENT. VANCE

B6

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S/P-0FP:PJLYDON:BDM
8-6-75 EXT. 28790
S/P:SWLEWIS

S/P:DPIKE

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: BANGKOK 16004

FOR:

WL *DP*
PJI *TS*
DP

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF REFERENCED DISSENT CABLE.
2. MR. DOUGLAS PIKE, OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF (S/P) HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE.
3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR CABLE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, AND THE CHAIRPERSON THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. COPIES WILL ALSO GO TO THE EAST ASIAN BUREAU AND AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE.
4. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL FOR THE SECOND TIME ON AN IMPORTANT MATTER AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SENT IN. YY

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July 20, 1972

DISSENT CHANNEL

Dear [redacted]

B6

After the Department received your telegram (#2313) of July 7, I consulted with the Bureau for African Affairs and other interested officers in the Department. This further response to your message outlines in some detail the Department's actions in relation to the crisis in Burundi.

As soon as the crisis in Burundi erupted on April 29, 1972, with a coordinated Hutu attempt to overthrow the Tutsi regime, the U.S. Government tried to be helpful from both the humanitarian and political points of view. In response to the initial requests from the Burundi Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services, and Caritas International, we supplied \$80,000 worth of relief supplies to help victims of the initial hostilities. We are reasonably certain that these first supplies reached the intended recipients without discrimination against any ethnic group.

On the political side, we joined with other governments represented in Burundi in an appeal to the Burundi Government to refrain from reprisals and repression against the Hutu majority. In view of the fact that we have no aid program in Burundi beyond a modest self-help program (\$35,000 in FY 72), and that traditionally the United States has been identified with the Hutus because of American missionary activity, we felt that the most effective influence on the regime to cease the repression could be exerted by other African governments. We actively pursued contacts with African leaders who are well known and respected in Burundi, such as President Mobutu of

[redacted]

American Embassy,
Tegucigalpa.

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2

Zaire, President Ould Daddah of Mauritania, and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Apart from Mobutu who sent a special envoy to Burundi to urge moderation, all the other Africans appeared reluctant to interfere in what they considered an internal matter of a sovereign African state. The annual summit conference of the Organization of African Unity in June 1972 did not even discuss the problem.

As soon as it became clear that subsequent distribution of humanitarian assistance was being controlled in such a manner as to deprive the Hutus in favor of Tutsis, we suspended all consideration of providing further aid. Other organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross also suspended plans for providing assistance.

In late June, the Secretary General of the United Nations sent a mission to Burundi to determine the facts and to recommend courses of action. The mission was sent with our encouragement, and Embassy Bujumbura assisted the mission in obtaining an accurate picture of the situation despite Burundi Government efforts to the contrary. We are now awaiting the Secretary General's reaction, and are encouraging his associates to move quickly because the killing and suffering continue.

In addition to the suffering within Burundi, a serious refugee problem has developed in neighboring countries, especially along Lake Tanganyika in eastern Zaire, and in Tanzania. Most of the refugees, including many Hutu students who escaped execution squads, are in terrible condition. The Department has requested the posts in the area to focus on this problem and to make recommendations. We have urged the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to take an urgent interest in the matter, and he has agreed to send a representative to the area immediately to coordinate assistance. The Catholic Relief Services is already working there, and the Department gave that organization a grant of \$50,000 on July 14th to start the relief program going while we obtain more details.

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I believe that from the foregoing you will agree that the U.S. Government has been doing the maximum within its limited capabilities to help the Hutus and to encourage a return to peaceful conditions.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
William I. Cargo

William I. Cargo
Director
Planning and Coordination Staff

Drafted: AF/C: HJCohen
SP/C: HJSpiro/ebd

Concurrence:

AF - Mr. Newsom

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

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1) S/P Ch...
2) W + Ch...
3) H...: d

February 3, 1975

4) Sm. 1/1

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[Redacted]

Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Room 5254A
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART B6

BEST COPY
AVAILABLE

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Dear [Redacted]

B6

Thank you very much for sending the Department your views, in Tel Aviv's 3305 of 19 June 1974, about PL 480 sales to Israel. Your use of the Dissent Channel to register views is especially appreciated. We deeply regret that our tardiness prevented this reply from reaching you while you were still in Tel Aviv.

Your message made the point that "Israel's increasing prosperity has progressively eroded Israel's case" for PL 480 assistance since its per capita GNP is relatively high and because it is receiving substantial amounts of assistance of other kinds.

The Department understands your reasoning, but believes, on the other hand, that PL 480 assistance had helped maintain Israel's healthy balance of payments' position while facilitating security purchases of military equipment on the civilian market abroad. Moreover, the Department believes that Israel does have need of food assistance.

It is clear that the policy issues you raised are relevant beyond the immediate context in which you raised them, and this enhanced the value of your raising them. I am pleased that you and a member of my staff have had an opportunity to discuss these matters directly, particularly since this gave us an opportunity more fully to appreciate your views.

In view of your conversation here, I understand that you consider further substantive response to your message unnecessary. I should, however, like again to express my thanks for sending us your views.

Sincerely,

Winston Lord
Director

Policy Planning Staff

*P.S. The delay in response
is in any event inexcusable.
We appreciate your interest and your
should have gotten better
treatment*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SOSI

RELEASE IN PART B6

September 24, 1974

~~SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

MEMORANDUM

TO : S/P - Mr. Winston Lord

FROM : AF/C - [redacted]

B6

SUBJECT: Dissent from AF Action Memorandum on DC-8

I continue to believe, and INR concurs, that no assurances from Bongo have value. However, this analysis is submitted to rebut the arguments of those officials who believe that assurances are of value and that the telegram from Bongo provides assurances on Rhodesia which are credible.

A. The AF memo states we now have Bongo's personal written assurances that the plane will not be used in Rhodesian trade. I state that Bongo, advised by his French counselors, has very carefully not given such assurances. We have three documents from Bongo:

1. A telegram to the Secretary stating that Bongo "renews the guaranties given in the note verbale of June 28 and on the occasion of the special mission's visit concerning the utilization of the aircraft for my personal use and in addition...for Air Afrique...under IATA regulations. This would exclude all countries under sanction by the UN, of which Gabon is a member and whose decisions have Gabon's full support and approval."

Comment: The word "guaranties" appears nowhere in the note verbale of June 28; the special mission provided no oral guaranties or assurances with regard to Rhodesia (see Enc. A - Memcon prepared by L/AF).

The note verbale contains many statements (not guaranties) about the plane; it would be maintained by Air Afrique, it will be used in accordance with the Treaty

~~SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

2.

of Yaounde, a contract has been signed for its purchase, its use will not compete with existing airlines, the plane is for Bongo's personal use, it will not be used to benefit countries sanctioned by the UN. Bongo did not repeat that key statement in his telegram.

Bongo has known for months of our concern that the plane will be used in Rhodesian trade. Furthermore, because we did not approve the export license after we received the note verbale (indeed, AF recommended against the sale, after we received the note), Bongo has known that note from his Ambassador did not provide sufficient assurances/guarantees on that point. Therefore, his personal message to the Secretary should, at the very least, have specifically repeated the statement that the plane will not be used to benefit Rhodesia. Instead, he simply repeated that the plane is for his personal use and for Air Afrique, statements which we received over his signature twice before and considered insufficient (see pgh # 2 and # 3 below).

I believe Bongo has intentionally avoided putting his own name to a statement that the plane will not be used in Rhodesian trade, and instead has given us a "guarantee" that the plane is for his personal use and for Air Afrique, which guarantees nothing. The sentence beginning "this would exclude all countries, etc" must be carefully looked at:

If the word "this" refers to its immediate antecedent "under IATA rules", it is meaningless, because L/AF informed us IATA rules do not prohibit member airlines from flying to Rhodesia, and two members (Portugal and South Africa) fly there regularly.

If the word "this" refers to usage by Air Afrique/UTA, it is meaningless because Bongo does not control that airline, and UTA has been involved in sanctions violations anyway.

If the word "this" refers to "personal use by Bongo" it is meaningless because the first plane was for Bongo's personal use and went immediately to Rhodesia.

~~SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

3.

In other words, the two key sentences simply read "I, guarantee the plane is for my personal use and for Air Afrique and this means the plane won't go to Rhodesia". Based on the analysis above, we have no guarantee over Bongo's signature about Rhodesia.

(Note: The telegram contains other statements which are misleading or false: Gabon does not fully support the UN; a fleet of planes flies from Libreville to Rhodesia regularly. Bongo did not receive approval from Chiefs of State and the OAU: Gowon of Nigeria (while temporarily President of the OAU) told Bongo it was inappropriate to give either approval or disapproval of the proposed purchase.)

2. Some months ago our Ambassador received a letter from Bongo saying the plane was for his personal use and for Air Afrique. No assurances on Rhodesia.

3. Exim received a letter from Bongo, repeating the two uses of the plane but saying nothing about Rhodesia. The letter did say the plane would be used in accordance with the Treaty of Yaounde. When a copy of the letter was given our Ambassador by Roland Bru (French advisor, and long-time agent of Foccart; Bru is described as "nefarious" and "bitterly Anti-American"), Bru said the Treaty of Yaounde provided the assurances we wanted on Rhodesia. AF researched the Treaty and found it was signed in 1961 (seven years before sanctions) and simply set up Air Afrique. In other words, we were given this letter and told it contained the assurances we wanted, but this was a false statement.

Given the consistent pattern of false statements (the June 28 note verbale contains innumerable blatant falsehoods - see Enc. B) made to us either in writing or orally there seems no reason to believe the statement in the note verbale concerning Rhodesian sanctions, and in fact AF did not do so. The "new element" in this situation is the telegram from Bongo, which gives no guarantees on Rhodesia. Why, therefore, should the State Department shift from its position of July 11 "don't sell" to its position of Sept. 16 "sell without any conditions"?

~~SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

B. Further comment on the statements in AF's memo:

1. AF states that the "assurances" in the Bongo telegram are the best we can get. Yet we have a copy of a letter from a GOG Minister to EXIM stating the plane will not be used in Rhodesian trade. This is better than the statement contained in the Bongo telegram. However, it is the same quality of assurance that we received in 1972, just before we approved the export license for the first plane which went immediately into Rhodesian trade.

2. AF States the assurances will protect us from criticism if the plane is mis-used. Yet we were criticized after allowing the first plane to go to Gabon when we knew Gabon was involved in Rhodesian trade, and our defense that we had prior assurances did not help us. Having been betrayed on the first plane, how can we explain our selling the second plane? By again referring to assurances?

3. AF states the costs to Bongo (of violating his guarantees) will include criticism from the OAU, the UN, the USG, and the press. Yet he is still incurring these "costs" on the first plane, and it doesn't bother him. In June 1974 the OAU reported that Rhodesia had obtained the use of this fleet of planes only because Gabon had "impersonated" Rhodesia. The planes are still flying out of Libreville to Rhodesia. There are no "costs" to Bongo because he declines to feel ashamed or embarrassed.

4. AF states Bongo must realize the possibility of bilateral action against him if he misuses the second plane. Why "must" he realize this? He knows of the flak we got on the first plane, yet bilateral relations have improved since 1972 and we are doing everything we can to increase American investment and he knows it. I believe he does not expect adverse action if he mis-uses the plane, and I doubt that the reference (in the proposed diplomatic note attached to AF's memo) to bilateral relations will be interpreted as a serious commitment from us to take action against him.

5. AF's memo refers to possible adverse action by Bongo against us if we refuse the sale. Yet the actions we anticipated have, in the most part, already been taken (rejections of bids, etc) and the DC-8 situation has only

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been one of the reasons the GOG has turned us down. The remaining possible adverse actions are so minor (i.e. the GOG assumes majority control of a manganese company in which US Steel has an interest) that they no longer form a significant motivation for acting positively on the export license.

Recommendation: by diplomatic note to the GOG Embassy, and by note verbale to the GOG from our Embassy in Libreville, let us tell the Gabonese that we were worried about the possible mis-use of the first plane before we sold it and therefore asked for and got assurances, but nevertheless the plane went into Rhodesian trade and is still there. Because the USG decided at the time the export license was issued in 1972 that mis-use would be prejudicial to sale of future aircraft to Gabon, we are now implementing that decision. In doing this, we are making no judgement about how the GOG would have used the second plane if we had approved the sale. We could add orally that since we believe a DC-8 can be purchased elsewhere (or a similar aircraft) our refusal to sell should in no way inconvenience President Bongo in fulfilling his need for a plane for his personal use.

In making this recommendation I am expressing my own views. However, these views are supported by the views expressed by other Foreign Service Officers, including those familiar with President Bongo and the Rhodesian sanctions problem, who feel the sale of the plane will be a mistake.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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file dissent

4/22/17

MEMORANDUM

TO : PPC/PDA/SPA -
FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake /s/
SUBJECT : Dissent Paper

B6

This will acknowledge the receipt of your dissent paper containing two proposals concerning the Sector Analysis Division of A.I.D. Theodore Moran of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your paper has been circulated to the Offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and the Chairman of the Open Forum, as well as the Director of A.I.D. We commend your use of the dissent channel and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

Clearances: S/P - RHarrington (draft)
S/P - NBoyer (draft)
S/P - TMoran



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

4/14/77
~~March 29, 1977~~

Dissent file

Dear [redacted]

This letter is a reply to your memorandum of March 14, in the dissent channel, in which you associate yourself with the earlier dissent of [redacted] concerning participation by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in various international monetary organizations.

As we noted in a letter to [redacted] since the advent of the new Administration there has been considerable movement and change of direction with respect to this policy. The U.S. no longer opposes SRV membership in U.N. specialized agencies. It has dropped some restrictions involving shipping to the SRV. Perhaps most important from the point of view of your memorandum, the U.S. no longer will raise objections to loans and programs for the SRV undertaken by the multinational financial institutions such as you mention as long as the normal procedures and technical requirements applicable to any recipient country are met. It is our position that any assistance provided the SRV should be in conformity with the policies and procedures of the organization concerned. Such assistance must meet the particular institution's economic and technical criteria and the SRV must carry out fully its obligations to them. In this connection, we believe that Vietnam's experience with the IMF in coming months will serve as a useful indicator of the extent to which membership in IFI's fosters the liberalization you speak of. Vietnam's record with the IMF also will likely affect its prospect for eventual project assistance from institutions with

[redacted]
ASIA/PT - Room 6668
Department of State
Agency for International
Development
Washington, D. C. 20523

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similar obligations, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. We are prepared to keep an open mind in regard to Vietnam's relationship with the IMF, but in the interim cannot prejudge our position on the merits of specific projects for which Vietnam may request assistance from other institutions in the future.

As perhaps you are aware, the US-Vietnamese relationship is now in a moment of flux and transition. We have agreed to meet the Vietnamese in substantive negotiations and probably these sessions will begin in the near future. It is too soon to know what exactly will be our policy on various issues, including existing legislative provisions, since so much depends on the Vietnamese negotiating strategy. But certainly it is safe to say the sense of the suggestions on economic relations made by [redacted] and yourself, and the anticipated direction of U. S. foreign policy in this respect, are now essentially in harmony.

B6

We thank you for your letter and appreciate your concern, which is one we all share, that efforts be made to improve and normalize relations between the U. S. and Vietnam.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Director
Policy Planning Staff

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

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S/P: NABOYER

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 129744

DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ILO

SUBJECT: ILO - ARTICLE 17

REF: GENEVA 4316

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS A RESPONSE FROM LAKE TO DISSENT
MESSAGE OF [REDACTED]

1. I AM RESPONDING TO YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE OF JUNE 1. AS YOU KNOW THE CHIEF FOCUS OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIVE FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, AND I HAVE REVIEWED YOUR MESSAGE FROM THAT VIEWPOINT.

2. IT APPEARS THAT THE QUESTIONS YOU RAISED RELATE PRIMARILY TO THE IMPRESSION OTHER DELEGATIONS HAVE RECEIVED OF THE US POSITION FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE US DELEGATION. YOU STRESS THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DELEGATION'S INSTRUCTIONS IMPLIED THAT IN THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 17 NO DEALS WERE TO BE MADE ON ANY OTHER ISSUES. YOUR DISSENT IS BASICALLY LEVELED AT THE TACTICS PURSUED BY THE DELEGATION IN DISCUSSING THE ARTICLE 17 PROPOSALS.

3. WE HAVE RAISED THIS QUESTION WITH THE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, AND IT HAS DETERMINED TO SEND A SEPARATE TELEGRAM CLARIFYING THE ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE DELEGATIONS ON THIS POINT. AS YOUR MESSAGE DID NOT CHALLENGE THE INSTRUCTIONS BUT RATHER RAISED A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION, AND, AS THAT QUESTION RELATES PRIMARILY TO OPERATIONAL TACTICS, WE DECIDED THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO RESPOND TO YOUR MESSAGE WAS THROUGH CLARIFIED INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO THE DELEGATION.

4. WE APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN IN THIS MATTER AND HOPE THAT THE NEW INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD SETTLE THE ISSUE THAT YOU HAVE RAISED. VANCE.

B6

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TELEGRAM

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DISSENT CHANNEL////////////////////////////////////

DISSENT MESSAGE FROM FSO JOHN R. DOBRIN

PH/DCA - HOLD FOR DOBRIN

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: FR, P/HT, PGOV
SUBJECT: USG RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH LEFT -
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY: ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IMPROVED FRANCO/
AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE IN LARGE MEASURE A FUNCTION
OF LONG-TERM INTERNAL STABILITY IN FRANCE, THIS
MESSAGE ARGUES THAT

-- PRESIDENT CARTER SHOULD RECEIVE FRANCOIS
MITTERRAND AT AN EARLY DATE;

-- EMBASSY PARIS SHOULD SERVE AS THE PRIMARY
VEHICLE FOR AN EXPANDED DIALOGUE WITH THE
SOCIALISTS INVOLVING DISCUSSIONS ON MAJOR US
FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES;

-- USG INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED, IN THE INCREAS-
INGLY PROBABLE EVENT OF A UNITED LEFT VICTORY
IN THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1978, BY
RESULTS WHICH GIVE THE SOCIALISTS (PS) A WIDE
MARGIN OF SUPERIORITY OVER THE COMMUNISTS
(PCF);

-- THE USG SHOULD AID THE PS QUEST FOR SUCH
SUPERIORITY OVER THE PCF THROUGH A CONSCIOUS
POLICY OF BOOSTING THE SOCIALISTS' IMAGE OF
STATESMANLIKE RESPONSIBILITY;

-- THE COSTS OF SUCH AN OPERATION - EVEN IN THE
EVENT OF A VICTORY OF THE CURRENT GOF MAJORITY
- CAN BE MINIMIZED.
END SUMMARY.

PART I: THIS CABLE IS A DISSENT FROM . . .

1. OUR PENCHANT FOR "TILTING" TOWARDS GISCARD: USG
THINKING ON FRANCE HAS TENDED TO STRESS THE ADVANTAGES
INHERENT IN THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE CURRENT
GOF MAJORITY. PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, THIS HAS MEANT
THAT WE HAVE TITLED TOWARDS PRESIDENT GISCARD
D'ESTAING IN AS MANY WAYS AS WE COULD AND HAVE TENDED
TO SHUB, OR AT LEAST DOWNPLAY THE IMPORTANCE OF, THE
LEFT OPPOSITION. THERE ARE OBVIOUS REASONS FOR SO
DOING:

-- UNLIKE MANY OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN
EUROPE, THE PS IS TIED TO A PCF WHOSE CHARACTER
AND ORIGINS ARE BOTH STALINIST AND ANTI-

AMERICAN;

RELEASE IN FULL

-- THE CURRENT GOF REPRESENTS, WE CURRENTLY
BELIEVE, KNOWN QUANTITIES IN THE FOREIGN
POLICY FIELDS WHICH MOST INTEREST US;

-- THE BELIEF THAT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS AROUND
GISCARD, INCLUDING THE GAULLISTS, ARE WILLING
TO BEND TO THE PRESIDENT'S WILL OR MOST MAJOR
FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS.

2. THE BELIEF THAT GISCARD, THE GOF AND THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY MAJORITY ARE SYNONYMOUS: FOR SOME TIME NOW
THIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN REPORTING ON THE VICISSITUDES
OF GISCARD, HIS GOVERNMENT AND HIS PARLIAMENTARY
MAJORITY. IN SPITE OF THAT REPORTING, CONVERSATIONS

7/29

SECRET

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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DISSENT CHANNEL

DISSENT MESSAGE FROM FSO JOHN R. DOBRIN

PM/DCA - HOLD FOR DOBRIN

WITH WASHINGTON POLICY-MAKERS SUGGEST THAT THE USG STILL VIEWS THE ASSEMBLY, GISCARD AND THE GOF AS BEING OF A SINGLE PIECE. THAT PROPOSITION IS DOUBIOUS AT BEST AND SEEMS TO BE A WEAK REED ON WHICH TO BASE USG POLICY-MAKING. VIEWED ON ONE LEVEL, GISCARD - CONSIDERED AS THE LEADER OF A GOVERNMENT AND A GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM - EXISTS ONLY AT THE GRACE OF JACQUES CHIRAC AND THE GAULLISTS; VIEWED ON ANOTHER, GISCARD'S GOF IS A GROUP OF RELATIVELY FACELESS TECHNOCRATS WITH FEW REAL POLITICAL ROOTS. VIEWED BY MORE THAN HALF OF THE FRENCH PUBLIC, GISCARD APPEARS TO BE AN INDECISIVE MAN WITHOUT THE MANDATE REQUIRED FOR PUTTING THROUGH A HARD-HITTING REFORM PROGRAM. FOR THE GOF, WHICH IS SHOT THROUGH WITH PS BUREAUCRATS AND GAULLIST OFFICE DIRECTORS, THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE INCENTIVE TO MAKE VIGOROUS APPLICATION OF THE PROGRAMS WHICH GISCARD HAS ALREADY PASSED AND EVEN LESS PRESSURE TO MAKE NEW PROPOSALS FOR MORE REFORM.

PART II: ASSUMPTIONS

3. GISCARD CAN'T MAKE IT ALONE: IF THE PROSPECTS FOR POST-1978 CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT GOF MAJORITY WERE GOOD, THIS CABLE MIGHT NOT REQUIRE WRITING. INSTEAD, THOSE PROSPECTS ARE QUITE AMBIGUOUS AND THE USG MAY SHORTLY BE CONFRONTED WITH THE FOLLOWING SITUATION (BASED ON CURRENT POLLING):

-- IN THE INCREASINGLY LESS LIKELY POSSIBILITY THAT THE CURRENT GOF MAJORITY WINS THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1978, ITS VICTORY IS ALMOST SURE TO BE A SQUEAKER WITH NEITHER GISCARD'S INDEPENDENT REPUBLICANS NOR THE CENTER SHOWING ANY MAJOR IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SEAT COUNTS;

-- THE MAJOR FACTOR IN SUCH A SQUEAKER ELECTION IS LIKELY TO BE THE GAULLIST RPR, THE EXTENT OF WHOSE LOSSES - AND LOSSES THERE ARE SURE TO BE - WILL DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE CURRENT MAJORITY WINS;

-- UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS, GISCARD WILL INCREASINGLY BECOME THE CAPTIVE OF THE RPR AND WILL BE STYMIED IN HIS EFFORT TO PUSH THROUGH THE MAJOR REFORMS WHICH HE CLAIMS TO SEEK;

-- PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, GISCARD'S FOREIGN POLICY WOULD LIKELY BECOME MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE INFLUENCE OF THE

ANTI-ATLANTICIST WING OF THE GAULLISTS. WHERE TODAY GISCARD CAN AFFORD TO IGNORE THE HARD-CORE GAULLISTS IN FAVOR OF CERTAIN QUIET MOVES IN THE DIRECTION OF IMPROVED FRANCO-US RELATIONS, AFTER A NARROW LEGISLATIVE ELECTION VICTORY HE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO MAKE TRADE-OFFS WHICH ARE UNLIKELY TO BE IN OUR INTEREST: IT WOULD THEREFORE BE AN ERROR TO CONTINUE OUR BELIEF THAT GISCARD - ON ANY TERMS OTHER THAN AN RI VICTORY (READ: A VICTORY GIVING HIM A CLEAR MANDATE TO LEAD) - IS THE BEST BET WE CAN HAVE IN FRANCE.

4. GISCARD PROBABLY CAN'T MAKE IT AT ALL: BUT THE POLLS SUGGEST THAT AN EVEN STERNER FATE AWAITS THE CURRENT GOF. WITH MOST MAJOR POLLS AGREEING THAT IF ELECTIONS WERE HELD TODAY THE UNITED LEFT WOULD GET SOME 53 PERCENT OF THE POPULAR VOTE, THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION IN FRANCE BECOMES WHETHER OR NOT THAT 53 PERCENT TRANSLATES TO ABSOLUTE CONTROL (246 SEATS OUT OF 490) OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IF IT DOES, THE CURRENT GOF MAJORITY MOVES INTO THE OPPOSITION AND THE UNITED LEFT HAS THE UNENVIABLE TASK OF FORMING A GOVERNMENT WHOSE STRENGTH, ACCORDING TO MOST OBSERVERS, COULD VARY FROM 250 SEATS TO AS MANY AS 280. THE SEAT COUNT PRODUCED BY THAT 53 PERCENT OF THE POPULAR VOTE IS IN DISPUTE - THE FACT THAT 53 PERCENT OF THE FRENCH TODAY WOULD VOTE LEFT IF THE ELECTION WERE TODAY IS HOT, THINGS CAN CHANGE BETWEEN THIS SUMMER AND THE ELECTIONS; NEW ELECTORAL MODALITIES CAN BE INTRODUCED WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE SEAT COUNT - NONE OF THIS ALTERS THE FACT THAT TODAY'S GOF MAJORITY HAS LESS THAN AN EVEN CHANCE OF STAYING IN

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 PARIS 21979 03 OF 06 291214Z
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PARIS 21979 03 OF 06 291214Z

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SECRET SECTION 3 OF 6 PARIS 21979

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LIMDIS

DISSENT CHANNEL

DISSENT MESSAGE FROM FSO JOHN R. DOBRIN

PH/DCA - HOLD FOR DOBRIN

POWER AFTER THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1978.

5. EVEN IF GISCARD COULD STAY IN POWER, THAT PROBABLY WOULDN'T SERVE OUR INTERESTS: ON THE ASSUMPTION OF A SQUEAKER VICTORY BY THE CURRENT GOF, WITH ALL THE PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL STABILITY THAT IMPLIES, THERE IS A STILL GREATER QUESTION WHICH USG POLICY MAKERS MUST CONSIDER NOW, WHILE THERE IS STILL THE LUXURY OF TIME IN WHICH TO THINK. IF THE CURRENT GOF MAJORITY, MUCH REDUCED, MANAGES TO WIN CONTROL OVER THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN THE FACE OF A POPULAR VOTE WHICH DENIES IT THAT CONTROL, ANOTHER MAY 1968 IS NOT A POSSIBILITY TO BE EXCLUDED. EVEN BETTER ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR LONG-TERM INTERNAL INSTABILITY WITH THE LEFT, THE UNIONS AND THE INTELLECTUALS JOINING IN TO DENOUNCE A GOF WHICH "CHEATED THE PEOPLE OF THEIR VICTORY". GISCARD'S ROOM FOR MANEUVER WOULD THUS BE REDUCED STILL FURTHER; MORE IMPORTANT, THE EFFECTS OF FRANCE'S INTERNAL POLITICAL CRISES WOULD TEND TO BECOME DESTABILIZING IN EUROPE. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, FRANCE WOULD BECOME A KIND OF GLOOMY LATIN 1980'S HAMLET DOOMED TO PLAY THE 19TH CENTURY TURKISH ROLE AS THE SICK MAN OF EUROPE. AND THAT CAN IN NO WAY SERVE US INTERESTS.

6. AND IF THE LEFT WINS -- WHICH LEFT? THE POLLS' SUGGESTION THAT THE UNITED LEFT COULD WIN THE LEGISLATIVES IF THEY WERE HELD TODAY REMINDS US THAT THE UNEASY COALITION OF SOCIALISTS, COMMUNISTS AND LEFT RADICALS (MRG) WHICH MIGHT COME TO POWER IS JUST AS FRAGILE AS THE MAJORITY MIGHT WELL BE. WITH CURRENT POLLING GIVING THE PS AND MRG SOME 33 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, THE 20 PERCENT HELD BY THE PCF GIVES THE COMMUNISTS A MAJOR ARM WITH WHICH TO FIGHT FOR INFLUENCE IN A UNITED LEFT GOF. IT ALSO SUGGESTS THAT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO HAVE THE PS DOMINATE SUCH A UNITED LEFT COALITION GOVERNMENT AS A COUNTER-WEIGHT TO PCF ADVENTURISM. WE KNOW A GREAT DEAL MORE ABOUT THE PS THAN WE DO ABOUT THE PCF, AND WHAT WE KNOW, WHILE IN NO WAY PERFECTLY REASSURING, SUGGESTS THAT THE SOCIALISTS HAVE A FAR CLEARER SENSE OF THE POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WHICH A LEFT VICTORY MIGHT HAVE THAN DO THE COMMUNISTS. THIS IS, OF COURSE, NOT A GUARANTEE OF GOOD BEHAVIOR ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE, BUT IT SUGGESTS A CERTAIN WILLINGNESS TO SEEK PRAGMATIC RESULTS BASED ON NATIONAL INTEREST RATHER THAN ON IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS. IN SHORT, THE PS IS A BETTER BET FOR USG FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS THAN THE PCF AND IS LIKELY TO REMAIN SO FOR THE FORESEEABLE

FUTURE. FINALLY, THE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL STABILITY, IF THE PCF KEEPS TO WHAT IT HAS BEEN PUSHING SINCE 1972, IS LIKELY TO BE ENHANCED BY A LEFT VICTORY, AT LEAST IN THE LONG RUN.

7. AND IF THE LEFT WINS -- STABILITY? ENDLESS SCENARIOS ARE CURRENTLY CIRCULATING IN FRANCE AS TO WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN AFTER A LEFT VICTORY. A VERY ROUGH TYPOGRAPHY MIGHT INCLUDE:

-- THE UNITED LEFT WINS WITH NEARLY 270 SEATS; MITTERRAND AND THE COMMUNISTS ARE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD QUICKLY ENOUGH WITH OVERDUE REFORMS TO WIN POPULAR CONFIDENCE AND INVESTMENT SUPPORT;

-- THE UNITED LEFT WINS WITH A BARE MAJORITY; A DISAPPOINTED PCF BECOMES TROUBLESOME IN THE GOVERNMENT, ON THE STREETS AND IN PLANTS AND FINALLY LEAVES THE GOVERNMENT; IN THE FACE OF THIS 1936-STYLE SCENARIO, MITTERRAND RECEIVES SUPPORT FROM THE CENTER AND, COVERTLY, FROM GISCARD AND IS ABLE TO STAY IN THE MATIONN AT THE HEAD OF A MINORITY GOVERNMENT; THIS POSSIBILITY TENDS TO APPEAL TO BACKERS OF "THIRD FORCE" POLITICS;

-- GISCARD DISSOLVES THE ASSEMBLY AFTER A VERY NARROW LEFT VICTORY; THE UNITED LEFT WINS THE NEW ELECTIONS, GISCARD RESIGNS AND MITTERRAND AND CHIRAC FIGHT A BATTLE FOR THE PRESIDENCY FROM WHICH THE YOUNGER CHIRAC EMERGES VICTORIOUS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 PARIS 21979 #4 OF 06 291232Z

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PARIS 21979 #4 OF 06 291232Z

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 6 PARIS 21979

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LIMDIS

DISSENT CHANNEL

DISSENT MESSAGE FROM FSO JOHN R. DOBRIN

PM/DCA - HOLD FOR DOBRIN

DO THESE SCENARIOS IMPLY GREATER STABILITY. ONLY THE FIRST AND SECOND ARE BEING TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY THESE DAYS. IN FACT, SOME JOURNALISTS ARE SAID TO HAVE CREATED A POOL BASED ON THE DAY OF GISCARD'S SUPPOSED ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WILL NOT DISSOLVE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REGARDLESS OF THE RESULTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. APOCRYPHAL THOUGH IT MAY BE, THE STORY SUGGESTS THAT GISCARD'S "OTHER OPPOSITION", AT LEAST, IS TAKING SERIOUSLY THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM TO BE ABOVE POLITICS (OR AT LEAST HIS DESIRE TO SO APPEAR). AND IT FURTHER SUGGESTS THAT GISCARD MIGHT WELL OPT FOR A ROLE AS FRANCE'S UNITING SAVIOUR. BUT EVEN WITHOUT GISCARD'S CONNIVANCE, THERE ARE SOME FACTORS WITHIN THE LEFT WHICH SUGGEST THAT IT CAN BE A FORCE FOR STABILITY. A UNITED LEFT VICTORY COULD REPRESENT

-- AN OUTLET FOR WHAT OBSERVERS ARE CALLING A "MONUMENTAL FRENCH NATIONAL EPIDEMIC OF 'FED-UPISM'";

-- A GUARANTEE TO THE BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS THAT WHILE SHORT-TERM SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS MIGHT STILL BE LACKING, THEY WILL HAVE FINALLY REACHED THE TOP OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PRIORITY ORDER;

-- A POSSIBLE GUARANTEE OF GOOD CONDUCT BY SOME OF THE IMPORTANT UNIONS;

-- SOLUTIONS TO THE BASIC (INEQUITIES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AND CREDITS WHICH HAVE BLOCKED THE COUNTRY FOR YEARS INTO AN OVER-CENTRALIZED, HIGHLY BUREAUCRATIZED MOLD;

-- ABOVE ALL, SOME KIND OF RENEWAL OF FAITH IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

8. WHO VOTES FOR THE LEFT THESE DAYS: MOST POLITICAL SPECIALISTS IN FRANCE BELIEVE THAT THE 1978 ELECTION WILL BE WON OR LOST ON THE BASIS OF ABOUT 4 PERCENT OF THE VOTE. THIS SWING VOTE, COMING FROM WHAT ONE POLLSTER CALLS "THE DISAPPOINTED CENTER" (AS NEARLY AS MOST DIFFERENTIAL POLLING CAN DETERMINE) COULD BE SCARED OFF BY THE APPEARANCE OF A UNITED LEFT IN WHICH THE PCF PLAYS TOO IMPORTANT A PART OR ATTRACTED BY A RESPECTABLE PS-DOMINATED LEFT. BUT IT IS ALSO A VOTE, OR SO THE POLLS SUGGEST, WHICH LISTENS TO THE SIREN CALL OF THE PCF'S PROGRAMS AND WHICH IS CAPABLE OF ASTONISHING SWITCHES IN ALLEGIANCE. THIS "FED-UP" VOTE, GIVEN THE BELIEF EXPRESSED ABOVE THAT

A NARROW ELECTORAL VICTORY BY THE CURRENT GOF WOULD LIKELY LEAD TO INTERNAL INSTABILITY SHOULD MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE PS RATHER THAN TOWARDS THE PCF. THERE IS LITTLE EXAGGERATION IN ARGUING THAT A LEFT VICTORY IN WHICH THE PS BECOMES EVEN A MORE DOMINANT FORCE THAN IT IS TODAY COULD LEAD TO A GOF SECURITY POLICY NOT UNLIKE THE ONE WE KNOW TODAY (SEE PARIS A-165 OF MAY 6, 1977); THERE IS STILL LESS IN ARGUING THAT WE CAN HELP THE PS, ONCE RID OF THE GISCARD SHIBBOLETH, ACHIEVE SUCH PRE-EMINENCE. AND THE VOTERS WHO MIGHT MAKE THAT SWITCH ARE NOT CLASSIC LEFT VOTERS -- BY ALL ACCOUNTS, THEY ARE THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS, THE NEW TOWN-DWELLERS AND THE BETTER-EDUCATED. IN SHORT, THEY ARE NOT THE CLASSICALLY ALIENATED, THEY ARE NOT THE BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS AND THEY ARE NOT THE INTELLECTUALS -- ALL OF WHOM HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED AS ANTI-AMERICAN, ALL OF WHOM PROBABLY ARE ANTI-AMERICAN AND ON WHOM THESE NEW VOTERS COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT MODERATING INFLUENCE. A CENTRAL ARGUMENT OF THIS CABLE, THEREFORE, IS THAT THESE VOTERS CAN MAKE CERTAIN FRANCO/AMERICAN RELATIONSHIPS WORK BETTER BY CONTRIBUTING TO PS DOMINATION OF A UNITED LEFT GOVERNMENT THAN THEY CAN BE ADDING TO A WEAK MAJORITY BUILT ON THE CURRENT GOF.

PART III: RECOMMENDATIONS

9. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD RECEIVE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND: IF WE ACCEPT THE NOTION THAT THIS ELECTION WILL BE WON OR LOST ON THE STRENGTH OF 4 PERCENT OF THE FRENCH VOTERS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO US THAT OUR CONTACTS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT REPRESENT THAT FACT. WE MAY NOT

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PAGE 01 PARIS 21979 05 OF 05 291248Z
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SECRET SECTION 5 OF 6 PARIS 21979

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DISSENT CHANNEL

DISSENT MESSAGE FROM FSO JOHN R. DOBRIN

PH/DCA - HOLD FOR DOBRIN

WANT TO SAY IT, WE MAY NOT EVEN WANT TO THINK IT, BUT OUR SUPPORT TO MITTERRAND MAY MAKE A CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE IN THE AMOUNT OF THE CENTER VOTE WHICH GOES TO HIM AND HIS CANDIDATES AS OPPOSED TO THE PCF. OUR RECEPTION OF MITTERRAND WOULD BE A SIGNAL OF ONLY ONE THING - OUR RECOGNITION OF HIS STATURE AS THE PRE-EMINENT LEADER OF THE FRENCH OPPOSITION. WHICH HAS, IN FACT, NEVER BEEN IN QUESTION. BUT IT IS ALSO A GRACEFUL GESTURE TO A PROUD MAN WHOSE LAST GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE WAS 20 YEARS AGO, WHOSE INTERNAL LOGIC DOES NOT NECESSARILY LEAD HIM TO DEAL WITH THOSE WITH WHOM HE SHOULD DEAL AND WHOSE CONCEPT OF THE UNITED STATES COULD BE AS GREATLY INFLUENCED AS WAS THAT OF PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN BY SUCH A MEETING. IN THIS CONNECTION, ONE MIGHT NOTE THE EXTENT TO WHICH FRANCO/US RELATIONS IN DE GAULLE'S TIME WERE POISONED BY THE GENERAL'S BELIEF THAT HE HAD ALWAYS BEEN SHABBILY TREATED BY THE AMERICANS. IT WOULD BE WELL NOT TO REPEAT THE SAME ERROR IN PREPARING TO DEAL WITH MITTERRAND.

10. THE USG SHOULD EXPAND ITS DIALOGUE WITH THE PS ON FOREIGN POLICY: THE PS "FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT" IS RELATIVELY NEW TO THE GAME, RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED IN THE DAY-TO-DAY CONDUCT OF DIPLOMACY AND QUITE OPEN TO PRIVATE DIALOGUE. WHILE SENIOR PS LEADERS CANNOT - FOR OBVIOUS POLITICAL REASONS - ADMIT IT PUBLICLY, THEY VERY MUCH WELCOME AND IN FACT SEEK OUT US VIEWS ON VARIOUS FOREIGN POLICY TOPICS. THE WILLINGNESS TO SEEK DIALOGUE (AS LONG AS SUCH DIALOGUE IS NOT PRESENTED AS A DEMAND FOR BLIND ADHERENCE TO US POSITIONS - READ: AS LONG AS THE PS IS RELATIVELY MORE FREE THAN WHAT THEIR PERCEPTION SUGGESTS IS THE POSITION OF THE SPD) IS COUPLED WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF THEORETICAL ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THAT DIALOGUE. STILL MORE IMPORTANT, TODAY'S PS IS REFRESHINGLY ABLE TO DISCARD PRE-CONCEIVED IDEAS IN FAVOR OF PRAGMATIC GOALS. IN SHORT, THE USG HAS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY IN TALKING WITH TODAY'S PS TO CONDUCT A KIND OF SUPER-SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY. WE SHOULD NOT NEGLECT THAT POSSIBILITY. ROUTINE, WORKING-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH THE PS SHOULD BE UPGRADED TO INCLUDE

-- MORE FREQUENT AMBASSADORIAL LUNCHES WITH MITTERRAND AND HIS TOP ASSOCIATES. THESE LUNCHES COULD HAVE FIXED AGENDAS AND MIGHT WELL FOCUS ON SUCH ISSUES AS US/EC RELATIONS, SALT, MBFR, CIEC, NATO, ETC. EVEN IF THE EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ARE ON A TOTALLY ANODINE LEVEL (READ: UNCLASSIFIED), THEY WILL HAVE

ACCOMPLISHED THE HIGHLY USEFUL TASK OF GIVING THE PS A CLOSER LOOK AT OUR VIEW OF REALITY. THEY WILL ALSO HAVE GIVEN PS LEADERS SOMETHING MORE OF A CHANCE THAN THEY ARE LIKELY TO HAVE LATER TO THINK ABOUT OUR POSITIONS;

-- MORE FREQUENT MEETINGS BETWEEN MINECON AND HIS PS COUNTERPARTS;

-- MORE FREQUENT CALLS ON SENIOR PS LEADERS BY VISITING SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS;

-- REGULAR "EARLY WARNING" ON SELECTED USG FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES; THESE COULD BE DONE BY THE EMBASSY IN A LOW-KEY WAY UNLIKELY TO ATTRACT PUBLICITY AND COULD BE QUICKLY CUT OFF.

11. CUTTING COSTS: NONE OF THE PROPOSITIONS MADE ABOVE HAS TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN A CATASTROPHIC MANNER AND THE ONLY ONE WHICH IS LIKELY TO RING LOUD BELLS AT THE ELYSEE AND MATIGNON IS THE POSSIBILITY OF A MITTERRAND CALL ON PRESIDENT CARTER. NOTING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY SEEN MARGARET THATCHER AND OTHER OPPOSITION LEADERS, WE MIGHT WELL WISH TO EXPLAIN THAT WE REGARD SUCH A CALL AS NOTHING MORE THAN A COURTESY PAID TO THE OPPOSITION LEADER - AND COULD ALSO NOTE THAT PRIME MINISTER BARRE'S TRIP MIGHT WELL BE MADE AFTER A MITTERRAND VISIT. SIMILARLY, SHOULD THE PRESIDENT DECIDE TO MAKE A TRIP TO FRANCE THIS YEAR, MUCH OF THE IMPACT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE DIRECTED AT PROJECTING A STATESMANLIKE IMAGE OF GISCARD.

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SECRET SECTION 6 OF 6 PARIS 21979

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DISSENT CHANNEL

DISSENT MESSAGE FROM FSO JOHN R. DOBRIN

PR/DCA - HOLD FOR DOBRIN

CONCLUSIONS

12. WHY BOTHER? TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE HAS IT THAT THE USG CAN ONLY DEAL WITH A GOVERNMENT IN POWER - THIS DOCTRINE HAS OFTEN BEEN BOTH BENT AND BROKEN IN THE HISTORY OF US FOREIGN POLICY. ITS APPLICATION IN TODAY'S FRANCE RAISES SEVERAL PROBLEMS:

-- THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC IS AT THE HEAD OF A GOVERNMENT NOT TOTALLY RESPONSIVE TO HIS WILL, AT THE HEAD OF A CABINET WITH LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT ON ANY MEANINGFUL POLITICAL LEVEL AND AT THE HEAD OF A COALITION NEITHER OF HIS OWN MAKING OR CHOICE - ONLY ONE OF THESE THREE INSTRUMENTS OF POWER CAN BE CONSIDERED AS RESPONSIVE TO THE TOTALITY OF HIS REFORM PROGRAM;

-- THE LEADER OF THE "OTHER OPPOSITION", JACQUES CHIRAC, HAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT HE HAS THE CAPACITY TO PARALYZE THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAMS AT ANY MOMENT OF HIS OWN CHOOSING - SO FAR, THE KNOWLEDGE THAT FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION IS VARY OF SPOILERS HAS KEPT HIM FROM DOING SO, BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE "MAJORITY OF THE MAJORITY" IS EYEING THE PRESIDENT WITH SOMETHING LESS THAN AFFECTION AND SOMETHING FAR NASTIER THAN ENVY AS THE ELECTIONS APPROACH;

-- THE LEADER OF THE LEFT OPPOSITION IS TRYING TO IMPOSE SOME SENSE OF REALISM ON A PARTY WHICH HAS LONG SHOWN ITSELF TO BE MORE CONCERNED BY MARXIST RHETORIC THAN BY PRAGMATIC POLITICS - MORE DIALOGUE WITH US COULD HELP IN THAT PROCESS;

-- THE LEFT OPPOSITION, SHOULD IT COME TO POWER, WILL DO SO WITH A SUBSTANTIAL COMMUNIST COMPONENT - ANYTHING WHICH IMPROVES MITTERRAND'S IMAGE WITH THE FRENCH PUBLIC WORKS, AT LEAST IN THIS CASE, TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE COMMUNISTS.

18. THE BOTTOM LINE: FRANCE MAY BE RUNNING OUT OF TIME, AS SOME OF THE GLOOMIER PROPHETS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE POLITICAL BARRIER ARE PREDICTING. GISCARD NO LONGER INSPIRES CONFIDENCE, CHIRAC SCARES EVEN SOME OF HIS OWN SUPPORTERS AND MITTERRAND, SOMEWHAT TARNISHED BY HIS DEBATE WITH BARRE, NO LONGER LOOKS LIKE

A GOOD BET TO SOME WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE SUPPORTED HIM. BUT IN THE MIDST OF IT ALL, THERE IS A TIDE OF RISING EXPECTATIONS WHICH GIVES EVEN CONSERVATIVES IN FRANCE A SENSE THAT 1978 IS GOING TO BE DECISIVE. THIS CABLE, FINALLY, IS A PLEA FOR GETTING THE SUM TOTAL OF OUR EGGS OUT OF THE GISCARDIAN BASKET BEFORE WE BECOME LINKED IN THE FRENCH PUBLIC MIND WITH WHAT COULD BE THE LOSING SIDE. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, IT IS A SUGGESTION THAT BEGINNING TO ACT ON THE RESULTS OF THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE COULD HAVE HIGH PAY-OFFS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.
HARTMAN

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PAGE 01 STATE 314136
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DRAFTED BY S/P: R. BARTHOLOMEW:WES
APPROVED BY ARA: MR. SHLAUDEMAN
M: LSEAGLEBURGER
S/S-O: S. GOLDSMITH
S/PRS: MR. BROWN

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DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [] FROM R. BARTHOLOMEW, S/P

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: CASC, PFOR, MX

SUBJECT: PRESS STATEMENT ON MOTOR TRAVEL IN SINALOA
REF: MEXICO 16290

1. YOUR NIACT IMMEDIATE DISSENT MESSAGE SLOGGED FOR DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN HAS BEEN REFERRED TO S/P, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES. DEPARTMENT IS CONSIDERING IT ON HIGH PRIORITY BASIS.
ROBINSON

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S/P:RBARTHOLOMEW, ACTING

Not OK with S/IG

PER:LRUSSELL
ARA:WLUERS
S/IG:RYOST

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE BRIDGETOWN

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: APER

SUBJECT: YOUR DISSENT MESSAGES

REF: BTN 1720, BTN 1750

FOR [REDACTED] FROM REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW,
ACTING DIRECTOR S/P

RB
NB
LR
WL
RY

B6

1. WE BELIEVE THE TWO REFERENCED MESSAGES AND THE MATTERS THEY RAISE DO NOT FALL WITHIN INTENDED PURVIEW OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. THE QUESTIONS OF YOUR ATTENDANCE AT THE SAN JOSE MEETING AND OF YOUR TRANSFER FROM POST ARE ESSENTIALLY ISSUES RELATING PERSONALLY TO YOU AND NOT THE MATTERS OF POLICY FOR WHICH THE DISSENT CHANNEL IS INTENDED. YOUR ORIGINAL DISSENT WAS PROPERLY TAKEN UP THROUGH THE CASP MECHANISM AND DID NOT INVOLVE THE OFFICIAL DISSENT CHANNEL. IT IS S/P'S PRIMARY CONCERN IN THIS AREA TO GUARD AGAINST SANCTIONS FOR USE OF THIS OFFICIAL CHANNEL, AND IT IS CLEAR, AT LEAST THAT THE REQUEST FOR YOUR TRANSFER IS NOT BASED UPON A SUBMISSION IN THAT CHANNEL.

2. WITH THIS SAID, S/P IS CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR CASE AND THE REQUEST FOR YOUR TRANSFER. IT IS THE CLEAR POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT TO ENCOURAGE PRESENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE POINTS OF VIEW ON POLICY ISSUES AND TO AVOID AT ALL COSTS ANY

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OUTCOMING TELEGRAM

Cont. 10/28/17

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SANCTIONS ON INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY HOLD DIFFERING VIEWS.

3. S/IG, ARA, AND PER, ~~WHICH~~ ^{S/IG IS} HAVE BEEN PROVIDED WITH COPIES OF THE REFERENCED CABLES. ~~ARE~~ PLANNING A SPECIAL INSPECTION OF BARBADOS TO DETERMINE MORE DETAILS OF SITUATION. WE BELIEVE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER RETALIATION FOR EXPRESSION OF DISSENT PLAYED A ROLE IN THE REQUEST FOR YOUR TRANSFER SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY EXPLORED BY INSPECTION AND HAVE SO ADVISED S/IG. WHILE WE BELIEVE THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE DESERVE FURTHER EXPLORATION, IN OUR VIEW THE INSPECTION IS THE APPROPRIATE IMMEDIATE MECHANISM. IF YOU ARE SO INCLINED FOLLOWING RESULTS OF THE INSPECTION, WE ADVISE THAT YOU PURSUE THE GRIEVANCE SYSTEM, WHICH IS ALSO AN APPROPRIATE TECHNIQUE. YY



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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April 9, 1976

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Redacted]

Information Officer, USIS
American Embassy
Rome, Italy

B6

Dear [Redacted]:

B6

Your message of February 3 in the dissent channel has been referred to me for response. We have read it with care and discussed it with specialists on Italian affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs and elsewhere in the Department. The comments that follow address your points in the order you present them.

1) Opinions will differ about how successful U.S. policy toward Italy has been at various times since 1945. Few would disagree with your statement that U.S. policy over the years has been anti-Communist in Italian affairs and that we have worked closely with the Christian Democratic Party--the plurality party, after all, and the leader of every government. But our objectives went beyond securing bases in Italy or (as in our support for the opening to the left in the 1960's) strengthening the anti-Communist majority as ends in themselves. On the contrary, it is not mere rhetoric to say that we have favored and worked for a democratic, Western-oriented and prosperous Italy. We have, therefore, supported parties and government alignments which seemed likely to implement policies to those ends. We hoped that the center-left formula would lead to reforms in Italian government and society which we, as well as that formula's Italian supporters, could see even in the 1950's were acutely necessary. The period of the center-left was marked, in fact, by notable economic growth and a marked improvement of the average Italian's standard of living. We regret as much as anyone that necessary reforms did not keep pace with this growth. I do not believe, however, that the U.S. Government need take responsibility for the center-left's failures. We could not then, nor can we now, dictate the policies of Italian governments, even those that were most pro-U.S. and pro-NATO in their foreign policy orientations.

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2) There can be no question but that the disclosures and allegations about covert U.S. actions in Italy, official and private, have had an adverse effect on the U.S. image and U.S. influence. How many Italians are surprised, how many are shocked, how many are now likely to translate their feelings into support for parties that are hostile to the U.S. and NATO--that is very difficult to tell. I am not convinced, however, that such actions taken together, and even less our much more important overt policies toward Italy, have had no results but the negative ones you list in section "B" of your message. Italy has remained a democratic country for 30 years and has enjoyed peace, relative stability, and marked economic growth. Things might have been better, but, in light of the country's past, they might also have been much worse. However difficult the present situation, that surely does not simply blot out the country's achievements in past years. Some Italians may choose now to blame the U.S. for their problems, but that does not mean that they are right.

3) Looking to the future, let me take your suggestions in order. It is not possible, and I believe it would not have a positive effect, to comment publicly on past covert activity or issue self-denials about future activity. Even if our statements would convince the doubting, which is itself doubtful, to do this in Italy would lead to pressures to do the same elsewhere. That would not be possible. The marginal gain in Italy, if any, would be more than outweighed by the renunciation of policy levers which, whatever past abuses or miscalculations there may have been, still retain some utility in some kinds of situations--a view which Congress clearly shares.

4) There is every reason to affirm publicly--and I believe that spokesmen for the U.S. Government have done so and should continue to do so--that we hope that Italy will remain a democratic, prosperous, Western-oriented country with a government which will address the pressing problems of the country more effectively than has been done in the recent past. Certainly we look to and encourage the democratic parties to do this. Certainly the U.S. is ready, as you suggest, to provide appropriate encouragement and overt help (particularly economic) to this end. I am more skeptical than you, however, that there is a great deal to be gained by conspicuously stepping up exchanges with the Italians in science, technology and so

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forth. The fundamental problems we--and they--are addressing concern the effectiveness of the administration and, above all, the will of the political class to make changes which are required by the country's rapid economic growth. I do think, however, that we should reexamine and, if possible, strengthen our contacts with the Italian academic community.

5) We have, as I understand, improved our contacts with the Italian Socialist Party (as shown by the invitation to de Martino to visit this country) and made clear that we look to it as an indispensable element in the government coalition. We should continue on this path, to the limit dictated by the PSI's own concern to avoid, at this point, an excessive U.S. embrace. At the same time, we are convinced here that the PSI is most likely to be drawn to the democratic option, out of its own self-interest, if there is a renewed and hence stronger DC for it to deal with. The U.S. policy of encouraging renewal of the DC is thus conceived as helping to strengthen the democratic parties as a group, including particularly the PSI.

6) As you might guess, in-house research on the PCI and contacts with academic experts are increasing steadily. I do not think that any amount of research will tell us just how the PCI would behave if it ever comes to share power--or if it does not. But there is no question, nor has there been for a long time, of thinking about the PCI as if nothing had changed since the 1950's, in Italian circumstances and within the party itself.

7) The problem of our stance toward the PCI is, of course, at the heart of our problem with Italy today. We must distinguish among these elements of the problem:

a) Even if the Department wished to ask Congress to amend the immigration act so as to drop the provisions excluding Communists from the U.S.--and I believe that, in the current state of East-West relations, it would not be useful to do so--there is little prospect that Congress would agree. Some thought is being given in the Department to the long-term question. But any action that might be taken on this issue would have to be taken at a high political level and with regard to Congressional as well as international considerations.

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-4-

b) The vexed question of recommending waivers for particular Italian Communists has, of course, opened the Department to criticism from much of the U.S. academic community on the grounds of rigidity, blindness to change and so forth. In fact, our policy not to grant such waivers has a more precise basis, namely, that the U.S. should do nothing in the pre-electoral period to make the situation of the democratic parties more difficult than it already is. We may not be able to do much to help the Christian Democrats, Socialists and others, but we might weaken them further by an action which would suggest (and you know how quick the Italians are to read subtle signals into small actions) that we are ready to accommodate the PCI in power. In fact, we do not think PCI entrance into the cabinet or the majority is inevitable, any more than we think it is desirable from the point of view of Italy's well-being or our own--for reasons set out by the Secretary on March 11.

c) As long as we think this, we will do nothing now or in the future to make PCI entry more nearly inevitable, whether with respect to visas or contacts in Rome. The cost of this policy is to expose us, if the PCI does come to power, to the charge of having been shortsighted. But there are compensating or overriding benefits. One is to make it at least marginally less likely that the PCI will come to power. Another is to give the PCI further incentive--out of power--to evolve toward democratic acceptability.

In conclusion, let me repeat that we are not ignoring the specifics of the Italian situation. We are well aware of the weaknesses and fragility of the status quo. European and global considerations do, certainly, enter into our thinking about Italy, and they support our continued preference for a government based on democratic, progressive, pro-Western parties. I believe we have little choice but to do what we can--little enough perhaps--to that end.

Although it is true that we are betting on, and hoping for, developments in Italian politics which will not include PCI participation in the government, we realize of course that elections may bring the Communists into the

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-5-

majority or the cabinet. We are thinking ahead carefully to the conditions and choices we would then face. We do not believe there is anything in our present policy that will put us in a position from which we will be unable to adapt appropriately to the new situation.

Sincerely yours,

Winston Lord

Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

P.S. Thank you for your thoughtful message. I regret it took so long to get back to you but we wanted to give you a thoughtful response. Your views have been helpful as we continue to wrestle with these issues back here.

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ACTION AID-31

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AIDAC

EO 11652: NA
TAGS: ELAB, BL
SUBJECT- AIFLD - PROPOSAL FOR ASSISTANCE TO ORIT

REF: STATE 243604

- MISSION HAS NO SERIOUS OBJECTIONS WITH AIFLD PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, MISSION DOES BELIEVE THAT SOME CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO POSSIBLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES TO ORIT'S IMAGE IN LATIN AMERICA SHOULD IT ACCEPT USG FUNDING. ORIT HAS BEEN CRITICIZED IN PAST FOR BEING DOMINATED BY AFL-CIO AND ACCEPTANCE OF USG FUNDING MAY SUBJECT IT IN FUTURE TO CHARGES FROM LEFT THAT IT IS DOMINATED BY USG.
 - LABOR ATTACHE DISSENTS FROM ABOVE IN BELIEF THAT DAMAGE TO ORIT'S IMAGE OUTWEIGHS ANY POSSIBLE BENEFITS FROM PROPOSAL. SEPARATE CABLE BEING SENT THROUGH DISSENT CHANNEL.
- BOEKER

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S/P:RFEINBERG:RYM
11/30/77 EXT 20822
S/P:PKREISBERG

ARA-MR. F. MCNEIL {SUBS}

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE SANTIAGO

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [REDACTED] FROM LAKE-S/P

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CI, SHUM

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO PRESIDENT
PINOCHET-DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: A) SANTIAGO 09018; B) STATE 262398; C) SANTIAGO 8838

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE VIEWS PRESENTED IN YOUR RAPID AND
THOUGHTFUL DISSENT MESSAGE WERE GIVEN IMMEDIATE CONSI-
DERATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG.

2. YOUR FIRST CONCERN CENTERED ON THE PROPOSED PRISONER RE-
LEASES. THE JUDGMENT HERE TO GO AHEAD RESTED ON THE BE-
LIEF THAT THE LETTER WAS PRIVATE, NOT TO BE MADE PUBLIC,
AND THEREFORE OFFERED NO PUBLIC CHALLENGE TO THE GOC THAT
WOULD IMPEL IT TO GET BACK AT US ON THE PRISONER RELEASE
QUESTION. WE BELIEVE THAT YOUR CONCERN ABOUT GIVING RECOG-
NITION TO PRISONER RELEASES COULD BE MET BY THE STRATEGY
OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH FIVE REFTEL (C), THAT IS IF THE GOC
TRANSLATES ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE ICEM PROPOSAL INTO ACTION
THE JSUSG WILL MAKE THE PROMISED PUBLIC RESPONSE.

3. THERE WAS INTENSIVE RECONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER THE USE OF THE WORD QUOTE RESTORE UNQUOTE IN THE
PRESIDENT'S LETTER IMPLIED A RETURN TO A SPECIFIC SET OF

PHK
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12

INSTITUTIONS. THE FINAL DECISION RESTED ON THE BELIEF THAT THE PHRASE QUOTE TO RESTORE TO CHILE THE VIGOROUS AND OPEN DEMOCRATIC TRADITION UNQUOTE DID NOT NECESSARILY REFER BACK TO PRE-1973 INSTITUTIONS, BUT RATHER TO A MORE GENERAL TRADITION OF HONORING DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES. THE PHRASE WAS MEANT AS A RESTATEMENT OF THE GLOBAL ADMINISTRATION POLICY OF PREFERRING DEMOCRACY, NOTABLY IN A COUNTRY WITH A LONG HISTORY OF IT.

4. COPIES OF YOUR MESSAGE WERE DELIVERED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AND THE NSC.

5. YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL IS COMMENDED. 44

RELEASE IN PART
B6

*You have been designated
action officer. A committee
was formed and met
October 20, 1975*

To: S/P -Winston Lord [redacted]
From: [redacted]

*John [redacted]
Tab A*

B6

Subject: Dissent Paper on Dept's Policies on Terrorism

I dissent from the following:

1. The Dept proclaims that it will not negotiate with terrorists (see attached). The Dept gives as its reason that this policy deters future kidnappings.

Dissent arguments: this policy is nothing more than a slogan, like "don't give up the ship." The Rand study showed that (a) a country's policy on terrorism (regardless of what the policy is) is the least significant factor in terrorists' planning, action, and reaction.

The Rand study also showed there is no basis for alleging that the "no negotiation" policy actually deters kidnappings.

I have said a great deal more on this subject in letters, memos, etc., which the Dept has, but has ignored, other than to commission the Rand study and then throw away the results because they do not fit in with the Dept's pre-conceived notions.

2. The Dept punishes Ambassadors who successfully negotiate to save lives. See the ~~xxxxxxx~~ Beverly Carter episode.

Dissent arguments: since I believe that negotiating to save lives is not only desirable in itself, but usually shows a high degree of diplomatic skill plus physical and moral courage, I recommend that any official who does this should be praised ~~xxx~~ publicly. Do you realize the effect the Carter episode will have on US Govt officials? The message is clear: save lives, and ruin your own career.

3. The Dept refuses even to finish the Rand study project. The case studies, including the one on Khartoum, which was the major point of my original request for an independent study, have never been delivered to the Dept (even though they are finished) because the Dept refuses to pay for them. I am sure the Dept is afraid the case studies show some officials, including high-ranking ones, making errors which caused loss of life. Does no one have the guts to get these studies and learn from them? Why are we punishing some one like Bev Carter, who succeeded, and covering up for the ambassadors who failed?

*John
Patterson*

up front w/ strategy

The most important part of the Rand study, e.g., the section containing recommendations for findings and for changes in policy, was rejected and ordered to be re-written in a form palatable to the Dept, by watering down the conclusions and placing them in a separate annex. So the end result has not yet appeared, and when it does, it will lack clarity and impact. Again, the Dept prefers to risk human lives rather than face the fact that its policies are imperfect.

will come out

The Dept does not even make the existing sections of the study available to officers handling hostage situations. When I was in AF/C during the Tanzania-Zaire case, the office director was not told of the studies and only saw them when I handed my own copies to him for his perusal. Note: one of the first conclusions of the Rand study was that each new hostage situation was handled as if no previous experience was available. The Zaire case illustrated that perfectly.

Dissent: we need the Rand study, let's get it and use it.

4. The Dept publically disowns Ambassadors who use official resources to assist in negotiating the release of captives. See the Carter story. Yet Carter did not take any more use of resources than other Ambassadors have; in other cases, ransom money has been shipped by pouch, stored in official safes, and persons contacting kidnapers have been escorted by JS Embassy officials. If the Dept sticks with disowning Ambassadors who do this, then in future cases Ambassadors will hesitate to use such resources.

Dissent: all resources should be used to save lives.

5. The Dept insists on announcing on every possible occasion, (and on instructing posts to do the same) that we do not give in to blackmail, pay ransom or release prisoners. These phrases (especially "give in to blackmail") are negative in their impact on a hostage situation, and confuse not only the public (see the Egan case) but also impede negotiations even when the latter are going on privately. If we want to negotiate, but any agreement we make with the kidnapers (even if only publishing a letter from a hostage) is going to be interpreted as "giving in to blackmail", then we have two contradictory policies running head on into each other. As long as those instructions exist, posts in hostage situations are going to make the same mistake again and again, by immediately announcing "we don't give in to blackmail", just when the situation is most tense and when the greatest flexibility is needed.

Dissent: issue instructions to everyone, from the President in the White House (see Khartoum case) thru the Secretary of State (see the Tanzania case) on down to the lowliest clerk (not forgetting the Attorney General of the United States, who talked too much during a hostage situation when the post was very wisely maintaining total silence):

"when you have a hostage situation, close your mouth; don't say anything about our policy, other than that we desire to keep communications open. PERIOD."

6. The Dept gives first priority to working with and through the host government, and only as a last resort works directly with the terrorists. This is an artificial priority, which may make sense in any ordinary diplomatic situation but is irrelevant to a hostage situation, where the first priority is to save lives.

Dissent: instruct posts to take whatever steps are needed, directly or thru the host government (depending on what will be most effective) to save lives.

7. The Dept has many strands of policies entangling hostage situations: relations with foreign countries, good public relations, "image," etc. We are encumbered by all this, and distracted by it. The sole policy is SAVE LIVES.

Dissent: revise all instructions to eliminate ideas which are there solely for press relations purposes, and get down to the hard core. We are not running an advertising campaign, we are trying to issue instructions to save lives. These instructions should be as clear and simple and free of confusing "clutter" as the instructions in a first-aid kit which tell you how to stop someone from bleeding to death ("apply direct pressure to the wound")

Conclusion: I have been trying since 1971 to push the Department away from its machismo-image self-concerns into an outward-looking policy which worries about hostages, rather than how the Dept will look. I believe some lives may have been lost and others endangered by the Dept's refusal to move. I think the time has come to ask the Dept to find the moral courage to take the Rand study, admit past mistakes, and issue a new policy instructions, which is simply: "Keep quiet publically; negotiate."

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : S/P - Mr. Lake

DATE: October 16, 1978

FROM : PA/FOI - E

B6

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL: Placement of Classification Review Staff

I dissent from the decision (unannounced but I understand already reached) to place the proposed classification review staff in the Bureau of Administration (A) instead of the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA).

Background

On June 1, 1977, PRM 29 initiated a study of the classification/declassification system as defined in EO 11652, a study which culminated on June 29, 1978 in the signing of EO 12065, replacing EO 11652 and making several changes in it. During the year of study, the Department was represented at White House meetings by PA, S/P and L and the Council on Classification Policy (CCP) was intensely involved and was kept aware of all developments (CCP has seven members including PA, L and A). In October-November, 1977 a series of working groups under the CCP's direction began work on various aspects of the new order, from which emerged the recommendation that systematic declassification at 20 years (the core provision of the new order) should be carried out by a new, centralized declassification staff. This provision was contested by the substantive bureaus but was unanimously adopted by the CCP in a meeting of May 15. At the same meeting, the CCP voted 6-1 to place the declassification staff in PA. The vote against was cast by the A representative. The A bureau's view was that the function and related functions should be placed in A.

Just before the CCP meeting, A sent a memo to M proposing that declassification, FOI functions, and Privacy be combined under the Director of FADRC. On receiving the CCP recommendation, M requested the Inspector General to study the question. The Inspectors' lengthy report, submitted to M on July 25, 1978 recommended the establishment of a central reviewing staff in PA, with record-keeping functions to be centralized in A; the report did not spell out how this would be done. No copy of this report has been officially made available to PA.



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE			
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TR	XMD	AIR	RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE JUL 26 4 43 PM '72
RMY	CIA	NAVY	FROM : Amconsul, HALIFAX RS/AN ANALYSIS BRANCH DATE: July 21, 1972
OSD	USIA	NSA	SUBJECT: Dissent Message: U.S. Assistance to Essentially Totalitarian Regimes: Value of Old UNRRA and China Relief Mission Approach
			REF : State A-3559, April 8
DISSENT CHANNEL			
This airgram transmits a dissenting view submitted by FSO-2 Principal Officer.			
<p>"As a retiring FSO with 29 years of Government service, I would like to suggest that the United States Government would in the long run ensure its security more effectively by reducing its assistance and close ties to essentially totalitarian governments. My comments are primarily directed at totalitarian governments of the right, such as Greece, Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan, and Paraguay, inasmuch as we already provide little assistance to most of the totalitarian governments of the left.</p> <p>"Without going into any detail, it has been my impression that much of the aid has not been effectively used and has often gone to those individuals who already are well off. Even more unfortunately, our aid has been interpreted as approval of undemocratic regimes. We find Admiral Moorer, in his New Year's message of several years ago praising our fine ties with Brazil at the very time that the <u>New York Times</u> and other sources are documenting torture and methods used in preventing free expression of opinion.</p> <p>"I recall that in the final days of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) assistance program and in the work of its U.S. supported successor, the China Relief Mission (CRM), those programs were quite successful in maintaining efficiency in their operations by simply cutting off aid to regions whenever corruption was noted.</p>			
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20 August, 1972

Dear Mr. ^{WIC}Cargo:

Your response to my telegram was most informative. It was quite detailed and included various items in discrepancy with my ideas and information. One particular case was the withholding of assistance by various international relief agencies. My source of information was the Tegucigalpa newspaper "El Dia", which printed a press release from UPI on June 30, concerning the suspension of aid by unnamed agencies. Another discrepancy concerned an anticipated disaster relief fund which I was reluctant to agree with due to danger of improper usage. My source here was an article by Mr. Benjamin Wells that appeared in the "New York Times" on June 25, (page 2). He was judged by my cohorts as being familiar with Burundi and the political situation there. Your response indicated the opinion that relief funds could be properly monitored. I do hope that opinion holds true. As you can see, none of my previous information came from official sources but from two newspaper articles readily available to thousands of people. Yet, my telegram was reclassified to Limited Official-Use and thus, so is the letter. I do not understand all the intricacies of the Burundi problem but it seems likely that the information is classified as a result of the potential jeopardizing of our relations with Burundi, or neighboring countries. I believe that we took a justifiable approach to the tribal strife in Burundi but justifiable only in the light of the letter you sent me. The situation as it appeared to me was centered around the appointment of an ambassador to Burundi and the desire to maintain good relations with the Burundi government regardless of the activities. It is unfortunate that such background information cannot be determined general information. I probably would not have sent a dissent telegram had I known what I know now. It still seems possible, however, that a breach of diplomatic relations might


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PAGE 2.

have been a potential approach, although not a solution. Judging by the absence of reports of Burundi, the situation apparently has settled. I thank you again for responding to my queries.

Yours truly,



*General Services Officer
Tegucigalpa*

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PAGE 01 STATE 237143

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APPROVED BY S/PISLEWIS
L/MIHFSHAMWELL (DRAFT)
MIDBOUCHARD (DRAFT)
HIELKRIZEK (DRAFT)
S/PIRSMITH (DRAFT)

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652IN/A

TAGS:OGEN

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE FOR [REDACTED]
REPLY YOUR LETTER OF FEBRUARY 25, 1974 TO DIRECTOR OF S/P
E. STATE 286874

B6

1. THE DEPARTMENT HAS COMPLETED ITS REVIEW OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE TO THE DIRECTOR OF S/P CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL VISITS. OWING TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ISSUES YOU RAISED, YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS WERE REVIEWED PERSONALLY BY THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT AND BY KEY OFFICERS IN THE BUREAU OF CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, THE OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER AND THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF.

2. CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING CONGRESSIONAL VISITS ARE SET FORTH IN DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR A-10315 OF OCTOBER 16, 1972. THE CONTENTS OF THIS AIRGRAM HAVE RECENTLY BEEN REVIEWED AND UPDATED AND ARE TO BE PUBLISHED SHORTLY AS

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PAGE 02 STATE 237143

A NEW SECTION OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL

STATE TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT

3. OBVIOUSLY, QUESTIONS THAT ARISE AT POST OVER THE LEGALITY OR ILLEGALITY OF CARRYING OUT A CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST ARE OF INTEREST TO THE DEPARTMENT. EVEN THOUGH THE DEPARTMENT IS EAGER TO FACILITATE CONGRESSIONAL VISITS, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS OR



MISSIONS HONOR ANY REQUEST WHICH THEY KNOW VIOLATES U.S. OR LOCAL LAWS. IF POSTS ARE IN DOUBT AS TO THE LEGALITY OF A REQUESTED ACTION, THEY SHOULD REFER THE MATTER TO THE DEPARTMENT FOR ADVICE. THE DEPARTMENT WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THESE QUERIES.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

4. THE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT AGREE WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT OFFICERS BE COMPELLED TO HONOR CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS. DECISIONS REGARDING CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS SHOULD BE MADE BY CONGRESSMEN OR MEMBERS OF CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS THAT EMBASSY PERSONNEL CONSIDER UNETHICAL OR IMPROPER. THEY NEED NOT FEEL COMPELLED TO HONOR THESE REQUESTS. OFFICERS HAVE SAID NO IN THE PAST; NO DOUBT THEY WILL SAY NO IN THE FUTURE. SOME OF THESE DECISIONS WILL NOT BE EASY. HOWEVER TO REFER THESE DECISION TO WASHINGTON IS NOT ONLY IMPRACTICAL BUT DIMINISHES THE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH THE DEPARTMENT EXPECTS OFFICERS TO EXERCISE. IN THE EVENT OFFICERS HAVE DOUBTS WHETHER OR NOT TO COMPLY WITH THESE REQUESTS, THEY SHOULD CONSULT WITH THEIR SUPERVISOR OR THE PRINCIPAL OFFICER AT POST.



5. WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR SUGGESTIONS FOR TIGHTENING THE PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING CONGRESSIONAL VISITS. THE DISSENT CHANNEL WAS CREATED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELICITING SUCH SUGGESTIONS. WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT YOU AND OTHER FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL ARE INCREASINGLY USING THIS CHANNEL TO BRING YOUR CONCERNS TO THE DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION. INGERSOLL

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 19, 1974

[Redacted]

Alternate Country Director
Office of Central African Affairs
Room 4238

[Redacted]:

B6

Thank you for your letter to Mr. Lord of September 15, 1974 in which you resubmitted your dissent message concerning the sale of a DC-8 to Gabon. I have discussed your paper with Mr. Lord and other responsible Members of the Policy Planning Staff. We would plan, as indicated in my letter to you of July 16, 1974, to bring your dissent to the attention of the Secretary if the Bureau of African Affairs were to make a recommendation with which you were not able to concur.

As you acknowledged in your letter of September 15, the Secretary's schedule would make it unlikely that he could read the large number of documents which you forwarded under the cover of that letter. I am of the opinion that an oral briefing, as you recommended, would be inappropriate and would like to make the suggestion that you condense your dissent message to a memorandum to Mr. Lord of about two pages. The memorandum should be on Department stationery. I believe a document of this length would have the best chance of receiving the Secretary's full attention.

I hope this suggestion meets with your approval and await the revised dissent memorandum at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Peter B. Swiers

Special Assistant to the Director
Policy Planning Staff

cc: P - Mr. Djerejian
OFP - Mr. Smith

S/P - Mr. DeFree



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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October 2, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

On October 2, I telephoned [redacted] (who was home on leave) to inform her that Mr. Easum (via Mr. Foley) had asked me to inform her that, with regard to her memo of September 26, he had no objection to EXIM and Commerce coming to the Department and reviewing all relevant files with respect to the Department's decision not to object to the issuance of a license for the export of a DC-8 aircraft to Gabon. However, Mr. Easum preferred that these documents not be sent to those agencies since they constituted internal working papers of the Department. I said that both EXIM and Commerce had been informed of this by Mr. Huffman, and that EXIM had already sent a representative to review documents, including the action memorandum to the Secretary to which was attached [redacted] dissent memorandum.

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[redacted] expressed appreciation and satisfaction with Mr. Easum's decision. She indicated that she understood the reasons for these documents being read in the Department rather than not being distributed to other agencies.

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S/P:TTHORNTON:HE
X-28328 6/8/82
S/P:PWOLFOWITZ

*P. card
6/14/82 = TEL*

ARA/CA - MS. ANDERSON(SUBS)
OFF - MS. HEAPHY

IDCA/TDP - MR. SCONCE(SUBS)

S/P, ARA, IDCA

*State 158435
6/9/82*

ROUTINE SAN JOSE

DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR FROM S/P WOLFOWITZ

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ENRG, TRGY, CS

SUBJECT: ALCOHOL FEASIBILITY STUDY

REF: SAN JOSE 3237

*PWPW
TZA
ARA/CA
IDCA/TDP
OFF*

B6

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE (REFTEL) ON THE TDP ALCOHOL FEASIBILITY STUDY. S/P HAS DISSEMINATED IT TO THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT AND CHECKED OUT THE POINTS THAT YOU MADE WITH THE RELEVANT BUREAUS.

2. YOUR CONCERN THAT THERE MAY NOT BE FINANCING AVAILABLE FOR THE OVERALL PROJECT IS WIDELY SHARED. OBVIOUSLY NOBODY CAN BE ABSOLUTELY SURE OF THE FUNDING OF THE PROJECT UNTIL ALL OF THE ASPECTS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED. AS YOU POINT OUT, HOWEVER, SCARCE TDP FUNDS SHOULD NOT BE USED WITHOUT REASONABLE INVESTMENT EXPECTATIONS. IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT TDP IS TAKING A VERY CLOSE LOOK AT THE INVESTMENT POTENTIAL (INCLUDING SOME INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST) BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO TAKE ON THE FEASIBILITY STUDY. IF IT TURNS OUT THAT THERE IS A REASONABLE POSSIBILITY FOR FUNDING THE PROJECT, THE FEASIBILITY STUDY WOULD BE A SENSIBLE NEXT STEP IN LOOKING AT A POTENTIALLY VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR COSTA RICAN DEVELOPMENT AND FOR AMERICAN TRADE.

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3. TDP CONFIRMS, INCIDENTALLY, THE POINT MADE IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF REFTEL -- THAT THE STUDY SHOULD NOT DUPLICATE WORK ALREADY DONE, SINCE THERE ARE NO STUDIES AVAILABLE THAT EXAMINE THE USE OF ETHANOL IN DIESEL ENGINES OR THE COST TO COSTA RICA OF SUCH A CONVERSION.

4. IN SUM, THEN, YOUR CONCERNS HAVE BEEN RAISED AT THE POINTS WHERE DECISIONS ARE NOW BEING CONSIDERED, THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE ANY SUBSTANTIAL DISAGREEMENT OVER THEM, AND THEY WILL BE TAKEN INTO FULL ACCOUNT.

5. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT VIEWS SUCH AS THE ONE YOU SET FORTH IN YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE BE EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATED TO DECISION MAKING POINTS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, THIS SHOULD BE DONE THROUGH NORMAL REPORTING PROCEDURES WHICH ARE MORE RAPIDLY AND FULLY DISSEMINATED. ALSO, NORMAL REPORTING SHOULD BENEFIT FROM THE FULLEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF RESPONSIBLE VIEWS. IN USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL, IT IS IMPORTANT TO OBSERVE THE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDELINES OF JANUARY 19, 1977, AND THE PROVISIONS OF 2 FAM 101 AND 11 FAM 243. THESE SPECIFY THAT THE CHANNEL IS INTENDED TO BRING TO LIGHT POLICY VIEWS THAT MAY NOT OTHERWISE COME TO THE ATTENTION OF POLICYMAKERS, RATHER THAN FOR TRANSMISSION OF POSITIONS THAT THE CONCERNED MISSION WOULD BE WILLING TO SEND FORWARD IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF BUSINESS. 44

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Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

PAGE 01 WARSAW 08467 221150Z
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WARSAW 08467 221150Z

**RELEASE IN
PART B6**

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /004 V
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FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1720

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 8467

DISSENT CHANNEL

EO 11652GDS

TAGS:

SUBJ: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: U.S. AID TO POLAND

REF: A. STATE 279079, B. WARSAW 8179, C. WARSAW 8192

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [REDACTED], AN OFFICER OF THE EMBASSY'S ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL SECTION, WHO SPECIALIZES IN FISCAL PROBLEMS. [REDACTED] HAS ASKED ME TO ROUTE THIS MESSAGE AS I SEE FIT. I RECOMMEND THAT OFFICIALS ATTENDING THE PRC MEETING TODAY SHOULD HAVE IT AS PART OF THE DOCUMENTATION THEY RECEIVE IN PREPARATION FOR THE MEETING.

2. BEGIN TEXT: IN A RECENT TELEGRAM TO THE DEPARTMENT (REF B), THERE WAS A DISCUSSION OF THE INTEREST THAT THE U.S. HAD IN MAINTAINING A STABLE ENVIRONMENT IN POLAND AND WHAT STEPS THE U.S. SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE TO PREVENT DOMESTIC UNREST. I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT A VOTE OF DISSENT.

3. THE TELEGRAM DEALT WITH WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD DO AS A MINIMUM TO HELP INSURE THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE INTERNAL DISORDER IN THE COUNTRY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I THINK THAT THE UNITED STATES IS DOING QUITE A BIT IN THIS REGARD AT THE TIME. AMERICAN BANKS ARE HEAVILY INVOLVED IN LENDING MONEY TO THE POLISH TRADE ENTERPRISES. THE INTEREST RATES THAT THE POLES HAVE OBTAINED IN RECENT DEALINGS WITH THE U.S. FIRMS HAVE BEEN QUITE GOOD, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE FINANCIAL STANDING OF THE ECONOMY AND THE CREDIT RISK INVOLVED. OTHER CORPORATIONS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN NUMEROUS SCHEMES TO HELP MARKET POLISH GOODS ABROAD. WHAT THE BANKS DO WITH THEIR DEPOSITORS' MONEY AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS DO WITH THEIR CAPITAL IS THEIR CONCERN, BUT WHAT WE ASK THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO DO WITH ITS FUNDS DESERVES SOMEWHAT MORE EXACT EXAMINATION.

4. POLAND IS A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY WITH A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM WHICH IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIC SYSTEM. RECENTLY, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ATTEMPTED TO SATISFY THE CONSUMER DEMAND WHICH HAD BEEN HELD IN CHECK SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO MEET THESE INCREASED CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS PRIMARILY DUE TO INEFFICIENCY, POOR PLANNING, AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, INADEQUATE GAINS IN WORKER PRODUCTIVITY. THE CLIMATIC CONDITIONS AND AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE NOT WITHSTANDING, IT SEEMS EVIDENT THAT THE POLISH ECONOMY IS HEADING FOR DIFFICULT STRAITS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

5. I DO NOT DISAGREE WITH THE BASIC AIM OF ENCOURAGING THE GOP TO INSTITUTE GRADUAL LIBERAL REFORM. I DO QUESTION WHETHER SHIELDING THE POLICY-MAKERS FROM THE FULL ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR DECISIONS IS THE PROPER ACTION FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO TAKE. ARE WE NOT IN FACT ENCOURAGING THE GOP TO CONTINUE THEIR

PRESENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES? THE PROBLEM APPEARS TO BE TO WHAT EXTENT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD AMELIORATE THE EFFECTS OF THIS INSTANCE OF MISMANAGEMENT, IN PARTICULAR, AND THIS TYPE OF ECONOMY, IN GENERAL.

6. I FEEL THAT ANY U.S. GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED COMMITMENT TO POLAND SHOULD BE ECONOMICALLY JUSTIFIED (I.E., DO WE GAIN SUFFICIENT ECONOMIC BENEFIT GIVEN THE COSTS INVOLVED?). WE SHOULD NOT SUBSIDIZE AND THEREBY AID AND ABET THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT. I AM NOT ENTIRELY CERTAIN THAT WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION OF HELPING TO STABILIZE A GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH WE HAVE PROFOUND PHILOSOPHICAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ALTERNATIVE MAY BE WORSE.

7. IN THE TELEGRAM, THERE IS NO MENTION OF HOW MUCH AID THE U.S. SHOULD GIVE TO POLAND. TO WHAT LENGTHS SHOULD WE ALLOW THE U.S. BANKING SYSTEM TO BECOME EXPOSED IN THE POLISH CREDIT MARKET? WHAT AMOUNT OF SUBSIDY SHOULD THE CCC PROVIDE TO SUBSIDIZE FOOD EXPORTS TO POLAND? I FEEL THAT THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IF WE ARE TO FORMULATE A COHESIVE POLICY TOWARD DEALING WITH POLISH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. I DO NOT THINK THERE IS MUCH DEBATE THAT THE ECONOMY WILL GET WORSE BEFORE IT WILL IMPROVE (IF IT EVER DOES). IF WE ARE COMMITTED TO ASSISTING IN THE STABILIZATION OF POLAND, WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE LIMITS TO WHICH WE WILL GO TO ACHIEVE THIS END. WE SHOULD ALSO BE SURE THAT THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF SUCH A POLICY JUSTIFY THE ECONOMIC COST. END TEXT.

8. [REDACTED] HAS READ REF C AS WELL AS REF B. DAVIES

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S/P:AWDEPORTE
9/10/76;X28994
S/P:RBARTHLOMEW

C:HSonnenfeldt
EUR/WE:RBarbour

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE BANGKOK, ROME

DISSENT CHANNEL

[REDACTED] FROM BARTHLOMEW, ACTING DIRECTOR, S/P

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, IT

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DISSENT MESSAGE CONCERNING US POLICY
TOWARD ITALY

REFERENCE: ROME AIRGRAM 251, 4 JUNE 1976

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR CAREFULLY CONSIDERED COMMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE POLICIES WHICH YOU BELIEVE THE US SHOULD FOLLOW TOWARD ITALY. THOUGH YOUR MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED BEFORE THE JUNE 20-21 ELECTIONS THE ISSUES IT RAISES ARE CLEARLY THOSE WE HAVE TO FOCUS ON, NOW AND IN THE MONTHS TO COME.

2. THERE CAN BE NO DISPUTE THAT THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, FURTHER STRENGTHENED IN THE ELECTIONS, HAS ENTERED A NEW PHASE OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS. THE POST-ELECTION DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES ALREADY SIGNIFIES AN INCREASE IN THE PCI'S ROLE WITH RESPECT TO DECISION-MAKING, AND IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THAT DIALOGUE HAS ALREADY REACHED ITS FINAL STAGE. THE NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE THE NUMBERS IN PARLIAMENT TO GOVERN WITHOUT AND EVEN AGAINST THE PCI BUT IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THEY DO NOT BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE TO DO SO IN LIGHT OF COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN THE COUNTRY AT LARGE.

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HS
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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

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3. YOU MAKE AN ABLE ARGUMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE US GOVERNMENT ALSO SHOULD NOW ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE WITH THE PCI, WITH THE OBJECT OF BARGAINING OUR ACQUIESCENCE IN ITS NEW ROLE IN ITALIAN POLITICS AGAINST WHAT YOU CALL ITS "ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR," PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY AN OPTION TO KEEP IN MIND AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS. BUT YOU ALSO PUT YOUR FINGER ON THE GREATEST SINGLE OBSTACLE TO OUR ADOPTING IT NOW: OUR BELIEF THAT PCI PARTICIPATION IN THE CABINET WOULD NOT ONLY JEOPARDIZE ITALY'S FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND OTHER WESTERN INSTITUTIONS BUT WOULD RENDER IMPOSSIBLE THE CONTINUED SYSTEM OF "VOLUNTARY MUTUAL CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION," IN YOUR WORDS, WHICH HAS DEVELOPED OVER THE YEARS. THIS SYSTEM, IN OUR VIEW, IS BECOMING EVER MORE IMPORTANT, WITH RESPECT NOT ONLY TO SECURITY IN EUROPE BUT TO THE ABILITY OF ALL THE WESTERN AND ADVANCED COUNTRIES TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE NEW AND VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS THEY ARE FACING. WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT THE PCI IS NOW THE KIND OF PARTY WHICH IS WILLING OR ABLE TO BE A COOPERATIVE PARTNER WITH US—WHATEVER ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ACCEPTANCE OF ITALY'S INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS. WE DOUBT THAT THE PCI WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DELIVER ON ITS SIDE OF SUCH A BARGAIN AS WE WOULD DEFINE IT. WE BELIEVE ALSO THAT FOR US TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A BARGAIN COULD NOT BE KEPT SECRET AND WOULD SERIOUSLY REDUCE ANY LINGERING POSSIBILITY FOR THE PCI TO BE KEPT OUTSIDE OF THE CABINET AND THE FORMAL GOVERNING MAJORITY. MOREOVER IT IS STILL OUR GOAL TO ENCOURAGE STEPS WHICH WILL LEAD ITALY OUT OF ITS CURRENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CRISIS AND WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE A NEW AND ABLE GENERATION OF DEMOCRATIC LEADERS TO TAKE CENTER STAGE AND EVENTUALLY CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH PCI INFLUENCE AND POWER CAN BE REDUCED. NOTICEABLY INCREASED CONTACTS WITH THE PCI, IN OUR VIEW, WOULD NOT NOW BE IN OUR INTERESTS.

4. AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE US SHOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE REFORM AND REJUVENATION OF THE DC. WE ARE ENCOURAGED, WITH DUE CAUTION, BY THE LOOKS OF THE ANDREOTTI GOVERNMENT. WE THINK ALSO THAT WE MUST STRENGTHEN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE "LAY PARTIES," PARTICULARLY THE REPUBLICANS AND THE SOCIALISTS. THE RECENT ELECTION OF BETTINO CRAXI AS PSI SECRETARY-GENERAL IS AN ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT. WE ARE NOT AT ALL POLLYANNISH ABOUT THE EARLY STRENGTHENING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES OR ABOUT THE EASE WITH WHICH ITALY'S IMMEDIATE, NOT TO SAY ITS MORE BASIC, PROBLEMS CAN BE OVERCOME. BUT, AS YOU SAY, THE RISE OF THE PCI IS NOT IRREVERSIBLE. THE BURDEN OF CONTAINING AND THEN REVERSING THE GROWTH OF COMMUNIST POWER

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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

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OBVIOUSLY FALLS MAINLY ON THE ITALIANS THEMSELVES, PARTICULARLY ON THE ABILITY OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE COUNTRY. WITHOUT EXAGGERATING THE INFLUENCE WE HAVE ON THE SITUATION, WE BELIEVE THAT THE BASIC OBJECTIVE OF US POLICY SHOULD BE TO HELP REVERSE THE TREND OF PCI ADVANCE WHILE SAFEGUARDING ESSENTIAL US INTERESTS IN ITALY AND WESTERN EUROPE BY DUE CONSIDERATION OF THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION THERE AS THEY PRESENT THEMSELVES. YY

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MAC

RELEASE IN PART
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S/P:GSAUSTIN
5/12/77 EXT. 29571
S/P:ALAKE

ARA - MR. DEVINE {DRAFT}
M/DG - MR. LISSFELT {SUBSTANCE}

D/HA - MR. SNEIDER {DRAFT}
S/P-OFP:NABOYER

S/P ONLY

IMMEDIATE SAN SALVADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, SHUM, US, ES

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
GOES

DISSENT CHANNEL, FOR [REDACTED] AND OTHER
SIGNATORIES OF REF A FROM ANTHONY LAKE - S/P

REF: {A} SAN SALVADOR 1732; {B} STATE 087800;
{C} STATE 098384; {D} STATE 105097

1. YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE PRESENTED A CONVINCING
CASE BASED ON SOUND REASONING AND EXPRESSED IN CLEAR
LANGUAGE.

2. LARGELY AS A RESULT OF YOUR CABLE, THE DEPARTMENT HAS
ADOPTED A MODIFIED VERSION OF YOUR OPTION 4. AMBASSADOR
LOZANO'S DEPARTURE IS BEING DELAYED ONE MONTH. DEPARTMENT
ALSO MAKING PLANS FOR A DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TO MAKE A FIRM
PRESENTATION ON US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY TO LEAVE NO DOUBT
IN THE MINDS OF THE HIGHEST OFFICIALS IN THE GOES THAT THE
AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN CONVEYING THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY
AND NOT HIS PERSONAL VIEWS. {REF C AND D}. IT IS ESSENTIAL
THAT THE GOES UNDERSTAND THIS, AS YOUR MESSAGE POINTS OUT.

AL
GSA *H*
FD *by B*
MS *by B*
ML *in*
NB *NE* B6

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| 2

3. I UNDERSTAND THAT AMBASSADOR LOZANO HAS SHARED WITH YOU THE CONTENT OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT AS CONVEYED TO HIM IN REF C.

4. FURTHER, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DEVINE ADVISED SALVADOREAN AMBASSADOR HERE ON MAY 9 THAT USG UNABLE TO SUPPORT \$90 MILLION IDB LOAN FOR EL SALVADOR ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS AND THAT WE SUGGESTED DEFERRAL THIS ITEM FROM IDB AGENDA. DEVINE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS POSITION WAS TOTALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ON HUMAN RIGHTS MADE BY AMBASSADOR LOZANO IN SAN SALVADOR.

5. I REITERATE THE DEPARTMENT'S APPRECIATION OF YOUR TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. 44

RELEASE IN PART B6



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TELEGRAM

Dominican Republic

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PAGE 01 SANTO 02190 231546Z

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ACTION SS-14

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8145

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SANTO DOMINGO 2190

PARA

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: YOUTH PARA; DISSENTING VIEW

REF: A) STATE A-3559, APR, 18, 1972; B) STATE 070302;
C) SANTO DIMINGO 1787; D) SANTO DOMINGO 2102

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY FSOS
[] AND [] SECTION.

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2. SECTION IV OF REFS C) AND D) OUTLINES THE COUNTRY TEAM'S VIEWS ON THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF "YOUTH" IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND RECOMMENDS LEVELS OF PERSONNEL TIME AND PROGRAM RESOURCES TO BE DEVOTED TO THE MISSION'S YOUTH PROGRAM. IT IS OUT VIEW THAT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY A SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER PROFILE IN THE YOUTH FIELD. AT A TIME WHEN THE INTERESTS OF THE USG IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HAVE SHIFTED AWAY FROM AN INVOLVEMENT IN THE DETAILS OF DOMINICAN POLITICAL LIFE AND WHEN THE TOTAL MANPOWER AND RESOURCES OF THIS MISSION ARE BEING REDUCED, IT SEEMS INAPPROPRIATE TO INCREASE THE EMPHASIS ON AN AMORPHOUS AND NARROW "YOUTH SECTOR".

3. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT IN SECTION IV, "THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF YOUTH" BE REDUCED TO "MINIMAL" AND THAT THE SPECIFIC PERCENTAGES OF PERSONNEL TIME AND PROGRAM RESOURCES BE LOWERED ACCORDINGLY. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD RESULT IN A WASTEFUL SEARCH FOR YOUNG PERSONS WHOSE RELATIVE NON-IMPORTANCE IS ONLY TEMPORARILY CAMOUFLAGED BY THE INTEREST OF THE USG.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 SANTO 02190 231548Z

4. OUR DISSENT, HOWEVER, IS NOT SO MUCH FROM REFS C AND D (WHICH ARE UNDERSTANDABLE RESPONSES GIVEN THE PARAMETERS SET IN STATE'S 070302), BUT FROM THE WHOLE YOUTH/PARA SYNDROME REFLECTED IN STAT'S 070302 AND OTHER MESSAGES WHICH SEEM RELICS OF A PREVIOUS ERA WHEN: 1) THERE WERE LARGER MISSIONS ABROAD; 2) THE USG BELIEVED ITS VITAL INTERESTS WERE AT STAKE IN ALMOST ANY UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRY; AND 3) USG OFFICIALS WERE CONFIDENT THAT IF THEY WORKED AT IT PROPERLY THEY COULD INFLUENCE GREATLY OR EVEN DETERMINE EVENTS IN THOSE COUNTRIES.

5. THE DISSENTERS ARE PLEASED THAT OVERALL U.S. POLICY NOW REFLECTS A MUCH MORE REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF U.S. INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S YOUTH PROGRAM BE REVISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT CHANGE.
MELOY

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PAGE 01 KINSHA 05689 01 OF 04 021252Z
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KINSHA 05689 01 OF 04 021252Z

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O 021137Z JUN 78
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 140

SECTION 1 OF 4 KINSHASA 5689

DISSENT CHAMBER

DRAFTER DESIRES DISTRIBUTION TO P, AF AND HA

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PDAS, PGOV, HORG, MILI, CG
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION FOR US POLICY TOWARDS ZAIRE

REF: 5 DAM 212. 3C

1. SUMMARY: THE DEGREE OF CORRUPTION AND INEPTITUDE OF THE MOBUTU REGIME HAS REACHED THE POINT WHERE INTERNAL REFORM IS FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES IMPOSSIBLE--WITNESS THE LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMS ANNOUNCED BY MOBUTU IN JULY 1977 AFTER THE FIRST SHAGA WAR

AND RELATED REFORMS PROMISED ON EVEN EARLIER OCCASIONS. ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT MOBUTU WILL FIND A WAY TO SABOTAGE EXTERNALLY

IMPOSED REFORMS WHICH THREATEN TO REDUCE HIS POWER AND FINANCIAL PREROGATIVES.

THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION IS THAT MOBUTU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO

REVERSE THE DECLINE OF HIS POLITICAL FORTUNES, AND THAT HIS REGIME WILL, SOONER, OR LATER, BE OVERTHROWN. THE LONGER MOBUTU HANGS ON, THE GREATER

THE DANGER OF A REVOLUTIONARY UPHEAVAL GIVING RISE TO A RADICAL, ANTI-US REGIME ALONG ANGOLAN, ETHIOPIAN, OR CUBAN LINES. THERE ARE ONLY

TWO REALISTIC OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE US TO COUNTER THIS GROWING THREAT TO OUR INTERESTS IN ZAIRE:

- TO CONCERT WITH BELGIUM AND FRANCE TO REMOVE MOBUTU FROM POWER;
- TO REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY OUR PRESENCE HERE, IF BELGIUM AND FRANCE

REFUSE TO COOPERATE, IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF OUR BEING ABLE TO ESTABLISH GOOD WORKING RELATIONS WITH THE SUCCESSOR

REGIME.

THIS DISSENT PAPER PREPARED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR

ARGUES THAT WE SHOULD SEEK THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE WHILE BEING PREPARED TO FALL BACK ON THE SECOND IF THE BELGIANS AND FRENCH REFUSE TO COOPERATE. END SUMMARY.

CORRUPTION

2. SOCIAL SCIENTISTS HAVE A WONDERFUL TERM TO DESCRIBE A REGIME LIKE

ZAIRE'S: "CLEPTOCRACY" DEFINED AS "GOVERNMENT BY ORGANIZED THEFT." WHILE PRESIDENT MOBUTU MAY NOT KNOW THE TERM, HE WELL UNDERSTANDS ITS

MEANING. DURING A 1976 MAY DAY ADDRESS TO A LARGE BODY OF PARTY STALWARTS AT KINSHASA'S MAIN STADIUM, MOBUTU CHIDED THEM FOR THEIR GLUMSPECUATIONS. "INANA HAVELLE," HE ADVISED THEM IN LINGALA, WHICH

IN PLAIN ENGLISH MEANS "STEAL CLEVERLY."

3. WHETHER OR NOT MOBUTU WAS JUSTIFIED IN COMPLAINING ABOUT HIS

COLLEAGUES' LACK OF FINESSE, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT CORRUPTION FORMS THE BASIS OF MOBUTU'S RULE. MOBUTU HIMSELF IS GUILTY OF MASSIVE MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE; HOW ELSE COULD AN EX-SERGEANT REACH THE POINT AFTER THIRTEEN

YEARS IN POWER WHERE PEOPLE COULD SERIOUSLY DEBATE WHETHER OR NOT HE IS THE RICHEST MAN IN THE WORLD. (IN AN INTERVIEW MOBUTU GAVE MOHAMMED BAYKAL A FEW YEARS AGO, WHEN BAYKAL WAS STILL EDITOR OF EGYPT'S "AL-AHRAH," MOBUTU ACTUALLY BOASTED OF BEING THE THIRD RICHEST MAN IN THE WORLD.)

4. WHETHER MOBUTU IS FIRST, THIRD OR TENTH, HE IS CERTAINLY IN THE RACE. THE VAST MAJORITY OF HIS FUNDS HAVE BEEN STOLEN FROM THE ZAIRIAN PEOPLE; FOR EXAMPLE, MOBUTU HAS AWARDED HIMSELF A PERSONAL MONOPOLY OVER ALL THE DIAMONDS PRODUCED IN ZAIRE. HOWEVER, RECENT DISCLOSURES THAT ZAIRE'S PRESIDENT STOLE 11,400,000 OF AMERICAN FUNDS DESTINED TO ASSIST OUR MUTUAL ALLIES IN ANGOLA SHOW AN

ADMIRABLE LACK OF NATIONAL BIAS. THIS SAME CORRUPTION FORMS THE VERY BASIS FOR MOBUTU'S RULE. UNDER HIS SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, INDIVIDUALS ARE CO-OPTED INTO THE RULING ELITE, ALLOWED TO LOOT A PARTICULAR GOVERNMENT FIELDS WITHOUT HINDRANCE FOR AN ELASTIC BUT LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME, AND THEN EITHER DROPPED (OFTEN TEMPORARILY) FROM THE ELITE OR MOVED ON

TO NEW PASTURES. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE GOVERNOR WILL EXPLOIT HIS REGION, THE SUB-GOVERNOR HIS SUBREGION, THE ZONAL COMMISSIONER HIS ZONE, AND SO ON.

5. ALL GOVERNMENTS SUFFER FROM SOME DEGREE OF CORRUPTION. IN THE CASE OF ZAIRE, HOWEVER, CORRUPTION HAS REACHED THE POINT WHERE THE AMOUNT STOLEN BY THE ELITE IS SO GREAT THAT NOT ENOUGH REMAINS TO KEEP SOCIETY FUNCTIONING AT EVEN MINIMUM LEVELS. SO LITTLE TRICKLES DOWN TO THE MAN

IN THE STREET THAT, ARITHMETICALLY, HE CANNOT SURVIVE IF HE DEPENDS ON HIS LEGAL SALARY ALONE. AND SO HE SUPPLEMENTS HIS INCOME. THE SCHOOL PRINCIPAL STEALS THE FUNDS THAT OUGHT TO REPAIR THE SCHOOL ROOF. THE TEACHER CHERISHES A CRIBE BEFORE HE WILL GIVE A STUDENT HIS GRADE. THE POLICEMAN ON THE BEAT SHARES DOWN PASSERS-BY, COLLECTING INSTANT "FINES" FOR MAKE-BELIEVE OFFENSES. THE CIVIL SERVANT WHO LACKS

SUITABLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR GRAFT IN HIS MINISTRY GOITS WORK AT NOON TO MOONLIGHT -- PERHAPS "SUNLIGHT" WOULD BE A BETTER TTPN -- IN A SECOND JOB. HOW CAN THESE ORDINARY PEOPLE DO OTHERWISE IN A SOCIETY WHERE PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AVERAGE THIRTY SIX ZAIRES PER MONTH AND THE TWO BAGS OF MANIOC WHICH HIS FAMILY NEEDS AS ITS BASIC FOODSTUFF FOR THE SAME MONTH COST NINETY ZAIRES?

SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 STATE 019599

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ORIGIN SS-14

INFO OCT-01 /015 R

DRAFTED BY S/PC:RRPETERSONIJK
2/1/73 EXT 22972
APPROVED BY S/PC:WICARGO
S/S - MR. BARNES

103109

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION BERLIN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 019599

DISSENT CHANNEL

FROM DIRECTOR OF S/PC

SUBJ: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM [REDACTED]
BERLIN 2055

B6

1. THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF BERLIN 2055, DATED NOVEMBER 28, 1972, A DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE CONCERNING AIR AGREEMENTS WITH THE GDR.

2. INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE TO THE DIRECTOR OF PLANNING AND COORDINATION, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT, EUR, EUR/CE, EB, EB/OA, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. ROGERS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

AREA DEVELOPMENT OFFICE FOR CENTRAL AFRICA
AMERICAN EMBASSY - YAOUNDE CAMEROON

17 July 1974

Mr. H. E. Hopkins
Director
Sik/PM
Office of Personnel and Manpower
Agency for International Development
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hopkins,

I have received a copy of your MEMO of July 2, 1974 to S/P - O/P -
Ms. Vogelgesang, Panel Chairman concerning my Dissent Channel
Message.

I wish to thank you for the content and form of your memorandum. When the cable came in requesting information on foreign born officers and spouses I must say it raised some eyebrows. No one here ever recalled seeing anything like it.

Personally, I did not object strongly to providing the information as requested. However, others here did feel strongly about it. As acting H/O I had the action to respond to the incoming. For the sake of their strong feelings about it I sent the Dissent message in my name.

Insofar as I am concerned, I am completely satisfied by your thoughtful response.

Sincerely yours,



Regional Development Officer (acting)

cc: Ms. Vogelgesang

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S/P:MMINTON/JAN
X 21095 : 6/16/81
S/P:PWOLFOWITZ

EA:JNEGROPONTE
IO:PWILCOX

S/P:EDOUGLAS
R/P:LWRIGHT
OF:GDRAGNICH

PRIORITY USUN NEW YORK

NODIS
DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR [] FROM WOLFOWITZ

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PDIP, UNGA, CB, XC, SREF

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL RESPONSE: US POLICY ON
KAMPUCHEAN RELIEF

REFS: (A) USUN NEW YORK 01086; (B) STATE 069012

1. YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE (REF A) WAS REVIEWED IN S,
P, S/P, EA, R/P, AND IO.

2. AS YOU KNOW FROM REF (B), THE RATIONALE FOR OUR CURRENT
POLICY IS THE HUMANITARIAN NEED TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF
THE KHMER PEOPLE AND THE PREVENTION OF A DESTABILIZING
INFLUX OF REFUGEES INTO THAILAND. WE ESTIMATE THAT IT MAY
BE NECESSARY TO CONTINUE RELIEF ASSISTANCE FOR A RELATIVELY
BRIEF ADDITIONAL TIME BEFORE KAMPUCHEA REACHES THE POINT
WHERE FAMINE AND MASS EXODUS ARE LESS LIKELY. THIS POINT
SHOULD BE REACHED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR IF THERE IS A GOOD
DECEMBER HARVEST, AS WE EXPECT. TO CEASE AID NOW, HOWEVER,
COULD CAUSE A REVERSAL IN OUR EFFORTS JUST AT A TIME WHEN
TERMINATION OF THE JOINT MISSION-RELIEF PROGRAM IS IN SIGHT.

3. WITH REGARD TO FOOD AID, THE DEPARTMENT AGREES THAT IT
WOULD BE WRONG TO CONTINUE SUCH RELIEF BEYOND THE POINT OF
DIRE NECESSITY AND THAT THE KHMER MUST FEND FOR THEMSELVES
AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, WE DEMUR FROM YOUR

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ASSESSMENT THAT THE "ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF THE RELIEF EFFORT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED" AND THAT NO FURTHER AID IS NOW JUSTIFIED. WHILE THE KHMER HAVE MADE REMARKABLE PROGRESS TOWARD FOOD PRODUCTION LEVELS ADEQUATE FOR SURVIVAL, THE FACT REMAINS THAT TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE THEY WILL PRODUCE IN 1981 ONLY 75% OF THEIR BASIC FOOD NEEDS. RICE PRODUCTION IN 1981 IS NOW PROJECTED TO FALL SOME 230-360,000 TONS SHORT OF MINIMUM NEEDS. WITHOUT LARGE AMOUNTS OF RELIEF FOOD AND PLANTING SEED AT LEAST THROUGH THE END OF THE YEAR, FAMINE WOULD LIKELY RETURN AND THE EFFORTS OF THE PAST TWO YEARS WOULD BE PUT AT RISK AND QUITE POSSIBLY LOST. NEVERTHELESS, OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO COMPLETE THE EMERGENCY RELIEF OPERATION BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. OUR PRESENT SUPPORT FOR LARGE RICE SEED DELIVERIES, IN FACT, IS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO BRING THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT INSIDE KAMPUCHEA TO A CLOSE BY THE END OF 1981. OUR OVERALL BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR THE PROGRAM ALSO REFLECT THIS OBJECTIVE: THE FY 1981 BUDGET OF \$68 MILLION WOULD DROP IN FY 1982 TO \$30 MILLION, MOST OF WHICH WOULD BE USED FOR FEEDING DISPLACED THAI AND KHMER BORDER REFUGEES. A SIZABLE PORTION OF ANY RESIDUAL ASSISTANCE DELIVERED TO THE BORDER WOULD SUPPORT THOSE DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN RESISTANCE TO THE VIETNAMESE.

4. WE HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY CAREFUL TO DRAW A SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN SURVIVAL ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER PEOPLE AND DEVELOPMENTAL AID WHICH WOULD DIRECTLY SUPPORT CONSOLIDATION OF THE VIETNAMESE/HENG SAMRIN POSITION IN KAMPUCHEA. THE DEPARTMENT HAS CLOSELY MONITORED VOLAG APPLICATIONS FOR EMBARGO WAIVERS TO SEND MATERIALS TO KAMPUCHEA AND IN RECENT MONTHS HAS JOINED COMMERCE AND TREASURY IN REJECTING MANY APPLICATIONS INVOLVING APPARENTLY DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT CONSIDER OUR FOOD AND SEED AID TO BE DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE; TO ELIMINATE IT AS SUCH WOULD BE TO ATTEMPT TO GET AT THE VIETNAMESE BY STARVING THEIR VICTIMS. EVEN THE VERY MODEST EFFORTS TO PROVIDE SOME OTHER BASIC SERVICES TO THE KHMER ARE CALCULATED TO IMPROVE THEIR CHANCES FOR SURVIVAL RATHER THAN TO CREATE A MARKETABLE SURPLUS. ANIMAL HEALTH PROGRAMS, FOR INSTANCE, ARE TO HELP FARMERS REBUILD THEIR

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133

DEPLETED STOCKS OF DRAFT ANIMALS, WITHOUT WHICH RICE CANNOT BE PLANTED OR HARVESTED. FISHERIES SUPPORT AND ICE MACHINES ALLOW THE KHMER TO BEGIN TO OBTAIN SOME ESSENTIAL ANIMAL PROTEIN AND TO TRANSPORT IT FROM PLACE OF CATCH TO MARKET. AND THE ANTIMALARIAL PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO REGAIN GROUND LOST IN THE LAST FEW YEARS WHEN MANY WEAKENED MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN PERISHED FROM THIS DISEASE. WE DO THESE THINGS FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, OF COURSE, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE SURVIVAL OF THE KHMER SERVES THE INTERESTS OF THE US AND ITS ALLIES. WITHOUT THE KHMER PEOPLE THERE CAN BE NO KHMER RESISTANCE TO THE VIETNAMESE AND NO INDEPENDENT KAMPUCHEA IN THE FUTURE. THE SOVIETS AND VIETNAMESE WISH TO CONTROL CAMBODIA; THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THEY ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SURVIVAL OF A HEALTHY, SELF-RELIANT KHMER POPULATION. THAT IS WHY THE SURVIVAL OF THE KHMER HAS BECOME AN IMPORTANT US POLICY OBJECTIVE.

5. AS FOR THE VIETNAMESE, WE BELIEVE IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE TO APPLY PRESSURE DIRECTLY TO VIETNAM THAN TO FURTHER POLITICIZE A HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT. EXAMPLES OF THIS DIRECT PRESSURE AS APPLIED BY THE US AND ITS ALLIES INCLUDE SUSPENSION OF WORLD BANK AND ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK CREDITS TO VIETNAM; TERMINATION OF JAPANESE BILATERAL AID; THE FORCED WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAM FROM CONSIDERATION FOR A MAJOR WFP PROJECT AND VARIOUS OTHER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. SUCH MEASURES COMPLEMENT THE POLITICAL ACTIONS WE ARE TAKING, SUCH AS SUPPORT FOR A BROADENED KHMER RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, CONTINUED BACKING OF DK SEATING IN MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS TO PREVENT RECOGNITION OF HENG SAMRIN, AND THE PROVISION OF FOOD SUPPLIES TO RESISTANCE GROUPS AT THE THAI BORDER.

6. WITH REGARD TO SOME OF THE OTHER POINTS YOU MAKE, WE ARE UNABLE TO AGREE WITH YOUR ASSERTION THAT THE DIFFICULTIES IN KAMPUCHEA ARISE LESS FROM A SHORTFALL IN OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE THAN FROM THE CONTINUED DISLOCATIONS CAUSED BY FIGHTING BETWEEN VIETNAMESE AND THE KHMER FORCES RESISTING THEM. THE CURRENT FIGHTING IS SMALL-SCALE AND LIMITED TO NON-FARMING AREAS. KAMPUCHEA'S BASIC PROBLEM REMAINS TO STAGE A COMEBACK FROM THE RAVAGES OF 1978-79. IN ANY EVENT, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO CUT OFF ALL FOOD AID TO THE KHMER EVEN IF THE FIGHTING WERE HAVING A SERIOUS EFFECT ON FOOD PRODUCTION. THE VIETNAMESE WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT AS LONG AS THERE IS A RESISTANCE, AND THE RESISTANCE DEPENDS TO SOME DEGREE UPON OUR RELIEF SUPPLIES. WE COULD NEVER COMPLETELY TERMINATE SUPPLIES REACHING THE RESISTANCE FORCES UNLESS WE WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE COLLAPSE OF MOST ARMED OPPOSITION TO VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION.

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7. THE DEPARTMENT SHARES YOUR CONCERN WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF VIETNAMESE DIVERSION OF SOME RELIEF SUPPLIES, BUT THE BEST EVIDENCE AVAILABLE SUGGESTS THAT WHATEVER DIVERSIONS OCCUR DO NOT COMPROMISE THE LARGER OBJECTIVE OF SUSTAINING THE KHMER, WHOSE CONDITION HAS IMPROVED GREATLY UNDER THE RELIEF PROGRAM. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DOCUMENT LARGE DIVERSIONS BY THE VIETNAMESE. YOUR COMMENT THAT AID TO KAMPUCHEA SERIOUSLY DETRACTS FROM RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR MORE DIRE SITUATIONS ELSEWHERE DOES NOT SQUARE WITH OUR RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFRICAN RELIEF OR OUR CONTINUED STRONG SUPPORT FOR PROGRAMS IN OTHER REGIONS. BUT IN ANY CASE, THE TRADE-OFF YOU SUGGEST SIMPLY IS NOT PRACTICAL AS LONG AS KHMER SURVIVAL REMAINS HIGH ON THE LIST OF US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES.

8. IN CONCLUSION, THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN SPURRED BY YOUR COMMENTS TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROCESS OF MONITORING DELIVERIES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF BETTER ADVERTISING SOVIET AND VIETNAMESE FAILURES TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE HUMANITARIAN ROLE IN KAMPUCHEA. WE APPRECIATE YOUR REMARKS WHICH HAVE HAD A CONSTRUCTIVE EFFECT IN THE POLICY REVIEW PROCESS EARLY IN THIS ADMINISTRATION. WHILE OUR APPROACH TOWARD KHMER RELIEF MAY NOT CONSTITUTE A PERFECT POLICY, WE CONSIDER IT THE MOST SUITABLE FOR ATTAINING OUR POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

44

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DISSENT CHANNEL

February 7, 1977

Mr. Anthony Lake
Director, Policy Planning Staff
S/P, Room 7813
Washington, D. C. 20520

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
Dear Mr. Lake:

I refer to Mr. Bartholomew's letter of February 1, 1977, in reply to my Dissent Channel message, "A Bicentennial Tragedy-- US Policy on the Spanish Sahara." That letter states that my recommendations would not work as a referendum would prove a failure. I do not understand whether by this the Department sees insoluble technical problems in holding the referendum, or whether a referendum would be a failure because the parties would not abide by the results, which might not be to their or our liking. It seems to me that if the UN ran the referendum and guaranteed the results that the probable resulting mini-state would not have to fear greatly from its neighbors.

I am gratified that my paper has evidently caused a change in policy so that we will increase our efforts to help Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco find a solution to the conflict. However, I believe that the Department's approach to the problem does not pay sufficient attention to a key group of actors, the Saharan people and their guerrilla movement, the Polisario Front. This is understandable as the Department has never produced a study of that movement. I am therefore enclosing another paper entitled "The Liberation Movement in the Western Sahara--The Polisario Front." This paper was basically written in March 1976 and has been in its present form since August, but has been buried in INR's bureaucracy. I am submitting it through the Dissent Channel because several people have expressed an interest in it, and as I am leaving INR shortly I do not want the paper to be killed through a pocket veto. The US Ambassador to Mauritania has stated that we are in a "pre-Vietnam configuration." I would also call your attention to Nouakchott 241 of February 4, 1977.

I wish this letter and my paper to be submitted to AF, NEA, Mr. Harold Saunders, and Ambassador Young, with the latter to also receive a copy of my first paper.

Sincerely yours,



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

We need copy of incoming (7 July) from Donp.

August 5, 1975

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[Redacted]

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APO San Francisco

Dear [Redacted]:

This is a response to your letter of July 7, 1975 (regarding your dissent message of June 11, 1975) and seeks to answer the two points you raise, namely, our view of your negotiating team proposal and the rationale for our decision to send copies of relevant messages to Vientiane.

It has been our understanding that your proposal to field a new negotiational team in Vientiane had been "to remove the 'hostage value' of the present team". It was hard for us to see how a second team would not simply increase the number of hostages involved. If you did have a new strategy of negotiations worked out in your mind it was not made clear in your dissent message and if such was the case, communicating the substance of that strategy might have greatly strengthened your message.

With respect to the dispatch of copies of the relevant messages to Vientiane we felt this was a matter of necessity. Since you proposed replacing the present team, had this suggestion been acted upon obviously the team in Vientiane would have to be notified at some point. Hence it was felt only fair that members be given as much advance notice as possible. The Vientiane group, moreover, was directly involved at the moment in the situation for when you proposed an alternative strategy than their own, and on this ground also, it seemed appropriate to seek their reaction.

I trust this will answer the points raised on your letter. Thank you again for your interest.

Sincerely,

Douglas Pike

Douglas Pike
Member
Policy Planning Staff

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

MEMORANDUM

Dissent file May 10, 1977

To: ~~Theodore Moran~~ Policy Planning Staff

From: [redacted] PPC/PDA/SPA

Subject: Comments Concerning Cable No. 11652 "L.A. Sector Analysis Activities and Support" from the Standpoint of the Immediate and Long-Range Issues of my April 11, 1977 Dissent Channel Memorandum

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This is in response to your request that I provide comments concerning the subject cable, a copy of which was sent to you on May 4.

My objections to the text of the cable, and to the past and future actions referred to in the cable, can be summarized as follows: 1) the Washington backstopping described in the cable is not adequate for carrying out successful sector analyses in agriculture, education and health; 2) as presented, the issue of centralization is false; 3) the cable contributes to the widespread confusion concerning what distinguishes sector analyses and sector assessments with respect to their contents and purposes; 4) the suggestions and actions outlined in the cable will have the effect of discouraging sector analyses.

Objection 1: Inadequate Washington Backstopping

A successful sector analysis requires close cooperation among various kinds of specialists who, for simplicity's sake, I will group into three classes: 1) analysts; 2) statisticians (survey and math statisticians, for instance); 3) computer science personnel. Project leadership must be exercised by the first class, consisting of analytically inclined social scientists with development background and experience. Individuals in class 2 & 3 do not need to be AID officials and, in fact, from the initiation of the Sector Analysis Division in October, 1970 to the present, have been PASA (now RSSA) personnel. Moreover, not all the analysts need to be AID officials. In agriculture, our priority sector, the number of USDA economists working under a RSSA with the division almost invariably exceeded the division's economists. However, the project director for each sector analysis was always a member of the division, i.e., an AID official. (See pp. 5-7 of the April 11 memo for a description of the division's operations.)

Obviously, there are many ways to divide the group 1's, i.e. social science analysts, workload on the U.S. side between AID and non-AID personnel. For example, our reliance on contract personnel could be made even greater, though I think that would not be advisable. And to shift it entirely out of the Agency's hands would be a fatal mistake. For legal reasons I assume this cannot be done: that by

-2-

simply passing the whole job to a contractor the USG cannot absolve itself of responsibility for an activity as important and as sensitive as an analysis of LDC social phenomena jointly agreed to with a host-country. Since our foreign assistance is part of our foreign policy, I assume there are parts of it that we cannot legally let out for contract.

The technical or developmental reasons for maintaining the USG direction within the Agency may be even more important. At the very least, the Agency and the host-country must agree on the major sectoral and intersectoral problems, issues and objectives on which the analysis will focus, on the methodology to be utilized for this purpose, and therefore on the duration of the project and the cost for both parties. Finally, if the Agency is simply a jobber and fails to get involved in the substance of the analysis, AID's justly infamous memory and understanding in this key development area will remain undeveloped.

The cable's rationale begins with the following statement: "With the experience accrued during the last several years and the maturation of approaches to sector analysis, the objectives; etc." I would very much like to know what is meant by "maturation of approaches." If this phrase is meant to suggest to the missions that sector analysis which is an activity that was, to the best of my knowledge, first conceptualized and carried out in the L.A. Bureau (though obviously drawing on research and analytical activities carried out in many different contexts) is now a fixed set of standardized activities which can be carried out by almost any contractor in almost any country, the missions are being seriously misled. The phrase is, at best, meaningless, and, at worst, highly misleading.

To whom in AID has this experience accrued? At the very least, it has accrued to the analysts who have worked in the Sector Analysis Division. Let us see where these analysts are.

Nine analysts or professionals have worked in the division since its inception 6½ years ago. Two left the Division and AID to establish their consulting firms. One left the Division at his own choice for a position in TAB. An accounting of the remaining six members should provide some indication of the present availability of this expertise to the L.A. missions.

Three of these analysts are now in PPC; and one is in TAB. Every one of these four analysts were very recently obliged to find positions outside the L.A. Bureau. Two have remained in the L.A. Bureau. One was transferred from the Sector Analysis Division to the Health & Nutrition Division; the other was transferred to the Rural Development Division. In short, a rather small portion of the "accrued experience" (1/3 of the presently available AID officials) referred to in the cable, and offered in the form of backstopping to the missions, has been retained by the Bureau. I think it is accurate to say that, wittingly or unwittingly, the Bureau has disbanded & scattered the sector analysis expertise & experience it so recently possessed.

It is interesting to observe a similar scattering with respect to sector analysis projects. Three sector analyses in L.A. countries are presently under way: 1) the El Salvador Education Sector Analysis;

-3-

2) the Dominican Republic Agricultural Sector Analysis; 3) the Bolivian Agricultural Sector Analysis. Only the last (1/3 of the sector analyses) has remained in the L.A. Bureau where the U.S. work is being coordinated & directed by the former Sector Analysis Division member now in the Rural Development Division. The other two sector analyses are being directed & coordinated by ~~the~~ two former Sector Analysis Division officials who are now in PPC. If PPC, in the former case with the support of the Administrator's or Deputy Administrator's Office, had not had the foresight to adopt these two projects, I venture to affirm that they would have come to a premature close with insufficient policy findings to warrant their cost or investment.

Moreover, the fact that each of the three presently ongoing sector analyses is being coordinated & directed on the U.S. side by the AID project director who initiated the project is, I submit, evidence of the need for continuity of leadership demanded by this rather complex endeavor. The failure of the L.A. Bureau to appreciate this fact (assuming it was not the Bureau's intention to terminate these projects) bodes ill for the future management of such activities.

I would like to point out that it would be more difficult to object to the abolishment of the Sector Analysis Division had its dissolution been preceded by a series of careful steps to locate the required sector analysis expertise in the rural, education & health divisions, and efforts had been made to insulate this personnel from AID's other pressing demands, such as programming and the carrying out of sector assessments. Anyone has seen how the need for rapid obligations in AID almost invariably dominates other considerations, might have doubts as to whether such an arrangement would work, but at least the attempt to make it work would reflect awareness of some of the problems involved. While Chief of the division, I suggested more than once that technicians in agriculture, education & health with the right backgrounds and/or inclinations be assigned for a two-year period to the Division, but the recommendation was not acted upon favorably. I think many more AID officials can contribute to the sector analysis process, but they must first be willing to learn from those that have the expertise and experience. The abolishment of the Division and the scattering of its members & projects have constituted serious disruptions to the sector analysis process. The Washington backstopping that is outlined in the cable is bound to be inadequate.

Objection 2: As presented, the decentralization issue is false.

To make clear the content of this objection, it is necessary to provide some background & history. There is no doubt whatsoever that the sector analysis projects that are being, and have been, carried out to date, have not been viewed by the field missions as "their" projects to the extent that they should have been. For obvious reasons a field mission should have the same sense of identification or, if you will, pride of ownership, in a sector analysis project that it has in any of its other projects. Why has this sense of identification been missing? This is the first point that needs to be cleared up.

-4-

First, I shall deal with what I believe to be the less important reason. Unfamiliarity with sector analysis has put certain AID technicians on the defensive and caused them to view it as a much more esoteric endeavor than it is. Fuller exchange between the Sector Analysis Division, the other technical divisions and the field would have contributed greatly, I think, to reducing whatever fear and suspicion existed. I believe there were communication failures on the Division's part. However, the general distrust in LA/DR concerning sector analysis was the main obstacle to communication.

That distrust was the main damper on field initiative and enthusiasm for sector analysis. If my memory doesn't fail me, it was some time after the sector analysis division was established in Oct. 1970, as a result of the approval of the AA (LA Bureau) then in office, that sector assessments were conceived and rather quickly made mandatory: an internal condition precedent for a sector loan. But sector analyses were not made mandatory, and are not mandatory now. Let me add immediately that I am not recommending they be made mandatory. The possibility of carrying out a sector analysis should be determined on a case-by-case basis: country interest, need, capacity, U.S. resource availability, etc. must be determined first. However, the central role assigned to sector assessments in AID's programming process has contributed to reducing the role of sector analysis.

As explained in the April 11 memorandum, sector assessments (Purpose C projects) are instruments for rapidly obtaining a rationale for loan allocations. They do ^{not} use a massive amount of primary data for disaggregate analysis in order to come to firm determinations concerning possible complementarities and inescapable trade-offs among major, multiple objectives (Purpose B), nor to involve, as well, the host country in order to internalize the sector analysis process (Purpose C). Consequently, when a mission initiated a sector analysis it was applauded by the new and small Sector Analysis Division and not by LA/DR. This is why enthusiasm dampened. Like any other mission or department, AID missions in the field respond to frowns & pats on the back from the home office. Mission enthusiasm diminishes considerably if AID/W's inquiry about the project is limited to an interest in its termination. Admittedly, I and other division members, have underestimated the duration of these new kind of projects, and the issue of duration needs to be aired.

Who pays and should pay for sector analyses: AID/W or the field? I must confess to the simple-minded view that it is the U.S. taxpayer who pays, and that the rest is a bookkeeping question. For purposes of Congressional review it would be clearly preferable if the funds requested in a CP for the Bureau of Census, say, were charged to each mission and country involved. This cannot be a problem since the activities of this RSSA are project and country specific. Prior determination of the projects to be carried out in order to determine the overall workload, staffing & funding must be done in any case. Despite long discussions concerning this matter, there may be administrative regulations I still do not understand, but the issue of centralization vs. decentralization with respect to funding strikes me as fundamentally false.

-5-

I think the same can be said with respect to design or methodology, and implementation. Point 3 in the cable that suggests that sector analysis will now be projectized is particularly puzzling. Sector analyses have always been projects. Indeed, the Division has always thought it immensely important to act accordingly and, from the start, to designate a project director who will see the project through to the finish, and to specify in as much detail as possible the nature of the policy products and the capabilities to be developed by the internalization process that will signal completion.

The real issue concerning decentralization of design, monitoring, implementation & training is what parts & how much of the U.S. workload can be carried out by mission & other field personnel, and what parts & how much must therefore be carried out by the AID/W backstoppers. As I suggested in my April 11 memorandum discussion of the one-site and the two-site options, the more that can be done on the LDC site the better. The first preference is to have the host-country personnel do the job; the second preference is to have resident foreign advisors and/or mission personnel do it; the third choice is to have it done by personnel on the second site, Washington, where, up to now, a good part of the load has come to rest. In both the second & third case the job should be done to a maximum extent with host-country personnel assisting, as part of the internalization process.

In sum, as presented, the issues of designing, projectizing, and implementing tend to mask some real issues which need to be aired. The cable refers to backstopping arrangements and thus recognizes that the missions will not be able to carry out sector analyses without additional U.S. assistance. But it does not address the issue of the mission staffing required to bring about greater mission involvement. And it should be noted, in this connection, that increased reliance on contracting for analytical work will have the effect of further reducing mission involvement.

The cable gives another reason for "decentralization", i.e., "improve integration of sector analytic work with other mission and bureau activities, thereby increasing the impact of sector analysis on programming and implementation." My objection to this statement is that it's ~~is~~ ambiguous. If it means that the design of a sector analysis should take mission project experience into account, and that the design of future mission projects should reflect sector analysis findings, the statement is unobjectionable. But if, as I fear, the statement is taken to mean that sector analysis projects are to be subordinated to pre-conceived policies, or to ongoing project approaches, then the fundamental purpose of sector analyses will be thwarted.

concerns how much of the U.S. responsibility

As I see it, the genuine issue of decentralization can be placed in the field missions. This issue is related to issues of mission staffing and training, and to the need for close cooperation among analysts, statisticians & programmers. All these issues depend on a fundamental policy question: how important are sector analyses for the kind of development Congress desires? Such a question is

-6-

Agency-wide. In fairness to the L.A. Bureau, it should be recognized that, despite the internal doubts, it went further in this direction than any other Bureau (although recently it seems to be turning back). Is, or is not, the furtherance of sector analysis an Agency, or an LA Bureau, policy? In my fourth objection, which addresses this question, I will argue that the cable suggests that furthering sector analyses does not have high priority.

Objection 3: The cable contributes to the widespread confusion between sector analyses and sector assessments.

First, although the cable's announced subject is "L.A. Sector Analysis Activities and Support", it goes on to discuss sector assessments, as well, contributing thereby to the tendency to confuse Purpose A and Purpose C activities. Second, the justification for "decentralization" that refers to the "integration of sector analytic work with other mission and Bureau development activities, thereby increasing the impact of sector analysis on programming and implementation", further contributes to the widespread confusion by so strongly suggesting that the purpose of a sector analysis is the same as that of a sector assessment, to wit, improving the next AID loan in the sector, and failing to mention host-country policy and resource allocation. Third, titling point 3 of the cable "Sector Assessment and Analysis Support" and then dealing with sector assessment arrangements contributes further to the confusion. Fourth, the cable does not define the two activities, although this would have been an opportunity to do so.

Objection 4: The cable will have the effect of discouraging sector analyses.

In its opening statement the cable announces that the "Sector Analysis Division...will cease to exist and primary responsibility for such activities, when they are undertaken, will now rest with the missions." (My underlining). As explained under Objection 2, for 6½ years the missions have observed considerable Washington skepticism concerning the value and practicability of sector analyses. It seems to me that a cable which announces the demise of the division is bound to be taken as an increase in skepticism, if some strong words of encouragement for sector analysis are not also included. Admittedly, the cable's references to sector analysis seem to place it in the category of good things but, as we all know, almost anything & everything can be defended as "good for development". The question is one of comparative value. It is a question of priorities.

As well as examining the country situation, missions properly look to the Agency & Bureau policy in establishing their priorities. In the area of study they will find that sector assessments are compulsory, and sector analyses are not. A common and usually justified mission complaint is that it is asked to carry out more activities than it can properly handle. Sector analysis projects are rather complex multi-year projects which would create new problems and headaches for missions. Given the history of sector analysis, it seems to me that a cable which does not urge the initiation of sector analysis projects, informs the missions that the Sector Analysis Division has been abolished, and states that for the non-agricultural sectors "support arrangements for sector assessment/analysis activities have not yet been formalized" will have the effect

-7-

"formalized" will have the effect of discouraging sector analyses.

The Sector Analysis Function

I would not like to have my objections to the cable, or the points I raised in the April 11 memorandum, to be wrongly viewed as arguments which have their origins in mere organizational considerations. I have proposed that the decision to abolish the Sector Analysis Division in the L.A. Bureau be reversed, and that the analytical function be strengthened throughout the Agency by establishing similar division in the other regional bureaus, because I have seen no other organizational proposal which will assure the proper carrying out of this function. The actions outlined in the cable reflect an underestimation of the value of sector analysis and of the special arrangements required for its proper execution.

Most of the individuals who have been involved in sector analysis work (and there are now a considerable number of us) have been convinced that it can make a major contribution in bringing about LDC reforms that favor a poor majority. In my case this conviction has been strengthened by a recent policy breakthrough in El Salvador. As a result of a 170-page sector analysis document (prepared by the Ministry with substantial AID & EUCEN assistance, not prepared by AID for the Ministry) the Ministry has changed its mind about the causes of "dropout" and the low schooling level attainment in the rural area, and has decided that the constraints are not on the demand side, as has been maintained until recently, but on the side of supply. In two telephone conversations with San Salvador we have been informed that the Ministry now plans to further expand educational services in the rural area, in part by completing all the incomplete schools, and in the future, by not building schools which have less than six grades. The rapidity with which this major policy change (the analysis is still under way and most of the final documents have yet to be prepared) has followed the empirical findings may be quite significant. And on some other occasion it may also be useful to consider the possible connections among the 1977 post-election violence and human rights violations, the 1967 repeal by the Legislative Assembly of its own agrarian reform law when this law was strenuously opposed by powerful interests, the insufficiency of schooling in the rural areas, and the failure of the peasantry, with a very high illiteracy rate, to organize and protest the repeal of the agrarian reform law when the repeal was under way.

In any case, I wish to reaffirm my conviction that the kinds of inquiry represented by sector analysis, carried out in and by LDCs, with outside assistance, will increase the probability that reforms favoring poor majorities are carried out. If AID wants the LDCs to carry out sound, objective inquiries of this sort, it should not attempt to make them subordinate to the annual obligation process.

During a two-month TDY in El Salvador, beginning May 15, I expect to use whatever free time is available to further elaborate on the policy and organizational implications of sector analysis, for consideration in AID.

Department of State

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S/P-OF: NBOYER (DRAFT)
S/P: RJHARRINGTON (DRAFT)
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S/P ONLY

MAC

-----192118Z 013571 /72

O 192052Z APR 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 087800

DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PDIP, E5

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: SAN SALVADOR 1732

FOR [REDACTED] FROM ANTHONY LAKE

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ON THE "SCENARIO OF AMBASSADORIAL CHANGE". GRANVILLE AUSTIN HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE COORDINATOR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED.
VANCE

B6

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PART B6

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S/P:MACASEY:BDM
EXT. 29716 9-26-77
S/P:JGARTEN: ACTING

S/P-OF - MR. KINNEY
S/P:RJHARRINGTON
EA/RA:DHARRIS

S/IL: DGOOD

S/P ONLY.

ROUTINE MELBOURNE

ROUTINE CANBERRA

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, ELAB, AS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN AUSTRALIA

FOR [] FROM GARTEN - S/P, ACTING

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN AUSTRALIA. COPIES OF YOUR REPORT HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS, THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, AND THE EAST ASIA REGIONAL AFFAIRS LABOR ADVISOR. THANK YOU FOR BRINGING THESE REPORTS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE DEPARTMENT. YY

JG
MAC
DSK
RJH
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DH

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RELEASE IN FULL

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 0273

PAGE 01 BUENOS 07234 031907Z

73

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 IO-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3311
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 7234

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UN, KS, AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINE POSITION ON KOREAN ISSUE AT UN: REVIEW OF BIDDING
AND REQUEST FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE

REFS: A) BA-7130, B) STATE 245459, C) BA-7148, D) STATE 131759,
E) BA-6903

1. ARGENTINA'S ORIGINAL POSITION WAS THAT SHE WOULD ABSTAIN ON ALL THREE QUESTIONS REGARDING KOREAN IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE. THIS REFLECTED A MIX OF PRAGMATISM AND PRINCIPLE, WITH MORE OF THE FORMER THAN THE LATTER. ARGENTINA MAY SINCERELY HAVE BELIEVED THAT NEITHER RESOLUTION WAS ADEQUATE AND THAT A THIRD SHOULD BE SOUGHT, BUT SHE ALSO HAD COMPELLING PRACTICAL REASONS FOR ABSTAINING: (A) SHE HAS RELATIONS WITH BOTH KOREAS AND WISHED TO OFFEND NEITHER; (B) SHE DID NOT WISH TO LOSE THIRD WORLD SUPPORT BY VOTING WITH US AND AGAINST NORTH KOREA; AND, PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, (C) HER AMBASSADOR IN THE UN HAS IDEAS OF BECOMING SFOGEN AND WISHES TO DO NOTHING TO OFFEND THE NONALIGNED BLOC. HENCE, ARGENTINA MADE UP HER MIND EARLY THAT SHE WOULD ABSTAIN ON THE TWO RESOLUTIONS. REPRESENTATIONS ON OUR PART HERE, IN THE UN, AND IN WASHINGTON COULD NOT SHAKE THEM FROM THAT POSITION. NEITHER COULD THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SOUTH KOREANS, THE JAPANESE, THE FRENCH AND OTHERS.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 BUENOS 07234 031907Z

2. ARGENTINA DOES, HOWEVER, VALUE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US. THUS, WHEN OUR CONTINUED DEMARCHES FINALLY CONVINCED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT WE PLACED EXTREME IMPORTANCE ON THIS ISSUE, THEY BEGAN TO SEARCH FOR SOME MEANS OF ACCOMMODATING US-- WITHOUT GIVING AWAY THEIR OWN POSITION. WHAT THEY CAME UP WITH AT THE LAST MINUTE WAS THE IDEA OF VOTING WITH US ON THE PRIORITY ISSUE, THUS, IN THEIR MINDS, HELPING TO ASSURE THAT THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION WAS TAKEN UP FIRST IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY--WHICH THEY BELIEVED WOULD ASSURE ITS PASSAGE AND KILL THE UNFRIENDLY RESOLUTION. THEY WERE UNDER NO MISCONCEPTIONS CONCERNING OUR DESIRE TO DEFEAT THE UNFRIENDLY RESOLUTION IN COMMITTEE. AMB HILL, IN HIS DEMARCHE ON OCT 28 SUGGESTING THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO REVIEW OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IF THEY DID NOT VOTE WITH US (SEE REF A), REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE VOTE THE FOLLOWING DAY--I.E. IN FIRST COMMITTEE. WE ARE CERTAIN REPRESENTATIONS IN THE UN AND WASHINGTON WERE EQUALLY CLEAR, BUT WHILE THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO KILL IT IN COMMITTEE, THE ARGENTINES APPARENTLY LOOKED AT THE PROBLEM AS A WHOLE, RATHER THAN SIMPLY IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE. FROM SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH WORKING LEVEL OFFICIALS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY ASSUMED THAT NOTWITHSTANDING OUR EFFORT TO DEFEAT THE UNFRIENDLY RESOLUTION IN COMMITTEE, OUR OVERRIDING PURPOSE WAS TO MAKE CERTAIN IT WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AND THIS THEY BELIEVED COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY VOTING TO TAKE UP THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION FIRST, EVEN IF BOTH RESOLUTIONS WERE SENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. OTHERWISE, AS ONE WORKING LEVEL OFFICIAL COMMENTED, "WHY DID YOU ATTACH ANY IMPORTANCE TO THE PRIORITY ISSUE IN YOUR AIDE-MEMOIRE TO US?" (SEE REF B).

3. FROM THE INTIMATIONS OF WORKING LEVEL OFFICERS, WE WERE AWARE OF THIS VIEW (SEE REF C), THOUGH FONMIN ARAUZ CASTEX NEVER ARTICULATED IT. EVEN IF HE HAD, WE WOULD HAVE HAD NO STRONG ARGUMENTS TO USE AGAINST IT, FOR ALL OUR INSTRUCTIONS FOCUSED ON VOTING IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE. NONE REALLY FLABORATED ON WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AND WHAT OUR TACTICS MIGHT BE IF BOTH RESOLUTIONS PASSED. IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS WITH WORKING LEVEL OFFICIALS WE FELL BACK ON PARA TEN OF REF D, I.E. THAT AN UNACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE RESOLUTION WOULD PROBABLY BE THE OUTCOME IN PLENARY IF BOTH PRESENT RESOLUTIONS PASSED IN FIRST

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FORM NO. 1652



Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 BUENOS 07234 031907Z

COMMITTEE. THIS WAS NOT AN EFFECTIVE ARGUMENT, HOWEVER, FOR THE ARGENTINES SIMPLY ASKED, "WHY?", AND WENT BACK TO THEIR ASSUMPTION THAT WE HAD ENOUGH VOTES TO PASS OUR RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. FURTHER, THE ARGENTINES HAVE ALL ALONG FAVORED A THIRD RESOLUTIONS; HENCE, THIS WAS WORSE THAN NO ARGUMENT AT ALL.

4. THE ARGENTINES MAY WELL HAVE BEEN TOTALLY WRONG IN THEIR APPROACH, BUT HERE AT LEAST (WE CANNOT SPEAK FOR ORTIZ DE ROZAS' VIEW) THEY BELIEVED AND STILL BELIEVE, THAT THEY WERE HELPFUL TO US BY VOTING AGAINST REVERSING THE PRIORITIES. THIS MAY NOT BE THE CASE, BUT IN ANY EVENT WE WOULD MUCH APPRECIATE SOME INDICATION FROM THE DEPT OR USUN AS TO WHAT WE DO NOW, DO WE INTEND TO LOBBY FOR THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION IN THE GA, DO WE GO TO A COMPROMISE RESOLUTION IN PLENARY (AND IF SO, WHY?), OR IS THERE SOME THIRD COURSE?

5. IF WE ARE GOING TO TRY TO GET THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION THROUGH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WE ASSUME WE WILL NEED ALL THE VOTES WE CAN GET, INCLUDING THAT OF ARGENTINA. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT WITH A BIT OF HORSE TRADING WE JUST MIGHT SWING THE ARGENTINES OVER TO VOTING WITH US. MOST VITAL ISSUE FOR ARGENTINA, AS FOMMIN ARAUZ CASTEX HAS INDICATED (SEE REF E), IS THAT OF MALVINAS. ARGENTINES UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIMS AGAINST THOSE OF THE UK. IF, HOWEVER, WE COULD SEE OUR WAY CLEAR TO PRIVATELY AND DISCREETLY URGF BRITISH TO CARRY ON WITH NEGOTIATIONS, THUS REMOVING IRRITATION BETWEEN TWO CLOSE FRIENDS, THIS MIGHT WELL BE ENOUGH TO CAUSE ARGENTINES, IN RETURN, TO VOTE WITH US ON KOREAN ISSUE. AND SUCH DEMARCHE ON OUR PART TO BRITISH WOULD COST US LITTLE. THERE IS UN RESOLUTION CALLING FOR TWO SIDES TO NEGOTIATE. WE WOULD NOT BE SHOWING PREFERENCE FOR EITHER SIDE. WE WOULD SIMPLY BE GIVING VERBAL SUPPORT TO A UN RESOLUTION AND URGING TWO FRIENDS TO SETTLE THEIR PROBLEM THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

6. CERTAINLY EMBASSY WOULD RECOMMEND STRONGLY AGAINST ANY "REVIEW OF BILATERAL RELATIONS" AT THIS TIME. ARGENTINA BELIEVES SHE RESPONDED TO OUR DEMARCHE, AT LEAST IN PART, AND WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND SUCH A REVIEW. FURTHER, WE MAY NEED THE ARGENTINE VOTE ON OTHER KEY ISSUES IN THE GA--POSSIBLY EVEN ON THE KOREAN ISSUE ITSELF. WE WILL NOT

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PAGE 04 BUENOS 07234 031907Z

GET IT BY REVIEWING RELATIONS, AND FINALLY, WE HAVE OTHER
IMPORTANT INTERESTS HERE--IN TERMS OF OUR INVESTMENTS,
OUR POLITICAL STRATEGY IN THE HEMISPHERE AND IN THE SOUTHERN
CONE--WHICH COULD BE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BY SUCH A STEP. WE
DO NOT RULE IT OUT FOR THE FUTURE, BUT AT THIS POINT IT
WOULD APPEAR TO BE PREMATURE AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.
HILL

~~SECRET~~

RELEASE IN FULL

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

December 16, 1971

To : The Secretary

From: S/PC - Arthur A. Hartman

Attached (Tab B) New Delhi Dissent Message

As you have instructed S/PC is reviewing the attached message (Tab B) and will be submitting comments after consultation with appropriate offices. I recommend:

a. That the message be given to the Chairman of the Open Forum Panel for comment, and

b. That you sign a telegram to New Delhi (Tab A) acknowledging receipt of this message.

Attachments:

Tab A - Proposed Telegram

Tab B - New Delhi cable

S/PC:AAHartman/gw
ext 22474

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

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FORM DS 322(OCR)

CONFIDENTIAL

S/P-0FP:SV0GELGESANG:EMB
7/8/74:X28790
S/P:PSWIERS

USIA {FOR IAA ONLY} {INFO}

PRIORITY PRETORIA

DISSENT CHANNEL

PS
SV

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: OEXC, SF
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: {A} PRETORIA 2911; {B} PRETORIA 2857; {C} PRETORIA
2663; {D} PRETORIA 2787

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF DISSENT TELEGRAM
2857 OF JUNE 28, 1974 SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED]

B6

2. MR. WILLARD A. DE PREE OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF
{S/P} HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF SUBSTANTIVE
RESPONSE TO THIS DISSENT MESSAGE.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR
DISSENT MESSAGES, [REDACTED]'S TELEGRAM HAS BEEN CIR-
CULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, AND
THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. ADDITIONAL COPIES ARE
BEING SENT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AF-
FAIRS, THE DIRECTOR FOR THE OFFICE OF AFRICAN PROGRAMS, AND
THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS AT USIA.

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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

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12

4. WE WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE CONCERNS
EXPRESSED BY BOTH 44

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Department of State

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DRAFTED BY S/P: MACASEY: BDM
APPROVED BY S/P: ALAKE
S/P: CFARRAR
S/P-OF: DSKINNEY
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MANILA

UNCLAS STATE 268301

DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: MANILA 17279

FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P-LAKE

B6

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 2, 1977. MR. CURTIS FARRAR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISSENT CHANNEL REGULATIONS, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL THE THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. VANCE

UNCLASSIFIED

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PART B6

CONFIDENTIAL

S/P:PKAPLAN:BAW
12/1/77 X20398
S/P:ALAKE

S/P:JGARTEN
S/P-OF-DSKINNEY

EUR/EE - MR. ANDREWS {SUBS}

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE WARSAW

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PO

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: US AID TO POLAND

REF: {A} WARSAW 8467; B {B} WARSAW 8179; {C} WARSAW 8192

TO [REDACTED] FROM S/P DIRECTOR LAKE

B6

ALP
PK
JG
NA
DSK

1. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND HAVE REVIEWED YOUR MESSAGE {REF A} ON US AID TO POLAND. WHILE IT ARRIVED TOO LATE FOR CONSIDERATION BEFORE THE NOVEMBER 22 PRC MEETING ON POLAND, IT WILL ENSURE THAT IT IS INCLUDED IN THE BRIEFING MATERIAL SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT'S REPRESENTATIVES AT THE PRC FOLLOW-ON MEETING, WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN EARLY DECEMBER UPON THE RETURN OF SECRETARY KREPS.

2. BY NOW, YOU MAY HAVE READ STATE 282737 {EXDIS}, WHICH SUMMARIZES THE RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 22 PRC MEETING AND REFERS TO FOLLOW-ON WORK. YOU ALSO MAY HAVE SEEN STATE 279079, IN WHICH ASSISTANT SECRETARY VEST AND I INDICATED OUR APPRECIATION TO AMBASSADOR DAVIES FOR THE TWO EXCELLENT WARSAW CABLES {REFS B AND C}.

THEY CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE DEPARTMENT'S CON-

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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

CONFIDENTIAL

12

CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUES BEFORE THE PRC. AS WE STATED, DISAGREEMENT EXISTED -- AND CONTINUES TO EXIST -- ON SOME OF THE DETAILED ISSUES. YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE DEALS WITH SOME OF THESE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS -- ESPECIALLY THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF US ASSISTANCE.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULT POLISH FINANCIAL SITUATION AND THE PROBLEMS THAT ENSUE FROM POLAND'S INEFFECTIVE POLITICO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM. SECRETARY KREPS IS SEEKING FURTHER DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE POLISH ECONOMY AND INDEBTEDNESS TO ASSIST US IN OUR FURTHER POLICY DELIBERATIONS. WE CERTAINLY DO NOT INTEND AN INDEFINITE SUBSIDIZATION OF THE POLISH ECONOMY. RATHER, WE WILL MAKE WHATEVER DECISIONS ARE NECESSARY BASED ON OUR OWN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE SITUATION. THIS WOULD INCLUDE REINFORCING POLISH EFFORTS TO STABILIZE ITS ECONOMY. IT ALSO WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE DANGERS OF INSTABILITY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, WHICH FORM THE CORE OF US POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE, AS DEFINED IN PD-21.

4. WE SHALL CERTAINLY KEEP IN MIND THE QUESTIONS YOU RAISED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF YOUR MESSAGE. WE EXPECT SOME OF THEM TO BE ADDRESSED AT THE NEXT PRC MEETING. YY

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 KINSHA 05689 03 OF 04 021310Z 6591
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 4 KINSHASA 5583

DISSENT CHANNEL

DRAFTER DESIRES DISTRIBUTION TO P, F AND HA

12. IN MY VIEW MOST OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR CONTINUING WITH
PRESENT POLICY ARE UNSOUND. THIS DISSENT PAPER HAS BEEN
DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CORRUPTION AND INEPTITUDE OF THE
MOBUTU REGIME ARE SO GREAT THAT ITS COLLAPSE IS INEVITABLE
IN THE SHORT OR MID-TERM REGARDLESS OF WHAT US POLICY IS ADOPTED.
THIS BEING THE CASE, LONG-TERM US INTERESTS CLEARLY DEMAND THAT WE
SEEK
OUT AN ALTERNATIVE TO MOBUTU NOW BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE AND A HOSTILE
REGIME HAS TAKEN OVER IN ZAIRE AS IN COEA, ETHIOPIA AND VIETNAM. THE
QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER TO STAY WITH MOBUTU OR TO RISK AN UNKNOWN WHO
MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP ZAIRE UNITED. THE QUESTION IS RATHER TO
ASSIST
IN MOBUTU'S REPLACEMENT NOW OR SEE HIM REPLACED LATER BY FORCES WHICH
ARE NOT ONLY OUTSIDE US INFLUENCE BUT ALSO ACTIVELY HOSTILE TO
AMERICAN INTERESTS.

13. THE US CANNOT PRETEND THAT SUCH AN ANTI-US POLICY BY A MOBUTU
SUCCESSOR REGIME WOULD BE UNDESERVED. WE AIRLIFT SUPPORT TO THE
BELGIAN AND FRENCH FORCES IS NOT THE REAL ISSUE. THE EMERGING
YOUNG ZAIRIAN ELITE, WHICH IS ANTI-MOBUTU ALMOST TO A MAN, KNOWS
AND ARTICULATES THAT THE US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PICKED MOBUTU
AS
ITS CHOSEN INSTRUMENT IN THE SIXTIES AND THAT THE US GOVERNMENT
CONTINUES

TO GIVE IMPORTANT SUPPORT TO THE MOBUTU REGIME TODAY. THIS ELITE
MAY NOT HAVE THE EXACT FIGURES BUT IT IS GENERALLY AWARE THAT
ZAIRE RECEIVES THE LARGEST AMOUNT OF US CIVILIAN AID OF ANY
COUNTRY IN BLACK AFRICA, THAT ZAIRE RECEIVES MORE US MILITARY
AID THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN BLACK AFRICA, AND THAT THE US
MISSION IN ZAIRE IS THE LARGEST IN BLACK AFRICA. IT ALSO SUSPECTS
THAT THE SRF FACILITY IN ZAIRE IS STILL THE LARGEST IN BLACK
AFRICA AND THAT IT HAS VERY GOOD WORKING ARRANGEMENTS WITH MOBUTU'S
SECRET POLICE, THE CND.

14. FROM THESE FACTS AND SUSPICIONS, MEMBERS OF THE EMERGING
ELITE DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE US COULD END MOBUTU'S EXPLOITATION
OF THE ZAIRIAN PEOPLE IF ONLY IT WISHED TO DO SO. THEY LOOK
UPON OUR DECLARATIONS THAT US POLICY IS DESIGNED TO AID THE ZAIRIAN
PEOPLE AND NOT ITS LEADERS AS DISINGENUOUS AT BEST. WHILE WE IN
THE US MISSION BELIEVE IN THE SINCERITY OF AMERICAN MOTIVES,
WE ARE ALSO AWARE THAT US AID DOES IN FACT SUSTAIN THE MOBUTU
REGIME.

15. THE US PRESENCE IN ZAIRE IS LARGE; THE BELGIAN AND FRENCH PRESENCE
IS EVEN LARGER. THE GOZ IS TOTALLY DEPENDENT UPON A PROSPECTIVE
LARGE INCREASE IN WESTERN ASSISTANCE FOR SURVIVAL TODAY. THAT
INCREASE CAN EITHER BE USED IN A VAIN EFFORT TO PROP UP A DISCREDITED
AND DECAYING REGIME OR TO SEEK AN ALTERNATIVE TO IT.

16. WHILE VARIOUS SCENARIOS FOR REPLACING MOBUTU ARE POSSIBLE,
THE US CLEARLY OUGHT TO TRY TO ACT IN CONCERT WITH BELGIUM AND
FRANCE. AFTER INFORMAL PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS, WE SHOULD INFORM
BELGIUM AND FRANCE THAT THE US HAS DECIDED AGAINST GIVING ANY
FURTHER ASSISTANCE TO THE MOBUTU REGIME. WE SHOULD OFFER TO WORK

WITH OUR TWO ALLIES TO FORCE MOBUTU TO RESIGN AND TO INSTALL A MORE
PROMISING SUCCESSOR. CONSIDERING THAT THE VERY SURVIVAL OF THE GOZ
IS DEPENDENT UPON A LARGE INCREASE IN WESTERN AID, OUR JOINT
LEVERAGE WOULD BE ENORMOUS, IF BELGIUM AND FRANCE WERE UNWILLING
TO JOIN WITH US IN SUCH A PROGRAM, WE SHOULD MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR
THAT THE US IS EQUALLY UNWILLING TO JOIN BELGIUM AND FRANCE IN
FURTHER EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO. THE MOST LIKELY RESULT
WOULD BE A JOINT WESTERN EFFORT TO CHOOSE AND INSTALL A
SUCCESSOR TO MOBUTU. IF, HOWEVER, BELGIUM AND FRANCE REFUSED TO JOIN
WITH US, THE US SHOULD PUBLICLY DISASSOCIATE ITSELF FROM THEIR
EFFORTS TO PROP UP THE MOBUTU REGIME. BY DOING SO AND BY REDUCING
OUR LARGE GOVERNMENTAL PRESENCE IN ZAIRE, WE WOULD ENHANCE OUR
CREDIBILITY WITH THE SUCCESSOR REGIME WHICH WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY
EVENTUATE DESPITE OUR ALLIES' BEST EFFORTS.

17. IF THIS SCENARIO SUGGESTS A POSSIBLE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION
OF HOW TO REPLACE MOBUTU, THE QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD REPLACE HIM
REMAINS
TO BE ADDRESSED. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT A DICTATORSHIP DOES NOT SELECT
A POTENTIAL SUCCESSOR TO STAND IN THE WINGS. THE MOBUTU REGIME IS
NO EXCEPTION. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER CERTAIN
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES TO ZAIRE'S CURRENT PRESIDENT.

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TO RUFHOL/ANEMBASSY BONN 923
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1061
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BERLIN 2805

DISSENT CHANNEL (PER STATE A-3559)
THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DESSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY
[REDACTED], USBER. DESIRED DISTRIBUTION IN DEPT.:
EUR/CE; EB/OA.

B6

K(2) THREE ALLIES MIGHT JOINTLY NEGOTIATE "BILATERAL"
WITH GDR AT SAME TIME FRG DOES. ALLIES MIGHT GRANT
GDR LANDING RIGHTS IN WEST BERLIN FOR FLIGHTS ORIGINATING
IN GDR (E.G. ROSTOCK OR LEIPZIG) IN RETURN FOR U.S.,
U.K. AND FRENCH RIGHTS TO VOVERFLY GDR. WE COULD ALSO
SEEK RIGHTS FOR SAME WEST BERLIN-GDR ROUTES TO BE GRANTED
TO GDR, IF MIRROR IMAGE TYPE AGREEMENT PREFERRED; BUT
OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE SIGNIFICANT TO
US THAN LANDING RIGHTS IN GDR. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD KEEP
ALL THREE ALLIES IN STEP AND WOULD CONCEDE NOTHING OUTSIDE
GERMANY. IT WOULD DEVIATE FROM NORM OF FRG NEGOTIATIONS
ON BEHALF OF WEST BERLIN, BUT OCCUPYING POWERS HAVE
RESERVED RIGHTS IN FIELD OF AVIATION.

ALLIES WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH GDR ON AVIATION (OR ANYTHING ELSE) AS SOON AS FRG IS READY TO COMMENCE AIR TALKS WITH GDR. HOWEVER, IF FIRST FRG PROPOSAL TO GDR WERE THAT GDR JOIN IASTA AND, FOR SOME REASON, THAT DID NOT WORK OUT, ENOUGH TIME MIGHT HAVE ELAPSED SO THAT ALLIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK WITH GDR FOR SECOND ROUND. GDR PROBABLY HAS LITTLE INTEREST IN FLYING TO WEST BERLIN; BUT THEY MAY BE MORE INCLINED TO PERMIT OTHER NON-THREE POWER FLIGHTS TO WEST BERLIN, INCLUDING LUFTHANSA, IF THEY THEMSELVES ALSO HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO. FURTHERMORE, PRESTIGE OF ENTERING DIRECTLY INTO AGREEMENT WITH THREE ALLIES, ESPECIALLY ONE INVOLVING WEST BERLIN, MIGHT APPEAL TO THEM.

(3) EACH OF THREE ALLIES MIGHT EXCHANGE OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS WITH GDR IN SEPARATE BILATERALS AT TIME OF FRG-GDR AIR AGREEMENT. GDR MIGHT PREFER US, UK AND FRANCE OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS TO WEST BERLIN LANDING RIGHTS OR BOTH MIGHT HAVE TO BE CONCEDED FOR ALLIES TO OBTAIN RIGHTS TO OVERFLY GDR. EVEN BOTH MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH UNLESS DONE EARLY ENOUGH SO THAT FACT OF AGREEMENTS WOULD BE WORTH SOMETHING TO THEM REGARDLESS OF SUBSTANCE. LATER GDR MIGHT INSIST ON LANDING RIGHTS IN US AS PART OF ANY BILATERAL AND IT IS DOUBTFUL IF THERE IS ANYTHING WE WOULD WANT FROM GDR IN AVIATION TERMS WHICH WOULD BE WORTH OUR GRANTING THEM LANDING RIGHTS IN US. GDSKLEIN
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DISSENT CHANNEL

F.O. 11652: N/A
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

FOR ADMINISTRATOR, MR. DANIEL PARKER, ROOM 5942

REFS: A) A-3592, B) AIDTO CIRC. A-207, C) STATE 118917
D) YAOUNDE 1669

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSIDENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY
[REDACTED] AREA DEVELOPMENT OFFICE,
YAOUNDE

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2. REF. B CALLS FOR INFORMATION ON EMPLOYEES AT POST WHO ARE FOREIGN BORN OR HAVE FOREIGN BORN SPOUSES. IT ASKS FOR THE EMPLOYEE'S NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, NAME OF FOREIGN BORN SPOUSE, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, CURRENT CITIZENSHIP OF EMPLOYEE OR SPOUSE, DATES OF NATURALIZATION IF U.S. CITIZEN AND LOCATION OF SPOUSE. THIS INFORMATION IS APPARENTLY REQUESTED EVEN THOUGH IT IS A MATTER OF RECORD THE SUBJECT EMPLOYEE AND SPOUSE ARE BOTH U.S. CITIZENS. THE PRESENT DISSIDENT IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE POLICY OF REQUIRING SUCH INFORMATION.

3. ON THE FACE OF IT, LIST-MAKING OF U.S. CITIZENS WHO ARE FOREIGN BORN SMACKS OF INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION. ANYONE MAKING UP LISTS LIKE THAT HAS THE BURDEN TO EXPLAIN THE REASON FOR IT. THEREFORE, AID/W WAS REQUESTED BY RE D TO GIVE THE REASON WHY SUCH INFORMATION WAS CALLED FOR BECAUSE THE MANUAL ORDERS CITED IN REF. B DO NOT MAKE CLEAR THE REASON FOR IT. THE RESPONSE WAS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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REF. C, A NON-RESPONSE.

4. LIST-MAKING OF DIRECT-HIRE FOREIGN BORN U.S. CITIZENS AND SPOUSES IS OBJECTIONABLE UNLESS THERE IS SOME LEGITIMATE REASON FOR IT. THE PURPOSE BEHIND REF. B SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED TO DETERMINE ITS LEGITIMACY. IF IT IS LEGITIMATE, AID/W EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO PROPER EXPLANATION WHEN BEING CALLED UPON TO PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION.

8. NO OBJECTION IS BEING RAISED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF ASKING AN EMPLOYEE SUCH QUESTIONS ON AN EMPLOYMENT QUESTIONNAIRE. ASKING CITIZENSHIP, PLACE AND DATE OF BIRTH IS STANDARD PRACTICE. IT IS THE APPARENT COMPILATION OF A LIST OF FOREIGN BORN U.S. CITIZENS WHICH AT FIRST BLUSH SEEMS OUT OF BOUNDS UNLESS THERE IS SOME ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION. THE PERMISSIBLE DISTINCTIONS IN TREATMENT OF NATURAL BORN U.S. CITIZENS AND NATURALIZED CITIZENS HAVE BECOME FEWER OVER THE YEARS TO THE POINT WHERE ONE CAN QUESTION THE LEGITIMACY OF SUCH A REQUEST AS IN REF. B.
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PAGE 01 BOMH 06717 01 OF 05 261515Z 6505

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CENTRAL MATTERS OF RAISING DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND LIMITING STRATEGICALLY OBJECTIONABLE TRADE. NATO IS NOT A WORLD FORUM BUT A DEFENSE ALLIANCE; AND TO THE EXTENT IT DOES NOT REACT SUBSTANTIVELY TO SOVIET PROVOCATION, IT MERELY HULLIFIES ITS OWN SYMBOLIC ACTS.

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SUBJECT: DISSSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SANCTIONS AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

1. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [REDACTED] THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE, AND SUGGESTS DISTRIBUTION TO USMAYO, US EUROPEAN EMBASSIES, ACDA, AND USIS.

3. SUMMARY: THE NET EFFECT OF US SANCTIONS AFTER AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND IS THE LOSS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF US/SOVIET TRADE TO OTHERS AND AN ACRIIONIOUS DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES ON RELATIONS WITH EUROPE. SANCTIONS AS A MEANS OF LIMITING - OR AT LEAST NOT ADDING TO - SOVIET ABILITY TO COMMIT AGGRESSION IS CONSORANT WITH OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND SHOULD BE VIGOROUSLY PURSUED. THE POLICY FAILED TO DATE BECAUSE:

-- WE DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR TO OURSELVES AND OTHERS WHAT SANCTIONS ARE SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPLISH;

-- WE MISREAD EUROPEAN MOTIVES IN UNDERMINING US/AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS AND BUILDING THE GAS PIPELINE;

-- WE EXECUTED SANCTIONS POLICY IN A WEAK, INCONSISTENT, AND UNTIMELY MANNER.

THE DIFFERENCES WE HAVE WITH THE EUROPEANS OVER SANCTIONS GO TO THE HEART OF THE ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP AND REFLECT LONG-TERM DIVERGENCIES OF GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS. EXPECTING EUROPEANS TO SACRIFICE PERCEIVED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR AN ABSTRACT ALLIANCE UNITY IS UNREALISTIC, AS IS AMPLY PROVED BY THEIR BEHAVIOR AFTER AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND. TO THE EXTENT THAT EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS DIVERGE, THE US MUST BE PREPARED TO DEVISE AND NEGOTIATE APPROPRIATE TRADE-OFFS. IN ATTEMPTING TO PAPER OVER INEQUITIES IN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS, THE DEPARTMENT RISKS HAVING EUROPEAN POLICY PREEMPTED BY THE CONGRESS THROUGH ANOTHER MANSFIELD AMENDMENT. END SUMMARY.

4. WHY WE NEED SANCTIONS: SYMBOL OR SUBSTANCE --

THE UNITED STATES WEAKENED AND CONFUSED ITS SANCTIONS POLICY AT THE OUTSET BY MIXING SYMBOLISH AND PUNITIVE MEASURES WITH GENUINE STRATEGIC CONCERNS. IF OUR PURPOSE IN REACTING TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN IN DECEMBER 1979 WAS TO SIGNAL DISPLEASURE ONLY, THEN IT WAS CORRECT AND COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL TO MGRK WITHIN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH PRODUCED AN EXEMPLARY CONDIGNATION SUPPORTED BY A LARGE MAJORITY. WHERE US POLICY GOT OFF TRACK WAS THE UNIQUE EMPHASIS PLACED IN NATO ON THE OLYMPIC BOYCOTT AND OTHER SYMBOLIC ACTS, WHICH ALLOWED OUR NATO PARTNERS TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE

5. WHAT SHOULD BE UNDERSCORED WITH NATO ALLIES ON SANCTIONS IS THAT INCREASED ACCESS TO WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND CREDITS HAS DEMONSTRABLY ADDED TO THE CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR PROXIES TO COMMIT AGGRESSION. BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN CHEAP CREDITS AND MOUNTAINS OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY PROVIDED THE EAST BLOC DURING THE SO-CALLED DETENTE PERIOD HAVE INCREASED RATHER THAN MODERATED SOVIET EXPANSIONIST APPETITES. THE CASE WAS MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR BY THE USE DURING THE AFGHANISTAN INVASION OF KAMA RIVER PLANT HEAVY VEHICLES, MANUFACTURED WITH THE LATEST WESTERN EQUIPMENT PURCHASED THROUGH SUBSIDIZED CREDITS. THE ARGUMENT IS NOT THAT SANCTIONS ARE NEEDED TO REINFORCE OTHER SIGNALS OF DISPLEASURE, OR THAT SUCH MEASURES WOULD RESULT IN A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN. BLUNTLY STATED, IT IS THAT THE UNITED STATES FOUGHT TWO MAJOR WARS TO STOP SOVIET-BACKED AGGRESSION IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND IT IS UNACCEPTABLE FOR ALLIES TO CONTINUE PRACTICES THAT MAKE SIMILAR WARS FOR THE UNITED STATES MORE LIKELY AND COSTLY. IT IS ASTONISHING THAT TWO YEARS AFTER AFGHANISTAN, AND A WEALTH OF INFORMATION ON HOW WESTERN TRADE IN STRATEGIC AREAS STRENGTHENS THE SOVIETS, THE UNITED STATES HAS STILL NOT MADE ITS CASE FOR SANCTIONS CLEAR TO PUBLICS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. MOREOVER, WE SEEM TO BE REPEATING THE SAME MISTAKES AFTER THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN POLAND.

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PAGE 01 BOHN 06717 02 OF 05 261516Z
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DISSENT CHANNEL:

MISREADING EUROPEAN MOTIVES --
THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE UNITY IN THE PRIORITIES OF EUROPEANS CAN BE JUDGED BY THEIR ACTIONS AFTER THE US/ AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS:

-- NOTWITHSTANDING PUBLIC PLEDGES BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND PRESIDENT GISCARD NOT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR US BUSINESS LOST THROUGH SANCTIONS, THE GERMANS AND FRENCH PROMPTLY SIGNED UP THE TWO MAJOR INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS THE US HAD FOREGONE: A STEEL PLANT AND AN ALUMINUM MILL OF APPROXIMATELY ONE BILLION DOLLARS TOTAL VALUE;

-- THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY QUADRUPLIED ITS GRAIN SALES TO THE SOVIETS IN 1980 TO TWO MILLION TONS, THEREBY JOINING WITH AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND ARGENTINA AS MAJOR UNDERCUTTERS OF THE US GRAIN EMBARGO;

-- TOTAL EUROPEAN TRADE WITH THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO RISE. WEST GERMAN BILATERAL TRADE, FOR INSTANCE, ROSE FROM 14 BILLION DM IN 1979 TO 15.35 BILLION DM IN 1980.

7. WHILE THIS WAS HAPPENING, THE US SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN THE VIEW THAT IT WAS EUROPEAN WEAKNESS OR OPPORTUNISM THAT PROPTED UNDERMINING OF US SANCTIONS; AND, IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO PRESERVE THE FACADE OF ALLIANCE UNITY THAN QUIBBLE OVER TRADE. NO PROMINENT AMERICAN OFFICIAL WENT ON RECORD THAT SUCH BEHAVIOR WAS UNACCEPTABLE, MUCH LESS WORTH OF A POSSIBLE US REACTION. EUROPEAN LEADERS VISITING WASHINGTON WERE PERMITTED TO BLANDLY CLAIM WITHOUT CONTRADICTION THAT THEY WERE NOT PURSUING BUSINESS AS USUAL WITH THE SOVIETS WHILE PUBLISHED STATISTICS SHOWED THE REVERSE. US HOPES WERE FOCUSED ON THE NATO PLEDGE TO RAISE REAL DEFENSE SPENDING BY THREE PER CENT AND TO EXPAND COCOM STRATEGIC CONTROLS THROUGH THE SO-CALLED HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR PROPOSAL. THE EUROPEANS WERE SOON TO SHRUG BOTH ISSUES OFF, LEAVING THE US NOTHING TO SHOW FOR ITS LABORS AND FOREBEARANCE. THEY DREW THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SPONGY US POSTURE, AND THE STAGE WAS SET FOR POLAND AND THE GAS PIPELINE.

8. THE CASE OF WEST GERMANY AND THE GAS PIPELINE IS A PARTICULARLY REVEALING INSTANCE OF HOW US POLICY HAS BEEN MISDIRECTED. IN MARCH 1980 - JUST FOUR MONTHS AFTER THE AFGHANISTAN INVASION - THE GERMAN CABINET TOOK THE KEY DECISION TO ALLOW UP TO 30 PER CENT OF DOMESTIC GAS USE TO BE OF SOVIET ORIGIN.

UNDER GERMAN LEADERSHIP, A EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM OF GAS COMPANIES EVENTUALLY PUT TOGETHER A PACKAGE WHICH WILL PROVIDE WESTERN EUROPE WITH 40 BILLION CUBIC METERS OF SOVIET GAS PER YEAR, ASSURE 15 BILLION DOLLARS OF EUROPEAN EQUIPMENT SALES AND DOUBLE SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNING IN THE COMING DECADE - THE BIGGEST EAST/WEST DEAL IN HISTORY. WHEN THE SIZE AND NATURE OF THE DEAL EVENTUALLY BECAME KNOWN TO THE US, CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT THE THREAT OF SOVIET ENERGY BLACKMAIL. THE GERMANS

MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN RESPONSE:

-- GERMANY NEEDS THE GAS, AND NO OTHER SOURCE IS AVAILABLE;

-- THIRTY PER CENT SOVIET GAS PRESENTS NO BLACKMAIL PROBLEM SINCE IT WOULD LARGELY BE USED IN INDUSTRIES AND UTILITIES THAT COULD EASILY SWITCH TO ALTERNATIVE FUELS;

-- THE MATTER IS NOT A GERMAN GOVERNMENT CONCERN SINCE IT IS A PURELY COMMERCIAL DEAL WITH NO OFFICIAL SUBSIDIES INVOLVED.

ALL OF THE ABOVE SUBSEQUENTLY PROVED TO BE FALSE, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THE US EVER SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. TO THE EXTENT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE GAS REQUIREMENTS, THEY WERE BASED ON A CONTINUATION OF A 10-15 PER CENT PER YEAR INCREASE IN GAS CONSUMPTION EXPERIENCED IN THE 70'S, WHEN GAS WAS CONSIDERABLY CHEAPER THAN ANY ALTERNATIVE FUEL. HOWEVER, GAS CONSUMPTION IN GERMANY DROPPED SHARPLY IN 1980 AND 1981 - PARTICULARLY IN INDUSTRIAL USE - AS THE STEEP RISE IN GAS PRICES MADE RESIDUAL FUEL OIL AND COAL CHEAPER ALTERNATIVES. GAS COMPANIES, THUS, AT PRESENT HAVE DIFFICULTY IN MARKETING THE GAS VOLUMES THEY HAVE UNDER CONTRACT, AND HOW THEY WILL DISPOSE OF THE ADDITIONAL 10.5 BILLION CUBIC METERS PER YEAR OF SIBERIAN GAS THAT WILL COME ON STREAM IN THE MID-80'S IS NOT EASILY ANSWERED. THE ONLY LIKELY OUTLET IS THE HOME-HEATING MARKET, ALTHOUGH EVEN HERE NUMEROUS COMMUNITIES ARE COMPLAINING ABOUT EXCESSIVE COSTS. THE PROBABLE OUTCOME IS THAT THE 30 PER CENT LIMIT WILL BE

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FORGOTTEN AS DOMESTIC AND OTHER EUROPEAN DELIVERIES ARE CURTAILED, AND THE GAS COMPANIES WILL HAVE TO ASK THE GOVERNMENT TO SUBSIDIZE GAS SALES. AS TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT CLAIM THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SUBSIDIES ON EQUIPMENT SALES, THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN FLATLY CONTRADICTED BY ISSUANCE LAST YEAR OF SEVERAL BILLION DM LOW INTEREST CREDITS (AMA PLANFO 8) TO GERMAN MANUFACTURERS, IN ADDITION TO GOVERNMENT-BACKED CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR ALL PIPELINE EXPORTS. THUS, THE WORST CASE SCENARIO FOR GERMAN ENERGY DEPENDENCY HAS EMERGED AS THE MOST LIKELY: WELL OVER 30 PER CENT RELIANCE ON SOVIET GAS, CONCENTRATED IN THE HOME-HEATING SECTOR, AND ALL BOUGHT WITH TAXPAYERS' MONEY.

9. WHY, DESPITE THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, DO THE GERMANS SO TENACIOUSLY CLING TO THE PIPELINE EVEN AFTER POLAND AND MOUNTING US DOMESTIC CRITICISM? IT IS NOT MERELY A QUESTION OF SHORT-TERM JOB CREATION, SINCE THE GOVERNMENT IF IT WERE SO MINDFUL COULD EXPAND THE DISTRICT HEATING, NUCLEAR AND COAL SECTORS TO ABSORB AT LEAST AN EQUIVALENT NUMBER OF WORKERS TO COVER THE SAME ALLEGED ENERGY NEED. THE KEY FACTOR IS THE POLITICAL DIMENSION, RELATED TO GERMAN CONCERNS THAT SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS - AND HENCE EAST/WEST TRADE - WOULD DRY UP WITH THE EXPECTED LOSS OF SOVIET OIL EXPORT CAPABILITY IN THE MID-80'S. TO THE GERMANS, THE EXISTENCE OF SIGNIFICANT TRADE WITH THE EAST IS A MEANS TO KEEP THE SOVIETS QUIESCENT AS REGARDS WESTERN EUROPE, AND PERMIT FURTHER MANEUVERING ROOM WITH THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. THE UNITED STATES FAILED TO SEE THAT THE GAS PIPELINE WAS NOT PRIMARILY AN ENERGY SUPPLY OR ECONOMIC MATTER TO THE GERMANS. WHEN THE US FINALLY BECAME ORGANIZED ENOUGH TO SEND A DELEGATION TO GERMANY IN LATE 1981 TO TRY TO STOP THE PIPELINE, ITS SOLE ARGUMENT THAT THERE ARE SUFFICIENT NON-SOVIET GAS SOURCES AVAILABLE TO MEET ALLEGED NEEDS NATURALLY FELL ON DEAF EARS.

10. REDRESSING ALLIANCE INEQUITIES --

THE SANCTIONS ISSUE ILLUSTRATES AND DEFINES FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE LAST DECADE. THE UNILATERAL US NUCLEAR GUARANTEE - THE GLUE THAT ONCE HELD THE ALLIANCE FIRMLY TOGETHER - IS NOW VIEWED BY MOST EUROPEANS AS ONLY A PARTIAL ANSWER TO THEIR SECURITY NEEDS; AND TO GROWING NUMBERS, IT IS LESS OF A DEFENSE THAN A THREAT OF NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST. THE SECURITY POSTURE OF EUROPE NOW CONSISTS OF A BALANCE BETWEEN COMMITMENT TO NATO AND ACCOMMODATION TO SOVIET INTERESTS, MOST IMPORTANTLY EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF TRADE AND CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS. THERE ARE VARIATIONS AMONG NATO ALLIES ON THE EMPHASIS OF THIS BALANCE; IN THE KEY CASE OF WEST GERMANY, THE DEFENSE BUDGET ALMOST EXACTLY MATCHES ITS VOLUME OF EAST/WEST TRADE.

11. IN THE PAST DECADE, THE THREAT OF AN OUTRIGHT SOVIET INVASION OF WESTERN EUROPE HAS CONTINUALLY RECEDED, WHILE

SOVIET APPETITE FOR ADVENTURISM IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS MARKEDLY INCREASED. TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE, EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET/AMERICAN COMPETITION IN THE THIRD WORLD ARE COLORED BY THE NEED TO JUSTIFY EUROPE'S INTERMEDIARY POSITION. IT IS NOT A COINCIDENCE THAT EUROPEAN INDIGNATION OVER ALLEGED AMERICAN-BACKED ATROCITIES IN EL SALVADOR REACHED A PEAK SHORTLY AFTER THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. ANOTHER SUCH PEAK HAS ALSO OCCURRED FOLLOWING THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN POLAND. "EUROPE NEEDS EL SALVADOR AS THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF AFGHANISTAN," ADMIT SOME OF THE FRANKER EUROPEANS. WHILE, OF COURSE, THE LEFTISTS LEAD THE ATTACK, THE POLICIES OF MOST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS REFLECT THE PREVAILING ATTITUDE. IN THE CARIBBEAN, THE EUROPEANS HAVE WITHDRAWN AMBASSADORS AND AID PROGRAMS FOR EL SALVADOR, AND REFUSED TO SEND OFFICIAL ELECTION OBSERVERS TO THAT COUNTRY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THEY SUPPLY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO NICARAGUA AND, AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF FRANCE, MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS WELL. AND WHILE INSISTING WITH A HIGH MORAL TONE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ATTEMPTING TO FORCE A MILITARY SOLUTION ON THE BASIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE REGION, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DUMPS SUBSIDIZED SUGAR ON THE WORLD MARKET AND, THEREBY, HANES ECONOMIC RECOVERY FOR MANY OF THE NATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. IT IS, OF COURSE, NOT ONLY IN THE CARIBBEAN BUT IN MANY OTHER AREAS IN THE WORLD WHERE EUROPEANS COUNTERVALENT THE AIMS OF RADICAL AND ANTI-AMERICAN FORCES - FROM ENCOURAGEMENT OF PLO INTRANSIGENCE TO CONTINUED TRADE, INCLUDING MILITARY ITEMS, TO QADDAFI. EVEN IN THE MUCH TOUTED CASE OF THE IRAQIAN SANCTIONS, A CLOSE READING OF THE TRADE STATISTICS WILL REVEAL THE TRUE NATURE OF ALLEGED EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES. WEST GERMAN FIRMS, FOR INSTANCE,

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PAGE 01 BONN 06717 04 OF 05 261519Z 6388 BONN 06717 04 OF 05 261519Z
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 05 BONN 06717

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CONTINUED TO EXPAND TRADE WITH IRAH THROUGH AFFILIATES IN AUSTRIA, WHICH POSTED A 300 PER CENT INCREASE IN TRADE DURING THE IRAH EMBARGO.

12. ALL OF THE FOREGOING DOES NOT SIGNIFY THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS. IT IS UNQUESTIONABLY IN US INTEREST THAT WESTERN EUROPE BE PRESERVED FROM SOVIET DOMINATION, AND UNDOUBTEDLY A LARGE MAJORITY WOULD PREFER THEIR PRESENT DEMOCRACY AND PROSPERITY TO THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL PENURY OF COMMUNISM. HOWEVER, THE US MUST RADICALLY RE THINK THE PLACE OF THE ALLIANCE IN ITS PRIORITIES, AND WHAT THE PROPER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE EUROPEANS SHOULD BE, GIVEN PRESENT TRENDS IN EUROPE AND THE LIKELY CHALLENGES FACING THE UNITED STATES IN THE COMING DECADE.

13. IN REVIEWING HISTORY OF THE POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS, IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT RELY ALONE ON APPEALS TO CONSCIENCE OR ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY TO INFLUENCE EUROPEAN BEHAVIOR. EXCEPT FOR INCONSEQUENTIAL SYMBOLISM, THE EUROPEANS HAVE GONE STRAIGHT AHEAD IN PURSUING THEIR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS WITH THE SOVIETS AS IF AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND NEVER HAPPENED. THE FAILURE OF THE BUCKLEY MISSION ON FINANCING, THE RASHISH MISSION ON THE GAS PIPELINE, THE NATO CONSULTATIONS ON POLISH SANCTIONS, AND NUMEROUS OTHER US INITIATIVES ON COCOM AND THE LIKE IN THE YEARS SINCE AFGHANISTAN CAN BE TRACED TO THE LACK OF ANY CLEARLY DEFINED US POSITION IN THE EVENT OF EUROPEAN INTRANSIGENCE.

14. IT IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS PAPER TO DETAIL A NEW EUROPEAN POLICY, BUT RATHER TO STIMULATE US POLICYMAKERS TO THINKING IN NEW WAYS ABOUT EUROPE AND, IN PARTICULAR, INTRODUCING THE HERETOFORE LACKING ELEMENT OF TRADE-OFFS AND LEVERAGE. AMERICAN POLICY CAN NO LONGER BE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF PERFECTLY ALIGNED ALLIED INTERESTS EXCEPT IN THE INCREASINGLY REMOTE CASE OF A DIRECT SOVIET ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE. THE US MUST NOW TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT IN MANY--PERHAPS THE MAJORITY--CRUCIAL ISSUES IN THE COMING DECADE, EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN INTERESTS WILL CLASH, AND THAT US LEVERAGE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE THE EUROPEANS CAN INFLICT. AMONG THE MANY URGENT QUESTIONS THAT NEED TO BE VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT ARE:

COMMITMENT TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE -- NATO WAS FOUNDED WHEN WESTERN EUROPEAN GNP WAS HALF THAT OF THE US. WESTERN EUROPEAN GNP IS NOW 25 PER CENT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE US, AND ALMOST TRIPLE THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IS THE US THIRTY-TWO BILLION DOLLAR PER YEAR US CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE STILL JUSTIFIED? SHOULD THE AMOUNT AND NATURE OF THE US CONTRIBUTION BE SUBJECT TO ANNUAL REVIEW AND BE DIRECTLY LINKED TO EUROPEAN RESTRAINT IN STRATEGIC TRADE WITH THE SOVIETS, AND IN OTHER AREAS OF US INTEREST?

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER -- THE EUROPEANS HAVE REPEATEDLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER EXPANSION OF STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS BEYOND PRESENT NARROW COCOM DEFINITIONS, AND THEIR METHODS OF ENFORCING SUCH CONTROLS ARE AT BEST QUESTIONABLE. WEST GERMANY, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS YET TO PROSECUTE REPEATED COCOM VIOLATORS, AND ITS TRADE WITH EAST GERMANY ENTIRELY ESCAPES COCOM CONTROLS. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AT THIS POINT CONSIDER IMPOSING TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS ON EXPORTS TO WESTERN EUROPE?

WHEAT SALES -- THE EUROPEANS ACCUSE THE US OF HYPOCRISY IN RESUMING WHEAT SALES WHILE CALLING FOR A STOP TO STRATEGIC INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS AND THE GAS PIPELINE. MANY AMERICANS SEEM TO AGREE, FORGETTING THAT EUROPE WAS ONE OF THE MAJOR UNDERCUTTERS OF THE AFGHANISTAN GRAIN EMBARGO. WILL UNILATERAL STOPPING OF WHEAT SALES AGAIN LEAD TO ANY DIFFERENT RESULT? SHOULD THE US DIRECT WHEAT EXPORTS TOWARD PENETRATING TRADITIONAL MARKETS OF EMBARGO UNDERCUTTERS WITH LONG-TERM BILATERAL CONTRACTS AT SUBVENTIONED PRICES, IF NECESSARY?

POLAND DEFAULT -- A POLISH DEFAULT WILL HIT THE EUROPEANS CONSIDERABLY HARDER THAN THE US. SHOULD THIS BE USED AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO RESTRAIN SUBSIDIZED EUROPEAN LOANS AND OFFICIAL GUARANTEES ON EXPORTS TO THE SOVIETS?

GAS PIPELINE -- SOME AMERICANS ARE NOW COUNSELING US ACQUIESCENCE TO THE GAS PIPELINE IN THE NAME OF SANCTITY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS. CAN THIS BE A SERIOUS ARGUMENT WHEN THE MAJOR BENEFACTOR IS A COUNTRY WHOSE AVOWED PURPOSE IS THE OVERTHROW OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM? CAN THE UNITED STATES COUNTERMANCE THE TIMING OF SUCH MAJOR DEALS BASED TRANSPARENTLY ON THE

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PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02

BOHII 06717 05 OF 05 261520Z

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BOHII 06717 05 OF 05 261520Z

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 05 BOHII 06717

DISSENT CHANNEL

SOVIET "BUY NOW, BAYONET LATER" TACTIC? IT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT THE SOVIETS SIGNED MAJOR WHEAT DEALS WITH US COMPETITORS SHORTLY BEFORE THE AFGHANISTAN INVASION, AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE PIPELINE CONTRACT WITH THE WEST GERMANS OCCURRED ONE MONTH BEFORE POLISH MILITARY CRACKDOWN. SHOULD THE US REAFFIRM ITS EXTRATERRITORIAL CONTROLS ON PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY, AND SHOULD WE REEXAMINE OTHER POINTS OF LEVERAGE SUCH AS US RIGHTS ON WEST BERLIN GAS SUPPLY?

CONSULTATIONS -- THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE ALLIANCE HAVE BROUGHT A VERITABLE FLOOD OF EUROPEANS TO WASHINGTON. ARE INCREASED CONSULTATIONS, BY THEMSELVES, A WAY OF RESOLVING OR MERELY WASHING REAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, AND DELAYING THEIR RESOLUTION? WOULD A MORE RESERVED US POSTURE TOWARD CONSULTATIONS REDUCE THE TEMPTATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS TO POSE AS UNWANTED INTERMEDIARIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIETS?

PUBLIC RELATIONS -- DOES THE CONTINUAL INTONING OF ALLIANCE UNITY AT PRACTICALLY ALL COSTS SERVE US INTERESTS IN EUROPE? WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, FIVE OUT OF SIX WEST GERMANS STILL BELIEVE THE GAS PIPELINE IS A GOOD DEAL, IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE SPOKEN OUT EARLY AND CLEARLY ABOUT THE UNDERMINING OF AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS, THE UNDERLYING MOTIVES OF THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT IN PURSUING THE PIPELINE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A US REACTION. WOULD A DETAILED US PUBLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN GERMANY HAVE A SOOTHRING EFFECT?

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS -- THE EUROPEANS HAVE AN ENORMOUS APPETITE FOR US BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON ARMS CONTROL, AND US PARTICIPATION IN ALL MANNER OF MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS THE ECE AND THE CSCE. IN THE PAST, THE US HAS USUALLY ACCEDDED TO EUROPEAN WISHES. SHOULD THE TIMING AND NATURE OF FUTURE US PARTICIPATION IN SUCH ACTIVITIES HENCEFORTH BE RELATED TO EUROPEAN RESTRAINT AND COOPERATION ON MATTERS VITALLY AFFECTING US INTERESTS?

15. THE ABOVE DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO SWING EUROPEAN POLICY TOTALLY OR EVEN LARGELY IN LINE WITH US OBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, THE EXERTION OF LEVERAGE SHOULD HAVE A MODERATING EFFECT ON EUROPEAN BEHAVIOR WHICH IS NOW MOSTLY ABSENT. AND EVEN IF THIS TOUGHER POLICY HAS NO PERCEPTIBLE RESULT, THE LESSENING OF US DIPLOMATIC FIXATION ON EUROPE AND THE GRADUAL TRANSFER OF US FORCES OUT OF EUROPE SHOULD PROVIDE THE US A BETTER POSTURE TO MEET IMMINENT SOVIET THREATS TO US SECURITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE MID-EAST, AND ELSEWHERE IN THE THIRD WORLD.

SEVERAL INFLUENTIAL SENATORS HAVE ALREADY PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF INTRODUCING ANOTHER HANSFIELD AMENDMENT AT THE NEXT SESSION OF CONGRESS, AND THE PRESENT MOOD IN CONGRESS

IS SUCH THAT THIS MEASURE COULD PASS BY A LARGE MAJORITY. THE DEPARTMENT IS, THUS, WORKING AGAINST TIME TO FORESTALL A MOVE THAT WOULD PROVOKE AN OUTRIGHT RUPTURE WITH EUROPE AND A LOSS OF WHATEVER LEVERAGE POSSIBILITIES ARE AVAILABLE TO US. THE BEST, AND PERHAPS THE LAST, OPPORTUNITY FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO STEER ANOTHER HANSFIELD AMENDMENT WILL COME DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO EUROPE NEXT JUNE. THE QUESTION DEPARTMENT POLICYMAKERS SHOULD NOW ASK THEMSELVES IN PREPARING FOR THE NEXT NATO SUMMIT IS WHETHER IT WILL BE THE STANDARD TYPE OF "SUCCESS" AT THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR, OR WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WILL BE PROVIDED THE REAL OPTIONS HE NEEDS TO CONVINCING THE CONGRESS - AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE - THAT US POLICY TOWARD EUROPE IS STILL IN THE RIGHT HANDS. BURNS

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REB440 POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 STATE 240600

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ORIGIN 00-02

INFO OCT:01 190-00 08-01 7004 R

DRAFTED BY G/P: JARZT
APPROVED BY IS/P: BARTHOLOMEW

030147

R 201337Z SEP 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 240600

DISSENT CHANNEL, FOR [REDACTED]

Z.O. (1100) GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, LE, IS, SY, I30, JD

SUBJECT: THE IMPERATIVE OF US ACTION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

REF: BEIRUT 7515

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CABLE ON THE IMPERATIVE ACTION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. MR. GRANVILLE AUSTIN OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR CABLE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE OPEN FORUM PANEL. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. KISSINGER

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Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART B6

PAGE 01 STATE 107488
ORIGIN SP-02

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 /003 R

DRAFTED BY S/P: GSAUSTIN
APPROVED BY S/P: ALAKE
ARA - MR. DEVINE (DRAFT)
D/HA - MR. SNEIDER (DRAFT)
M/DG - MR. LISSFELT (SUBSTANCE)
S/P-OPP: NABOYER
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S/P ONLY

-----130311Z 086585 /63

O 130247Z MAY 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 107488

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, SHUM, US, ES

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GOES

DISSENT CHANNEL, FOR [REDACTED] AND OTHER SIGNATORIES OF REF A FROM ANTHONY LAKE - S/P

B6

REF: (A) SAN SALVADOR 1732); (B) STATE 087800;
(C) STATE 098384; (D) STATE 105097

1. YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE PRESENTED A CONVINCING CASE BASED ON SOUND REASONING AND EXPRESSED IN CLEAR LANGUAGE.
2. LARGELY AS A RESULT OF YOUR CABLE, THE DEPARTMENT HAS ADOPTED A MODIFIED VERSION OF YOUR OPTION 4. AMBASSADOR LOZANO'S DEPARTURE IS BEING DELAYED ONE MONTH, DEPARTMENT ALSO MAKING PLANS FOR A DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TO MAKE A FIRM PRESENTATION ON US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY TO LEAVE NO DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF THE HIGHEST OFFICIALS IN THE GOES THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN CONVEYING THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY AND NOT HIS PERSONAL VIEWS. (REF C AND D). IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE GOES UNDERSTAND THIS, AS YOUR MESSAGE POINTS OUT.
3. I UNDERSTAND THAT AMBASSADOR LOZANO HAS SHARED WITH YOU THE CONTENT OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT AS CONVEYED TO HIM IN REF C.
4. FURTHER, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DEVINE ADVISED SALVADOREAN AMBASSADOR HERE ON MAY 9 THAT USG UNABLE TO SUPPORT \$90 MILLION IDB LOAN FOR EL SALVADOR ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS AND THAT WE SUGGESTED DEFERRAL THIS ITEM FROM IDB AGENDA. DEVINE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS POSITION WAS TOTALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ON HUMAN RIGHTS MADE BY AMBASSADOR LOZANO IN SAN SALVADOR.
5. I REITERATE THE DEPARTMENT'S APPRECIATION OF YOUR TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. CHRISTOPHER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Blaney file

FORM DS 322(OCR)

FILE

Youth

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN PART B6

CU/YSS:RTARNDT:LSB
4/23/74:EXT. 23730
S/P - SLEWIS.

CU/OPP:NBOYER
T - CJONES {INFO}

S/P:HCBLANEY
ARA/CAR:JWSIMMS

ROUTINE SANTO DOMINGO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, OGEN, DR, SCUL
SUBJECT: YOUTH PARA, DISSENTING VIEW
REF: {A} SD 538 FEB 6, 1974 {B} SD 2190 MAY 21, 1973
{C} STATE 209583 OCT 24, 1973 {D} SD 4159 OCT 9, 1973
{E} SD 4585 NOV 8, 1973 {F} STATE 228145 NOV 20, 1973

SL
RTA *me*
NB *me*
HCB *Ad*
Cd *Ad*
JWS *me*

1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES VIEWS OF FSOS [] AND [] THEIR OPINIONS WILL BE PRESENTED IN FORTHCOMING REVIEW OF YOUTH POLICY PAPER WHICH RESULTED FROM WORLDWIDE POST REA#SPONSES. DISCUSSION WILL TACKLE QUESTION OF BROAD REFOCUSING OF APPROACH TO YOUTH QUESTIONS, TAKING ACCOUNT OF IDEAS RAISED IN THIS MESSAGE AS WELL AS OTHERS. THIS REVIEW WILL FOCUS ON PROBLEM OF HOW BEST TO ASCERTAIN AND MAINTAIN AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF ATTENTION AT EACH MISSION AND TO INTEGRATE THE YOUTH DIMENSION INTO OVER-ALL MISSION EFFORTS.

2. THE DEPARTMENT HAS STRESSED BASIC IMPORTANCE OF ON-COMING GENERATION AS FACTOR IN PRESENT AND FUTURE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF COUNTRIES IN WHICH US HAS INTEREST. THUS YOUTH FACTOR SHOULD BE REL#FLECTED AS APPROPRIATE IN POLITICAL REPORTING AND ANALYSIS.

3. IN LIGHT OF POINTS IN DEPTTEL 2190, ANY FURTHER SUGGES-

B6

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

FORM DS 322A{OCR}

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12

TIONS ON SPECIFIC POINTS IN PARAS 2, 4 AND 5 WHICH
AUTHORS MAY WISH TO ADD WOULD BE WELCOMED BY REVIEW
GROUP.444

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PL

Ben - could
I have the
ref's please,
on this.
Peter

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TEL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REDBIS

PAGE 01 BANGKO 10004 000000Z

ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 08-01 150-00 2004 W

P 000029Z AUG 78
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0020

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BANGKOK 10004

DISSENT CHANNEL

DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS EA FOR INFORMATION

R.O. 110021 GDB
TAGS APER DISSENT
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: A) STATE 173000; BY VIENTIANE 0027; C) VIENTIANE 14871
B) STATE 109710; E) STATE 147521; F) VIENTIANE 147001
G) STATE 148001; H) VIENTIANE DAD MSG 220000Z JULY 1978

THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY

SUMMARY: BACKGROUND AND MOST RECENT AUTHORIZATION TO PRO-
CURE AND SHIP MAP FUNDED RICE BASED ON TWO KEY POINTS: 1) RICE
IS FOR PROVISION TO FAR (ROYAL LAD ARMY) TROOPS; 2) PROCURE-
MENT FOR DELIVERY AFTER JUNE 30, 1978 WAS FOR PURPOSE OF
"SAFEGUARDING U.S. PERSONNEL DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER
DRAWDOWN TO MINIMUM PERSONNEL LEVEL." LADS MISSION ON RECORD
TO EFFECT THAT "FAR NOW EXISTS ONLY ON PAPER" AND THAT QUESTION
OF THREAT TO SECURITY "HAS NO VALIDITY" AND SHOULD NOT BE
REASON FOR CONTINUED RICE SHIPMENTS. CONTINUED SHIPMENTS
OF MAP-FUNDED COMMODITIES TO PGNU CONTROLLED ARMY IN FACE
OF PGNU OCCUPATION EMBASSY COMPOUNDS AND PGNU REFUSAL RE-
LEASE PERSONAL PROPERTY USG EMPLOYEES, IS NOT SUPPORTABLE.
RECOMMEND NO FURTHER COMMODITY DELIVERIES (RICE AND POL)
BE MADE. END SUMMARY.

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PAGE 03: BANGKO 10004 000000Z



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7. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT DELIVERY OF MORE THAN 1000 MT (NOT ABOUT 1000 MT PER REF. G) PARA. 9) OF MAP RECEIVED IN EXCESS OF 500,000 DOLLARS WILL IMPROVE SITUATION OR, MORE IMPORTANT, THAT NON-DELIVERY HAS AN AGGRAVATED SITUATION.

8. RECEIPTIBILITY WILL BE LOST ONCE DELIVERY IS MADE. BECAUSE RECEIPTIBILITY IS BETTER PROVIDED BY THE AVANCEMENT OF RECEIPTS ALREADY PROCURED BUT NOT YET DELIVERED. PAYMENT FOR THIS RECEIPT ON DELIVERY TO ORIGINATOR AND THE RECEIPT CAN BE CANCELLED IF NO LONGER REQUIRED. COST OF CANCELLATION WILL BE LESS THAN COST OF RECEIPT.

9. SIMILARLY, THE ARGUMENT BY PNGUIS NOTE OF JUNE 26, 1976 (REF. G, PARA. 5) WOULD LOSE CREDIBILITY ONCE JULY PORTION OR ANY ADDITIONAL DELIVERY IS MADE AT THIS LATE DATE.

10. FINALLY, CONTINUED DELIVERIES OF RECEIPTS TO PNGUIS AT THE SAME TIME PNGUIS IS CREATING ADDITIONAL COSTS FOR THE USG IN THE FORM OF CLAIMS FOR EXPROPRIATED PERSONAL PROPERTY, SEEMS UNSUPPORTABLE.

11. UNGE YOU ORDER SUSPENSION OF ALL DELIVERIES IMMEDIATELY. WHITEHOUSE



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CONFIDENTIAL REB461

PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02

SAN SA 01732 01 OF 03 152115Z

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INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 SSO-02 /004 W
*****152214Z 095942 /72

O 152056Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3995

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 SAN SALVADOR 1732

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652-1 GDS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE - SCENARIO OF AMBASSADORIAL CHAN

GE

5 FAM 212.3; 2 FAM 101, 11 FAM 243, STATE A-309

1. THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED BY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] FSO-3 POLOFF AND FSO-5 COMBATT RESPECTIVELY, AND
SUBSCRIBED TO BY THOSE FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL WHOSE
APPEAR IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH. WE SUGGEST THIS DISSENT
BE DISTRIBUTED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY TCDMAN AND THE NCS AS
WELL AS THE ADDRESSEES DESCRIBED IN 5 FAM 212.3. WE ARE NOT
SENSITIVE TO WIDER DISTRIBUTION.
2. THE ISSUE - ON APRIL 11 THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOTIFIED
THAT HE WILL BE REPLACED, HIS SUCCESSOR TO BE NAMED SHORTLY,
HE WAS TOLD TO DEPART POST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THOSE
SIGNING THIS MESSAGE WISH TO REGISTER THEIR DISSENT FROM AN ACTION

N.

WHICH MIGHT APPEAR TO BE A ROUTINE AMBASSADORIAL CHANGE TO
THOSE IN WASHINGTON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECISION,

BUT WHICH IN THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL ATMOSPHERICS HAS
SERIOUS ADVERSE FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS WE BELIEVE A MIS-
PERCEPTION OF WHAT IS ABOUT TO OCCUR WILL BE DETRIMENTAL TO
POLICY OBJECTIVES THIS EMBASSY IS PURSUING AND COULD
SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE FUTURE USG POLICY GOALS

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PAGE 02

SAN SA 01732 01 OF 03 152113Z

IN LATIN AMERICA.

3. WE ARE NOT DISPUTING, OR IMPLYING DISSENT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVE TO NOMINATE AMBASSADORS OF EXECUTIVE CHOICE. AS PROFESSIONAL FOREIGN SERVICE PRACTITIONERS, HOWEVER, WE QUESTION THAT SUFFICIENT ANALYSIS WAS MADE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THIS DECISION WILL BE IMPLEMENTED, I.E., THE STATE OF THE PRESENT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. PROPER TIMING IN IMPLEMENTING THIS DECISION COULD ADVANCE CRITICAL USG POLICY OBJECTIVES. IMPROPER TIMING, ON THE OTHER HAND, COULD SERIOUSLY IMPEDE PRESENT AND FUTURE PURSUIT OF THESE VERY INTERESTS.

4. OUR REQUEST FOR A REVIEW OF THIS DECISION ENDS WITH A RECOMMENDATION FOR ONE OF TWO POSSIBLE OPTIONS. ONE INVOLVES THE PRESENT AMBASSADOR REMAINING AT POST FOR AN ADDITIONAL PERIOD. WHILE MISSION PERSONNEL ADMIRE THE MANNER IN WHICH AMBASSADOR LOZANO HAS HANDLED HIMSELF AND PURSUED US NATIONAL INTERESTS DURING HIS TENURE, THIS EXTENSION WAS NOT REPE-

AT

NOT AN OBJECTIVE OF THE DISSENT. IF DEVELOPED, AS DID THE ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATION, FROM OUR ANALYSIS OF HOW TO BEST PROTECT AND PROJECT US NATIONAL INTERESTS.

5. BACKGROUND ON ISSUE - BEGINNING ROUGHLY IN OCTOBER 1976, THIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN PURSUING WITH VIGOR, ENTHUSIASM AND STEADY DEPARTMENTAL SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE, A POLICY WITH HEAVY EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. THIS CAME ABOUT, NOT WITH THE ARRIVAL OF A NEW AMBASSADOR IN AUGUST 1976 OR NEW US ADMINISTRATION IN JANUARY 1977, BUT AFTER A SERIES OF INTERNAL SALVADORAN EVENTS INDICATED A DETERIORATING PATTERN. THE MAJOR ONES INCLUDED: (A) THE APPARENT ASSASSINATION OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF GOES AGENTS (THE RICHARDSON CASE); (B) THE MISYREATMENT AND EXPULSION OF US CITIZEN PRIESTS TO VAGUE AND UNSUBSTANTIATED CHARGES; (C) THE VIOLENT AFTERMATH OF THE FEBRUARY 20, 1977 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND (D) PROBLEMS IN OBTAINING TREATY-GUARANTEED ACCESS TO DETAINED

D

US CITIZENS. THESE EVENTS, COUPLED WITH GOES INDIGNATION AT USG COMMENT ON ITS ELECTORAL PROCESS AND US CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR, RESULTED IN GOES WRATH FOCUSING ON THE AMBASSADOR AND THOSE EMBASSY OFFICERS

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PAGE 03

SAN SA 01752 01 OF 23 152110Z

WHO HAD CARRIED THE USG MESSAGE TO THEM. AFTER THE PRESS CARRIED THESE STORIES TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD, THE AMBASSADOR BECAME MORE AND MORE THE PERSONIFICATION OF THE USG HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. THOSE WITHIN THE GOES WHO COUNSELED DEFIANCE OF USG EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN BEGAN A CAMPAIGN TO OUST THE AMBASSADOR. THIS IS THE PRESENT SITUATION.

6. ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND THIS DISSENT - WE HAVE CONSTRUCTED THIS DISSENT ON A NUMBER OF BASIC ASSUMPTIONS WHICH MUST BE KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD IF OUR CONCERN AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TO BE APPRECIATED.

THESE INCLUDE:

(1) WHILE RECENT EVENTS IN EL SALVADOR ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT TO THE USG AND PUBLIC, NEWS OF THEM HAS REACHED A WIDE AUDIENCE THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. ANY PRECEDENT HERE COULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS IN RELATED CASES THROUGHOUT THE HEMISPHERE.

(2) THE USG - IN THE PERSON OF THE AMBASSADOR AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS - HAS BEEN CONVEYING FUNDAMENTAL U.S. POLICY TO THE GOES ON THE RICHARDSON CASE AND RECENT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

(3) THE USG HAS NOT BEEN BLUFFING OR POSTURING IN EXPRESSING CONCERN ON HUMAN RIGHTS OR DEMANDS IN THE RICHARDSON MATTER. IT IS SERIOUSLY RPT SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH BOTH, AND WILL PURSUE THEM.

(4) THE GOES STRATEGY TO DATE HAS BEEN TO STALL AND HOPE RICHARDSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN HAS PEAKED, BELIEVING THAT THE USG IS GOING THROUGH "A MOOD" WHICH WILL GO AWAY SHORTLY. THIS VIEW IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF PRESIDENT-ELECT ROMERO AND HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISERS.

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PAGE 01 MELBOU 01929 01 OF 03 080012Z 8895
ACTION SP-02

MELBOU 01929 01 OF 03 080012Z

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-08 /884 V
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R 070715Z SEP 77
FM AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4066
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 3 MELBOURNE 1929

DISSENT CHANNEL

E O 11652 N A
TAGS PINT, ELAB, AS
SUBJ: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN AUSTRALIA

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A SERIES OF THREE REPORTS PREPARED BY []
POLITICAL OFFICER [] WHICH EMBASSY/CANBERRA HAS DECLINED
TO TRANSMIT. [] IS SUBMITTING THE SERIES VIA THE DISSENT CHANNEL
BECAUSE HE BELIEVES IT CONTAINS INTERPRETATIONS OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN

AUSTRALIA WHICH SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF WASHINGTON END-
USERS. THE REPORTS WERE ORIGINALLY SUBMITTED TO THE EMBASSY AS
MELBOURNE 1737, MELBOURNE 1865 AND MELBOURNE 1888. PURCELL
REQUESTS THAT S/P DISTRIBUTE COPIES NOT ONLY TO THOSE LISTED ON PAGE 4
OF THE DEPT'S A-307 BUT TO MR DALE GOOD S/IL AND MR DONALD HARRIS
EA/RA.

2. MELBOURNE 1737

A. SUBJECT: INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN AUSTRALIA: WHO ARE THE VILLAINS?

1. FOR A LONG TIME THE FEDERAL GOVT AND THE NON-LABOR STATE
GOVTS OF QUEENSLAND AND WEST AUSTRALIA (AND TO A LESSER EXTENT
VICTORIA) HAVE BEEN DOING THEIR BEST TO CONVINCE PEOPLE THAT THE
AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY WOULD BE MOVING MORE RAPIDLY TOWARD RECOVERY
IF IT WERE NOT FOR A MIXED BAG OF GREEDY, IRRESPONSIBLE AND
IDEOLOGICALLY-
MOTIVATED TRADE UNION AGITATORS WHO, THEY CLAIM, HAVE BEEN KEEPING THE

COUNTRY IN A STATE OF ALMOST CONSTANT INDUSTRIAL UNREST. THESE
GOVTS HAVE MAINTAINED THAT INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT ARE UP
AND INVESTMENT AND CONSUMPTION ARE DOWN NOT BECAUSE THE CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF HAVE BEEN POORLY-
CONCEIVED OR IMPLEMENTED BUT LARGELY BECAUSE THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT
HAS BEEN USING ITS INDUSTRIAL MUSCLE TO DISRUPT
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND TO BLACKMAIL HARD-PRESS EMPLOYERS.

2. THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT HAS REACTED TO THIS THESIS BY CHARGING
THE CONSERVATIVE GOVTS WITH RESORTING TO WHOLESAL AND INDISCR-
IMINATE "UNION-BASHING" AS A MEANS OF SHIFTING THE BLAME FOR UNSUCCESS-
FUL POLICIES FROM THE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE POLICIES TO THEIR VICTIMS.

3. BOTH SIDES HAVE MARSHALLED FACTUAL INFORMATION TO SUPPORT THEIR
POSITIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOVTS (AND THEIR SUPPORTERS AMONG
THE EMPLOYERS) HAVE CITED THE DISRUPTIVE AND EXPENSIVE STRIKES WHICH
HAVE OCCURRED SO FAR IN 1977 IN SUCH KEY SECTORS AS AIR AND SURFACE
TRANSPORT AND MINING (WITH MORE OF THE SAME THREATENED) AND THE
TRADE UNIONS HAVE RESPONDED BY DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE DRAMATIC
REDUCTION WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN THE NUMBERS OF MAN-HOURS LOST IN
STRIKES DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1977 (DESPITE THE FACT THAT REAL
WAGES HAVE CONTINUED TO MOVE STEADILY DOWNWARD).

4. IN ATTEMPTING TO IDENTIFY THE "VILLAINS", HOWEVER, IT IS

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NECESSARY TO LOOK AT ONE OR TWO BASIC FACTS WHICH ARE NOT QUITE SO
EASY TO PERCEIVE OR DEMONSTRATE AS THOSE WHICH STEW FROM RECORDED
EVENTS OR OFFICIAL STATISTICS. FIRST AMONG THESE IS THE SIMPLE BUT
VERY OFTEN IGNORED FACT THAT THE TRADE
UNION MOVEMENT DOES NOT POSSESS ANYTHING LIKE A MONOPOLY
OF THE MILITANT OR IDEOLOGICALLY-MOTIVATED ELEMENTS WHICH ARE
CURRENTLY PLAYING LEADING ROLES IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN AUSTRALIA. THUS, WHILE THERE ARE CERTAINLY LEFT-WING
CONFRONTATIONISTS IN POWERFUL POSITIONS IN THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT
THERE ARE ALSO RIGHT-WING CONFRONTATIONISTS IN

HIGH PLACES IN THE FEDERAL AND NON-LABOR STATE GOVTS AND ON THE
EMPLOYERS' SIDE OF THE BARGAINING TABLE. BY THE SAME TOKEN WHILE
THERE ARE MANY GOVT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYERS WHO VIEW SERIOUS
INDUSTRIAL CONFRONTATION AS SOMETHING TO BE AVOIDED WHENEVER POSSIBLE
THERE ARE ALSO MANY TRADE UNION LEADERS WHO RESORT TO STRIKES OR OTHER

DRASTIC SANCTIONS ONLY AS A LAST RESORT AFTER THEY HAVE EXHAUSTED
EVERY OTHER MEANS OF ACHIEVING REDRESS OF SERIOUS OR LONG-PENDING
GRIEVANCES.

5. THE POINT TO BE FIRMLY GRASPED HERE IS THAT IN A PURELY INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS SENSE OR CONTEXT, THERE ARE NO REAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

CONSERVATIVE GOVT OFFICIALS WHO INTERVENE PUBLICLY ON THE SIDE OF
EMPLOYERS IN UNRESOLVED INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES (AS MANY HAVE DONE) AND
LEFT-WING TRADE UNION LEADERS WHO IMPOSE ARBITRARY BANS ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF IMPORTANT PUBLIC PROJECTS. FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES
BOTH ARE FUNCTIONING AS MILITANT CONFRONTATIONISTS AND BOTH ARE
"VILLAINS".

6. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, FOR ANY CRITICISM OR DESCRIPTION OF THE
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM IN AUSTRALIA TO BE BALANCED, COMPLETE
AND CREDIBLE IT MUST REFLECT AN AWARENESS OF AND A WILLINGNESS TO
ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACT THAT GREEDY, IRRESPONSIBLE AND IDEOLOGICALLY-
MOTIVATED ELEMENTS, THE VILLAINS, ARE AND HAVE LONG BEEN HARD AT WORK
NOT ONLY IN ONE CAMP BUT IN ALL THREE OF THEM.

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 MELBOU 01929 02 OF 03 080320Z
ACTION SP-02

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MELBOU 01929 02 OF 03 080320Z

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 /004 W
-----006827 080324Z /65R 070715Z SEP 77
FM ANCONSUL MELBOURNE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4067
INFO ANEMBASSY CANBERRA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 3 MELBOURNE 1929

DISSENT CHANNEL

3. MELBOURNE 1855:

A. SUBJECT: INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN AUSTRALIA: WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY
MOTIVATING FORCES?1. DESPITE THE PUBLICITY WHICH MILITANT LEFT-WING TRADE UNION LEADERS
ARE CONSTANTLY RECEIVING ON THE FRONT AND EDITORIAL PAGES OF AUSTRALIANNEWSPAPERS AND ON RADIO AND TV NEWSCASTS, IT NEVERTHELESS BECOMES
OBVIOUS WHEN ONE LOOKS BEHIND THE HEADLINES THAT THE PRIMARY MOTIVATINGFORCES WHICH UNDERLIE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN AUSTRALIA AT THE
PRESENT TIME ARE NOT IDEOLOGICAL OR POLITICAL IN NATURE-THEY ARE
CLEARLY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC.2. TO EXPRESS THE SAME POINT IN DIFFERENT WORDS, IF MILITANT LEFT-
WING TRADE UNION LEADERS IN AUSTRALIA WERE HAVING TO RELY PRIMARILY
OR LARGELY ON IDEOLOGICAL OR POLITICAL ISSUES TO GET THEIR MEMBERS
TO SUPPORT STRIKES, BANS AND OTHER FORMS OF DIRECT INDUSTRIAL ACTION
THEY WOULD CURRENTLY BE ENJOYING DRAMATICALLY LESS SUCCESS THAN THEY
HAVE IN FACT BEEN ENJOYING.3. THE BASIC PROBLEM APPEARS TO BE THAT AUSTRALIANS ACROSS VIRTUALLY
THE ENTIRE POLITICAL SPECTRUM HAVE DISCOVERED THAT THEY ARE IN
SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT WITH EACH OTHER ABOUT THE MANNER IN WHICH
THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS HAVE
BEEN CUTTING UP THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC PIE. THIS BEING THE CASE,
HARD-PRESSED EMPLOYERS, STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY AN OUTSPOKENLY
PARTISAN CONSERVATIVE GOVT, HAVE SPENT THE PAST 18 MONTHS PLAYING
"SHATCHBACK" WITH REAL WAGES IN THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION AND THE
TRADE UNION MOVEMENT HAS BEEN CONCENTRATING ITS
EFFORTS ON MAINTAINING THE APPROXIMATELY 10 O/O INCREASE
IN REAL WAGES WHICH IT WON IN 1974 (WHILE SO FAR GIVING
RELATIVELY LITTLE CONSIDERATION TO ADDITIONAL INCREASES BASED ON AN
EMPLOYER'S PRODUCTIVITY OR HIS ABILITY TO PAY).4. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: IN 1974-A YEAR OF UNPRECEDENTED
POST WORLD WAR II STRIKE ACTIVITY-MONEY WAGES IN AUSTRALIA INCREASED
BY APPROXIMATELY 26 O/O (WHICH MEANT THAT, WITH 16 O/O INFLATION, REAL
WAGES INCREASED BY 10 O/O). IN APRIL 1975 THE ARBITRATION
COMMISSION BEGAN TO IMPLEMENT QUARTERLY CPI-BASED WAGE INDEXATION
AS A MEANS OF CONTROLLING MONEY WAGE INCREASES BY UNDERTAKING
TO PROTECT REAL WAGES AGAINST INFLATION. DURING THE NOV-DEC 1975
FEDERAL ELECTION, THE COALITION PROMISED TO
"RESPECT WAGE INDEXATION". EARLY IN 1976, HOWEVER,
THE FRASER GOVT RENEGED ON THIS COMMITMENT AND EMBARKED
UPON AN ANTI-INFLATIONARY CAMPAIGN IN WHICH IT ATTEMPTED TO CONVERT
THE WAGE INDEXATION SYSTEM INTO A DEVICE
FOR REDUCING-NOT MAINTAINING-REAL WAGES. THE PRESIDENT OF THE
ARBITRATION COMMISSION, SIR JOHN MOORE, GAVE AN INDICATION OF THE
SUCCESS THE FRASER GOVT HAS ACHIEVED IN THIS CAMPAIGN WHEN HE REVEAL
ED
IN HIS AUG 22 WAGE DECISION FOR THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1977 THAT THE
CPI HAD INCREASED BY 13.8 O/O IN THE YEAR SINCE THE JUNE, 1976
QUARTER WHEREAS AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS (SEASONALLY ADJUSTED) PER
EMPLOYED MALE UNIT HAD INCREASED BY ONLY 10.8 O/O.5. WHILE THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION HAS CONSISTENTLY FOUND THE
MUCH MALIGNED TRADE UNION MOVEMENT TO BE IN "SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE" WITH ITS WAGE GUIDELINES, IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO
UNDERSTAND WHY LARGE NUMBERS OF AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNION LEADERS-
MODERATES AS WELL AS MILITANTS-
NATURALLY DISSATISFIED WITH DECLINING REAL WAGES AT A TIME OF
INCREASING PRICES, HAVE RESORTED TO STRIKES AND OTHER DIRECT ACTION
IN EFFORTS TO GET BETTER DEALS FOR THEIR MEMBERS THAN THE FRASER
GOVT, THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION OR THE EMPLOYERS HAVE BEEN WILLING
OR ABLE TO PERMIT OR GRANT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE COUNTRY'S 2 MOST SERIOUS
AND DISRUPTIVE STRIKES SO FAR IN 1977-THE TRANSPORT WORKERS STRIKE IN
VICTORIA IN APRIL AND THE AIR CONTROLLERS STRIKE IN MAY (BOTH OF
WHICH WERE PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL)-WERE CALLED PRIMARILY IN SUPPORT
OF LONG-PENDING LOGS OF CLAIMS AND NOT PRIMARILY BECAUSE SOME OF THE
TRADE UNION LEADERS INVOLVED WERE INTENT ON DISRUPTING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY.6. THE PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT IS NOT TO DISMISS THE FACT THAT
MILITANT TRADE UNION LEADERS EXIST IN AUSTRALIA WHO HAVE CONSCIOUSLY
INSTIGATED SERIOUSLY DISRUPTIVE STRIKES, BANS AND OTHER DIRECT
INDUSTRIAL ACTION IN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE IDEOLOGICAL OR POLITICAL
GOALS. THE PURPOSE IS TO POINT OUT THAT THE ISSUES WHICH UNDERLIE
THE GREAT MAJORITY OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN AUSTRALIA TODAY ARE
WHAT WE IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD CLASSIFY AS "BREAD AND BUTTER" ISSUESAND TO SUGGEST THAT MANY MORE TRADE UNION CLAIMS
AND DEMANDS ARE JUSTIFIED ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL
MERITS THAN ONE WOULD CONCLUDE FROM RELYING ON THE
MEDIA SERVICES WHICH ALL-TOO-OFTEN AUTOMATICALLY BRAND DISRUPTIVE
TRADE UNION ACTIONS (BUT RARELY EMPLOYER ACTIONS)
AS "GREEDY" OR "IRRESPONSIBLE".

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ACTION SP-02

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R 070715Z SEP 77
 FM AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4068
 INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

WHEN AND IF THE FEDERAL GOVT ATTEMPTS TO IMPLEMENT ITS RECENTLY-
 ENACTED INDUSTRIAL LEGISLATION AND AFTER THE ACTU HAS HELD ITS
 BIENNIAL CONGRESS SCHEDULED FOR SEPT 12-16 IN SYDNEY.
 BRAND

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DISSENT CHANNEL

4. MELBOURNE 1888:

A. SUBJECT: INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN AUSTRALIA: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

1. AT THE PRESENT TIME BOTH SIDES IN THE CONTINUING INDUSTRIAL
 RELATIONS CONFRONTATION IN AUSTRALIA-THE NON-LABOR GOVT AND
 THE EMPLOYERS ON ONE SIDE AND THE TRADE UNIONS ON THE OTHER-POSSESS
 SUFFICIENT POWER AND COMPELLING INCENTIVES TO BRING ABOUT EITHER
 INCREASES OR DECREASES IN THE COUNTRY'S LEVELS OF INDUSTRIAL
 DISPUTATION. THIS BEING THE CASE ELEMENTS IN BOTH CAMPS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY

BE MAKING EFFORTS DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS TO DO ONE OR THE
 OTHER DEPENDING ON THEIR ESTIMATES OF WHAT WOULD BEST SERVE THEIR
 POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC INTERESTS. IN PARTICULAR, IF THE FRASER GOVT
 WERE TO DECIDE THAT AN ANTI-UNION "WHO GOVERNS AUSTRALIA?" CAMPAIGN
 WOULD HELP IT TO WIN AN EARLY FEDERAL ELECTION THERE IS LITTLE
 DOUBT THAT IT WOULD EMBARK UPON SUCH A CAMPAIGN MAKING FULL USE IN
 THE PROCESS OF ITS HARSH, RECENTLY-ENACTED INDUSTRIAL LEGISLATION
 AS A MEANS OF EVOKING ILLEGAL AND/OR DISRUPTIVE TRADE UNION RESPONSES.

BY THE SAME TOKEN, IF LEFT-WING TRADE UNION LEADERS WERE TO
 DECIDE THAT A MASSIVE CAMPAIGN OF INDUSTRIAL ACTION WOULD HELP TO
 FRUSTRATE THE FRASER GOVT'S URANIUM POLICIES THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT
 MANY OF THEM WOULD ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH CONSERVATIONISTS AND
 OTHER ANTI-URANIUM GROUPS IN A VARIETY OF EFFORTS TO PREVENT OR
 DISRUPT THE MINING AND SHIPMENT OF URANIUM ORE.

2. DURING THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF, MODERATE LEADERS ON BOTH
 SIDES OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FENCE SUCH AS MINISTER OF
 EMPLOYMENT STREET AND ACTU PRESIDENT HAWKE HAVE ATTEMPTED IN VARIOUS
 WAYS TO MINIMIZE INDUSTRIAL UNREST AND TO KEEP IT TO THE EXTENT
 POSSIBLE WITHIN LEGALLY-PREScribed CHANNELS. STREET HAS DONE THIS
 PRIMARILY BECAUSE, UNLIKE SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE CABINET,
 HE BELIEVES THAT CONCILIATION IS PREFERABLE TO CONFRONTATION EVEN IF
 IT MEANS MAKING OCCASIONAL CONCESSIONS TO YOUR ADVERSARIES.
 HAWKE HAS DONE IT PRIMARILY BECAUSE, AS A SHREWD AND AMBITIOUS POLI-
 TICIEN AS WELL AS A RESPONSIBLE TRADE UNION LEADER, HE SEES THE ALP
 LOSING IF INDUSTRIAL UNREST PROVIDES FRASER WITH A BELIEVEABLE
 PRETEXT FOR FIGHTING A FEDERAL ELECTION ON THE ISSUES
 OF "LAW AND ORDER" OR "WHO GOVERNS AUSTRALIA?"

3. GIVEN THE FOREGOING, THE ELEMENTS WHICH ARE MOST LIKELY TO
 INCREASE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTATION IN THE MONTHS AHEAD ARE MILITANTS
 ON BOTH THE RIGHT AND LEFT WHO WILL BE SEEKING WAYS OF EXPLOITING
 INDUSTRIAL UNREST FOR THEIR OWN HIGHLY PARTISAN POLITICAL ADVANTAGE.
 THE FACTORS WHICH ARE MOST LIKELY TO DECREASE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTATION
 ARE (A) THE MODERATES ON BOTH SIDES WHO PREFER CONCILIATION TO
 CONFRONTATION AND (B) THE CONTINUING NATIONWIDE "STAGFLATION" WHICH
 IS MAKING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR EVEN THE MOST
 MILITANT LEFT-WING UNION LEADERS TO GET THEIR MEMBERS TO GO
 ALONG WITH INDUSTRIAL ACTIONS WHICH THEY FEAR MIGHT PLACE THEIR
 ECONOMIC SECURITY
 IN JEOPARDY.

4. IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO SAY SUBSTANTIALLY MORE ON THIS SUBJECT

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DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR [] FROM W. LORD, DIR., POLICY PLANNING STAFF

E.O. 11652: X009-3

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, FR

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DISSENT MESSAGE CONCERNING
SOCIALIST-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE IN FRANCE

REFERENCE: PARIS 12051, 260929Z APR 76

1. THANK YOU FOR REFERENCED MESSAGE IN THE DISSENT
CHANNEL, WHICH HAS BEEN REFERRED TO ME FOR REPLY.
REGRET DELAY IN RESPONDING. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
ISSUES RAISED HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH APPROPRIATE
SPECIALISTS IN THE DEPARTMENT.

2. THERE ARE FEW WHO WOULD DISAGREE WITH THE DISSENT
MESSAGE'S POINT OF DEPARTURE AS STATED IN THE SUMMARY
AND ELSEWHERE: THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FRENCH

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PAGE 02 STATE 163463

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COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF) IN THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE WOULD ROSE A MOST GRAVE CHALLENGE TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND US INTERESTS. THE DEPARTMENT IS ENTIRELY CONVINCED OF THIS, THOUGH OF COURSE THERE COULD BE SOME DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ABOUT WHETHER THE CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF ITS HAPPENING WOULD BE JUST THOSE THAT YOU SUGGEST. WE BELIEVE ALSO THAT PCF PARTICIPATION IS NOT INEVITABLE AND THAT WE SHOULD DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO PREVENT IT. THE QUESTION IS HOW TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN OPPOSITION.

3. YOUR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DESERVE CONTINUED REVIEW AS OUR EXAMINATION OF THE PROBLEM GOES FORWARD AND AS THE FRENCH POLITICAL SITUATION ITSELF DEVELOPS UP TO THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION. AS OF NOW WE ARE NOT PERSUADED THAT THERE IS MUCH CHANCE OF PROMOTING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SOCIALISTS AND GISCARD OR THEREFORE THAT WE SHOULD INVEST MUCH CAPITAL IN TRYING TO BRING THAT ABOUT. IT IS ARGUED BY MANY THAT GISCARD WOULD WELCOME SUCH AN ALLIANCE. PERHAPS HE WOULD AFTER THE NEXT ELECTION. BUT HE HAS LITTLE LATITUDE BEFORE THEN. HIS OWN INDEPENDENT REPUBLICAN PARTY IS LESS INTERESTED IN REFORM THAN GISCARD HIMSELF IS, AND IS NOT AT ALL THE KIND OF PARTY WITH WHICH THE SOCIALISTS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD ALLY THEMSELVES IN LIEU OF THE COMMUNISTS.

4. IT SEEMS TO BE THE CASE--MUCH AS WE REGRET IT--THAT THE SOCIALISTS, CONFRONTING THE CONTINUED WEAKNESS OF THE CENTER AND ITS INCORPORATION IN THE GOVERNMENT MAJORITY, AND FACING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TWO-BALLOT ELECTORAL SYSTEM, ARE CONVINCED THAT THEY NEED THE PCF AS ALLIES AT THE POLLS. CERTAINLY THE ALLIANCE HAS SO FAR PAID OFF FOR THE SOCIALISTS, IN SHORT-TERM ELECTORAL GAINS AND IN THEIR LONGER-TERM STRATEGY OF BECOMING THE NUMBER ONE PARTY OF THE LEFT. THERE ARE SOME WHO THINK THAT AFTER THE NEXT ELECTION THE SOCIALISTS MIGHT TAKE OFFICE UNDER GISCARD WITHOUT THE COMMUNISTS. OTHERS DOUBT IT. BUT IN ANY CASE IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT THE SOCIALISTS

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PAGE 23 STATE 163463

WOULD TAKE THE RISK AT THIS LATE HOUR, AND WITH A FAIR PROSPECT OF VICTORY, OF SCUTTLE THE PCF ALLIANCE, BARRING A CHANGE IN THE ELECTORAL LAW OR IN THE NATIONAL SITUATION TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE PCF. THE PCF, FOR ITS PART, SEEMS IRREVOCABLY LINKED TO THE UOR THROUGH THE ELECTION. WHAT REALIGNMENTS MIGHT FOLLOW THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IS ANOTHER QUESTION.

5. WHAT CAN WE DO NOW? FIRST, OBVIOUSLY, WE SHOULD MAKE OUR CONCERNS CLEAR. WE HAVE DONE SO, VERY EXPLICITLY, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. SHOULD A CLOSER EMBRACE OF GISCARD AND HIS COALITION AND A MORE CLEARCUT US DISTANCING FROM THE SOCIALISTS ALONG WITH THE COMMUNISTS, AS YOU SUGGEST, DO SUBSTANTIAL GOOD TO THE FORMER AND HARM TO THE LATTER? WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD DO EITHER. IT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS

THAT US-FRENCH RELATIONS ARE IN GOOD SHAPE, THAT WE ARE WORKING AND COOPERATING SYMPATHETICALLY WITH GISCARD. IN LIGHT OF THE DEBATE OVER DEFENSE POLICY IN FRANCE, WE HOPE THAT THE INTELLIGENT AND DESIRABLE EVOLUTION OF FRENCH POLICY DOES NOT CREATE A POLITICAL BACKLASH UNFAVORABLE TO HIM. CERTAINLY IT IS A DELICATE MOMENT FOR US TO EMBRACE HIM TOO OSTENTATIVELY.

6. AS FOR THE SOCIALISTS, OUR CONTACTS WITH DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL GROUPS OR PARTIES IN A SITUATION SUCH AS THAT OF FRANCE ARE CONDUCTED TO INFORM OURSELVES, OF AS WELL AS TO INFLUENCE THE PLANS, DECISIONS, PROCESSES AND SO FORTH OF THE POLITICAL ENTITIES IN QUESTION. SUCH CONTACTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO REFLECT THE PRESENT AND POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE TO US OF THAT GROUP, WHETHER OR NOT IT IS FRIENDLY, RATHER THAN TO SIGNAL A VALUE JUDGMENT OR APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL ON OUR PART. WE THEREFORE HAVE SOME RESISTANCE TO YOUR SUGGESTION THAT INCREASES OR REDUCTIONS IN OUR CONTACTS BE USED AS THE VEHICLE TO EXPRESS OUR RESPONSE TO SOCIALIST POLICIES.

7. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS NO INCLINATION TO BUILD BRIDGES TO MITTERRAND GOING BEYOND THE KIND AND DEGREE OF CONTACT THE US GOVERNMENT HAS, IN FRANCE AS ELSEWHERE,

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PAGE 24 STATE 163463

WITH DEMOCRATIC NON-COMMUNIST OPPOSITION FORCES, MITTERRAND HAS NO REASON, AFTER HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON, TO THINK THAT HE IS "ATTRACTIVE" TO US. HE KNOWS THAT WE DO NOT TRUST HIS COMMUNIST ALLIES OR LIKE HIS ALLIANCE WITH THEM. NEVERTHELESS, HE PERSISTS IN THE ALLIANCE PRESUMABLY BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THAT, IN THE PRESENT STATE OF FRENCH POLITICS, IT OFFERS THE

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WITH DEMOCRATIC NON-COMMUNIST OPPOSITION FORCES, MITTERRAND HAS NO REASON, AFTER HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON, TO THINK THAT HE IS "ATTRACTIVE" TO US. HE KNOWS THAT WE DO NOT TRUST HIS COMMUNIST ALLIES OR LIKE HIS ALLIANCE WITH THEM. NEVERTHELESS, HE PERSISTS IN THE ALLIANCE, PROBABLY BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THAT, IN THE PRESENT STATE OF FRENCH POLITICS, IT OFFERS THE SOCIALISTS THEIR ONLY VIABLE ROAD TO POWER. WE DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN PERSUADE OR CAJOLE HIM TO DO WHAT HE THINKS-- WITH SOME REASON-- IS MANIFESTLY AGAINST HIS POLITICAL INTEREST. EVEN SO, WE AGREE WITH YOU THAT IF WE SHOULD NOT COURT THE SOCIALISTS, WE CANNOT IGNORE THEM EITHER. UNLIKE THE COMMUNISTS, THEY ARE A PART OF THE DEMOCRATIC SPECTRUM, AND ONE DAY THEY MAY LEAD THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

8. WE WILL, OF COURSE, KEEP IN MIND THE FACT THAT THERE ARE POLICY STEPS OF OUR OWN THAT MIGHT PROVE USEFUL TO GISCARD'S GOVERNMENTAL COALITION-- WHICH, IN THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG CENTER, IS THE ONLY REAL OPPONENT OF THE LEFT. THIS CANNOT, OF COURSE, IMPLY AN ALL-OUT ACCOMMODATION OF FRENCH POLICY OR THE PRESENT FRENCH LEADERS. BUT WE BELIEVE OUR RECORD HAS BEEN POSITIVE AND WILL REMAIN SO.

9. AS TO YOUR LAST SUGGESTION, ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS AND POLICIES THAT WOULD FOLLOW A LEFT COALITION VICTORY IN 1978 OR 1981 CANNOT BUT BE HELPFUL IN PLANNING TO DEAL WITH THOSE CONTINGENCIES. WE SEE THIS AS A NECESSARY COMPLEMENT TO THE CONTINUING ATTENTION THAT MUST BE PAID TO FRENCH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS UP TO THOSE ELECTIONS WITH AN EYE TO DOING OUR UTMOST TO PREVENT UNDESIRABLE OUTCOMES. KISSINGER

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FROM THE SECRETARY

REFERENCE: New Delhi 19255

SUBJECT: Policy Recommendations on South Asian
Crisis contained in REFTEL

I have read your message with interest and
have asked S/PC to comment on it after consultation
with other appropriate offices. I have also
asked the Open Forum Panel to give me its comments.

END

DRAFTED BY:

S/PC:AAHartman/gw

DRAFTING DATE

12/16/71

TEL. EXT.

22474

APPROVED BY:

The Secretary

CLEARANCES:

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FROM : Amembassy LA PAZ

R.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS : EMIN, BL

SUBJ : Tin

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DATE: January 10, 1978

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This airgram transmits a paper titled U.S. Commodity Policy: The Case of Tin, written by Regional Resources Attache, [redacted]. The paper examines the situation in the international tin market and U.S. tin policy and offers some recommendations for change. This paper represents the views of the author and in no way reflects the opinions of U.S. Embassy La Paz on this issue nor any other of its personnel.

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U.S. Commodity Policy: The Case of Tin. Each mineral has its own special characteristics of location, use, production and marketing. In the case of tin, location is limited primarily to Southeast Asia and Bolivia. It is a rather rare element of high cost and has important and useful characteristics as a metal. Tin is hard to concentrate and mill recovery rates at least in Bolivia often do not exceed fifty per cent. However, there is one thing especially unique to tin in its marketing situation, that is, a U.S. strategic stockpile containing over 200,000 long tons. Also, the USG is a member of the International Tin Agreement. The only international mineral agreement to which we belong.

The U.S. is greatly dependent on tin imports for its supply. There is no important tin production in the U.S. although there is potential for production from resources in Alaska. We import about 85% of our needs in tin with the remainder coming mainly from secondary recovery. The only important sources of new tin are Southeast Asia and Bolivia.

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Drafted by:
POL/ECOM: [redacted]

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Drafting Date: 1/3/78	Phone No.: 218	Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM: WBeal
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IMPEDIMENTS

-- Malaysia: Tin producers in Malaysia must pay a 27% a.v. export tax, a 5% a.v. development tax, a 5-15% profits tax, and personal or corporate income taxes up to 30%. Additionally, state governments have restricted the reissuance of old mine leases and the issuance of new mine leases in order to limit new investment to ethnic Malays and state controlled corporations. As a consequence, tin production in Malaysia has fallen by 26% in the past five years despite the doubling of the ITC floor price and the tripling of the market price.

-- Thailand: The Thai mining industry must pay 27% a.v. royalty and an effective 6% a.v. business tax in addition to a 35% corporate tax rate. Additionally, the RTG has been unwilling or unable to provide adequate security in the tin mining areas, and increasingly the RTE has insisted on participating in new ventures. As a consequence, tin production has stagnated since 1972.

-- Bolivia: The industry pay ad valorem royalty and export taxes totalling 46%. Additionally, the GOB has excluded mining in 71% of its total land area.

UNCLASSIFIEDPage 2
La Paz A-5

Tin is a scarce resource. Its crustal abundance is .005%. Most geologists who know tin and its limited worldwide occurrences believe that it will be an increasingly scarce resource. Large, low grade deposits are few and virtually all of these have metallurgical problems that prevent their being considered resources at all. Large, high grade deposits are a thing of the past. Peter Rich has predicted (Tin Symposium, La Paz, Nov. 1977) that the free world will continue to experience shortages of tin reaching 53,000 metric tons annually by 1986 and 162,000 metric tons annually by 2006. His thesis is that tin will cease to be a tonnage commodity over the next 20 to 30 years. Supplies will simply not be available even at high prices for large users such as the canning industry. The U.S. has very limited tin reserves and resources and world supplies compared to world demand appear inadequate.

Tin consumption in the U.S. has risen more in 1976 and 1977 than the recent historical trend of 1 to 2%. This is because reduction of tin usage has reached limits in tinning of steel cans and has even begun to recover some markets lost previously to aluminum and plastics. Further, tin has fast growing new-uses in the chemical industry. Tin compounds used in insecticides do not have environmental contamination problems that compounds of other minerals have. Tin usage in solder especially in the electric industry benefits from new technology which should ensure continued use of lead-tin alloys. The automotive industry will show a drop in tin usage to the extent change over to aluminum radiators is adopted. This is offset somewhat by growing use of the calcium-lead-tin battery.

The U.S. strategic stockpile of tin has at times been a political and an economic burden. It has great potential to be a blessing or to cause mischief. The 200,000 long tons of tin held by GSA is in value terms its most important commodity. This tin was purchased after World War II and the Korean War at what producers term cooperative prices of about \$1.00 per pound. Current prices are about \$6.00 per pound. Our GSA tin stockpile is a rapidly appreciating asset which will continue to appreciate. Since the early 1960's we have sold tin from our stockpile because we had accumulated too much. Keeping all this unnecessary tin it is argued, is a burden on the taxpayers. There has been a general world shortage of tin for about fifteen years and GSA sales have made up the shortfall. The price of tin would have been higher without these sales even though consumption has grown slowly. Thus, new production was discouraged. GSA oversold tin in late 1973 and in 1974 as 43,000 metric tons were sold or over 20% of free world supply even though consumption had been growing at only 1-2% per annum. This was followed by world recession in 1975. Tin overhang on the market combined with reduced demand resulted in a disastrous year for tin. In late 1976 and all of 1977 there was no new congressional authorization for sale of GSA tin because of a disagreement over stockpile policy between the White House and Congress. Prices rose from under \$3 to \$6 per pound, a reflection of the gap between world production and world consumption

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Page 3
La Paz A- 5

and evidence of what would have happened years earlier without GSA sales. The major tin producers, Malaysia, Bolivia, Indonesia and Thailand are not only poor countries but are traditionally our friends and mining conditions in these countries are usually abysmal. For them, the GSA stockpile hangs like a sword of Damocles over an important and scarce natural resource.

Further, our stockpile policy has been influenced by political forces such as the canning industry who are more interested in a short term low tin price than in the long term health of the tin industry. So, sales have been made for commercial reasons in spite of protestations that GSA is a strategic and not an economic stockpile. Our tin stockpile goal is also set at a far too low level for apparently political but indefensible reasons. The strategic stockpile is, according to the Federal Preparedness Agency guidelines, supposed to be sufficient to cover the first three years of a national emergency. In 1977, U.S. consumption of tin was 70,000 long tons of which 55,600 long tons is primary tin. Yet surprisingly enough our stockpile goal is 32,400 metric tons or about 7 months supply.

Politically our tin policy as most visibly expressed in International Tin Council meetings has been costly. The U.S. delegation has consistently been the leader of consuming countries opposing increases in the ITC buffer stock price range. We have argued that prices have gone up too much and that costs have not risen as much. As explained above, this ignores the low base from which tin started, having been held low for years by GSA sales. Economic theory tells us that when a good is scarce it rises in price until sufficient new production is called forth to establish equilibrium. Until now this has not been allowed to happen in the tin industry.

The price of tin rose to astronomical heights in 1977 and continues to rise, averaging over \$5.50 per pound during the two months when this article was written. The exact reaction from the marketplace one would expect. The reason is a large gap between world production and consumption and no authorization for GSA sales. What has U.S.G. reaction been? We have taken the attitude that we should hang tough in the International Tin Council (ITC) and resist the demands of bothersome developing countries who constantly press to have the buffer stock price range raised. This shows U.S. industry that State Department officers are tough negotiators not striped pants pansies and serves, we think, as a signal to producers of other commodities that we will not cave in to every producer demand for more money.

However, our politico-economic reason for joining the ITC and later for offering to make a voluntary contribution to the buffer stock was to show evidence of good faith intentions in the overall context of

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Page 4
La Paz A-5

North-South dialogue and our willingness to deal with economic concerns of developing countries. Instead, we have been confrontational in ITC meetings to defend a policy not in our best long run economic interest.

Summarized below are the main points we have looked at regarding the international tin industry and U.S. tin policy:

- Tin is a scarce world resource and we are dependent on imports.
- Traditional as well as new uses are growing.
- We have a large buffer stock which is appreciating rapidly in value but we are selling it off.
- Our tin stockpile goal is too low.
- Confrontations in ITC meetings have been damaging our credentials in the North-South dialogue.
- Tin production is lower than consumption and tin prices have on the average been too low for about 15 years.
- Tin is scarce and current prices are high and rising (in absence of GSA sales).
- Consumers are suffering from current high prices, yet new tin production is only slowly being developed.

Recommendations:

If U.S. tin policy is wrong, then what should be the basic elements of a new policy? There are two main issues of importance; 1) the U.S. strategic stockpile and, 2) U.S. positions in the ITC. Fortunately, we have enough tin remaining in our stockpile to satisfy various interests. The stockpile goal is too low at 32,400 long tons and should be raised to the equivalent of three years consumption of primary tin or 170,000 long tons (based on 1977 consumption). Beside the need for strategic purposes we have already seen that tin is a scarce and appreciating resource. The Carter Administration is committed to contributing about 4,000 long tons to the ITC buffer stock as our share of the consumer contribution. It is not a gift; the U.S. gets back the original value plus earnings if it withdraws from the ITC. The remaining about 30,000 long tons in the stockpile should be authorized by Congress for sale by GSA. The sales should be done in consultation with producer countries and the ITC. Since after this authorization we will have no more tin for sale we must do all we can to stimulate new investment in tin mining. Tin sales by GSA should continue only as long as the tin price remains above \$5.00 lb. or alternatively we could commit ourselves to sell 10,000 long tons per year and no more for three years in order to maximize predictability and stability in the tin market.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIEDPage 5
La Paz A-5

To avoid recurring battles in the ITC, we should give more power to the Executive Secretariat of the ITC to set the price range for buffer stock operations. We should encourage use of econometric analyses to help in setting the price range. We should initiate informal contact with producer governments prior to ITC meetings to allow for greater understanding of our position and hopefully develop more reasonable producer expectations. Further, as a matter of policy regarding tin prices, we should be willing to accept higher prices as a frank incentive for development of new tin mines (which will take at least several years) until there is some approximate balance between free world supply and demand. This means accepting higher price ranges in the ITC. Unfortunately, past experience and an analysis of tin producer country situations tells us that the above measures will not be enough due to structural problems in individual countries. Tin investment is already responding somewhat to higher prices but it is not enough. More new investment in tin mining can be encouraged through priority treatment by the Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC) and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM).

OPIC Board

Opic has already received ~~non-informative~~ directives to increase financing and insurance of mining projects in LDC's. Tin should be a primary target. OPIC insurance will help to overcome fears of political instability in tin producing LDC's. US capital will be attracted to tin mining because of high prices. Eximbank can make credits available for the export of the latest US mining machinery and equipment. In most cases US capital would be advised to associate itself with local public or private capital. For their part tin producers will benefit from greater employment, tax income and foreign exchange earnings. Finally, the U.S. should go frankly and openly on the record as favoring these steps as demonstration of our ability to seek cooperative and mutually beneficial solutions to common problems. We should state that if in future years a tin surplus were to develop we would expect that tin prices, by means of lowering the ITC buffer stock price ranges, would be held to a lower level as a disincentive to new production in order to restore balance just as we are now prepared to raise prices to restore balance in the market.


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FORM DS 322(OCR)

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OFF: LLOWENSTEIN: JB
07/05/74 EXT 23852
S/P: BSWIERS

USIA (FOR IAA ONLY) (INFO)

PRIORITY PRETORIA

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OEXC, SF
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM [REDACTED] CA0

PBS
LLX: 2

B6

REFS: (A) PRETORIA 2857; (B) PRETORIA 2911

- 1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE (REFTEL A) AND AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS (REFTEL B).
- 2. OFF HAS BEEN STUDYING OVERALL U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA IN LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL AND ELSEWHERE. ACTION ON REFTEL (A) DELAYED BY SHORT WEEK BUT BEING GIVEN PRIORITY ATTENTION. ACTION OFFICER IS WILLARD A. DE PREE, S/P.

DECONTROL: GDS. YY

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PAGE 01 STATE 098455.

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ORIGIN SP-02

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 ES-01 /003 R

DRAFTED BY S/P: EO'DONNELL: AG
APPROVED BY S/P: PWOLFOWITZ
S/P: EDOUGLAS
S/OF: GDRAGNICH

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R 170300Z APR 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY RANGOON

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 098455

DISSENT CHANNEL-FOR [] FROM S/P PAUL WOLFOWITZ

B6

E.O. 12065: GDS, 4/15/86 (WOLFOWITZ; PAUL)

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: YOUR RECENT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REFERENCES: A) RANGOON 0965; B) STATE 057781

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. WE HAVE DISTRIBUTED COPIES TO THE SECRETARY, THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE COUNSELOR, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM. MARK MINTON, POLICY PLANNING STAFF MEMBER, WILL COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY.

3. I COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. HAIG

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WEAVER JESSIE B
77 WARSAW 8192

CONFIDENTIAL / EXDIS OR ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 21 WARSAW 8192 21 OF 23 120615Z
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-21 ISO-20 SSO-20 /226 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1535
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 3 WARSAW 8192
EXDIS

I.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ECON IAGR IFIN PINT PL US UR

SUBJ: THE POLISH ECONOMIC MORASS - WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. DO?
1. IN WARSAW 8179, WE ATTEMPTED TO ASSESS THE POLISH SITUATION AS WINTER APPROACHES. WE FOUND PROSPECTS GRIM ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, AND SAW THE LIKELIHOOD OF OVERT DEMONSTRATIONS OF PROTEST, SPARKED BY FOOD AND FUEL SHORTAGES, WHICH COULD CONVOLVINGLY THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY. WE CONCLUDE THAT IT IS IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO HELP MAINTAIN A MODERATE, GIENKA-LIKE REGIME. APART FROM THE CONSIDERABLE SYMBOLIC SUPPORT FOR THAT GOAL WHICH WILL RESULT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S PROSPECTIVE VISIT TO WARSAW, CHANCES OF ACHIEVING IT REST MAINLY IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE. IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS, WE RECOMMEND SOME SPECIFIC U.S. RESPONSES TO POLISH REQUESTS FOR HELP.

2. THERE IS NO PANACEA, NO FAST SHORTCUT WHICH WILL LEAD POLAND QUICKLY OUT OF ITS ECONOMIC MALAISE, AND THIS WOULD BE TRUE EVEN IF SOME MASSIVE, MULTI-NATION ASSISTANCE EFFORT WERE POSSIBLE, WHICH IT IS NOT. HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES COULD TAKE SEVERAL UNILATERAL ACTIONS WHICH WOULD GO A CONSIDERABLE WAY TOWARD DEFUSING THE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AND INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE SITUATION WHICH NOW EXISTS. SOME OF THESE ACTIONS INVOLVE IMMEDIATE RELIEF WHICH MIGHT HELP AVERT AN INTERNAL EXPLOSION

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PAGE 02 WARSAW 8192 21 OF 23 120615Z

LIKE GDAWSK 1970 OR RATON 1975. SUCH AN EXPLOSION COULD ULTIMATELY HAVE RAMIFICATIONS MUCH MORE SERIOUS THAN A WERE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL DISORDER IN A MEDIUM-SIZED COUNTRY IN EASTERN EUROPE. OTHER ACTIONS INVOLVE LONGER-RANGE STEPS WHICH MIGHT HELP THE POLISH AUTHORITIES GET A BETTER MANAGEMENT GRIP ON THE COUNTRY'S FLOUNDERING FINANCIAL STRUCTURE. THESE ACTIONS WOULD REQUIRE QUICK AND LEFT MANEUVERING THROUGH OUR OWN BUREAUCRATIC AND LEGISLATIVE LAZYRINTHS. SOME COULD BE HELPED BY ASSISTANCE FROM OUR ALLIES AND EVEN BY THE TACIT ACQUIESCENCE OF THE USSR.

3. SOME IMMEDIATE ACTIONS -

(A) CCC CREDITS. - FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THE APPROXIMATELY 50 DAYS WHICH REMAIN IN THE YEAR 1977, CCC CREDITS ARE CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT. THEY PROVIDE OUR ONLY POSSIBILITY OF QUICK RESPONSE TO POLAND'S SEVERAL REQUESTS OVER RECENT MONTHS FOR GRAIN CREDITS. THE LEVEL OF \$302-MILLION WOULD MEET THE POLISH BIL MADE IN MAY DURING THE MEETING OF THE AGRICULTURAL WORKING GROUP. WE

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77 WARSAW 25192

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SHOULD, HOWEVER, PURSE FOR \$450-MILLION. THIS WOULD GO ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS OF THE WAY TOWARD FULFILLING POLAND'S REQUEST OF \$600 MILLION IN GRAIN CREDITS THIS YEAR, A REQUEST MADE IN SEPTEMBER AS IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE COUNTRY WOULD AGAIN SUFFER A BAD HARVEST. ANY POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING PAYMENTS WHICH WILL FALL DUE THIS YEAR AND IN 1973 ON PAST CCC CREDITS SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED.

(E) A LONG-TERM GRAIN-PURCHASING AGREEMENT -

(I) THE POLES HAVE URGENTLY AND FORMALLY ASKED THAT WE AGREE TO THE CONCLUSION OF A LONG-TERM (PREFERABLE TEN-YEAR) AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH POLAND WOULD BE ABLE TO PURCHASE FOUR-TO-FIVE MILLION TONS OF US GRAIN EACH YEAR. THIS PROPOSAL HAS BEEN MADE AT VARIOUS LEVELS IN WASHINGTON AND WARSAW. AS EXPLAINED BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE OLSZEWSKI IN A MEETING WITH EXIM BANK

CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE 23 WARSAW 25192 21 OF 23 120615Z

CHAIRMAN MOORE ON OCTOBER 13, IT WOULD INVOLVE THE PURCHASE OF ABOUT \$400 MILLION WORTH OF GRAIN EACH YEAR, WITH REPAYMENT OVER SEVEN YEARS AFTER A THREE-YEAR GRACE PERIOD AND AT INTEREST RATES OF NO MORE THAN ONE AND ONE-HALF PERCENT OVER LIBOR. IN EFFECT, IT AMOUNTS TO AN INTERMEDIATE FORM OF FOOD CREDIT ON TERMS BETWEEN THOSE OF PL-480 AND THE CCC PROGRAM.

(II) A PROGRAM OF THIS TYPE WOULD REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. IT WOULD CONSTITUTE A NEW FORM OF US GOVERNMENT FOOD ASSISTANCE AND WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL REVIEW AND ADJUSTMENT BY SEVERAL DIFFERENT AGENCIES. NOTWITHSTANDING, WE BELIEVE THE PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT BE REJECTED AS OUT OF THE QUESTION OR EVEN OVERLY AMBITIOUS OR IMPRACTICAL BECAUSE OF THOSE FACTORS.

(III) NOR SHOULD THE IDEA BE ARBITRARILY PIGEONHoled BECAUSE SOME US OFFICIALS ARE OPPOSED TO LONG-TERM COMMODITY SALES AGREEMENTS. WE RECENTLY ENTERED INTO A LONG-TERM GRAIN-SALES AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, OUR MAJOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY ADVERSARY. FURTHERMORE, IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE USSR WILL AGAIN MAKE USE OF THE AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE LARGE AMOUNTS OF WHEAT AND CORN DURING THIS CROP YEAR. ASIDE FROM THE BETTER CREDIT TERMS WHICH THE POLES ARE SEEKING, WE DO NOT SEE ANY QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TYPE OF AGREEMENT SOUGHT BY POLAND AND THAT WHICH THE SOVIETS NOW ENJOY. CERTAINLY, THE SIZE OF THE CORRELATED POLISH PURCHASES AND THEIR ABILITY TO IMPACT ON THE MARKET WOULD BE LOWER THAN IN THE SOVIET CASE.

(IV) AT A TIME WHEN POLAND IS IN SERIOUS ECONOMIC TROUBLE AND THE US PRESS IS BEGINNING TO PICK UP THE STORY, THE PUBLIC REALIZATION THAT WE ARE SELLING GRAIN TO THE SOVIETS UNDER AN ESTABLISHED LONG-TERM AGREEMENT, WHILE DENYING ONE TO THE POLES, COULD BE UNFORTUNATE. (THERE ARE FAR MORE POLISH-AMERICANS WHOSE RELATIVES ARE GOING TO FEEL THE DIRECT IMPACT OF WHAT WE DO OR DO NOT DO, THAN THERE ARE AMERICANS WITH RELATIVES IN THE USSR.) FURTHERMORE, THE NEGOTIATION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS FULLY IN LINE WITH OUR STATED FOREIGN-POLICY INTEREST OF TRYING

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PAGE

WEAVER, JESSIE B
77 WARSAW 25192

CONFIDENTIAL / EXDIS OR ONLY

PAGE 24 WARSAW 25192 21 OF 23 120615Z

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CONFIDENTIAL / EXDIS OR ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 21 WARSAW 28192 02 OF 03 120611Z
ACTION SS-25
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 WARSAW 3192
EXDIS

(C) ENTRY INTO THE PL-492 CLUB - IT IS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR POLAND TO RECEIVE PL-492 ASSISTANCE THIS YEAR RANGE FROM NEGLIGIBLE TO NON-EXISTENT. AND IT IS ALSO ARGUED THAT POLAND'S STATE OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PUTS IT IN A DIFFERENT CLASS FROM THE COUNTRIES RECEIVING PL-492 AID IN 1977. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT, UNLESS IT IS LEGALLY IMPOSSIBLE, POLAND SHOULD BE ENTERED ON THE LISTS FOR PL-492 AID, EVEN IF THE AMOUNT RECEIVED THIS YEAR IS A MERE TENS OF MILLION DOLLARS. RULFS, LIKE GOVERNMENTS, CAN EASILY CHANGE OVER SEVERAL YEARS AND THERE IS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY THAT POLAND MIGHT BE ELIGIBLE FOR SIGNIFICANT PL-492 AID IN 1978 OR SOME YEAR THEREAFTER. ACCOMPLISHING THE PAPERWORK FOR ENTRY INTO THE PL-492 CLUB IN 1977 OR 1978 WOULD SAVE TIME LATER.

4. SOME MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS

(A) BRINGING POLAND INTO THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

(I) WE BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME TO STOP TREATING THE POSSIBILITY OF POLISH ENTRY INTO THE IMF AS A DELICATE, PRO-AND-CON ISSUE ON WHICH THE US GOVERNMENT HAS NO FIXED POSITION AND WHICH AWAITS SOME SPECIFIC ACTION BY THE POLIS. THE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGE OF THE IMF MEMBERSHIP TO WARSAW WOULD BE CREDITS, LOANS, AND OTHER MONETARY AID FROM A POWERFUL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

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PAGE 02 WARSAW 28192 02 OF 03 120611Z

BUT WE BELIEVE THAT AN EQUALLY, AND POSSIBLY EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, ADVANTAGE WOULD BE THE PRESSURE SUCH MEMBERSHIP WOULD GENERATE ON THE POLISH AUTHORITIES TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CERTAIN STANDARDS OF FISCAL DISCIPLINE AND RESPONSIBILITY. IN ADDITION TO GAINING THE BENEFITS OF IMF ADVICE AND ANALYSES, THE POLISH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL LEADERSHIP WOULD, POSSIBLY FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE WORLD WAR II, BE COMPELLED TO ADHERE TO RULES AND REGULATIONS WHICH ARE RECOGNIZED AS STANDARD, SOUND, FISCAL MANAGEMENT IN MOST ADVANCED COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. THE NECESSITY OF COMPLYING WITH VARIOUS IMF RULES COULD BE USED AS AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION TO THE POLISH PEOPLE AS TO WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS TAKING CERTAIN ACTIONS WHICH OTHERWISE WOULD BE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE (EVEN, I.E., RISKS IN THE PRICES OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS).

(II) OVER THE PAST YEAR, THE EMBASSY HAS MADE SEVERAL DISCREET SOUNDINGS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A POLISH APPROACH TO THE FUND. THE REACTION FROM SOME OF THE COUNTRY'S TOP ECONOMIC PLANNERS AND FINANCIAL EXPERTS HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS, BUT VERY INTERESTED.

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77 WARSAW 28192

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 WRESTED, AND ALSO CURIOUS ABOUT WHAT THE US POSITION WOULD BE.
 WOULD THE UNITED STATES, THEY HAVE ASKED, SUPPORT A POLISH
 APPLICATION?

(III) WE THINK IT IS NOW TIME TO STOP FEELING AND, FLATLY,
 BUT QUIETLY, TO ADVISE THE POLES THAT (A) WE THINK IT WOULD BE
 AN EXCELLENT IDEA IF THEY APPLIED FOR IMF MEMBERSHIP, AND (B)
 THAT THEY CAN EXPECT UNITED STATES SUPPORT IF THEY APPLY. THIS
 APPROACH COULD BE DONE IN A LOW-KEY MANNER HERE IN WARSAW.
 THE FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS COULD ALSO
 BE EXPLAINED HERE. MANY TOP POLISH ECONOMIC FIGURES ARE ALREADY
 AWARE OF THESE ADVANTAGES. THEY MERELY AWAIT SOME MOVEMENT.

(IV) WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIETS? CONFRONTED WITH THE SHOPPING
 LIST WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE WARSAW RUMOR MILL (THE ONLY INTER-
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PAGE 23 WARSAW 28192 22 OF 23 122611Z
 PRISE IN THE COUNTRY WHICH CONSISTENTLY OVER-FULFILLS ITS PLAN),
 GURKIN LAID BEFORE THEM DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW AND
 WITH THE VOLATILITY OF THE POLISH PROLETARIAT, IT IS NOT
 TOTALLY EXCLUDED THAT AT LEAST SOME ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
 MIGHT BE PREPARED TO TOLERATE POLAND'S RE-JOINING THE IMF AS
 ONE WAY OF HELPING THE POLISH ECONOMY STAY AFLOAT. FACED WITH
 THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING TO PROVIDE MORE SUPPORT CREDITS ON TOP
 OF THE BILLION DOLLARS THEY EXTENDED JUST A YEAR AGO, THE SOVIETS
 MIGHT ASSIST, HOWEVER GRudgingLY. FINALLY, HOWEVER, WE CANNOT
 SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCE THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. WE SHOULD TAKE
 SUCH ACTION AS WE CAN IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT WE BELIEVE WOULD BE
 HELPFUL IN INDUCING THE POLISH AUTHORITIES TO RUN THEIR ECONOMY
 MORE RATIONALLY.

(V) WOULD THE POLES AGREE TO PROVIDE THE EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC
 DATA REQUIRED BY THE FUND AND THE BANK AS THE PRICE OF MEMBERSHIP?
 WE DO NOT REGARD CURRENT POLISH RELUCTANCE TO PROVIDE INFORMA-
 TION AS A MAJOR PROBLEM. WHEN ROMANIA JOINED THE FUND, IT
 PROVIDED SOME, BUT NOT ALL, OF THE REQUIRED INFORMATION ON A VERY
 SECRET BASIS. LATER, IT PROVIDED MORE. WE UNDERSTAND THE LEVEL
 CONTINUES TO INCREASE. POLAND COULD FOLLOW THE SAME ROUTE.
 THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUROPE, THE TREND IS TOWARDS A SLOW, CONTINUED
 TOW IN THE PROVISION OF BASIC ECONOMIC DATA FOR WESTERN LOANS,
 FOR UN ORGANIZATIONS, FOR THE PUBLIC IN GENERAL. (THE USSR
 REMAINS AT THE FROZEN END OF THE SPECTRUM.) SOME OF THE
 INFORMATION WHICH HUNGARY HAS PROVIDED FOR RECENT BANK OF AMERICA
 EURODOLLAR LOANS MORE THAN MEETS IMF REQUIREMENTS. ITS PUBLICA-
 TION WOULD HAVE BEEN UNIMAGINABLE FIVE YEARS AGO. WE BELIEVE
 POLAND SHOULD MAKE THE JUMP, AFTER WHICH SUCH MATTERS AS BALANCE-
 OF-PAYMENTS DATA AND INFORMATION ON GOLD RESERVES CAN BE WORKED
 OUT OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS.
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77 WARSAW 2192

CONFIDENTIAL / EXDIS OR ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 21 WARSAW 2192 23 OCT 83 120642Z

ACTION SS-25

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 3 OF 3 WARSAW 2192

EXDIS

(E) PREPARATIONS FOR A ROLLOVER REQUEST IN 1978 -

(S) MOST WESTERN ESTIMATES PLACE THE LEVEL OF POLISH INDEBTEDNESS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF \$12 BILLION, WITH A DEBT-SERVICE RATIO OF BETWEEN 30 AND 35 PERCENT. THE POLISH ECONOMY SEEMS TO SUFFER NEW BLOWS ALMOST WEEKLY, E.G., A BAD POTATO CROP AND THE POSSIBILITY OF LESS SOVIET GRAIN THAN EXPECTED. WE CONSEQUENTLY THINK THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE UNITED STATES MAY SOON RECEIVE A REQUEST FOR A ROLLOVER OF ALL PAYMENTS DUE ON CURRENT INDEBTEDNESS. A LIKELY TIME MAY BE SPRING, 1978. WE THINK WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR IT. BEING PREPARED MEANS REACHING AGREEMENT ON WHAT OUR RESPONSE WILL BE AND, ASSUMING THAT IT IS FAVORABLE, GETTING THE NECESSARY PAPERWORK DONE. WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER WHAT WE ARE GOING TO ASK IN RETURN -- AND HERE WOULD BE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE POLISH TO APPLY FOR IMF MEMBERSHIP -- AND WHAT WE THINK WE CAN GET.

(SS) ONLY ABOUT ONE-QUARTER OF POLISH GOVERNMENT INDEBTEDNESS TO THE UNITED STATES IS TO THE US GOVERNMENT. THE BALANCE IS HELD BY LARGE AMERICAN BANKS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN SYNDICATE LOANS TO POLAND OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. WE BELIEVE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND BANKING OFFICIALS MAY ALREADY HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH US BANKS REGARDING RESCHEDULING OF PRIVATE PAYMENTS.

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PAGE 22 WARSAW 28192 23 OF 23 140342Z

(C) APPROACHES TO OTHER NATO COUNTRIES ON POSSIBLE POLISH
ROLLOVER AND RESCHEDULING REQUESTS -

APPROXIMATELY THREE-QUARTERS OF POLAND'S FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS IS
TO WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND COMMERCIAL BANKS. WE SHOULD
COORDINATE INFORMATION ON POLISH REQUESTS FOR RESCHEDULING
WITH OUR NATO ALLIES AND TRY TO GET AN AGREED NATO OR NATO/
WESTERN POSITION ON HOW THEY WILL BE HANDLED. AGAIN, AS IS THE
CASE WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE BULK (MORE THAN ONE-HALF) OF
POLAND'S DEBT TO WESTERN EUROPE APPEARS TO BE TO COMMERCIAL
BANKS RATHER THAN TO GOVERNMENTS, ALTHOUGH THERE IS ALSO A
LARGE AREA OF GOVERNMENT-GUARANTEED CREDITS. WE SUSPECT THAT
THE LEADING WEST EUROPEAN CREDITOR IS THE FRG, BOTH THROUGH
CREDITS EXTENDED BY ITS MAJOR BANKS SUCH AS DEUTSCHE BANK AND
LIPSCHMIDT, AND ALSO THROUGH COMMERCIAL CREDITS GUARANTEED BY THE
QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL HERMES CORPORATION. WE MAY GET SOME INDICINGS
OF POLISH INTENTIONS DURING CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO POLAND

CONFIDENTIAL

/ EXDIS OR ONLY

PAGE

WEAVER JESSIE B.
77 WARSAW 2192

CONFIDENTIAL

/ EXDIS OR ONLY

LATER THIS MONTH.

2. THE PROPOSALS SET OUT ABOVE MAKE UP AN IMPOSING LIST. ALL
OF THEM WOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF OUR
ASSESSMENT OF POLAND'S DIFFICULT AND WORSENING SITUATION AND
OF THE US INTEREST IN SEEKING, WHERE WE CAN, TO HELP A MODERATE
POLISH LEADERSHIP DEAL WITH IT. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE NOT TO
HAVE TO FIND OUT WHETHER JAN SZCZEPANSKI IS RIGHT IN BELIEVING
THAT A HUSAK, NOT A TUBCEK, WOULD FOLLOW GIEREK.

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TELEGRAM

Department of State

PAGE 01 STATE 011850
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APPROVED BY S/P: WLOD
S/P: ODP: NABOYER
NEA/ARR: MORAPER (IN DRAFT)

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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FOR [] FROM LORD DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, LE, IS, SY, JO

SUBJECT: THE IMPERATIVE OF US ACTION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

REF: BEIRUT 7585

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ABOUT US POLICY TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS AND LEBANON. IT WAS THOUGHTFUL AND READ WITH INTEREST. THE DEPARTMENT VALUED ITS ANALYSIS AND SEVERAL OF ITS ACCURATE PREDICTIONS. SOME OF YOUR PREDICTIONS DIDN'T COME TRUE, BUT NO ONE CAN ASPIRE TO BATTING A THOUSAND ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THE LENGTH OF TIME WE HAVE TAKEN TO REPLY DOES NOT INDICATE INATTENTION TO YOUR VIEWS. WE GREATLY REGRET THE DELAY IN REPLYING TO YOU.

2. YOUR MESSAGE SEEMS TO HAVE THREE DISTINGUISHABLE, ALTHOUGH OVERLAPPING, SUBJECTS: BROAD US POLICY TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS; ACTIONS THE UNITED STATES MIGHT TAKE VIS-A-VIS PALESTINE IN THE LEBANESE CONTEXT; AND HOW THESE ISSUES MIGHT BE ADDRESSED IN AN ELECTION YEAR. OUR RESPONSE IS ORGANIZED ACCORDINGLY.

3. YOUR IMPATIENCE WITH THE SLOWDOWN IN OUR DIPLOMACY ON MANY ISSUES THIS YEAR -- IN WHICH THE ELECTION CLEARLY

PLAYED SOME PART -- IS UNDERSTANDABLE AND NO DOUBT YOUR SENTIMENTS ARE WIDELY SHARED. YET THE COORDINATION OF THOUGHT AND ACTION IMPLICIT IN YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR A BIPARTISAN STATEMENT BY THE CANDIDATES ON A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE IN AN ELECTION YEAR. EQUALLY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MOST DIFFICULT FOR ANY INCUMBENT ADMINISTRATION TO TAKE A POSITION UNILATERALLY. THREE REASONS, NOT ENTIRELY CONSISTENT, APPLY TO SUCH A BIPARTISAN OR UNILATERAL MOVE. SHORT OF GRAVE NATIONAL CRISIS, ELECTORAL OPPONENTS ARE UNLIKELY TO AGREE ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES DURING A CAMPAIGN. IT CAN BE ARGUED, INDEED, THAT THE PURPOSE OF A CAMPAIGN IS TO PRESENT POLICY ALTERNATIVES TO VOTERS. SECOND, FOR THE ADMINISTRATION UNILATERALLY TO HAVE TAKEN A POSITION ON A PALESTINIAN STATE COULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE OPPONENT'S TAKING A POSITION THAT COULD NARROW HIS OPTIONS IN THE EVENT HE WERE ELECTED. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE -- AND THIS IS THE THIRD REASON -- BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES PROBABLY CANNOT PUBLICLY DEFINE ITS POSITION ON A WEST BANK STATE WITHOUT REVEALING ITS THINKING ON AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. TO DO THIS PREMATURELY COULD EXPOSE AN ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION TO MISINTERPRETATION BY ITS OWN CITIZENRY AND BY BOTH ARABS AND ISRAELIS.

4. YOUR VIEW THAT A SUCCESSFUL DISPOSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IS ONE OF THE KEYS TO STABILITY IN LEBANON IS WIDELY SHARED. NEITHER THE EVOCATIVE POWER OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE NOR THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES

CAN BE CORKED UP IN LEBANON FOR LONG EVEN SHOULD THE LEBANESE BE ABLE TO PUT THEIR OTHER PROBLEMS IN ORDER. AS THEY NOW SEEM TO BE BEGINNING TO DO, AND THE SYRIANS BRING THE PALESTINIANS THERE UNDER CONSIDERABLE CONTROL. A RETURN TO STABILITY IN LEBANON OVER THE LONGER TERM CERTAINLY DEPENDS IN PART ON A RESOLUTION OF THE BROAD PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE MADE SOME MAJOR MOVE REGARDING THE PALESTINIANS DURING RECENT MONTHS AS A WAY OF HELPING TO MEND THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS ANOTHER MATTER. AND WHETHER OR NOT ANNOUNCING US SUPPORT FOR A WEST BANK STATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN OUR TACTIC IS YET A FURTHER QUESTION. OFFICIALS IN THE DEPARTMENT DID CONSIDER WHETHER MOVES REGARDING THE PALESTINIANS WERE POSSIBLE OR WISE IN SEVERAL CONTEXTS: THE EFFECT ON THE PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES; ON SYRIA'S PALESTINIAN POLICY; ON EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN RELATIONS;

ON US RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES. AND ON THE EFFECT ANY MOVE WOULD HAVE ON OUR CHANCES OF FOSTERING AN OVERALL ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. THE DEPARTMENT CONCLUDED THAT ANY MAJOR MOVE REGARDING THE PALESTINIANS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN WISE IN SEVERAL OF THESE CONTEXTS. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE PRESSURE ON THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON SEEMS PRESENTLY TO HAVE FAVORED THE MODERATES MORE THAN THE REJECTIONISTS.

6. WHEN TO PLAY WHATEVER CARDS WE MAY HAVE REGARDING PALESTINIAN ISSUES -- WITH THE AIM OF BRINGING THE PALESTINIANS INTO SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND FOSTERING OVERALL SETTLEMENT -- HAS BEEN ONE OF THE MOST DELICATE JUDGMENTS WE HAVE FACED -- AS YOU WELL KNOW. THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE TRUE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. AS WE TRY TO LOOK BOTH BACKWARD AND FORWARD, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE BEST CASE CAN BE MADE FOR HAVING SAVED OUR PALESTINIAN CARDS FOR LATER. WE STILL HAVE THEM FOR USE AT THE WATERSHED MOMENTS THAT SURELY LIE AHEAD OF US.

7. THERE CAN BE NO DISAGREEMENT WITH YOUR VIEW THAT "US NATIONAL INTEREST IS BEST SERVED BY A STABLE ARAB WORLD AND THEREFORE IN A RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE." THE DEPARTMENT INTENDS TO CONTINUE WORKING TOWARD THIS GOAL. ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUCH AS YOU SUBMITTED WILL HELP US TO DO SO, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY NOT BE ADOPTED AS FULLY AS YOU WOULD LIKE. THANK YOU AGAIN FOR SHARING YOUR PROVOCATIVE THINKING WITH US.
KISSINGER

File

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OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 087800
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APPROVED BY S/P: ALAKE
S/P: GAUSTIN (DRAFT)
S/P-OF: NBOYER (DRAFT)
S/P: RJHARRINGTON (DRAFT)
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O 192052Z APR 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE

-----192118Z 013571 /72

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PDIP, ES

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: SAN SALVADOR 1732

FOR [] FROM ANTHONY LAKE

B6

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ON THE "SCENARIO OF AMBASSADORIAL CHANGE". GRANVILLE AUSTIN HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE COORDINATOR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED.
VANCE



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Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 801

PAGE 01 BERLIN 0204Z 251251Z

52
ACTION EUR-20

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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION NATO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BERLIN 2042

SUBJ: FRG, LUFTHANSA AND BERLIN

REF: A) BONN 159001 B) BERLIN 1637 ^{AVG} _{AVG}

1. MISSION AGREES THAT LUFTHANSA TEGEL STOP ON MOSCOW
RUN PROVIDES USEFUL METHOD OF MEETING FRG POLITICAL
NEEDS WITHOUT DAMAGING COMMERCIAL POSITION OF ALLIED
IGS CARRIERS AND HAS PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED THIS
METHOD OF INTRODUCING THE GERMAN AIRLINE INTO BERLIN
AVIATION PICTURE (BERLIN 1637). FOR REASONS OUTLINED
REF B WE BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE FOR GERMAN AIRCRAFT
FLYING TO WEST BERLIN TO UTILIZE CORRIDOR REGIME.
FLIGHT TO TEGEL BY NON-CORRIDOR ROUTING WOULD MAKE IT MORE
DIFFICULT TO ENSURE LUFTHANSA USE OF CORRIDORS IN THE
EVENT OF LATER LUFTHANSA IGS PARTICIPATION. ROUTING
OF THIS ONE SERVICE OUTSIDE THE CORRIDORS WOULD NOT,
HOWEVER, UNDERCUT OUR LEGAL POSITION, PROVIDED
HANDOVER MODALITIES SIMILAR TO THOSE DEVELOPED FOR
SAS/AUA FLIGHTS WERE UTILIZED.

2. LUFTHANSA ENTRY INTO IGS, EVEN IF LIMITED TO TWO
FLIGHTS WEEKLY OR TO LOW CEILING ON NUMBER OF PASSENGERS,

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 REPLIN 02042 251251Z

WOULD CONSTITUTE PRECEDENT, AFTER WHICH IT WOULD BE
VERY DIFFICULT FOR ALLIES TO RESIST PRESSURES FOR
INCREASE IN LIMITS.

3. HOWEVER IF STOPOVER IS ARRANGED, IT SEEMS TO US THE
WEST GERMANS WILL BECOME ENGAGED IN DISCUSSING AIR
ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE GDR. ONWARD FLIGHTS OF LUFTHANSA
TO THE SOVIET UNION WOULD INVOLVE FURTHER OVERFLIGHTS
OF GDR TERRITORY. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD
EXPECT THE GDR INSIST UPON NEGOTIATIONS OF SUCH OVER-
FLIGHT RIGHTS, AND MOST PROBABLY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A
BROAD FRG/GDR UNDERSTANDING ON AIR MATTERS. GDR REFIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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Department of State

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TO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 8205
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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OGEN

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE; ANOTHER VIEW OF US-CHINA POLICY
AND THE GROC'S OPTIONS REGARDING ITS INTERNATIONAL
STATUS

REF: (A) TAIPEI 5297; (B) TAIPEI A-195

FOR

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF REFS.
2. MR. JAN KALICKI OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF (S/P) HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO THIS DISSENT MESSAGE.
3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR AIRGRAM HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, AND THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. ADDITIONAL COPIES ARE BEING SENT TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS.
4. WE WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO YOUR CONCERNS.
INGERSOLL

S/P-0FP:RFSMITH:TAW
10/23/74 EXT.28790
S/P:PBSWIERS

S/P:JHKALICKI

S/S - UHLUERS

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PAGE 01 BANGKO 08679 291033Z

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
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DISSENT CHANNEL

EO 11652/ NA
TAGS: AORG, EAID, TH
SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION OF RED-USOM RELATIONSHIPS

REF: STATE 107086

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTING BY:



B6

2. SUMMARY: IN THE SPIRIT OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IS ENCOURAGED WHEN SUBSTANTIVE POLICY ISSUES ARE AT STAK WE ARE TRANSMITTING HERewith THE COLLECTIVE VIEWS OF THE FOREGOING RED STAFF REGARDING THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PLACING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL ACTIVITIES IN NINE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ONE OF THE SIX U.S. BILATERAL AID MISS-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



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MODIFICATION. WE FIND THE PROPOSAL OUTLINED THERE INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT AND UNLIKELY TO PROVE WORKABLE. WE DO NOT SEE HOW RED CAN CONTINUE AS A QTE SEPARATE OFFICE UNQTE, WITH DISTINCT PROGRAMS IN NINE COUNTRIES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME HAVING ITS QTE DIRECTOR UNQTE REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE BILATERAL AID MISSION TO THAILAND. WE ARE AWARE OF THE WORKING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEvised BETWEEN AID'S REGIONAL AND BILATERAL PROGRAMS IN AFRICA AND CENTRAL AMERICA, AND HAVE ALWAYS SCRUTINIZED RED'S STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS WITH A VIEW TO DEVISING BETTER ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS IF SUCH SEEMED FEASIBLE. HERE IN BANGKOK MOST EMBASSIES HAVE EITHER A COUSELLOR OR FIRST SECRETARY IN CHARGE OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS. THE USG, WHICH THROUGH RED HAS BEEN AT THE FOREFRONT IN FORMULATING MULTILATERAL REGIONAL UNDERTAKINGS BOTH THROUGH INFORMAL MEETINGS OF SUCH OFFICERS AND IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS CONVENED BY THE REGIONAL GROUPINGS WITH WHICH RED WORKS, NOW CHOOSE TO DOWNGRADE ITS POSITION OF COUNSELLOR OF EMBASSY FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS, ELIMINATE THE INDEPENDENCE AND IDENTITY OF THE OFFICE IT CREATED TO ASSIST REGIONAL UNDERTAKINGS IN THIS AREA, AND PLACE ITS REGIONAL PROGRAMS (COVERING NINE COUNTRIES) UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ITS BILATERAL AID MISSION TO THAILAND. IN OUR JUDGEMENT THE ASIAN AND DONOR COMMUNITY INTERPRETATION GIVEN SUCH A MOVE CAN ONLY BE THAT THE U.S. IS NOW RELEGATING REGIONAL COOPERATION TO A MUCH LOWER PRIORITY.

5. WE ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED OVER RED'S WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MEKONG COORDINATING COMMITTEE (MCC) AND THE TWENTY-NINE NATIONS WORKING WITH THIS REGIONAL GROUP. THAILAND'S DOMINANCE WITHIN MEKONG BASIN AFFAIRS HAD LONG BEEN A SOURCE OF IRRITATION TO THE OTHER RIPARIAN STATES. LATELY THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN AMELIORATED THROUGH THAI AND MCC INITIATIVES. IF THE USG NOW PUTS ITS PARTICIPATION IN MEKONG BASIN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE DIRECTOR OF ITS BILATERAL AID MISSION IN THAILAND, THEN THIS WILL PROBABLY BE VIEWED BY ALL RIPARIAN STATES AS U.S. ACCEPTANCE AND SUPPORT OF THAI HEGEMONY IN MEKONG AFFAIRS. THE CONCERN HERE IS ESPECIALLY NOTWORTHY IN CONSIDERING THAI/LAO RELATIONSHIPS. THE LAO ARE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE IN ALWAYS SEEMINGLY EMERGING AS THE LOSER IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE THAI. THE NEW COALITION GOVERNMENT IN LAOS WOULD PROBABLY PLACE FAR GREATER SIGNIFICANCE UPON U.S. PARTICIPATION IN MEKONG AFFAIRS BEING HANDLED THROUGH THE U.S. BILATERAL AID MISSION TO THAILAND THAN THE OTHER RIPARIANS, BUT ALL ALONG WITH DONOR NATIONS CAN BE

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PAGE 04 BANGKO 08679 291033Z

EXPECTED TO SPECULATE AS TO THE UNDERLYING USG POLICY MOTIVES BEHIND SUCH A MOVE. WITHIN OTHER ASIAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THE INTERPRETATION OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE U.S. REGIONAL OFFICE INTO THE U.S. BILATERAL MISSION TO THAILAND WILL RANGE FROM DOUBTS CONCERNING UNDERSTOOD U.S. COMMITMENTS TO ONGOING REGIONAL PROGRAMS

TO QUESTIONING REGARDING THE EXPECTED CONTINUING ROLE OF THE USG IN REGIONAL ACTIVITIES. WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT ANY COOPERATING CATION WILL BELIEVE THAT THIS SUBORDINATION OF THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR TO A BILATERAL DIRECTOR WAS PROMPTED BY RELATIVELY SMALL FINANCIAL SAVINGS OR BUREAUCRATIC EFFICIENCIES, BUT RATHER THAT IS IT IN FACT A MAJOR POLICY SHIFT WHICH WILL CAUSE THEM TO RETHINK THEIR OWN APPROACHES TO REGIONALISM.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT THE REORGANIZATION OUTLINED IN THE REFTTEL SERVES NEITHER U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE REGION NOR THE INTERESTS OF THE ASIAN NATIONS CONCERNED. WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE TREATED AS A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN USG POLICY, AND AS SUCH SUBJECTED TO THE ANALYSIS WHICH IT DESERVES.
MASTERS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN FULL

*S/P - Mr. Kingman
Rm. 7526*

April 24, 1974

MEMORANDUM - CONFIDENTIAL

To: S/P - Mr. Lewis

From: S/P - Harry C. Blaney

Subject: Telegram on Youth responding to a dissent message

CU which now has general responsibility for Youth Affairs has sent the following telegram to S/P for approval. Under current guidelines for Dissent, S/P has action responsibility for items in this channel.

I have worked out short response with CU/YSS on this which notes new review of Policy paper which was done up by the previous Special Assistant for Youth Jerry Inman. At the same time, telegram notes current views on youth and requests any further thoughts from dissenting FSOs.

I recommend your approval of this interim message.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

✓ cc: Open Forum Panel

Attachments:

- 1. Outgoing telegram
- 2. Incoming dissent message (Santo Domingo 2190)
- 3. Youth Policy Paper (December 12, 1972)

S/P:HCBlaney:cb
x21964

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B6



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Peter Lydon

~~PRS~~

Dissent

December 10, 1975

file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MEMORANDUM

DISSENT CHANNEL

To: S/P - Mr. Winston Lord

From: S/P - Thomas P. Thornton

Subject: Dissent

B6

has dissented (Tab A) from our terrorist policy. She and others feel very strongly about this and, of course, she is seeking to drive a further nail into Bill Macomber's coffin on the grounds that he mishandled the Khartoum incident. The points she raises are very legitimate ones; however, there is a very firm policy on this and the Secretary is hardly likely to budge.

Attached also (Tab B) is a proposed response to her, forwarding along with it a memo written by Bob Fearey (S/CCT) that I had him put together. His memo basically says what is to be said. Your letter is designed to show that we did give it the college try (and I did -- hence the long delay). Alternatively, Peter Lydon suggests a very short note from you forwarding Fearey's piece. I would be delighted to do this; my concern is that it looks too perfunctory. We have to bear in mind, incidentally, that is a great believer in going public with dissent material or anything else that she believes supports the cause of justice.

Her memo is sloppy and offensive in parts and it does not do her cause full justice. She is technically wrong on the Bev Carter case as far as I can tell. (Perhaps we should discuss this when you return.) There is some smoke on the RAND issue, but I have talked to all parties concerned and everybody is happy as a clam. In view of that there isn't much else we can say. On the other points, as indicated above, she is fighting a very determined City Hall.

Ultimately I believe that we should forward the whole package to S so that we can tell her with good conscience we have sent her views to the Secretary.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-2-

I have only given you the letter in draft. (In fact there is still one detail that I have to check out with S/CCT.) I thought you might have some leisure to read on the trip and form a general opinion.

We should probably discuss this further when you get back, given the touchy nature of the problem and [redacted] enthusiasm for a good fight.

B6

Life would, of course, be much easier if you took the easy way out and decided on a pro forma reply forwarding Fearey's memo. I cannot in good conscience recommend that however.

Attachments:

Tab A - [redacted] Dissent Paper on Dept's Policies on Terrorism

Tab B - Proposed response and memo from Robert Fearey.

S/P:TPThornton:vb
x21744

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
New Delhi

*Hold for
"Dissem."*
tel

October 23, 1971

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

William I. Cargo, Esquire
Director of Planning and Coordination
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Bill:

Attached are some notes which I have made in the effort
to get some "Perspective on the South Asian Crisis and
United States Policy."

They may be of some interest to you at this particular
time.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Enclosures: as stated.

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B6

Dissent file

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B6

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DISSENT CHANNEL

March 27, 1973

[Redacted]
Regional Legal Advisor
USAID Mission
Islamabad, Pakistan

B6

Dear [Redacted]

This is to acknowledge receipt of your thoughtful letter of March 31, 1973, containing your dissent regarding US military supply policy in South Asia.

As you know, we take great care to ensure that views submitted in the Dissent Channel are laid before the responsible officers of the Department for consideration. When this procedure is completed, we will respond substantively to your letter.

Sincerely yours,

WIC

William I. Cargo
Director
Planning and Coordination Staff

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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PAGE 01 STATE 213748

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S/P/OFF/PLYDON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 213748

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE
REF: BANGKOK 10084

FOR [REDACTED]

1. THIS MESSAGE CONCERNS YOUR SECOND DISSENT, THE MATTER OF SUSPENSION OF DELIVERIES TO LAOS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND RICE UNDER THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.
2. STATUS OF THE PROGRAM AT THIS MOMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: OUR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO LAOS HAVE BEEN TERMINATED, AND CONGRESS HAS PROHIBITED FURTHER AID FOR THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR, PRIOR TO JUNE 30, FOR REASONS DISCUSSED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE YOU REFERRED TO, AND OTHER CORRESPONDENCE AS WELL, SUCH AS VIENTIANE 4372. THE DEPARTMENT APPROVED EMBASSY VIENTIANE'S RECOMMENDATION THAT A PORTION OF THE REMAINING FY. 75 FUNDS BE USED TO FINANCE MAP, POL AND RICE FOR A JULY INCREMENT ONLY. THIS INCREMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN FULLY DELIVERED LONG SINCE HAD

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FORM DS 322(OCR)

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S/P-0FP:SVOGELGESANG:EMB
7/8/74:X28790
S/P:PSWIERS

USIA {FOR IAA ONLY} {INFO}

PRIORITY PRETORIA

DISSENT CHANNEL

PS
SV

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: OEXC, SF
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: {A} PRETORIA 2911; {B} PRETORIA 2857; {C} PRETORIA
2663; {D} PRETORIA 2787

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF DISSENT TELEGRAM
2857 OF JUNE 28, 1974 SUBMITTED BY

B6

2. MR. WILLARD A. DE PREE OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF
{S/P} HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF SUBSTANTIVE
RESPONSE TO THIS DISSENT MESSAGE.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR
DISSENT MESSAGES, MR. PRILLAMAN'S TELEGRAM HAS BEEN CIR-
CULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, AND
THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. ADDITIONAL COPIES ARE
BEING SENT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AF-
FAIRS, THE DIRECTOR FOR THE OFFICE OF AFRICAN PROGRAMS, AND
THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS AT USIA.

FORM DS 322A(OCR)

CONFIDENTIAL

12

4. WE WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE CONCERNS
EXPRESSED BY BOTH 44

B6



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART B6

January 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE

SUBJECT : Dissent Channel Message

[redacted] came into the office (9/81) -
(Policy Planning Staff) to review our response
to his dissent channel - U.S. Policy Toward
Vietnam and Kampuchea. ^{message}

B6

Response attached.

Dissent File



Department of State

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APPROVED BY S/PC AHARTMAN
PER/SRSIGCOLLUM (SUBSTANCE)
M/DG:JMORTON
S/PC:IRRETERSON

088474

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA

UNCLAS STATE 103836

DISSENT CHANNEL
FROM ACTING DIRECTOR, S/PC

REF: GUATEMALA 2534, STATE 101450

1. DEPT APPRECIATES DISSENTING VIEW TO STATE POLICY
SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED] REGARDING EMPLOYEES
WHO HAVE MARRIED FOREIGN NATIONALS. B6

2. WHILE DEPT RECOGNIZES THAT SOME FOREIGN-BORN SPOUSES
OF EMPLOYEES ARE RELATIVELY BETTER ACQUAINTED WITH LIFE
IN US THAN OTHERS, AND THAT SOME LIKE [REDACTED] HAVE
ALREADY BEEN NATURALIZED, EVERY EFFORT IS MADE TO UPHOLD
UNIFORM APPLICABILITY OF 3 FAM 629 IN FAIRNESS TO ALL
AFFECTED EMPLOYEES. WE CONTINUE BELIEVE THAT REGULAR
DEPARTMENTAL ASSIGNMENT IS BEST METHOD OF EXPOSING
FOREIGN-BORN SPOUSES TO US. B6

3. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE HAVE NOTED ERROR IN ASSIGNING
[REDACTED] TO MONROVIA. THIS ASSIGNMENT HAS BEEN BROKEN
IN FAVOR OF A DEPARTMENTAL ASSIGNMENT AS POST AWARE FROM
PREVIOUS TEL. B6

4. IN VIEW FOREGOING, THEREFORE, DEPT WISHES CONFIRM

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179



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 103836



ASSIGNMENT TO DEPT FOR NEXT TOUR OF DUTY. JOHNSON

B6

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5016

RELEASE IN FULL

July 28, 1972

Mr. Alexander L. Peaslee
1702 Burnley Avenue
Charlottesville, Virginia 22902

Dear Mr. Peaslee:

This will acknowledge receipt by the Department of State of the Dissent Channel messages you transmitted prior to your departure from Halifax. These messages have been brought to the attention of Principal Officers of the Department and the Assistant Secretaries for East Asian Affairs and European Affairs. As the Dissent Channel is intended for internal expression of views, the LOU classification of these messages will be maintained beyond August 1.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
William I. Cargo

William I. Cargo
Director
Planning and Coordination Staff



Department of State

6018 TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 544

PAGE 01 STATE 179972

51
ORIGIN SS-14

INFO OCT-01 /015 R

RELEASE IN FULL

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DRAFTED BY DG/EM:WADIAMANTI:AWS
9/29/72 EXT 22819
APPROVED BY M/DG:WOHALL
DG/EM:TRBYRNE
S/PC:RPETERSON
S/PC:WICARGO
06

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R 031333Z OCT 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MBABANE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 179972

DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJ: OBJECTION TO EXCLUSION FROM REPRESENTATION ELECTION
FROM DIRECTOR S/PC
REF: 1) A-9235 2) MBABANE 1619

WE APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS CONCERNING YOUR DISENFRANCHISEMENT
BUT REF AIRGRAM STATEMENT ON AGREEMENT OF "ALL PARTIES"
WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT E.O. 11636 CLEARLY EXCLUDED
CHIEFS OF MISSION AND PRINCIPAL OFFICERS UNDER SECTION
2(C)(3) AND DEPUTY CHIEFS OF MISSION UNDER SECTION 2(C)(4).
THE ONLY DISCRETIONARY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED
PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS. COMMISSION HAS SINCE
ADDED PRINCIPAL PERSONNEL OFFICERS TO EXCLUDED LIST. ROGERS

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32

FORM

M. Wilson, Feb
copy
Tegucigalpa, Honduras
February 25, 1974

5029

RELEASE IN PART B6

Director of Planning and Coordination
Room 7246
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Sir:

I would like to request official guidance through Department of State regulations in regards to overseas visits or correspondence by Congressmen or Congressional Committees. My personal experience is limited, but I have consulted with others in positions similar to mine and find that Congressional requests can on occasion create problems involving the personal integrity of employees of the Department of State. Requests can be unethical, personally distasteful, or even illegal. The present situation is confusing as there are no official instructions and posts seem to operate so as to avoid any possible repercussions or inquiries by either the Department of State or the United States Congress.

As an example of problems involving personal integrity or job integrity I offer the case of a U.S. Congressman using a U.S. Government leased airplane to visit a resort island off the coast of Honduras without proper travel orders. Use of the leased airplane was authorized at post only because there did not seem to be other alternatives. Problems that developed later when the bill for the use of the airplane was analyzed were also resolved at post with the attitude that it had happened and the post must accept its responsibilities.

Another example indicates that posts seem to be intimidated even by the correspondence from U.S. Congressmen. As an example, a U.S. Senator mailed United States currency through the diplomatic pouch for the purchase of contraband gemstones. The gemstones were purchased by a U.S. Government employce and returned to the Senator through the diplomatic pouch. This example is blatantly illegal with currency carried by the diplomatic pouch and gemstones being illegally imported into the United States, by-passing customs. I would not think such misuse of the pouch is common, but nothing has changed from the viewpoint of the post to prevent another Congressman from using the pouch for similar personal profit.


Page -2-

The more common problems confronting employees at post will not involve legal questions but rather questions of ethics or taste. I refer primarily to the soliciting of female companionship for the visiting Congressmen or staff.

What I have described are instances which I would find unethical or illegal. All are requests which I would consider as improper conduct by an elected member of Congress, or for that matter, anyone. I see the problem as challenging the integrity of an escort officer or certifying officer who finds himself in an undesirable position of acceptance of status quo and blind compliance with requests. Even the meaning of political service or tribute changes here so that it does not apply to the situation. My examples are given only to provide background on what type of problems could be directed at Foreign Service employees. The impetus for my request is that such things can happen and from observation are sometimes actually anticipated and accepted.

What I seek is a reporting mechanism established within the Department of State which would allow decisions relevant to Congressional requests to be made by the Department of State and not by the individual. Precepts for use of such a reporting system should be minimal. The objective is to let the Department of State assume the responsibility for those decisions which have been determined by someone close to the situation as having legal or ethical complications. The post at present does not have a working capability to question, let alone refuse, a Congressman's request. It is not adequate to permit one's supervisor or other person to handle the problem unless the initial protest or query is properly answered by the Department of State. I therefore request the Director of Planning and Coordination to propose official policy to give the responsibility for decisions related to the propriety of a Congressional request to the Department of State rather than the overseas post.

Yours truly,



American Embassy/Tegucigalpa

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

JUL 2 1974

RELEASE IN PART B6

MEMORANDUM

TO: S/P - OFF - Ms. Sandra Vogelgesang, Panel Chairman
FROM: SER/PM - H. B. Hopkins
Director
Office of Personnel and Manpower
SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Message, Yaounde 1876, dated 13 June 1974,
from [redacted] A.I.D. Employee

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We regret any consternation or ill-feeling created by the references cited in [redacted] Dissent Message.

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A review was conducted by the A.I.D. Office of Security into the Agency's compliance with AID Manual Order 414.6, Citizenship Requirements, and A.I.D. Manual Order 448.2, Marriage of AID Employees, which is a Uniform State/AID/USIA Regulation. Security considerations dictated a need to examine and verify Agency compliance. Specifically, compliance with AID Manual Order 414.6, Section V 2.c.1. which states, "Normally, an appointee who at time of appointment in AID Foreign Service is married to a naturalized citizen of the United States or a foreign national is not assigned for duty in the country of origin of the spouse", and compliance with AID Manual Order 448.2 (3 FAM 629) Section 629.1-1c which states, "An employee married to a national or former national of another country will normally not be assigned to the country of the spouse's origin or former nationality", should be verified. To review each and every Foreign Service Reserve and Staff Officer's official personnel file in the Agency would be a very time-consuming task. Therefore, it was decided that it would be more expedient to request each AID post to forward the required information to AID/Washington. AIDTO Circular A-207 (attached) was then sent to each post. The sole purpose of the airgram was to insure compliance with AID Manual Order 414.6 and 448.2.

[redacted] is making several points in his Dissent Message:

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1."even though it is a matter of record the subject employee and spouse are both U. S. citizens; the present dissent is directed against the policy of requiring such information". Mr. Fell is correct that the information required is a matter of record in his personnel file. This is not necessarily the case for every employee. Verification and updating of official personnel files are periodically required.

2. [redacted] "On the face of it, list-making of U. S. citizens who are foreign-born smacks of invidious discrimination". We would like to assure [redacted] that the Agency is not making any lists. It is

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- 2 -

not now nor ever the Agency's intention to do this. We are merely attempting to update, verify, and to insure the accuracy of data in the official personnel file. Legal separation, divorce, deaths and marriages are reasons for changes in data that was originally received at time of appointment. If the official personnel file verifies the data that we receive in response to AIDTO Circular A-207 and there is no conflict with the regulations, this will be the end of the matter. If there is a conflict with the regulations, each case will be thoroughly examined and an objective decision rendered. The MO's cited do not dogmatically preclude assignment to country of spouse's origin.

3. [] wants the legitimacy of AIDTO Circular A-207 investigated. B6
The request made in the airgram is strictly to assure compliance with a Uniform State/AID/USIA Regulation, M. O. 448.2 (3FAM 629). Regulations are constantly being examined and reviewed. The Office of Security and members of my staff are currently reviewing M. O. 414.6 and M. O. 448.2 to insure that the rights of the employee and the security of the Agency are being protected. However, until a change is made, AID has to comply with the regulations.

4. [] implies in paragraph 5 of his Dissent Message, that he B6
understands the "principle" involved and that he recognizes "permissible distinctions in treatment of natural born U. S. citizens and naturalized citizens". The obvious reason for any distinction would not be to deny but to protect the rights of the employees, his spouse and his children from any possible discrimination, undue personal pressure or harm, such as kidnapping or terrorist threat, violation of one's rights due to laws of foreign country, such as, not recognizing U. S. citizenship of spouse or children, and to prevent as much as possible any conflict of interest or potential threat to U. S. security.

We hope that the above is responsive to [] Dissent Message. Please B6
assure him that the information requested in no way reflects on the integrity or loyalty of himself or his spouse. If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Attachment: a/s



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Jidda, Saudi Arabia

RELEASE IN PART
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~~OFFICIAL-INFORMAL~~
~~SECRET~~

February 22, 1978

ATZ
2) File dissent

Anthony Lake, Esquire
Director
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20521

Dear Mr. Lake:

I thank you for your considerate and thoughtful letter of February 15, 1978 regarding my dissent views on terrorism.

Perhaps you will be interested in what motivated my action. Basically, it was because I was getting soundings at this post and elsewhere in the Service that there were suggestions being put forward that the U.S. should soften its policy on ransom prohibitions. I felt that doing this would make a mockery of the deaths of a lost of friends in Khartoum and Beirut.

In any case, please be assured that I never lost my faith in the belief that our country would do the right thing. Basically, I feel that when terrorists strike against the U.S., it is a de facto declaration of war and requires a warlike reaction. Of course, there are legal and moral responsibilities towards other countries involved in either the locale of the act or the transport means. The U.S., however, is equally involved, and stifling of such acts will occur when there will be no question of our determination to react quickly to such situations and continue the pursuit when the terrorists get away.

Your letter and the copy of the Secretary's testimony are reassuring.

Sincerely
[Signature]

[Redacted Signature Box]

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GDS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

RELEASE IN PART B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL -2757-~~

PAGE 01 STATE 147521

SI
ORIGIN EA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00
DODE-00 PM-03 EB-03 PRS-01 SP-02 SSO-00 INRE-00 /040 R

DRAFTED BY EA/LC:JDROSENTHAL:DTM
APPROVED BY EA:RHMILLER
DDO/ISA:LT COL KING (DRAFT)
NSC:WSTEARMAN (SUBS)
AID:MHUNTINGTON (DRAFT)
S/S: RKUCHEL

***** 016532

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TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE
INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 147521.

LIMDIS

Z.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, LA

SUBJECT: MILITARY RICE FOR LAOS

REFS: A. VIENTIANE 44131 B. BANGKOK 11855/ C. BANGKOK 11478

BANGKOK FOR [redacted]

1. APPRECIATE PROMPT AND COMPLETE RESPONSE REFS A AND B.

2. IN LIGHT OF IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED RICE DELIVERIES TO MAINTENANCE AND SAFETY OF MISSION, AS DESCRIBED PARA B REF A, KRANKER AUTHORIZED TO CONTRACT FOR ADDITIONAL DELIVERIES THROUGH SEPTEMBER FOR USE AS OPTION NOTED PARA D REF A.

important and not ref'd. by Kranker

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 147521

3. PROCUREMENT PER PROCEDURES INDICATED PARA 3 AND 4 REF C AUTHORIZED. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT RICE COST BASED UPON FOB DELIVERY AT DESTINATION, THUS MEETING ALL RELATED COSTS FOR THESE SHIPMENTS.

4. FYI: CONGRESS HAS NOW PASSED A CONTINUING RESOLUTION (CRA) WHICH HAS A PROVISION PROHIBITING USE OF CRA FY 76 FUNDS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE FOR LAOS. THIS RE-EMPHASIZES THE NECESSITY FOR THE OBLIGATION OF FY 75 FUNDS PRIOR TO THE END OF THE FISCAL YEAR. NO CONTRACT IS TO BE SIGNED WHICH WILL IN ANY WAY INVOLVE THE OBLIGATION OF FY 76 FUNDS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE FOR LAOS.

5. DDD CONCURS. INGERSOLL

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RELEASE IN PART
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November 2, 1972

Status of [] and the review of 3 FAM 629

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I called [] on November 2 and explained that I was acting on behalf of Mr. Cargo in seeking a status report on his dissent message. [] advised me to call Mr. Miller in the Office of Employee Grievances.

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Mr. Miller informed me that the matter has split into two related issues: (1) the status of [] individual grievance, and (2) a review of 3 FAM 629. As regards [] case, Mr. Miller has recommended to Mr. Brewster that [] be reassigned overseas. The case is under review in Brewster's office. As this is now an employee grievance case, I recommend that S/PC dissent channel intervention be terminated.

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The second issue, that of review of 3 FAM 629, however, is a policy issue and as such is still the concern of the S/PC dissent channel. The policy in 3 FAM 629 is currently under review in M/DG. Mr. Macomber has directed Ambassador Hall to pursue a review of this policy and, I have been informed, that review is currently being undertaken.

Bing Stemple

RELEASE IN PART
B6

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Raymond F. Smith, Chairperson, S/P-OFP

DATE: August 27, 1974

FROM : , GSO, Quito

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Letter

REF. : State 184093, Quito 5375

Enclosed please find copy of Dissent Channel Letter as sent on Feb 25, 1974 from Tegucigalpa, Honduras as requested. Reply will be greatly appreciated as the subject is of considerable importance to several employees working in the Administrative area.

GSO: , mele



5010-109

UNCLASSIFIED

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan.

<h1 style="margin: 0;">AIRGRAM</h1>			RELEASE IN PART B6 FOR RM USE ONLY
S/P 1			
ANA	CUR	FE	A-342
HEA	CU	IMR	SECRET
L	FBI	AID	RECEIVED DEPT. OF STATE SEP 9 10 24 AM 1974 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS SECRET
AGR	COM	FQB	DATE: 5 SEPTEMBER 1974
INT	LAB	VAR	TO : Department of State E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS : OGEN PFOR FROM : AmEmbassy MOSCOW FROM : SUBJECT : Dissent Message REF : DISSENT CHANNEL This message transmits a dissenting view submitted by [] of the Embassy Economic/Commercial Section. A POLICY PROPOSAL: AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN SOVIET ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AS A CATALYST FOR COMPLETING THE DETENTE PROCESS <u>Introduction</u> Now as never before since its inception, prominent voices in both the US and USSR are questioning the concept of detente. "What does detente mean?" or, more to the point, "What is there in it for us?" The results of detente initiatives so far are inconclusive. Both countries need something more tangible than an abstract concept known as detente. With the advent of a new administration, now is a prime time for new bold initiatives, for introduction of a policy that will give guts to the word "detente." This should be a policy which will speak to and satisfy the fundamental interests of the US and USSR—interests which ultimately can be realized <u>only</u> within the bilateral framework. This paper sets forth a policy designed to meet that requirement. <u>The Presuppositions</u> The action program outlined herein is based on certain presuppositions as to what each country has most to gain from detente. A discussion of these presuppositions follows later.
TR	AMB	AIR	HANDLING INDICATOR DISSENT CHANNEL ECON-1 CHARGE CHRON
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	FORM 6-62 DS-323 FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out
OSD	USIA	NSA	[] 9-5-74 CHARGE: ADubs

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Moscow A- 342

2

United States - The fundamental goal of the United States from detente is the achievement of verifiable arms control and/or disarmament with the Soviet Union which will assure long-term US security.

Soviet Union - The one significant payoff for the USSR from detente would be a USG policy permitting essentially uncontrolled acquisition of American equipment, technology, credits, and other economic benefits for its own economic development and modernization.

The Policy Objective

To seek a broad agreement with the Soviet Union linking all-encompassing economic cooperation with the USSR (the Soviet payoff, which only the US can provide) with verifiable arms control and/or disarmament concessions from the USSR to guarantee long-term US security (the US payoff, which only the USSR can provide).

Discussion

I. That long-term security--i.e., a condition of real peace--is the prime US objective from detente can hardly be open to contention. Far less obvious is the reality that the only genuine payoff for the USSR from detente is in the economic/trade area. This is because the Soviet domestic economy, mainly due to damaging structural (ideological) inadequacies, is incapable of performing efficiently. It can sustain annual growth only through injections of disproportionately massive capital investments rather than by stimulating increased labor productivity (efficiency).

In the field of planning and management, the Soviets are still bound by basic ideological hangups which prevent them from applying real decentralization in economic decision-making. The absence of such decentralization has caused a chain reaction of problems, the end result of which is the fact that the ordinary worker has no real reason to work productively or be responsive in any other way to the overall economic needs of the country. Further, the performance indicators applied by Soviet planners to gauge economic progress still consist chiefly of quantitative rather than qualitative elements. Quantity rather than quality is a historical phenomenon in Soviet economic planning which has led to a modus operandi characterized by low-quality manufactured goods containing needlessly large amounts of raw materials. In short, besides being inefficient the Soviet economy is extremely wasteful.

Because of the constant emphasis on quantity, the Soviet economic system is incapable of absorbing the results of research and development into the production process in any coherent or rapid

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Moscow A- 342
3

way. The Soviets (and Russians before them) have historically produced fine and innovative thinkers; many of their contemporary research institutes are producing excellent work. Yet the transformation of technological processes into production is largely unattainable since factory managers pay attention to the plan (it is a law) and its fulfillment. Because diverting resources to absorb R&D into production would render plan fulfillment more difficult, that absorption is achieved only very slowly. In a recent conversation with Senator William Roth of Delaware, Dzherman Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the prestigious USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, made precisely this point. He stated: "A major problem in the Soviet economy is the delay in introducing new technology and processes into actual production. Soviet research is of high quality, whereas production and management techniques lag behind."

For these reasons, the Soviet economy is essentially an inefficient, ponderous, aimless organism. By the same token, rather than catching and passing Western economies in its performance--as predicted 15 years ago by Khrushchev--the Soviet economy is falling farther behind them, relatively speaking, since innovation in the West finds its way into production so much more quickly than in the USSR.

II. One might reasonably ask why, if the Soviet economy is in such disarray, the leadership does not adopt a series of tough, pragmatic measures to tighten it up. The answer is that basic economic change can take place only when accompanied by basic political change, and that is intolerable to those in power.

Instead, the Soviets are banking on acquiring sufficient Western technological processes and sophisticated equipment to offset the weaknesses caused their economy by its ideological basis. In this way they hope to achieve real economic progress without changing the existing economic structure. Soviets have told Embassy officers (see Moscow A-25 of January 24, 1974, for example) that economic planners have already effectively given up trying to find ways of inducing Soviet workers to increase their efficiency and productivity.

III. In general terms, then, the Soviets intend to rely heavily on foreign technology and equipment to modernize and rationalize their economy. Specifically, moreover, there is every reason to believe that the Soviets see the US as their chief hope for achieving that goal. This is apparently a deliberate policy decision on their part. The present bottleneck in US-USSR trade, revolving around the intertwined MFN-credits-Jewish emigration

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Moscow A- 342

4

issues, has caused bureaucrats at the operational level in the Soviet foreign trade structure to question the desirability of "wasting time" with the US market. Yet it is known that policy-makers have consistently rebuffed such points of view, stressing the overriding importance of acquiring sophisticated American equipment for Soviet internal economic development.

An ipso facto indication of the great Soviet desire to enjoy the benefits of the US market is the increasingly conciliatory stance taken by the USSR on the Jewish emigration issue, this in spite of the Soviet leadership's intense indignation at what it views as US interference in internal Soviet affairs. The most recent evidence of this Soviet policy was the revelation on August 27, 1974, by a leading economist at the prestigious USA Institute that all Soviet industrial ministries have established American sections to deal exclusively with ways and means of acquiring needed US equipment.

At the same time, increasing Soviet trade with other developed Western countries is an acknowledged fact. Clearly, the Soviets are prepared to "make do" with other, less-desirable partners if a comprehensive agreement with the US cannot be achieved.

IV. Aside from the glaring and presently insoluble problems faced by the Soviets in developing their economy, additional problems are created for the USSR by the arms race itself. In the US, with its exceptionally high level of economic development, increased resource allocation to the armaments industries serves as a stimulus for the economy. In the Soviet Union the reverse is true. Expenditures in the military sector--especially the enormous funds required for developing new strategic weapons systems--are a definite hindrance to overall economic growth and result in delays to or postponements of important development projects, most particularly in Siberia.

In discussions with Embassy officers, Soviet officials now openly acknowledge this problem. For example, a leading Soviet economic planner made the following statement to this writer recently: "The reason we want to come to an agreement with you on armaments is in order to divert resources to other more pressing areas of the economy. This is a sincere desire, not only for security but also for economic reasons."

V. This writer's assessment of the urgent requirements of the Soviet economy, combined with a perceived Soviet leadership mentality to seek foreign economic "assistance" which only the US can provide, adds up to the conclusion that the USSR can be persuaded to

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Moscow A- 342
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agree to a strategic accommodation (including appropriate safeguards, verification procedures, etc.) with the US which will satisfy our security requirements.

Again, the question may logically be asked as to why the Soviets would agree to a linkage of such crucial importance for both countries when they can hardly swallow the relatively modest coupling of increased Jewish emigration from the USSR in return for American MFN and credits. There are several possible answers to this question.

First of all, the kind of USG-sanctioned economic cooperation with the USSR envisaged by this proposal would be far greater than the rather limited issues of MFN and Ex-Im Bank credits. It would also greatly exceed anything envisaged under existing US-USSR bilateral agreements in the trade and economic fields, and would include such measures as:

-- effective abolition of commodity and technology export controls by the US, except in those areas with particularly sensitive military applications

-- comprehensive US company participation in Soviet development projects

-- continuing technology inflows from the US, including upgrading state-of-the-art on existing and future projects, supplied from the US

-- provision of US management assistance, both participating (in conjunction with individual projects) and advisory (in overall economic planning), subject to Soviet sensitivities in this area

-- direct USG credits outside the Ex-Im Bank framework at concessionary rates to the USSR for purchases of American equipment and technology

Other areas of cooperation would be mutually agreed upon depending on expressed Soviet requirements.

Secondly, the Soviets have reacted so bitterly to the Jackson Amendment because it was construed as foreign interference in the internal affairs of the USSR. A linkage involving Soviet concessions in the arms control field could not possibly be viewed as internal interference, since it is an area involving directly the security interests of foreign countries, in this case the US.

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6

In other words, it is not "linkage" per se to which the Soviets object; in many conversations with Soviet officials this writer has received the impression that a proper linkage involving key national interest questions of both countries would be not only possible but also desirable.

VI. This analysis deals only with the economic/trade aspects of a proposed agreement. The specific arms control and/or disarmament gains which would represent the US payoff naturally would be determined by experts from the appropriate USG agencies. Obviously, the agreement could be viable only if adequate safeguards, verifications, etc., can be guaranteed. Here again, however, Soviet participation in such an agreement would be dictated by the economic gains which the USSR would obtain.

Objections

United States

1. Some political elements in the US might view such an agreement as a sell-out of US vital interests, arguing that it would involve a military or strategic stand-off while at the same time strengthening the Soviet economy and thus making that country more powerful. Such an argument would fail to take hold of two key points:

-- Technology and equipment alone--no matter where they come from--will not be adequate to modernize the Soviet economy, it being structured in such a way as to inhibit the assimilation of any kind of innovation.

-- Should significant economic gains become possible in the USSR through foreign equipment and technology purchases (coupled with modest structural reorganization), such gains will ultimately be felt at the consumer level resulting in aggravation of latent pressures for more consumer goods. Under Soviet circumstances, consumer pressures would lead to political pressures. The advent of "consumerism" in the USSR would have the effect of forcing traditionally outward-looking Marxism-Leninism to become more introspective. This would, of course, also be a positive development for the US.

2. The defense establishment may object that economic cooperation will lead to a strengthening of the USSR militarily. While this is true, it is a negative aspect that would have to be accepted for the sake of overriding interests. Again, it must be stressed that any US-USSR accommodation could work only if it included workable procedures for verifying adherence by the USSR to the arms control and/or disarmament provisions.

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Moscow A-342
7

Soviet Union

1. The greatest opposition of all is likely to come from the Soviet military establishment. Having seen the USSR approach parity with the US militarily, Soviet generals will hardly be inclined to level off or even diminish the degree of their offensive capabilities.

2. Far-sighted conservative elements in the CPSU leadership may oppose an agreement on the grounds that large-scale introduction of US technology into the Soviet economy will ultimately force basic political liberalization. This assumption is probably correct. On the other hand, in reaching an agreement with the USSR as espoused in this paper the US would be giving its tacit, if unspoken, agreement to renouncing any kind of interference in Soviet domestic affairs, including its system of internal control. The realization of the US position on that question would be a strong argument in overcoming conservative opposition to an agreement.

Neither the Soviet military establishment nor conservative CPSU elements would be likely to oppose an agreement on the grounds of fear of a preemptive military strike from the US. It is doubtful that there remains any military or political groupings of any size in the USSR which actually believe, and therefore fear, that the US represents a military threat to the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

The formula known as detente, while not yet floundering, requires a catalyst to achieve a genuine reduction in or elimination of tension between the world's two superpowers. An agreement linking economic cooperation with guaranteed strategic security can provide such a catalyst. Detente would be fulfilled and genuine long-term peace would be far nearer attainment. With that goal in mind this proposal is herewith respectfully submitted.

DUBS

AD

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RELEASE IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL REB462

PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02

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INFO OCT-21 ES-21 ISO-02 SSO-22 /004 W
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FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SACSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3985

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 SAN SALVADOR 1732
DISSENT CHANNEL

(5) THE FEBRUARY 20 ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH (BOTH IN THE PLAZA AND THE "SELECTIVE PURGE"), INDICATE THE INCOMING ROMERO GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE MORE RECALCITRANT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MORE A PURELY MILITARY HARD-LINE REGIME. THIS TREND COULD BE FOSTERED WITH THE WRONG SIGNAL AT THIS TIME FROM THE USG.

(6) THE AMBASSADOR'S DEPARTURE WILL INEVITABLY BE INTERPRETED IN SOME CIRCLES AS USG AWARENESS OF HIS RPT HIS PROBLEMS WITH THIS GOES, AND USG DISSATISFACTION WITH THE

SITUATION. SUCH AN INTERPRETATION WILL BE STRONGER IF HE LEAVES SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. AN IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE, WHILE UNDER FIRE, CAN ONLY CONVINCE MANY THAT THE GOES POLICY TO STONERULL WAS CORRECT.

(7) CERTAIN GOES BACKERS, HAVING GONE TO WASHINGTON TO MALIGN AMBASSADOR LOZANO AND SUGGEST HIS RECALL, WILL INTERPRET HIS WITHDRAWAL AS TOTAL VINDICATION FOR THEIR ADVICE AND POLICY. THIS WILL STRENGTHEN THEIR PRESTIGE AND VOICE IN THE ROMERO YEARS, WHICH WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IN TERMS OF FUTURE HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE IN EL SALVADOR AND POSSIBLY FOR OTHER US INTERESTS HERE.

7. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS - ACCEPTING THE PREMISE THE ADMINISTRATION HAS IRREVOCABLY DECIDED TO CHANGE AMBASSADORS, WE FORESEE AND HAVE ANALYZED SIX POSSIBLE SCENARIO OPTIONS IN THE TRANSITION FROM THIS AMBASSADOR TO THE NEXT. EACH SCENARIO EMITS A DIFFERENT SIGNAL TO THE GOES AND INTERESTED AUDIENCES.

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PAGE 02

SAN SA 21732 22 OF 23 152123Z

THE SIX ARE:

I. AMBASSADOR LOZANO LEAVES ON APRIL 30 AND THE NEW AMBASSADOR ARRIVES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. SIGNAL - THE USG IS ANXIOUS TO REESTABLISH THE FORMER "GOOD FRIENDS" RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOES. THE USG BELIEVES IT UNFORTUNATE THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES CAME UP AND SHOULD BE PUT BEHIND US QUICKLY. THE USG WILL WORK WITH BOTH THE PRESENT AND INCOMING REGIMES, REGARDLESS OF PERFORMANCE ON THIS ISSUE. LOZANO WAS REMOVED FOR HIS VIGORIOUS ACTIONS ON THE RICHARDSON CASE ET AL.

II. THE AMBASSADOR LEAVES ON APRIL 30. HIS REPLACEMENT ARRIVES ON OR ABOUT THE JULY 1 INAUGURATION OF GENERAL ROMERO, A CHARGE IS CHIEF-OF-MISSION IN BETWEEN. SIGNAL - THE USG WANTS TO START OFF WITH A NEW APPROACH WITH THE ROMERO ADMINISTRATION. LOZANO WAS REMOVED FOR HIS ACTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE PREVIOUS GOOD RELATIONSHIP CAN BE RECAPTURED, BUT ONLY WITH THE DEPARTURE OF LOZANO AND TERMINATION OF THE MOLINA TENURE

III. AMBASSADOR LOZANO DEPARTS ON APRIL 30. THE NEW AMBASSADOR DOES NOT ARRIVE UNTIL WELL INTO THE ROMERO TENURE; PERHAPS SEVERAL MONTHS. THE CHARGE PRESIDES. US IS WAITING TO SEE HOW THE ROMERO REGIME PERFORMS. SIGNAL -

MUCH THE SAME AS II, BUT LESS LIKELY TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD.

IV. THE AMBASSADOR LEAVES ON APRIL 30. NO REPLACEMENT IS NAMED UNTIL THE GOES DEMONSTRATES WHAT ACTIONS IT INTENDS TO TAKE ON THE RICHARDSON CASE. SIGNAL - THE USG IS WAITING AND SEEING, BUT ONLY TO DETERMINE IF THE GOES WILL MAKE GOOD ON ITS PROMISES TO SATISFACTORILY EXPLAIN THE RICHARDSON MATTER. THE USG WILL STICK TO ITS GUNS. IT WAS NOT THE AMBASSADOR, BUT THE USG THAT WAS PURSUING THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY.

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PAGE 03

SAN SA 21732 02 OF 03 152123Z

V. AMBASSADOR LOZANO REMAINS IN PLACE, AT LEAST UNTIL THE JULY 1 CHANGE IN SALVADORAN REGIMES. HE TAKES NO INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS OR OTHERWISE.

SIGNAL - THE AMBASSADOR WAS PURSUING USG POLICY IN THE RICHARDSON AND RELATED CASES. THE CHANGE IN SALVADORAN REGIMES IS A NATURAL TIME TO CHANGE AMBASSADORS, AND REPRESENTS NOTHING BEYOND THAT. VI. THE AMBASSADOR REMAINS IN PLACE, AT LEAST UNTIL JULY 1. HE USES HIS LAME DUCK STATUS TO HAMMER HOME USG CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RICHARDSON CASE AND OTHER ISSUES THAT MIGHT COME UP.

SIGNAL - THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE THAT THE USG IS DEAD SERIOUS ON RICHARDSON, HUMAN RIGHTS, ET AL.

8. RECOMMENDATION - WE RECOMMEND IMPLEMENTATION OF EITHER IV OR VI. WE PREFER THE LATTER SINCE WE BELIEVE IT CONVEYS THE clearest, LEAST SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETATION MESSAGE THAT THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS AS BASIC TO US FOREIGN POLICY AS WE HAVE BEEN LED TO BELIEVE.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 9, 1977

CH for your files

Dear

I am responding to your dissent channel message of September 15 concerning the question of continued United States membership in the International Labor Organization.

As you are aware, the President announced on November 1 that the United States would withdraw from the ILO. While the factors and interests considered in making this decision were complicated and could reasonably lead to different interpretations, the remarks made by Secretary Marshall to the press agreed in large measure with your own analysis.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Director, Policy Planning Staff

Office of ILO Affairs,
Department of State.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 27515 01 OF 05 102915Z

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 5 BEIRUT 7515

DISSENT CHANNEL *Captious*

Z.O. 116521 008
TAGS: PFCR, PINT, LE, IS, SY, 138, JO
SUBJECT: THE IMPERATIVE OF US ACTION ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

REF: (A) BEIRUT 8906, (9) TEL AVIV 7953, (C) AMMAN 3859,
(D) CAIRO 10048, (Z) JERUSALEM 1030, (F) CAIRO 11291
(G) KUWAIT 8987

1. RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION: EMBASSIES AT AMMAN, CAIRO,
DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, LONDON, TEL AVIV; CONSULATE AT
JERUSALEM; IN DEPARTMENT NEA, NEA/IAI, NEA/ARN, INR, INR/RNA.

2. FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS BEEN BY [REDACTED]
POLITICAL OFFICER AT THIS EMBASSY. IT IS, IN MY
VIEW, A SOLID AND SERIOUS STUDY OF A COMPLEX SET OF ISSUES, BUT
IT GOES BEYOND WHAT I REGARD AS THE APPROPRIATE
PARAMETERS OF REPORTING FROM THIS EMBASSY AT THIS TIME.
I HAVE NO QUARREL WITH [REDACTED] IS ARGUMENT THAT THE
LEBANESE PROBLEM AND US POLICY APPROACHES TO IT CANNOT BE
DIVORCED FROM THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT, OR FROM
DOMESTIC AMERICAN POLITICAL CONCERNS, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE
DEPARTMENT IS FULLY FAMILIAR WITH THIS VIEW AND I DO NOT
SHARE HIS BELIEF THAT THE USG MUST ACT IMMEDIATELY.
IF THE KIND OF DECLARATION RECOMMENDED BY [REDACTED]
WERE TO BE ISSUED, IT WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL PREPARATION
AND CONSULTATION WITH A NUMBER OF PARTIES TO
HAVE ANY CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THE DESIRED RESULT.
THIS MESSAGE IS BEING SENT BY TELEGRAM BECAUSE OF THE

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PAGE 22

BEIRUT 07515 01 OF 25 180913Z

INADEQUACY OF CLASSIFIED POUCH SERVICE AT THIS POST. SINCE IT IS PRIMARILY A POLICY STUDY, THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO CONSIDER IT, APPROPRIATELY EDITED, FOR THE "OPEN FORUM JOURNAL."

3. SUMMARY: EMBASSY BEIRUT'S SUGGESTION IN MID-JULY OF A US DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE WEST BANK EVOKED CONSIDERABLE COMMENT FROM NEIGHBORING POSTS (PARAS 4-5 BELOW). HOWEVER, BEIRUT'S PROPOSAL AS WELL AS OTHER POST'S COMMENTS WERE PARTIAL ANALYSES OF MULTINATIONAL PROBLEMS FROM LIMITED NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (PARA 6). RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON (PARAS 7-9) SUGGEST, BARRING MAJOR STRATEGIC SWIFT IN DAMASCUS (PARA 11), CONTINUED CHRISTIAN/SYRIAN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND LITTLE CHRISTIAN OR SYRIAN INTEREST IN A COMPROMISE SOLUTION (PARA 12). PROSPECTS FOR PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION UNDER SARKIS, WHO SHOULD ASSUME PRESIDENCY SEP 23, ACCORDINGLY ARE DIM, AND FAILURE MAY RESULT IN DISSOLUTION OF WHAT IS LEFT OF LEBANESE STATE (PARA 13). PALESTINIAN STATUS IS NOW KEY PROBLEM IN LEBANON (PARA 14). BOTH PALESTINIANS AND CHRISTIANS AGREE ON PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CAUSE, WHERE GERM OF SOLUTION IS TO BE FOUND (PARA 15). US IS ONLY POWER WHICH CAN PRESSURE ISRAEL SUFFICIENTLY TO ACCEPT ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINIAN STATE IN ABSENCE OF NEW MIDDLE EAST WAR (PARA 16). US NATIONAL INTEREST IS BEST SERVED BY A STABLE ARAB WORLD AND THEREFORE IN RESOLUTION OF PALESTINIAN ISSUE, WHICH IS KEY DESTABILIZING FACTOR (PARA 17). TEMPORARY WEAKENING OF PLO IN LEBANON MAY TEMPT US TO ABANDON EFFORT TO FIND MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION (PARA 18). BOTH PRESENT ADMINISTRATION AND POTENTIAL DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION WOULD SERVE OWN FUTURE INTERESTS BY LAYING GROUNDWORK FOR NEXT ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY NOW (PARA 19). RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION IS BIPARTISAN ENDORSEMENT OF CONCEPT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE (PARA 20). DOMESTIC US POLITICAL IMPACT IS MANAGEABLE (PARA 21). STATEMENT WOULD HAVE SALUTORY IMPACT ON ISRAEL: RADICALIZATION OF PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT MIGHT BE AVOIDED; AND CONTINUED DISSOLUTION AND DESTRUCTION OF

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 27518 01 OF 05 180915Z

LEBANON MIGHT BE HALTED (PARA 22). UNILATERAL ADMINISTRATION DECLARATION WOULD HAVE LESS IMPACT BUT WOULD STILL SERVE NATIONAL INTEREST AND ADVERSE, ELECTION YEAR IMPACT MIGHT BE TOLERABLE (PARA 23). CONTINUATION OF DO-NOTHING POLICY WOULD ASSURE CONTINUED DEGRADATION OF US INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST (PARA 24).

4. STATE OF DEBATE ON PALESTINIAN ISSUE. EMBASSY BEIRUT IN MID-JULY SUGGESTED (REFTEL A) THAT SOME PROSPECTS FOR PEACE EXISTED IN LEBANON AT THAT TIME, GIVEN SYRIA'S DEMONSTRATION ON GROUND THAT IT HELD

MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND PALESTINIANS, AND POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL REFORMS IN LEBANON WHICH WOULD OFFER PLO FACE-SAVING FORMULA TO EXTRICATE ITSELF FROM LEBANESE IMBROGLIO. BEIRUT FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT US COULD PROVIDE IMPORTANT BOOST TO THIS PROSPECT BY ENDORSING IDEA OF PALESTINIAN WEST BANK STATE, THEREBY OFFERING PALESTINIANS ANOTHER FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR BACKING DOWN IN LEBANON (REFTEL A, PARA 2).



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PAGE 21

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5. BEIRUT'S PROPOSAL ELICITED CONSIDERABLE COMMENT FROM NEIGHBORING POSTS. TEL AVIV (REFTEL R) OBJECTED THAT PROPOSED POLICY "WOULD INVOLVE PAYING A CLEAR COST (CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOI) IN RETURN FOR HIGHLY UNCERTAIN GAIN (ALLEVIATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN LEBANON)." AMMAN (REFTEL C) URGED THAT US OUGHT NOT TO GET OUT IN FRONT IN ADVOCATING A "PLO-LED STATE," HYPOTHESIZED THAT PLO LEADERSHIP AND CHARACTER MIGHT BEGIN TO CHANGE TO US ADVANTAGE, AND EVEN ARGUED THAT "OUR PAST POLICIES (OF NON-SUPPORT FOR PLO) WERE ABOUT TO BE VINDICATED." CAIRO (REFTEL D) NOTED EGYPTIAN VIEW THAT MOST LIKELY ALTERNATIVE TO PRESENT ARAFAT LEADERSHIP IN PLO IS MORE RADICAL -- PERHAPS FROM PRESENT PFLP LEADERSHIP, AND THAT FEW PLO MEMBERS WOULD AFFILIATE THEMSELVES WITH A "SUPER SAIGA." GOM ITSELF WOULD PREFER PLO LED BY ABU IYAD, WHO MIGHT BE MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO EGYPTIAN ADVICE, ALTHOUGH IYAD, TOO, HAS RADICAL BACKGROUND. JERUSALEM (REFTEL E) ARGUES THAT US GESTURE TOWARDS PLO IS PREMATURE, GIVEN FLUIDITY OF LEBANESE SITUATION. JERUSALEM SAYS THAT IDEA OF A PALESTINIAN STATE SHOULD BEST EMERGE FROM CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, AND CONCLUDES THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ADDRESS LONGER RANGE OBJECTIVES MEANINGFULLY IN MIDST OF PRESENT ANARCHY AND FIGHTING IN LEBANON.

6. ORIGINAL BEIRUT PROPOSAL AS WELL AS COMMENTS OF NEIGHBORING POSTS ALL BASICALLY ADDRESSED IDEA OF

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PAGE 02

BEIRUT 07515 02 OF 05 180916Z

PALESTINIAN STATE FROM PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVES OF HOST COUNTRIES, THIS IS NATURAL AND PROPER FUNCTION OF AMERICAN EMBASSIES ABROAD. IT IS ALSO, UNFORTUNATELY, INSUFFICIENT ANALYSIS FROM WASHINGTON PERSPECTIVE, WHICH MUST PROPERLY ADDRESS ISSUE IN TERMS OF GLOBAL US INTEREST AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT US DOMESTIC POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES. REST OF THIS MESSAGE WILL THEREFORE ADDRESS RELEVANCE OF PALESTINIAN QUESTION NOT ONLY TO LEBANON'S CURRENT SITUATION BUT ALSO TO STATE OF ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE AND TO US DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE.

7. STATE OF AFFAIRS IN LEBANON. MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN LEBANON IN LAST MONTHS IS EMERGENCE OF WINNING CHRISTIAN/SYRIAN MILITARY/POLITICAL STRATEGY. PALESTINIAN DIVERSIONARY OFFENSIVE SOUTHWARD ALONG COAST FROM TRIPOLI IN JULY WAS NOT ONLY FAILURE, BUT HAS BEEN TURNED INTO CHRISTIAN SEIGE ON OUTSKIRTS OF TRIPOLI ITSELF. TELL ZAATAR WAS NO LONGER MILITARILY DEFENSIBLE AS EARLY AS END OF JUNE, BUT CHRISTIAN SEIGE TACTICS MINIMIZED CHRISTIAN LOSSES, AND TURNED FALL OF TELL ZAATAR INTO MAJOR MILITARY AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, PSYCHOLOGICAL DISASTER FOR PALESTINIANS (EVEN WHILE COSTING CHRISTIANS SOMETHING IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION). IN MIDST OF TELL ZAATAR AGONY, OTHER REMAINING ENCLAVE IN "CHRISTIANLAND" NOT YET UNDER CHRISTIAN CONTROL, NABAA, FELL ALMOST UNNOTICED.

8. CHRISTIANS ARE NOW POSITIONED FOR MAJOR OFFENSIVE AGAINST PALESTINIAN BASTIONS IN SALIENT EAST OF BEIRUT BETWEEN CHRISTIAN AND SYRIAN LINES IN HIGH MOUNTAINS OF HRBN, PRINCIPALLY AT AINTOURA AND MTEIN, AND AS OF THIS WRITING APPEAR STILL HOPEFUL THAT PALESTINIANS WILL GIVE THEM UP WITHOUT A FIGHT.

9. ON NEGOTIATING FRONT, PALESTINIAN-SYRIAN AGREEMENT OF JULY 20 WAS HIGHLY FAVORABLE TO SYRIANS. IT TACITLY ACCEPTED CONTINUED SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND PROVIDED FOR PALESTINIAN RETURN TO

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 07515 22 OF 25 180919Z

RESTRICTIVE STATUS OF 1969/1973 "CAIRO ACCORDS." SYRIANS HOWEVER IMPOSED DEMANDS ON INTERPRETATION OF CLAUSES OF AGREEMENT (PARTICULARLY COMPOSITION OF QUADRIPARTITE CEASE-FIRE COMMITTEE), WHICH SUGGESTS THERE IS A LIMIT TO SYRIAN INTEREST IN REACHING SERIOUS COMPROMISE WITH PALESTINIANS AT PRESENT TIME.

12. ON INTERNAL LEBANESE POLITICAL SCENE, ONLY PHALANGE PARTY AMONG FOUR FRONT ELEMENTS HAS TAKEN MODERATE POSITION VIS-A-VIS MODERATE MOBLEN LEADERSHIP. JUNBLATT'S EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE LEBANESE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY ARMY HAVE MET LITTLE SUCCESS. CHRISTIANS ARE TRYING, AND MAY YET SUCCEED, IN SPLITTING PLO-LEBANESE LEFTIST ALLIANCE. LT. KATIB AND "LEBANESE ARAB ARMY" HAVE JUST BEGUN TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH MODERATE ISLAMIC ELEMENTS. KATIB MAY HAVE BEEN EMBARRASSED TO PLO, BUT HIS DISAFFECTION WILL FURTHER NARROW LEBANESE SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN CAUSE. ARAFAT MAY SOON HAVE LITTLE CHOICE OTHER THAN ACCOMMODATION WITH CHRISTIANS, ON THEIR TERMS, OR SWING TO TOTALLY REJECTIONIST POSTURE. CHRISTIANS ARE RIDING HIGH, HAVE LITTLE REASON TO DOUBT THAT THEIR PRESENT STRATEGY, ASSUMING CONTINUED SYRIAN SUPPORT, WILL BRING THEM EVEN MORE VICTORIES. THEY HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED A MARGINATE "MOUNTAIN STATE" IN FACT, IF NOT IN LAW, AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS (OPERATIONS IN JEZZINE AREA) THAT THEY MAY BE HOPEFUL OF ESTABLISHING A DOMINANT POSITION THROUGHOUT WHOLE MOUNTAIN AREA. THEY MAY NOT SEEK, OR BE CAPABLE OF OUTRIGHT MILITARY CONQUEST OF ENTIRE COUNTRY, BUT MAY WELL BE IN POSITION TO IMPOSE "CANTONIZATION" ON TERMS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING.

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8. ORIGINAL BEIRUT CONFIDENTIAL IN ... NEIGHBORING POSTS ALL BASICALLY ADDRESSED IDEA OF ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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11. ONLY POSSIBLE FLY IN THE OINTMENT, FROM CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE, WOULD BE SHIFT IN SYRIAN SUPPORT. DURING DAYS BEFORE PRESUMED ASSUMPTION OF POWER BY PRESIDENT-ELECT BARKIS, IT APPEARS THAT SYRIANS ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE POLITICAL STRATEGY, SEEKING TO MAXIMIZE THEIR OWN GAINS THROUGH FLUID INTERNAL LEBANESE POLITICAL SITUATION. HOWEVER THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT ASSAD WILL SHIFT HIS SUPPORT AWAY FROM CHRISTIANS, NOR ARE THERE SERIOUS SIGNS OF A CHANGE IN REGIME IN SYRIA WHICH COULD ALTER ENTIRE LEBANESE EQUATION. SYRIANS ARE MAINTAINING AND MAY BE STRENGTHENING THEIR MILITARY POSTURE IN LEBANON, THUS KEEPING OPEN THEIR "MILITARY OPTION." MEANWHILE, THE RECORD OF ARAB LEAGUE MILITARY EFFORTS TO DATE SUGGESTS THEY WILL CONTINUE INEFFECTIVE AS DEVICE TO RESTRAIN CHRISTIAN/ SYRIAN SIDE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT MAY EMERGE FROM EXPECTED ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT. ONLY ARAB STATE WHICH COULD MAKE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE, EGYPT, SEEMS DETERMINED TO NOT GET INVOLVED DIRECTLY.

12. MOST LIKELY TREND IS FOR FURTHER CHRISTIAN/ SYRIAN ADVANCES THROUGH SHIFTING POLITICAL AND MILITARY PHASES. IT IS UNCLEAR AT WHAT POINT, IF ANY, SYRIANS MAY SERIOUSLY SUE FOR PEACE, BUT IT SEEMS LIKELY THEY HAVE NOT YET ACHIEVED THEIR MINIMAL OBJECTIVE VIS-A-VIA PALESTINIANS OF BRINGING THEM TO KNEE AND WITHIN SYRIAN ORBIT, HOWEVER DEFINED GEOGRAPHICALLY AND POLITICALLY. IF SYRIANS ARE WILLING TO SETTLE FOR A

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PAGE 22 BEIRUT 07513 01 OF 25 180917Z

PLO WHICH THEY THEMSELVES COULD DOMINATE WHILE NOT TOTALLY DESTROYING IT AS AUTONOMOUS POLITICAL ENTITY, THEN THEY MAY HAVE MADE MAJOR POLITICAL FAUX PAS IN REACHING JULY 29 AGREEMENT. THEIR FAILURE TO TAKE ACCOMMODATING ATTITUDE TOWARDS ITS IMPLEMENTATION WILL CONVINCED MANY PALESTINIANS OF FUTILITY OF FLEXIBLE ARAFAT APPROACH. BY DISCREDITING ARAFAT POLITICALLY AMONG PALESTINIANS, SYRIANS THEMSELVES MAY HAVE GIVEN MAJOR BOOST TO MOST RADICAL PALESTINIAN VOICES, THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT PALESTINIAN NATIONAL SALVATION IS POSSIBLY ONLY THROUGH ROYAL ARAB REVOLUTION IN MARXIST TERMS. SYRIANS/CHRISTIANS MAY CRUSH PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT MILITARILY FOR THE TIME BEING, BUT THEREBY PREPARE WAY FOR RETURN OF MOVEMENT IN FAR MORE VIRULENT, DOGMATICALLY MARXIST FORM SEVERAL YEARS HENCE. IDEA THAT SYRIANS MAY YET SUCCEED IN "TAMING" PLO IS AT BEST EXTREMELY RISKY AND MAY PROVE TO BE NAIVE. ENDURING STRENGTH OF PLO, LIKE ANY NATIONAL MOVEMENT, IS IN DEDICATION AND DISCIPLINE OF ITS MEMBERSHIP, NOT EXTENT OF FOREIGN MATERIAL SUPPORT. SYRIAN SUPPORT OF PAST CAN IN ANY CASE BE REPLACED TO CONSIDERABLE EXTENT BY LIBYAN, IRAQI AND PERHAPS EVEN SOVIET SUPPORT.

18. PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN LEBANON. TERM OF OFFICE OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE ENDS ON SEP 28. FRANGIE AND CHAMOUN SEEM UNLIKELY TO ATTEMPT PLOY TO EXTEND THEMSELVES IN OFFICE THEREAFTER (WHICH WOULD BE DEATH KNEEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACADE, THE ONLY REMAINING FACTOR UPHOLDING LEBANESE NATIONAL UNITY, AND PAVE THE WAY FOR DE JURE PARTITION IN LINE WITH REALITIES ON THE GROUND), ALTHOUGH POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE RULED OUT ENTIRELY. ELIAS SARKIS WILL PRESUMABLY ASSUME OFFICE AS PRESIDENT, WITHOUT ANY ARMY (OR MILITIA), WITHOUT A FUNCTIONING REPRESENTATIVE PARLIAMENT, AND WITH ONLY REMNANTS OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. HE DOES NOT EVEN HAVE A PARTY APPARATUS. HIS STRENGTH WILL BE BASED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THAT REMNANT OF POLITICAL NEEDS, MORAL AUTHORITY. THE SYRIANS WILL PROBABLY SUPPORT HIM (THEY ENGINEERED HIS ELECTION IN MAY), BUT SUCH SUPPORT MAY BE PURE POISON IN STRICTLY LEBANESE POLITICAL TERMS, AS HE SEEKS TO ACCOMMODATE SYRIAN

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PAGE 23

BEIRUT 07818 23 OF 45 190917Z

INTERESTS IN ORDER TO RETAIN THEIR SUPPORT, NOT ONLY LEFTISTS SUCH AS JUNBLATT BUT ALSO MANY MODERATES SUCH AS RAYMOND HOSE SEE SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE AS PART OF THE PROBLEM, NOT SOLUTION. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW HARKIS MIGHT WIN THESE ELEMENTS TO PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND YET RETAIN SYRIAN SUPPORT.

14. SARKIS, IF HE IS TO FIND POLITICAL SOLUTION, MUST SOMEHOW ADDRESS FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF WAR ITSELF. VIEWS DIFFER ON ORIGIN OF WAR, PRINCIPALLY BETWEEN THOSE WHO SEE LEBANESE-LEBANESE CONFESSIONAL STRIFE AND SOCIAL TENSIONS AS KEY ISSUES AND THOSE WHO PERCEIVE PALESTINIANS BREAKING OUT OF CONFINES OF CAIRO ACCORDS AS BASIC ISSUE. NEVERTHELESS, NEARLY ALL OBSERVERS AGREE TODAY THAT CONFLICT HAS BECOME MOST ESSENTIALLY A MARONITE-PALESTINIAN WAR. IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT LEBANESE LEFT IS BY FAR WEAKER ELEMENT OF PALESTINIAN/LEFTIST ALLIANCE. OUTLINES OF COMPROMISE LEBANESE/LEBANESE SOLUTION ARE ALSO CLEAR, AMOUNTING TO GREATER SHARING IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POWER BY LEBANESE MUSLIM (AND DRUZE) COMMUNITIES. KEY UNRESOLVED ISSUE, ON WHICH CENTRAL ANTAGONISTS -- CHRISTIANS AND PALESTINIANS -- ARE MILES APART IS PROBABLY IRRECONCILABLE IS FUTURE OF PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON. CHRISTIANS NOW GENERALLY REJECT EARLIER COMPROMISE SOLUTION. THE CAIRO ACCORDS FOR AT LEAST PERMISSIVE INTERPRETATION THEREOF AS UNACCEPTABLE ENCROACHMENT ON LEBANESE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. PALESTINIANS ARE HARDLY LIKELY TO ACCEPT RETURN TO AUTHENTIC REFUGEE STATUS, CONFINED TO THEIR CAMPS AND LARGELY DISARMED.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07515 04 OF 05 180920Z

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15. CURIOUSLY, BOTH CHRISTIANS AND PLO AGREE ON ESSENTIALITY OF A PALESTINIAN NATIONAL STATE. SINCE CONFLICT CENTERS ON PALESTINIAN DEMAND, IN ABSENCE OF SUCH A STATE, FOR AUTONOMOUS POLITICAL OPERATION WITHIN LEBANON, CORE OF SOLUTION IS THEREFORE REALITY, OR AT LEAST SERIOUS PROSPECT, OF A PALESTINIAN STATE.

16. PALESTINIANS AND LEBANESE ALIKE KNOW THAT, BARRING A SUCCESSFUL ARAB WAR AGAINST ISRAEL AT SOME TIME IN THE UNFORSEEABLE FUTURE, ONLY POWER ON EARTH WHICH CAN ORCHESTRATE THE CREATION OF SUCH A STATE IS UNITED STATES. WASHINGTON HOLDS THE KEY TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. WASHINGTON THEREFORE ALSO HOLDS KEY TO SOLUTION OF LEBANESE PROBLEM, WHICH TODAY IS ANOTHER ASPECT OF THAT SAME MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. FAILURE TO USE THAT KEY WITHIN NEXT MONTH WILL MEASURABLY INCREASE LIKELIHOOD OF COLLAPSE OF LEBANESE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, AS SARKIS SEEKS ASSUME OFFICE, COLLAPSE OF MODERATE PLO AND OPEN PROSPECTS FOR PROLONGED AND BLOODY PROCESS OF PARTITION AMONG THE LEBANESE COMMUNITIES AND PROLONGED GUERRILLA WAR OF ATTRITION BY PALESTINIANS AND THEIR LEBANESE ALLIES AGAINST CHRISTIANS AND SYRIANS.

17. US POLICY PERSPECTIVE, IT IS PARTIAL, AND THEREFORE ERRONEOUS, TO BASE US POLICY ON PALESTINIAN QUESTION ON ANALYSIS OF LEBANESE SITUATION ALONE, JUST AS IT IS ERRONEOUS TO BASE US POLICY ON PALESTINIAN/

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PAGE 02

BEIRUT 27515 04 OF 05 182920Z

MIDDLE EAST QUESTION ON MERE ANALYSIS OF SYRIAN, ISRAELI, JORDANIAN, EGYPTIAN OR EVEN PALESTINIAN SITUATION. PROPER POINT OF DEPARTURE IS ANALYSIS OF US NATIONAL INTEREST IN WHOLE MIDDLE EAST AREA, WITH DUE REALISTIC BUT NOT OPPORTUNISTIC DEFERENCE TO DOMESTIC US POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. IF BASIC US INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST ARE TO ASSURE ADEQUATE FLOW OF OIL AND LIMITATION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE, THEN BROAD INSTRUMENTAL US OBJECTIVE IN AREA MUST BE TO ASSURE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT WITHIN STABLE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK. MOST IMPORTANT DESTABILIZING FACTOR IS UNMISTAKABLY UNRESOLVED PALESTINIAN QUESTION. COMPELLING LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE IS THAT CENTRAL CONCERN OF US POLICY SHOULD BE TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR PALESTINIANS, THAT IS, A POLITICAL SITUATION ACCEPTABLE TO GREAT MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES. HISTORY OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT OVER LAST DECADE OR SO DEMONSTRATES THAT ONLY SUCH SOLUTION IS A PALESTINIAN NATIONAL STATE. THIS IS HARDLY AN ORIGINAL IDEA, HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF PERENNIAL FAILURE OF US TO ADDRESS PROBLEM EFFECTIVELY (OR EVEN ADMIT ITS EXISTENCE UNTIL FAIRLY RECENTLY), IT IS AS VALID AND DEMANDING OF SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TODAY AS IT HAS BEEN AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST. IN THIS CONTEXT, LEBANON TRAGEDY IS ANOTHER, YET COMPELLING REASON TO LEND MATTER URGENT CONSIDERATION AT PRESENT TIME. US REFUSAL TO ADDRESS PROBLEM IN PAST DID NOT MAKE IT DISAPPEAR. THERE IS NO GOOD REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT FURTHER DELAY OR TEMPORIZATION WILL AMELIORATE PROBLEM FOR THE FUTURE.

18. IMPORTANCE OF THE PRESENT MOMENT. ARAB WORLD HOPES -- SADAT HAS SAID -- THAT 1977 WILL BE "YEAR OF THE PALESTINIANS." FUNDAMENTAL TO ARAB VIEW IS CORRECT PERCEPTION THAT THE US CANNOT UNDERTAKE ACTIVE STEPS INVOLVING HARD NEGOTIATING AND THE ARTFUL APPLICATION OF PRESSURE IN AN ELECTION YEAR. IN THE INTERVAL, PLO MAY BE SO BADLY WEAKENED IN LEBANON THIS YEAR THAT, AIDED AND ABETTED BY ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE AS WELL AS ARAB INCOMPREHENSION, US HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION TO MIDDLE EAST AND PERCEPTION OF NEED TO COME TO TERMS WITH

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PAGE 23

BEIRUT 27515 04 OF 28 182920Z

PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT WILL WEAKEN TO POINT WHERE US MIDDLE EAST POLICY AGAIN BECOMES ONE OF DRIFT AND MERE RESPONSE TO EVENTS. A PRESIDENT FORD OR A PRESIDENT CARTER COULD BY EARLY 1977 DECIDE THAT PALESTINIAN PROBLEM CAN BE FINESSED FOR HIS ENTIRE TERM OF OFFICE. PRICE -- JEOPARDY OF WESTERN WORLD'S OIL SUPPLY, CONTINUED INSTABILITY AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN MIDDLE EAST, RENEWAL OF EXTREMIST PALESTINIAN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND COMPLETION OF DEVASTATION OF LEBANON -- MIGHT SEEM UNUSUAL TO MASSIVE PRESSURES OF AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY. IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF LONGER-TERM US MIDDLE EAST INTERESTS TO TAKE SOME ACTION NOW WHICH WILL PERMIT THE RESUMPTION OF AN ACTIVE US DIPLOMACY IN 1977.

19. BOTH PRESENT ADMINISTRATION AND POTENTIAL CARTER ADMINISTRATION MIGHT BE PREVAILED UPON NOW, JOINTLY, NOT TO RENEW AN ACTIVE MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY, BUT TO SET STAGE FOR REAL PROGRESS ON PALESTINIAN QUESTION AFTER NEW ADMINISTRATION TAKES OFFICE, ON GROUNDS THAT LONGER-TERM US NATIONAL INTERESTS COMPEL IT. PRESENT ADMINISTRATION, BY LOGIC OF ITS STEP-BY-STEP DIPLOMACY OF LAST THREE YEARS, COULD NOT EASILY REVERSE A DENIED SERIOUS DIPLOMATIC EFFORT IN MIDDLE EAST BEGINNING AFTER JANUARY 22. DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGER IS NOT NOW BENIGNE TO AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY. RECENT STATEMENTS OPPOSING ISRAELI ANNEXATIONIST TENDENCIES SUGGEST DEMOCRATIC CAMP MIGHT BE PREVAILED UPON TO ACQUIESE IN STEPS TOWARDS A REAL MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION BEFORE THE ELECTION, WHICH WOULD FACILITATE ITS TASK THEREAFTER.

20. RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY SEEK TO ARRANGE A BIPARTISAN DECLARATION THAT THE UNITED STATES ESPouses CONCEPT OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL STATE IN AREA HISTORICALLY KNOWN AS PALESTINE, COUPLED WITH RENEWAL OF US SUPPORT OF RIGHT OF STATE OF ISRAEL TO EXIST. DETAILS ARE NOT ESSENTIAL, BUT MIGHT BE SKETCHED IN BROAD OUTLINE: WEST BANK, POSSIBLY GAZA, ACCESS TO THE SEA, END OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, SECURITY FOR

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PAGE 24



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PAGE 04 BEIRUT 07515 04 OF 05 183920Z
ISRAEL, ETC.

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PAGE 21 BEIRUT 07515 25 OF 05 180916Z

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ACTION 3P-32

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISG-00 7094.W.....

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R 171520Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1808

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 5 OF 5 BEIRUT 7515

DISSENT CHANNEL

21. DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPACT: DECLARATION, IT
BIPARTISAN, WOULD NOT PREJUDICE ELECTORAL CHANCES OF
EITHER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, ABILITY OF NEXT
PRESIDENT, OF EITHER PARTY, TO FACE UP TO PALESTINIAN
QUESTION WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED.

22. FOREIGN POLITICAL IMPACT: IN ISRAEL, STATEMENT
WOULD HELP DISABUSE BOTH GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP AND
PUBLIC OPINION OF IDEA THAT PALESTINIAN QUESTION CAN
BE FINESSED INDEFINITELY AND ACCELERATED A PROCESS OF
NATIONAL REASSESSMENT ON WHICH NEW US ADMINISTRATION
COULD CAPITALIZE. IN ARAB WORLD, STATEMENT WOULD
MASSIVELY ENHANCE AMERICAN INFLUENCE AND ARAB-AMERICAN
COOPERATION AND SHARPLY WEAKEN LINGERING SOVIET
INFLUENCE. AMONG PALESTINIANS, STATEMENT WOULD ARREST
DRIFT TOWARDS RADICALIZATION, THUS FACILITATING
NEGOTIATED SOLUTION NEXT YEAR. IN LEBANON, STATEMENT
WOULD BE WELCOMED BY ALL FACTIONS, WITHOUT A SINGLE
EXCEPTION, WOULD FACILITATE INTERIM CHRISTIAN-PLO
AGREEMENT, AND WOULD CONSIDERABLY ENHANCE CHANCES OF
EFFECTIVE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION UNDER
SARKIS.

23. ALTERNATIVELY, PRESENT ADMINISTRATION ALONE COULD
MAKE STATEMENT. THIS WOULD INJECT MIDDLE EAST ISSUE
INTO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN. IT WOULD HAVE
EDUCATIONAL VALUE. HOWEVER IT WOULD RISK TEMPTING
CARTER CAMP TO CAPITALIZE ON ISSUE BY OPPOSING CONCEPT

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 27515 75 OF 82 182918Z

OF PALESTINIAN STATE, THUS PERHAPS WORSENING PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS ON ISSUE AFTER ELECTIONS. ISRAELI REJECTIONIST CAMP WOULD TAKE HEART FROM POSSIBLE CARTER OPPOSITION IF IT WERE UNEQUIVOCAL. HOWEVER, CARTER CAMP HAS BEEN NOTABLY ASTUTE IN AVOIDING PAINTING ITSELF INTO CORNER ON ISSUES SO FAR, AND WOULD BE COUNTED ON TO DO SO IN THIS CASE. DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGER MIGHT SEEK TO CAPITALIZE ON ISSUE, BUT HE WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE BETTER ABLE TO DEAL WITH ISSUE AS PRESIDENT IS DIRECT RESULT OF RESPECTABILITY ACCORDED IDEA OF PALESTINIAN STATE BY UNILATERAL DECLARATION BY FORD ADMINISTRATION. PRESIDENT FORD MIGHT WELL JUDGE DECLARATION WOULD WEAKEN REJECTION CHANCES, HOWEVER, HE MIGHT ALSO JUDGE THAT THIS ISSUE ALONE WOULD NOT BE DECISIVE. HE MIGHT BE PERSUADED THAT MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL INTEREST OUTWEIGHS MARGINAL AND NON-DECISIVE ELECTORAL LOSSES.

24. FINALLY, OF COURSE, US COULD CONTINUE ITS PRESENT DO-NOTHING POLICY, OCCASIONALLY LEVITATED BY AFFIRMATION OF DEVOTION TO CAUSE OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, AND, IN LEBANON, AFFIRMATION OF US SUPPORT OF LEBANESE NATIONAL UNITY AND RESOLUTION OF LEBANESE PROBLEMS THROUGH A PROCESS OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE (AS RECOMMENDED IN REPTELS P AND Q). US STATEMENTS ON LEBANON WOULD CONTINUE TO RING INCREASINGLY FATIGOUS. PALESTINIAN INTRANSIGENCE AND RADICALIZATION (WITH POTENTIAL SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD) WOULD BE TOLERATED AND CHANCES FOR MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT QUITE POSSIBLY SET BACK A NUMBER OF YEARS. COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF LEBANON, AND WITH IT A HISTORICAL CENTER OF ARAB MODERNIZATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT, WOULD BE TOLERATED -- AND POSSIBLY ASSURED. US NATIONAL INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST -- LIMITATION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND ASSURED OIL SUPPLIES -- WOULD BE INCREASINGLY JEOPARDIZED BY PROLONGED US POLICY INDIFFERENCE TO MAJOR ELEMENTS IN PROCESS OF ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT IN ENTIRE ARAB WORLD. LANE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

*file document
channel
with state*

April 18, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO : See Distribution List
FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake *AL*
SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Message

Attached for your information is, San Salvador 1732, a dissent channel message on the scenario of ambassadorial change in San Salvador. Granville Austin, of the Policy Planning Staff, has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply.

Copies to:

- S - The Secretary *W*
- S/S - The Executive Secretary
 - Open Forum Chairman
- M - Deputy Under Secretary for Management
- ARA - Assistant Secretary
- M/DG - Director General
- D/HA - Coordinator

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PAGE 01 SAN SA 01732 21 OF 03 152115Z
ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 RS-01 ISG-00 SSO-00 7024 W
*****152214Z 096942 772

O 152056Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3995

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 SAN SALVADOR 1732

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 116521-GDS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE - SCENARIO OF AMBASSADORIAL CHAN

GE

5 FAM 212.3/ 2 FAM 101, 11 FAM 243, STATE A-309

1. THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED BY [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] PSD-3 POLOFF AND FSO-5 COMBATI RESPECTIVELY, AND SUBSCRIBED TO BY THOSE FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL WHOSE APPEAR IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH. WE SUGGEST THIS DISSENT BE DISTRIBUTED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY TCDMAN AND THE NCS AS WELL AS THE ADDRESSEES DESCRIBED IN 5 FAM 212.3. WE ARE NOT SENSITIVE TO WIDER DISTRIBUTION.
2. THE ISSUE - ON APRIL 11 THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOTIFIED THAT HE WILL BE REPLACED, HIS SUCCESSOR TO BE NAMED SHORTLY. HE WAS TOLD TO DEPART POST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THOSE SIGNING THIS MESSAGE WISH TO REGISTER THEIR DISSENT FROM AN ACTION

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WHICH MIGHT APPEAR TO BE A ROUTINE AMBASSADORIAL CHANGE TO THOSE IN WASHINGTON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECISION,

BUT WHICH IN THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL ATMOSPHERICS HAS SERIOUS ADVERSE FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS WE BELIEVE A MISPERCEPTION OF WHAT IS ABOUT TO OCCUR WILL BE DETRIMENTAL TO POLICY OBJECTIVES THIS EMBASSY IS PURSUING AND COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE FUTURE USG POLICY GOALS.

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PAGE 02

SAN SA 01732 01 OF 03 152113Z

IN LATIN AMERICA.

3. WE ARE NOT DISPUTING, OR IMPLYING DISSENT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVE TO NOMINATE AMBASSADORS OF EXECUTIVE CHOICE. AS PROFESSIONAL FOREIGN SERVICE PRACTITIONERS, HOWEVER, WE QUESTION THAT SUFFICIENT ANALYSIS WAS MADE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THIS DECISION WILL BE IMPLEMENTED, I.E., THE STATE OF THE PRESENT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. PROPER TIMING IN IMPLEMENTING THIS DECISION COULD ADVANCE CRI [REDACTED] POLICY OBJECTIVES. IMPROPER TIMING, ON THE OTHER HAND, COULD SERIOUSLY IMPEDE PRESENT AND FUTURE PURSUIT OF THESE VERY INTERESTS.

4. OUR REQUEST FOR A REVIEW OF THIS DECISION ENDS WITH A RECOMMENDATION FOR ONE OF TWO POSSIBLE OPTIONS. ONE INVOLVES THE PRESENT AMBASSADOR REMAINING AT POST FOR AN ADDITIONAL PERIOD. WHILE MISSION PERSONNEL ADMIRE THE MANNER IN WHICH AMBASSADOR LOZANO HAS HANDLED HIMSELF AND PURSUED US NATIONAL INTERESTS DURING HIS TENURE, THIS EXTENSION WAS NOT REPE

AT

NOT AN OBJECTIVE OF THE DISSENT. IT DEVELOPED, AS DID THE ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATION, FROM OUR ANALYSIS OF HOW TO BEST PROTECT AND PROJECT US NATIONAL INTERESTS.

5. BACKGROUND ON ISSUE - BEGINNING ROUGHLY IN OCTOBER 1976, THIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN PURSUING WITH VIGOR, ENTHUSIASM AND STEADY DEPARTMENTAL SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE, A POLICY WITH HEAVY EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. THIS CAME ABOUT, NOT WITH THE ARRIVAL OF A NEW AMBASSADOR IN AUGUST 1976 OR NEW US ADMINISTRATION IN JANUARY 1977, BUT AFTER A SERIES OF INTERNAL SALVADORAN EVENTS INDICATED A DETERIORATING PATTERN. THE MAJOR ONES INCLUDED: (A) THE APPARENT ASSASSINATION OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF GOES AGENTS (THE RICHARDSON CASE); (B) THE MISTREATMENT AND EXPULSION OF US CITIZEN PRIESTS TO VAGUE AND UNSUBSTANTIATED CHARGES; (C) THE VIOLENT AFTERMATH OF THE FEBRUARY 23, 1977 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

AND (D) PROBLEMS IN OBTAINING TREATY-GUARANTEED ACCESS TO DETAINED

US CITIZENS. THESE EVENTS, COUPLED WITH GOES INDIGNATION AT USG COMMENT ON ITS ELECTORAL PROCESS AND US CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR, RESULTED IN GOES WRATH FOCUSSED ON THE AMBASSADOR AND THOSE EMBASSY OFFICERS

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PAGE 03

SAN SA 01732 01 OF 03 152110Z

WHO HAD CARRIED THE USG MESSAGE TO THEM. AFTER THE PRESS CARRIED THESE STORIES TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD, THE AMBASSADOR BECAME MORE AND MORE THE PERSONIFICATION OF THE USG HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. THOSE WITHIN THE GOES WHO COUNSELED DEFIANCE OF USG EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN BEGAN A CAMPAIGN TO OUST THE AMBASSADOR. THIS IS THE PRESENT SITUATION.

6. ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND THIS DISSENT - WE HAVE CONSTRUCTED THIS DISSENT ON A NUMBER OF BASIC ASSUMPTIONS WHICH MUST BE KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD IF OUR CONCERN AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TO BE APPRECIATED.

THESE INCLUDE:

(1) WHILE RECENT EVENTS IN EL SALVADOR ARE RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT TO THE USG AND PUBLIC, NEWS OF THEM HAS REACHED A WIDE AUDIENCE THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. ANY PRECEDENT WERE COULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS IN RELATED CASES THROUGHOUT THE HEMISPHERE.

(2) THE USG - IN THE PERSON OF THE AMBASSADOR AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS - HAS BEEN CONVEYING FUNDAMENTAL U.S. POLICY TO THE GOES ON THE RICHARDSON CASE AND RECENT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

(3) THE USG HAS NOT BEEN SLUFFING OR POSTURING IN EXPRESSING CONCERN ON HUMAN RIGHTS OR DEMANDS IN THE RICHARDSON MATTER. IT IS SERIOUSLY RPT SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH BOTH, AND WILL PURSUE THEM.

(4) THE GOES STRATEGY TO DATE HAS BEEN TO STALL AND HOPE RICHARDSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN HAS PEAKED, BELIEVING THAT THE USG IS GOING THROUGH "A MOOD" WHICH WILL GO AWAY SHORTLY. THIS VIEW IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF PRESIDENT-ELECT ROMERO AND HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISERS.

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REB462

PAGE 21
ACTION SP-02

SAN SA 01732 02 OF 03 152123Z

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISD-00 SSO-00 /004 W
-----152215Z 097161 /72

O 152066Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3906

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 SAN SALVADOR 1732
DISSENT CHANNEL

(5) THE FEBRUARY 20 ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH (BOTH IN THE PLAZA AND THE "SELECTIVE PURGE"), INDICATE THE INCOMING ROMERO GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE MORE RECALCITRANT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MORE A PURELY MILITARY HARD-LINE REGIME. THIS TREND COULD BE FOSTERED WITH THE WRONG SIGNAL AT THIS TIME FROM THE USG.

(6) THE AMBASSADOR'S DEPARTURE WILL INEVITABLY BE INTERPRETED IN SOME CIRCLES AS USG AWARENESS OF HIS RPT HIS PROBLEMS WITH THIS GOES, AND USG DISSATISFACTION WITH THE

SITUATION. SUCH AN INTERPRETATION WILL BE STRONGER IF HE LEAVES SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. AN IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE, WHILE UNDER FIRE, CAN ONLY CONVINCED MANY THAT THE GOES POLICY TO STONEWALL WAS CORRECT.

(7) CERTAIN GOES BACKERS, HAVING GONE TO WASHINGTON TO MALIGN AMBASSADOR LOZANO AND SUGGEST HIS RECALL, WILL INTERPRET HIS WITHDRAWAL AS TOTAL VINDICATION FOR THEIR ADVICE AND POLICY. THIS WILL STRENGTHEN THEIR PRESTIGE AND VOICE IN THE ROMERO YEARS, WHICH WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IN TERMS OF FUTURE HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE IN EL SALVADOR AND POSSIBLY FOR OTHER US INTERESTS HERE.

7. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS - ACCEPTING THE PREMISE THE ADMINISTRATION HAS IRREVOCABLY DECIDED TO CHANGE AMBASSADORS, WE FORESEE AND HAVE ANALYZED SIX POSSIBLE SCENARIO OPTIONS IN THE TRANSITION FROM THIS AMBASSADOR TO THE NEXT. EACH SCENARIO EMITS A DIFFERENT SIGNAL TO THE GOES AND INTERESTED AUDIENCES.

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PAGE 02

SAN SA 01782 02 OF 03 152123Z

THE SIX ARE:

Would the signal be...

I. AMBASSADOR LOZANO LEAVES ON APRIL 30 AND THE NEW AMBASSADOR ARRIVES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. SIGNAL - THE USG IS ANXIOUS TO REESTABLISH THE FORMER "GOOD FRIENDS" RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOES. THE USG BELIEVES IT UNFORTUNATE THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES CAME UP AND SHOULD BE PUT BEHIND US QUICKLY. THE USG WILL WORK WITH BOTH THE PRESENT AND INCOMING REGIMES, REGARDLESS OF PERFORMANCE ON THIS ISSUE. LOZANO WAS REMOVED FOR HIS VIGORIOUS ACTIONS ON THE RICHARDSON CASE ET AL.

II. THE AMBASSADOR LEAVES ON APRIL 30, HIS REPLACEMENT ARRIVES ON OR ABOUT THE JULY 1 INAUGURATION OF GENERAL ROMERO. A CHARGE IS CHIEF-OF-MISSION IN BETWEEN. SIGNAL - THE USG WANTS TO START OFF WITH A NEW APPROACH WITH THE ROMERO ADMINISTRATION. LOZANO WAS REMOVED FOR HIS ACTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE PREVIOUS GOOD RELATIONSHIP CAN BE RECAPTURED, BUT ONLY WITH THE DEPARTURE OF LOZANO AND TERMINATION OF THE MOLINA TENURE

III. AMBASSADOR LOZANO DEPARTS ON APRIL 30. THE NEW AMBASSADOR DOES NOT ARRIVE UNTIL WELL INTO THE ROMERO TENURE; PERHAPS SEVERAL MONTHS. THE CHARGE PRESIDES. US IS WAITING TO SEE HOW THE ROMERO REGIME PERFORMS. SIGNAL -

MUCH THE SAME AS II, BUT LESS LIKELY TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD.

IV. THE AMBASSADOR LEAVES ON APRIL 30. NO REPLACEMENT IS NAMED UNTIL THE GOES DEMONSTRATES WHAT ACTIONS IT INTENDS TO TAKE ON THE RICHARDSON CASE. SIGNAL - THE USG IS WAITING AND SEEING, BUT ONLY TO DETERMINE IF THE GOES WILL MAKE GOOD ON ITS PROMISES TO SATISFACTORILY EXPLAIN THE RICHARDSON MATTER. THE USG WILL STICK TO ITS GUNS. IT WAS NOT THE AMBASSADOR, BUT THE USG THAT WAS PURSUING THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY.

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PAGE 03 SAN SA 01732 02 OF 03 152129Z

V. AMBASSADOR LOZANO REMAINS IN PLACE, AT LEAST UNTIL THE JULY 1 CHANGE IN SALVADORAN REGIMES. HE TAKES NO INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS OR OTHERWISE.

SIGNAL - THE AMBASSADOR WAS PURSUING USG POLICY IN THE RICHARDSON AND RELATED CASES. THE CHANGE IN SALVADORAN REGIMES IS A NATURAL TIME TO CHANGE AMBASSADORS, AND REPRESENTS NOTHING BEYOND THAT.

VI. THE AMBASSADOR REMAIN IN PLACE, AT LEAST UNTIL JULY 1. HE USES HIS LAME DUCK STATUS TO HAMMER HOME USG CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RICHARDSON CASE AND OTHER ISSUES THAT MIGHT COME UP.

SIGNAL - THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE THAT THE USG IS DEAD SERIOUS ON RICHARDSON, HUMAN RIGHTS, ET AL.

8. RECOMMENDATION - WE RECOMMEND IMPLEMENTATION OF EITHER IV OR VI. WE PREFER THE LATTER SINCE WE BELIEVE IT CONVEYS THE CLEARST, LEAST SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETATION MESSAGE THAT THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS AS BASIC TO US FOREIGN POLICY AS WE HAVE BEEN LED TO BELIEVE.

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REB463

PAGE 01 SAN SA 01732 03 OF 03 1521472
ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-31 ES-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /004 W
*****152216Z 097668 /72

O 152056Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3097

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 SAN SALVADOR 1732

DISSENT CHANNEL

ARGUMENTS WE WOULD ADVANCE TO SUPPORT THIS
RECOMMENDATION INCLUDE:

(A) THE TRANSITION FROM ONE SALVADORAN REGIME TO
ANOTHER IS A MORE NATURAL TIME TO CHANGE US AMBASSADORS,
RATHER THAN TWO MONTHS BEFORE.

(B) THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT AMBASSADOR
LOZANO WAS PURSUING HIS OWN VENDETTA RATHER THAN USG
POLICY IS GREATLY DIMINISHED.

(C) THE USG DOES NOT LOSE ALL MOMENTUM ON
THE RICHARDSON QUERY, AND CAN MAXIMIZE WHATEVER
LEVERAGE IT MIGHT HAVE IF THE ROMERO GOVERNMENT
WANTS TO GET THAT ISSUE OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE ITS
INAUGURATION. THE OPTION ALSO GIVES BETTER LEVERAGE
BOTH IN IMMEDIATE AND FUTURE RANGE SINCE IT CAN
BE TAILORED TO GOES ACTIONS OR LACK THEREOFF.

(D) THE POSSIBILITY IS MINIMIZED THAT US MISSION PERSONNEL
ADVOCACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS WILL DIMINISH IF THEY BELIEVE
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN WASHINGTON DICTATED THE UNTIMELY
REMOVAL OF THE AMBASSADOR REGARDLESS OF THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS
DISCUSSED ABOVE.

(E) NEITHER THE GOES NOR ITS SUPPORT GROUPS
WALK AWAY WITH AN IMAGE OF THE USG AS A PAPER TIGER
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PROTECTION OF ITS CITIZENS, ETC.

(F) THESE OPTIONS HOLD THE GREATEST PROMISE

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PAGE 02


SAN SA 01732 03 OF 03 152147Z

OF IMPEDING WHATEVER PRESSURES MIGHT EXIST FOR THE ROMERO ADMINISTRATION TO PURSUE AN EVEN HARDER LINE ONCE IN OFFICE.

9. IN THE NAME OF BREVITY, WE HAVE NOT LISTED THE PROS AND CONS OF EACH OF THE ACTION OPTIONS. THAT ANALYSIS CAN BE SUPPLIED IF NECESSARY.

10. CONCLUSION, WITHOUT QUESTIONING, OR APPEARING TO QUESTION, PRESIDENT CARTER'S RIGHT TO REPLACE AN AMBASSADOR WHENEVER HE DEEMS BEST, THE UNDERSIGNED RECOMMEND THAT AMBASSADOR LOZANO'S TENURE BE EXTENDED AT LEAST THROUGH THE JULY 1 INSTALLATION OF THE ROMERO REGIME AND THAT DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD HE BE INSTRUCTED TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE

TO THE FULLEST EXTENT COMPATIBLE WITH OTHER NATIONAL INTERESTS.
11. CONCURRENCES. (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)




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PAGE 03

SAN SA 01732 03 OF 03 152147Z



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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RS

RELEASE IN FULL

August 15, 1974

TO: The Secretary
FROM: S/P - Winston Lord *W*
SUBJECT: Dissent Memorandum

Attached is a dissent memorandum on the Cyprus crisis. In accordance with established procedures for the dissent channel (which is set up, as you know, to give a direct means of expressing dissent within official channels) this paper was forwarded to me and I pass it on to you without comment. It is dated August 9 (though the drafting date shows August 12) but only reached me on August 14.

Our office will respond directly to the drafter, incorporating any comments which you might wish to make.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Dissent Memorandum
- Tab B - Department Notice

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RELEASE IN
PART B6

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S/P: CALLEGRONE: AG
04/05/82 EXT 22972
S/P: WOLFOWITZ

ROUTINE BONN

DISSENT CHANNEL FROM S/P WOLFOWITZ FOR [REDACTED]

E.O. 11652: GDS, 4/5/88 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL)

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL ON SANCTIONS AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

REFERENCES: A) BONN 7342; B) BONN 6717

- 1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. PER YOUR REQUEST, REFTEL B SENT TO ACDA AND USICA. YY

Handwritten initials/signature

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

file

RELEASE IN
PART B6

August 5, 1977

MEMORANDUM

To: S/P - Mr. Lake
Through: S/P - Mary Ann Casey
From: S/P - Theodore H. Moran *TEL*
Subject: Dissent Message

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Here is the response to dissent message.

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There is a genuine interest in "sector analysis" in AID, but there is a feeling in some quarters that interpretation of how it should be done is too time-consuming, expensive, and non-policy relevant.

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I have told him that I will try to get him in touch with people who are sympathetic to his ideas, and if the problem is merely him they can tell him.

In any case, the points he raises are being reconsidered in AID and the whole debate should now be taken out of the dissent channel.

Attachment

Clearances: AID - Mr. Eriksson *THM*
ARA - Ms. Peters *THM*

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RELEASE IN PART B6

PAGE 01 PARIS 12051 01 OF 03 260943Z

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ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISQ-00 7004 W

P 260920Z APR 76
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0205

115387

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 12051

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOA, NATO, FR

SUBJECT: ~~DISSENT MESSAGE: SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE~~
~~IN FRANCE~~

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED] POLITICAL/MILITARY OFFICER AT EMBASSY PARIS. [REDACTED] REQUESTS THAT, IN ADDITION TO USUAL DISTRIBUTION, MESSAGE BE DISTRIBUTED TO EUR, PM AND INR UNDER SUCH DISTRIBUTION CONTROLS AS THE DEPARTMENT DEEMS APPROPRIATE. THIS MESSAGE WAS PREPARED ON APRIL 23, 1976, ALTHOUGH ITS ROOTS GO BACK TO EARLY FEBRUARY.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY (PCP) IN THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE WOULD POSE THE GRAVEST CHALLENGES TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE STRUCTURE OF SECURITY THAT HAS ASSURED PEACE IN EUROPE FOR ALMOST THREE DECADES. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN AMONG THE CONCERNS PROMPTING THE PRESIDENT'S AND THE SECRETARY'S REPEATED DECLARATIONS OPPOSING COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. I AM PERSUADED THAT THE THREAT INHERENT IN THE CASE OF THE SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE IN FRANCE FAR EXCEEDS THE CONSIDERABLE DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH POTENTIAL COMMUNIST GOVERNING ROLES ELSEWHERE IN WESTERN EUROPE. I AGREE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S AND THE SECRETARY'S APPROACH AND BELIEVE THE EMBASSY'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE'S SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE SHOULD IN NO

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PAGE 02 PARIS 12281 01 OF 03 250943Z

WAY RISK UNDERCUTTING IT. RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARÁ 6 FOR NEW DIRECTIONS IN OUR FRENCH POLICY ARE FRAMED WITH THIS PURPOSE IN MIND. I UNDERSTAND THEY HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND REJECTED BY THE AMBASSADOR, END SUMMARY.

3. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE IN FRANCE

A. THE SECURITY OF GERMANY IS AT THE VERY HEART OF THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AND -- CONSEQUENTLY -- OF OUR OWN SECURITY. AN INSECURE GERMANY WOULD PRESENT AWESOME UNKNOWN'S FOR THE FUTURE. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE STRIVEN FOR 30 YEARS -- AND I BELIEVE QUITE RIGHTLY -- TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THE FRG HAD NO LEGITIMATE REASON TO FEEL UNDULY INSECURE CONFRONTED, AS IT IS, BY THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE WARSAW PACT ALONG ITS EASTERN BORDER. THE FORCES OF MODERATION AND GOOD SENSE WHICH HAVE GOVERNED THE FRG FOR THESE 30 YEARS WOULD BE HAMPRESSED TO SURVIVE AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH ADDED A POTENTIALLY HOSTILE GOVERNMENT WITH COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION ON ITS WESTERN BORDER AS WELL. IF A SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST REGIME CAME TO POWER IN FRANCE, MY OWN BET IS THAT THE FRG WOULD BE PUSHED TOWARD A REACTIONARY BACKLASH WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WOULD RENEW EUROPE'S FEARS OF AN IRRESPONSIBLE AND REVANCHIST GERMANY. WE MUST NOT LET THIS HAPPEN.

B. MOREOVER, FRANCE IS UNLIKE ANY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY CURRENTLY THREATENED BY COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN ITS GOVERNMENT: IT POSSESSES A MAJOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. IF ITALY GOES COMMUNIST, IT WILL POSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR EUROPE'S SECURITY STRUCTURE. BUT IT WILL NOT THREATEN THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. THE FRENCH CASE IS WHOLLY DIFFERENT. THE TOLERABLE LEVEL OF CONSISTENCY WHICH CURRENTLY CHARACTERIZES FRENCH NUCLEAR STRATEGY COULD WELL BE REPLACED (I WOULD SAY WOULD BE REPLACED) BY A MAJOR NEW COMPLICATION FOR OUR OWN NUCLEAR STRATEGY IF A SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE CAME TO POWER IN FRANCE. THIS FRENCH POTENTIAL FOR NUCLEAR DESTABILIZATION IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO AMERICA'S VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS. WE MUST NOT LET THIS HAPPEN.

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PAGE 03 PARIS 12361 21 OF 03 260943Z

C. FURTHERMORE, ANY CONCEPT OF DEFENDING EUROPE AGAINST A WARSAW PACT INVASION THROUGH A "SUSTAINED CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE" USING FRENCH TERRITORY AND FORCES WOULD BE RENDERED HIGHLY DOUBTFUL (I WOULD SAY IMPOSSIBLE) IN THE EVENT OF PCP PARTICIPATION IN THE FRENCH

[Faint, mostly illegible teletype text]

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~~SECRET~~ REB575.

PAGE 01 PARIS 12051 02 OF 03 260944Z

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ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00, 7004, W..... 116382

F 260929Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0206

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 12051

DISSENT CHANNEL

GOVERNMENT. WE MUST NOT LET THIS HAPPEN.

D. FINALLY, THE US NATION WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT -- PERHAPS IMPOSSIBLE -- TO COMMIT ITSELF TO THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE AGAINST POTENTIAL COMMUNIST INVASION IF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS THEMSELVES CHOOSE TO VOTE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND FUNCTIONARIES INTO POWER IN A KEY COUNTRY LIKE FRANCE. WE MUST NOT LET THIS HAPPEN, EITHER.

4. DOMESTIC FRENCH ASPECTS. -- BEYOND THESE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS -- WHICH ALONE WOULD JUSTIFY OUR OPPOSITION TO PCF PARTICIPATION IN A FRENCH GOVERNMENT -- THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL FRENCH DOMESTIC REASONS FOR DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WITHIN OUR DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK TO KEEP THE COMMUNISTS OUT OF THE GOP.

A. FIRST, THE COMMON PROGRAM IS BOUND TO PROVOKE A CONSERVATIVE REACTION THROUGHOUT FRANCE, IF THE SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE SERIOUSLY ATTEMPTS TO IMPLEMENT IT. REGARDLESS OF THE JUSTICE OF SOME OF THE COMMON PROGRAM'S PLANKS, THE VERY FACT THAT THE PCF PARTICIPATES IN ITS FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION WILL RAISE THE FEAR THAT THE COMMON PROGRAM IS SIMPLY THE FIRST STOP IN "COMMUNIZING" THE FRENCH NATION. BEING BASICALLY CONSERVATIVE, THE FRENCH NATION WILL REACT. WHETHER THIS REACTION WILL BE RELATIVELY PEACEFUL (AS IN 1968) OR MORE PROFOUND (AS IN 1871), IS DEBATABLE. WHAT IS BEYOND DOUBT, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE RESULTING DESTRUCTION TO FRANCE'S POLITICAL,

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PAGE 02 PARIS 12751 02 OF 03 260944Z

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FABRIC WOULD GET BACK THE CAUSE OF FRENCH LIBERTY. IT MIGHT EVEN PROVIDE A RETURN TO A REACTIONARY AND REPRESSIVE REGIME. CONSEQUENTLY, THOSE WHO PROMOTE THE SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE ARE POINTING FRANCE TOWARD REVOLUTION, NOT EVOLUTION, WITH ALL THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS THAT THIS COULD IMPOSE ON FRANCE.

B. SECOND, GISCARD WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THE SOCIALISTS AS HIS ALLIES. THIS WOULD PUT THEM MORE IN THE CENTER OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM OF FRANCE, WHICH IS WHERE THEY SHOULD BE IF THEY ARE TO ACHIEVE A RESPONSIBLE PROGRAM OF REFORM WITHOUT AT THE SAME TIME PROVOKING DESTRUCTIVE POPULAR REACTIONS. FOR A MULTITUDE OF REASONS, MITTERRAND HAS REJECTED THE OPTION OF JOINING GISCARD IN THE CENTER. RATHER, HE PREFERS TO MAINTAIN HIS ALLIANCE WITH THE PCF. THIS IS A BAD DECISION FOR FRANCE BECAUSE IT ROBS GISCARD OF IMPORTANT SUPPORT FOR THE REASONABLE REFORMS HE SEEKS IN FRANCE. MOREOVER, IT IS BAD FOR THE POLITICAL FABRIC OF FRANCE BECAUSE IT HEIGHTENS POLITICAL POLARIZATION OF RIGHT AND LEFT, AT THE VERY TIME WHEN FRANCE NEEDS THE STABILITY OF A GOVERNMENT OF THE CENTER.

C. FINALLY, MITTERRAND PROVIDES NO CREDIBLE EXPLANATION OF HOW HE WILL MANAGE TO HOLD FRANCE TOGETHER WHEN HE TO LEAD A GOVERNMENT INCLUDING THE PCF. ON THE ONE HAND, SOME SAY THAT HE WOULD "CONTROL" THE PCF. BUT IF HE BELIEVES IN THE COMMON PROGRAM -- AND WE HAVE LITTLE REASON TO CONCLUDE THAT HE DOESN'T -- AND IF HE IS PREPARED TO LET THE PCF PARTICIPATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT PROGRAM, HE IS WRITING A PRESCRIPTION FOR A WAVE OF POLITICAL REACTION THAT IS LIKELY TO ENGULF HIS GOVERNMENT AND -- IN THE PROCESS -- TEAR FRANCE APART. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF HE INTENDS TO KICK THE COMMUNISTS ONCE HE HAS COME TO POWER THROUGH THEIR SUPPORT, WHERE WILL HE TURN TO FIND SUBSTITUTE SUPPORT? WILL THE COMMUNISTS BE WILLING TO STAND BY TRANQUILLY WHILE HE BETRAYS THEIR TRUST? THE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS ARE OBSCURE, ALTHOUGH THE STRUGGLE TO FIND THE ANSWERS IN REAL LIFE UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD UNDERCUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A MITTERRAND GOV AND PLACE IN JEOPARDY THE FRAGILE COHESION OF FRANCE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE.

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PAGE 03 PARIS 12051 22 OF 03 260944Z

5. CONCLUSIONS

THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PCP SHARING IN THE GOVERNING OF FRANCE POSES THREATS TO US NATIONAL INTERESTS OF A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT MAGNITUDE FROM THE SITUATION IN OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHERE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IS POSSIBLE. WE ARE PLAYING FOR THE VERY HIGHEST STAKES IN THE FRENCH CASE. CONSEQUENTLY, OUR POLICY MUST BE THE SHREWDEST AND THE LEAST AMBIGUOUS. OUR CONCERNS MUST BE MADE UNHISTAKABLY CLEAR TO EVERYONE. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, THAT IS THE ONLY WAY THAT THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM -- NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL -- CAN WORK. WE MUST NOT BE DETERRED BY THOSE WHO ACCUSE US OF INTERFERING IN "FRENCH DOMESTIC POLITICS." THE TRUTH REMAINS THAT, SECOND ONLY

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PAGE 01 PARIS 12051 03 OF 03 260947Z

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ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 2024.W

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P 260929Z APR 76
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY #297

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 12051

DISSENT CHANNEL

TO GERMANY'S POLITICAL FUTURE, THE FUTURE OF FRANCE WILL DETERMINE THE DIRECTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, WHICH IN TURN IS THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR OWN SECURITY. SOME OBSERVERS SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD BUILD MORE BRIDGES TO MITTERRAND NOW SINCE HE MAY BE FRANCE'S LEADER TOMORROW. I BELIEVE THIS REFLECTS UNDUE HASTY, AND RISKS UNDERCUTTING THE PRESIDENT'S AND THE SECRETARY'S POLICY. THE TIME TO CONSIDER AN "INSURANCE POLICY" RAPPROCHEMENT WITH MITTERRAND IS ONLY WHEN WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE. THAT IS NOT THE CASE TODAY. MOREOVER, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE NOT LIKELY TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE COURT THE LEADER OF FRANCE'S SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ARE DRAMATIZING THE DANGERS OF SUCH ALLIANCES. AS WE PLAY FOR THESE HIGHEST STAKES, THERE ARE SEVERAL NEW POLICIES THAT SHOULD GUIDE OUR BEHAVIOR AT THIS EMBASSY.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EMBASSY'S POLICY TOWARD SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE

FIRST, WE SHOULD NOT LET MITTERRAND BELIEVE THAT HE IS MORE ATTRACTIVE TO US BECAUSE OF HIS CONTENTIOUS PERFORMANCE. QUITE THE CONTRARY, WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO HIM THAT HIS FORM OF SOCIALISM FOR FRANCE -- I.E., A SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE -- MAKES HIM LESS ATTRACTIVE TO THE UNITED STATES. ABOVE ALL ELSE, WE SHOULD NOT COURT MITTERRAND AND THE PS. NOR, FOR THAT MATTER, SHOULD WE IGNORE THEM. THEY ARE IMPORTANT PLAYERS ON THE

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PAGE 02 PARIS 12051 03 OF 03 -260947Z

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FRENCH POLITICAL SCENE AND WE SHOULD KEEP LIMITED CON-
TACTS OPEN WITH THEM, BUT OUR CONTACTS SHOULD UNDERLINE
OUR HOSTILITY TO THE SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE, WHILE
NOT CLOSING THE DOOR ON A WARMER RELATIONSHIP WITH A
FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY THAT IS INDEPENDENT OF THE PCF.
TO DO THIS, I RECOMMEND THAT WE REDUCE THE LEVEL AND FRE-
QUENCY OF OUR CONTACTS WITH THE SOCIALISTS SO LONG AS
THEY REMAIN IN ALLIANCE WITH THE PCF. IN POINT OF FACT,
OUR TRACK RECORD SO FAR IN DEALING WITH MITTERRAND AND
HIS PS COLLEAGUES SHOWS THAT OUR LOBBYING WITH THEM HAS
FAILED TO CHANGE THEIR POINT OF VIEW. THEY ARE NOT OPEN
TO OUR REASONED ARGUMENTS AGAINST THEIR ALLIANCE WITH
THE COMMUNISTS. SPECIFICALLY, THIS IS NOT THE TIME TO
ENGAGE IN A DISCUSSION OF DEFENSE TOPICS WITH THE LEADER
OF THE SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE. INDEED, THERE MAY
NEVER BE A "RIGHT TIME" TO DISCUSS THESE SENSITIVE ISSUES
WITH MITTERRAND SO LONG AS HE REMAINS ALLIED WITH THE
PCF.



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SECOND, WE SHOULD DEVOTE MORE ATTENTION TO THE DEMOCRATIC
PARTIES OF THE CENTER AND RIGHT THAT -- FOR THE MOMENT --
PRESENT THE BEST HOPE FOR REFORMING FRANCE WITHOUT RISK
AND FOR DEFEATING THE SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST ALLIANCE AT THE
POLLS. I HAVE NO PARTICULAR FORMULA FOR HOW THE UNITED
STATES CAN AID THE CAUSE OF THE CENTER AND RIGHT BUT I AM
PERSUADED THAT THIS IS PRECISELY THE QUESTION THAT SHOULD
BE PREOCCUPYING OUR ATTENTION. ONE WAY TO BEGIN ANSWER-
ING THAT QUESTION IS TO INCREASE THE LEVEL AND FREQUENCY
OF OUR CONTACTS WITH THOSE PARTIES SO THAT WE BETTER
UNDERSTAND THEIR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, AND RECOMMEND
TO WASHINGTON WAYS TO BUTTRESS THE STRENGTHS AND REDUCE
THE WEAKNESSES AS STEPS IN OUR COMMON STRUGGLE AGAINST
COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE GOF.

THIRD, WE SHOULD ADDRESS MUCH MORE OF OUR EMBASSY
RESOURCES TOWARD ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT ON FRANCE,
WESTERN EUROPE AND ALLIANCE SECURITY OF A SOCIALIST/
COMMUNIST COALITION COMING TO POWER IN FRANCE.
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Memorandum of Conversation

*AF/C - Ms. Diggs
DC-8 II
A*

RELEASE IN PART B6

DATE: June 28, 1974

TIME: 4:30-5:30 P.M.

SUBJECT: President Bongo's Desire to Acquire a DC-8/63CF

PARTICIPANTS:

Gabonese:

- H. E. Vincent Mavoungou, Gabonese Ambassador
- Mr. Roland Bru, Economic and Financial Adviser to President Bongo
- Mr. Jacques Pigot, Privy Counselor of President Bongo
- Mr. Daniel Richon, Vice President of UTA

U.S.A.

Mr. John Foley, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

[Redacted]

Mr. Keith Huffman, Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs

Mr. Alec Toumayan, Language Services

COPIES TO: Ambassador John A. McKesson III, Libreville, Gabon

- [Redacted]
- AF/C - Ms. Diggs ✓
- AF - Mr. Foley
- AF/S - Mr. O'Neill, Jr.
- AF/P - Mr. Linehan, Jr.
- EB/OA/AVP - Mr. Ortman
- Export-Import Bank - Mr. John W. Lentz

After introductions Mr. Foley stated that the Department representatives were delighted to meet with Ambassador Mavoungou and President Bongo's special mission.

Ambassador Mavoungou handed Mr. Foley a lengthy note in French which appeared to set forth President Bongo's efforts to acquire a DC-8/63CF

L/AF:BKHuffman:mmp
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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2

and requested an urgent response to these efforts. Mr. Foley stated that the Department would have the note translated and study it carefully.

Mr. Richon, speaking in French, referred to the Gabonese Government's agreement with Seaboard International to acquire a DC-8/63CF. He described the agreements whereby UTA would maintain and operate the aircraft and Air Afrique would use it on its regular runs when President Bongo was not using it. Mr. Richon further described the close commercial relationship between UTA and Air Afrique under which aircraft from both companies are pooled and maintained and crews are trained.

Mr. Richon said that when UTA had heard that President Bongo was going to acquire a plane, it had been concerned that this might disturb the fragile UTA-Air Afrique routes and disturb the system. Accordingly UTA had urged him to be loyal ("fidel") to UTA. UTA also encouraged President Bongo to acquire a McDonnell-Douglas aircraft which could be fitted into Air Afrique's McDonnell-Douglas fleet and maintenance operations. Mr. Pigot remarked that President Bongo also preferred DC-8's from his own flying experience, preferring to charter DC-8's whenever possible. Mr. Richon said that President Bongo had become convinced of the necessity for acquiring his own aircraft after UTA prepared a tally of Bongo's extraordinary expenditures for leasing aircraft in the past year.

Mr. Foley said he understood President Bongo might already possess one DC-8. All three members of the special mission feigned ignorance about any other DC-8 Bongo might have acquired. Mr. Foley again asked if there was not a DC-8 already in Gabon, in which President Bongo had some personal interest. After a moment of silence Mr. Pigot said "that is a private deal." (C'est une affaire privee.) Ms. Palmer asked if the plane was not with Affretair but received only silence as a reply. In response to a question from Mr. Foley, Mr. Richon stated that to his knowledge, UTA did not maintain the present Affretair DC-8. Mr. Richon also said that UTA had invested several hundred thousand dollars in a passenger pack for the DC-8/63CF. UTA's expenditure plus President Bongo's unhappiness towards UTA about the continued unavailability of the aircraft, which it had recommended, made the company extremely anxious to have the sale consummated. Accordingly, he wondered when the aircraft would be available.

Mr. Foley stated that actions by the sprawling U.S. bureaucracy on applications for export licenses took a long time. While he could not state when a decision would be made, he could say that he hoped it would occur very soon.

Mr. Pigot contrasted the speed with which the export license for the C-130 for the Gabonese military had been approved. He also noted that in the present case President Bongo had "cleared" the purchase with OAU.

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3

Mr. Bru then pressed Mr. Foley for more precise information on the impediments to the sale and a decision date noting that Bongo regarded the DC-8 as his own personal aircraft. Bru asked whether he could advise President Bongo that the DC-8 was now available or whether he should tell Bongo to acquire his aircraft elsewhere. Mr. Foley reiterated his statement regarding the normal delays experienced with the sale of large aircraft.

At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Foley stated that the United States Government prized its fruitful relations with President Bongo, and he requested that Mr. Bru convey the Department's warmest regards to the President and our hopes that a decision would be reached on the DC-8 matter very soon.

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ZUI RUEHCS 1564W & 1636W RUFHJA0011S

ATTN CCO
R/W TRANS 2055/1 AND 2055/2 (2 IS UNDER 0014S)
DE RUFHNA 2055/1
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280945Z NOV 72
FM USMISSION BERLIN
TO RUFHOL/AMENPASSY BONN 902
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1263
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BERLIN 2055

DISSENT CHANNEL (PER STATE A-3559)
THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DESSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY
[REDACTED] USSR. DESIRED DISTRIBUTION IN DEPT.:
EUR/CE: ED/OA.

SUB: AIR AGREEMENTS WITH GDR

REF: A) BERLIN 2042 B) BERLIN 2000 C) STATE 182952 PARA 4
D) BERLIN 354 PARA 6

1. SUMMARY: INCONTEXT FORTHCOMING FRG-GDR AVIATION
BILATERAL, CONSIDERATION OF FOLLOWING PROPOSITIONS,
WHICH WOULD SUPPLEMENT MORE THAN DISSENT FROM PREVIOUS
MESSAGES, IS RECOMMENDED: ALLIES SHOULD NOT GRANT
RIGHTS FOR LUFTHANSA PASSENGERS BETWEEN FRG AND BERLIN,
EVEN IN PRINCIPLE FOR LATER PERIOD; IF FRG RAISES
SUBJECT OF SUCH RIGHTS, ALLIES SHOULD ASK WHETHER FRG
IS REALLY INTERESTED IN VIABLE ALLIED INVER GERMAN
SERVICE(IGS) FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE AND POINT OUT PROBABLE
NEED TO RAISE IGS FARES AGAIN NEXT YEAR EVEN WITHOUT LUFTHANSA
PARTICIPATION; AND ALLIES SHOULD OBTAIN RIGHTS TO
OVERFLY GDR AT SAME TIME FRG OBTAINS SUCH RIGHTS, PREFER-
ABLY THROUGH GDR JOINING ICAO AND INTERNATIONAL AIR
SERVICES TRANSIT AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

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2. FRG IS APPARENTLY INTENT ON REACHING AGREEMENT WITH GDR IN NEAR FUTURE WHICH WOULD PERMIT LUFTHANSA STOPS IN BERLIN ON ROUTE TO MOSCOW AND EVENTUAL CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS BY LUFTHANSA BETWEEN FRG AND BERLIN. WITH OBJECTIVE OF FURTHERING U.S. INTERESTS IN CONTEXT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, CONSIDERATION OF FOLLOWING IS RECOMMENDED:

1) ALLIES SHOULD NOT GRANT RIGHTS FOR LUFTHANSA PASSENGERS BETWEEN FRG AND BERLIN NOR INDICATE POSSIBILITY OF GRANTING SUCH RIGHTS LATER. TO DO SO WOULD SERIOUSLY THREATEN VIABILITY OF ALLIED IGS BECAUSE, ONCE ALLIES ACCEPT PRINCIPLE OF LUFTHANSA PARTICIPATION IN IGS, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO LIMIT THAT PARTICIPATION. SINCE FRG REPORTEDLY CONTENT IF LUFTHANSA WERE TO CARRY NO PASSENGERS BETWEEN FRG AND BERLIN AT LEAST FOR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF YEAR OR TWO, FRG HAS NO LOGICAL NEED TO ASK ALLIES EVEN TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION NOW.

1) IF FRG NEVERTHELESS SEEKS ALLIED CONSIDERATION NOW OF POSSIBILITY OF GRANTING LUFTHANSA FRG-BERLIN PASSENGER RIGHTS LATER, ALLIES SHOULD ASK WHETHER FRG IS REALLY INTERESTED IN VIABLE ALLIED IGS FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE. IF THIS IS BEGINNING OF END OF SUCH SERVICE, PANAM AND BEA CAN CUT LOSSES BY ORDERLY PLANNED PHASEOUT, IF NOT, THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN FIRM LONG-RANGE UNEQUIVOCAL ASSURANCES. IN THIS CONNECTION ALLIES SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT TO FRG PROBABLE NEED TO RAISE IGS FARES TO GAIN NEXT YEAR TO BRING THEM CLOSER TO LUFTHANSA PER SEAT-MILE FARES WITHIN FRG, EVEN WITHOUT LUFTHANSA IGS PARTICIPATION. LOW BERLIN FARES WERE ESTABLISHED AS SOCIAL MEASURE IN VIEW OF SURFACE TRAVEL DIFFICULTIES. NOW THAT SURFACE TRAVEL EASIER, MUCH TRAFFIC HAS ALREADY SHIFTED FROM AIR TO SURFACE AND ORIGINAL JUSTIFICATION FOR RELATIVELY LOW BERLIN AIR FARES IS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. ANOTHER FARE INCREASE WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY EVEN IF LUFTHANSA TAKES OUT OF IGS, BECAUSE HIGHER THAN NORMAL LOAD FACTORS ARE NEEDED TO BREAK EVEN AT NEW DECEMBER 1 FARES, MUCH OF BEA INEFFICIENCY IS STRUCTURAL AND NOT EASILY REMEDIED (E.G. TYPE OF AIRCRAFT), AND MOVE TO BERLIN WILL BE EXPENSIVE.

C) ALLIES SHOULD OBTAIN OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS FROM GDR AT SAME TIME FRG DOES. UNTIL ALLIES HAVE SUCH RIGHTS, WE CAN NOT DO MUCH ABOUT PRESENT DIFFICULTIES, SUCH AS 10,000 FOOT CEILING AND LACK OF BULGARIAN LANDING RIGHTS FOR MAT CHARTER FLIGHTS, AND GDR MIGHT DEVISE WAYS TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR OTHER FLIGHTS USING CORRIDORS WHICH THEY COULD PLAUSIBLY ARGUE WERE UNRELATED TO SUPPORT OF ALLIED GARRISONS IN WEST BERLIN. WHILE WE WOULD MAINTAIN THAT CORRIDOR RIGHTS ARE NOT DEPENDENT UPON GDR GRANT OF OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS, THEY COULD INTERPRET THEIR ACTIONS AS REGULARIZING CORRIDORS FOR ALL ALLIED CIVIL FLIGHTS AND THUS HAVE EXCUSE TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE GENERALLY. ALLIED OVERFLIGHTS FROM BERLIN TO EAST ARE, OF COURSE, DEPENDENT UPON GDR GRANT OF RIGHTS. THREE POSSIBILITIES FOR ALLIES TO OBTAIN RIGHTS TO OVERFLY GDR ARE DESCRIBED BELOW IN ORDER WHICH THEY MIGHT LOGICALLY BE TRIED CHRONOLOGICALLY:

(1) GDR MIGHT JOIN ICAO AND RELATED INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES TRANSIT AGREEMENT (IASTA), WHICH PROVIDES FOR OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS FOR SERVICES ON MULTILATERAL BASIS. BY GDR JOINING, ALLIES AS WELL AS FRG WOULD OBTAIN DESIRED OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS WITHOUT HAVING TO NEGOTIATE BILATERALS WITH GDR (ALTHOUGH LESS FORMAL SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE NECESSARY FOR SUCH ITEMS AS ROUTE DESIGNATIONS). GDR MAY BE RELUCTANT TO JOIN IASTA, SINCE THEY WOULD THEREBY LOSE BARGAINING LEVERAGE THEY NOW USE, E.G. TO PERSUADE SAS AND AUA TO FLY TO SCHOENEFELD RATHER THAN TO WEST BERLIN. HOWEVER, BY JOINING THEY WOULD RECEIVE SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS TO OVERFLY OTHER COUNTRIES AND THEY MIGHT FIND IT ATTRACTIVE TO BE TREATED LIKE MANY OTHER COUNTRIES ON QUESTION OF OVERFLIGHTS (RESULTANT GDR RIGHT TO OVERFLY US WOULD PROBABLY COST US LITTLE IF ANYTHING SINCE FLYING OVER US WOULD NOT SEEM TO FIT INTO FORESEEABLE INTERFLUG ROUTE NET). BERLIN SENATOR GRABERT BELIEVES GDR WILL JOIN IASTA (REF.C). ALLIES MIGHT LOGICALLY REFER TO GRABERT STATEMENT AND ASK FRG TO URGE GDR TO JOIN IASTA, EITHER INSTEAD OF OR SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH FRG-GDR BILATERAL. WE MIGHT ALSO REFER TO FRG UNDERTAKING IN ARTICLE 3 OF CHAPTER 12 OF SETTLEMENT CONVENTION "TO PURSUE, IN ITS BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS, A LIBERAL AND NONDISCRIMINATORY POLICY."

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RELEASE IN PART
B6



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 068

PAGE 01 NEW DE: 19255 151529Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO: OCT-01 SSO-00 :CCO-00 /026 W

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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4751

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~~SECRET~~ NEW DELHI 19255

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT ////////////////

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SOME ADJUSTMENT OF US POLICY IN THE SOUTH ASIAN CRISIS

REF: STATE 201473 AND II FAM SECTION 243

THE FOLLOWING IS A REPORT DRAFTED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR [] WHICH I HAVE DECLINED TO APPROVE BECAUSE OF BELIEF IT DOES NOT ACCORD IN SOME RESPECTS WITH OFFICIAL U.S. POLICY ALREADY ESTABLISHED DESPITE PRIOR PRESENTATION BY ME OF SOME OF HEREIN ENUMERATED POINTS, AND BECAUSE OF OTHER RESERVATIONS INCLUDING ITS TIMELINESS. NONETHELESS, I BELIEVE []'S VIEWS ARE OF SUFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE TO REQUIRE, AS REQUESTED BY HIM, SUBMISSION TO THE DEPARTMENT UNDER PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN THE REFERENCE COMMUNICATIONS.

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QUOTE 1. CURRENT STUDIED AMBIGUITY CONCERNING POSSIBLE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN TREATENS REMAINING AMERICAN POSITION AND PROSPECTS IN INDIA AND BANGLA DESH, AND IS VIEWED ASKANCE BY FRENLY THIRD COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES HERE INCLUDING ESPECIALLY BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. UNFORTUNATELY THIS AMBIGUITY IS WITHOUT PERCEPTIBLE CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE UPON PRIORITY US INTEREST IN EARLY END OF INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT AND THREATENS TO REDUCE US ROLE TO CONTENTIOUS IRRELEVANCY AS REGARDS EMERGING REALITIES IN SOUTH ASIA.

2. AT THIS JUNCTURE, ENDING THE WAR ENTAILS (A) CAPITULATION OF PAKISTANI FORCES IN EAST, (B) GOP RECONCILIATION TO LOSS OF EAST

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PAGE 02 NEW DE. 19255 151529Z

PAKISTAN AND (C) GOI INHIBITION AGAINST EXPLOITING MILITARY ADVANTAGE AGAINST WEST PAKISTAN.

3° IN EAST, THERE IS NO FEASIBLE PROSPECT OF REVERSING OUTCOME, ALTHOUGH DURATION AND COSTS COULD VARY WITH PAKISTANI WILL TO RESIST THIS REGARD, GOP HOPES OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION TEND TO BUTTRESS PAKISTANI DETERMINATION AND THUS TO EXTEND HOSTILITIES. (GENERAL MANEKSHAW MAINTAINS US POSTURE WORKS AGAINST SURRENDER SOONEST IN EAST -- NEW DELHI DAO 2218).

4° IN WEST, US MAY BE ABLE (A) TO BEST SERVE GOP NEEDS AND US INTERESTS BY SHARING CANDID US ASSESSMENT OF DESPERATE MILITARY OUTLOOK, AND BY PRIVATELY ACKNOWLEDGING US INABILITY TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN IN HOPELESS WAR OF REVISION OR REVENGE; AND (B) TO STRENGTHEN GOI MODERATES BY EARLY US ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF BANGLA DESH REALITIES, AND BY FIRM US POSITION AGAINST TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS. THIS REGARD, ANY MARGINAL IMPACT ON INDIAN HAWKS OF CONTINUING POSTURE OF CALCULATED UNCERTAINTY OF US RESPONSE IS OUTWEIGHED BY (A) COSTS TO US INTERESTS IN INDIA AND BANGLA DESH, (B) RISK OF PROLONGING AND EXTENDING WAR THROUGH FEEDING GOP EXPECTATION OF US INTERVENTION, AND (K) POSSIBLE PROVOCATION AND COVER FOR SOVIET MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN REGION.

5° INDIANS FROM PRIME MINISTER DOWN AND INCLUDING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS PREVIOUSLY FIRM FRIENDS OF USA INCREASINGLY EXPRESS DESPAIR, RESENTMENT AND ANGER THAT USG COULD SUGGEST INDIA AGGRESSOR AND WOULD HOLD OPEN POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING PAKISTAN DIRECT/INDIRECT AND OVERT/COVERT MILITARY AS WELL AS DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AT THIS JUNCTURE. ENEMIES OF AMERICA ARE, OF COURSE, EBULLIENT IN ANTICIPATION OF WHAT ALL INDIA RADIO CHARACTERIZED DECEMBER 12 AS QTE ALIENATION OF INDIA FROM AMERICA FOR DECADES TO COME UNQTE.

6° DOUBTLESS IT WILL TAKE TIME TO REPAIR INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, BUT FIRST WE NEED TO ARREST DETERIORATION IF WE ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN WORKING AGAINST WAR. THIS REGARD, WE URGE:

(A) FULL SUPPORT IN UNITED NATIONS FOR CEASE-FIRE BASED ON EMERGING REALITY OF BANGLA DESH, E.G., UK DRAFT (USUN 5009);

(B) IMMEDIATE STATEMENT REAFFIRMING USG QTE ABSOLUTE NEUTRALITY UNQTE, DEFINED TO PRECLUDE SUPPORT IN ANY FORM EXCEPT HUMANITARIAN AS LONG AS HOSTILITIES CONTINUE, AND SPIKING NUMEROUS ALLEGATIONS TO CONTRARY (INCLUDING OF US CONNIVANCE WITH JORDAN/

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 NEW DE 19255 151529Z

SAUDI ARABIA IN F-104 DEAL; AND
(C) PROMPT ESTABLISHMENT OF PRAGMATIC USG RELATIONS
WITH BANGLA DESH AUTHORITIES (1) FOR PRACTICAL LIAISON (2) TO
SIGNAL US INTENTIONS TO GOI AND GOP, AND (3) TO PREPARE FOR
MORE FORMAL TIES.

7. IN SUM, POLICY ADJUSTMENTS CAN STILL HELP US TO CUT LOSSES
AND ACCOMMODATE TO REALITIES OF INDIAN REGIONAL PREDOMINANCE
AND BANGLA DESH INDEPENDENCE. UNQUOTE GP-4. KEATING

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FORM DS 322(OCR)

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B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/P-RAY SMITH
X28790 2/25/75
S/P- SLEWIS X20358

S/P - THORNTON

ROUTINE NEW DELHI

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EAID, IN
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE: ARMS SALES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

S/P-SLEWIS
R SMITH
T THORNTON

FOR

[REDACTED]

B6

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE REFERENCED DISSENT CHANNEL TELEGRAM OF FEBRUARY 19, 1975.
2. MR. THOMAS THORNTON OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF (S/P) HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO MR. HAGER'S DISSENT MESSAGE.
3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, [REDACTED]'S TELEGRAM HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. COPIES HAVE ALSO BEEN SENT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF AID, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, AND THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS.
4. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THERE IS NO REPEAT NO LONGER ANY POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING DECISION ON LIFTING OF SOUTH ASIAN ARMS SALES EMBARGO, SO THAT THIS ELEMENT OF YOUR PROPOSAL HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. WE SHALL, HOWEVER, PURSUE BROADER QUESTION YOU RAISE REGARDING PRINCIPLE OF SELLING ARMS TO LDC'S AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO YOUR CONCERNS. YY



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART B6

MEMORANDUM

SEP 16 1975

TO :

FROM : S/P - Winston Lord *W Lord*

SUBJECT: Your Dissent from the Department's Policy on Rhodesian Sanctions

As a result of the dissent you expressed in your memorandum of July 3, 1975, a mechanism has been established for coordinating the handling in the Department of matters pertaining to violations of Rhodesian sanctions. Instructions have been issued to all offices in the Department and to all posts that AF/S is the action office on sanctions and that any information concerning possible violations should be reported to that office. AF/S will be responsible for coordinating with other offices and agencies concerned and seeing to it that ensuing recommendations are forwarded to the appropriate level in the Department.

In the second portion of your memorandum you urged that all posts be required to report any knowledge of sanctions violations by third countries. You questioned advice given by L that there is no legal requirement to report to the UN information about third country violations. L has gone into this again and, after having checked all UN resolutions pertaining to Rhodesia since 1965, has reported as it did before: there is no such legal requirement.

The legal question aside, you have stated that it should be a matter of policy that the US Government report to the UN Sanctions Committee any knowledge we have regarding third countries which violate Rhodesian sanctions. I think you passed over too lightly the possible damage which could occur to our relations with a given country if we reported to the UN that it had violated sanctions and we revealed the source of our information. Looking at the totality of US interests in that country, the price of reporting that it had violated the sanctions could indeed be higher than we would want to pay.

-2-

There are, however, two means by which we can handle third country violations of the sanctions. First, if we become aware of a violation, we can, depending on the circumstances, notify the government of the country in which the violation takes place. Or, second, we can notify the British Government, which, if it is convinced of the validity of our information, can inform the UN Sanctions Committee or the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee without revealing the source of the information. This the Department has done and will continue to do when warranted.

I want to thank you again for using the Dissent Channel. By doing so, you have caused a deficiency in the Department's procedures for dealing with sanctions violations to be remedied.

P.S. This was an excellent use of the dissent channel, with concrete results achieved. I want to thank you again for your interest.

I have one quarrel with your memorandum - your allegation / assumption that "the very words 'moral and humanitarian' are taboo in our foreign policy decision-making process today." I respectfully disagree.

Drafted: S/P:DKPetterson:bdm *DKP*

Clearance: AF/S:RHaverkamp (in draft)

RELEASE IN PART
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~~RTD~~
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APPROVED BY S/P = WLORD
S/P = PLYDON
S/P = CHKONTOS

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TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:PFOR, UN

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE ON COORDINATING US FOREIGN POLICY

REF: BUENOS AIRES 7383

FOR [REDACTED] FROM DIRECTOR S/P

B6

1. THIS CABLE ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE BUENOS AIRES 7383 ON COORDINATING US FOREIGN POLICY. MR. C. WILLIAM KONTOS OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR CABLE HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM PANEL AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF ARA AND IO. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. KISSINGER

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN
PART B6

September 9, 1981

DISSENT CHANNEL

Dear :

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We apologize for our delay in replying to your dissent message. Your views were given careful consideration during the recent period of preparation for the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Manila and the Kampuchea Conference in New York.

Your differences with our Kampuchea strategy appear to stem from one basic premise--that Vietnam has occupied Kampuchea in self-defense. Your message suggests that Vietnam has committed 200,000 soldiers to Kampuchea primarily to protect itself against a "two-front" threat from China and that the basic problem for U.S. policy is to convince Hanoi that occupation of Kampuchea is not necessary to defend its own integrity vis-a-vis China.

We believe that a review of the events of the past few years demonstrates that Hanoi invaded its neighbor not to protect itself, but to expand its sphere of influence. That assessment of Hanoi's motives is shared by the great majority of the world community, as demonstrated by the results of the recent international conference on Kampuchea. A striking feature of that conference was the series of Third World speakers who condemned Vietnam's "colonialist" actions. Those speakers represented non-aligned countries which could not in any way be considered beholden to China or the U.S.

The Vietnamese Communist Party sought for years to control its Kampuchean counterpart, but was frustrated by the independent-minded KCP leadership. In the early 1970s, for example, Vietnam unsuccessfully attempted to exert control over the Khmer Rouge guerrilla movement through the "Khmer Viet Minh" who had been sheltered in Hanoi since 1954. Many of these same "Khmer Viet Minh," carefully trained by Hanoi

-2-

for fifteen years, became key figures in the leadership of the present Phnom Penh regime. Vietnamese leaders have even admitted to Western journalists that they considered an overthrow of the Khmer Rouge leadership in 1972--long before Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea had caused any problems along the two countries' common border. After the Khmer Rouge assumed power in 1975, Hanoi's machinations continued. In mid-1977, several months before the most serious DK attacks on Vietnamese border areas, Hanoi's representatives had already begun to approach overseas Khmer figures to recruit leaders for a new SRV-controlled Phnom Penh regime.

To view the DK's attacks against Vietnamese border towns as a serious threat against Vietnam's territorial integrity would seem to take Hanoi's protestations too much at face value. The Vietnamese army, one of the best in East Asia and supported by a population of 60 million, never faced any credible threat from Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea, with one-tenth the population and wracked by factionalism and self-inflicted social chaos. It seems more plausible to conclude that the weakness and unpopularity of the DK regime provided a convenient opportunity for the Hanoi leadership to fulfill its long-standing objective of a Vietnam-controlled Indochina federation.

Your message also places much emphasis on China's alleged hegemonistic interests in the region. From the perspective of Rangoon, we can understand this suspiciousness of Beijing. China has been slower in cutting its ties with the BCP than it has with other Southeast Asian communist parties. Legitimate questions may exist concerning China's long-term intentions. Current trends in China's relations with SEA, however, indicate a turning away from the extremes of the Cultural Revolution, toward a policy aimed at stable cooperative relationships with the governments of the region. This is true even in the case of Burma. We believe that this is a trend that should be encouraged and supported.

We appreciate that our own views of China's intentions may be more sanguine than those of Southeast Asians who remember dark episodes of the past. But American policy cannot be based only on the fears. Much of our policy is based on our security commitment to Thailand, which is directly threatened by Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea. The other ASEANs have supported Thailand, not because of U.S. activism

(as you suggest), but because they identify their own security with that of Thailand.

Neither ASEAN nor American policy on Kampuchea takes its cues from China. The ASEANs made it clear at the conference in New York that they are the leaders in this endeavor. At the conference, China strongly objected to some ASEAN ideas, but the final conference documents contained all of ASEAN's key substantive concepts. The ASEANs succeeded in moving Beijing forward a great deal in accepting their consensus view of a political solution.

While the ASEANs wish to prove that they are not tools of the Chinese, they also recognize that China, acting for its own reasons, is one of their most valuable partners in their confrontation with Vietnam. Chinese military pressure against Vietnam and assistance to the DK are major components of the pressure on Hanoi. The ASEANs understand that a comprehensive settlement of the Kampuchea problem must also be acceptable to Beijing.

China's long term goal is a Vietnam which is at least neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict. But Beijing has clearly implied in diplomatic notes to Hanoi that a resolution of the Kampuchea problem would make possible the settlement of major bilateral issues. Relations between the two countries were poor before the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, but the tangible "China threat"--the presence of 250,000 PLA along the Vietnamese border and Beijing's curriculum of "lessons" for Hanoi-- was put in place after the invasion. Resolution of the Kampuchea problem should remove the one major factor behind that military pressure, and eventually make possible movement toward a restoration of Sino-Vietnamese relations close to the pre-1978 modus vivendi.

In your message you suggest that we have underestimated Vietnam's resilience. We have no illusions that Vietnam will be brought to a settlement quickly. But the waiting process will be much harder on Vietnam than on her adversaries. Vietnam now faces opponents who are its neighbors and will not tire of the confrontation. The DK resistance effort, which you mention, is only one of the many pressures on Vietnam. No individual pressure will persuade Vietnam that a resolution of this problem is in its own self-interest. It is the composite of economic, military and diplomatic pressure which makes an impact.

The reduction of Soviet influence and elimination of Soviet military access in Indochina is a long term objective, which probably can only be achieved in the context of resolution of the Kampuchea problem. Any effort now to entice the Vietnamese away from the Soviets by offering immediate assistance or lifting of economic sanctions would only lead Hanoi to conclude that its adversaries had lost their resolve. The coalition of countries supporting ASEAN has made clear to Hanoi that its dependence on the Soviet Union can end with a Kampuchea settlement, which would remove the main reason for Hanoi's isolation and of the present suspension of hundreds of millions of dollars in multilateral and bilateral aid.

Sincerely,

Paul D. Wolfowitz
Director
Policy Planning Staff



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN
PART B6

September 23, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO : IO/LAB -

FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake *PA for*

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Message

B6

This will acknowledge receipt of your dissent channel memorandum on the U.S. membership in the ILO. Cameron Hume of the Policy Planning Staff will be coordinating a substantive reply to your paper, copies of which have been distributed to the Offices of the Secretary, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Executive Secretary, and the Chairman of the Open Forum, in addition to the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs and the Special Assistant to the Secretary for International Labor Affairs. Your use of the dissent channel is commended. We will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

December 9, 1974

SECRET

TO : M/FSI/SSFP -

FROM : S/P - Samuel W. Lewis, Acting *SWL*

SUBJECT : Your Dissent Memorandum, "Critique of The Substantive Handling of The Cyprus Crisis" dated August 9, 1974.

B6

In accordance with the procedures set forth in the Department Notice of May 8, 1974, concerning dissent messages, this will constitute the response to your Dissent Memorandum on Cyprus dated August 9, 1974. Although the Secretary has had the opportunity to consider your Memorandum, the Policy Planning Staff takes responsibility for this reply, in which the Bureau of European Affairs also concurs. I apologize for the length of time which has elapsed.

This is essentially an argument about US prescience and US power. You assert, in substance, that:

1. The status quo ante crisis was infinitely better than the present situation, and we should therefore have made greater efforts to preserve it. This argument brackets the time sequence of the actual crisis.
2. Before the coup, it was known that Ioannides intended to overthrow Makarios and that the consequences would be severe;
 - strong US representations to Ioannides would have prevented the crisis;
 - nevertheless, foreknowledge was not translated into policy, primarily because intelligence from Athens was at best conflicting and because the USG was not in touch with the decision-making element in the GOG.

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3. After the coup, it was known that a Turkish military intervention could only have been prevented by removal of Sampson and the Greek coup leaders on Cyprus;

-- strong US representations to the Greeks to remove them would have prevented the intervention;

-- nevertheless, foreknowledge was, again, not translated into policy.

4. After the Turkish intervention, it is a fact that the present situation, which is tending to evolve toward partition of the island, is fraught with peril: permanent Greek-Turkish confrontation, with permanent destabilization of NATO's southeastern flank and permanent opportunities for the USSR in the area;

-- strong US pressure on Turkey in favor of a tradeoff of Turkish military withdrawal for federation on Cyprus can substantially correct this situation, even if the status quo ante cannot be restored;

-- nevertheless, it does not appear that these perceptions are being translated into policy.

Nobody would claim perfection for our policy concerning Cyprus, but a different view of what we could have foreseen and what we could have done is, I think, legitimate.

1. In general, it would have been very hard for the USG, as a government, to foresee the present situation ~~in all its complexities before the crisis~~ and to make greater efforts to preserve the status quo on Cyprus in consequence, even if our channels of communication had been perfect.

Most people concerned with the area worried about the status quo in the whole area, whose importance transcended that of Cyprus. The status quo on Cyprus (however good it looks in retrospect) was based on second-class status for the island's Turkish population and had been repeatedly called into question since independence -- not least by Makarios himself.

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It was clear that the two status quos were somehow related, but it was not clear how they were related. For this reason, it could not be clear that resolute US action to preserve the status quo on Cyprus was the sine qua non of regional stability, even had it been true, and even had the success of US action been assured. The hesitancy which marked our Cyprus policy before the coup may therefore have been inevitable, or at least, natural.

2. In that general framework, our specific policy before the coup was almost bound to be hesitant too. Intelligence reports from Athens were at best conflicting, as you put it. Beyond that, as you also note, stronger US representations might not have been heard in Athens. But even if they had been made and heard, the long-term consequences for US policy in the area were problematic. Ioannides might in fact have backed down and then been ejected in favor of a civilian government. But we might also have been left in the center of a dispute between an enraged Turkish government and an irritated and more entrenched Greek junta coming off a successful coup on Cyprus, with very important US/NATO facilities in both Greece and Turkey in jeopardy. With the best of information, we would have confronted a range of difficult choices.

3. This was also true after the coup, which clearly made Turkish intervention likely and some kind of US action necessary. There was no real doubt that after over a decade of acquiescence the Turks were determined this time to set right what they considered a fundamentally wrong and necessarily unstable situation on Cyprus, and that they would not be denied again. It seemed very likely that Turkish intervention would provoke the Greek-Turkish war everyone wished to avoid. But the question of how best to avoid it was, once again, complex.

Your advice, judging from your Memorandum, would have been to remove the basis for Turkish intervention (and therefore of Greek-Turkish war) by pressure on the Greeks to remove Sampson and the Greek officers responsible for the coup. Had such pressure been applied, and been successful, the Turks might have backed down; in the upshot, the humiliated Greek junta might have been replaced. Unhappily, this was not the only possible

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or even only likely prospect. As you note, success could not have been assured even with better intelligence. And, another result might have been Sampson in the Greek-Cypriot saddle, an infuriated Greek junta at war with Turkey which had landed on Cyprus, the US in the middle, and the whole infra-structure of the Western security position in the Eastern Mediterranean at risk. Or, alternatively, since Sampson appeared from the outset a very dubious horse with little staying power, especially after Makarios' escape became known, it was arguable whether any push was needed. At least, I think, it is hard to argue that the range of ambiguous choices shrank with the coup.

In this situation, we chose to struggle for breathing space. We sought to encourage the UK to bring the other two Guarantor Powers into negotiation, to discourage the Turks and reprove the Greeks without condemning either publicly in ways which could only harden both their positions, and to warn them both off war. This policy was not totally successful, in large part because the Turks apparently made a definite decision to intervene and placed their demands in London at a high enough level to ensure rejection. But war was avoided, negotiations began, and, in the upshot, civilian government was restored in Greece. We were not entirely responsible for either the successes or the failures, whatever the Greeks may now insist. But this outcome, with all its faults, avoided the worst, preserved some US capacity to mediate between two valuable Allies, and thereby at least opened onto a future consonant with broad US policy interests.

4. ~~Since the Turkish intervention, I see us as~~ engaged in essentially the course you recommend: encouraging the parties toward a solution acceptable to them, in the awareness that Turkey, with its strengthened position, will need to make the most concessions, and that some form of tradeoff between military withdrawal and federation will probably underlie any agreement.

Thus there appears to be no basic disagreement on current policy. There is none concerning the perils of the present situation for US and Western interests in the critical area. At the same time,

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I recognize we may have different views on timing and what the US can and should do. It is apparent that the road ahead will be long and involved, and the outcome uncertain. But that is the real problem: we cannot assure a given outcome by maximizing pressure on Turkey, or on anyone. Both the Greeks and the Turks are aware that we do not necessarily espouse all their objectives as a matter of policy. All we favor as a matter of policy is a solution that they, the communities on Cyprus, and the international community can live with. Only time and much more effort will tell whether one can be achieved. Still, while there are few grounds for optimism, there are as yet no grounds for despair.

as per two
Concur: EUR - Mr. Stabler

cc: The Secretary
The Executive Secretary
S/P - Mr. Lord
EUR - Mr. Hartman
S/P-OFP - Mr. Smith

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Drafted by: S/P:TWSimons, Jr.:anc
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DRAFTER: JWestmoreland, CU/AF Ext: 23281

CLEARANCES: CU/AF:WBedmondson; AF/S:O'Neill; USIA/IAA:JMcGintley, SCI/SA:Reaubien
AF:DEasum; CU:JRichardson; S/P:HSpino-Svegelasane

ACTION POST-S: PRETORIA PRIORITY S/P-DFP RFSwith
Dissent Channel

INFO. POST-S: _____

E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: OEXC, SF

(Mandatory) SUBJ: Dissent Message

REF: Pretoria 2857, 2911; State 146614

TEXT: (double-spaced)

1. After reviewing the messages sent by the CAO and the Ambassador and associated documents, the Department believes that the decision not to issue a public statement, in response to the SAG's refusal of passports to three non-white IV grantees, was appropriate under the circumstances.
2. The CU program in South Africa has undergone significant expansion during the past two fiscal years, growing from a modest program in FY-72 to one of the largest in Africa in FY-74 and one that appropriately concentrates approximately 2/3 of its resources on the Black, Colored and Asian communities. Such an expansion and the important emphasis on non-white grantees certainly has not gone unnoticed by the SAG. Given the occasional displeasure and perhaps apprehension such emphasis must generate, the lack of interference on the part of the SAG has been rather remarkable.
3. Especially when viewed against this background, we think the Post's two main points are well taken; namely, that a public expression of USG regret at this point in time could endanger a high-level channel of communication, particularly after Interior Minister Mulder took the initiative

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personally to "assure" the Ambassador that the SAG was not attempting to undermine the program. Secondly, we agree that there is a genuine risk of provoking SAG retaliation in preventing future non-white grantees from participating in the program.

4. The refusal of the passports could, of course, constitute SAG interference despite their denials that this was not intended. SAG actions in this area will bear close watching to see if they develop into a pattern of attempting to frustrate the objectives of the program. If such a pattern does emerge, a thorough assessment in the overall context of our relations with South Africa would be in order.

5. The policy question implicit in the CAO's message is whether the USG should not be playing a stronger "adversary" role when confronted with the SAG's restrictive policies. This question is under continuous review and discussion in the Department. But, in this particular case, we feel that vigorously pushing ahead with the operation of a program which is a tangible expression of our desire to maintain communications with all South Africans is likely to be more productive than a provocative, critical statement at this time.

6. Regarding question of NIH Fellowships, the Department appreciates views expressed in both Pretoria 2857 and 2911. Since NIH program is in fact a competition, Department agrees that access to competition and opportunity for final selection should be open to all qualified persons without regard to race. Best means of accomplishing genuinely nondiscriminatory selection and making this clearly but inoffensively evident to all is matter for careful consideration in light of NIH program objectives, individual country circumstances, and U.S. foreign policy. Department will explore matter further with NIH and keep Embassy and CAO advised.

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Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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APPROVED BY S/P: KAPLAN

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DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [REDACTED] CAP. CONT.

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E.O. 12356 12356: DECLAS: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, IS, EG, JO, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: THE U.S. AND THE PALESTINIANS: NEED FOR AN OPEN
DIALOGUE

[REDACTED] FROM S/P - PHIL KAPLAN, ACTING

B6

REF: TEL AVIV 18662

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON "THE U.S. AND THE PALESTINIANS: NEED FOR AN OPEN DIALOGUE". COPIES OF YOUR CABLE HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE, AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. WHEN COMMENTS FROM THESE OFFICES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED, A MEMBER OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF WILL COORDINATE A REPLY. SHULTZ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN
PART B6

August 5, 1977

Dear

B6

This letter is in response to your dissent channel message of April 11 and your follow-up analysis of May 10 regarding the decision to abolish the Sector Analysis Division in AID's Latin America Bureau. In reviewing the history and rationale of sector analysis programs, it is clear that improved sector analysis is important to progress in meeting "Basic Human Needs" objectives and that the experiences of the past years in the conduct of sectoral analyses have taught us a great deal about appropriate methodologies and managerial strategies for obtaining the maximum policy relevance from the work once it is completed. The crucial questions are how much time and money should be spent to produce what kinds of output, and how best to organize to get the kinds of output desired.

On both of these questions there is broad agreement on many of the points you raise. AID's Latin America Bureau and AID in general are allocating the bulk of available funds mainly to "Purpose C" as you define it (relatively quick policy-relevant sector examinations or "sector assessments"). Aside from a few projects, such as those in Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, which were initiated in the former LA Sector Analysis Division, there are no activities in the "Purpose B" category (broader and more comprehensive sector analyses performed by AID and aimed at determining optimum policy) or "Purpose A" category (same scope as "Purpose B" but involving host country institutions with the objective of internalizing the process). AID recognizes, however, that many of the assessments of the past -- highly qualitative as opposed to quantitative -- are not sufficient. AID has also made a clear decision to decentralize the sector analysis function,

Agency for International
Development
Washington, D.C. 20520

B6

-2-

in keeping with Administrator Gilligan's announced intent of avoiding an overly large bureaucratic concentration in Washington. [It is beginning to realize,] however, that missions need some important backstopping support in sector analysis from Washington. *I understand*
there is also
awareness,

Will decentralization as it is being envisioned effectively undermine the prospects for useful sector analysis? This is, as you suggest, a real danger. Current studies underway in Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, however, suggest that AID field missions working with local counterparts can produce useful and timely results while building host country skills in the process. The Dominican Republic example is doubly interesting, from the point of view of your comments on how to pay for sector analysis, since it was begun under the centralized funding approach but has now been transferred to the Mission and the second stage will be carried out as a Mission funded activity.

At the same time it must be recognized, as you do, that the LA Sector Analysis Division initiated these two projects and they continue to draw on AID analysts and Census Bureau consultants who acquired considerable experience in the Division. This illustrates the need for back-up from Washington that you emphasize. [There is some indication that AID officials are coming to realize this need.] State 071531 (enclosed), for example, contains an ambitious plan and budget for improving and updating agricultural sector assessments which in some cases involve multi-year, basic efforts that would appear to come close to "Purpose B" or "Purpose A" type sector analyses.

Nonetheless, the issues you have raised continue to be important. The need for sector analysis assistance and the associated need for Washington backstopping applies to every region and thus to AID as a whole. These issues seem especially pertinent in view of current efforts to develop a new US development assistance strategy. I believe that your use of the dissent

-3-

channel has increased the awareness of these issues by AID officials. I thank you for your letter and encourage you to continue to bring your experience and your ideas to bear in raising these issues through normal channels in AID.

Sincerely,

/s/

Anthony Lake
Director
Policy Planning Staff

Enclosure:

State 071531

RELEASE IN PART
B6



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 24, 1978

[Redacted]
Regional Resources Attache
The American Embassy
LaPaz

B6

Dear [Redacted]:


B6

I have received your dissent channel message on tin and have asked Harriet Hentges of my staff to act as coordinator in charge of a substantive reply.

In accordance with dissent channel procedures, copies of your message have been distributed to the offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, The Chairman of the Open Forum and the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs.

We commend your use of the dissent channel and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

Sincerely,


Anthony Lake
Director
Policy Planning Staff

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

OPTIONAL FORM 185 (OCR) (10-75)
Formerly DS-322 (ICR)
Dept. of State

RELEASE IN PART
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ACK	MRN	DTG	SIGNATURE
UNCLASSIFIED		CLASSIFICATION	
SPECIAL CHARGES			
S/P: EODONNELL: KAZ		NAME	
L/24/80 DATE: 22972		TEL. EXT.	
S/P: WAKEPICE		NAME	

*File
dissem
channel*

1 OFFICE	NAME	2 OFFICE	NAME
3		4	
5	CLEARANCES	6	CLEARANCES
7		8	

S/P: ONEYUNCH

PRIORITY: NICARAGUA

INFO PREFERENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISSENT CHANNEL -- FOR ONLY FROM S/P: LAKE

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL REPLY (US COMMODITY POLICY: THE CASE FOR TIN)

REF: LA PAZ A-5 1978

1. THE ECONOMIC BUREAU (EB/ISM) HAS ASKED US FOR A COPY OF THE REPLY PREPARED BY S/P IN RESPONSE TO YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE (LA PAZ A-5, 1978). SINCE THIS REPLY WAS PREPARED FOR YOU ONLY, WE WOULD LIKE YOUR CONCURRENCE BEFORE RELEASING IT. EB PLANS TO USE IT IN A CURRENT INTERNAL DISCUSSION OF TIN POLICY.

2. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE NOTIFY US WHETHER YOU CONCUR.

INITIALS
AL AUTH.
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UNCLASSIFIED



**UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
MISSION TO PAKISTAN**

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASE IN PART ~~_____~~
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SK file

Cable: USAIDPAK

HEADQUARTERS OFFICE
ISLAMABAD

DISSENT CHANNEL

June 6, 1973

Mr. William L. Cargo, Director
Planning & Coordination Staff
Department of State, Rm 7246
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Cargo:

Thank you for your letter of May 14, 1973. I appreciate your efforts in providing a comprehensive reply to the questions raised in my dissent letter of March 21, 1973.

While continuing to disagree with the South Asian Arms Supply policy, I am grateful for your explanation of the policy decision.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature Box]

Regional Legal Advisor

B6

Classified by *William A. Wolfper*
Subject to E. O. 11652
Automatically downgraded at two
year intervals and declassified
on December 31, 1979.

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RELEASE IN PART
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REB463

PAGE 21 SAN SA 01732 03 OF 03 1521472
ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-31 ES-31 ISDP00 850-00 /004 W
*****152216Z 097668 /72

O 152056Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3997

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 SAN SALVADOR 1732

DISSENT CHANNEL

ARGUMENTS WE WOULD ADVANCE TO SUPPORT THIS
RECOMMENDATION INCLUDE:

(A) THE TRANSITION FROM ONE SALVADORAN REGIME TO
ANOTHER IS A MORE NATURAL TIME TO CHANGE US AMBASSADORS,
RATHER THAN TWO MONTHS BEFORE.

(B) THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT AMBASSADOR
LOZANO WAS PURSUING HIS OWN VENDETTA RATHER THAN USG
POLICY IS GREATLY DIMINISHED.

(C) THE USG DOES NOT LOSE ALL MOMENTUM ON
THE RICHARDSON QUERY, AND CAN MAXIMIZE WHATEVER
LEVERAGE IT MIGHT HAVE IF ~~THE ROMERO GOVERNMENT~~
~~WANTS TO GET THAT ISSUE OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE ITS~~
INAUGURATION. THE OPTION ALSO GIVES BETTER LEVERAGE
BOTH IN IMMEDIATE AND FUTURE RANGE SINCE IT CAN
BE TAILORED TO GOES ACTIONS OR LACK THEREOFF.

(D) THE POSSIBILITY IS MINIMIZED THAT US MISSION PERSONNEL
ADVOCACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS WILL DIMINISH IF THEY BELIEVE
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN WASHINGTON DICTATED THE UNTIMELY
REMOVAL OF THE AMBASSADOR REGARDLESS OF THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS
DISCUSSED ABOVE.

(E) NEITHER THE GOES NOR ITS SUPPORT GROUPS
WALK AWAY WITH AN IMAGE OF THE USG AS A PAPER TIGER
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PROTECTION OF ITS CITIZENS, ETC.

(F) THESE OPTIONS HOLD THE GREATEST PROMISE

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PAGE 02 SAN SA 01732 03 OF 23 152147Z

OF IMPEDING WHATEVER PRESSURES MIGHT EXIST FOR THE ROMERO ADMINISTRATION TO PURSUE AN EVEN HARDER LINE ONCE IN OFFICE.

9. IN THE NAME OF BREVITY, WE HAVE NOT LISTED THE PROS AND CONS OF EACH OF THE ACTION OPTIONS. THAT ANALYSIS CAN BE SUPPLIED IF NECESSARY.

10. CONCLUSION, WITHOUT QUESTIONING, OR APPEARING TO QUESTION, PRESIDENT CARTER'S RIGHT TO REPLACE AN AMBASSADOR WHENEVER HE DEEMS BEST, THE UNDERSIGNED RECOMMEND THAT AMBASSADOR LOZANO'S TENURE BE EXTENDED AT LEAST THROUGH THE JULY 1 INSTALLATION OF THE ROMERO REGIME AND THAT DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD HE BE INSTRUCTED TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE

TO THE FULLEST EXTENT COMPATIBLE WITH OTHER NATIONAL INTERESTS.

11. CONCURRENCES. (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

- [REDACTED] CAPITAL RESOURCES DEVELOP OFF.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] C.A.R.S.
- [REDACTED] POL OFF
- [REDACTED] USAID
- [REDACTED] SECRETARY
- [REDACTED] C.A.R.S.
- [REDACTED] SECRETARY
- [REDACTED] EDUCATIVE OFFICER
- [REDACTED] VICE CONSUL
- [REDACTED] AID
- [REDACTED] FSR-3, [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] AID
- [REDACTED] USAID, PROGRAM OFFICER
- [REDACTED] CONSUL
- [REDACTED] PSRU-5, [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] PCD
- [REDACTED], FSR-4, [REDACTED], P/C
- [REDACTED] FBRL-7, USAID, [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] FSR-5, [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] VICE CONSUL
- [REDACTED] LTC, US ARMY

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Handwritten notes and signatures in the right margin.

PAGE 03 SAN SA 01732 03 OF 03 152147Z

[REDACTED] FSRU#4, [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] FSSQ#7
 [REDACTED] DAO
 [REDACTED] FSS#B, SECRETARY
 [REDACTED] VICE CONSUL
 [REDACTED] FSS#B, SECRETARY
 LOZANO

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RELEASE IN FULL

WEAVER JESSIE E
77 STAT 279279

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 21 STAT 279279

ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO CCI-21 ISO-22 SS-15 SP-22 COME-22 EP-22 SSO-22
CIAI-22 IAR-27 NSAI-22 INRI-22 PX-25 NSCI-22 /652 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/EE:JSEYMOUR

APPROVED BY EUR - BELLUERS

S/S:KAFIAN

EUR/EE:CHSCHWILT

S/P:ALAVE

F:DHICE (PHONE)

-----277253 222185Z /72

C 222230Z NOV 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 279279

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM VESI AND LARE

P.O. 11832: JIS

TAGS: PINT, PCOVE, PCOM, TAGR, SHUM, PL, US, UR

SUBJECT: PROC MEETING ON POLAND

REF: WARSAW 8179, 8182

1. THE PROC MEETING WILL BE HELD NOVEMBER 22 WITH PHIL HABIB IN THE CHAIR. (COMMERCE SECRETARY KREPS ALSO PLANS TO ATTEND.)

2. WE GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR TWO EXCELLENT CABLES (REFERENCES) WHICH CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO OUR CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUES. WE HAVE ALSO INCLUDED THEM IN THE BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR HABIB. ON SOME ISSUES, AS YOU KNOW, THERE IS DISAGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE YOUR

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PAGE 22

STAT 279279

CLEAR AND FORCEFUL PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUES AND THE ALTERNATIVES WILL GUIDE US TO THE RIGHT CHOICES. YY

HABIB

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WEAVER JESSIE B
77 WARSAW 8179

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PAGE 01 WARSAW 08179 01 OF 03 111207Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07
L-03 NSAE-02 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 AID-05 COME-00 EB-08 FRR-03 TRSE-00
XMP-02 OPIC-03 LAB-04 SIL-01 OMB-01 AGRE-00 FEA-01
/087 W

-----073277 111241Z /11

P R 111031Z NOV 77
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1520
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL KRAKOW POUCH
AMCONSUL POZNAN POUCH
C O M F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 WARSAW 8179
EO 116527DS

TAGS: PINT PGOV ECON TAGR SHUM PL US UR
SUBJ: POLAND IN MID-AUTUMN, 1977 -- AN ASSESSMENT
1. SUMMARY: IN THIS MESSAGE, WE APPRAISE THE POLISH
POPULAR MOOD AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A BREAKDOWN IN
CIVIL ORDER AS WINTER NEARS AND THE STATE OF THE
ECONOMY WORSENS. WE EXAMINE SOME OF THE APPROACHES
TAKEN BY AN INCREASINGLY HARRIED AND BAFFLD LEADERSHIP
TO CONTAIN THE MOUNTING PRESSURE OF POPULAR DISCONTENT
AND CONCLUDE THAT THE US HAS A STAKE IN HELPING THE
POLISH PEOPLE GET THROUGH THE WINTER AND SPRING TO
THE NEXT HARVEST, AND IN HELPING KEEP A MODERATE REGIME,
LIKE THAT HEADED BY EDWARD GIEREK, IN OFFICE. END SUMMARY.
2. MORE AND MORE, WE HEAR FROM OUR POLISH SOURCES
THAT THE SUPPLY OF FOOD AND FUEL AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
POPULAR MORALE "HAVE NEVER BEEN WORSE". THIS EVALUATION
IS NOT TO BE TAKEN LITERALLY, BUT IT DOES APPLY FOR
THE PERIOD OF GIEREK'S LEADERSHIP. LESS MEAT IS

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PAGE 02 WARSAW 08179 01 OF 03 111207Z
AVAILABLE, AND LINES IN FRONT OF THE SHOPS ARE LONGER,
THAN AT ANY TIME DURING THE PAST SEVEN YEARS (WARSAW 8022).
(MOST VARSOVIANS SAY ONE HAS TO GO BACK AT LEAST FIFTEEN YEARS
TO FIND A COMPARABLY BAD PERIOD.) STRINGENT RATIONING OF
COAL TO HOUSEHOLDERS, AND EFFORTS AND EXHORTATIONS
TO ECONOMIZE ON ELECTRICITY, HAVE AFFECTED THE POPULAR
MOOD LESS THAN THEY MIGHT HAVE, ONLY BECAUSE OCTOBER AND
EARLY NOVEMBER HAVE BEEN MILD AND MOSTLY FAIR. AS THE
DAYS DRAW IN AND THE TEMPERATURE DROPS, TEMPERERS WILL
RISE COMMENSURATELY. POLAND IS ENTERING THE THIRD
STRAIGHT WINTER OF SERIOUS MEAT AND FUEL SHORTAGES
AND THIS ONE PROMISES TO BE WORSE THAN THE PRECEDING
TWO.

3. IN WARSAW, THE MOOD IS ONE OF SULLEN PASSIVITY. THERE
ARE GRIPES APLENTY, BUT NOT MANY SIGNS AS YET OF

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PAGE

WEAVER JESSIE B
77 WARSAW 8179

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WILLINGNESS TO TRANSLATE THE GRIPE INTO DEMONSTRATIVE PROTEST. HOWEVER, THE CAPITAL IS BETTER OFF THEN MOST OTHER URBAN CENTERS, NOT TO MENTION SMALL TOWNS, AND WE CAN ONLY GUESS WHETHER OR NOT THE MORE INTENSE BITTERNESS OUTSIDE WARSAW IS LIKELIER TO FLARE INTO VIOLENT PROTEST. (THIS MESSAGE IS TOO LONG TO SEND ENCODED TO KRAKOW AND POZNAW BY WIRE, SO I AM POUCHING COPIES TO OUR CONSULS THERE AND ASKING THEM TO COMMENT ON IT.)

4. OVERT MANIFESTATIONS OF RESENTMENT ARISING FROM THE ECONOMIC DEBACLE ARE ALREADY TAKING PLACE. THE RECENT STRIKES IN THE SILESIA COAL MINES, ABOUT WHICH FOREIGN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES WERE INFORMED BY A SPOKESMAN FOR THE DISSIDENT MOVEMENT FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE CITIZEN (RUCK), ARE WITHOUT DOUBT EXCEPTIONAL ONLY IN THAT THEY HAVE COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE WEST. WE CAN BE SURE THAT

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PAGE 03 WARSAW 28179 01 OF 03 111207Z

INDUSTRIAL ACTIONS OF VARIOUS SORTS--WORKING STRICTLY TO RULE, SIT-DOWN STRIKES, WALKOUTS BY SHOP CREWS AND OTHER SMALL UNITS--ARE BEING WIDELY USED TO SUPPLEMENT THE NORMAL FLOW OF BEETS BY SHOP STEWARDS AND SECRETARIES OF PARTY PRIMARY ORGANIZATIONS. NO STATISTICS ARE AVAILABLE, BUT UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES FROM WORK, MALINGERING, DRUNKENNESS ON THE JOB, PILFERAGE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY, AND THE OFFERING AND TAKING OF BRIBES, ARE ALL SAID TO BE SHARPLY ON THE RISE. IN FACT, IN MAJOR SPEECHES DURING THE PAST MONTH, BOTH GIEREK AND JAROSZEWICZ OPENLY COMPLAINED ABOUT SUCH PRACTICES, AMONG NUMEROUS OTHERS (WARSAW 8253).

5. THE BRUTE FACTS OF ECONOMICS HAVE CONSISTENTLY THWARTED GIEREK'S PLANS OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS, AND THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT IS NOW BEING FELT WITH INCREASING FORCE. TOPPING OFF THE MAJOR SHORTFALLS IN THE 1977 POLISH--AND SOVIET--GRAIN HARVESTS, THE LATEST BAD NEWS IS THAT THE POTATO CROP, IN THE WORDS OF A SENIOR AGRICULTURE MINISTRY OFFICIAL, IS DISASTROUS (WARSAW 8252). THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHORTAGES OF BOTH FEED GRAINS AND POTATOES FOR THE RAISING OF LIVESTOCK--ESPECIALLY PIGS--ARE MOMENTOUS. THE SAME AGRICULTURE MINISTRY OFFICIAL DESCRIBED THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO SWINE AS EXTREMELY DELICATE AND POTENTIALLY VOLATILE. THE NUMBERS OF PIGS ARE SLOWLY BEING BROUGHT BACK TOWARDS THE LEVEL OF 1975, BUT AVOIDANCE OF A REPETITION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SLAUGHTER OF 1975-76 WILL REQUIRE AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF FEEDGRAINS AND OTHER FEEDSTUFFS AT PRICES THE FARMERS CAN AFFORD TO PAY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT OFFICIALS DOWN TO THE VILLAGE LEVEL HAVE ALREADY BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PASS THE WORD TO FARMERS THAT THERE WILL BE NO SHORTAGE OF SWINE FEED AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO IMPORTING WHATEVER IS NECESSARY. BUT TO HOLD THE LINE THIS WINTER

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PAGE

WEAVER JESSIE E
27 WARSAW 9179

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THE REGIME NEEDS OUTSIDE HELP IN ASSURING GRAIN
SUPPLIES, AND THIS MEANS INCURRING A STILL GREATER
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PAGE 04

WARSAW 09179 01 OF 03 111207Z

BURDEN ON ITS ALREADY OVERLOADED INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
POSITION.

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PAGE

WEAVER JESSIE B
77 WARSAW 8179

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 WARSAW 08179 02 OF 03 111219Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07
L-03 NSAB-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 AID-05 COME-00 EB-00 FRB-03 TRSE-00
XMB-02 OPIC-07 LAB-04 SIL-01 OMB-01 AGR-00 FEA-01
/087 W

-----073629 111241Z /11

P R 111031Z NOV 77
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1521
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL KRAKOW POUCH
AMCONSUL POZNAW POUCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 WARSAW 0179
6. EVEN IF IT SUCCEEDS IN ACCOMPLISHING THE FUNDAMENTAL
AIM OF KEEPING MOST OF THE PEOPLE FROM GOING
HUNGRY, THE REGIME IS UNLIKELY TO WEATHER THE WINTER
WITHOUT POPULAR DISTURBANCES. FRUSTRATION AND DIS-
GRUNTLEMENT ARE TOO GREAT, TEMPERAS ARE STRETCHED TOO
THIN, AND THE POTENTIAL CAUSES OF SUCH DISTURBANCES
ARE NOW TOO MANY, TO PERMIT ANYONE BUT A COCKEYED
OPTIMIST TO BELIEVE THEY CAN BE AVOIDED ALTOGETHER. FOR
ONE THING, THERE IS AN INCREASING POPULAR SENSE THAT
GIEREK AND CO. SIMPLY HAVE NO SOLUTIONS TO AN ECONOMIC
SITUATION THAT IS BECOMING INTOLERABLE. THE RECENT
GIEREK AND JAROSZEWICZ SPEECHES CAN HAVE DONE LITTLE
TO DISPEL SUCH DOUBTS. AS WE HAVE NOTED (WARSAW 0058),
BOTH SPEECHES AMOUNTED TO A RECITAL OF PROBLEMS OF
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT WHICH HAVE BECOME ENDEMIC IN
POLAND, COUPLED WITH PLAINTIVE APPEALS TO THE CITIZENRY
FOR SUPPORT IN OVERCOMING THEM, BUT WITH NO STATEMENT
OF A PROGRAM FOR DOING SO. THE VAGUE PROMISES THAT THE
"ECONOMIC MANEUVER" WOULD BEGIN TO BEAR FRUIT IN A
FEW YEARS CAN HARDLY HAVE BEEN REASSURING TO A POPULACE

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PAGE 02 WARSAW 08179 02 OF 03 111219Z

WHOSE RISING EXPECTATIONS OF THE EARLY 1970'S HAVE BEEN
SO THOROUGHLY DASHED, AND THE CATALOGUE OF SOCIO-
INDUSTRIAL ILLS AND EFFORTS TO SHIFT THE BLAME TO
"CERTAIN VOIVODSHIPS", "SOME ENTERPRISES", AND "SOME
MINISTRIES" WILL PROBABLY ONLY REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION
THAT THIS LEADERSHIP HAS NO ANSWERS.

7. NO ONE CAN BE BETTER AWARE OF THE RISING DANGER
OF POPULAR REACTION THAN GIEREK AND HIS TEAM, WHO CAME
TO POWER ON THE HEELS OF THE BALTIC PORT WORKERS'
RIOTS OF DECEMBER 1970. THAT REALIZATION ACCOUNTS
FOR THE RESTRAINT CHARACTERIZING THE REGIME'S CURRENT
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE VARIOUS DISSIDENT GROUPS WHICH,
INSPIRED BY THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE WEAKNESS OF

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087

WEAVER JESSIE P
77 WARSAW 8179

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THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP, HAVE BEGUN TO ACT SOMEWHAT MORE BOLDLY. (WE SHOULD DIFFERENTIATE HERE BETWEEN THE COMPARATIVELY MORE CAUTIOUS CURRENT BEHAVIOR OF THE KSS (COMMITTEE FOR SOCIAL SELF-DEFENSE--FORMERLY THE WORKERS' DEFENSE COMMITTEE, OR KOR) AND THE BOLDER STANCE OF RUCF, WHICH HAS ALSO BEEN ENCOURAGED TOWARDS ACTIVISM BY THE PARTIAL VACUUM LEFT BY THE CHANGE IN APPROACH OF THE KSS. BUT THESE FINE POINTS REQUIRE TREATMENT ELSEWHERE.) HEIGHTENED DISSIDENT ACTIVITY HAS MET WITH MINIMAL REGIME COUNTERACTION. E.G., FINES LEVIED AGAINST RUCF SPOKESMEN FOR PASSING INFORMATION TO RADIO FREE EUROPE VIA WESTERN NEWSMEN, AND THE TEMPORARY DETENTION ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS OF PEOPLE COLLECTING SIGNATURES FOR AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL PETITIONS. CLEARLY, GIEREK FEELS IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO RAISE THE POLITICAL TEMPERATURE AMONG INTELLECTUALS AND STUDENTS BY ORDERING A REAL CRACKDOWN, INCLUDING ARRESTS, AND THUS CREATING NEW DILEMMAS FOR HIMSELF. ON THE CONTRARY, HE CONTINUES TO SEEM DISPOSED TO BE

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PAGE 23 WARSAW 78179 22 OF 23 111219Z
CONSILIATORY WHEREVER HE CAN. A CASE IN POINT IS THIS WEEK'S ISSUANCE OF A PASSPORT TO KSS ACTIVIST JAN-JOZEF LIPSKI TO TRAVEL TO GREAT BRITAIN FOR HEART SURGERY.

9. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, GIEREK'S OPTIONS ARE NARROW, AND HE APPEARS TO BE LOOKING MOST IMMEDIATELY TO POLITICAL GESTURES OF ONE SORT AND ANOTHER TO HELP HIM KEEP THE LID ON.

9. THE FIRST OF THESE WAS HIS MEETING WITH CARDINAL WYSZYNSKI ON OCTOBER 29 (WARSAW 7873). AS ONE WARSAW INTELLECTUAL OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC HUE PUT IT BITTERLY, "FIRST COMES ECONOMIC BANKRUPTCY, AND THEN IDEOLOGICAL BANKRUPTCY." IN FACT, GIEREK WAS COMPELLED TO ACCEPT THE PRIMATE'S INSISTENT DEMAND FOR OVERT REGIME RECOGNITION THROUGH PRECISELY SUCH A MEETING.

10. THE NEXT WILL BE GIEREK'S MEETING WITH THE POPE AT THE END OF THIS MONTH. ACCORDING TO PRESENT PLANS, THE PRIMATE WILL BE IN ROME DURING THE MEETING AND WE CAN EXPECT THAT THE POPE WILL HAVE RECEIVED A VERY CAREFUL BRIEFING ON HOW TO HANDLE THE COMMUNIST CHIEF OF THIS MOST DEVOUT OF ALL THE LANDS WHERE THE FIGURE OF THE HOLY FATHER COMMANDS POPULAR RESPECT. (IT IS INTERESTING TO SPECULATE WHETHER GIEREK MIGHT AGREE THAT THE POPE COULD VISIT POLAND. THE POLISH POLITICAL LEADERSHIP COULD REGARD AN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT SUCH AN INVITATION HAD BEEN EXTENDED FOR LATE SPRING OR SUMMER OF NEXT YEAR AS AN EFFECTIVE CALMATIVE FOR THE UNEASY WINTER WHICH LIES AHEAD. SUCH A VISIT, LONG AN AMBITION OF THE HOLY SEE AND THE POLISH EPISCOPATE, WOULD, OF COURSE, PRODUCE UNPRECEDENTED SCENES OF MASS TERROR THROUGHOUT POLAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE

WEAVER JESSIE B
77 WARSAW 3179

CONFIDENTIAL

THE REGIME MIGHT CALCULATE THAT, THE WINTER ONCE OVER, IT
COULD THEN CONSIDER WHETHER IT WAS REALLY NECESSARY
TO ENTERTAIN THE VISIT AFTER ALL.

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PAGE 04 WARSAW 33179 02 OF 03 111213Z

11. THE THIRD SUCH MEETING IS THAT WHICH IS PLANNED
WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. THE MERE FACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
VISIT TO WARSAW WOULD BE RENEWED TESTIMONY TO THE SPECIAL
CHARACTER OF THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH, MORE THAN ANY OTHER
EASTERN EUROPEAN STATE, POLAND HAS WITH THE U.S.
REGARDLESS OF WHAT IS OR IS NOT DECIDED OR DISCUSSED
AT SUCH A MEETING, THE WIDESPREAD POLISH RUMOR GRAPE-
VINE WILL BE LOADED WITH REPORTS ABOUT AMERICAN "HELP"
AND "LOANS" AND THE U.S. INTENTION NOT TO LET POLAND
GO UNDER. (THIS WILL ALSO BE THE EFFECT, TO A LESSER EXTENT,
OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT, WHICH HAS JUST BEEN ANNOUNCED
FOR LATE NOVEMBER.)

12. EVEN ALL THIS IS PROBABLY NOT ENOUGH TO ENSURE
AGAINST POPULAR FLAREUPS, BUT, TAKEN TOGETHER, THE MEETINGS
COULD HELP HOLD THEM WITHIN REASONABLE BOUNDS. TWO

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PAGE

WEAVER JESSIE B
77 WARSAW 8179

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 WARSAW 08179 03 OF 03 111222Z

ACTION FUR-12

INFO OCT-21 ISO-20 CIAE-20, PODE-20 PM-25 H-21 INR-27
L-25 NSAE-20 NSC-25 PA-21 PRS-01 SP-22 SS-15
USIA-26 AID-25 COME-20 ES-25 FRB-25 TRSE-22
XMB-22 OPIC-22 LAB-24 SIL-21 OMB-21 AGRI-20 FEA-21
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P R 111031Z NOV 77
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1522
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL KRAKOW POUCH
AMCONSUL POZNAN POUCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 WARSAW 8179

MORE RESTRAINING FACTORS SHOULD BE MENTIONED.
13. THE FIRST IS THAT THE GIEREK TEAM SEEMS TO HAVE NO
BENCH STRENGTH, NO SUBSTITUTES, OR PINCH HITTERS
WHO MIGHT BE CALLED INTO THE GAME OR REPLACE THE
FLAGGING REGULARS NOW IN THE LINE-UP. THIS IS NOT TO
SAY THAT CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP WILL NOT OCCUR.
THEY ALMOST SURELY WILL; ONE VERY POPULAR MOVE WOULD BE
THE LONG-AWAITED SIDE-LINING OF PREMIER JAROSZEWICZ. BUT THE
KEY POINT IS THE ABSENCE OF CANDIDATES ABLE AND WILLING
TO CHALLENGE THE FIRST SECRETARY FOR THE TOP SLOT.
DESPITE THE GROWING PERCEPTION OF GIEREK AS ALMOST
TOTALLY BAFLED IN HIS EFFORTS TO COPE WITH POLAND'S
PROBLEMS, HE IS ALSO WIDELY SEEN AS AN ESSENTIALLY
DECENT PERSON, AS COMMUNIST LEADERS GO. IT THUS
SEEMS DOURTFUL THAT MOST DEMONSTRATORS AGAINST THE
CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS WOULD WANT TO CARRY THINGS
SO FAR AS TO UNSEAT THE FIRST SECRETARY WHEN THERE IS
NOT A CLUE AS TO WHO MIGHT SUCCEED HIM. PROFESSOR JAN SZCZE-
PANSKI SAYS, THAT, AFTER

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PAGE 02 WARSAW 08179 03 OF 03 111222Z

GIEREK, POLAND WOULD GET HUSAK, NOT DUBCEK. IF IT IS
NOT TRUE, IT IS AT ANY RATE WELL PUT.
14. THE OTHER, AND PROBABLY MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTOR OF ALL, IS
THE DESIRE, EXTENDING ACROSS THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF POLISH SOCIETY,
TO AVOID CREATING A SITUATION WHICH COULD BRING ABOUT
DIRECT SOVIET INTERVENTION. THIS DESIRE CONTRIBUTES TO
THE PROCESS OF CHURCH-STATE ACCOMMODATION; IT KEEPS THE
DISSIDENTS FROM ACTIVITIES AS PROVOCATIVE AS THEY MIGHT
OTHERWISE BE TEMPTED TO UNDERTAKE. MORE IMponderable
IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT WOULD INHIBIT A CHAIN REACTION
AMONG WORKERS ONCE SOME OF THEM HAD TAKEN TO THE
STREETS. ON BALANCE, WE THINK IT WOULD OPERATE
STRONGLY ENOUGH, EVEN UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO
PREVENT A TOTAL BREAKDOWN OF THE ORDER OF THIS ADMITTEDLY

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WEAVER JESSIE B
77 WARSAW 8179

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VOLATILE SOCIETY.

15. THE PROSPECT, THEREFORE, IS THAT THE GIEREK LEADERSHIP WILL MANAGE TO Muddle THROUGH THE NEXT MONTHS, BUT THAT IT WILL BE AN ANXIOUS AND UNSETTLED PERIOD FOR POLAND, FOR THE USSR, FOR THE US, AND FOR ALL IN EUROPE WHO KNOW HOW GREAT THE PRESSURE IS IN THE POLISH BOILER. AND, FINALLY, WE CAN NEVER COMPLETELY RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHAIN REACTION WHICH, DESPITE EVERYBODY'S BETTER JUDGMENT, MIGHT GET OUT OF HAND AND REQUIRE THE SOVIETS, COMPLETELY AGAINST THEIR DESIRES, TO MOVE IN PHYSICALLY AND SECURE THE KEYSTONE OF THEIR CORDON STALINAIRE.

16. CONFRONTED WITH THE POTENTIAL DANGER OF AN EXPLOSION IN POLAND, IT IS POSSIBLE TO SNEAK AND SAY THAT IT IS A PROBLEM FOR THE POLISH COMMUNISTS AND THEIR SOVIET OVERLORDS, BUT NOT FOR THE US. THERE ARE TWO PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS TO SUCH

CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE 03

WARSAW 89179 03 OF 03 111222Z

A RESPONSE. FIRST, THE 31,500,000 POLES WHO ARE NOT COMMUNISTS ARE THOSE WHO WOULD DO THE SUFFERING--NOT THE 2,500,000 POLISH COMMUNISTS, WHO, IN AN EXTREMITY, COULD SIMPLY GO EAST (ALTHOUGH THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THEM, BEING "RADISHES" -- RED ON THE OUTSIDE, BUT WHITE ON THE INSIDE -- WOULD CERTAINLY STRIVE TO REMAIN THE THEIR HOMELAND). MANY OF THOSE 31.5 MILLION ARE THE RELATIVES OF THE ESTIMATED TEN MILLION AMERICANS OF POLISH ORIGIN. THIS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, MAKES WHAT HAPPENS IN POLAND A MATTER OF GREAT NATURAL INTEREST TO THE US GOVERNMENT. SECONDLY, I SUGGEST THAT THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF THE UNTHINKABLE--THE KILLING OF NUMBERS OF POLES BY SOVIET TROOPS--ON US ATTITUDES TOWARDS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE FAR GRAVER AND FAR LONGER LASTING THAN THAT PRODUCED BY THE WARSAW FACT INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968.

17. THIS LEAVES THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE US SHOULD DO. WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN DOING WHAT WE REASONABLY CAN TO HELP PREVENT A FURTHER SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN POLAND. ANY BREAKDOWN IN PUBLIC ORDER WHICH WOULD RISK SOVIET INTERVENTION WOULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS FAR BEYOND POLAND'S BORDERS. WE SHOULD ALSO TRY TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER THE MODEST STEPS TAKEN OVER RECENT YEARS BY GIEREK AND HIS ASSOCIATES IN THE DIRECTION OF A MORE LIBERAL INTERNAL REGIME. IF GIEREK CANNOT MAINTAIN HIMSELF AT THE TOP, WE SHOULD LIKE TO SEE SOME SIMILARLY MINDED MODERATE LEADER IN CHARGE IN WARSAW. THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT CARTER WILL SIGNAL THIS PREFERENCE. BUT POLAND'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS ARE IN THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REALM, AND WE SHOULD THUS PREPARE TO TAKE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC MEASURES TO HELP THE POLES SHORE UP THEIR SAGGING ECONOMY. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS, TOGETHER WITH A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE POLISH ECONOMY, ARE

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PAGE 01 BUENOS 27383 101714Z

41
ACTION *SP-02*

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UN
SUBJECT: COORDINATING US FOREIGN POLICY

REF: A) STATE 225930 B) STATE 255960 C) STATE 260081 D) USUN 5556

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN PREPARED BY [REDACTED]

1. RECENT CABLES FROM THE DEPARTMENT CONCERNING THE KOREAN ISSUE AT THE 30TH UNGA INDICATE THAT A MAJOR DECISION WAS MADE WITH RESPECT TO US POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS. AS DEDUCED FROM PARAGRAPH 1 OF STATE 225930, THE OPERATIVE PORTION OF OUR NEW DEPARTURE WOULD IN SIMPLEST TERMS APPEAR TO BE: "SOME ISSUES IN THE UN ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US; THEREFORE, WE MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INSURE THAT OUR VIEW-POINT PREVAILS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. TO THIS END WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO SELECTED COUNTRIES OUR CONCERN ABOUT THESE ISSUES AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO RE-EVALUATE OUR RELATIONS WITH THEM IN LIGHT OF THEIR BEHAVIOR IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY." AS A RESULT OF THIS INSTRUCTION, WE HAVE MADE THREE DEMARCHES IN BUENOS AIRES, ONE IN NEW YORK AND ONE IN WASHINGTON, IN WHICH WE HAVE TOLD THE ARGENTINES THAT THEIR ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE KOREAN ISSUE WOULD, IF UNFAVORABLE TO OUR VIEW, HAVE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

2. THAT THIS THREAT WAS MADE WITHOUT HAVING THOUGHT THROUGH

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PAGE 02 BUENOS 07383 101714Z

ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA AND INDEED WITHOUT A PROPER APPRECIATION FOR ITS IMPACT ON OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE UN ITSELF CAN BE SEEN FROM SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED. FOR EXAMPLE, IN STATE 256900, RECEIVED AFTER OUR DEMARCHES, WE WERE TOLD THAT THE MATTER OF OUR APPROACH TO UN VOTES WAS ONE WHICH EMBASSIES AND ARA NEEDED TO CONSIDER FULLY BUT NOT WITH URGENCY. AS FURTHER NOTED, THE SUBJECT WAS AN IMPORTANT ONE WHICH "COULD BE DISCUSSED AT LENGTH," AND THAT IT WAS IN FACT RECEIVING A LOT OF "HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION" IN THE DEPARTMENT. THAT THE ISSUE SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED A LOT OF HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION BEFORE IT WAS IMPLEMENTED WOULD APPEAR THE MINIMUM REQUIRED GIVEN THE IMPACT IT WOULD HAVE ONCE ARTICULATED. THAT IT DID NOT RECEIVE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION AND COORDINATION BEFORE WE TOOK THESE STEPS IS APPALLING.

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3. THERE EXIST MANY COUNTRIES, ARGENTINA AMONG THEM, WHOSE IMPORTANCE TO US CLEARLY EXCEEDS THEIR VOTES IN THE UN HOWEVER IMPORTANT THE QUESTIONS MAY BE. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT WHEN ISSUES ARE OF GREAT MAGNITUDE, AND PERHAPS THE KOREAN ISSUE IS A CASE IN POINT, WE SHOULD NOT EXERT ALL APPROPRIATE CLOUT TO ACHIEVE OUR UNN OBJECTIVES. WHAT IS AT ISSUE HERE IS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AN UNCOORDINATED, BADLY IMPLEMENTED EXERCISE OF OUR POWER CONTRIBUTES TO ACHIEVING EITHER THE SPECIFIC ENDS WE SEEK IN THE UNGA OR TO OUR MAINTENANCE OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH A HOST OF COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD.

4. IN THE KOREAN CASE THE USG DECIDED TO ACT FIRST AND THINK IT THROUGH LATER. FOLLOWING THE VOTING IN FIRST COMMITTEE, FOR THE FIRST TIME THE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR ACTIONS BOTH IN TERMS OF THEIR EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE KOREAN ISSUE AND THEIR IMPACT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS SEEM TO BE RECEIVING SERIOUS ATTENTION. IN STATE 260081 WE LEARN THAT THE QUESTION OF "NOW WHAT DO WE DO?" IS BEING DISCUSSED. IT APPEARS THAT THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON WHAT ALL THIS FRANTIC SHOW OF OUR UNFOCUSED TOUGHNESS MEANS FOR THE US, AND THAT APPARENTLY DISAGREEMENT HAS ARISEN AS TO THE WISDOM OF THE WHOLE SANCTIONS POLICY. IT WOULD NOT SEEM TO BE ASKING TOO MUCH TO HAVE EXPECTED THE DEPARTMENT TO HAVE DEBATED THIS QUESTION BEFORE IT WENT FORWARD WITH AN INSTRUCTION WHICH NOW PUTS US IN THE SITUATION OF HAVING TO DECIDE WHAT IF ANY

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PAGE 03 BUENOS 07383 101714Z

SANCTIONS ARE TO BE APPLIED, HOW THEY ARE TO BE APPLIED AND INDEED IF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF APPLYING SANCTIONS SHOULD HAVEEVER BEEN CONTEMPLATED MUCH LESS DIRECTLY COMMUNICATED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE FIRST PLACE.

*As 1st Com. to the
Gen. Ref. to the*

5. IN USUN 5558 WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO "STAND BY" FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE QUESTIONS POSED IN STATE 255900 ARE ANSWERED BEFORE THIS INSTRUCTION IS ISSUED. IF NOT, WHATEVER THE SEVERITY OF THE CRIME, THE USG MAY WELL TAKE THE PUNISHMENT.

6. I SUBMIT THAT THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE PRESENT FIASCO CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE OF THE DEPARTMENT TO ALLOW THE ISSUE TO BE DEBATED BY THE POSTS CONCERNED, CLEARLY, TO HAVE DONE SO WOULD HAVE SUBJECTED THE PROPOSAL TO SERIOUS CRITICISM, WHICH WOULD HAVE LESSENED THE PROBABILITY OF ITS ADOPTION. THIS IS AS IT SHOULD BE. HOWEVER, IF, AFTER HEARING THE OBJECTIONS POSTS WOULD HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY VOICED TO THE PROPOSAL, THE DEPARTMENT STILL WISHED TO GO AHEAD, IT WOULD HAVE DONE SO WITH A CLEARER IDEA OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS DECISION, MORE IMPORTANTLY, HAVING HEARD THE OBJECTIONS BEFOREHAND, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN A BETTER POSITION TO TAILOR ITS ACTIONS TO MORE APPROPRIATELY ACHIEVE US OBJECTIVES.

7. TO PARAPHRASE SENATOR SPARKMAN, "IF THE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT TRUST ITS POSTS ENOUGH TO INVITE THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TAKEDFFS, IT SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE POST WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AMELIORATE THE EFFECTS OF ANY RESULTING CRASHES."

8. AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: THIS CABLE SENT THROUGH DISSENT CHANNEL REPRESENTS VIEWS OF FSO ZAMBITO ONLY. EMBASSY'S OWN COMMENTS ON SITUATION HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED IN BA-7234. HILL

As obtain

JULY 1975 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

TO : S/P [redacted]

DATE: September 15, 1977

B6

FROM : IO/LAB - [redacted]
Director, Office of ILO Affairs

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SUBJECT: Dissent Paper

The attached paper will, I hope, be considered in light of the fact that I am the only Foreign Service Officer who has had [redacted] ILO affairs since July 1975. The paper's content is based on my very thorough knowledge of the issues, including my participation for two years as member of the delegation. I would add that despite my close involvement I have nevertheless tried to maintain a critical viewpoint rather than automatically endorsing each policy decision. For example, I dissented very strongly from our sending the letter of intent in the first place, and I have dissented on several occasions since then.

B6

Suggested distribution: S/IL -Dale Good
Undersecretary Habib
Assistant Secretary Maynes

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment



5010-110

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DISSENT FROM CONTINUING US MEMBERSHIP IN THE ILO

I dissent from the US staying in the ILO, for the following reasons:

1. There is general consensus in the US that through June 1977 insufficient progress was made to justify staying in (see Tab A and B). (See also delegation report signed by US worker, employer, and government representatives).
2. Nothing has happened since then which would justify a decision to continue our membership.

(a) The "commitments" made by governments in recent weeks are the same ones we received at the beginning of our reform effort and throughout the two-year period. They do not change the picture in any way. The EC-9 letter to President Carter is vaguely worded and hedged with reservations. It was stimulated by Amb. vanden Heuvel and the State Department.

(b) Any commitment made by Blanchard is untrustworthy. He has consistently given in to pressure from the EE/G-77 bloc. At the June 1976 annual conference he collaborated with the G-77/Arabs in bending the rules to allow the Governing Body to vote twice on seating the PLO; we had won on the first vote; we lost on the second (Tab C). At the World Employment Conference (June 1976) he told the American delegation that the workers' and employers' groups had accepted Soviet-sponsored revisions in the final declaration; this in fact was not so (Tab C).

On June 9, 1977 he told us that his letter (which contained language we wanted) on the Arab-Israeli issue was not going to be changed, no matter what the Arabs said. A few hours later he re-wrote the letter to suit the Arabs. Later in the conference, when the CACR report was being debated and was clearly going to be defeated in a vote, Blanchard refused to adjourn the session even though Irving Brown (AFL-CIO delegate) urged him to do so. It should be noted that Blanchard gave in to G-77/Arab pressures even under the maximum threat of our letter of intent, when it would have been logical to expect him to be most responsive to our objectives. If we extend the letter of intent, our "credibility" will be greatly weakened, and there is no reason to expect Blanchard then to be more responsive or take more risks than he did in 1975-77 -- on the contrary we can expect less from him under such circumstances. Furthermore, he is up for re-election in 1978, and knows where the majority votes are coming from. Contrary to the statement made in IO's memo for the President's evening reading in July 1977, Blanchard is not a dedicated international civil servant. He is a politician.

Finally, it should be noted that Blanchard's letter/statement, if he should issue one, was done in response to an initiative of Amb. vanden Heuvel and the State Department suggesting that such a statement from him would be helpful.

(c) The recent "commitments" by a handful of Third World countries were stimulated by our request to the EC-9 that they make demarches to G-77 members to get some reaction to our withdrawal. Some G-77 were asked directly by Amb. vanden Heuvel (Colombia, for example).

The question then remains: with "commitments" from our allies and from the Third World so minimal in content and so clearly stimulated by USG initiatives (We received a demarche from Spain shortly after our Ambassador asked the Spanish Ambassador to do so, Aug. 29:) why should we conclude that "sufficient progress" has been made since the June conference to justify staying in the ILO? And what do we expect to achieve if we stay in? There is a consensus in the US that no progress towards our goals can be made unless we find agreement with other Third World members on common objectives. At this point we have no agreed-on goals even in the State Dept., much less with US workers/employers, and still much less tested out on EC-9 allies, so we have no basis to reach a decision that progress can be achieved. Clearly the majority of ILO members were and remain opposed to our goals set forth in the November 1975 letter. We have no new goals.

There is also consensus in the US that we must find a way to accommodate the Third World on structural reform if anything is to be achieved on other goals. Yet we have no proposal even in the USG, much less agreed on with US workers and employers. We know that the Third World wants to take a leading role in the Governing Body and also shift more power to the Conference where tripartism is weakest and we know that the GB as it is presently constituted is our best forum for achieving our goals. Any change will be for the worse. We have no solution to this dilemma, so an extension of our membership is like jumping from a plane without a parachute, hoping we will land in a haystack. Furthermore, why should we be making concessions, ("be flexible", say the EC-9 to President Carter) after having been let down by the ILO? Surely those who say they want us to stay in should be offering concessions to us. I do not understand why we are trying to "buy" our way back into an organization which has just made very clear that it is strongly opposed to USG objectives.

The CACR report - described as the conscience of the ILO -- has been rejected twice in four years. It is interesting to note that in June 1977, at the end of our major reform effort, we were only four votes closer to getting the report accepted than in 1974, and only gained 2% more of the quorum. In both years we were far away from getting the necessary votes to accept the report. (Tab D)

An analysis of the voting records of countries visited by the USG representative to the ILO in 1976-77 shows that personal demarches have no impact. (Tab E)

Some USG observers have tried to argue that the 1977 CACR report was rejected because of the delegates' "confusion" over the Arab-Israeli issue, unlike the rejection in 1974 which was focussed on the criticism of the USSR. The implication is that if it had not been for this confusion, the 1977 report would have been accepted. If this thesis was valid, there should have been a sharp increase (over 1974) in the votes cast against the 1977 report, reflecting the Arab/G-77 bloc concern about the Middle East. Yet in fact, in both years the Arab/G-77 bloc voted solidly against the report, making common cause with the USSR which was cited in both years (Tab). The Middle East was not the issue in 1977, and in 1977 there was in fact a very slight increase of votes in our favor.

During the final debate on the 1977 report, the delegates were told clearly (by the UK worker delegate) that the vote was not only on the report but on continued US membership. His statement was greeted with ribald laughter, jeers, pounding on the table, and applause. There was no misunderstanding as to what the conference was doing, and subsequent comments in July and August by some USG officials that delegates really did not know what they were doing are without foundation in fact. Quite aside from the lengthy debate on the report in the plenary before the vote, each member government had received a demarche from the USG, and 32 had received a personal visit by the USG representative. Delegates deliberately chose to slap the US in the face, knowing full well what they were doing, i.e. causing the US to leave the ILO.

The cables that DCM Sorenson sent immediately after the Conference should be re-read now, so that we do not delude ourselves about the attitudes of ILO members. There has been no change in those governments' foreign policies. They are telling us what we want to hear, indeed they are in some cases saying what we asked them to say.

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This/especially true of the "Communist/USSR threat" argument, which is unsubstantiated. (Tab F and G).

The analysis of voting for the past four years shows that there has been no significant increase in support for US objectives (Tab H). We collected a few Western votes under the threat of our letter of intent, not because of genuine agreement with our ideas. We cannot expect any serious support

from the Third World in the future; the LDC's do not agree with us on substance, and we will be perceived as a "paper tiger" with regard to our new threat to withdraw. This lack of credibility will of course be much worse if we do not have the AFL-CIO and Chamber of Commerce with us. Tripartism was one of the points in the Kissinger letter. Shall we now stay in the ILO on a non-tripartite basis?

Impact on Other International Organizations of Withdrawal from
the ILO

The memos written by the office directors handling WHO, UNESCO, ICAO, IMCO, ITU and a number of other international agencies are unanimously in favor of our withdrawing from the ILO (the agency director for UNESCO handled ILO affairs from 1972-1975). The memos point out that we gain by withdrawal and lose by staying in, with regard to other UN agencies. Attached is an additional memo pointing out that there is no adverse "ripple effect" in our withdrawal, since the ILO is a unique agency because of its tripartite structure and its activities in the international labor union field which make it unlike any other UN agency (Tab I). It has an existence and purpose all its own and is only incidentally a member of the UN system.

I believe that any ripple effect (and there may well be none) would be healthy, giving other agencies a signal that we will not automatically stay in international agencies "because they are there". Conversely, I believe that there would be a very adverse effect on the Carter Administration's policy of supporting and improving international agencies if we stay in. We would be sending a signal that would actually contradict the position of the new Administration (that the USG is committed to international organizations because we believe they make an important positive contribution to international relations.) If we stay in the ILO -- an organization which has been clearly shown to be out of line with US objectives and unreformable -- the signal will be that we have so little concern with international organizations that we do not care whether they are useful or useless, effective or just political debating arenas. Is this the message we want to communicate? How can the Administration go on saying that we support the UN system because international organizations are an important and valuable tool of foreign policy while simultaneously retaining membership in an organization which has conspicuously demonstrated its ability and desire to work effectively against international cooperation despite massive US inputs, resources, personnel, demarches aimed at halting these hostile trends?

Furthermore, there is a glaring and fundamental inconsistency in even expressing concern about the impact of withdrawal from the ILO on other agencies.

1. As Lane Kirkland pointed out at the CLC meeting (Tab J, p.6) such considerations were taken into account before the November 1975 letter was sent; if we thought that withdrawal should

not be implemented because it might destroy the UN system or at least set an undesirable precedent, then we should never have sent the letter. Carter endorsed withdrawal as a US policy on May 27, 1977!

2. How can we use as an excuse for extending the letter our concern about the withdrawal-impact on other agencies, while simultaneously saying in that very letter that we will withdraw in November 1978 if there are not sufficient signs of progress? If we are not going to withdraw in 1977 (because of the possible adverse impact) what is the credibility of saying we will in 1978? We are trapped in a Catch-22. We extend the letter because of our fear of withdrawal-impact and thus signal that we really will never withdraw; the withdrawal impact will be exactly the same in July 1978, and we will be telling the world by our extension (based on fear of withdrawal impact), that we will never withdraw.

Extending the letter of intent for one year: this is a legal gimmick, the kind we have been criticizing the ILO for. For example, we were severely critical of Blanchard, his legal advisor, and the officers of the Governing Body in June 1976 when, in response to political pressure, they manipulated the Standing Orders to allow a second vote by the Governing Body on giving observer status to the PLO for the World Employment Conference, after we had won the first time. The CLC met afterwards and agreed that when Blanchard came to visit the US in the fall, all CLC participants would "chew him out" for using legal loopholes for political purposes. Yet now we propose to stay in by these same methods. Our credibility in the ILO and elsewhere will be non-existent, on this point of "twisting the rules". One of the four points of the Kissinger letter will have been violated by the US. We will never again be able to criticize ILO members or the Secretariat when they bend the rules.

The idea of the extension originated with Ambassador vanden Heuvel who has been pushing it in Geneva; at a meeting with Blanchard and the EC-9 August 11 he suggested that they request a legal opinion for the ILO since it was not possible for the US to do so, for political reasons. The ILO Legal Advisor later stated that an extension was possible.

There are already indications that some members of the G-77 dislike the one year extension which they perceive as more US "threat" tactics.

7.

I think it is likely that our credentials will be challenged and that our membership status will be entangled in legalities for months, in the ILO and/or the International Court. This is a high price to pay, and the price goes higher, should we be ruled against. In any case it will be a sleazy spectacle: the right of the US to be a member of an international organization being debated, challenged, criticized. The impact on the US public, the US Congress, etc., as these attacks go on, month after month, may be very detrimental to the overall favorable posture the Carter Administration is trying to achieve with regard to international organizations.

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The ILO's legal opinion is suspect; in early 1976/USG representative raised the idea of extension with Francis Wolf, the legal counselor of the ILO, and was told to read the constitution which states that a notice of intent is for two years. When later that year the ILO secretariat itself began talking about an extension, the State Department's legal advisor informed IO that it was not possible and we so informed Blanchard (Tab K). Meany, Kirkland and Smith made this same point (about the illegality of an extension and the impact of our twisting the rules) when they saw Secretary Vance August 15 and also at the CLC meeting August 16 (see memcon and Tab J). Our July 30 options paper to the Secretary (cleared by L) states that an extension could be challenged on legal grounds in the ILC or in the ICJ (Option 8). L repeated this in its memo of September 1 which analyzes the ILO legal opinion. L concludes that "it is more likely than not that an extension would be upheld." That prediction of success is hardly encouraging in its degree of optimism. L's memo of September 2 concludes with the statement that the extension would leave us open to the same criticism we have made in the Kissinger letter, i.e. bending the rules.

Lane Kirkland said in 1976: "Were it not for the weak and sometimes irresponsible postures assumed by various representatives of the highest offices of the ILO, the letter of intent to withdraw from the Organization would in all likelihood never have been written." (Tab C) In other words, the US workers have publicly stated that the bending of the rules by Blanchard was the major cause of our sending the letter of intent. Our bending of the rules now makes us look like either fools or knaves.

RELEASE IN PART B6

Enc. B

Analysis of June 28 Note Verbale and Oral Statements
made by Personal Emissaries

The most recent indication of Bongo's lack of interest in maintaining good-faith relations was the behavior of his three "personal emissaries with plenti-potentiary powers" who tried to obtain the export license within 24 hours and when unsuccessful, called upon a Deputy Assistant Secretary in AF and made a number of false statements both orally and in writing. For example:

Roland Bru, the head of the delegation, stated that he was only the advisor to Bongo and knew nothing about airlines or airplanes; yet our files show him as a Director of the Air Transport Company of Gabon. Bru, a Foccart man, is bitterly anti-American.

Mr. Richon, another member of the delegation, a French Vice President of UTA, denied that UTA has maintained the first DC-8; yet UTA performed an engine change on the plane despite our efforts to prevent spare parts from reaching the DC-8. Richon is also with Foccart.

All three delegates denied any knowledge of the existence of the first DC-8, and responded with silence when asked if the plane was not being used by Affretair. Given the fact that all three Frenchmen are close advisors of Bongo, who has been several times told about the USG's concern about the use of the first DC-8 and who knows it is a factor in our delaying issuance of the license for the second plane, these denials are hardly credible.

The delegation presented a note discussing the history of Bongo's interest in acquiring the second plane (see Tab E). The note's false statements are rebutted below:

p. 2, pgh 2: EXIM did not offer any assurances of a favorable decision, since they have grave doubts about the use of the plane.

p. 2, pgh 5: Ambassador McKesson told Bongo during his visit in April that we had serious problems with the second plane because of the mis-use of the first plane; Bongo was very angry.

- 2.

p. 2, last pgh: we have explicitly stated our reservations, pertaining to mis-use.

p. 3, pgh 1: it was the USG which took the initiative to require documents establishing bona fide use of the second plane.

p. 3, pgh c: Bongo has told us orally that he plans to use the second plane to set up a competing airline, outside UTA.

pg. 3, pgh 2: Bongo did not inform OAU members, only the Secretary General who has no authority to make decisions. Moreover, the letters from the OAU officials simply acknowledge his having informed them of his intent to make the purchase; no approval was given.

pg. 2, last pgh: objections about Gabonese violations of sanctions were raised orally and in writing at the OAU summit.

pg. 4, pgh 1: Gabon's attachment to principles of African solidarity (e.g. support for sanctions) have frequently been shown to be non-existent.

pg. 4, last pgh: The "undoubtedly circumstantial incidents" could better be described as premeditated violation by the GOG of oral and written assurances to the USG concerning use of the first plane.

9/24/74

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	FBO	AID	
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PARAGUAY

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CONFIDENTIAL A-54

HANDLING INDICATOR TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE IN FULL

JUN 14 7 25 AM '72

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : AmEmbassy ASUNCION DATE: June 12, 1972

SUBJECT : NARCOTICS CONTROL ACTION PLAN

REF : Asunción's A-115, State 206403

1. BACKGROUND: THE DRUG SITUATION IN PARAGUAY

Paraguay has long been a smuggling center for consumer goods and the smuggling of such goods to neighboring countries (chiefly Argentina and Brazil) carries no legal penalties. Indeed, the smugglers--including military and civilian officials, pilots, and business and professional men--have operated quite openly and with the tacit approval of the Paraguayan Government. In addition, despite the existence of an official Commission for the Suppression of Contraband, the Government has turned its back on the illegal smuggling of goods into Paraguay, except for occasional moves against small-time operators. It is widely assumed that smuggling "concessions" given to various powerful military and civilian officials are part of the "price" of political peace in Paraguay. In some respects, all of Paraguay is a free port: a large percentage--probably more than half--of all goods entering and leaving the country are unrecorded. Ports of entry consist of a single international airport and a handful of controlled border-crossing points. On the other hand, there are hundreds of miles of river borders and an estimated 600 uncontrolled airfields and landing strips (402 of which are officially registered with the Civil Aviation Authority of the Defense Ministry).

Changing world drug trafficking routes have put drugs into the local smuggling pattern in recent years. Some of the traditional smuggling cliques with foreign ties are now trafficking in narcotics and dangerous drugs, and in Paraguay they have found

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Date: Initials:

FORM 10-64 DS-323

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Drafted by: POL: JWS/lums/pm	Drafting Date: 7 June 72	Phone No.:	Contents and Classification Approved by: Charge - Brewin
Clearances: POL/R - CDi	BNDD: Grayner	DAO: DWheeler	EDON - TCBrown
USAID: RWither	CONS: RJSerber	USIS: RWooton	MILGP: ColWaitt

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Page Two
Asunción's A-54

an advantageous warehouse, safe haven, and transfer point from which to move their merchandise to other points on the continent and eventually to the U.S. market. The major advantages of Paraguay as a transfer point are: the porous nature of the country's frontiers; its countless remote airstrips; its central location in South America; the lack of any legislation providing for criminal sanctions against drug traffickers; and the inefficiency, ignorance, and susceptibility to corruption of custom and police officials. It should be observed that it is widely accepted in Paraguay that protection and other assistance is given traffickers by some Government officials. Hard evidence of this is very difficult to come by; however, the Embassy has reason to believe that Enio Varela, a fugitive from U.S. justice on narcotics charges, enjoys the "protection" of Maj. Gen. ~~Arturo~~ Colman of the Paraguayan Army. As far as is known, Varela is not wanted on any charge in Paraguay.

Drugs involved in the traffic include: heroin, usually moving from Europe to the U.S. market through intermediate countries; cocaine, moving from the Andean countries toward the U.S. or other countries; and marihuana, grown in Paraguay and exported to Brazil and Argentina. (Marihuana plantings are not believed to be widespread or vital to the economic life of any region of Paraguay.) There is also some trafficking in amphetamines and other psychotropic substances, though we lack detailed knowledge of such traffic.

Drug abuse within Paraguay is as yet minimal, probably limited to marihuana use in the capital by a very small group of young people, and abuse of heroin, cocaine or amphetamines by even fewer persons. Drug abuse is thus not seen as a national social problem of significant dimensions within Paraguay. Despite considerable educational effort since early 1971 by the Embassy, working through the local press, there is as yet no national consensus about the dangers drugs pose for Paraguay itself. We have, however, detected in recent months an increasing preoccupation that Paraguayan youth, too, might fall victim to drug abuse. Since the official attitude is that the Paraguayan's moral qualities constitute a safeguard against drug abuse, such preoccupation does not manifest itself openly.

The Embassy has been assured on frequent occasions by ranking COP officials that the Government is sincere when it says it wishes to cooperate with the U.S. Government on the drug problem. Paraguay has taken certain steps in this direction and as recently as May of this year arrested three cocaine traffickers in collaboration with the resident BNDD agent. By and large, however, there has been more talk than action, and much more remains to be done by the Government before it can be said with any reasonable degree of confidence that the Paraguayan Government has made a real commitment to the elimination

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Three
Asunción's A-54

of narcotics trafficking through Paraguay. The reasons for Paraguay's rather indifferent record of cooperation can be seen in the natural inertia of the Paraguayan Government, the paucity of financial and other material resources at its disposition, and above all, the fact that action on the narcotics front does not yet have as high a priority within the Government as the United States would wish.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Four
Asunción's A-54

II. U.S. DRUG GOALS IN PARAGUAY

A. Long Term Objectives

1. Reduction in the smuggling of narcotics and other dangerous drugs into and out of Paraguay.
2. Prevention of narcotics and dangerous drug production in Paraguay.

B. Short Term Objectives

1. Reduction in the smuggling of narcotics and other dangerous drugs into and out of Paraguay.
2. Prevention of narcotics and dangerous drug production in Paraguay.
3. Extradition of the French-Argentine narcotics trafficker Auguste Ricord.
4. General recognition within Paraguay, particularly among key officials and opinion makers, of the need to fight drug production, drug smuggling, and drug abuse.
5. Commitment by the Paraguayan Government to a program of action, in cooperation with the U.S. Government and the governments of neighboring countries, to eliminate drug trafficking through Paraguay, as well as marijuana production.
6. Passage of the legislation already introduced into the Paraguayan Congress providing for criminal sanctions against drug producers and traffickers.
7. Creation of an effective drug investigation unit within the Paraguayan Ministry of the Interior.
8. Improvement of the administrative machinery relating to controls over drug exports, imports, sales, and storage.
9. Ratification of the Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs adopted at the Geneva Conference of March 1972.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Five
Asunción's A-54

10. Extradition of Enio Varela, a Paraguayan citizen who has been arraigned in the U.S. for drug trafficking and is a fugitive from U.S. justice.
11. Negotiation of a revised Extradition Treaty with the U.S., specifically providing (as the existing Treaty does not) for the extradition of persons accused of narcotics offenses.
12. Signature by Paraguay of the Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. on narcotics control cooperation.
13. Paraguayan membership in INTERPOL.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 111
Asunción's A-98III. STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE GOALSA. Unilateral Paraguayan Actions.

As already noted, the Paraguayan Government does not officially acknowledge the existence of a local drug abuse problem. Nevertheless, the submission to the Paraguayan Chamber of Deputies by the Executive of a draft law providing penalties for drug offenses and controls over the distribution of drugs in Paraguay is a tacit admission that the problem may have to be faced some day. The law did not reach a vote in the 1971 Congress and, since the opening of the current Congressional session, has been resubmitted to the Chamber. Even if it passes this year, it may well be some time before controls become effective, as there are none at the present time, and the staffs of those agencies responsible for carrying out the control provisions of the law will need to be enlarged and trained.

The Paraguayan Ministry of Interior has selected an Assistant Secretary-level official to head, in addition to his present duties, a new specialized narcotics investigation unit within that Ministry. No such unit exists now, nor are there any Paraguayan police officials familiar with techniques of narcotics investigation. Since the establishment of the unit is allegedly dependent upon the passage of the legislation now pending before the Congress and no provision has been made for it in the current budget, it would be early 1973 at best before the unit could function even nominally, unless, of course, the U.S. Government were to agree to assume the starting costs of the operation.

The Paraguayan Government gave its assent to the establishment of an office of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) in Asunción last year, and this office has been functioning since October. It is too early to characterize definitively the quality of working level cooperation received from local police. Despite the rumored involvement of both the Chief of the Asunción Police and his Chief of Investigations in drug trafficking and the latter's basically unfriendly attitude toward the U.S., however, it may tentatively be characterized as satisfactory thus far. On May 26 and 27, for example, three Paraguayans were arrested by detectives in the employ of the Ministry of the Interior for attempting to sell one kilo of cocaine to the BNDD agent in Asunción, who had set up the sale and alerted the local authorities to the time and place. The Embassy has just been informed that those accused will be held under the provisions of Article 79 of the Constitution (state of siege) until

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Seven
Asunción's A-54

legislation is in effect to provide penalties for narcotics offenses, then released, re-arrested and charged under the new law as if the action with which they are charged had taken place after passage of the law.

Paraguay signed and ratified the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1971, but has not yet adhered to the amendments adopted at Geneva in March 1972 which were designed to strengthen the International Narcotics Control Board and without which the Convention lacks teeth. Recently, Paraguay also signed and ratified the U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Furthermore, in July, 1971, Paraguay signed with Brazil a general health agreement in which, at the initiative of the former, provisions relating to control of narcotics and hallucinogens were included. For reasons unknown to us, however, Paraguay declined to have a reference to cooperation on narcotics control included in the Joint Declaration issued at the end of Argentine President Lanusse's December 27-29, 1971 visit to Asunción.

It is widely believed in Paraguay that certain high Paraguayan officials are involved in drug trafficking, though conclusive evidence is lacking and the facts in any event are hard to come by. A number of officials are known to be engaged in other types of smuggling, and circumstantial evidence links some with known drug traffickers. President Stroessner has asked us to furnish him personally with any information about drug trafficking by government officials, but for lack of conclusive evidence, we have thus far not complied with his request. The President has stated that he has looked into the rumors concerning the involvement of leading generals and civilian officials and is satisfied that they are unfounded and that those accused are innocent of drug trafficking, though, when pressed, he tacitly admitted that some of them might be involved in other types of smuggling. We doubt that his investigation has been more than perfunctory, and, while we believe that he is disturbed by the increasingly unfavorable publicity Paraguay is receiving as a drug transfer center and may well be opposed to drug trafficking on moral grounds, it is not certain that he would crack down on officials involved in trafficking if he believed his power position would be threatened were he to do so. Meanwhile, Paraguayan-American relations, which up until a year ago were very good, have been adversely affected by the serious complicating factor of the drug issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Eight
Asunción's A-54B. Bilateral U.S. - Paraguayan Actions

In view of the fact that the actions by the Paraguayan Government thus far do not indicate that it regards the drug problem as a serious one, and since its cooperation in the fight on trafficking/has been minimal, it seems clear that the U.S. effort to secure cooperation must now be stepped up. While we have recently made it clear that failure to extradite Augusto Ricord could have serious consequences for Paraguay, we have basically used the carrot rather than the stick approach until now. Moreover, we have laid such stress on securing Ricord's extradition that the Paraguayan Government might well be excused for thinking that, if only Ricord is delivered, the U.S. Government will be satisfied and will forget that the country continues to serve as a drug transfer center. Thus, it is apparent that the time has come to tell the Paraguayan Government that we will not go on tolerating their dilatory approach to the problem and that, if they value their relations with the U.S., they must attack the problem rapidly and on a broad front with bolder and more effective measures than any they have taken thus far. We should, moreover, be prepared to use whatever stick we can to convince the Paraguayans that we mean business. Should Paraguayan cooperation with respect to the drug problem remain unsatisfactory at the end of 30 days, we should determine what retributive steps are practicable and warn the Paraguayan Government, preferably in the person of President Stroessner himself, that the U.S. cannot continue its cooperation with Paraguay at the existing level unless, within a fixed time period, say, another 30 days, Paraguayan efforts to cooperate with the U.S. on the drug problem show a marked improvement. Should the Government not heed this warning, we should then begin to take selective steps to evidence our decreased cooperation. Possibilities in this regard could include avoiding public appearances in connection with Government-sponsored events, withholding fellowships and travel grants from high-ranking Paraguayan civilian and military officials, cutting back on commercial cooperation, delaying, reducing, and, ultimately, even terminating all economic development and military assistance until cooperation becomes manifest. Each successive step would be taken only after evaluating its probable effect on: the Paraguayan Government's attitude--including any likelihood of its causing the Government to conclude that it must not appear to act in response to "pressure"; our ability to maintain useful relations with those Paraguayans who could be helpful in dealing with the drug problem; and the interests of persons and organizations, both Paraguayan and U.S., which are not closely tied to the Paraguayan Government's immediate self-interest. Nevertheless, no such considerations should be allowed to inhibit action deemed necessary to secure the suppression of trafficking through Paraguay, since the U.S. has no national interests in this country comparable to our interest in controlling the traffic in narcotics.

Meanwhile, we should continue to improve our knowledge of and relations with those parts of the Paraguayan Government most directly

CONFIDENTIAL

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Page Nine
Asunción's A-54

involved in dealing with the drug problem--the police, the Ministries charged with law enforcement, health and judicial matters, the customs service, and the military who control Paraguay's frontiers and, directly or indirectly, all its territory. We would hope thereby to improve our own and their intelligence collection, push these entities to take stronger and better coordinated action, and encourage them to cooperate more effectively with each other and ourselves in combatting narcotics trafficking.

For some time now, we have been encouraging the Paraguayans to organize and train the specialized drug investigation unit within the Ministry of Interior which they envision. We have informally offered to help train Paraguayan personnel (using both AID and BNDD funds) for this unit, which initially is expected to have no more than half-a-dozen members. The Ministry has expressed its willingness to accept this offer, and, indeed, one official who is to be assigned to the unit is now in training at the International Police Academy. The Director General of the Ministry has informed the Embassy, however, that establishment of the unit is dependent

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Ten
Asunción's A-54

upon passage of the legislation now before Congress to establish criminal penalties for drug offenses and that, moreover, there is no provision in the current budget for the operations of such a unit. Thus, the earliest date for establishment of the unit would probably be the beginning of 1973, (the Paraguayan fiscal year is the calendar year), unless the U.S. Government were prepared to pick up the starting costs, and not for several months beyond that date could the unit be expected to be even minimally effective. Under the circumstances, it is probably too soon to consider what U.S. equipment might be made available to the unit on a grant or sales basis. Nevertheless, it seems likely that eventually all or part of the following will be needed: six radio-equipped four-wheel drive vehicles; six walkie-talkies; six pairs of binoculars; three narcotics field test kits; one light aircraft (the police now have none); two 35 mm. cameras with telephoto lenses; and assorted electronic surveillance devices. Though given the U.S. interest in the control of trafficking, the Paraguayan sense of priorities, and the limited resources of the Paraguayan Government, the Paraguayans would probably be disinclined to pay for any part of such equipment, the prospect of their doing so might be explored.

We have been pushing for passage of criminal drug legislation ever since the fall of 1971, when it was first presented to the Chamber of Deputies, and will continue to do so. Most knowledgeable persons, including opposition members of the Congress, express optimism regarding the likelihood of passage during the current legislative session, and the Minister of Interior has just told the Chargé that he expects final action on the law by the end of the current month. Such an outcome cannot be taken for granted, however. It is obvious that, had Stroessner made it patently clear to the Congress that he regarded enactment of the legislation as a matter of priority, the last session of Congress would have taken the necessary action. In addition to continuing the discussions we have had with members of the subcommittee considering the legislation, we will endeavor to expand our contacts with law enforcement and health officials both before and after the bill becomes law. In particular, we will be in contact with the Ministry of Health concerning the possibility that the Embassy might provide assistance, perhaps by the assignment on a temporary duty basis of a BNDD adviser, in the implementation of the registration, prescription and other control measures contained in the law.

When the proposal was first made that a conference be held under U.N. auspices to amend the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics, we urged the Paraguayan Government to send a representative to such a conference and to co-sponsor or at least vote for the amendments. Though we at first received replies encouraging us to think that our arguments had been accepted, we eventually learned that, in fact, the Paraguayan Government objected to those amendments that would

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Eleven
Asunción's A-54

increase the powers, especially the investigatory powers, of the International Narcotics Control Board, i.e., those very amendments that would give the Convention teeth. Recent inquiries as to Paraguayan intentions with respect to the amending Protocol have failed to elicit any commitment, and it is impossible at the present time to say whether or not Paraguay will ultimately sign and ratify the document. Nevertheless, we will continue to press for Paraguayan adherence to the amendments at an early date.

As already noted, we have made the extradition of the French-Argentine narcotics trafficker Auguste Ricord a prime objective and a gauge of Paraguayan cooperation in the fight on trafficking. Despite our efforts to bring home to the Paraguayans the importance we attach to this case and the unfavorable publicity for Paraguay generated as a result of the lack of action on it, we have no unequivocal guarantee that Ricord will ever be handed over to us or even that he will not ultimately be released from prison scot-free. On June 2, La Tribuna, one of Asunción's two independent dailies, carried the story that the case would not be decided until July. When asked to comment on this, Solicitor General Acevedo told the Chargé that he believed the decision would be handed down during the current month and that it would result in extradition. Acevedo, however, has proven an unreliable informant in the past. Just why the case has dragged out for 15 months is not known to the Embassy. The story most commonly heard is that powerful officials are protecting Ricord; clearly, the line taken by Stroessner--that the executive and judicial powers being separate in Paraguay, he cannot take any action in the case--is not credible, and Foreign Minister Sapena has admitted as much. To be sure, for a variety of reasons, it is probably not easy for Stroessner to intervene now that the case has been before the courts so long. Although it would have been simpler had he done so some months ago, intervention even at this point in time is by no means impossible. In any case, the delay has been the result of government inaction, not defense maneuvering. Having expressed our point of view on the Ricord case at the highest levels of the Paraguayan Government, we do not plan to take any further action for the present but will, of course, keep informed on developments in the case.

Whether or not Ricord is extradited, we should, as soon as a decision is handed down, press for the extradition of Enio Varela, an accused narcotics trafficker who is a Paraguayan citizen and a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Twelve
Asunción's A-54

fugitive from U.S. justice. We have thus far refrained from raising the Varela case officially with Paraguayan officials in order not to complicate resolution of the Ricord case. We have, however, made it known to officials, including the Solicitor General, that Varela is believed to be in Paraguay and that, in our opinion, he is extraditable.

For similar reasons, i.e., to avoid possible complications in securing Ricord's extradition, we have not thus far broached officially the question of a new extradition treaty, but the Paraguayan Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, speaking "extra-officially," recently told the Chargé that he hoped the U.S. would take the initiative on a new treaty as soon as the Ricord case is resolved. The present treaty, which dates from 1913 and makes no mention of narcotics offenses, is manifestly unsatisfactory, and we have concurred in a suggestion made by the Department that informal discussions leading ultimately to the negotiation of a new one might be held this coming fall.

Eventually, we may wish to sound out Paraguayan educational authorities on the desirability of including anti-drug abuse material (perhaps provided by the U.S.) in the Paraguayan school curriculum. A decision in this regard would depend upon the spread of drug abuse within Paraguay, public attitudes toward it, and our estimate of Paraguayan Government receptivity toward such a program, as well as on the availability of U.S. funds.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Thirteen
Asunción's A-54C. Multilateral Efforts

Insofar as we can determine, no multilateral effort in the drug field is being made in Paraguay at the present time. Neither the United Nations unit here nor the local offices of the various regional agencies have concerned themselves with the local abuse or trafficking problem. Paraguay has not contributed to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control and, given its financial problems, is not likely to do so. We doubt, moreover, that the Paraguayan Government would be receptive at this stage to an extensive and widely advertised multilateral program designed to deal with drug abuse, the aspect of the problem in which the U.N. is most interested elsewhere. As already stated, there is a tendency on the part of Paraguayan officials to deny that the problem even exists, and their sensitivities on this score might well cause the rejection of any multilateral scheme to deal with drug abuse. Should the problem here worsen significantly, however, the Paraguayan Government might be persuaded that it would be useful to have a U.N. or WHO/PAHO adviser on drugs attached to the Ministry of Public Health. (There is a PAHO adviser on other matters in the Ministry now.)

Prospects for cooperation at the sub-regional level do exist, and the first tentative steps in this direction were taken at the December 1971 meeting of the Ministers of Public Health of the Cuenca del Plata countries, which adopted certain recommendations concerning means of combatting the drug problem. At the time of the Embassy's last contact with the Paraguayan Ministry of Public Health, early in May, it was indicated that nothing had yet been done to implement these recommendations, though Ministry officials showed understanding of the problem. The projected conference of all or certain South American countries to be held soon under the auspices of the Brazilian Government could be a major step forward in the area of sub-regional cooperation. It remains to be seen, of course, what the practical results will be in Paraguay or elsewhere, but it seems certain that, at the very least, the conference will have the effect of reminding the Paraguayan Government of the importance of the drug problem and of increasing its awareness of the concern of neighboring countries and the measures being taken by them to fight drug abuse and trafficking.

Paraguay is not a member of INTERPOL, reportedly for financial reasons, and though the Paraguayan police apparently have satisfactory relations with their colleagues across the borders of the three neighboring countries, Paraguay has no formal agreements and no regularized exchanges of information with the police of any other

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Fourteen
Asunción's A-54

country. Indeed, Embassy officers have found themselves passing information through U.S. channels to Paraguay from her neighbors. Though this could hardly be described as a multilateral effort, the practice does benefit all the countries involved, particularly in narcotics intelligence work. With the establishment of BNDD offices in neighboring capitals this process should become commonplace and more advantageous as more police forces are involved. We will, however, endeavor to point out to the Paraguayans the advantages of joining INTERPOL.

D. U.S. Unilateral Efforts

Although originally established with two agents, the BNDD office in Asunción has been manned by one for virtually the entire time it has been in existence and that one, being charged with regional responsibilities, has been absent in La Paz or Buenos Aires a good part of the time. In order to achieve maximum effectiveness, the BNDD agent in Asunción should be free of responsibilities with respect to any area outside Paraguay. Otherwise, he will necessarily be absent from time to time and, in his absence, the Ambassador will lack expert advice on drug matters, and other Embassy officers may be called upon to play roles for which they are not ideally prepared. Moreover, narcotics intelligence gathering activities will necessarily suffer, and it is obvious that more, rather than less, intelligence is needed. The anticipated assignment to the Embassy of a customs agent during the current month may alleviate, but will not wholly resolve this problem.

The BNDD agent assigned to Asunción has his own internally administered reward system. Presumably, the customs agent will also have his own. At some later date, consideration will be given to the desirability of providing the Paraguayan narcotics unit with money to reward informants.

In the field of public relations, we will refine and intensify our current educational efforts on drugs with the public media. USIS will be discreetly placing news articles, other publications, and radio programs, and films for television. Our efforts along these lines will continue to inform top Government leaders, as

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Fifteen
Asunción's A-54

well as the public at large, on the drug problem in general, and, hopefully, with time help to achieve the consensus regarding the local narcotics threat that is now lacking and enlist public opinion to an increasing degree in the war against trafficking.

We have sent to the U.S. as a leader grantee one of the Deputies sitting on the sub-committee of the Chamber that is now considering the draft criminal drug law, and two other Deputies and a businessman, also grantees, have been briefed in Washington on the drug problem. We will continue to use the leader grant program as a means of educating Paraguayan leaders with regard to drugs, as well as training and orientation programs offered by ENDD and Customs.

The post's Narcotics Coordinating Committee has recently been established on a more formal basis. All major elements of the Country Team are represented. Since the conclusion of the Curacao conference, the Committee has met three times, once to hear the report of the Embassy's representative at that meeting and twice to consider the present Narcotics Control Action Plan. It is intended that the Committee will meet regularly in the future.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Sixteen

Asunción's

IV. PRIORITIES, TIME TABLE, AND FUNDING

The following actions to be taken by either the Paraguayan or U.S. Government or both, as indicated, are listed of U.S. priority. Also shown are the anticipated dates of completion and initial funding.

Priorities

Time Table

- 1. Continuation by Embassy of current efforts toward extradition of Auguste Ricord, always tying this case to the more important overall anti-narcotics effort

To continue until case decided

Funding: Nil

- 2. Enactment of criminal drug law now before the Paraguayan Congress

July 1972

Funding: Nil

- 3. Establishment of a drug investigation unit within Paraguayan Ministry of the Interior

January 1972 if possible

Funding: Nil, unless USG picks up starting costs

- 4. Signature and ratification by Paraguay of Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotics

September

Funding: Nil

- 5. Signature by Paraguay of Memorandum of Understanding on Narcotics Control Cooperation

July 1972

- 6. Presentation from time to time to appropriate Paraguayan authorities, including, if deemed necessary, President Stroessner, of detailed factual information on the involvement of any Paraguayan officials in narcotics trafficking.

To continue in future

Funding: Nil

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Seventeen
Asunción's A-54

7. Following final resolution of the Ricord case, submission to Paraguayan Government of request for extradition of Enio Varela
Whenever Ricord case decided

Funding: Nil
8. Following final resolution of the Ricord case, negotiation of a new extradition treaty which would, inter alia, specifically enumerate drug trafficking and smuggling as extraditable offenses
Whenever Ricord case decided

Funding: Nil
9. Training and equipping of Paraguayan drug investigation unit
To continue so long as necessary

Funding: \$35,000 for equipment
(does not include airplane mentioned in text)
\$ 5,000 for training
10. USIA-USIS media drive to educate Paraguayan public opinion regarding drugs
To continue for foreseeable future

Funding: Nil
11. Paraguayan membership in INTERPOL
December 1972

Funding: Nil
12. BNDD advisor TDY to Paraguayan Ministry of Public Health on implementation of drug law
Whenever law enacted

Funding: \$7,000

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page Eighteen

Asunción's A-54

13. Assignment of UN or PAHO drug advisor to Paraguayan Ministry of Public Health for extended period

January 1973, if at all

Funding: Unknown

14. Inclusion of anti-drug abuse material in Paraguayan public school curriculum

July 1973, if at all

Funding: Nil

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Page Nineteen
Asunción's A-54

V. TOTAL ESTIMATED FUNDING

\$47,000

VI. MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the above action plan be approved in substance as a basis for pushing ahead on narcotics control in Paraguay, in lieu of the one submitted in Asunción's A-115.
2. That funds totaling \$47,000 be made available as appropriate to the agencies involved, to be expended as needed during Fiscal Year 1973.



BREWIN

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CLASSIFIED

PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOUTH ASIAN CRISIS AND UNITED STATES POLICY

PORTIONS ILLEGIBLE

United States policy has been slow to accommodate to the new power realities in South Asia stemming from (a) the abortion of democracy in Pakistan following the hopeful elections of December 1970, (b) the reaffirmation of political maturity in the Indian elections of early March 1971, (c) the attempted military repression by the Pak Army in East Pakistan beginning March 25, 1971, and (d) the continuing embitterment and resistance that repression has evoked in and around East Pakistan. Several home truths have been and remain evident: (a) Pakistan is probably finished as a unified state; (b) India is clearly the predominant actual and potential power in the South Asian region; (c) Bangla Desh probably is emerging as an autonomous entity or independent state; and (d) West Pakistan is a volatile polity with most uncertain prospects.

Arms et al.

During the past six months continuing US arms supply to Pakistan, while modest in quantity, has associated the United States with the military repression and put a severe psychological strain on goodwill for America in India and East Pakistan. United States promotion with India of several nonstarter proposals, such as United Nations observers to facilitate refugee return, counsels of restraint without reassurance, and suggested need for refugee count verification, has angered and embittered the Government of India. Moreover, United States Government reserve, as reflected in a dearth of top-level and sympathetic statements, correspondence and discussions, has suggested official United States inattention to and misunderstanding of the South Asian crisis, as compared to the relatively clear perceptions predominant in unofficial American expressions of opinion.

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No. 1000

There have been brighter aspects, including particularly the timely and substantial United States relief contributions for the many millions of East Pakistani refugees in India as well as the even larger numbers of distressed population in East Pakistan. There also have been real inhibitions on United States capacity for effective response including the perceived need to maintain cordial relations with the Government of Pakistan. Nonetheless, any doubt that the United States policy response might have been more effective should be removed by comparison with the actual USSR performance.

Educative Process.

The situation in South Asia is likely to get worse before it gets better since large-scale compulsive forces are at work, including alienated Bengal, reorganized insurgency, reinforced Indian and Pakistani Armies, and political necessities and rigidities within the Governments of Pakistan and India. Neither the major participants, Pakistan, Bangla Desh and India, nor the interested parties, the USSR, PRC and US, see the outcome clearly, and all have yet to endure a period of testing of assumptions and assimilating of realities concerning such basics as the degree of solidarity and persistence of East Bengali alienation; the relative effectiveness of the Mukti Bahin and the Pakistani Army; the political and economic staying power of the Government of Pakistan; and the projected rate and limits of refugee influx from East Pakistan to India.

Timing.

When timeframes are hazardous, the further unfolding of basic realities over the next couple months will be crucial for pending decisions all around concerning possible capitulation by the Government of Pakistan or the Bangla Desh insurgents. The response among the contesting parties, continuation and escalation of insurgency and reorganizing, and outright Indo-Pakistani hostilities, tension already

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... stated to felt ... probably ... December to January ... into the next transition ... probably ... "There probably is no intent on ... side to facilitate hostilities during the next "educative" period, although ... high state of military and psychological readiness on both sides ... risk of accidental escalation and could facilitate rapid implementation of any policy shift towards war

... causal problem of the South Asian crisis is political, and political settlement is the acknowledged solution. ... The Government of India seeks to pressure the Government of Pakistan with ... military intervention to deal with a representative ... of East Pakistan. This strategy, ... pressure on the ... wide-ranging support of the Mujib-Banhi insurgents, ... the Government of Pakistan ... military preparedness ... into the hands of the Government of Pakistan by ... The national unity policy of the ... as hard-line ... and some ... about its level of ... The Bengali ... continues to ... independence ... negotiation ... Indian-supported ...

Relief.

The immediate and symptomatic problem in the South Asian crisis is humanitarian relief in East and West Bengal. However, in circumstances of scarcity and conflict, relief supplies and third party presence inevitably have important political content. For the Government of India the ten million refugees from East Pakistan entail domestic and external imperatives with implications for political stability, economic viability and governing party and leadership strength. The Indian analysis, not a condition or prescription, is that these refugees will not return, if ever, until trusted leaders control East Pakistan.

Scorecard.

The South Asian crisis has enabled the USSR to score big in India, also in East Pakistan, and still to hold its own in West Pakistan. The US has scored largely the reverse, that is, held on in West Pakistan (population 60 million) and lost badly in India (550 million) and in East Pakistan (70 million). All is not lost, however, and with Indian-American relations at an all time low, the prospects, short of an Indo-Pakistani war, are for some improvement. However, it will be an uphill job, to transcend a low-level holding operation.

Recovery.

If war comes the United States will likely suffer even more severely in India and in East and West Pakistan for its currently ambiguous posture and its historically military supply role. The United States is more blamed than it deserves and as the facts are increasingly digested, there perhaps will be some second thoughts in India and East Pakistan about US policy intentions if not effects. Then, too, there is still room for beneficial modifications of United States policy, such as categorically ending military supply and deferring other than humanitarian assistance to Pakistan, talking

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...to President Nixon, recognizing the importance of the psychological factor in South Asia, and cultivating appropriate styles in formulation and presentation. The reservoir of Indian-American goodwill, though greatly diluted, is still extant. Moreover, contradictions inherent in Indian and East Pakistani expectations concerning the Soviet relationship presumably will come to light and with unfolding events perhaps show United States policy in a somewhat better light. Also, it is not impossible, however difficult to envisage at this juncture, that the United States could even emerge as the least unacceptable and therefore indispensable mediatory party in the South Asian crisis. Meanwhile, the appropriate US posture in the South Asian crisis is one of patient concern, impartiality and availability, of seeking with all parties to cultivate dialogue and develop understanding, and of avoiding self-disqualifying positions and self-defeating initiatives.

Style:

These are anxious times in South Asia, but the United States cannot afford to be too anxious. Needed is a period of calm, watchful waiting to permit Indian and East Pakistani emotions to subside and to permit detractors to enmesh themselves in the contradictions. Fundamental is a perceived United States acceptance of the reality of India as the predominant power in the Subcontinent, against which the United States does not seek to counterpose any power combination. Secondary positive and negative actions to strengthen the United States image and its relationships with the Government of India also need to be undertaken, concurrent with brisk, frank and private defense of United States interests against prejudicial or discriminatory policy and action by the Governments of India and Pakistan. While the United States remains among the more important external influences in South Asia, it now has neither the opportunities nor the responsibilities of predominant influence.

Looking Ahead.

Over the next uncertain months of continuing crisis, it may prove necessary if Indo-Pakistani war is to be avoided, for the United States to facilitate or even promote a political settlement, while recognizing that Soviet interests, short of preventing war, remain essentially inimical to those of the United States. Particularly if Bangla Desh emerges or even if it does not, the East Pakistan area will need large-scale economic and technical assistance. For this assistance to be most effective, some multinational and regional development effort encompassing West as well as East Bengal may be indicated. In any event, complex, competitive and cooperative multinational relationships in South Asia are the prospect, hopefully with continuing western participation, further strengthening of the roles of other major Asian powers such as Japan and Indonesia, and gradual normalization of Sino-Indian relations.


October 21, 1971

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 18662 01 OF 03 171547Z 1125
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 18662

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, IS, EG, JO, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: THE UNITED STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS: NEED
FOR AN OPEN DIALOGUE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DRAFTING INFORMATION

THIS MESSAGE WAS CO-DRAFTED BY [REDACTED]

EMBASSY TEL AVIV. THE MESSAGE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH OTHER EMBASSY OFFICIALS, BUT NO CLEARANCES WERE SOUGHT.

3. SUMMARY: SINCE 1975, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY REAFFIRMED ITS POLICY, INCORPORATED IN THE 1975 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USG AND ISRAEL, NOT TO "RECOGNIZE OR NEGOTIATE WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION SO LONG AS THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND DOES NOT ACCEPT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338." IN 1982, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO THE U.S. CONSULATE IN JERUSALEM NOT TO ENGAGE IN OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH MUSTAFA DUDIN OR OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VILLAGE LEAGUES IN THE WEST BANK, THIS INSTRUCTION COMING IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE BY THE CONSULATE ON WHETHER ITS OWN PRACTICE OF AVOIDING CONTACT, FOLLOWED DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR, SHOULD BE MODIFIED. AS A RESULT OF THESE TWO POLICY DECISIONS, THE USG HAS EFFECTIVELY FORECLOSED COMMUNICATION WITH TWO ARTICULATE EXPONENTS OF PALESTINIAN INTEREST: -- IN THE PLO CASE, THE ORGANIZATION WITH WHICH THE GREAT MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS IDENTIFY AND SUPPORT AS THEIR POLITICAL SPOKESMAN. THIS MESSAGE URGES REVIEW OF BOTH POLICY DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THEIR INCONSISTENCY WITH OVERALL U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS OBJECTIVES OF MAINTAINING AND FACILITATING CONTACT AND DIALOGUE WITH ALL STRAINS OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE U.S. FURTHERMORE, THESE POLICIES SEVERELY HAMPER U.S. EFFORTS TO BROADEN PARTICIPATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, AND LEAVE THE FIELD OPEN TO THOSE FORCES WHICH SEEK TO PERPETUATE, RATHER THAN RESOLVE, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

4. IN ARGUING THIS CASE, WE ARE NOT UNMINDFUL OF THE EFFECT WHICH A CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY WILL HAVE ON ISRAEL'S PERCEPTION OF U.S. ADHERENCE TO PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, WE CONFESS TO SOME CONFUSION AS TO THE EXACT NATURE OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL REGARDING THE PLO, SINCE WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE 1975 MOU HAS BEEN AMENDED BY SUBSEQUENT

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS. IN A BROADER SENSE, WE BELIEVE THAT COMMITMENTS SUCH AS THESE NEED TO BE DEVELOPED WITH MUCH MORE CARE AND FORESIGHT, SO THAT U.S. POLICY DOES NOT FIND ITSELF HEMMED IN BY SWEEPING PROMISES MADE DURING THE ANXIOUS, LAST-MINUTE OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE SEE THIS LATTER PROBLEM AS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN VIEW OF FUTURE COMMITMENTS WHICH ISRAEL WILL INEVITABLY DEMAND OF THE UNITED STATES IN RETURN FOR PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

5. FINALLY, THIS MESSAGE ALSO ADDRESSES THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS OF HOW AND WHEN TO BEGIN THE DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO AND THE VILLAGE LEAGUES. WE BELIEVE THAT, AT THE PROPER MOMENT, THIS SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY COULD ENHANCE U.S. EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE PEACE PROCESS. END SUMMARY.

6. THE PROBLEM

(A) PLO: IN THE YEARS SINCE THE 1975 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, THE U.S. HAS RESTRICTED THE DEFINITION OF TERMS IN THAT AGREEMENT TO PRECLUDE ANY POLITICAL CONTACT BETWEEN U.S.G. AND PLO REPRESENTATIVES. AN EXCEPTION OCCURRED DURING THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR AND EVACUATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL FROM BEIRUT WHEN U.S.G. DIPLOMATS ENGAGED IN SECURITY-RELATED DISCUSSIONS WITH PLO OFFICIALS. FROM OUR OWN CONTACTS IN GAZA, AND FROM REPORTING BY OTHER MISSIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD, WE ARE PERSUADED THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS IDENTIFY WITH THE PLO AND ACCEPT THE PLO AS THE LEGITIMATE SPOKESMAN FOR PALESTINIAN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 TEL AVIV 18662

DISSENT CHANNEL

INTERESTS. ALTHOUGH MANY PALESTINIANS DISSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM PLO-INSPIRED VIOLENCE, THEY ASSOCIATE BROADLY WITH THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC GOALS OF THE MOVEMENT. BY NOT EVEN ENGAGING IN A DIALOGUE WITH PLO OFFICIALS, U.S.G. OFFICIALS HAVE THUS BEEN CUT OFF FROM GAINING INFORMATION AND SORELY NEEDED PERSPECTIVE ON THE PLO. THIS HAS OBVIOUSLY DETRACTED FROM U.S. MIDDLE EAST PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS, IN THAT WE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO DEAL WITH SELF-PROCLAIMED MODERATE PALESTINIAN SPOKESMEN WHO OFTEN REPRESENT LITTLE BEYOND THEIR OWN VIEWS OR WISHFUL INTERPRETATIONS OF PLO VIEWS.

(G) VILLAGE LEAGUES: IN LATE 1981, THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIE HERALDED THE FORMATION OF THE WEST BANK VILLAGE LEAGUES, PRIMARILY AS A POLITICAL COUNTERWEIGHT TO PRO-PLO INFLUENCES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. FOR REASONS BEST EXPLAINED BY CONGEN JERUSALEM, THE CONSULATE REFUSED TO MAKE CONTACT WITH VILLAGE LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVES FOR NEARLY A YEAR. IN RESPONSE TO A RECENT CONGEN REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE AS TO WHETHER THIS PRACTICE SHOULD BE MODIFIED, THE STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO MEET VILLAGE LEAGUE OFFICIALS, THEREBY FORMALIZING INTO POLICY A PRACTICE DEVELOPED OVER TIME. THE DEGREE OF VILLAGE LEAGUE SUPPORT IN THE WEST BANK, ITS REPRESENTATIVENESS AND ITS SCOPE OF ACTION INDEPENDENT OF ISRAELI INFLUENCE ARE CENTRAL, BUT HARD TO ANSWER, QUESTIONS. U.S. POLICY, HOWEVER, HAS NOW CUT US OFF FROM ENGAGING IN DIALOGUE WITH YET ANOTHER BODY OF PALESTINIANS.

FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE IN TEL AVIV, IN VIEW OF OUR BEING CUT OFF FROM THE GROUP WHICH PALESTINIANS CLAIM IS

REPRESENTATIVE AND FROM THE GROUP WHICH ISRAEL PROCLAIMS IS REPRESENTATIVE, WE DO NOT SEE HOW U.S. JUDGMENTS ON PALESTINIAN INTERESTS CAN BE FORMULATED WITH CREDENCE. FURTHERMORE, OUR NON-INVOLVEMENT HAS LEFT THE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL ARENA OPEN ONLY TO THOSE WHO, FOR DIFFERENT REASONS, ARE OFTEN NOT COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. IN A SITUATION WHEREIN ALL OTHER PARTIES HAVE VESTED INTERESTS IN PROMOTING COMPETITIVE PALESTINIAN VIEWS, ONLY THE U.S. CAN PLAY THE CRITICAL ROLE OF HONEST BROKER, A ROLE WHICH WE HAVE ABANDONED FOR LESS IMPORTANT, EXPEDIENT POLITICAL PURPOSES.

7. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

IF ANYTHING, OUR ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY IN RELATED CASES IN THE PAST SHOULD HAVE PERSUADED US TO PURSUE A DIFFERENT POLICY VIS-A-VIS PALESTINIAN CONTACTS. HAVE U.S. INTERESTS BEEN SERVED BY OUR REFUSAL IN IRAN TO MAKE CONTACT WITH DISSENTING ELEMENTS BEFORE THE SHAH'S DOWNFALL? OR NORTH KOREAN AND LIBYAN CONTACTS? IN THESE CASES TOO, THE OVERRIDING AMERICAN OBJECTIVE OF DIALOGUE WAS SACRIFICED TO EXPEDIENT

POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS, THE PRICE OF OUR MISTAKES BEING EVIDENT ONLY IN RETROSPECT. CANNOT THE SAME ARGUMENT BE USED WITH RESPECT TO GEULA COHEN AND THE TENIYA PARTY IN ISRAEL WHOSE PLATFORM IS TOTALLY AT ODDS WITH U.S. POLICY?
8. CONCLUSIONS

IN SHORT, U.S. POLICY REGARDING CONTACTS WITH PALESTINIANS -- PLO OR VILLAGE LEAGUE -- IS SELF-DEFEATING. WE URGE THE DEPARTMENT TO RECONSIDER POLICY AND DEVELOP WAYS TO PERMIT USG OFFICIALS TO GAIN FIRST-HAND IMPRESSIONS OF PALESTINIAN VIEWPOINTS. IN THE CASE OF THE PLO, WE SHOULD NOT FEEL THAT OUR 1975 MOU WITH THE ISRAELIS PRECLUDES CONTACT, HOWEVER FORCEFULLY THE ISRAELIS STICK TO THIS INTERPRETATION. IN FACT, THE 1975 MOU PRECLUDES ONLY RECOGNITION AND NEGOTIATION WITH THE PLO AS LONG AS THE PLO "DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND DOES NOT ACCEPT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338." IT DOES NOT RULE OUT CONTACT AND DIALOGUE -- A DIALOGUE WHICH IS NOT ONLY APPROPRIATE AND OVERDUE, BUT WOULD ALSO SERVE AS AN IMPORTANT IMPETUS TO THE PEACE PROCESS OVER THE LONG RUN. IN THE CASE OF THE VILLAGE LEAGUES, USG CONTACTS WOULD GIVE US FIRST-HAND IMPRESSIONS OF A MOVEMENT WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL BELIEVES WILL LEAD THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS INTO THE PEACE PROCESS.

9. IN ARGUING THE CASE FOR AN OPEN DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED OFF LIMITS TO U.S. OFFICIALS, WE ARE NOT UNHINDLED OF THE

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DISSENT CHANNEL

BROADER QUESTION OF THE CREDIBILITY OF U.S. COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL. WE NOTE THAT THE 1975 MOU WAS AGREED AS A VITAL ELEMENT TO CONSUMMATE THE SIMAI II AGREEMENT. WITHOUT IT, IT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH A SECOND STAGE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, SUBSEQUENT U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS DEFINED THIS COMMITMENT IN WAYS WHICH MADE THE ORIGINAL PROMISE TO ISRAEL MORE SWEEPING, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING EVEN LOW LEVEL DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH PLO OFFICIALS. ON THE QUESTION OF DIALOGUE WITH THE VILLAGE LEAGUES, U.S. POLICY IS ALSO BECOMING INCREMENTALLY MORE SWEEPING. FOR EXAMPLE, DECEMBER 12 PRESS GUIDELINES DRAFTED IN RESPONSE TO U.S. NEWSPAPER REPORTS HAVE ELEVATED THE ISSUE OF CONTACT WITH MUSTAFA DUDIN TO AN EXALTED PLANE WHICH, IT IS ALLEGED, HAS A DIRECT AND NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND U.S. REGIONAL INTERESTS.

10. FOR THE FUTURE, WE URGE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAREFULLY EVALUATE AND WEIGH THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMMITMENTS IT PLANS TO ENTER INTO. REGARDING THE QUESTION AT HAND, WE BELIEVE THAT A CAREFUL STUDY OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO REGARDING CONTACT WITH THE PLO AND THE VILLAGE LEAGUES SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN; AND WE HOPE THAT, FOLLOWING SUCH A REVIEW, A CONSISTENT AND LEGAL WAY CAN BE FOUND TO INCREASE U.S. DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERINGS WITH THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

11. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

FROM OUR READING OF THE MOOD IN WASHINGTON, WE UNDERSTAND THAT FEW ARGUMENTS WILL BE RAISED OPPOSING THE PRINCIPLES AND IDEAS OUTLINED ABOVE. THE KEY QUESTION, THEREFORE, IS HOW TO OPERATIONALIZE THIS CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY SO AS TO MAXIMIZE THE FULFILLMENT OF U.S. INTERESTS.

(A) TIMING

UNLESS THE RUSSEIN VISIT TO WASHINGTON DECEMBER 21 AUGERS A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TIME WOULD BE RIPE FOR THE U.S. TO CONSIDER PLAYING THE PLO CARD. IN DOING SO, WE COULD ESSENTIALLY TAKE THE SAME TACK AS WE DID WITH THE FEZ FOLLOW-UP DELEGATION, I.E. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS FAITHFUL TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, BUT WE ARE SEEKING WAYS THROUGH DIALOGUE TO ELICIT INTEREST AND PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

(B) TACTICS

WE MUST BE PREPARED BOTH TO PUBLICIZE OUR INITIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AND VILLAGE LEAGUES WHILE CAREFULLY PORTRAYING THEM AS PART OF OUR OWN ON-GOING

EFFORTS TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. WE DO NOT CONCUR WITH THE IDEA THAT HAS BEEN BROACHED THAT INITIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO SHOULD BE IN TUNIS OR ANOTHER ARAB CAPITAL BETWEEN A LOCALLY-STATIONED U.S. OFFICIAL AND A PLO OFFICIAL. RATHER, WE BELIEVE THAT A MID-LEVEL WASHINGTON-BASED OFFICIAL SHOULD TRAVEL TO A NEUTRAL SITE IN EUROPE. INITIAL MEETINGS WITH DUDIN OR OTHER VILLAGE LEAGUE OFFICIALS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE SAME TIMEFRAME.

(C) IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS

THE CENTRAL QUESTION IS WHETHER WE CAN CONTAIN THE DAMAGE IN ISRAEL, I.E., BY NOT GIVING THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE THAT THE U.S. HAS UNDERMINED THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THUS THAT ISRAEL HAS THE "RIGHT" TO ANNEX THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. FRANKLY, WE HAVE OUR DOUBTS AS TO OUR ABILITY TO ARGUE THE SUBTLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A MODIFICATION OF THE 1975 MOU AND A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH THE 1975 AGREEMENT INAUGURATED. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THIS IS A RISK WORTH TAKING AND THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH IS WORTH THAT RISK.
LEWIS

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May 14, 1973

DISSENT CHANNEL

[redacted]
Regional Legal Advisor
USAID Mission
Islamabad, Pakistan

B6

Dear [redacted]

As I promised in my letter of March 27, we have pursued the questions on South Asia arms supply that you posed in your dissent channel letter of March 21, 1973.

You have raised a number of specific substantive points. They are material ones and they deserve an answer. I have asked my staff, together with other concerned persons in the Department, to comment on them. These comments are enclosed with this letter.

The main burden of my letter is not, however, substantive. The important point for you to know is that the considerations you have raised have repeatedly occupied attention at the highest levels. They have been discussed in National Security Study Memoranda, in meetings of the Senior Review Group, in discussions with the Secretary, and in many other gatherings of persons at all levels who are concerned, as you are, with the implications of our arms supply policy.

I am personally convinced that these points have received an extensive and fair hearing, and have had an impact on our policy, for as the enclosed comments point out, we have settled on a policy that is very restrictive and is designed to meet many of the difficulties that you raise. Obviously these arguments did not carry the day in the sense that we did not impose a total arms embargo. As you are aware, there are strong counter-considerations--and, indeed, I am not sure that the logic of your argumentation necessarily leads to a total embargo.

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The dissent channel was created as a further means of ensuring that all points of view are brought forth in the interest of making the best policy choices. Your constructive concern in this policy question is appreciated.


Sincerely yours,

Signed
William I. Cargo

William I. Cargo
Director
Planning and Coordination Staff

Enclosure:

Comments on South Asian Arms Supply

Clearance: NEA/PAB - Mr. Bruce Laingen 

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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DISSENT CHANNEL//////////

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OEXC, SF
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE; CORRECTION

REF: STATE 163349

PARAGRAPH 2 REPTEL SHOULD BE CORRECTED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

2. CU PROGRAM IN SOUTH AFRICA HAS UNDERGONE SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION DURING PAST TWO FISCAL YEARS, GROWING FROM MODEST PROGRAM IN FY-72 TO ONE OF THE LARGEST IN AFRICA IN FY-74 AND ONE THAT APPROPRIATELY CONCENTRATES APPROXIMATELY 2/3 OF ITS RESOURCES ON BLACK, COLORED AND ASIAN COMMUNITIES. SUCH EXPANSION AND THE IMPORTANT EMPHASIS ON NON-WHITE GRANTEEES CERTAINLY HAS NOT GONE UNNOTICED BY THE SAG. GIVEN THE OCCASIONAL DISPLEASURE AND PERHAPS APPREHENSION SUCH EMPHASIS MUST GENERATE, THE RELATIVELY LITTLE INTERFERENCE ON THE PART OF THE SAG IS NOTABLE. KISSINGER

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/10/2001 (SCOTTON, FRANK W.)
TAGS: PEPR, PORG, US, CB, VM, ASEAN, XC, JA, AS
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM AND KAMPUCHEA

REF: STATE 057781-C

1. [] DISSENTS FROM REFTTEL ON THE BASIS OF HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE INDOCHINA AREA OBTAINED THROUGH 14 YEARS OF DUTY RELATED TO VIETNAM AND CHINA AFFAIRS. QUOTE THERE IS INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN SOME POLICY OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES SELECTED TO ATTAIN THOSE OBJECTIVES AS DESCRIBED REFTTEL. DISCUSSION OF CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP TO VIETNAM AND KAMPUCHEA IS CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT, AND REFTTEL GIVES INCOMPLETE APPRECIATION OF FACTORS AT WORK IN THE REGION. THE INTERAGENCY GROUP REVIEW COULD USEFULLY BE OPENED FOR RECONSIDERATION.

2. U.S. OBJECTIVES AS STATED ARE WORTH CONSIDERABLE EFFORT. HOWEVER I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT MORALE SUPPORT FOR DK UNITS OPERATING WITH LOGISTICS PROVIDED THROUGH THAILAND FROM CHINA REALLY CONTRIBUTES TO THE LONG-TERM SECURITY OF THAILAND, NOR IS IT LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM KAMPUCHEA. KHMER SURVIVAL AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION WERE MOST SERIOUSLY COMPROMISED BY THE VERY LEADERSHIP WHOSE

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CREDENTIALS WE ARE APPARENTLY PREPARED TO SUPPORT AT THE UNITED NATIONS. REDUCTION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND ELIMINATION OF SOVIET MILITARY ACCESS IN INDOCHINA WILL HARDLY BE ACHIEVED BY ACTIVITIES WHICH SEEK TO FURTHER ISOLATE VIETNAM POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY

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3. WE OUGHT TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA PROBLEM IS ALSO AT LEAST PARTIALLY A MANIFESTATION OF A CHINA-VIETNAM PROBLEM. VIETNAM BELIEVES ITSELF THREATENED BY CHINA AND WILL NOT ACCEPT A SOLUTION IN KAMPUCHEA WHICH APPEARS TO OFFER CHINA THE POSSIBILITY OF A TWO-FRONT STRATEGY AGAINST VIETNAM. I BELIEVE THAT THE REFERENCES TO RALLYING OF NATIONALIST FORCES TO OPPOSE VIETNAMESE, AND SON SANN-SIHANOUK RESPECTED NATIONAL KHMER LEADERSHIP, ARE "THIRD FORCE" CHIMERAS WHICH ONLY OBSCURE THE BASIC PROBLEM: HOW CAN VIETNAM BE CONVINCED THAT VIS-A-VIS CHINA.

S/S-O
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4. IN THE PAST WE ALWAYS UNDERESTIMATED VIETNAM'S RESILIENCE. THEY DO HAVE TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS, BUT THOSE PROBLEMS HAVE TO BE APPRECIATED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VIETNAMESE WORLD VIEW: I.E. VIETNAM IS THE WORLD AND INDOCHINA IS THE UNIVERSE. VIETNAM HAS A LARGE FORCE COMMITTED TO THE KAMPUCHEA PROBLEM. THREE YEARS AGO VIETNAM HAD A FORCE, ALBEIT SMALLER, COMMITTED TO THE SAME PROBLEM. THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE FOR THE VIETNAMESE IS THAT THE PROBLEM IS NOW HUNDREDS OF MILES WEST OF SAIGON RATHER THAN A ONE DAY DRIVE. VIETNAM WILL PAY A CONSIDERABLE PRICE TO PRESERVE THIS STATUS QUO.

5. THE PARALLEL POLICIES OF CHINA, ASEAN, AND THE U.S. TO CREATE PRESSURES AND IMPOSE COSTS ON HANOI SEEKING VIETNAMESE CHANGES OF POLICY ARE PRESUMABLY TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS OF CONVENIENCE. OUR VIRTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN A CHINESE STRATEGY OF UNREMITTING PRESSURE ON VIETNAM AND SUPPORT OF THE KHMER ROUGE, OUR

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ACTIVISM IN TRYING TO KEEP ASEAN UNITED ON A THAI-CENTERED POLICY, DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR CHINA'S OWN HEGEMONISTIC INTERESTS IN THE REGION AND THE DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS WITHIN ASEAN OF THAT ASPECT TO VIETNAM'S BEHAVIOR.

6. FROM THE DISTANT PERSPECTIVE OF RANGOON IT IS DIFFICULT TO FULLY-FOLLOW INDOCHINA DEVELOPMENTS AND IN RELUCTANTLY DISSENT WITH COLLEAGUE JOHN NEGROPONTE. HOWEVER I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRC HAS PLAYED A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN INDOCHINA, AND BASED ON THE CURRENT BURMESE EXPERIENCE WITH A PRC SUPPLIED COMMUNIST INSURGENCY ONE MUST STILL BE SUSPICIOUS OF CHINA'S INTENTIONS IN THIS REGION. AN INTER-AGENCY GROUP CAN USEFULLY DIVEST ITSELF OF LATENT ANTI-VIETNAM SENTIMENT AND ON A COMPREHENSIVE BASIS REOPEN THE VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA (CHINA-VIETNAM) SUBJECT FOR ANOTHER LOOK.
END QUOTE.
SHERRY

NOTE BY OC/T: DISSEMINATION COORDINATED WITH S/S-O, MANN.

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RELEASE IN
PART B6

March 15, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO : John R. Eriksson, Chief, Sector and Program Analysis
Division EPC/PDA/SRA

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: El Salvador Education Sector Analysis: Report on EDY
Period [REDACTED] 1977

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I. The Status of the Analytical Working Documents (AWDs)

Enclosed is a list of the AWDs, the preparation of which constitutes the last phase of the project.

AWD #1: This is a short introductory AWD completed quite some time ago.

AWD #2: This is the document that focuses on the repetition and dropout of basic education, the first efficiency issue, and the one I gave a briefing on at the PDA staff meeting. 150 pages had been drafted in AID/N and brought to San Salvador in December for review and critique and revision by ODEPDR. Shortly after arrival on the present TDY, I realized that it would have to be completely re-written. Why? Because one of the findings of this analysis was that repetition is being under-reported by a factor of 3 -- a finding first rejected by ODEPDR, later accepted, and still later used by ODEPDR as a basis for questioning our estimates of interyear or between-grade dropout for rural and urban areas -- an encouraging example of internalization with ODEPDR turning the tables on us and becoming more critical and precise than we had been. (By the way, yearly or within-grade dropout calculations are not affected.) As a result, Alan Saalfeld of BUCEN and I have spent a major part of this month re-writing AWD #2, with Edgardo Martinez of ODEPDR and Tony Boni of BUCEN reviewing and polishing. It will be taken to Washington April 3.

Main AWD #2 Conclusions: As a result of the analysis that will be described in this document the Ministry will know a great deal more about what's going on in the crucial areas of repetition and dropout than it knew before. This may be a large claim for only one document, but the claim, we think, is justified. One thing ODEPDR and we have learned is that the way certain data has been collected, and the way inferences have been drawn from certain data have been obscuring large, important problems. Repetition and illiteracy have

- 2 -

both been greatly underestimated because of ways the data has been collected (ways rather easily corrected). False inferences concerning educational progress have been drawn from increases in lower-grade matriculations swollen with large numbers of unidentified repeaters. As in most countries, between-grade dropout was not being quantified and, as a consequence, factors of insufficiency to which that particular quantification will lead were being mistaken for factors of inefficiency. So much for some of the important methodological findings which will be useful, I think, in other countries.

What is the major policy finding of AFD #2? Put in one sentence, it is the following: the rural population (which is twice as large as the urban population and which has a fertility rate almost twice as large and which is, therefore, the main supplier of the labor force) can have the primary education (sixth grade) graduation rate of its entrants (almost the entire rural population at this point) increased from its present 20% rate to the urban rate of 70% by eliminating the present insufficiencies, constituted mainly by "incomplete" schools. (Incomplete schools are schools with less than six grades. In 1973, there were 3,022 basic education schools, 1,347 of which were rural incomplete schools, of which 999 had 3 grades or less.)

This policy finding is presented in the document as a leading hypothesis which is accepted after consideration and examination of five rejected hypotheses and after examination of the accepted hypothesis. Each hypothesis is examined as a possible explanation of part or all of the difference between the 20% rural and the 70% urban graduation rates. Hypothesis-1 is that the lower rural rate is due partly or wholly to less demand for schooling in the rural areas as a result of greater opportunity costs. The hypothesis is rejected on three grounds: a) grade by grade, students are older in the rural schools, mainly because the average entry age is greater by 1 + years. Opportunity costs in terms of wages of agricultural production foregone are greater for older children. Were opportunity costs a determining factor a lesser representation of older students would take place; whereas the opposite occurs; b) were there less demand for schooling in rural areas, a higher yearly dropout rate in rural schools grade by grade could be expected. There's no statistically significant difference between rural and urban schools grades 2 to 6. In grade 1, the urban rate is significantly higher; c) 14% of the rural 7-15 year-old population commutes to urban schools, a sign of strong demand; rural schools are more crowded than urban schools -- additional evidence of unsatisfied demand.

Hypothesis-2. The lower rural rate is due partly or wholly to less capacity for schooling in the rural area. Hypothesis rejected on the grounds that rural school students did better on the achievement exams, almost without exception. Admittedly, they were invariably older by about 2 years. But there was no evidence of inferior capacity when ages are held equal.

- 3 -

Hypothesis-3. The lower rural rate is due partly or wholly to a lesser relevance in the curriculum for rural residents. This hypothesis was rejected on grounds similar to the above. If 'intelligence' (whatever that is) is normally distributed in the two areas, a significant difference in scores unfavorable to rural students could be attributed to relevance problems. No such difference appears. (Please note that we are not arguing that there is no curriculum relevance problem, nor even that it might not be more acute in the rural area, but only that as a hypothesis for explaining any part of the graduation rate difference the evidence is clearly unfavorable.)

Hypothesis-4. The lower rural rate is due partly or wholly to greater emotional maladjustment or alienation in rural schools. Here again the available evidence is unfavorable. Within-year or annual dropout rates are the best available indicators of maladjustment. Differences are not significant (for a 7 year period) for grades 2 to 5, and grade 1 (obviously the most important grade with respect to adjustment to school) has a higher rate for urban schools. (Incidentally, a large number of the AFD #2 findings are substantiated by AFD #6 findings concerning socio-economic characteristics of the 2500 subsample of tested students. For example, later entry in rural areas, highly infrequent out-of-school work, general evidence of satisfaction and adjustment with schooling in both areas as inferred from responses to attitudinal questions.)

Hypothesis-5. The lower rural rate is due partly or wholly to an inferior teaching-learning process in the rural schools. Once again, the evidence is unfavorable, whether the alleged inferiority is viewed as 'cognitive' (tests scores) or as 'affective' elements of the socialization process (lower first grade dropout).

Hypothesis-6. The lower rural graduation rate is due to the insufficiency of services in the rural area. This is the accepted hypothesis. There is a wealth of favorable evidence. 1) Schools in both areas and both zones are full; space is fixing matriculation. Pupil spaces per 7-14 school-age population in urban schools and matriculation per that same population are very close approximations, about 125%, and the approximations repeat themselves at the lower levels of the 14 urban departmental zones. The same very close approximation between spaces and residents enrolled, both as a national aggregation, and at department levels, takes place in the rural area, with available rural student spaces estimated as 43% of the 7-14 population. There is no evidence anywhere that space is underutilized - a sign of unsatisfied demand also evidenced by the commuting to urban schools of 14% of the rural school-age residents; 2) 1,347 of the 3,022 schools have less than the six grades, 989 have three grades or less. Since all schools are crowded,

- 4 -

the possibility of continuing in other schools is reduced, distance and transportation problems aside. 3) Except for grade 1, where urban schools have a higher rate, yearly dropout is not different in the two zones, whereas between year "dropout" which reflects lack or insufficiency, though difficult to estimate is obviously concentrated in the rural zone. 4) All schools are crowded, but rural schools are the most crowded. Minimum classroom space is supposed to be 1.3 m² per pupil. It is 0.90 m² in urban schools; 0.84 m² in rural schools. 5) The rural school and urban school distribution of total matriculation among grades is further evidence of the rural area school space shortage. 40% of the rural school students are in the first grade, compared with 21% of the urban school students; 52% of the rural school students are in the first and second grade, as compared to 36% of the urban school students. There appears to be a certain amount of infrastructure pyramid within the schools themselves. It is possible that the effort to get everyone into the system is leading to the expansion of first grade space at the expense of higher grades. The very high rates of first grade repetition (the grade repetition most seriously under-reported) also contributes to this phenomena. 6) The rural space shortage also helps explain the serious late entry in the rural area. There is not enough space for everyone, and so a very large number of students do not enter until age 9 or 10. If a rural child does begin to work at 13, and begins school at age 10, instead of age 7, he can get 3 instead of 6 years of schooling, and is likely to be, or to become, illiterate.

You have here a summary of the argument that raising rural primary graduation from 20% to 70% could be accomplished relatively easily since it is a straightforward insufficiency problem, and not a complex inefficiency problem. Getting both zones up above the 70% is a different problem. It would probably involve addressing elements in both areas; teacher training, nutrition, alienation, curriculum may all be involved. But the first priority is clear: it is providing the huge poor majority in the rural area with schooling opportunities they do not now have. It also seems clear that the impact on the literacy and skill levels of the future labor force would be immense, and that employment and rural development policies should be coordinated and integrated with school expansion plans.

So much for the benefits. What about the costs? I estimate that completion of the incomplete schools (or their "nuclearization" with nearby feeder and receiver arrangements) would involve an increase of around 15% in the basic education operating or recurring budget, or about 10% of the total public education operating budget. This would be a very modest cost when compared to the benefits.

The little table below is something we believe could be accurately filled yearly at any level of aggregation if certain data

- 5 -

collection and tabulations changes are made. This one is for grades 1-5 at the national level; the rates are percentages of grades 1-5 initial matriculation (includes repeaters); some are crude estimates for reasons mentioned previously.

Total 'Dropout'	Within Grade Yearly Dropout	Between-Grade Interyear 'Dropout'
13%	10%	8%
Permanent 'Dropout'	Permanent Yearly Dropout	Permanent Inter-Year 'Dropout'
13%	5%	6%
Non-Permanent 'Dropout'	Non-Permanent Yearly Dropout	Non-Permanent Inter-Year Dropout
5%	5%	0%

Total Repetition : 26%
Reported Repetition: 3%

This tabular summary of flow "inefficiencies" may give a sense of the magnitude of the present waste of finances and, more important, potential human talent, and serve as introduction to more specific comments. Again, the basic contention is that the "inefficiencies" are primarily reflections of insufficiencies. This is why "dropout" usually appears in quotes. Most of the time it would be more accurately characterized as "lock-out" or "forced out".

Repetition. Highest in Grade 1 at about 35% dropping slowly down to 16% in grade 6. In grade 1, the average student is matriculating 1.6 times. This is a tremendous problem which was being completely mis-judged because of under-reporting by a factor of 3 and the lack of analysis which reveals data inconsistencies and unwarranted inferences. The model for estimating new entrants (and, therefore, repeaters) for each grade from the population census tape, designed by Alan Saalfeld of EUCM, will be useful for most countries, I think, since the two census questions of present attendance in school or not, and highest grade completed, are standard population census items. It is also noteworthy that we can get permanent "dropout" estimates from the model which sets the stage for estimating the nine kinds of "dropout" specified in the table above. I suspect this serious under-reporting of repetition and this clogging of the system at the first grade base is taking place in many, if not most, LDCs.

Another thing we have discovered is that a very large number of students who have passed the first grade are repeating it. Why? There seem to be 2 important reasons: 1) shortage of space in grade 2; 2) a widespread misconception (or viewpoint) by both parents and teachers that the child should "read" (sound the words

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of the phonetic Spanish language) after finishing grade 1. An 'oriented promotion' policy aimed at encouraging passing and thereby reducing repetition, introduced in 1971, has apparently been circumvented by repetition of students who have 'passed' -- a phenomenon overlooked by the policy-makers until the analysis uncovered it. We are now trying to quantify this 'new' phenomenon. (As I see it, the disaggregation bias in policy-oriented analysis should be 'qualitative', as well as 'quantitative' -- breaking up phenomena into sub-kinds, as well as making estimates for portions of known kinds.) Repetition for Grade 2 and above seems to be fed mainly by the within-grade non-permanent dropout of the previous year. Consequently, reduction of this dropout would be the best way to reduce this repetition. A fair part of this dropout might be reduced by eliminating crowding.

Literacy. Officially, there are slightly more than 1 million illiterates who are 10 years of age or older. In AWD #1 I dropped the hint that the official amount, based on the population census, was an under-estimate. In AWD #2 we make the case at greater length. It appears that the individuals who have never entered school tend to be marked as illiterate and those who have had any schooling whatsoever tend to be noted as literate. In 1971 over 1/2 million adults who had not completed the first cycle (grade 3) were in most part registered as literate, it appears. One of the implications of this under-estimation is that it will get worse if steps are not taken, since those who do not enter the first grade are approximating 0 whereas those who are 'dropping out' of the first, second and third grade are increasing. Here again, corrective measures involving changes in the census questionnaire and instructions to interviewers would probably be applicable to other countries. (Relevant to the question of schooling and literacy is the most important fact about the 24 achievement exams given to 55,000 students: the students in El Salvador are learning a surprising amount. School attendance through the six grades will assure development of basic skills.)

Permanent Dropout. As pointed out, about 70% of the urban residents and 20% of the rural residents have been getting a primary education. This means that 30% of the urban residents and 80% of the rural residents have become permanent 'dropouts' somewhere along the way before reaching the end of the sixth grade. (We have this by grade and zone, of course). One of the indications that late entry, high rates of repetition and the shortage space are very closely related phenomena in the rural areas, and that these do not reflect perceived need or felt demand for schooling, is constituted by the fact that in 1971 over 60% of the 12 year old rural residents were in school -- despite the rural space shortage. Why weren't these kids in the sixth grade, the prescribed grade for their age? Because of late entry, because of repetition (also due in part to space shortage) and because of the disincentive of the dead-end or incomplete schools (within the rural area, incomplete schools have

- 7 -

a significantly higher yearly dropout rate: if you can only get to the 3 grade, you take your time in doing so).

So much for the up-to-1971 experience. It has been contended that these patterns have undergone a significant change as a result of school construction in the last six years in the rural areas. As suggested before, after making corrections for underestimation of repetition our estimates indicate no significant change in the pattern. We believe the school expansion in the rural area may not have gone far beyond keeping up with the population increase (the rural area has a much higher birth rate and twice the population of the urban population). Fortunately, the 1975 1% household CONAPLAN survey picked up schooling level and attendance information which will allow us to compare that year with 1971. The CONAPLAN tape is Harvard's most important data source in the relevance study it is doing for the analysis, and Russell Davis will provide us with the tables we need shortly after his return next week.

Yearly Dropout. Both here, as in matriculation data, reporting is accurate, and the oriented promotion has had positive effects, lowering the annual dropout rates somewhat. Fortunately, in the rural areas, half-day schools have lower annual dropout rates than whole day schools. In the urban schools, taking all grades into consideration, there is no significant difference regarding within-grade dropout between half-day and whole-day schools. So here we have a potential for economies with no sacrifice with respect to annual dropout. As mentioned before, within the rural area, annual or within-grade dropout is higher in the incomplete schools.

Between-Grade or Interyear "Dropout". This kind of "dropout" tends to be neglected, mainly because it is much more difficult to estimate. The estimate of 8% of initial matriculation involves more assumptions than are desirable, and it may be more than 8%. All the students in rural terminal grades 1 to 5 who do not repeat or transfer to the next grade in another school fall into this category. If correct repetition quantities are obtained this can be estimated every year.

So much for the AFD #2 Conclusions. I will not describe conclusions for the other documents but simply report on their status.

AFD #3. Practically completed by ODEPOT. Expect to take Spanish version to Washington April 8.

AFD #4. Somewhat further behind, but expect it will be completed by departure April 8.

AFD #5. Have not been able to work on this here as expected. Will begin it in Washington.

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AWD # 6. Completed by Floyd O'Quinn of BUCEN and now being reviewed and revised by ODEPOR. Should be revised before April 8.

AWD # 7. Completed by José Ricardo of BUCEN. Review by ODEPOR to begin next week.

AWD # 8. First draft just completed by ODEPOR. Expect to review it next week. Hope to take it to Washington.

AWD # 9. Written but needs thorough revision.

AWD #10. This is where all findings on increasing the efficiency of basic education -- findings concerning repetition, dropout, cost, access, ETV, changes in socio-economic factors for improving performance that can be affected by policy, school inputs, analysis of test items and implication for curriculum and teacher training -- are integrated. It is a key document that will require considerable interchange between ODEPOR and ourselves.

AWD #11. Completed.

AWD #12. Structure or outline recently agreed to. Most of the data has been tabulated.

AWD #14. We have an outline but are having trouble getting the data because the university has been closed.

AWD #16. Both the approach and specification of available data need to be worked out.

Relevance. As you know, Harvard is carrying the ball on the USG side in this area. Russell Davis arrived last week and returns March 16. This morning he gave ODEPOR a report on activities. He described the model he has been developing with McGinn and other colleagues for analyzing relevance, the processing stage of the five data sources, and some preliminary results of the CONAPLAN manpower survey. Harvard seems to be moving quite rapidly, and I think it will develop some useful things in the area of relevance, both in terms of methodology and policy. Tomorrow Davis will be reporting on the organizational analysis directed by Warwick.

II. Next Steps

Completing the analysis through AWD # 23 by October is going to require considerable effort from everyone involved. After a month in Washington, I may have to return for a 2-month stretch. I expect to bring my wife and daughter on the next trip.

- 2 -

Edwin Anderson	-	USAID Mission Director
Allen Goldstein	-	USAID Deputy Mission Director
Howard Handler	-	USAID Program Officer
Ray San Giovanni	-	Chief/US AID/ENR
Robert Bartram	-	Chief, BUCEN RSSA
Robert Bair	-	BUCEN
Floyd O'Quinn	-	BUCEN
José Ricardo	-	BUCEN
Charlotte Jonnes	-	LA/DR/EST
Julio Schlotthauer	-	LA/DP
William Charleson	-	TA/ENR
Alan Saalfeld	-	BUCEN/San Salvador
Anthony Boni	-	BUCEN/San Salvador
Russell Davis	-	Harvard University
Noel McGinn	-	Harvard University
Donald Warwick	-	Harvard University

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 28, 1978

MEMORANDUM

TO: S/P - Mr. Anthony Lake

FROM: PM/SAS -

DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: US Policy Toward Kenya
and the Horn

This memorandum suggests that we should take a fresh look at the basic assumptions underlying our approach to the problem of indigenous Somalis living in the North Eastern Province of Kenya. A memorandum expressing the conventional approach to this problem--from which this message dissents--is attached at the end of this memorandum.

The Question: Is our present policy toward Kenya and Somalia best designed to contribute to long range stability in the Horn?

A Basic Assumption: The strongest political force at work in the Horn today and for the foreseeable future is Somali nationalism and irredentism.

An Immediate Problem: The Kenyan delegation of Vice President Moi, Foreign Minister Waiyaki, Attorney General Njonjo, and Minister of Finance and Planning Kibaki, which will be in Washington March 1-3, will be likely to request sales of defensive military equipment, possibly including additional jet aircraft, TOW missiles, artillery, and other significant items. They may request FMS financing to assist in these purchases. Assuming the Congress approves the FY 1979 request for \$10 million for Kenya, we will have provided \$70 million in financing since FY 1976, to cover the cost of 12 F-5 aircraft, in fulfillment of a promise.

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previously made by Secretary Kissinger. Up to the present, there has been no suggestion that we would seek to obtain FMS financing beyond FY 1979. The Kenyans, however, now fear that Somalia will seek to wrest control of the Somali-inhabited North Eastern Province, and are preparing to be able to defend the territory militarily. Our good relations with Kenya, and our desire that they continue, make it very likely that we will accept the Kenyan analysis of the problem, and seek to be responsive to Kenyan requests.

An Alternate View: Somali nationalism is the most cohesive force in the region. It will be dissuaded only temporarily by military force. The unifying force of common language, culture, religion, and a shared identity will continue to assert itself. We should realize that the key to long-range stability in the Horn is:

- Somali acquisition of the Ogaden
- and the North Eastern Province of Kenya.

U.S. efforts should therefore be directed toward:

- convincing Kenyatta of the wisdom of ceding Somali-inhabited territory to Somalia
- obtaining for Kenya compensating economic assistance to be used in the remaining, non-Somali areas of Kenya, rather than channelling such assistance into the NEP, where its effectiveness in buying the loyalty of indigenous Somalis is questionable
- providing Somalia economic assistance for use in areas newly acquired from Kenya.

This would:

- reduce tension by removing its cause
- eliminate the need for the GOK to spend large sums to defend against a Somali threat
- allow both Kenya and Somalia to get on with the business of internal development without diverting energies and resources into large military establishments

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- provide the grounds for a relationship of confidence and trust between the USG and Somalia.

In addition, we should:

- take no steps to oppose the actions of third countries to assist Somalia in retaining control of the Ogaden. (Similarly, we should do nothing to oppose efforts to assist the Eritreans in their struggle for independence.)

This would:

- recognize the temporary historical nature of the Ethiopian empire, now in recession
- suitably chastise the Ethiopians for their abandonment of close ties with the West in favor of the communist bloc
- be heartily welcomed by Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and other moderate pro-Western members of the Arab League.

The Problem: the Kenyan reaction to such a suggestion. Initial reaction would probably be that such a step would be a sign of fear and weakness unbecoming a proud nation, despite the fact that neither love nor trust currently exists between the Black African population of Kenya and their Somali compatriots. It is doubtful that any American official has ever had the temerity to broach such a suggestion, for fear of being accused of favoring the dismemberment of Kenya. Certainly, only Kenyatta has the stature to undertake such a step. Despite the initial, emotional reaction such a suggestion is likely to provoke in the average Kenyan, further consideration of the economic implications of such a decision--particularly if followed by increased outside economic assistance--would show the advantages. The key to popular acceptance of a cession of Kenyan territory would lie in the government's being able to demonstrate that such a step would contribute to the economic betterment of the non-Somali areas. A significant increase in grant American economic assistance, rather than an offer of additional FMS financing for military purchases, could help this end.

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As for the possible charge that negotiating a border adjustment could set off a chain reaction of similar pressures within Africa, the reply is that the Somali case is unique. There are no other cases in sub-Saharan Africa in which a nation consisting of a single ethnic, tribal, or linguistic group seeks to incorporate neighboring members of the same ethnic group into its body politic. There are in fact only three other African nations composed of a single ethnic or tribal unit--Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho--and there is no movement in these cases to incorporate neighboring areas inhabited by people of the same tribe into a single national homeland.

Obviously one could not simply propose the cession of the NEP to President Kenyatta without some preliminary preparation of the atmosphere. We should:

- further document and substantiate the unlikelihood that the NEP will ever make a net positive contribution to the economic well-being of Kenya
- float the idea of a cession of territory in the press and respected academic, foreign policy, or African affairs journals, so that the basic tenets of the argument begin to percolate within the Kenyan elite
- direct the attention of the television media toward the problem of the NEP
- enlist the assistance of members of the Legislative Branch, when visiting Kenya, to raise discussion of this issue, citing the press and periodical articles as a take-off point for discussion.

This course of action offers an opportunity to avoid a wasteful, non-productive effort to turn Somalis into something they never have been and have no desire to be: active, loyal Kenyan citizens. It would avoid wasteful military expenditures, the siphoning of limited skilled manpower into military and security activities, and possibly even military conflict itself. This no-win situation can be turned around, into a chain of events in which all parties--both nations and peoples--benefit, if only they will first step back and look at the problem objectively, free from the irrational desire to retain territory for territory's sake.

Attachment

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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APPROVED BY S/PC WICARGO
S/S: TLELIOTJR (SUBSTANCE)

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DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR [] [] [] AND []
USOM, BANGKOK

B6

FROM DIRECTOR, S/PC

REF: BANGKOK 5767

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE CONTAINED IN BANGKOK 5767. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE WILL RECEIVE FULL ATTENTION IN THE DEPARTMENT. INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THIS TELEGRAM HAS BEEN MADE TO THE SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE COUNSELOR, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM PANEL.

2. REFTEL RAISED TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE. ROGERS

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Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

ARA

EXDIS

PAGE 01 STATE 105097
ORIGIN 55-25

3858

STATE 105097

INFO OCT-01 150-07 550-20 /926 R

DRAFTED BY ARA/CEN: WMATTHEWS
APPROVED BY ARA: TATOUMAN
ARA/CEN: DC JOHNSON
ARA: FDEVINE
D/NA: MBOVA
NSC: RPASTOR
S/S: SEBASTIAN
P: JFORBES

-----091720Z 098559 /53

O 091706Z MAY 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 105097

EXDIS FOR THE AMB FM TOSHAN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, SHUM, US, ES

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH THE GOES

REF: (A) STATE 098384 (B) SAN SALVADOR 2055

1. -- I SHARE THE VIEW THAT AN ORAL MESSAGE BY MATTHEWS ALONG THE LINES OF REF A MIGHT NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONVEY TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT-ELECT (A) THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEW THE RICHARDSON CASE AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND (B) THE FACT THAT YOUR REPRESENTATIONS ON THESE MATTERS HAVE BEEN UNDER INSTRUCTION. UNFORTUNATELY, I CANNOT INCLUDE SAN SALVADOR ON MY ITINERARY.

2. MATTHEWS WILL, THEREFORE, BRING A LETTER CONTAINING THE POINTS MATTHEWS AND YOU WERE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE ORALLY EXCEPT THE ONE ON CAUTIONING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ON TRAVEL. THAT POINT SHOULD STILL BE MADE ORALLY, AS ITS INCLUSION IN A LETTER WOULD PROBABLY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

3. YOU SHOULD REQUEST MEETINGS AS PREVIOUSLY INSTRUCTED FOR YOURSELF AND MATTHEWS, BUT FOR WEEK OF MAY 22 INSTEAD OF MAY 15, AS MATTHEWS WILL NOW BE UNABLE TO TRAVEL BEFORE THAT TIME. YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT MATTHEWS WILL BEAR A MESSAGE FROM A HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL ON THE RICHARDSON CASE AND OTHER MATTERS FOR PRESIDENT MOLINA. BUT YOU SHOULD NOT SPECIFY WHETHER THE MESSAGE WILL BE IN LETTER FORM NOR THE IDENTITY OF ITS SENDER.

4. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE RICHARDSON CASE AND PRE- AND POST-ELECTION EVENTS IN EL SALVADOR HAVE COMBINED TO CREATE TENSIONS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS THAT WILL NOT BE EASED SIMPLY OR QUICKLY. NEVERTHELESS, I TRUST THAT THE LETTER AND YOUR ACCOMPANYING EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN WILL MAKE CLEAR TO MOLINA AND ROMERO NOT ONLY OUR UNHAPPINESS OVER THE FAILURE OF THE GOES TO BE RESPONSIVE TO DATE, BUT ALSO OUR CONTINUED HOPE THAT IT WILL CHOOSE TO ACT IN THE FUTURE SO AS TO RENEW OUR CONFIDENCE IN ITS DESIRE TO RESTORE GOOD RELATIONSHIPS. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE SALVADORAN LEADERSHIP IS NOT CURRENTLY INCLINED TO YIELD ON THE RICHARDSON CASE AND WILL NOT BE ADVERSE TO INTERPRETING FUTURE US ACTIONS TO SUIT ITS OWN SENSITIVITIES, JUST AS IT HAS DONE IN THE RECENT PAST. WE MUST MAKE CLEAR, THEREFORE, THAT WHILE WE IN NO WAY CONDONE ITS PAST CONDUCT, NOR CAN WE CONSIDER THE RICHARDSON CASE A CLOSED ISSUE UNTIL WE ARE PROVIDED A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE, OUR PRINCIPAL INTEREST IS THAT THE GOES

PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE OF FURTHER CASES SUCH AS THE RICHARDSON ONE AND, MORE BROADLY, THAT THERE BE AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE TOTAL HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR.

6. WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT INTEND TO MAKE LETTER PUBLIC UNLESS GOES IS COMPLETELY UNYIELDING. AND CERTAINLY NOT UNTIL GOES HAS HAD TIME TO REACT.

7. FYI: WE HAVE PRESENTLY UNDER INTERDEPARTMENTAL REVIEW THE QUESTION OF WHETHER, BECAUSE OF THE RICHARDSON CASE AND OTHER CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN EL SALVADOR, WE SHOULD ADVISE THE IOB THAT WE WISH TO HAVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE SAN LORENZO HYDROPOWER LOAN POSTPONED. IF WE DO SO, WE WILL ADVISE THE GOES THAT OUR DECISION TO DELAY THIS LOAN IS LINKED PRIMARILY TO HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN EL SALVADOR, AND WE INTEND TO EMPHASIZE THE RICHARDSON CASE AS A MAJOR PART OF THOSE CONDITIONS. SINCE THE USG POSITION ON THIS LOAN IS STILL NOT FINALIZED, THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE TIGHTLY HELD. END FYI. CHRISTOPHER

RF

*Pile Walker
document
file*

ACTION COPY

SECRET

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RELEASE IN FULL

AT/C B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LC NO. 42439
T-122/R-XXXIV
French

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF GABON IN THE UNITED STATES

No. 50404/AW

Washington, June 28, 1974

The Embassy of the Republic of Gabon in the United States of America presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to reiterate the extreme interest that its Government attaches to the immediate issuance of an export license for a McDonnell Douglas DC8-63-CF airplane now being purchased from Seaboard.

reported in Sept. 9 telegram

This aircraft is intended for the personal use of the President of the Republic of Gabon as well as for travel by official missions of the Gabonese Government. This transportation at present is provided by the expensive method of chartering flights on various airlines (Air-Afrique, UTA, Air Zaire, etc.); *- of what kind?*

On numerous occasions this matter has been brought to the Department of State's attention, through both the United States Embassy at Libreville and the Embassy of the Republic of Gabon at Washington. Furthermore, all pertinent documents were transmitted in due time to the American authorities.

Nonetheless, no decision has been taken, so the President of the Republic of Gabon decided to send a plenipotentiary and extraordinary mission to the Department of State, which the Ambassador of the Republic of Gabon had the honor to lead on Friday, June 28, 1974. The exceptional nature of

this mission underlines the importance that the Chief of State and the Gabonese Government attach to a prompt solution.

Indeed, it should be pointed out that:

1. On March 20, 1974, the Republic of Gabon, represented by its Minister of the Economy and Finance, signed the contract to purchase the aforesaid aircraft from Seaboard and immediately made a down payment of US\$ 400,000. The American authorities were advised of this transaction.

2. Concurrently, approaches were made to the Export-Import Bank of the United States, which offered the hope that a favorable decision would soon be forthcoming.

*not true
Levy, AEM who
att ended the meeting
Opposed the
arrangement
having heard
about the plan
from President
M. P. ...*

3. Furthermore, the American financial establishments consulted by the Gabonese Republic stated that they would make the additional financing available.

*Subsequently, during visit
at UNGA*

4. At that time, by letter of April 16, 1974, the President of the Republic of Gabon transmitted all relevant information concerning the use and operation of the aircraft to the President of the Export-Import Bank. The United States Ambassador at Libreville was also informed.

5. During his visit to the United States during the same period, the President of the Republic of Gabon was informed of no potential objections or restrictions concerning the purchase of the DC8-63-CF. Moreover, a contract for the purchase of a Hercules C-130 was concluded simultaneously with no difficulty being raised.

*not true, McKesson informed ...
problems
with the
Almond ...
George
C. ...
McKesson ...*

However, the delay in issuing the export license for the DC8-63-CF implied that the American authorities might have certain reservations that had never been explicitly stated.

*not so
clearly
stated over
concern the
nature of which
same led to
... of second*

not so
we told him USA
would write them
to OAU. then
he followed.

For that reason, in order to avert any restrictive interpretation, the Gabonese Government took the initiative of communicating fully all documents establishing the total regularity of the transaction, both economically and politically:

read
OAU
exchanges

1. On the economic level, the conclusion of a technical management contract with UTA guarantees:

a. Suitable logistics, since UTA, which is certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, will provide industrial maintenance and supply, train, and supervise the trained crews required on a permanent basis;

b. An effort to ensure a sound rate of return by integration with the operations of the UTA-Air Afrique group (both companies are members of the International Air Transport Association and have a DC8 fleet);

is this totally correct?

c. Harmonization with the present air system. Consequently, there would be no danger of disturbing its equilibrium through the introduction of a potential outside the provisions of the Yaoundé Treaty of which the Gabonese Government, a founding member of Air-Afrique, is a co-signatory.

where does Air Afrique come into all of this? security of AF lines?

2. On the political level, the Gabonese Government stresses that it informed its fellow African Governments that are members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and, in that respect, it produced both a letter from the OAU Secretary General granting approval confirmed by a letter from the Organization's Acting President, General Gowon, President of the Republic of Nigeria. Both documents clearly established the unqualified approval of this transaction.

no, the Secretary General

did not approve only acknowledged

intention to bring a bill

Furthermore, the recent OAU meeting held in June 1974 at Mogadiscio reconfirmed the total absence of objections.

not true, Babon was called in the report - considerable discussion conclusions are not.

As a founding member and partner of the multinational company Air-Afrique, as established by the Yaoundé Treaty, the Gabonese Government saw in this transaction an opportunity to point up its attachment to the principles of inter-African solidarity and therefore formally and publicly excluded any possibility of using the DC8-63-CF in contradiction to those principles.

*need
Rhodesia
Sanctions
breach
under the
statute*

The Gabonese Government again states, if necessary, that in no event will the DC8-63-CF be used in a different way that might somehow benefit any one of the countries censured by the international organizations of which Gabon is a member, such as the OAU, UN, and CAMO.

*not
on
Sept 9.*

Under these circumstances, the Gabonese Republic can only be surprised at the unexpectedly long period of time required to issue the export license essential for its purchase.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Gabon takes pleasure, however, in underscoring the quality of the bonds uniting the United States of America and Gabon. Furthermore, he notes that American enterprises have always met with cordial and understanding acceptance in his country, with whose development they are associated in many fields (manganese mining, petroleum prospecting, general equipment, etc.).

He is pleased that prompt approval could be given to the President of the Republic of Gabon concerning the supply of a Hercules C-130 aircraft and hopes that similar arrangements will permit the immediate delivery of the DC8-63-CF.

*funny how
they
the
Mangrove
there is a
linkage
but don't
know*

If in the past undoubtedly circumstantial incidents at times have troubled the serenity of relations between the United States of America and Gabon, the two countries nonetheless remain united by the same trust in the free

-5-

future of the Western world. It would be most unfortunate, therefore, if a totally unjustified misunderstanding were to alter this climate of mutual understanding and friendly cooperation profitable to both countries.

Conveying the deep concern evidenced by the President of the Republic and the Gabonese Government, the Ambassador of Gabon therefore solemnly expresses the wish that the American authorities will not further delay in settling this matter and avails himself of this occasion to renew to the Department of State the assurances of his very high consideration.

[Signature]

[Embassy of the Republic of Gabon
stamp]

RELEASE IN PART
B6



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

*JA for Long
file
present
Z... ..*

December 16, 1975

~~SECRET~~
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

[Redacted]
American Embassy
Buenos Aires, Argentina

B6

Dear [Redacted]:

We have received your dissent message (Buenos Aires 7386) regarding U.S. policy on the Korean issue at the United Nations this year. Based on your reading of several State and USUN cables, you have inferred a lack of coordination within the Department in developing and applying this policy. You also question the usefulness of such a policy without first having available the views of our diplomatic posts.

Both of your questions deserve and have received full attention. Your dissent in particular was a significant one because it dealt with the process of coordinating a highly complex, and rapid series of actions and responses on the part of numerous and geographically very dispersed actors. This is at the heart of our business, and doing it right is one of the principal permanent and structural problems before us. Therefore, continuous evaluation and criticism of the process, such as you have provided, is essential and welcome.

While all the messages you cite were signed "Kissinger" and hence the assumption could initially be made that they, presumably, represent fully considered Departmental policy, a close scrutiny of these messages shows they fall in two categories, as follows:

1. Only one of the three State Department messages you have referenced represents a policy line cleared by all interested bureaus of the Department. State 225930 was a world-wide policy statement coordinated and approved at the Assistant Secretary level of each regional bureau. The instruction was directed not to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

selected countries but to all countries "with which we maintain relations." The message to be conveyed was not "our willingness to re-evaluate our relations with them" in light of their General Assembly record but to make clear that their cooperation in the UN on issues of importance would be a consideration in our bilateral relations. The difference between your summary of policy and the actual statement is significant enough to point out. :

2. The remaining two cables, State 255900 and State 260081, were among the once-a-week messages sent only to ARA posts, called "ARA Weekly Highlights." These are not cleared outside of that bureau. Such a review of the week's events ("Bill Luers is on a speaking tour of the corn belt") in a chatty style is not a definitive policy statement. It is an "in-house" document designed to familiarize ARA posts with current developments and to convey some idea of major trends potentially affecting the posts and region. It is not a policy-making vehicle but a reporting medium for the Assistant Secretary to the Ambassadors of his region. Some confusion may have been created unintentionally by using this "in-house" document as a means of commenting on the bilateral pressure feature of our efforts to obtain support for our position on Korea, particularly when juxtaposed with our Department-wide approved policy statement. The Embassy, given its position as described in BA 7234, seems to have understood this distinction. If you will re-read the ARA communications, I think you will find that for the most part they address the Bureau's efforts to wrestle with the general problem of multilateral-bilateral coordinations, whereas you have applied their contents to the particular 1975 UN Korean resolution case. Thus, in State 255900 where the Bureau requests full but not urgent consideration of the general problem of translating bilateral into multilateral leverage, this broad topic is clearly a different one from the current operational Korean Vote problem dealt with seven paragraphs earlier in the cable.

Nonetheless, ARA will take steps to review the present terms of reference of the Weekly Highlights so as to make explicit the fact that it is a vehicle for sharing

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

with the field the discussion of policy in the process of being made, rather than a medium enunciating the final product.

In preparing for the Korean debate in the United Nations this year, we were confronted with the central issue of persuading those governments not wholly committed to hostility toward us to support our position on the competing Korean resolutions. Because the Korean security problem is of major importance to us we wished to make this fact clear to all states with which we have relations. As the Department's cable 225930 states: "they must realize that votes on the few issues which we define as vital to our interests are of such importance that failure to be responsive to our requests for cooperation will normally be reflected in our bilateral relations." While strongly stated, it is a realistic statement, for it is idle to suppose that bilateral relations would remain exactly the same despite displays of antagonism or lack of responsiveness toward the US on important matters. The power of the US to influence events is often over-estimated and the idea of sanctions does not necessarily apply; in some instances, could not apply. A political affair suggests political means, which can be more subtle than overt retaliation and which the Embassy in Buenos Aires appears to understand. Witness their cable 7234: "when our continued demarches finally convinced the Foreign Ministry that we placed extreme importance on this issue, they began to search for some means of accommodating us -- without giving away their own position," and further on in Paragraph 5, with the suggestion of a "bit of horse trading" over the Malvinas. In other words, our cooperation for your cooperation.

A Department cable, despatched to a number of embassies, detailing the US position on an issue before the UN and asking that embassies present a demarche to their respective host governments, cannot equally detail the approach each embassy should take in soliciting a vote, nor did the Department do so beyond making clear that the vote will be taken seriously and that this factor should be conveyed to the country. It would not appear a practical conduct of US foreign policy to ask 101 embassies to debate with the Depart-

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

4

ment whether or not the Korean issue is of vital American interest at this time, or whether the US should or should not make a determined attempt to secure votes for the resolution it submits to the General Assembly. The regional bureaus and country desks are, of course, consulted.


Obviously, each embassy is in the better position to determine the direction or degree of political pressure, or trade, most likely to succeed. Embassies are encouraged to suggest which forms of pressure are apt to be most successful and which likely to be counter-productive, but they need to understand that a simple appeal not to apply any pressure is not responsive to the Department's effort to deal with the problem. Thus, the question to be debated is how best to exercise persuasion vis-a-vis a particular government, in what area, and if a trade-off of some sort is indicated, what might be the US loss versus the gain of a UN vote. Inasmuch as the Korean issue will not be the last vote of its kind, these considerations must continue to be under constant review. Your dissent cable has been useful in furthering our discussion of these issues.

Sincerely,



Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

RELEASE IN PART
B6



THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL

[Redacted]

August 21, 1974

B6

Senior Seminar
Foreign Service Institute
SA-3

Dear-Tom:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your dissent memorandum dated August 9 (received in this office on August 14). In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your memorandum has been distributed to the offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff and the Chairman of the Secretary's Open Forum Panel.

I will see that you receive a reply to your most timely comments as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Ray F. Smith".

Raymond F. Smith
Chairman



Department of State

RELEASE IN PART
B6

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL 3111~~

PAGE 01 PRETOR 02911 021120Z

53
ACTION SP-03

INFO OCT-01 ES-02 /006 W

R 021053Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0160
INFO USIA WASHDC

106814.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PRETORIA 2911

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OEXC, SF
SURJ: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: PRETORIA 2857 AND 2787

1. I REFER TO DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE OF [REDACTED] (PRETORIA 2857) RELATING TO THE EXCHANGE VISITOR PROGRAM IN WHICH HE TAKES ISSUE WITH CERTAIN DECISIONS ON THIS PROGRAM WHICH I HAD PERSONALLY APPROVED.

2. IT CERTAINLY NEEDS NO DEMONSTRATION THAT OUR POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA IS, TO USE THE oft-QUOTED PHRASE, ONE OF ABHORRENCE OF APARTHEID AND THE RACIAL POLICIES OF THE PRESENT SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME. WE HAVE SAID SO, MANY TIMES AT MANY LEVELS. I SHARE WITH MR. PRILLAMAN HIS DISLIKE OF THIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICY, AND I AM OF COURSE FULLY AWARE OF THE MORAL DILEMMAS THAT OUR OWN POLICIES PRESENT IN THEIR ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION. WE CAN THROW UP OUR HANDS AND WALK AWAY FROM THE ILLIBERALITY OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, OR WE CAN KEEP HAMMERING AWAY AT IT, SEEKING CHANGE FOR THE BETTER STEP BY STEP. SINCE WE CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FULL FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, THE LATTER COURSE IS THE ONE THE USG HAS WISELY ELECTED TO FOLLOW.

3. FROM THIS HIGH-LEVEL DECISION FLOWS A NEED FOR ME TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBLE ACTIONS. WE INTEND

CONFIDENTIAL

2

B6

RELEASE
IN PART
B6

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

American Embassy, West Building, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi-21, India

Telephone : 7 0 3 5 1
Telegrams : 'USAID'

May 27, 1976

~~Confidential~~


Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
Acting Director
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Bartholomew:

Many thanks for your letter of May 7 commenting upon my dissent message ("Development Aid as a Political Weapon"). Interestingly, you suggest that timing played a major role in the decision to withdraw our aid offer. Of course, aid decisions then on the table would be bureaucratically vulnerable to political uses. I can well understand the pressures of the moment which prevailed. Nevertheless, one should expect that the art of foreign policy be more selective, rising above mere bureaucratic expediency.

While continuing respectfully to disagree with the aid to India decision, I am grateful for your candid and articulate explanation.

Sincerely yours,



Regional Legal Advisor

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B6

*see
Dissent file*

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LRM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REA 192

PAGE 01 STATE 228145

64
ORIGIN SPO-03

INFO OCT-01 /004 R

DRAFTED BY S/PC:LRMURRAY
APPROVED BY S/PC:LRMURRAY
ARA/PLC:MARTIN
C/Y:SHEEHAN

034484

R 192207Z NOV 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 228145

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, OGEN, DR
SUBJECT: DISSENTING VIEW

REF: SD 04585

EMBASSY'S CABLE 02L90 OF MAY 23 WAS INADVERTENTLY MISDIRECTED IN DEPARTMENT, AND AS RESULT, APPROPRIATE ATTENTION WAS NOT GIVEN TO SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN MESSAGE. WE ARE NOW STUDYING YOUR VIEWS AND WILL RESPOND WITH SPECIFIC COMMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ALL FIELD RESPONSES TO YOUTH PARA QUESTIONNAIRE ARE PRESENTLY UNDER STUDY, AND ENTIRE QUESTION IS EXPECTED TO COME UNDER FORMAL REVIEW IN 3 OR 4 WEEKS.
KISSINGER

DEI



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



ELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **RELEASE IN PART B6**
Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 047887
ORIGIN SP-02

0462

INFO OCT-08 ADS-08 ES-01 /803 R

DRAFTED BY S/P:HEROVIS:COB
APPROVED BY S/P:SDOSWORTH
S/P:ESVENDSEN (DRAFT)
S/S-M:CPATRIZIA (DRAFT)
P:RRAPHEL
WEA:VCLUVERIUS

ES
DP
AK

R 221505Z FEB 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

-----335705 221943Z /38

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 047887

DISSENT CHANNEL FROM BOSWORTH TO [REDACTED]

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, IS, EG, JD, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: THE UNITED STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS: A
NEED FOR AN OPEN DIALOGUE
FOR [REDACTED]
FROM S/P DIRECTOR STEPHEN BOSWORTH

REFS: (A) TEL AVIV 18662 (B) STATE 352554

1. ~~TO~~ ENTIRE TEXT).

2. REFTEL WAS A VERY THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE AND IT GAVE US A CHANCE TO REVIEW OUR POLICY ON A VERY IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE SUBJECT.

3. WE NOTE YOUR VIEW THAT THE U.S. SHOULD FOSTER AN OVERALL POLICY OBJECTIVE OF "MAINTAINING AND FOSTERING CONTACT AND DIALOGUE WITH ALL STRAINS OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE U. S." IN FOSTERING SUCH DIALOGUES, THERE ARE ALWAYS A NUMBER OF CONSIDERATIONS THAT MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. FIRST, THERE IS THE QUESTION OF HOW RELEVANT THE GROUP IS TO THE

ISSUE WE ARE CONCERNED WITH AND THEIR ABILITY TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THAT ISSUE. THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF COSTS AND RISKS THAT MAY ATTEND THE ESTABLISHMENT AND THE MAINTENANCE OF SUCH A DIALOGUE. SUCH QUESTIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS EASILY ANSWERED AND IN MANY CASES INVOLVE JUDGMENT CALLS.

4. YOU ARE CORRECT THAT THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1975, PROVIDED ONLY THAT WE "WILL NOT RECOGNIZE OR NEGOTIATE" WITH THE PLO UNTIL IT MEETS OUR CONDITIONS. ORIGINALLY, THIS LANGUAGE -- WHICH WAS NEGOTIATED WITH ISRAEL -- WAS UNDERSTOOD NOT TO PRECLUDE DIRECT CONTACTS. FORMER SECRETARY KISSINGER CONFIRMED THIS IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW LAST YEAR. NEVERTHELESS, IN THE YEARS THAT FOLLOVED IT CAME TO HAVE THIS MEANING. WHILE MOVING BACK TO THE ORIGINAL MEANING IS AN OPTION, THE ATTEMPT TO DO SO WOULD BE SEEN, AND USED POLITICALLY, AS A BROKEN COMMITMENT.

5. IN THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE DO NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL OR APPROPRIATE TO CHANGE CURRENT POLICY ON DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE PLO OR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN VILLAGE LEAGUES. OUR POLICY ON THE ISSUES OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE IS DEFINED BY UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. THESE PROVIDE FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS ON THE BASIS OF "RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT

TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE," AND IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT WE WISH TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PALESTINIANS. THE PLO HAS NOT ACCEPTED THOSE PRINCIPLES ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED THAT WE ARE WILLING TO CONDUCT A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IF IT WILL ACCEPT UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST IN SECURE BOUNDARIES. WHEN IT MEETS THOSE CONDITIONS, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TALK TO THEM. THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY.

6. IN THE MEANTIME, THERE IS ANOTHER FACTOR TO CONSIDER. THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS PROVIDE FOR THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO BE NEGOTIATED BY EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND THE U. S., AND THEY PERMIT THE DELEGATIONS OF THE JORDAN AND EGYPT TO INCLUDE "PALESTINIANS" FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA...." WHILE SOME OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA MAY BE MEMBERS OF THE PLO, THEY ARE NOT OVERTLY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH AND, IF THEY WERE, ISRAEL WOULD PROBABLY REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM ON THE GROUNDS

THAT THEY WERE TERRORISTS AND THAT THEY OPPOSED THE PRINCIPLES OF THE COA. IN ANY EVENT, THE COA DO NOT PROVIDE FOR REPRESENTATION BY THE PLO AS SUCH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON GETTING REPRESENTATIVE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA INTO THE JORDANIAN AND/OR EGYPTIAN DELEGATIONS.

7. INDEED, A PERSUASIVE CASE COULD BE MADE THAT -- AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME -- OUR POLICY GOALS WOULD BE HAMPERED, RATHER THAN FURTHERED, WERE THE PLO TO MEET OUR LONG-STANDING TERMS FOR COMMENCING A DIALOGUE. PUBLIC ATTENTION IN THAT CASE WOULD INEVITABLY FOCUS ON THE US-PLO RELATIONSHIP AND WELL-MEANING OBSERVERS WOULD CONTEND THAT THE PLO HAD EARNED A PLACE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE ESSENTIAL ISSUE OF ARAB ENDORSEMENT OF JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION WOULD AT BEST BECOME FOR THEM CONFUSED AND PERHAPS LOST SIGHT OF COMPLETELY.

8. AS FAR AS THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VILLAGE LEAGUES ARE CONCERNED, WE DO NOT REGARD THEM AS TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, EITHER JURIDICALLY OR POLITICALLY. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ELECTED AND HAVE NO REAL MANDATE FROM THE PEOPLE THEY PURPORT TO REPRESENT. IN FACT, SINCE THE VILLAGE LEAGUES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES ARE CONSIDERED BY THE OTHER PALESTINIANS TO BE ISRAELI COLLABORATORS, IDENTIFICATION WITH THEM COULD CAUSE THE OTHER PALESTINIANS TO EQUATE OUR GOALS WITH THOSE OF THE ISRAELIS AND DAMAGE OUR EFFORT TO GET TRULY REPRESENTATIVE WEST BANKERS INTO THE PEACE TALKS.

9. WHILE THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VILLAGE LEAGUES COMPLICATES OR PREVENTS AN EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THESE GROUPS, WE ARE AWARE OF THEIR VIEWS. THE VIEWS OF THE PLO ARE PASSED TO US ON A REGULAR BASIS BY THE SAUDIS, THE JORDANIANS, AND OTHER OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE CIRCLES. IN ADDITION, PLO OFFICIALS APPEAR FREQUENTLY ON RADIO AND TV IN THE U.S., WHERE THEY EXPOSE THEIR VIEWS. THE VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VILLAGE LEAGUES ARE OFTEN PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS.

10. YOUR POINT ABOUT THE PLACE AND MANNER OF THE DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IF AND WHEN IT BEGINS IS WELL TAKEN. THE SUGGESTION WE MADE FOR CONTACT IN JERUS WAS MEANT FOR THE PRELIMINARY STAGE. THIS NEED NOT BE THE

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Department of State

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... Y OR EVEN THE ULTIMATE WAY THE DIALOGUE IS CARRIED
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 DRAFTED BY ARA/CEN: FICKS/LCJOHNSON
 APPROVED BY ARA:TODMAN
 ARA:FDEVINE
 ARA/CEN:MBOVA
 ARA:GLISTER
 O/HA:KHILL
 ARA: FARMSTRONG
 ARA/CEN:WMATTHEWS
 ARA: D. TICE
 ARA/S- MR. SEBASTIAN

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 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE
~~SECRET~~ STATE 098384
 EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR FROM TODMAN

INFO. 11652:GDS
 TAGS:PFOR, SHUM, ES
 SUBJECT:RELATIONS WITH THE GOES: NEXT PHASE
 IN ANTICIPATION OF YOUR DEPARTURE ON OR ABOUT JUNE 1,
 WE WISE CAREFULLY AND EMPHATICALLY TO ADDRESS WITH THE GOES
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PAGE 02 STATE 098384
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 ROMERO.

THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE MADE:
 - FIRST, EXPRESS OUR CONCERN AND DEEP REGRET OVER FOREIGN
 MINISTER BORGONOVO'S KIDNAPPING AND OUR AWARENESS OF THE
 SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE GOES
 AT THIS TIME AND OUR DESIRE TO REMOVE YET ANOTHER COM-
 Plicating FACTOR - NAMELY, THE PRESENT TENSION IN US/GOES

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PAGE 1

OFFICIALS OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT. HE WILL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF HIS PRESENCE TO SPEAK TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL, HOWEVER, TO MAKE CLEAR THE UNABATING RESOLVE OF WASHINGTON TO PURSUE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AND TO CONFER ON ANY OTHER ISSUE OF INTEREST TO THE EMBASSY.

-- UNDERSCORE THE USG'S SERIOUS CONTINUING DISSATISFACTION OVER GOES REACTION ON THE RICHARDSON CASE.

-- INDICATE THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO RESOLVE THIS IRRITANT IN OUR RELATIONS .

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PAGE 03 STATE 098384
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-- SPECIFICALLY REFER TO OUR PROTEST CONCERNING THE QUESTIONABLE TREATMENT OF FATHER BERNARD SURVIL AND THE LACK OF READY ACCESS FOR CONSULAR OFFICERS TO TRACY NIELSEN.

-- STATE THAT WE SEEK FROM EL SALVADOR ASSURANCES THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT WILL OBSERVE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES AND PRISONERS.

-- MAKE CLEAR THAT IF NO SUCH ASSURANCES CAN BE PROVIDED, AND IF AMERICANS CONTINUE TO BE THE OBJECT OF QUESTIONABLE TREATMENT AT THE HANDS OF SALVADORAN OFFICIALS, THAT WE WILL BE FORCED TO CONSIDER EL SALVADOR A PLACE WHERE AMERICANS SAFETY AND RIGHTS CANNOT BE GUARANTEED AND WILL SO CAUTION THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

-- INDICATE THAT WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE FULL FINDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION.

-- NOTE THAT WE HOPE TO AVOID REACHING SUCH A STAGE SINCE WE ARE WELL AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN TOURISM TO EL SALVADOR, AND OF THE NEED FOR POSITIVE CLIMATE FOR AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN CONTEMPLATING INVESTMENT IN THAT COUNTRY.

-- END IN A COUNTERBALANCING POSITIVE VEIN BY STATING THAT WE DO NOT WISH TO HAVE EXACERBATED RELATIONS WITH EL SALVADOR AND WOULD HOPE THAT THESE REASONABLE REQUESTS CAN BE MET SOON SO WE CAN RESTORE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE FRIENDLY TENOR OF OUR RELATIONS.

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EXPECT THAT WE CAN OBTAIN FROM HIM ASSURANCES, PREFERABLY
IN WRITING (POSSIBLY COINED AS A RESPONSE TO OUR PROTEST
NOTE OVER SURVIL AND NIELSEN), THAT INTERNATIONALLY
RECOGNIZED STANDARDS OF TREATMENT OF DETAINEES OR PRISONERS

WILL BE MAINTAINED AND THAT THE SAFETY AND RIGHTS OF
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77 STATE 98384

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PAGE 05 STATE 098384

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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UNCLASSIFIED

November 4, 1974

MEMORANDUM TO: INR/CIS -

B6

FROM: S/P - Samuel P. Lewis

SUBJECT: Dissent Message on Visa Procedures
re Public Charge

We have been exploring your interesting dissent message of September 13 regarding the elimination of public charges under Section 212 (a) (15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and we took this matter up with SCA.

SCA advises us that "certain aspects of the message are of direct relevance to an overall re-examination of standards and procedures under section 212(a) (15) that is currently being conducted by the Visa Office, and it is therefore being considered in conjunction with this re-examination."

After the SCA review and further consideration by S/P, which we hope can be completed in the near future, we will communicate with you once again.

Clearances:

→ OFF - Mr. Smith *RS*
SCA - Mr. Recknager *TR*

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FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0128

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OEXC, SF

SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICAN PASSPORT DENIALS FOR EXCHANGE VISITORS

1. WE HAVE LEARNED SAG HAS REFUSED PASSPORT FOR IV GRANTEE ADVOCATE I. MAHOMET. WITH IV GRANTEE KGWARE AND CACHALIA, THIS IS THIRD REFUSAL IN RECENT WEEKS.

2. HOWEVER, MIN INTERIOR MULDER AS WELL AS DFA HAVE INITIATED PERSONAL TELEPHONE CALLS TO AMBASSADOR CONCERNING THEIR EMBARRASSMENT THIS ACTION AND STRESSED THAT IN EACH CASE, REFUSAL WAS BASED ON MATERIAL IN EACH INDIVIDUAL'S DOSSIER AND THAT THESE WERE NOT ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST US EXCHANGE VISITOR PROGRAM. MULDER DECLINED, HOWEVER, TO STATE PRECISE GROUNDS FOR SAG REFUSAL. DFA REPORTED SEC INTERIOR TO AVOID FUTURE PROBLEMS SUGGESTED ADVANCE CLEARANCE OF OUR PROPOSED GRANTEE WITH INTERIOR, WHICH AMBASSADOR FLATLY REJECTED.

3. IN VIEW OF FOREGOING, WE INTEND NO REPRESENTATIONS ON THESE REFUSALS. HOWEVER, MAHOMET MAY WELL TAKE REFUSAL TO PRESS. IN THIS CASE WE SHALL LIMIT OURSELVES TO STATING, AND ONLY ON AN IF ASKED BASIS, THAT SAG INFORM EMBASSY DIRECTLY OF REFUSALS - WITHOUT MENTION OF LEVEL - AND THAT QUESTIONS AS TO REASONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO SAG ITSELF.

4. WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE BEST LINE FOR ANY RESPONSE, INCLUDING BY DEPT., IN ORDER TO PREVENT POSSIBILITY OF DRYING UP ANY FUTURE COMMENTS WHICH OFFICIALS OF SAG MIGHT MAKE TO US.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 841

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EXDIT

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12065: RCE-1 3/10/2001 ISCOTTON, FRANK V.
TAGS: PEPR, FCRG, US, CB, VN, ASEAN, XC, JA, AS
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM AND KAMPUCHEA

REF: STATE 057781-C

1. [redacted] DISSENTS FROM REPTTEL ON THE BASIS OF HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE INDOCHINA AREA OBTAINED THROUGH 14 YEARS OF DUTY RELATED TO VIETNAM AND CHINA AFFAIRS. QUOTE THERE IS INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN SOME POLICY OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES SELECTED TO ATTAIN THOSE OBJECTIVES AS DESCRIBED REPTTEL. DISCUSSION OF CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP TO VIETNAM AND KAMPUCHEA IS CONFUSINGLY ADMIXED, AND REPTTEL GIVES INCOMPLETE APPRECIATION OF FACTORS AT WORK IN THE REGION. THE INTERAGENCY GROUP REVIEW COULD USEFULLY BE OPENED FOR RECONSIDERATION.

2. U.S. OBJECTIVES AS STATED ARE WORTH CONSIDERABLE EFFORT. HOWEVER I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT MORALE SUPPORT FOR DK UNITS OPERATING WITH LOGISTICS PROVIDED THROUGH THAILAND FROM CHINA, REALLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE LONG-TERM SECURITY OF THAILAND. HCR IS LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM KAMPUCHEA, FURTHER SURVIVAL AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION WERE MOST SERIOUSLY COMPROMISED BY THE VERY LEADERSHIP WHOSE CREDENTIALS WE ARE APPARENTLY PREPARED TO SUPPORT AT THE UNITED NATIONS. REDUCTION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND ELIMINATION OF SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN INDOCHINA WILL HARDLY BE ACHIEVED BY ACTIVITIES WHICH SEEM TO FURTHER ISOLATE VIETNAM POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY

3. WE OUGHT TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA PROBLEM IS ALSO AT LEAST PARTIALLY A MANIFESTATION OF A CHINA-VIETNAM PROBLEM. VIETNAM BELIEVES ITSELF THREATENED BY CHINA AND WILL NOT ACCEPT A SOLUTION IN KAMPUCHEA WHICH APPEARS TO OFFER CHINA THE POSSIBILITY OF A TWO-FRONT STRATEGY AGAINST VIETNAM. I BELIEVE THAT THE REFERENCES TO MALLYING OF NATIONALIST FORCES TO OPPOSE VIETNAMESE, AND SON SANN-SINAHOUK RESPECTED NATIONAL KHMER LEADERSHIP, ARE "THIRD FORCE" CHINESE WHICH ONLY OBSCURE THE BASIC PROBLEM: HOW CAN VIETNAM BE CONVINCED THAT OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA IS NOT A NECESSARY DEFENSE OF ITS OWN INTEGRITY VIS-A-VIS CHINA.

4. IN THE PAST WE ALWAYS UNDERESTIMATED VIETNAM'S RESILIENCE. THEY DO HAVE TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS, BUT THOSE PROBLEMS HAVE TO BE APPRECIATED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VIETNAMESE WORLD VIEW: I.E. VIETNAM IS THE WORLD AND INDOCHINA IS THE UNIVERSE. VIETNAM HAS A LARGE FORCE COMMITTED TO THE KAMPUCHEA PROBLEM. THREE YEARS AGO VIETNAM HAD A FORCE, ALBERT SMALLER, COMMITTED TO THE SAME PROBLEM. THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE FOR THE VIETNAMESE IS THAT THE PROBLEM IS NOW HUNDREDS OF MILES WEST OF SAIGON. RATHER THAN A ONE DAY DRIVE. VIETNAM WILL PAY A CONSIDERABLE PRICE TO PRESERVE THIS STATUS QVO.

5. THE PARALLEL POLICIES OF CHINA, ASEAN, AND THE U.S. TO CREATE PRECEDENTS AND IMPOSE COSTS ON HANOI CELEBRATING VIETNAMESE CHANGES OF POLICY ARE PRESUMABLY TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS OF CONVENIENCE. THEY REFLECT A DIFFERENCE IN A CHINESE STRATEGY OF WATER TIGHT PRESSURE ON VIETNAM AND SUPPORT OF THE KHMER POLICE, OUR

POLICY MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE INTERAGENCY GROUP IN THE REGION AND THE DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS WITHIN EACH OF THAT ASPECT TO VIETNAM'S BEHAVIOR.

6. FROM THE DISTANT PERSPECTIVE OF HANOI IT IS DIFFICULT TO FULLY FOLLOW INDOCHINA DEVELOPMENTS AND IN RELUCTANTLY DISSENT WITH COLLEAGUE JOHN HERRINGTON. HOWEVER I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRC HAS PLAYED A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN INDOCHINA. AND BASED ON THE CURRENT BURMESE EXPERIENCE WITH A PRC SUPPLIED COMMUNIST INSURGENCY ONE MUST STILL BE SUSPICIOUS OF CHINA'S INTENTIONS IN THIS REGION. AN INTER-AGENCY GROUP CAN USEFULLY DIVERSIFY ITSELF OF LATENT ANTI-VIETNAM SENTIMENT AND ON A COMPREHENSIVE BASIS REOPEN THE VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA (CHINA-VIETNAM) SUBJECT FOR ANOTHER LOOK. END QUOTE.
SHERRY

NOTE BY OC/T: DISSEMINATION COORDINATED WITH E/S-O, HANOI.

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RELEASE IN PART
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May 7, 1976

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[redacted]
Regional Legal Advisor, USAID
American Embassy
New Delhi

B6

Dear [redacted]:

Thank you very much for your dissent cable of March 10, dealing with the political uses of aid. You are raising points of genuine concern and ones that have been widely considered in overall aid policy formulation as well as in the specific case of India.

I could take issue with a number of the points that you make, but I am sure that you know the arguments and counterarguments very well. I would only point out that development aid to India became--as you express it--the sacrificial lamb simply for probably unfortunate reasons of timing: aid decisions were on the table at the moment when we felt that a political signal had to be sent; at the time there was no other relevant element of the Indo-US relationship available to be used as the medium for a necessary message.

In regard to the broader proposition of relating aid to political criteria, you have stated your case cogently and the problems that you raise are matters which in their general form we all consider to be far from closed questions.

I would observe that we believe it legitimate, both in relation to congressional mandates and to the standards of sensible public policy, that development aid decisions as among countries which are qualified on need and developmental criteria not be immune from considerations of a political, or inter-governmental order. In the case of India, when the head of government made and repeated statements about the United States which were both unfriendly and untrue (and which by implication supported suggestions that U.S. aid workers were intelligence agents) the demands of the political order for a clear and concrete response were of great importance.

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- 2 -

Your message is of course being forwarded to the Secretary. I had intended to suggest further that you submit the substance of it to Open Forum but as this letter was being prepared, Peter Lydon informed me that you had already done this. I think your piece will be a useful contribution to an important discussion, although it should not be shown as having been a dissent message as well.

Sincerely yours,



Reginald Bartholomew
Acting Director
Policy Planning Staff



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B6

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, IS
SUBJ: ISRAEL'S FY 1975 PL 480 TITLE I REQUIREMENTS

REF: A, TEL AVIV 2698; B, TEL AVIV 3305

1. FOLLOWING REPRESENTS DISSENTING VIEWS (SEE REF B) OF [REDACTED], ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL OFFICER.

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2. I BELIEVE EMBASSY'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL (REF A) WAS SOUNDLY BASED. TO EXTENT THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY SITUATION REQUIRES USG FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE--AND IT UNQUESTIONABLY DOES--MILITARY CREDIT AND SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE ARE APPROPRIATE. USG HAS BEEN GENEROUS WITH THIS AID, AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO BE SO. AS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (ESPECIALLY PL 480), ISRAEL'S INCREASING PROSPERITY HAS PROGRESSIVELY ERODED ISRAEL'S CASE. OUR PL 480 ASSISTANCE IS MORE URGENTLY NEEDED BY COUNTRIES WITH ONE-FIFTH OF ISRAEL'S PER CAPITA GNP.
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PAGE 02 OF 02 (2/20/02) 12:00:00 AM
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
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REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO YOUR CONCERN. INGSOLL

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 2, 1978

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MEMORANDUM

TO : PM/SAS -

FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake ✓

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Memorandum on Kenya

B6

I have received your ^{interesting} dissent memorandum on US policy in Kenya. I have distributed copies to the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, and the Chairman of the Open Forum, as well as the Under Secretaries for Political Affairs and Security Assistance, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and the Director for Politico-Military Affairs. Dan Spiegel on my staff will be coordinating our reply.

Thank you for using the channel. We will be responding as promptly as possible to the issues you have raised.

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w/ ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

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DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR S/P - OPEN FORUM FOR ERIC SVENDSEN NROM [redacted]

B6

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, EG, JO, XF, PLO
SUBJECT: THE U. S. AND THE PALESTINIANS: NEED FOR AN
OPEN DIALOGUE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE

REFS: A. 82 STATE 360755, B. 82 STATE 352554, C. 82 TEL AVIV 18662

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUGGESTION THAT WE CONSIDER PUBLISHING OUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE IN THE OPEN FORUM JOURNAL (REF A). WHILE WE AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE ISSUES RAISED WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO A WIDER AUDIENCE IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMUNITY, OUR PRIMARY INTEREST AT THIS TIME IS A FOCUSED POLICY REVIEW AMONG A LIMITED NUMBER OF DECISION-MAKERS. PUBLICATION OF THE VIEWS WE EXPRESSED COULD BE USEFUL UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, BUT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE THE TIME IS APPROPRIATE NOW TO PUBLISH THE MESSAGE.
LEWIS

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
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APPROVED BY SP: WALAKE
LA/DR: RGOMEZ (DRAFT)
LA/DR: MBROWN (DRAFT)
AA/LA: EW COY
S/P (OPEN FORUM): DKINNEY (DRAFT)
S/P: HXENTGES (DRAFT)
LA/CAR: GFGOWER



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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJ: DELETION OF FUNDING IN HAITI PROJECT 086 OF A.I.D.
FOR HEALTH DELIVERY SERVICES

REFS: (A) PAP 2945; (B) STATE 165854; (C) PAP 2647;
(D) STATE 186639; (E) PAP 3087; (F) STATE 24881

1. SUMMARY: THE ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR THE HEALTH PROJECT IN HAITI ADVOCATED IN YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE CAN BE INCLUDED IN THE NEW FY 1978 HEALTH PROJECT FOR HAITI. A.I.D.'S LATIN AMERICA BUREAU HAS NOT WITHDRAWN ITS SUPPORT FOR A MAJOR PROGRAM TO DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT A RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY SERVICE IN HAITI, BUT BEFORE ANY ELEMENT OF ANY PROJECT IN THE SERIES CAN BE AUTHORIZED, A PROPERLY PREPARED PROJECT PAPER MUST BE ON HAND THAT CAREFULLY PREPARES AND JUSTIFIES ALL PROPOSED EXPENDITURES, AND RELATES THEM TO THE LONG RUN GOAL OF THE PROJECTS.

2. IN YOUR DISSENT CABLE, (REF. A), YOU OBJECTED TO THE DECISION IN THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (DAEC) OF THE LATIN AMERICA BUREAU TO CUT FUNDING FOR PROJECT 086 - HEALTH PROJECT II - BY ABOUT THREE MILLION DOLLARS, THEREBY ELIMINATING ALL FUNDS FOR THE GOV MINISTRY OF HEALTH TO BE USED FOR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS, DRUGS AND

SUPPLIES, VEHICLES, PDL, CONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION, AND MAINTENANCE; AND FOR FUNDING YEARS 3, 4, AND 5 OF THE PROJECT. YOUR OBJECTION WAS BASED ON TWO GROUNDS: (1) IT BROKE FAITH WITH THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH, WHICH HAD BEEN ASSURED IT WOULD RECEIVE THE FUNDS IN THE NEW PROJECT AS PART OF A LONG RANGE PLAN TO DEVELOP A LOW COST RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY SYSTEM (RHDS) TO COVER AT LEAST 70 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION AND (2) IT WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP (DESIGN AND TEST) A PRACTICAL RHDS THAT COULD BE REPLICATED COUNTRYWIDE BY LATER PROJECTS. IN THE BELIEF THAT AID/W HAD DECIDED NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO CONSIDER PROVIDING THE DELETED FUNDS AT A LATER DATE, YOU REQUESTED THE FULL RESTORATION OF THE ENTIRE AMOUNT WHICH HAD BEEN CUT.

3. THE L.A. BUREAU BELIEVES YOUR OBJECTION WAS BASED ON SEVERAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAVE SINCE BEEN RESOLVED, SO THAT THE PROJECT IS NOW MOVING FORWARD PROPERLY.

4. FIRST, THE L.A. BUREAU AND AID/W HAVE NOT RETREATED FROM A POLICY OF WORKING WITH THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH TO

DEVELOP A WIDESPREAD RHDS IN HAITI. ONE OR MORE ADDITIONAL PROJECTS ARE PLANNED FOR THIS PURPOSE, AND IF A SATISFACTORY PROJECT PAPER CAN BE PREPARED, THE L.A. BUREAU HOPES TO AUTHORIZE A NEW PROJECT FOR THIS PURPOSE, NO. 091, IN FY 1978. THE ACTING MISSION DIRECTOR WAS ASSURED OF THIS COMMITMENT BY THE DIRECTOR OF LA/DR ON AUGUST 18, 1977, INCLUDING THE INFORMATION THAT THE ITEMS DELETED FROM PROJECT 086 CAN BE INCLUDED IN PROJECT 091 IF A PROPER JUSTIFICATION IS RECEIVED.

5. SECONDLY, WHILE PREFERRING THIS APPROACH, THE L.A. BUREAU IS ALSO WILLING TO CONSIDER A REQUEST FROM USAID/HAITI FOR AMENDING PROJECT 086 IF THE MISSION SHOULD WISH TO ARGUE THAT THIS COURSE IS PREFERABLE AND PRESENTS A SOUND JUSTIFICATION (REF. F).

6. THIRDLY, WHILE THE LATIN AMERICA BUREAU PLANS AND DESIRES TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT THE RHDS, IT HAD BY NO MEANS PROMISED, MANDATED OR COMMITTED THE FUNDS TO THE MISSION FOR THE PROJECT ELEMENTS WHICH WERE LATER DELETED BY THE DAEC. NOTWITHSTANDING THE LONG TERM COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE, EACH SPECIFIC COMMITMENT OF FUNDS FOR A PROJECT MUST DEMONSTRATE ADEQUATE PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND COSTING AND BE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY AID/W. THERE

WAS NO EXEMPTION FROM THIS REQUIREMENT FOR PROJECT 086. FOR THIS REASON, ALL A.I.D. MISSION STAFFS MUST TAKE CARE IN DISCUSSING PROPOSED PROJECT ASSISTANCE WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO AVOID CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT AN A.I.D. COMMITMENT EXISTS PRIOR TO BUREAU REVIEW AND AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDING FOR THE PROJECT.

7. THE L.A. BUREAU IN LATE JUNE HAD IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF WEAKNESSES IN THE PROJECT PAPER FOR 086 WHICH HAD TO BE CORRECTED BEFORE ALL PROJECT ELEMENTS COULD BE AUTHORIZED, AND NOTIFIED USAID/HAITI OF THIS IN REF (B). IT PROVIDED TDY ASSISTANCE TO HELP THE MISSION PROVIDE THE ADDITIONAL PLANNING AND JUSTIFICATION REQUIRED, BUT SINCE YOU WERE ON HOME LEAVE DURING THIS PERIOD, YOU MAY NOT HAVE BEEN FULLY AWARE OF THESE REQUIREMENTS, AND OF

COURSE, COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS. WHEN THE DAEC REVIEWED THE REVISED PROJECT, IT FOUND THAT A NUMBER OF ITS SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION HAD NOT BEEN MET. CONSEQUENTLY, FAILURE TO MEET STANDARDS OF COSTING, PLANNING, AND JUSTIFICATION FOR CERTAIN PARTS OF THE PROJECT REQUIRED THAT THEY BE DELETED IF THE REST OF THE PROJECT WERE TO BE AUTHORIZED. SPECIFICALLY, DETAILS ON DEVELOPING AND TESTING THE MODEL RHDS WERE NOT SUPPLIED. WITHOUT INFORMATION ON THE TIMING FOR DETERMINING THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL RHDS AND DETAILED COST ESTIMATES FOR STAFFING AND OPERATING A WELL JUSTIFIED NUMBER OF PROTOTYPE RHDS UNITS, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO JUDGE THE NEED, TIMING OR REASONABLENESS OF THE ELEMENTS OF LOGISTICAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT AND THE OPERATION OF THE PROTOTYPES FOR WHICH FUNDING WAS BEING REQUESTED. THE REVISED PROJECT PAPER INCREASED THE NUMBER OF CLINICS TO BE REHABILITATED FROM 5 TO 15, BUT PROVIDED NO COST ESTIMATES OR JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CHANGE, LEAVING THE REQUESTED FUNDS FOR THIS PART OF THE PROJECT UNCHANGED; VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS ALSO WERE CHANGED BUT NO JUSTIFICATION WAS SUPPLIED FOR THE VEHICLES REQUESTED OR FOR THE FACT THAT THE FUNDING REQUEST WAS UNCHANGED. THE REQUEST FOR FUNDING OF MEDICINES WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN TERMS OF DEVELOPING THE RHDS AND APPEARED AS GENERAL BUDGET SUPPORT FOR THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH. SINCE THE PROTOTYPE RHDS HAD NOT YET BEEN DEVELOPED, THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE THIRD, FOURTH, AND FIFTH YEARS OF

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PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 261036

PROJECT EXPENDITURE COULD NOT BE COSTED AND JUSTIFIED.

THESE POINTS WERE MADE BY THE L. A. BUREAU NOT TO CRITICIZE THE MISSION, FOR IT REALIZED THAT DELAYS IN SECURING CONSULTANTS UNDER A PRIOR PROJECT HAD DELAYED PROJECT PREPARATION AND PERHAPS MADE PARTS OF IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PREPARE BY THE DEADLINE FOR FY 1977 FUNDING, BUT SIMPLY TO POINT OUT THAT THE DAEC HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ELIMINATE THE PROJECT ELEMENTS FOR WHICH PROPER PLANNING, COSTING AND JUSTIFICATION COULD NOT BE SUPPLIED.

8. IT IS HOPED THIS RESPONSE CLARIFIES THE STATUS OF AID/W FUNDING DECISIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RHDS IN HAITI. WE HOPE THAT THESE APPARENT DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION ADDRESS AND ANSWER RESPONSIVELY THE POINTS RAISED IN THE DISSENT CHANNEL. IF NOT PLEASE LET US KNOW. WE APPRECIATE HAVING THE ISSUE RAISED SO THAT CLARIFICATION CAN BE MADE. VANCE

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in 1977

Results of US Reform Effort

RELEASE IN PART
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The following assessment is in two sections:

A - Events prior to the June 1977 conference

B - The June 1977 Conference

In reading the assessment, note that: a) some early successes were overtaken; b) the June 1977 conference which was essentially negative came at the end of the reform period, when it would have been logical to expect to see a positive outcome of our efforts; and c) the burden of proof is on those who wish us to stay in, because when we gave notice of intent to withdraw we stated we would leave unless there were sufficient reforms to cause us to reverse our decision.

A. Events prior to the June 1977 conference

Positive

1. The Working Party on Structure met several times during the period but reached no conclusion on how to reform the structure of the Governing Body. Since we did not want change, this outcome is a plus, although not entirely attributable to our reform effort (the WPS had been meeting for years without reaching any agreement).

2. The Special Maritime Conference (October 1976) was a success ^{because} we achieved our basic objective of preventing election of an East European to the chairmanship of the conference.

3. We also succeeded in preventing election of East Europeans to three other key posts: chairman of the Governing Body, President of the annual conference (ILC), and president of the World Employment Conference (WEC).

4. The May 1976 Governing Body voted not to grant observer status to the PLO at the WEC.

5. The June 1976 ILC Resolutions Committee referred to the GB several resolutions introduced by the communists, instead of presenting them to the plenary of the ILC.

6. The June 1976 ILC Committee on Application of Conventions criticized the USSR for non-compliance with the convention on forced labor.

7. The WEC final document was generally acceptable to us, and we (with the help of our allies) stopped a last-minute effort by the G-77 and the Soviet bloc to insert unacceptable language into the Declaration of Principles.

8. A draft resolution on Israeli migration into the Israeli-occupied territories was not passed at the WEC.

9. The March 1977 Governing Body provided three successes:

- a. no further meetings of the WPS were scheduled;
 - b. the book was closed on the 1974 anti-Israeli resolution;
 - c. the US-amendment to Article 17 was approved and referred to the Standing orders committee of the ILC.
- (Note: see Section B for description of June 1988 ILC reversal of these decisions).

Negative

1. The President of the June 1976 ILC, under heavy political pressure, referred back to the GB the question of seating the PLO at the WEC, instead of ruling that nothing further could be done.

2. The GB, under heavy political pressure, reversed its earlier ruling and amended the standing orders of the WEC to seat the PLO.

3. The June 1976 ILC Committee on Application of Conventions and Recommendations failed to cite Czechoslovakia, primarily because of the role played by a Belgian labor union leader (Houthuys), aided by an official of the ILO secretariat. This was an incident of the "double standard".


4. There were strong indications at the WEC that the G-77 was beginning to act as a bloc, whereas previously at ILO meetings only regional caucuses had been apparent. This is an example of increasing politicization.

5. The "Basic Needs" documents which the ILO Secretariat wrote in preparation for the WEC was heavily politicized in its content (it made no distinction between socialist and communist economies, labeling the Eastern bloc as socialist; it implied there was no important difference between capitalism and socialism in achieving economic growth it failed to deal with problems created by OPEC). Despite our strong and detailed criticisms of this document when it was in draft, only minor changes were made, and it has

subsequently been distributed world-wide, causing problems for us in other fora. The failure of the Secretariat to issue a well-balanced document reflects political pressure from the G-77 and Eastern bloc.

6. At the November 1976 Governing Body we attempted to close the book on the 1974 anti-Israeli resolution. At the last minute, the employer group, normally our strongest supporters, caved in to Arab pressure and requested postponement of the issue until March 1977. The result was that at the March 1977 meeting, we had three "successes", all linked together in the eyes of the G-77, and this led to a strong backlash at the June 1977 conference. If we had closed the book in November 1976 we would have avoided the linkage and also allowed more time for a cooling-off of the Arab reaction to the decision to close the book. The outcome of the June 1977 conference might have been less disastrous to us. The structure of the Governing Body. Since we did not want change, this outcome is a plus, although not entirely attributable to our reform efforts (the WPB had been meeting

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The following "diary" discusses examples (by no means all of them) of our Western allies' letting us down at the 63rd ILC. When "Western support" is used as an example of our "success" in reforming the ILO, it needs to be put into context of several factors:

A. Voting

1. At ILO conferences prior to our notice of withdrawal, we had few Westerners voting with us; since November 1975 we have fairly consistently had a hard core we could count on because of our threat of withdrawal. This is not the kind of support we were seeking, and Amb. Silberman told our IMEC friends this in early 1976 (see para J, EXDIS telegram - ~~Geneva 2953~~ ^{Geneva 2953} _{4/15/76}). These votes, obtained under duress, are as meaningless as the 99% votes cast when a government is "elected" in the Iron Curtain countries.

2. We have been guilty of causing erosion of tripartism on our side just as much as the radicals have on their side. We have gotten the votes of government, worker, and employer representatives from Western countries as a solid bloc (within each delegation) because of the political pressure of our notice of withdrawal. While it is gratifying to have gotten the votes that we did, we cannot use a "double standard" by criticizing the radicals for pressuring other delegates into non-tripartite bloc voting against us, yet accepting bloc voting as a "plus" when it is in our favor.

B. Other Activity

A vote should be the last step taken in support of a particular objective; it should be preceded by weeks and months of preparation, lobbying, making demarches, holding tripartite

meetings of each country's delegation to decide on policy and tactics, taking initiatives in regional group meetings to plan strategy, seeking chairmanships of key committees, coordinating with allies before making speeches, etc.

The Westerners either failed to do these things at all, or did them only in response to the pressure of our threat of withdrawal, and even then needed specific goading by the USDEL. When they did get involved, they usually did the minimum required, did it late, and/or did it unenthusiastically.

Comment

Someone who wants to defend the minimal and reluctant role of our allies might say: "after all, this was an American battle and we could not expect our allies to do more than provide supporting fire."

Yet, this is the very situation which led to the letter of intent, namely that it has been the US which has been fighting, protesting, lobbying, etc., in the ILO, while our allies "held our coat". In past years, our allies have told us that they wished to avoid confrontation and therefore they gave in to G-77/Soviet pressure. The letter of intent was issued because we felt that one compromise after another had taken place, to the point where there was soon going to be little left of the ILO as we had originally joined it. The letter of intent said, to our allies: "here we draw the line; no more compromises; no more avoidance of the issues; no more leaving the US to fight alone. Are you with us?"

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The answer from our allies (as their actions, not words, demonstrated); "we are with you to the extent that we will do the absolute minimum which may result in your staying in the ILO. We do not agree with you on substance and/or tactics, and we resent being badgered and hectored ~~and~~ ^{incl} having to stand up and be counted."

The ~~two~~ ^{two} allies (Canada and the UK) whom we would have expected to give us the strongest support have been most outspoken in disagreeing with us. Mainwaring (Canada) told Dan in my presence last year that Canada does not agree with us on the most fundamental issue -- structure of the GB -- but would support (?) the US position in order to keep us in the ILO. Mainwaring "broke ranks" with us on structure in the last days of the conference

The British Government delegate said to me twice in March at the Governing Body, that his government would decide the issues to support (?) the US on only after we told them whether the UK's support would keep us in the ILO (the implication was that if the US wasn't going to stay, why bother?). This attitude necessitated a special trip to the UK by Dan in the middle of the March Governing Body, to get across to our ally that we wanted support based on agreement with us, not support designed to keep us in. (see attached cable)

The fact that Lane Kirkland says the AFL-CIO is satisfied with the Western support we got is interesting but not decisive since, unfortunately, it was not the AFL-CIO but the US Government which made world-wide demarches and which has repeatedly told our allies we wanted support based on agreement on fundamental principles, not support under threat of our withdrawal.

It is the US Government which must assess its own degree of satisfaction with the results; we cannot shrug our shoulders and say, "if Meany is happy, why should we worry?" The USG has interests and concerns beyond those of 16th Street.

The US Government conclusion about Western "support": it was minimal, provided under duress, and transitory. Such "support" does not justify our staying in the ILO, and our Western allies were told ^{this} by Amb. Silberman, at the beginning of our reform effort. They were given fair warning about what criteria we would use in our test. They failed the test.

Attachment

1. Prior to the 63rd ILC no Western government asked its Embassies to make demarches on key issues; yet such a procedure is normal in any diplomatic effort in an international forum. Also, the EC-9 (chaired by UK) did not caucus ahead of time to decide on policy, tactics, etc. (see attached cables).

2. We had told our allies we would meet with them in Geneva to discuss strategy on Article 17. USG Representative Horowitz had dinner with representatives of UK, Australia and Canada May 23 and later said it was a waste of time because they had had no ideas ready on strategy. Horowitz therefore suggested to them that ^{the} West should start with the present text and make concessions later: the US had to suggest the strategy.

3. At the same dinner, Horowitz asked what chairmanships in the ILC the allies would seek; they had no ideas. Two days later (May 25) he asked the UK (chairman of EC-9) again about chairmanships; the EC-9 still had no ideas. UK said the EC-9 would caucus when ^{the} conference plenary started. Horowitz said that was too late and urged action but got none. Horowitz then got an officer of the ILO Secretariat to suggest to the UK that the EC-9 ought to caucus at once; they finally did, on the last day of the GB but only as the result of the foregoing prodding. Klotz (FRG) told Upton (USDEL) he understood the US wanted a chairmanship.

Upton said Horowitz had already told the UK we did not; Klotz replied that the failure of the UK to tell this to the EC-9 showed lack of communication and coordination among EC-9.

At staff meeting Horowitz commented that we had had the same problem in June 1976; the West never did any prior work, and as result of their apathy, the Soviet bloc and G-77 had made deals on chairmanships. Horowitz said we would have to come up with ideas and sell them to the West because otherwise the West's inertia would lead to disaster.

4. We wanted Klotz (member of FRG delegation) to accept a key chairmanship; Haase, head of FRG delegation, would not allow it.

5. Westerners then put forth Veldkamp (Netherlands) despite their knowledge that we opposed him because of his hostile role at June 1976 conference (he was instrumental in preventing Czechoslovakia from being cited in a special paragraph). The West did this because Netherlands wanted him to be elected and the West preferred to support one of their own rather than the US, on this issue.

6. We wanted Ventejol (head of French delegation) - our strongest supporter - to accept a chairmanship. He refused. He did not come to Geneva until June 2, after the ILC had started. He was not in town for the Governing Body and other events at which much lobbying and planning was done in preparation for ILC. He continued to come and go throughout the plenary, rather than work consistently.

3.

7. Ambassador Cook, head of Australian delegation, refused to seek the chairmanship of the Selections Committee, despite our urging.

8. The Netherlands employer representative (Cornelia Hak) said to Upton May 25, "why not send Article 17 amendment to the Structure Committee?" This was only two weeks after she had had a long talk by phone with Horowitz in Washington in which he had explained that ~~sending~~ Article 17 to the Structure Committee would be defeat.

9. May 26: Horowitz said that at the IMEC meeting earlier in week, the West had said the US was too rigid in what it was doing.

10. June 2 - staff meeting: Shire (Labor Dept. lawyer) said that in Committee on Application of Conventions (CACR) he needed help from the West. Specifically: the Australian, Canadian and UK government representative were often not there (in Committee) because they were also serving on other committees. Horowitz said he would speak to their heads of delegation but it was a problem caused by their small delegations (query: in view of the importance of this conference, couldn't our allies have sent a couple more people so we had adequate coverage everywhere?)

Later , it was the absence of our IMEC friends from CACR meeting which caused the situation where the USG was the only Government to vote for putting Ethiopia on the "special list". IMEC had first agreed that all IMEC

4

governments would vote that way; then IMEC changed its collective mind, but failed to get the word to the USG because key IMEC government representatives were out of the room when the item came to a vote. Apparently Horowitz' request to heads of IMEC delegations to have their representatives stay put in this key committee did not have any effect.

11. June 3 - during the debate on part of the DG's report (on the Arab-Israel issue) the UK government representative spoke in favor of sending it to the Resolutions Committee. When he was asked by us later why he had not said he was speaking on behalf of the EC-9 he said it was because the EC-9 had not caucused to agree on its position. (Comment: therefore we lost an opportunity to have our allies' views known).

Also: note that the UK and Canadian Government speeches were not exactly fiery (see attached). They could have been far more outspoken.

12. Fortuit, a French government delegate, told Palmer (USDEL) he had to return to Paris June 6 to meet with Ventejol and others "to decide on our policy towards the ILO." (Comment: this seems rather late) He suggested to Palmer that the US should try to find some policy or formula which would attract some members of the G-77 and break up the bloc. He did not seem to feel that France needed to take any initiative along these lines, but rather that it was up to the US to solve the problem. Finally, he asked Palmer if the US would withdraw if we were not satisfied. Palmer said we would. The fact that he asked indicates he had not believed the numerous statements we had made during the preceding eighteen months.

13. June 7 - after we lost our initial effort on Article 17, we wanted to try for a joint committee discussion on the amendment. Horowitz spoke to the UK just before a meeting of EC-9, and the UK agreed to try to avoid having the EC-9 take a final position until we could see what degree of support there was for a joint committee. (again, the US was the one taking the initiative). The final result was that the Structure Committee rejected the joint committee idea. Horowitz reported to staff meeting that our Western Committee allies did not speak in favor of the joint/idea because they believed it would not be adopted. They were silent because they wanted to avoid a fight. USDEL therefore said in the Structure Committee that we would not oppose Article 17 being discussed in the Structure Committee (we were the only Western government which had wanted to press for the joint committee.)

14. June 13 - The IMEC group (committee on application of conventions) caucused with the US and it was agreed that IMEC would speak along with US about conditions in USSR. The West German delegate told the US he would deliver a real "blast" at conditions in the USSR. Yet only two Western government representatives besides the US spoke (FRG and Australia) and their interventions were brief and mild. The workers' leader, Houthuys (Belgian), moved for closure, and the employer's leader (Australian) supported it; the employers had not spoken in the debate at all. Although the closure motion was defeated, the atmosphere towards further

6

debate was so cold that after it only a few very brief remarks were made. The US worker, who had prepared a fifteen-minute speech criticizing conditions in the USSR, spoke only for a moment, and later said that the closure motion had prevented him from "building the record" in the committee which would have justified a strong "special paragraph" against the USSR.

The paragraph was drafted by the Committee officers (British, Australian, and Belgian), and was weak. When the draft committee report was presented to the committee for approval, the paragraph was rushed through by the Committee officers, who cut off debate before any committee member had time to speak about the text or suggest changes. None of our IMEC allies objected to this.

Afterwards, the Japanese government representative asked us if that was enough to satisfy us (IMEC had been unwilling to go for the "special list" and reluctant even to support a special paragraph. The US had to take the lead).

15. On Article 17, IMEC agreed with US not to present new texts to the Structure Committee but to wait until a drafting committee was formed (the new texts were from the employers group and from the Canadian government). But on June 14, in the Structure Committee, the Swedish employer presented a new text on Article 17 (despite agreement the day before not to do so); Horowitz was very critical of the text (stating it was worse than Article 17 as it now stands), in the Committee. The Australian Government delegate told Upton later that the US would lose because of our failure to negotiate. / ^{The} Australian representative told Horowitz ^{the} / US was too pushy. The British

Ambassador told Sorenson (Charge') that the US was not listening to the West's concerns and that our "consultations" consisted of our telling them what we wanted. Other IMEC representatives said they did not like being "lectured at".

When a small group met to consider drafts of Article 17, the French government representative (Ventejol) was not there because he had gone back to France; his deputy left the meeting when it was only halfway through its deliberations. (Note: the French are supposed to be our strongest allies in the ILO.)

16. June 15 - late in the day the EC-9 met and agreed to support the US tactic of starting to discuss the text of Article 17 in the Structure Committee while also seeking to kill the G-77 resolution on structure. However, the EC-9 asked Horowitz if the US would instead of pushing for amending standing orders on Article 17, agree to a resolution in plenary stating the principles of Article 17. Horowitz said "no" (note: interesting that after we had told everybody that we were going all the way on Article 17, they should still ask us to accept a compromise to avoid a confrontation -- this is the same attitude that led to the letter of intent).

17. June 16 - in Structure Committee, Mainwaring (our Canadian ally) began discussing the substantive part of the G-77 resolution, despite explicit IMEC/US agreement that substantive discussion would not begin until IMEC had caucused to decide on its position. Horowitz said the next day that he never thought he would have to tell off Mainwaring for

"breaking ranks" but in fact he had had to do just that the morning of June 17, because Mainwaring had violated the agreement.

18. Also in Structure Committee, during discussion of reform of the composition of the Governing Body, Ventejol, (France) our best ally, said his government/was in favor of negotiating on changing Article 7 and 36 (dealing with permanent seats and veto power). We have consistently said we are against this.

19. June 21 - Horowitz said at staff meeting that although it was clear that the report of the Structure Committee would be unacceptable to/US, he had decided not to push for a vote because IMEC didn't want one and the US had to maintain good relations with IMEC in order to get their future cooperation (note: at this point, the US was supporting IMEC rather than the other way round!)

Late on June 21 there was a long IMEC meeting on the content of the draft report of the Structure Committee. IMEC said the report as it now was, was the best that could be accomplished and wanted us to accept it. US then took a leadership role

We insisted the language had to be changed. More meetings took place but no satisfactory language was achieved. Azimi (chairman of SC) then drafted the report which was to be considered in various groups the morning of June 22.

(Note: Palmer was sitting next to Kirkland in plenary during the afternoon and asked him what was happening.

He said, "the Westerners are leaving us; they want us to accept a report that we can't accept, so Horowitz has to go into the IMEC meeting and stand with his back against the wall; we can't give in on this".)

20. June 22 - IMEC and other ~~groups~~^{groups} met; agreed to accept report of Structure Committee; we said we could not - and we were left alone.

During the final hours of the plenary on the last day, when the report of the Committee on Structure was being discussed, the US was the only government to disassociate itself from the report because the report failed to include important principles (Article 17) which we had been striving towards. All other Western speakers accepted the report.

IO/LAB:

7/77

B6

(Continued from Page 4)

ery, a far-reaching Convention and Recommendation furthering the tripartite concept was adopted by the Committee and subsequently by the Plenary. Although some of the representatives of Eastern bloc governments tried to amend the language of the instruments to fit their own monolithic structure, the measures passed overwhelmingly. In an amusing show of "independence," some Eastern bloc "worker representatives" and those of the USSR, as well, voted in favor of the instruments, even though their government and "employer" delegates opposed them.

The Committee on Application of Conventions and Recommendations made a largely objective report this year. The Soviet Union was noted in a special paragraph for its violation of the convention prohibiting forced labor. The Czech government would have been the subject of a similar paragraph for nonobservance of the Convention on Freedom of Association, save for the intervention of the Worker Chairman and the secretariat of the Committee itself.

The Worker Chairman ^{made the effort} again this year to do away with the special list of non-compliance with ILO Conventions and Recommendations. Again, he failed. But the persistence with which he and his allies pursue this effort, with more than tacit assistance from the secretariat and, this year, from the Chairman of the Committee (Veldkamp, Government Delegate, Netherlands) gives rise for concern. This special list of non-compliance with ILO Conventions and Recommendations is the very heart of the Organization's purpose. If no public mention is made of lack of adherence to ratified ILO standards, then there is no point in enacting them in the first place.

The Committee on the Working Environment paved the way for a possible Convention on this important issue at a later Conference. Again, the Conference reacted favorably to the work of this relevant Committee with no hint of politicization.

In spite of the general agreement not to convene a Committee on Resolutions of the ILO during this conference, owing to the World Employment Conference and the resulting heavy work schedule, the USSR, and the World Federation of Trade Unions and various of their allies presented three resolutions mere minutes be-

fore the deadline for resolutions in May. The resolutions were handled by a much reduced Committee, since the ICFTU forces and the AFL-CIO boycotted the Committee's sessions. With no quorum, no action was taken on the Communists' resolutions, except that they were referred to the Governing Body, a relatively meaningless gesture. The humiliation of the Communists was clear to all.

One potential trouble spot centered around the Committee on Structure. The thorny question of composition of the Governing Body—i.e. whether to broaden the Council to include more Third World countries—was again debated. There will be a working party in the future to continue discussion of this issue, which is gaining some momentum in the Third World.

A Net Improvement Overall

Aside from the tumult and disarray of the World Employment Conference, the conduct of the 1976 International Labor Conference was a marked contrast to the events of last year. There is a new spirit and strength among the genuine democracies in the ILO, a greater resolve to stick together and hold the Organization to its constitutionally required endeavors. The weak point continues to be the Secretariat of the ILO, particularly in its seeming inability to hold firm in the face of pressures from various groups bent on achieving openly political ends within the ILO. Then, too, there is adequate cause for concern regarding the Committee on Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO, where again there was a clear case of a weak secretariat yielding to efforts to pull the teeth of this important Committee.

Nonetheless, the future of the ILO appears somewhat more promising after this 61st Conference. The democratic forces have reasserted their strength after a moribund period. Questions remain, however, as to the future: if the resolve of genuinely democratic forces within the International Labor Organization can be sustained and even strengthened in future meetings, there will be reason for encouragement.

An Important Caveat

The crisis within the International Labor Organization will continue, nonetheless. The Conference of 1976 was an unusual one, in that the World Employment Conference disrupted the

normal functioning of the Annual ILO Conference. There was no Resolutions Committee, at least in functioning form. The Director General did not give his customary report to which, in theory, remarks are directed throughout the conference. It is the response to the Director General's Report which frequently gives rise to the extraneous political issues that have caused so much difficulty in the past. The June 1977 Annual Conference will be a truer and more difficult litmus for indicating improvement in conditions within the Organization.

The ILO Office, however, has demonstrated very clearly in this 61st Annual Conference and throughout the World Employment Conference that its concept of its role diverges from the way others concerned with the organization's well-being view it. From the Director General down, the Office still holds meetings with government groups without informing worker and employer delegations. For that reason, the World Employment Conference was not adjourned on its last day until midway through the early morning hours, working under a clock that was stopped at midnight, while government, worker and employer delegations fought out the issue of the last-minute effort to modify the final working document of the Employment Conference. The ILO office, with all its inherent power under the constitutional procedure of the ILO to influence events positively in all meetings of the Organization, has used that power to the detriment of the best interests of democratic forces in the ILO, and, at times, to that of the Organization. It caves in before political threats; it worked out the formula with Arab groups that assured the admission of the PLO to the World Employment Conference because the Arab groups threatened to boycott the Conference. It quided the President of the World Employment Conference on the manner in which he would, in effect, amend the final document of the WEC to suit certain elements of the "77," an illegal procedure by any measure.

This is not the manner in which the affairs of the ILO should be conducted. Were it not for the weak and sometimes irresponsible postures assumed by various representatives of the highest offices of the ILO, the letter of intent to withdraw from the Organization would in all likelihood never have been written.

The test of the future, then, is not solely whether there can be an effective and lasting alliance of democratic

Bolshevik Labor Union leader

D

Analysis of 1974-75 and 1977 Voting Patterns in
the ILO on Key Issues to the US

1. 1974 Vote on CACR Report

123 yeas
156 abstentions
Quorum: 206
83 more votes needed to pass the report

Yea votes equaled approximately 61% of the quorum.
Membership in 1974 equaled 125 countries.

2. 1977 Vote on CACR Report

135 yeas
197 abstentions
Quorum: 214
79 more votes needed to pass the report

Yea votes equaled approximately 63.8% of the quorum.
Membership in 1977 equaled 135 countries.

- 2 -

Impact of Horowitz's personal demarches on voting in the ILO
in support of US positions

Latin and Central America

	<u>1974</u>	<u>Art. 17 1977</u>	<u>CACR 1977</u>
Argentina	abst	abst	abst
Brazil	yea	abst	abst
Columbia	yea	yea	yea
Mexico	abst	absent	abst
Panama	abst	abst	abst
Peru	abst	abst	abst
Trinidad/Tobago	abst	absent	absent
Venezuela	absent	abst	absent

Africa

	<u>1974</u>	<u>Art. 17 1977</u>	<u>CACR 1977</u>
Ghana	abst	abst	absent
Ivory Coast	absent	abst	abst
Kenya	yea	abst	yea
Liberia	absent	yea	absent
Nigeria	abst	absent	abst
Sierra Leone	absent	absent	absent
Guana	abst	abst	abst
Tanzania	abst	abst	absent
Zambia	abst	absent	absent
Zaire	abst	abst	absent

East and Southeast Asia

	<u>1974</u>	<u>Art. 17 1977</u>	<u>CACR 1977</u>
India	abst	abst	abst
Indonesia	abst	abst	abst
Iran	abst	yea	abst
Malaysia	abst	abst	absent
Pakistan	abst	abst	abst
Singapore	absent	absent	absent
Sri Lanka	abst	abst	abst
Philippines	abst	abst	abst
Thailand	abst	absent	absent

- 3 -

Near East Asia

	<u>1974</u>	<u>Art. 17 1977</u>	<u>CACR 1977</u>
Kuwait	abst	abst	abst
Morocco	abst	abst	abst
Saudi Arabia	abst	abst	abst
U.A.R.	abst	abst	abst

Given the voting patterns noted above, it would appear that the personal demarches made by Dan Horowitz to the 32 governments in support of US positions on the ILO had no positive effect at all. These countries voting records in June 1977 mirrored those of June 1974, and were in opposition to positions and issues the US supported.

IO/LAB:JLewis:rtb
9/8/77 x21120



DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART B6

Dec. 19, 1975

To: S/P -Winston Lord

From:



B6

Subject: Dissent on Handling of Rhodesian Sanctions Issues

I was disappointed in the Department's response to my dissent. Assigning action responsibility for Rhodesian sanctions issues to the Rhodesian Desk Officer does not seem to me to be a very dynamic approach to a problem which the Department has been grappling with unsuccessfully for a number of years. In fact, during my tour in AF, the Rhodesian Desk Officers were involved in such problems but did not get much of a hearing when higher level officers either in AF or EB or Commerce gave higher priority to selling items or keeping foreign chiefs of state happy. I therefore believe that the same situation will arise again as did with regard to the sale of DC-8's.

May I suggest one alteration in the Department's "new" mechanism? Amend it to indicate that the Coordinator for Human Affairs must be formally brought into the picture whenever the possibility of sanctions violations exists. Hopefully this will ensure that the key issue in sanctions, e.g., the human rights of blacks in Rhodesia, will be given a little more attention than it has heretofore.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

UNCLASSIFIED

December 10, 1974

MEMORANDUM TO: INR/CIS -

B6

FROM: S/P - Samuel P. Lewis

SUBJECT: Dissent Message on Visa Procedures
re Public Charge

S/P has again discussed your dissent message of September 13 with SCA.

We are informed that your views regarding the definition of a public charge under our visa procedures, along with other views on this subject, are now receiving the careful attention of senior officers in the Visa Office and in SCA. This subject is an important item on the agenda at the consular conference now being held in Mexico, and it is anticipated that policy recommendations on this subject will probably be developed following this meeting.

S/P accordingly believes that your well-reasoned views are receiving adequate attention in the policy consideration now under way. Although we expect that any final decisions on this subject will be made generally known, we have in addition requested SCA to apprise you of them when the current review is completed.

~~S/P would like to thank you for your interest and helpful assistance in regard to this important matter.~~

Clearances:

OFF - Mr. Smith
SCA - Mr. Recknagel

S/P:RBFinn:vb
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UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASE IN PART
B6



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

W. Lord
H. Smith
H. Smith

February 3, 1975

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

[Redacted]
Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Room 5254A
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

B6

Dear [Redacted]:

Thank you very much for sending the Department your views, in Tel Aviv's 3305 of 19 June 1974, about PL 480 sales to Israel. Your use of the Dissent Channel to register views is especially appreciated. We deeply regret that our tardiness prevented this reply from reaching you while you were still in Tel Aviv.

Your message made the point that "Israel's increasing prosperity has progressively eroded Israel's case" for PL 480 assistance since its per capita GNP is relatively high and because it is receiving substantial amounts of assistance of other kinds.

The Department understands your reasoning, but believes, on the other hand, that PL 480 assistance had helped maintain Israel's healthy balance of payments position while facilitating security purchases of military equipment on the civilian market abroad. Moreover, the Department believes that Israel does have need of food assistance.

It is clear that the policy issues you raised are relevant beyond the immediate context in which you raised them, and this enhanced the value of your raising them. I am pleased that you and a member of my staff have had an opportunity to discuss these matters directly, particularly since this gave us an opportunity more fully to appreciate your views.

In view of your conversation here, I understand that you consider further substantive response to your message unnecessary. I should, however, like again to express my thanks for sending us your views.

Sincerely,

W. Lord

Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

*P.S. The delay in response
is in any event inexcusable.
We appreciate your interest and your
should have gotten better
treatment.*

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RELEASE IN
PART B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM
1937

PAGE 01 STATE 274409
ORIGIN SP-02
INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 AMAD-01 ES-01 /004 R

DRAFTED BY S/P: THORNTON; AG-
APPROVED BY S/P: PWOLFOWITZ

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE

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DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR [] FROM S/P WOLFOWITZ
E.O. 12065: GDS, 10/14/87 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL)

CA

B6

TAGS:

SUBJECT: COSTA RICA'S ECONOMIC CRISIS

REFERENCE: SAN JOSE 5764

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE HAVE RECEIVED YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE OF SEPT MBER 8, STUDIED IT CAREFULLY, AND BROUGHT IT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SENIOR CONCERNED OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT; I APPRECIATE THE THOUGHT THAT YOU HAVE GIVEN TO THIS MATTER AND THE INITIATIVE THAT YOU HAVE TAKEN IN DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION OF COSTA RICA AND SOME OF ITS POSSIBLE EFFECTS.
3. YOUR CONCLUSION THAT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE IS NOT AN ADEQUATE SAFETY NET FOR COSTA RICA IS INCONTESTABLE. WE ALSO AGREE -- WHILE WE MUST PURSUE WAYS TO INCREASE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO COSTA RICA -- THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT EVEN INCREASED LEVELS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE MAY NOT SUFFICE TO PREVENT A SEVERE DETERIORATION IN THE COSTA RICAN ECONOMY. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ECONOMIC HARDSHIP WILL NECESSARILY LEAD TO A FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY IN COSTA RICA OR THAT A TAKE-OVER BY EITHER LEFT OR RIGHT IS INEVITABLE. THERE ARE OTHER POLITICAL FACTORS AT WORK IN COSTA RICA AND EVEN TO APPEAR TO GIVE UP ON CENTRIST ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, COULD UNDERMINE THE BEST HOPE THAT COSTA RICA HAS.
4. NONETHELESS, WE DO NEED TO CONSIDER A FULL RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES AND OPTIONS, INCLUDING THE ONE THAT YOU HAVE SET FORTH IN GENERAL TERMS. WE WOULD WELCOME SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND RELATED POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE EMBASSY BELIEVE WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE FORMULATION OF MID AND LONGER TERM U. S. POLICY TOWARDS COSTA RICA.
5. THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. HAIG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Nasser

RELEASE IN PART
B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AF/E:RFILLING
E/29/76; X23355
S/P:WLORD

S/CCT:RAFEAREY
AF:WESCHAUFLE
S/P:PLYDON

NEA/EGY:GBROWN
S/P:DKPETTERSON

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE ABU DHABI

DISSENT CHANNEL
FOR []

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINS, SU, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT NIMEIRI'S CALL ON PRESIDENT FORD

REFERENCE: ABU DHABI 1432

1. THE DEPARTMENT ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT YOUR ARGUMENTS SUBMITTED THROUGH THE DISSENT CHANNEL AGAINST PRESIDENT NIMEIRI MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN LIGHT OF NIMEIRI'S ROLE IN RELEASE OF EIGHT BLACK SEPTEMBER MURDERERS OF AMBASSADOR NOEL AND DCM MOORE.

2. PRESIDENT NIMEIRI IS MAKING A GOODWILL PRIVATE VISIT TO US JUNE 9-29 TO PROMOTE TRADE WITH SUDAN. THIS UNOFFICIAL VISIT GREW OUT OF INVITATIONS FROM SEVERAL STATE GOVERNORS WHO HAD PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH SUDAN. IN RESPONSE TO SUDANESE REQUEST, WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY OUR EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM, PRESIDENT FORD MET BRIEFLY WITH NIMEIRI ON JUNE 10.

3. DEPARTMENT FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE STRONG FEELINGS THAT FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES OF CLEO NOEL AND CURTIS MOORE HAVE ABOUT THE GOS RELEASE OF THEIR MURDERERS TO EGYPTIAN CUSTODY. IN REACTION TO THIS RELEASE WE WITHDREW OUR AMBASSADOR FOR FIVE MONTHS AND SUSPENDED PROGRAMS OF

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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

| 2

BILATERAL AID AND ASSISTANCE FOR 21 MONTHS. THE GOS UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED THE NECESSITY FOR THE USG TO TAKE THESE ACTIONS, AND WE BELIEVE THEY FORCEFULLY MADE OUR POINT TO THE GOS.

4. WHERE YOU AND DEPARTMENT SEEM TO DIFFER IS ON HOW LONG NIMEIRI GOVERNMENT IS TO BE PUNISHED. WE DO NOT BELIEVE USG SHOULD CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AGAINST A COUNTRY WHICH IS OF MINOR BUT GROWING ECONOMIC CONCERN AND NOT INSIGNIFICANT REGIONAL POLITICAL INTEREST TO US. TWO YEARS HAVE NOW ELAPSED, THE EIGHT KHARTOUM TERRORISTS ARE STILL IN DETENTION IN CAIRO (THEY HAVE ALREADY SERVED THREE YEARS, MORE THAN ANY OTHER PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS), AND THE GOS HAS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN FREEING ALL FIVE OF THE AMERICANS KIDNAPPED LAST YEAR BY ERITREAN INSURGENTS, AS WELL AS HELPING OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE FIVE AMERICAN TENNECO CAPTIVES IN 1974.

5. THE DECISION TO NORMALIZE REFLECTED THE CONSIDERED OPINION OF THE EXECUTIVE THAT, SINCE WE HAD MADE OUR POINT, SINCE IT HAD BEEN CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE GOS, AND IN VIEW OF THE LATTER'S WISH FOR BETTER RELATIONS AND ITS COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE USG, NOTABLY IN CASE OF ERITREAN KIDNAPPERS, THE TIME HAD COME FOR SUCH A MOVE.

6. THE DEPARTMENT THANKS YOU FOR USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WISHES TO ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR VIEWS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY NOTED AT HIGH LEVELS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT.YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 25, 1977
7/25

TO: S/P - Mr. Lake
FROM: IO/LAB - [redacted]
SUBJECT: Dissent From Vanden Heuval's Proposal

B6

I attach my analysis; I wish to dissent from this proposal, for the reasons stated in my memo of July 22, plus the reasons stated in the memo in L (also attached).

As a separate but related subject, I dissent from the procedure whereby S/P sends a memo to the Secretary endorsing a policy proposal before the responsible bureau has had the opportunity to prepare and submit its views on the proposal and without S/P thoroughly studying such views in reaching its own conclusion. I question whether such action by S/P serves the Secretary's needs.

I might add that when we submitted our Action Memo on July 22, we conscientiously refrained from stating IO's views on the various options because we had not yet heard from other bureaus and offices, and did not wish to "rush to judgment" by giving the Secretary only a partial recommendation which did not incorporate all appropriate views. I think S/P should follow a similar practice, and not send to the Secretary a document which has not been fully "staffed out" throughout the Department. S/P can always disagree with the responsible Bureau, but only after S/P has reviewed the issue thoroughly.

Attachments.

IO/LAB: [redacted] : of

B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GDS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

*Sandy —
per your request —
Mearns*

~~SECRET~~

July 11, 1974

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: P - Mr. Sisco
FROM: AF - Donald B. Easum *DE*

Proposed Sale of Second DC-8 to Gabon

PROBLEM AND SUMMARY

President Bongo is pressing us for an export license to permit him to buy another DC-8. He says he will give us signed assurances it won't be misused even though another DC-8, purchased from a US company for his "personal use" in 1972, went immediately into Rhodesian trade. This led to sharp criticism of the US Government along the lines that the sale violated or contributed to the violation of UN sanctions against Rhodesia. We see three possible courses of action: sell with moderate conditions, sell with tougher conditions, or refuse to sell the plane.

BACKGROUND: THE FIRST PLANE

The first DC-8 was purchased by Affretair, a company incorporated in Gabon. Because of published reports and other indications that the company was involved in Rhodesian trade, written assurances were obtained from Affretair that the plane would not be so used. On instructions from Bongo, the GOG provided oral assurances to this effect. The export license was issued in September 1972 with a warning clause to the effect that if the assurances were violated, future sales of parts or planes to Gabon could be affected. The plane left the US October 14; as early as two weeks later it was reported to be in Rhodesian hands, flying out of Salisbury.

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In late 1973, the USG received protests from the UN Sanctions Committee and the OAU and inquiries from the House Africa Sub-Committee about the employment of the plane. Press stories criticized the Department for permitting such a sale. A US note was sent to the Gabonese Government August 31, 1973 requesting information and assurances about the use of the DC-8. No written response has ever been received. In December 1973 the UN Sanctions Committee, based upon its investigation of the activities of Affretair, sent a note to the GOG requesting its cooperation in terminating the illicit operations of the aircraft. Recent eye witness reports confirm that the plane nonetheless continues to fly meat regularly out of Rhodesia to Europe, often stopping in Libreville en route.

THE SECOND PLANE

The GOG has assured us that the second DC-8 would be used only for Presidential travel and carriage of freight to and from other countries except those that are not UN members. President Bongo sets great store on obtaining the plane now, has promised written assurances concerning its use, and says our refusal to sell may influence GOG attitudes toward US investment interests in Gabon. Ambassador McKesson is reasonably confident that the plane would not be misused and argues in favor of the sale, citing the possibility of retaliatory action in the event Bongo is turned down. Investigations over the past several months by Commerce, ExIm and intelligence sources have produced no clear evidence that Bongo has misrepresented the purposes of his proposed second purchase. Greater factual detail is provided in a memorandum from L at Tab A.

Despite lack of such evidence to date, INR and CIA believe that the second DC-8 would find its way into Rhodesian trade or be used in some kind of link-up with the first aircraft, including being used as a conduit for spare parts (see INR memo at Tab B). Factors that support this judgment include the worthlessness of Bongo's assurances concerning the first plane, his known contempt for Rhodesian sanctions (which permits him to earn a lucrative rake-off on the first plane), and the fact that the Rhodesian meat shippers are urgently seeking additional jet aircraft, as well as spare parts for the first DC-8.

~~SECRET~~

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3.

THE OPTIONS

1. Approve the export license on condition that Bongo gives personal written assurances that the aircraft would not be used in any way to support Rhodesian trade.

Pro: By showing our willingness to ignore Bongo's past transgressions and to trust his assurances concerning the second plane, would help US-Gabonese relations to remain on even keel, assist in maintaining Gabonese receptivity for American investment and contribute to preserving whatever willingness Bongo may have to be helpful on issues which concern us.

Con: Would generate quick criticism from a number of sources along the lines that the Department is flouting Rhodesian sanctions by ignoring our experience with Affretair and with Gabonese assurances that have proved worthless in the past. Such criticism would be particularly untimely in view of British and OAU increasing efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of sanctions, and our own attempts to obtain repeal of the Byrd Amendment.

2. Approve the export license if Bongo agrees to the conditions in 1 above and on condition that he has removed the first plane from Rhodesian trade, or canceled its Gabonese registry and denied it landing/overflight rights.

Pro: If Bongo were to do all these things, a significant irritant in our bilateral relations would be eliminated. This would end USG involvement in a sanctions violation which has generated considerable criticism from the press, Congress and international organizations. It would also show a "tough line" on sanctions which in the eyes of some might strengthen our efforts to repeal the Byrd Amendment.

Con: Our insistence on these conditions would probably produce a decision on Bongo's part to buy elsewhere. It would also produce angry charges of unwarranted interference

~~SECRET~~
GDS

~~SECRET~~

4.

in Gabon's internal affairs, and possible retaliation against US interests in Gabon. Moreover, it would not assure permanent exclusion of DC-8s from illicit Rhodesian operations since Bongo could return the first plane and/or place the second plane into Rhodesian trade as soon as he had the second DC-8 firmly in his possession.

3. Refuse to sell (by withholding approval of the export license).

Pro. This option is attractive in the sense that, unlike the options that oblige Bongo to make promises or take actions that could be expected to be extremely unpalatable to him, it would not touch the first plane or the money he is believed to make from it. The option is straightforward, without suggestions of doubt of Bongo's word or implications of interference in internal Gabonese affairs. It would demonstrate to Bongo and others our support for Rhodesian sanctions at a time of heightened interest in their implementation and of efforts to obtain repeal of the Byrd Amendment. It would also show we meant what we said in the warning clause in the first export license, and that we cannot ignore seemingly premeditated and continuing violations of Bongo's pledges to us.

Con: Could result in damage to our bilateral relations including the possibility of adverse decisions on several pending US business contracts and off-shore oil concessions.

BUREAU POSITION

AF recommends Option 3, i.e., refusal to sell by denying the export license. (We would inform the Commerce Department that foreign policy considerations obliged us to recommend the denial.) This recommendation is based on AF's concurrence with the INR/CIA assessment that the second plane would move into Rhodesian trade, thus putting the sale into the category of an action that might fall under the terms of Executive Order 11419, which prohibits, among other things, the promotion of trade with Rhodesia. L joins in opposing the sale on legal grounds, provided the AF/INR/CIA judgment of eventual use of the plane is sustained by the Department.

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GDS

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5.

Bongo could be expected to react against this decision. He is a pragmatist, however, and would be unlikely to take across-the-board action against US interests; he might single out one or two companies to show his displeasure. We believe the possibility of retaliation on his part could be mitigated by our explaining the decision straightforwardly, indicating that we had no other alternative given our experience with the first plane, current heightened interest in the implementation of Rhodesian sanctions, and our present efforts to obtain repeal of the Byrd Amendment.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize adoption of Option 3 -- refuse to sell by withholding approval of the export license.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively, you may wish to adopt:

Option 1 -- approval of export license on condition Bongo gives personal written assurances that the aircraft would not be used in any way to support Rhodesian trade.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Option 2 -- approval of export license if Bongo agrees to conditions in Option 1 and on condition that he has removed first plane from Rhodesian trade or canceled its Gabonese registry and denied it landing/overflight rights.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- 1. L Memorandum
- 2. INR Memorandum

Clearances: L/AF - Mr. Huffman ^{mk} INR - Mr. Packman ^{WV}
 EB/OA - Mr. Ortman ^{WV} AF/S - Mr. O'Neill ^{WV}
 EB/ITP/EWT - Mr. Goodman ^{WV} AF/RA - Mr. Walker ^{WV}

Drafted by: ^{WV}
 AF/C:JDiggs:APalmer:AF:JFoley:DBEasum:gm
 ext22530:7/11/74 ^{WV}

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GDS

TAB A.

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July 11, 1974

Proposed Sale of Second DC-8 to Gabon:Factual Summary

The Gabonese Minister of Economy and Finance entered into an agreement dated March 20, 1974 with Seaboard World Airlines, Inc., for the purchase of a DC-8/63CF (convertible cargo-passenger aircraft) for a price of \$11,200,000. The contract is contingent upon EXIM financing. Gabon has deposited \$400,000 but can recover this sum if it withdraws from the agreement at this time. Applications for an export license and for EXIM financing have been filed. The GOG has also entered into an agreement with UTA under which the French company would service and operate the DC-8 and an agreement with Air Afrique whereby that airline would operate the DC-8 when Bongo was not employing it for his personal travel. In a letter to Ambassador McKesson dated April 13, 1974, President Bongo stated that the aircraft would be employed for his personal use. In a note to the President of the EXIM Bank dated March 21, 1974 the Minister of Economy and Finance stated that the DC-8 would be used for Presidential travel and the carriage of freight to other countries except those not represented in the United Nations.

In 1972, President Bongo pressured the Department to authorize sale of a DC-8 to Affretair, a Gabonese-registered company. He stated that the DC-8 was to be used for his personal use as well as for freight carriage within Gabon and between Gabon and Europe. Because of published reports of Affretair's involvement in air freight traffic with Rhodesia, the Department requested the Commerce Department to condition issuance of an export license upon the receipt of written assurances from the Gabonese that the aircraft would not be used in trade with Rhodesia. Affretair provided written assurances to this effect but the Gabonese government assurances were only provided orally by the Minister of Transportation upon instructions from Bongo. The export license was then issued with the further proviso that future sales of aircraft or spare parts would be conditioned upon Gabonese compliance with their assurances. Though we have no firm assurance that Affretair advised the Gabonese government about this warning, we consider this a strong possibility.

Prior to issuance of the export license in 1972 some officers in the Department were aware of sensitive intelligence information from British sources that Affretair was a front for a Rhodesian concern and that the DC-8 would be operated and managed out of Salisbury under Gabonese registry. The conduct of the Department officers approving the sale under these circumstances is now the subject of an inquiry by a special panel convened by Deputy Under Secretary Brown. The Acting Director of the Office of Central African Affairs had earlier brought the matter to the attention of the Justice Department. On

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the basis of similar information from private commercial sources including Air Afrique, EXIM denied financing for the aircraft which was then privately financed through the exporter and departed the United States October 14, 1972. On October 28, the London Daily Telegraph reported that a Salisbury concern had acquired Rhodesia's first commercial jet, a DC-8 to be known as the "sanctions buster". Since that time, the aircraft has been engaged in well publicized freight traffic to Gabon and to Europe. The U.S. has received protests from the UN Sanctions Committee and the OAU and there have been critical reports in the press of the Department's conduct. Recently, under UN pressure, Greece announced it would in the future withhold facilities from the DC-8. The Netherlands is also seized with the problem of Affretair's use of its facilities. The U.S. Commerce Department has rejected several applications for licenses to export spare parts to Affretair.

When Bongo first requested another DC-8 in a meeting on December 5, 1973, Ambassador McKesson (as he reported in Libreville 1093 - 7 Dec. 1973) "registered surprise and recalled unfavorable publicity connected with first purchase. He (Bongo) brushed this aside as un-consequential and said that, if it would make it easier for U.S., G.O.G. would purchase plane directly (rather than through Affretair) and he would personally sign any documents we wanted so that no possible criticism could be attached to U.S."

In April of this year Commerce acquired information from a U.S. citizen recently in Rhodesia that Bongo received a substantial sum annually from the Rhodesian concern to keep the DC-8 under Gabonese registry and that the same concern would be attempting soon to acquire another DC-8 in the U.S. also to be registered in Gabon. This disclosure which raised the prospect of a repetition of the 1972 transaction, was subsequently corroborated by reports from two U.S. aircraft vendors that they had been contacted on behalf of Affretair by Frederick B. Ayer & Associates, the Swiss aircraft broker which had arranged the first DC-8 sale. However, closer inquiry by Commerce with the Frederick B. Ayer office in New York disclosed that it was seeking a DC-8/55F for Affretair whereas Bongo had contracted with Seaboard World Airlines to acquire a slightly different model, termed a DC-8/63CF.

Coincidental with Commerce's investigative efforts, EXIM Bank has sought information regarding Bongo's efforts through Air Afrique and UTA (the French carrier), which were among the private commercial sources which tipped-off EXIM about the true nature of the first sale. In the present case, these sources have corroborated Bongo's statement that he desires the aircraft for Presidential travel or lease to Air Afrique. These sources, however, may not be objective, since, as noted, UTA has a contract to service the aircraft for Bongo and Air Afrique has a contract to use it when not being operated for Bongo.

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The Department has also sought information about Bongo's efforts through the British intelligence channels which revealed the Rhodesian link in the last transaction. These sources have not yet disclosed any useful information concerning the present case.

Finally, the Department sought the views of the OAU on Bongo's request, in light of that organization's earlier criticism of our first sale. Though the OAU never responded directly to our inquiry, President Gowon, in his former capacity as OAU President, wrote to Bongo stating in part: "As far as I am concerned, your decision to buy a DC-8/63 aircraft for your personal use is a purely internal affair of the Republic of Gabon, and it is not for the Organization of African Unity to give or withhold consent about its purchase." AF does not believe this communication will in any way immunize the U.S.G. from African criticism should the second aircraft be used in Rhodesian trade.

BKH
L/AF:BKHuffman:mmp . 7/11/74
x-23736

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RELEASE IN PART
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

1) S/P Chan
2) W & Chan
3) H. St. J.
4) S. Smith

February 3, 1975

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Room 5254A
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

B6

Dear Mr. Matter:

Thank you very much for sending the Department your views, in Tel Aviv's 3305 of 19 June 1974, about PL 480 sales to Israel. Your use of the Dissent Channel to register views is especially appreciated. We deeply regret that our tardiness prevented this reply from reaching you while you were still in Tel Aviv.

Your message made the point that "Israel's increasing prosperity has progressively eroded Israel's case" for PL 480 assistance since its per capita GNP is relatively high and because it is receiving substantial amounts of assistance of other kinds.

The Department understands your reasoning, but believes, on the other hand, that PL 480 assistance had helped maintain Israel's healthy balance of payments position while facilitating security purchases of military equipment on the civilian market abroad. Moreover, the Department believes that Israel does have need of food assistance.

It is clear that the policy issues you raised are relevant beyond the immediate context in which you raised them, and this enhanced the value of your raising them. I am pleased that you and a member of my staff have had an opportunity to discuss these matters directly, particularly since this gave us an opportunity more fully to appreciate your views.

In view of your conversation here, I understand that you consider further substantive response to your message unnecessary. I should, however, like again to express my thanks for sending us your views.

Sincerely,

Winston Lord
Director

Policy Planning Staff

P.S. The delay in response to you was primarily caused by personnel changes - was not in any event inexcusable. We appreciate your interest and you should have written better treatment.

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Ref. U. Dissent



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN
PART B6

August 29, 1977

*File
Dissent*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Redacted]

Political Officer
American Embassy
Tripoli

Dear [Redacted]

This is further to my letter of August 2 acknowledging your dissent channel message of July 11 which questioned the advisability of our becoming involved in the dispute in northern Chad.

You are quite right in pointing out that the conflict between Libya and Chad grows out of tribal disputes that reach far back in history. But current politics and ideology are involved as well, and we cannot ignore these. Though Libyan support for the Moslem tribes of northern Chad antedates the Qadhafi regime, Qadhafi has given a new thrust to this activity. Moreover, current Libyan claims to the Aouzou strip appear to ignore Libya's previous acceptance in the 1955 Franco/Libyan Treaty of the conventional boundary from 1989-1902, which we have officially recognized. (See State Department Geographer's International Boundary Study on the Chad/Libya Boundary of May 5, 1961.)

President Sadat of Egypt believes that events in Chad are part of a Libyan attempt to subvert and out-flank his own government. We may not see the problem precisely in this way, but we are obliged to give weight to Sadat's views. And in any event it is clear that Qadhafi's activities in northern Chad pose a threat to the existence of that country's government, which is friendly both to Egypt and to the United States.

We agree with Chad's other friends (e.g., Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Niger, France) that the only solution to the insurgency is a negotiated arrangement between Chad and the rebels guaranteeing the latter certain rights in their home territory. We do not believe that a military solution is feasible, and it is not our

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-2-

intention to encourage Chad to seek such a solution or to become involved ourselves in the dispute. But we do think it is in the national interest of the United States to make limited sales of military equipment to the Government of Chad. In the meantime we plan to continue to support the mediation efforts undertaken by the Organization for African Unity. Our goal is a negotiated settlement of the dispute.

Let me express my appreciation for your thoughtful, well-written analysis. You are quite correct in drawing attention to the danger of the United States Government's becoming directly involved in the Chad conflict. It is a point that all of us in the department who deal with this problem will keep very much in mind.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Director
Policy Planning Staff

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S/P:JAARZT:BDM ..
EXT. 29716 4-9-76
S/P:PBSWIERS

PRIORITY

NEW DELHI

FOR



E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: NEW DELHI 3621

PBS
JAA

B6

1. THIS CABLE WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE "DEVELOPMENT AID AS A POLITICAL WEAPON". MR. THOMAS THORNTON OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR PAPER HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE OPEN FORUM PANEL. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

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B6.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 2, 1978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

To: PM/SAS -

From: S/P - Anthony Lake *AL*

Subject: Dissent Channel Paper on U.S. Policy Toward
Kenya and the Horn

B6

With apologies for the long delay, let me belatedly give you a substantive reply to your provocative paper of February 28.

Your basic thesis -- that the key to long-range stability in the Horn lies in Somali acquisition of both the Ogaden and the North Eastern Province of Kenya -- is of course in sharp contrast to our own (and the OAU) position of preserving the territorial integrity of African states as they are presently constituted. Your specific policy recommendations -- e.g., that we encourage Kenya to cede the NEP and that we not oppose the actions of third countries helping Somalia to "retain control of the Ogaden" -- are vigorous and interesting but raise a number of difficult problems.

I am doubtful that you have given adequate weight to the enormous importance African states attach to the OAU-sanctioned principle of territorial integrity. The almost universal backing by sub-Saharan countries for the Ethiopian position in the Ogaden war tends to support this judgment. The thought of widespread conflict in Africa over existing borders tends to confirm its wisdom.

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-2-

From such a point of view, the domestic and foreign policy problems Ethiopia and Kenya would face if they tried to divest themselves of their ethnic Somali areas are formidable and not to be undertaken lightly. The borders of traditional Somali areas, both in Kenya and in Ethiopia, are very difficult to define, much like the exact borders of "German areas" in the Sudetenland. I doubt that Kenyatta, Mengistu or their successors would be willing to consider letting these areas go, assuming they could be sharply defined, even for substantial assistance quid pro quos. You suggest these quids should come from the US Government, an innovation which could cost us heavily and might open parallel issues in numerous other areas of the world. I suspect, in fact, that only military defeat could provide an adequate stimulus for and explanation of Ethiopia and Kenya giving up these areas. Even if Somalia, with outside aid, were successful in achieving a Greater Somalia, this would be likely only to create a new and extended period of instability as Kenya and Ethiopia sought outside help of their own to regain their territories. The 1964-67 Shifta War, the Ogaden conflict and the Eritrean revolt support the view that, unfortunately, only a considerable amount of force can hope to change the territorial status quo in the Horn.

I am also concerned that the steps you propose might seriously strain, and possibly destroy, U.S.-Kenyan relations at a time when we are working hard to improve them. In addition, it could injure our relations with nearly all other members of the OAU, who might (understandably) fear that we would next propose that they, too, give up some of their ethnic regions.

While the Ogaden and NEP will continue to be areas of tension and backwaters outside the main streams of Ethiopian and Kenyan life, Somalia can really do more to aid its ethnic brethren in Kenya and Ethiopia by peaceful means rather than by directly supporting armed conflict in these same areas.

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-3-

I do want to thank you for sharing your views with us, and to apologize again for my delay in getting back to you. I hope you will continue to give us your opinions, either informally or through the dissent channel. We value them and will take them into account as we try to hammer out workable policies for the Horn and for other areas of Africa.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN PART
B6

December 3, 1974

The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The following is my dissenting view in accordance with State Department Airgram A-3592 of May 21, 1974.

SUMMARY:

In the prosecution of U.S. policy in Thailand the official U.S. (Embassy and Military) posture of supplication vis-a-vis the RTG is not only self-defeating, but is wholly out of keeping with either good bargaining techniques or the factual situations we have faced in the past or face today. While this approach has not been totally unproductive, its dollar costs have been grossly higher than necessary, and more important, it established the basis for many of the present-day USC political problems in Thailand. These problems are being exacerbated by the continuation of weak negotiating practices and an almost cavalier attitude towards costs and waste, particularly on the part of the U.S. Military.

DISCUSSION:

There is now and has been over the years in our dealings with the RTG a clear failure on the part of our senior civilian and military officials to recognize the value of the U.S. presence in Thailand to the RTG. This weakness has been quite naturally played upon by the RTG at every opportunity, particularly in their dealings concerning the U.S. Military in Thailand. The theory that "unless we do everything the RTG wants they will throw us out" has long been and still is espoused as the official Embassy position, and is neither based on fact nor is it supportable by circumstances. On the political side such a position has resulted in precedents which have actually weakened

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our position. The lack of a Status of Forces agreement being one of the more serious problems in this connection. From the financial point of view, consistently weak negotiating tactics have cost the U.S. Taxpayers far in excess of what would be justifiable, or necessary, to attain our foreign policy goals.

EXAMPLES (Of what can be accomplished):

1) In September 1973, the RTG waived its earlier instituted requirement for payment of export premium and reserve set-aside taxes on USG multi-million dollar procurements of Thai rice in support of our program in Laos. This waiver was the culmination of actions initiated independently by USAID/Laos with the RTG - actions taken out of urgent need for the rice and frustration with continued procrastination on the part of the U.S. Embassy in Thailand, whose (then) counselor for Economic Affairs at one point actually suggested that the USG pay the taxes, rather than raise the "unpleasant" question to a high enough level within the RTG to allow for a solution. USAID/Laos' refusal to pay the taxes, and direct USAID/Laos "unofficial" contact with the RTG forced the Embassy to arrange an "official" meeting between USAID/Laos' representative, the Embassy Counselor for Economic Affairs, and the responsible RTG official. When thus approached at the decision-making level, the RTG official determined the USG rice feeding program was to be treated as a "joint AID program between the USG and the RTG on behalf of the RTG," with resultant savings to date of more than US\$ 3 million. In spite of the foregoing, as late as July 1974 the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok refused to acknowledge this RTG attitude, and to use same in negotiations with the RTG concerning USG programs in Laos.

2) In July 1974 the Express Transport Organization of Thailand (ETO) agreed to a transit-truck rate for USAID/Laos cargo between Sattahip and Laos which is Bht. 1110 (US\$ 54.50) per ten ton truck lower than ETO's original asking price and is Bht. 1441.40 (US\$ 70.66) per ten ton truck lower than the rate now being paid by the U.S. Military for the same service over the same route. The present U.S. Military rate is based on a renegotiation of the Military/ETO agreement effected at about the same time as was the USAID/Laos/ETO agreement. Discussions with U.S. Military Contracting Officer and Embassy officials revealed on the military side an attitude of indifference and the claim that "the ETO is a monopoly - we can't do anything about their overcharges."

The USAID/Laos/ETO agreement followed nearly two years of negotiations during which time ETO operating level negotiators refused to reduce their (excessive) demands, and numerous requests for assistance

- 2 -

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from the U.S. Embassy proved fruitless. The satisfactory conclusion was reached within less than two months following USAID/Laos' determination that the oft-requested assistance from the U.S. Embassy was simply not to be forthcoming. Accordingly direct contact was made between USAID/Laos and a senior ETO official. The considerable concession in rate granted by the ETO was based on the fact that the ETO - as an RTG Agency, agreed to consider, and ultimately recognized the mutuality of USG/RTG interest in the USG/Laos program, the very point the U.S. Embassy has consistently rejected as being a valid bargaining position.

The success of both of the foregoing negotiations proves several important points:

- 1) The RTG does recognize the importance of our presence and programs in support of anti-communist elements in contiguous countries and is prepared to cooperate when the "chips are down."
- 2) By no means is the USG forced to comply blindly with unreasonable demands by RTG agencies. All demands are negotiable, and chances for positive results increase proportionately with the level of approach within the RTG.

There is no doubt that not all of the U.S. desires are politically or otherwise acceptable to the RTG. However, I contend that more often than not, recalcitrance or unreasonable demands on the part of RTG officials, particularly operating level personnel, results more from the fact that they have correctly assessed the lack of bargaining ability and simple naivete on the part of our diplomatic and military teams here, and not because, as a matter of RTG policy, major U.S. objectives in this part of the world are significantly out of line with those of the RTG.

The recent visit to Laos of the RTG Foreign Minister Charoonphan Israngkur is a perfect case in point. When confronted with a complaint about U.S. bases on Thai soil he made it quite clear to the Lao that while the RTG does "not want American military forces to be stationed in its territory . . ." the RTG " . . . does not wish to see the military forces of any other nations stationed in Laos either."¹ Obviously the RTG considers it necessary that some U.S. presence in Thailand

¹ USIS translation "Foreign Minister Charoonphan Israngkur's News Conference (Don Muang Airport Nov. 8, 1974)"

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continue at least for the present time, since according to Foreign Minister Charoonphan, withdrawals "depend on the situation outside our country and whether there will be any developments which would have repercussions on the stability and security of our country." ^{1/} This was certainly the attitude of the former (Thanom) regime, and, it is clearly the attitude of the present RTG.

It is a fact that while political power is presently in the hands of civilians, some of whom are not particularly pro-U.S., the raw power in Thailand is still in the hands of the Thai Military which organization has been and continues to be in favor of continued U.S. Military presence in Thailand. Moreover, many highly placed individuals within both the Thai Civilian Bureaucracy and Military organizations are connected with business ventures which reap substantial profits from goods and services supplied to the U.S. Military. ^{2/} Official and unofficial (U.S. Military personnel and their dependents) expenditures in Thailand during the first eleven months of CY '74 amounted to US\$ 160,000,000 ^{3/} or about 8% of Thailand's foreign exchange surplus. It is obvious that a complete and/or precipitous withdrawal of U.S. Military personnel would not be suitable to either the Thai Military (as an organization receiving many operating benefits from the U.S. Military presence) the RTG from a strictly national economic view, or to the numerous politically powerful civilian and military individuals whose business interests would be negatively affected by the loss of the substantial market the U.S. Military represents. In this connection, it should also be recognized that even one of the severest Thai critics of the U.S., former Foreign Minister Dr. Thanat Khoman has made it clear ^{4/} that removal of U.S. troops and bases is not expected to be immediate, and that the military should be replaced by a "similar number of businessmen, educators, doctors and scientists." The implication being that Thailand is well aware of the economic impact of the U.S. Military presence, and the negative effect on the Thai economy of a complete withdrawal without a concurrent replacement source of income.

¹ USIS translation "Foreign Minister Charoonphan Israngkur's News Conference (Don Muang Airport Nov. 8, 1974)"

² Embassy BKK Airgram A243 6/30/72

³ MACTHAI

⁴ Address to American Chamber of Commerce, February 20, 1974

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
CONCLUSION:

The naivete evidenced by our Embassy and Military staff in dealings with the RTG has seriously undermined our efforts in Thailand and has achieved results only at costs far greater than necessary.

RECOMMENDATION:

Reassess our Military requirements in Thailand. Make every effort to reduce our presence unilaterally. Understand that requirements of ours also have Military and economic value to the RTG. Recognize that these are real values and that they involve a mutuality of political interests as well as significant financial interest on official and unofficial levels, and employ this knowledge positively in negotiations with the RTG. Abandon the "hat in hand" approach whereby we feel we must continually prove our worth to the RTG. That is to say, negotiate with the knowledge that we do represent both political and economic assets to the RTG and to many of the individuals within the RTG with whom we negotiate. Put our negotiations on a businesslike basis and in so doing, bring into our dealings with the RTG a greater degree of practicality than heretofore exhibited.

Sincerely yours,



Chief, Bangkok Operations Office
USAID/Laos

cc: Director of Policy Planning Staff
Executive Secretary

B6

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Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 119475
ORIGIN SP-02

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 ES-01 /003 R

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APPROVED BY S/P-OF: EESVENDSEN
S/P: DBANDLER

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

UNCLAS STATE 119475

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [REDACTED] FROM OPEN FORUM

B6

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: N/A
SUBJECT: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE

REF: VIENNA 04581

CHAIRMAN ERIC SVENDSEN

1. YOUR MESSAGE ON "SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE" SLUGGED FOR THE DISSENT CHANNEL HAS RECEIVED LIMITED DISTRIBUTION TO S/P ONLY. THERE IS SOME QUESTION WHETHER THIS IS PROPERLY A DISSENT CHANNEL MATTER, SINCE THE ISSUE INVOLVES A DISPUTE WITHIN AFSA RATHER THAN A SUBSTANTIVE FOREIGN POLICY QUESTION. HOWEVER, I HAVE PROVIDED AFSA PRESIDENT DENNIS HAYES WITH A COPY OF YOUR MESSAGE, AND AFSA IS CURRENTLY PREPARING A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO THE POINTS RAISED. IF THE MATTER IS NOT RESOLVED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME, WE WILL CONSIDER FURTHER STEPS. REGARDS.

DAM

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


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

January 13, 1976



B6

Dear Ms. Palmer:

Thank you for once again offering a suggestion regarding the Department's procedure for handling Rhodesian sanctions violations. Inclusion of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in the procedure makes eminent good sense. AF has agreed to notify the Coordinator's office when it becomes aware of a possible violation of sanctions, and the Coordinator's office has responded positively to the suggestion that it participate. The mechanism providing for participation by the Coordinator's office has been formalized. Your continued interest in this matter has been helpful and is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Winston Lord".

Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM

September 20, 1974

To: INR/CIS -

From: S/P - Winston Lord *WJL*

Subject: Dissent Message

B6

This is to acknowledge receipt of your dissent message of September 13, 1974 on "Section 212(a)(15) of the INA."

Mr. Richard B. Finn of the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) has been named coordinator in charge of substantive response to this dissent message.

In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your airgram has been circulated to the Offices of the Secretary, The Executive Secretary, The Director General, The Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and the Secretary's Open Forum Panel. Additional copies are being sent to the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs and to Mr. Carl Shepard of the Visa Office.

We will reply as promptly as possible to your concerns.

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 03305 191012Z

ACTION COPY

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ACTION SP-03

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2785

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, IS
SUBJ: ISRAEL'S FY 1975 PL 480 TITLE I REQUIREMENTS

REF: A, TEL AVIV 2698; B, TEL AVIV 3306

1. FOLLOWING REPRESENTS DISSENTING VIEWS (SEE REF B) OF
 ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL OFFICER.

2. I BELIEVE EMBASSY'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL (REF A) WAS SOUNDLY
BASED, TO EXTENT THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY SITUATION REQUIRES USG
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE--AND IT UNQUESTIONABLY DOES--MILITARY CREDIT
AND SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE ARE APPROPRIATE. USG HAS BEEN GENEROUS
WITH THIS AID, AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO BE SO. AS FOR
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (ESPECIALLY PL 480), ISRAEL'S INCREASING
PROSPERITY HAS PROGRESSIVELY ERODED ISRAEL'S CASE. OUR PL 480
ASSISTANCE IS MORE URGENTLY NEEDED BY COUNTRIES WITH ONE-FIFTH
OF ISRAEL'S PER CAPITA GNP.
KEATING

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

21

RELEASE IN
PART B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/P: CALLEGRONE: AG
09/22/81 EXT 22972
S/P: WOLFOVITZ

ROUTINE SAN JOSE

DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P PAUL WOLFOVITZ

E.O. 11652: GDS, 9/22/86 (WOLFOVITZ, PAUL)

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REFERENCE : SAN JOSE 5764

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. WE HAVE DISTRIBUTED COPIES TO THE SECRETARY, THE COUNSELOR, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE OPEN FORUM. THOMAS THORNTON, POLICY PLANNING STAFF MEMBER, WILL COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. 44

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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RELEASE IN PART B6

December 9, 1974

~~SECRET~~

TO : M/FSI/SSFP [redacted]

FROM : S/P - Samuel W. Lewis, Acting *SM*

SUBJECT : Your Dissent Memorandum, "Critique of The Substantive Handling of The Cyprus Crisis" dated August 9, 1974.

B6

In accordance with the procedures set forth in the Department Notice of May 8, 1974, concerning dissent messages, this will constitute the response to your Dissent Memorandum on Cyprus dated August 9, 1974. Although the Secretary has had the opportunity to consider your Memorandum, the Policy Planning Staff takes responsibility for this reply, in which the Bureau of European Affairs also concurs. I apologize for the length of time which has elapsed.

This is essentially an argument about US presence and US power. You assert, in substance, that:

1. The status quo ante crisis was infinitely better than the present situation, and we should therefore have made greater efforts to preserve it. This argument brackets the time sequence of the actual crisis.

2. Before the coup, it was known that Ioannides intended to overthrow Makarios and that the consequences would be severe;

-- strong US representations to Ioannides would have prevented the crisis;

-- nevertheless, foreknowledge was not translated into policy, primarily because intelligence from Athens was at best conflicting and because the USG was not in touch with the decision-making element in the GOG.

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3. After the coup, it was known that a Turkish military intervention could only have been prevented by removal of Sampson and the Greek coup leaders on Cyprus;

-- strong US representations to the Greeks to remove them would have prevented the intervention;

-- nevertheless, foreknowledge was, again, not translated into policy.

4. After the Turkish intervention, it is a fact that the present situation, which is tending to evolve toward partition of the island, is fraught with peril: permanent Greek-Turkish confrontation, with permanent destabilization of NATO's southeastern flank and permanent opportunities for the USSR in the area;

-- strong US pressure on Turkey in favor of a tradeoff of Turkish military withdrawal for federation on Cyprus can substantially correct this situation, even if the status quo ante cannot be restored;

-- nevertheless, it does not appear that these perceptions are being translated into policy.

Nobody would claim perfection for our policy concerning Cyprus, but a different view of what we could have foreseen and what we could have done is, I think, legitimate.

1. In general, it would have been very hard for the USG, as a government, to foresee the present situation ~~in all its complexities before the crisis~~ and to make greater efforts to preserve the status quo on Cyprus in consequence, even if our channels of communication had been perfect.

Most people concerned with the area worried about the status quo in the whole area, whose importance transcended that of Cyprus. The status quo on Cyprus (however good it looks in retrospect) was based on second-class status for the island's Turkish population and had been repeatedly called into question since independence -- not least by Makarios himself.

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It was clear that the two status quos were somehow related, but it was not clear how they were related. For this reason, it could not be clear that resolute US action to preserve the status quo on Cyprus was the sine qua non of regional stability, even had it been true, and even had the success of US action been assured. The hesitancy which marked our Cyprus policy before the coup may therefore have been inevitable, or at least, natural.

2. In that general framework, our specific policy before the coup was almost bound to be hesitant too. Intelligence reports from Athens were at best conflicting, as you put it. Beyond that, as you also note, stronger US representations might not have been heard in Athens. But even if they had been made and heard, the long-term consequences for US policy in the area were problematic. Ioannides might in fact have backed down and then been ejected in favor of a civilian government. But we might also have been left in the center of a dispute between an enraged Turkish government and an irritated and more entrenched Greek junta coming off a successful coup on Cyprus, with very important US/NATO facilities in both Greece and Turkey in jeopardy. With the best of information, we would have confronted a range of difficult choices.

3. This was also true after the coup, which clearly made Turkish intervention likely and some kind of US action necessary. There was no real doubt that after over a decade of acquiescence the Turks were determined this time to set right what they considered a fundamentally wrong and necessarily unstable situation on Cyprus, and that they would not be denied again. It seemed very likely that Turkish intervention would provoke the Greek-Turkish war everyone wished to avoid. But the question of how best to avoid it was, once again, complex.

Your advice, judging from your Memorandum, would have been to remove the basis for Turkish intervention (and therefore of Greek-Turkish war) by pressure on the Greeks to remove Sampson and the Greek officers responsible for the coup. Had such pressure been applied, and been successful, the Turks might have backed down; in the upshot, the humiliated Greek junta might have been replaced. Unhappily, this was not the only possible

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or even only likely prospect. As you note, success could not have been assured even with better intelligence. And, another result might have been Sampson in the Greek-Cypriot saddle, an infuriated Greek junta at war with Turkey which had landed on Cyprus, the US in the middle, and the whole infra-structure of the Western security position in the Eastern Mediterranean at risk. Or, alternatively, since Sampson appeared from the outset a very dubious horse with little staying power, especially after Makarios' escape became known, it was arguable whether any push was needed. At least, I think, it is hard to argue that the range of ambiguous choices shrank with the coup.

In this situation, we chose to struggle for breathing space. We sought to encourage the UK to bring the other two Guarantor Powers into negotiation, to discourage the Turks and reprove the Greeks without condemning either publicly in ways which could only harden both their positions, and to warn them both off war. This policy was not totally successful, in large part because the Turks apparently made a definite decision to intervene and placed their demands in London at a high enough level to ensure rejection. But war was avoided, negotiations began, and, in the upshot, civilian government was restored in Greece. We were not entirely responsible for either the successes or the failures, whatever the Greeks may now insist. But this outcome, with all its faults, avoided the worst, preserved some US capacity to mediate between two valuable Allies, and thereby at least opened onto a future consonant with broad US policy interests.

4. Since the Turkish intervention, I see us as engaged in essentially the course you recommend: encouraging the parties toward a solution acceptable to them, in the awareness that Turkey, with its strengthened position, will need to make the most concessions, and that some form of tradeoff between military withdrawal and federation will probably underlie any agreement.

Thus there appears to be no basic disagreement on current policy. There is none concerning the perils of the present situation for US and Western interests in the critical area. At the same time,

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I recognize we may have different views on timing and what the US can and should do. It is apparent that the road ahead will be long and involved, and the outcome uncertain. But that is the real problem: we cannot assure a given outcome by maximizing pressure on Turkey, or on anyone. Both the Greeks and the Turks are aware that we do not necessarily espouse all their objectives as a matter of policy. All we favor as a matter of policy is a solution that they, the communities on Cyprus, and the international community can live with. Only time and much more effort will tell whether one can be achieved. Still, while there are few grounds for optimism, there are as yet no grounds for despair.

WS per tws
Concur: EUR - Mr. Stabler

cc: The Secretary
The Executive Secretary
S/P - Mr. Lord
EUR - Mr. Hartman
S/P-OFP - Mr. Smith

tws
Drafted by: S/P:TWSimons, Jr.:anc
x28613

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RELEASE IN PART
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April 11, 1977

Memorandum

To: Tony Lake, S/P - Director, Policy Planning Staff

From: [REDACTED]

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DISSENT CHANNEL

Subject: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: Two Proposals: 1) that the decision to abolish the Sector Analysis Division in A.I.D.'s Latin American Bureau be reversed; 2) that the analytical function throughout the agency, and the provision of analytical services to selected LDCs, be strengthened and expanded through the establishment of Sector Analysis Divisions in the other Regional Bureaus.

This memorandum presents a Dissent Channel viewpoint of [REDACTED]. The drafter does not wish to restrict distribution of this message.

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I. The Immediate Issue: Should the Sector Analysis Division of A.I.D.'s Latin American Bureau be abolished?

A. Introductory Remark

I have been informed that the division is to be abolished at the end of the current fiscal year. Although I was Chief of the division from [REDACTED] my views concerning the division's functions, the transferability of these functions, and the desirability of the division's dissolution have not been requested. If arguments for abolishing the division have been made, I am unaware of them, and cannot address them directly in the pages that follow. I therefore propose I be given the opportunity to respond to such arguments if and when they are made.

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B. The Shift in Foreign Assistance Priorities and the Development of the Sector Analysis Division

The establishment and development of the Sector Analysis Division has coincided with a change in A.I.D.'s primary concern from that of helping close balance of payment and national budget gaps to helping satisfy the basic human needs of the poor majorities in the LDCs in accordance with the various Congressional mandates. The need for policy-oriented sector analysis has achieved increasing recognition as a result of various developments: 1) greater appreciation for the complexity of development problems, including increased awareness of the variations in relations among social phenomena from country to country, and from region to region; 2) fuller recognition

-2-

of the fact that development goals are multiple (and that these goals include increased employment, income redistribution, increases in food production, reductions in population growth rates, reduction in rural-to-urban migration, etc.); and fuller recognition of the fact that achievement of these goals does not necessarily accompany success in attaining overall growth; 3) the gradual realization that some of these goals are predominantly "sectoral", others predominantly "intersectoral"; and a greater appreciation of the need to determine the possible complementarities and the inescapable trade-offs among these sectoral and intersectoral goals in specific country situations.

C. Different Views that Arose Concerning the Main Purpose of the Sector Analysis Division

Officials outside of the division have had different views concerning what the division's main purpose should be. These differences have concerned the scope, content and duration of, and the host-country involvement in, the analyses carried out by the division. Three general positions can be identified. Some officials felt that the division's original mandate was too broad. They believed the division should concentrate exclusively on rapid examinations of sectors in order to improve A.I.D. sector loans. (Since this is the most limited of the three purposes we will call it "Purpose C".) Others favored the broader purpose of a detailed and comprehensive sector analysis aimed at determining optimum policy and resource allocation for achieving major goals (Purpose B). And others favored the still broader purpose of carrying out such a sector analysis jointly with the LDC and thus internalizing an analytical process that would be subsequently carried out unilaterally (Purpose A).

I have always favored making Purpose A the main purpose of the division, recognizing that in certain circumstances and during certain periods it is not an attainable goal and that we must settle for the second objective instead. Achieving Purpose B provides the USG with increased understanding of a sector's main problems and how different sector policies will affect the main sectoral and intersectoral objectives. Moreover, successful execution of a unilaterally carried out sector analysis will facilitate the subsequent internalization of the analytical process. In other words, prior achievement of Purpose B increases the probability that Purpose A will be subsequently achieved.

For example, the division's first detailed and comprehensive agricultural sector analysis, the Colombia Agricultural Sector Analysis-I, involved, among other things, the construc-

-3-

tion of a rather large Leontiev input-output matrix. The GOC was not at that time organized to cooperate in such an endeavor. It provided the division with the data it needed, including cost of production farm studies, and both the data processing and the analytical interpretation were carried out in Washington. However, the methodological, statistical and analytical working documents prepared under the project were all translated into Spanish so that the employed methodology and the policy findings could be shared with the GOC. Thus the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis-I paved the way for the Colombian Agricultural Sector Analysis-II -- a more ambitious endeavor carried out in Bogotá with limited assistance from A.I.D. There have been some similarities and some differences in the patterns of cooperation and exchange in a small farm analysis in Guatemala, a health sector analysis in Colombia, (predominantly Colombian with decreasing A.I.D. inputs) an analysis of primary education in Ecuador (often incorrectly referred to as a sector analysis), a regional agriculture and nutrition analysis in Bolivia, and an agricultural sector analysis in the Dominican Republic.

During my tenure as Chief of the division we also initiated the El Salvador Education Sector Analysis, which I continued to direct during my year at The [redacted] Institution, and am now helping complete in my new post [redacted]. Since this analysis is a clear example of Purpose A, I shall describe it briefly later.

Obviously, scope, duration and host-country participation are factors that tend to be positively correlated. Greater analytical scope to obtain fuller understanding of the involved phenomena and the interrelation of the selected goals requires more time and, generally speaking, greater host-country involvement. Generally speaking, LDC involvement has been favored by the field and openly opposed by A.I.D./W loan officials who are primarily concerned with "moving the money". Loan officials and recent Bureau leadership have wanted the Division to focus exclusively on Purpose C: on the "improvement" of selected A.I.D. loans. From this standpoint internalization of the analytical process in order to improve future LDC policy and resource allocation should not have been a purpose of the Sector Analysis Division.

Since "Sector Assessments" were conceived and developed as the standard A.I.D. instrument for accomplishing Purpose C, the loan officer viewpoint was that the Sector Analysis Division should dedicate itself exclusively to carrying out sector assessments. The characteristics which distinguish sector assessments from sector analyses have their origins

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-4-

in the time constraint which is placed on assessments. Since assessments are invariably carried out as part of the programming cycle in preparation for an A.I.D. loan, they must necessarily be more limited in scope, rely primarily, if not exclusively, on data that is already available (no special surveys) and avoid host-country involvement (since such involvement is likely to delay preparation of a document which is being treated as an internal condition precedent for a loan). The technical divisions (Agriculture, Education and Health) in the L.A. regional bureau have been carrying out and/or directing sector assessments in cooperation with the missions. Had the Sector Analysis Divisions dedicated itself to this task, besides neglecting Purposes A and B, it would have been duplicating efforts of the technical divisions.

The failure to pursue Purposes A and B would have been a serious omission. Studies which involve a quick general review of the sector but are primarily concerned with the use of loan funds, though of value are much less useful than detailed and comprehensive analyses of sectors and the relations of these sectors to the larger society. Moreover, the failure to strengthen the host-country analytical and decision-making capabilities maintains the condition of intellectual dependency on the part of the LDCs which is A.I.D.'s stated purpose to reduce and finally eliminate.

This discussion of the issues involved in past efforts to use the Sector Analysis Division for carrying out sector assessments-- whether or not labeled as such-- is, I believe, relevant to the immediate issue before us: should the Sector Analysis Division be abolished?

The recent decision to abolish the division is, in effect, a recognition that the division is not needed for accomplishing Purpose C. In other words, implicit in the decision in question is the recognition that assessments can be carried out by the missions with A.I.D./W technical division support. This was precisely the position taken by the Sector Analysis Division during my 4½ years as Chief.

However, abolishment of the Sector Analysis Division would also constitute a decision not to carry out sector analyses, either unilaterally (Purpose B) or bilaterally (Purpose A). This is the decision which I contest and propose be reversed.

-5-

D. Organization, Budget and Operating Procedures of the
Sector Analysis Division

Sound decisions concerning the Sector Analysis Division require a minimum understanding of what it has done and how. As Chief for 4 1/2 years and later, after a year at [redacted] when my departure from the division was definite and my replacement had been chosen, my attempts to discuss the division's future directions were totally unsuccessful. I prepared various memos but these were not answered in oral nor written form. Since the division's work represented a fairly radical departure from past A.I.D. operations, I will provide a brief description.

At its maximum staffing level, the Sector Analysis Division had five professionals. As Chief, I supervised the staff, periodically reviewed the division's projects and took direct charge of the projects in the education sector (Education Data Reports for Colombia, Guatemala, Panamá, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Ecuador and Mexico, the Ecuador analysis of primary education, and the El Salvador Education Sector Analysis.) A senior economist was in charge of the main agricultural analyses, an operation research analyst provided computer and analytical design advice for all projects, an agricultural economist assisted in all the analyses of agriculture and directed a project himself, a program economist was responsible for analytical projects in health, and the five analysts exchanged views on all the division's projects at fairly frequent intervals.

Since the two basic purposes in establishing the division involved tasks of major proportions-- that of arriving at improved policy and resource allocation, and that of internalizing an ongoing analytical process in A.I.D.'s three priority sectors for selected countries-- it was recognized from the start that the five A.I.D. officials were not enough, and that additional support of two kinds would be needed: 1) a group of professionals to provide statistical support (sample survey design and techniques of statistical analysis) and computer or data processing services; 2) a group of agricultural economists to support the larger workload of analysis in this priority sector.

Provisional determinations concerning how to most effectively and efficiently carry out unilateral and bilateral sector analyses also had to be made from the start, since such determinations had direct bearing on the location and composition of the two supporting groups. For example, it was recognized that the most effective way to carry out a Purpose A sector analysis would be to have all the analytical,

B6

-6-

statistical and computer personnel, as well as the computer hardware, on the LDC site. Since it would not be financially and logistically feasible to have such large amounts of U.S. professional resources abroad, the next-best procedure in terms of effectiveness, and the most efficient and economical procedure, would be to have all the core professionals involved on two sites: the host-country group on one site (with one USG advisor perhaps), and a closely knit USG group in Washington. (This has not precluded the use of university personnel or university contracts.)

We therefore established our two support groups by means of RSSA agreements, with U.S. Government agencies. Approximately 20 Bureau of Census (BUCEN) statistical and computer science personnel and eight U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (USDA) economists have worked in close proximity to the A.I.D. Latin American Bureau Sector Analysis Division. The cost of the two RSSAs has been roughly \$1 million, the main expense items being the salaries of this personnel, the very large amounts of data processing in the U.S. which A.I.D. computer facilities were unable to handle, and travel and per diem expenses of the RSSA personnel on TDY in Latin American countries. The physical proximity of the three USG groups (the division, BUCEN, and USDA) was a basic requirement. During certain periods the analysts have needed daily, and during other periods weekly face-to-face contact with statisticians, programmers and other computer science personnel in order to coordinate activities and to determine proper procedures for the collection, processing, and analysis of data. Propinquity and close cooperation between the three groups has been essential to the division's success in arriving at policy conclusions which are sound, as well as important.

The effectiveness and efficiency of the two-site procedure can be illustrated by the El Salvador Education Sector Analysis. The GOES established a sector analysis group; carried out special surveys and provided additional funds over a four-year period; has sent programmers to work with BUCEN personnel in Washington for weeks, even months at a time (very effective on-the-job training, as well as a means for accelerating the project) and sent the Director of the Ministry planning office, and the chiefs of the statistical and planning departments under this office, to work with me here on various occasions for 2 and 4-week periods. It was agreed that all the data processing possible would be carried out in San Salvador, and that the USG would take the overflow-- although the overflow has turned out to be the larger part. (Part of the internalization process has been to increase Salvadorean hardware and software capabilities so that all future data processing can be done there.) Various BUCEN officials have provided technical

-7-

assistance in San Salvador for 2, 3 and 4-week periods; I have just returned to A.I.D./W after a two-month period in San Salvador helping prepare our first six analytical documents. The analytical-policy product to be completed by September 30, 1977 will consist of 23 documents (all written in Spanish and to be translated into English, as well). Attached is a list of the documents and a recent memo to my supervisor, [redacted], which summarizes some of the main conclusions and policy findings of Analytical Working Document No. 2. Some of the policy findings of this document constitute radical departures from conventional views concerning education problems in LDCs and are, I believe, very important for Central American educational development. The reader can judge for himself. In any case, these attachments should contribute to an understanding and appraisal of sector analysis projects.

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E. My Main Conclusion Concerning the Immediate Issue

I have described the work of the division, and the three past positions concerning what should have been the division's main purpose, because I think this information bears on the judgement as to whether or not the division should be abolished. Since the Agency is stressing the importance of improving analysis and policy, I can conceive of no good reason for abolishing a division which was awarded a Certificate of Achievement in May, 1972 "in recognition of exceptional contributions to the improvement of management in A.I.D." and singled out for recognition in the Superior Unit Award given to its larger office, LA/DR, in October 1975 for "trailblazing analytical approaches in the exploration of the problems of development in A.I.D.'s sectors of concentration." Careful evaluation of the projects carried out by the division, and thorough discussion of future directions would be extremely useful, of course. This would constitute an attempt to profit from the division's experience and to assure preservation of the division's memory (including its methodological developments and its policy findings) before making organizational and procedural changes.

Since the reason for abolishing the division has not been discussed with me, I am obliged to speculate as to what it may be. My explanation is a rather simple one. Many A.I.D./W officials are wholly occupied with the large and demanding task of requesting and obligating the yearly appropriation. They tend to forget that transferring resources is not an end-in-itself but, rather, one of the means for achieving social and economic goals in the LDCs. They forget that unless LDCs develop policies which are effective and efficient in raising the economic, social and cultural living conditions of

-8-

their poor majorities, resource transfers under bilateral or multilateral assistance programs will not have their desired effects. These officials have come to accept sector assessments (Purpose C) as legitimate A.I.D. activities because they have been laid down as formal bureaucratic requirements for loans. However, they do not accept Purposes A and B as legitimate because these do not facilitate the only activity they're concerned with: the resource transfer process.

I believe a thorough discussion of Purposes A and B should now be carried out. These purposes are closely related to basic issues which A.I.D. and the Department are facing: internal reforms in the LDCs; increasing the complementarities and reducing the trade-offs among the different growth and equity goals; making bureaucracies accountable; assuring memory, learning and improvements in policy. In the section that follows I will discuss some of the social, economic and political aspects of the broader and longer-range issue of the role of analysis in A.I.D. and in the LDCs.

II. The Longer-Range Issue: The Role of Analysis in Development

A. The Need for Analysis of Social Phenomena in the LDCs

Will the LDCs solve their major social and economic problems with the resources they are likely to obtain under a New International Economic Order (NIEO) or some variant thereof? An acceptable reply to such a general question must be equally general. The LDCs will solve their major social and economic problems if they have sound and appropriate policies, good management and sufficient technical know-how, as well as the required amounts of resources. If the resources are not properly allocated and used, the LDC's major social and economic objectives will not be attained.

If appropriate policy is one of the necessary conditions of the "development" that solves major national problems, on what does the formulation of such policy depend? Policy that is appropriate to a given national situation depends on an understanding of that situation; and this understanding involves the use of both theory and fact. In other words, this understanding comes about as the result of applying the best available theories and conceptual frameworks for explaining social phenomena to the collection, analysis and interpretation of facts. As we are finally beginning to admit, these facts are different from country to country, and from region to region. The old, pervasive belief that "development" is the result of a series of fixed steps that can be specified in a handbook for

-9-

every nation to follow is finally being recognized as a mistaken point of view.

Policy issues are the most complex issues involved in "development". Consequently, it is not surprising that these are the issues which foreign assistance agencies have handled with greatest ineptness. When the preconceived macroeconomic and sectoral policies supported by a foreign assistance agency are appropriate to the LDC in question, an effort to impose such policies in the loan negotiation process may seem arrogant or insensitive to the LDC officials involved. When the supported policies are not appropriate there is more than mere appearance or exaggerated Third World touchiness behind the charge of arrogance. The plain truth is that the macroeconomic and sectoral policies recommended to LDCs by multilateral and bilateral agencies have usually been based on rather superficial understandings of the problems involved.

However, this deficiency of foreign assistance agencies must be viewed in conjunction with the corresponding deficiency of the LDCs. It is important to note that an equal or greater inadequacy of LDC understanding explains why the policies supported by foreign assistance agencies are so seldom openly challenged by the negotiating LDC officials. Although they may disagree with the foreign agency policy recommendations, they seldom have another policy with a better rationale behind it to propose as a substitute. Host country officials often agree to changes in policy which the foreign assistance agency tries to bring about through loan allocations and loan conditions precedent, and which the LDC officials are later successful in circumventing through unilateral budgetary, organizational, and procedural measures. Perhaps it is not surprising that countries fail to adopt or implement policies which they have not participated in fashioning and which, moreover, are not backed up by an empirically grounded and well-argued rationale. In any case, both the LDCs and the foreign assistance agencies have failed to develop satisfactory procedures for improving policy. This is one of the major deficiencies in the development efforts of the last 30 years.

Establishment of the Sector Analysis Division can be viewed as a modest first step in an attempt to remove this deficiency in the Latin American region. The successful completion of a Purpose A sector analysis is meant to provide the host country with policy products of immediate utility and to establish an ongoing unilateral process of analysis that will lead to continuous improvements in policy.

This approach to the improvement of policy attempts to take into account some important characteristics of the Third

-10-

World. I have already referred to features which are more "technical" in nature, i.e., the increasing appreciation for the complexity of social and economic problems, along with the growing recognition that these problems are multiple and cannot be satisfactorily dealt with singly or in isolation. In sum, the establishment of an ongoing analytical process in the LDC is an attempt to help it deal with the complementarities and trade-offs of interrelated problems.

There are also important "political" reasons for giving analysis a much greater role in development efforts. In negotiating with the developing world foreign assistance agencies have always found themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, they must try to avoid being charged with dictation; on the other, they must do their best to assure that the funds entrusted to them are optimally used for development purposes. How to achieve improvement in policies, including more effective and more efficient support for the underprivileged majorities, without imposing or dictating policy is an old problem that has become more acute.

Purpose A sector analyses constitute parts of a larger strategy for steering between the Scylla of dictation and the Charybdis of irresponsibly handing over the money. By participating in the kind of joint inquiry represented by a Purpose A sector analysis we are both learning about, and demonstrating respect for, unique national conditions-- a learning we do not achieve, and a respect we do not express, when we propose pre-conceived policies. By helping LDCs develop capabilities for analyzing their problems, we are helping them eliminate their most serious and basic form of dependency, their intellectual dependency; we are strengthening the propensity for fact-finding that is integral to an open and democratic society; and we are participating in the North-South dialogue in a way which may help alter the present patterns of accusation and counter-accusation.

B. The Advantages for the USG in Providing Analytical Assistance to LDCs and in Strengthening the Analytical Function in A.I.D.

In his testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations concerning the FY 78 foreign assistance request, one of the Administration's fundamental foreign policy objectives specified by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance was : "To foster a climate of constructive cooperation, dialogue and reciprocal benefit in North-South diplomacy." In remarks made during his visit to the Department of State, President Carter also referred to this

1/ Statements of U.S. officials in this section are taken from the March 3 and 31, 1977 issues of "Front Lines".

-11-

objective when he stated: "Our constant search will be to find common ground on which we can reach agreement so that we can set an example for the rest of the world in a friendly and mutually respectful attitude." Two other statements of the President indicated that he felt that how this should be done was not yet entirely clear. "I think we need a substantial change in our foreign aid programs... So I think I understand the problem. I don't understand the answers yet." The President also called for the "evolution of an idea or a new approach or a consistent old approach." The proposal that the analytical function be consolidated and extended throughout the Agency and that analytical services be provided to selected LDCs is, I believe, a response to the President's call which merits examination.

A.I.D. Administrator, John J. Gilligan has promised to carry out a "thorough examination of the Agency's organizational structure." Clearly, determinations concerning the future role of analysis in A.I.D. will have implications for organization and staffing. Moreover, it is one of the contentions of this memo that making analysis one of A.I.D.'s central functions will contribute not only to the North-South dialogue but to making "A.I.D. more responsible to the 'New Directions' policy legislated by the Congress"-- another objective stressed by the Administrator.

In carrying out the kind of joint inquiry represented by a Purpose A sector analysis we would, first, be participating in a North-South dialogue concerning development with the focus on facts and existential relations, rather than on preconceived views and opinions. Second, we would be strengthening the LDC's analytical and decision-making capabilities. And third, we would become better informed as to how the LDC can most efficiently and effectively satisfy the basic needs of its poor majority.

Since our concern for this majority is a matter of public record, there should be nothing surreptitious about our interest in helping LDCs carry out inquiries which determine what policies are needed for eliminating poverty, malnutrition, ignorance, unemployment, etc. Indeed, nations that do not want assistance in conducting such inquiries, and that do not have well-argued rationales supporting their strategies, might be disqualifying themselves for future assistance. In this way self-help would continue to be recognized as a fundamental requirement, but it would be given much more substance than it has had in the past. Under such an approach a new element of USG modesty would be introduced since we would stop pretending we have the answers when we do not. Furthermore, the case for reform would be strengthened since it would now be based on the outcomes of

-12-

inquiries which provide detailed information concerning production, family income, employment, nutrition, migration, illness, education, etc., and the relations among them and their main causal factors. Indeed, the more information we have about such phenomena the more meaningfully we will be able to discuss "economic" rights, and their relations to other human rights.

Since economic, social and political progress in the LDCs depends finally on LDC policies, the issue as to what can be done to help LDCs improve their policies is a fundamental issue. I have made two major contentions: 1) that continuing analytical processes in the LDCs are a necessary condition for arriving at sound policies; 2) that helping establish such processes should be a major form of U.S. assistance. If there are alternative foreign assistance approaches for improving LDC policies it would be very useful to consider them and to compare them with the approach I've proposed.

In any case, thorough discussion of the longer-range issue is very badly needed. Even if the agency decided to consolidate and extend the analytical function and to provide analytical services to the LDCs it would need to explore various related issues which will here be only mentioned: 1) the criteria for deciding which LDCs to approach with the proposal to establish a continuing process of analysis in one or more sectors; 2) the necessity of tailoring the scope and objectives of a first analysis in a host-country to its existing capabilities for data collection, data processing and analytical interpretation; 3) the role of analysis in "middle-income" countries which have had good overall growth performance but are not solving the social and economic problems of their growing poor majorities (countries which will be receiving less USG concessional assistance, but which are important to the USG for humanitarian and security reasons); 4) the possibility of making certain completed sector analyses, and continuing processes of analysis, models for a region (for example, the El Salvador Ministry of Education planning office should become a source of training for the other Central American countries in data collection, data processing, analysis, and the use of data for both planning and day-to-day management); 5) a possible relation between agricultural sector analyses and issues of inter-dependencies, including world-wide agricultural resource accounting; 6) the possibility that the multilateral lending agencies would also provide assistance in policy-oriented analyses, and the coordination of such assistance with A.I.D.

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INCUMING TELEGRAM

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: ILO SUBJ: ILO - ARTICLE 17

REF : GENEVA 4278

FOLLOWING DISSENT MESSAGE DRAFTED BY [] MEMBER U.S. DELEGATION TO ILO:

1. MEXICAN GOVERNMENT REP TO GOVERNING BODY LOMBERA, IN INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH USREP HOROWITZ MAY 27, SUGGESTED THAT IN ORDER TO GIVE ILO MEMBERS WHO ARE OPPOSED TO ARTICLE 17 AMENDMENT SOMETHING WHICH THEY COULD FEEL WAS "VICTORY", INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING COULD BE REACHED THAT ARTICLE 17 AMENDMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY CONFERENCE IN RETURN FOR AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT DECISION TAKEN BY 1975 CONFERENCE THAT ELECTION OF DIRECTOR GENERAL BY GOVERNING BODY WOULD BE APPROVED BY CONFERENCE. (THIS 1976 DECISION RESULTED FROM ADOPTION OF STRUCTURE COMMITTEE REPORT WHICH CONTAINED WORDING THAT THIS NEW PROCEDURE WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED "AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.") HOROWITZ TOLD LOMBERA THAT US WOULD HAVE TO KNOW IF LOMBERA HAD THE BOTES, HAD INSTURCTIONS, AND WAS SERIOUS, BEFORE US WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL, AND ARRANGED MEETING WITH HIM FOR MORNING OF MAY 30, TO LISTEN TO HIS PROPOSITION.

2. LOMBERA HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN PEDDLING PROPOSITION ELSEWHERE SINCE AGO. ITALIAN GOVT REP TO GB, HAD HEARD IT EARLIER; DG BLANCHARD MENTIONED IT TO HOROWITZ AFTER GB SESSION ON MAY 27 (HOROWITZ RESPONDED BY ASKING FOR INFO ON HISTORY OF DIRECTOR GENERAL ELECTION PROPOSAL); FIRST SECRETARY OF TURKISH MISSION MENTIONED IT TO PALMER AFTERNOON OF MAY 27; AND US WORKER ADVISOR BOGGS WHO HAD HEARD OF THIS PROPOSAL ALREADY FROM SEPARATE SOURCE, TOLD MEMBER USDEL MAY 27 THAT ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH PACKAGE WOULD BE CONTRARY TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS. BOGGS HAD EARLIER ASKED PALMER HER REACTION TO PROPOSAL, AND HAD BEEN TOLD IT WAS CONTRARY TO HER INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE "NO DEALS".)

3. HOROWITZ QUERIED US EMPLOYER (SMITH) AND WORKER (BOGGS) REPS ABOUT LOMBERA PROPOSITION. BOTH INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER IT.

4. AT USDEL STAFF MEETING MAY 28, HOROWITZ REPORTED LOMBERA APPROACH AND SPECULATED THAT "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT" MIGHT BE WORKED OUT WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO WIN ON ARTICLE 17 WHILE GOING ALONG ON DG ELECTION ISSUE. PALMER QUESTIONED WHETHER SUCH AGREEMENT WOULD BE POSSIBLE, IN VIEW OF U.S. POSITION THAT WE WANT NO DEALS ON ARTICLE 17. TO WHICH HOROWITZ REPLIED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FORMAL LINKAGE OF THESE TWO ITEMS.

5. AT MAY 30 STAFF MEETING HOROWITZ REPORTED HIS MEETING EARLIER THAT MORNING WITH LOMBERA AT WHICH LOMBERA SAID THE DG ELECTION ITEM COULD BE DISCUSSED IN CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON STRUCTURE. HOROWITZ POINTED OUT TO LOMBERA THAT ARTICLE 17 ISSUE SHOULD BE REFERRED BY SELECTIONS COMMITTEE TO STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE SINCE STRUCTURE COMMITTEE HAD NEVER SHOWN INTEREST OR TAKEN ACTION ON IT AND THAT IT WAS NOT A STRUCTURE ISSUE. LATER IN DIS-

CUSSION, HE ALSO SAID TO LOMBERA THAT US POSITION IS THAT WE WISH TO AVOID CONFRONTATION OR STRUCTURE ISSUES BUT ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS INFORMALLY WHATEVER STRUCTURE ISSUES ARE OF CONCERN TO ILO MEMBERS, INCLUDING DIRECTOR GENERAL ELECTION. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, HOROWITZ SAID TO LOMBERA US DISASSOCIATED ITSELF FROM LINKING IMPLEMENTATION OF 1975 DECISION (ON HAVING CONFERENCE APPROVE DG ELECTION) WITH APPROVAL OF ARTICLE 17 AMENDMENT. AT STAFF MEETING, PALMER URGED, UNSUCCESSFULLY, THAT "DISASSOCIATION," WHICH CONNOTES DISINTEREST BUT NOT OPPOSITION, WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH AND THAT USDEL SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE AND KILL THE PROPOSAL BY STATING STRONG OPPOSITION.

6. COMMENT: DESPITE THIS STATEMENT BY HOROWITZ TO LOMBERA, AND LATER DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED PARA 7 REFEEL THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT SOME DELEGATES TO CONFERENCE MAY NOT THINK SOME KIND OF LINKAGE CAN BE WORKED OUT IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE PASSAGE OF ARTICLE 17 AMENDMENT WITHOUT CONFRONTATION. LOMBERA PROPOSAL COMPLICATES US POSITION SINCE WHILE WE ARE SEEKING CLEAR-CUT DECISION ON ARTICLE 17 AMENDMENT, USDEL ALSO IS URGING NON-CONFRONTATION DISCUSSION ON STRUCTURE (MANY DELEGATES CONSIDER ARTICLE 17 A STRUCTURE ISSUE). WE CANNOT CONTROL SPREAD OF IDEA THAT THE LOMBERA PROPOSAL IS WORTHWHILE AS FACE-SAVING MECHANISM WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS. PALMER BELIEVES THAT IN ORDER TO PUT END TO THIS PROPOSAL IF IT IS AT ALL POSSIBLE TO DO SO, STRONGER EFFORT THAN "DISASSOCIATION" (NOW BEING MADE WHEN OPPORTUNITY ARISES) IS NEEDED AND THAT USDEL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY INITIATE OPPORTUNITIES, INCLUDING REGIONAL DELEGATE GROUPS WHICH HOROWITZ MAY BE INVITED TO ADDRESS, TO STATE FLATLY THAT ARTICLE 17 SHOULD GO TO STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE AND BE CONSIDERED ON ITS MERITS. WHILE ISSUE OF DG ELECTION BELONGS IN STRUCTURE DISCUSSIONS WHERE IT MAY OR MAY NOT ARISE AT THIS CONFERENCE, USDEL SHOULD STATE THAT IF DG ELECTION ISSUE DOES ARISE IN STRUCTURE COMMITTEE US WILL DECIDE US POSITION ON THE ISSUE'S MERITS AT THAT TIME AND WE ARE OPPOSED TO (RATHER THAN DISASSOCIATED FROM) LINKAGE OF THIS WITH ARTICLE 17. RATIONALE FOR STRONG OPPOSITION AND FOR TAKING INITIATIVES IS (1) IF LINKAGE PROPOSAL GETS TOO WIDE AN AUDIENCE, US CREDIBILITY ON WITHDRAWAL POSTURE (I.E., THAT WE WANT DELEGATIONS TO STAND UP ON MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE) MAY BE AFFECTED. (2) IF US MAKES CLEAR TOO LATE IN THE CONFERENCE THAT THERE IS NO LINKAGE, OTHER DELEGATE'S CHAGRIN AT REALIZING THERE IS NO LINKAGE MIGHT WELL FORCE A HARDENING OF POSITIONS IN STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE, THEREBY THREATENING PASSAGE OF CURRENT ARTICLE 17 PROPOSAL. (3) FACT THAT INITIALLY (MAY 27) LOMBERA (AND THROUGH HIM PERHAPS OTHER DELEGATES), WAS TOLD THAT US WILLING LISTEN TO HIS LINKAGE PROPOSAL, MAY HAVE ERODED US POSTION THAT WE WANT CLEAR-CUT DECISIONS, WIN OR LOSE, RATHER THAN "PACKAGES" ON KEY ISSUES, INCLUDING ARTICLE 17, WHICH MAY BLUR OUTCOME. [] CONSIDERS STRONGER USDEL ACTION THAT THAT DESCRIBED PARA 7 REFEEL NEEDED TO ELIMINATE ANY CONFUSION. AS OF JUNE 1, DURING MORNING SESSION OF CONFERENCE, LOMBERA PROPOSAL STILL ACTIVELY BEING DISCUSSED IN CORRIDORS. SORENSON

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DISSENT CHANNEL

FOLLOWING REPEAT MEXICO 16290 ACTION SECSTATE 30 DEC 76

QUOTE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MEXICO 16290

DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR: DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN FROM [] USIS OFFICER

EO 11652: NA
TAGS: CASC PFOR.MX
SUBJECT: PRESS STATEMENT ON MOTOR TRAVEL IN SINALOA

REF MEXICO 16176 AND STATE 313324

STRONGLY URGE DEPARTMENT ISSUE, WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY, TRAVEL ALERT TO AMERICAN CITIZENS RE HAZARDS OF TRAVEL IN SINALOA, MEXICO. IF DEPARTMENT DECIDES THERE ARE OVERRIDING POLICY REASONS TO NOT MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AT THIS TIME, STRONGLY URGE OTHER MEASURES BE TAKEN SUCH AS ASKING U. S. CUSTOM OFFICIALS AT NOGALES BORDER TO GIVE WRITTEN NOTICE TO ALL AMERICANS TRAVELING INTO MEXICO ON ROUTE 15. BELIEVE FURTHER DELAY IN MAKING ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BORDER ON CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. IF ADDITIONAL AMERICANS ARE MOLESTED AND DEPARTMENT HAS NOT ISSUED WARNING, THERE IS BOUND TO BE A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION ON THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY.
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BENEFITS TO OUTWEIGH THE COSTS.

6. WE DO AGREE THAT THERE COULD BE A DANGER OF THE SUBSIDY'S BECOMING TOO LARGE AND CONTINUING OVER TOO LONG A PERIOD. WE INTEND TO GIVE THESE AND OTHER SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF THIS PROGRAM CAREFUL ATTENTION AS WE PROCEED WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

7. THANK YOU FOR SHARING YOUR IDEAS WITH US THROUGH THE DISSENT CHANNEL. CHRISTOPHER

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AIDAC, DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR [] FROM S/P LAKE

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: AIFLD PROPOSAL FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO ORIT

REF: LA PAZ 8776

1. WE HAVE STUDIED YOUR MESSAGE OBJECTING TO THE GRANT OF US GOVERNMENT FUNDS TO ORIT ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT MAY DAMAGE THE IMAGE OF THAT ORGANIZATION SO MUCH AS TO OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS OF AN EXPANDED PROGRAM.

2. THE CONCERNS YOU EXPRESS WERE CONSIDERED BEFORE A DECISION WAS MADE. AFTER DISCUSSION AT THE TUNIS LABOR ATTACHE CONFERENCE WHERE YOU WERE PRESENT AND MADE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME POINTS, THE AID MISSIONS WERE ASKED FOR COMMENTS BY STATE CABLE 243004. OF THE TWENTY RESPONDERS, FOURTEEN SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL, ABOUT HALF WITH SOME KIND OF RESERVATION, AND SIX WERE NEUTRAL. ONE OF THE LATTER RECOMMENDED AGAINST ACTIVITIES IN THAT PARTICULAR COUNTRY. ONLY THE MISSIONS IN ARGENTINA AND BOLIVIA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT ORIT ACCEPTING USG SUPPORT.

3. PRESUMABLY THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS THEMSELVES WOULD BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO THE KIND OF DAMAGE YOU WARN OF. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ORIT EXECUTIVE BOARD CONSIDERED THE

QUESTION BEFORE AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. AIFLD HAS ASSURED US THAT THEY ARE WORKING VERY CLOSELY WITH THE AFL-CIO ON THE MATTER. THUS THOSE MOST CLOSELY AND DIRECTLY INVOLVED DO NOT SEEM TO FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF USG ASSISTANCE.

4. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (INCLUDING TRADE UNION RIGHTS) THAT CHARACTERIZES USG ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA. DEMOCRATIC LABOR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE AREA ARE WELL AWARE OF OUR ATTITUDES AND ARE IN SYMPATHY WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF US LABOR POLICY. THERE IS A NEW MOOD OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE AND WE THINK US ASSISTANCE TO ORIT CAN USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO WHAT THE US IS DOING IN THE LABOR FIELD. IF WE EXPECT AN AUTOMATIC UNFAVORABLE REACTION, WE ARE NOT DOING JUSTICE TO THE BENEFICIAL IMPACT OUR POLICIES AND OUR ASSISTANCE CAN HAVE.

5. WHILE THERE MAY BE DAMAGE TO THE ORIT IMAGE IN SOME REGIONS, PERHAPS FOR EXAMPLE IN BOLIVIA, THE CLEAR MAJORITY OF LABOR EXPERTISE FAVORS THE PROGRAM AND EXPECTS THE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/P File

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October 19, 1978

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

TO : PA/FOI -

FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake

SUBJECT : Your Dissent Channel Message on the
Classification Review Staff

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This will acknowledge receipt of your dissent channel message entitled "Placement of the Classification Review Staff." I have designated Cameron Hume of the Policy Planning Staff as coordinator in charge of a substantive response. Your memo has been distributed to the following: the Office of the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, the Executive Secretary of the Department, the Chairman of the Secretary's Open Forum, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, and the Assistant Secretary for Administration. I commend your use of the dissent channel and assure you that we will respond to the questions you have raised as soon as possible.

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

Because of the time needed to implement M's decision once it was made, PA has been anxious to obtain the decision and has engaged in high level discussions with M. I understand that M has now concluded that the entire function, which implies the existing FOI and EO mandatory review functions also, should be placed in A. What would happen to the CCP, which has oversight and appeals functions for the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the EO, is not clear, but logically it would follow the rest of the function to A.

Arguments

1) A's basic contention is that (a) the declassification function and related functions are primarily a record keeping matter and as such properly belong in A; (b) the function can be more efficiently handled in A.

2) PA's position is that:

(a) the declassification function and the related FOI function are primarily a public relations matter. The object of the EO and the FOIA implementation is not to produce a perfect records system, but to show the public that the Department has a real concern for openness.

(b) Congress encouraged the placing of the FOI function in the public affairs area of the Department.

(c) The CCP, after an extremely thorough airing of all points of view, recommended placing the function in PA.

(d) the Inspectors' report supported placing the basic function in PA, subject to the record keeping being handled by A.

(e) PA has released 90% of the material requested under EO 11652 and the FOIA, a record of meeting the standard of openness which could hardly be improved on.

(f) PA has been extremely successful in holding lawsuits to a minimum and has yet to lose a suit.

(g) There is no reason to believe that placing the function in A would increase its administrative efficiency. While delays occur in both bureaus, the delays in handling Privacy Act cases (which are handled by A at present) far exceed those in handling FOI cases

- 2 -

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- 3 -

in PA, although there were 3500 FOI requests in 1977 compared with 1100 Privacy Act requests. Both bureaus are equally hampered by delays in the reviewing process, because of shortage of reviewing time in the substantive bureaus. In addition, searching for records in FADRC has slowed to the point of a 30-day delay for even routine requests. The A bureau attributes these problems to lack of resources, a difficulty which would be unaffected by the proposed organizational change.

(h) There have been problems in running PA's computer system and consequently in record keeping, and PA has no objection to this function being assumed by A -- on the contrary, when the PA/FOI computer system was first proposed, PA suggested that A should assume responsibility for a system which would be melded with its existing system. A refused to accept the job, not surprisingly, perhaps, in view of the fact that they originally did have the FOI function but wished to get rid of it and initiated its transfer to PA in 1973. Since 1975, however, A has made several attempts to recover the FOI/EO function; what caused this change of heart is not clear.

(i) PA's front office has taken the lead, through its chairmanship of the CCP, in every aspect of implementing the new Executive Order, and has amassed several years experience in dealing with the EO and FOIA. This experience would be lost if the function were cut off from PA.

The foregoing is a brief summary of the many words which have been written on this subject in the last six months. To sum up:

1) I find it remarkable that in the face of every recommendation to the contrary, except that of one interested party -- the Congress, the CCP, the IG, -M has reached the decision to turn the function over to the A bureau.

2) Philosophically, it is contrary to the whole basis of the EO, the FOIA, and the President's policy on openness to remove this function from an area which deals with the public every day, whose door is always open, to an inward-looking restricted area of the Department whose primary duty, as they have made clear in their own submissions, is to the integrity of their own records. It will have a particularly chilling effect on PA/FOI's excellent relations with newspapermen. It is a first step in dismantling the unified public relations program which the Department and the PA bureau have built with great care and gratifying success.

- 4 -

3) To be consistent, what basis would remain for leaving the Historical Office, whose primary duty is the declassification and publication of key documents, in the PA bureau? HO deals with a very limited and specialized public, works primarily on records, and will be ultimately responsible for declassification guidelines. There is no logical reason why this function should not follow the other declassification functions to A (I do not advocate this, but it seems to me inescapable).

4) Procedurally, the method chosen by A to sidetrack the recommendation of the CCP, the failure to give PA a copy of the Inspectors' report, and the long delays in reaching a decision (which have resulted in a pile up of essential items which must be approved and completed by December 1, 1978) leave an unfortunate impression. This impression is reinforced by the response of A to PA/M, which was pursuing the question of space for PA/FOI -- space which PA has been attempting to obtain for many months. Mr. Dupré on September 20 dismissed the question of FOI space with the comment that "this was no time to be worrying about FOI space since the new dispensation for the declassification work would render (PA's) concern academic." If this remark is correctly reported, I can interpret it in no other way than that Mr. Dupré was already privy to M's decision, which PA was not.

I will be happy to supply further documentation if you require it.

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R.O. 11652: U/A
TAGS: AORG, EAID, TH
SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION OF RED/USOM RELATIONSHIPS

REF: A, STATE 107086; B, BANGKOK 8679; C, BANGKOK 9607;
D, STATE 137208; E, STATE 142287

1. EMBASSY FULLY SHARES WASHINGTON VIEWS THAT REGIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES SHOULD NOT BE DENIGRATED AS RESULT PLANNED CONSOLIDATION USAID ACTIVITIES IN THAILAND. HOWEVER, WE ALSO SUPPORT WASHINGTON POSITION THAT USG SHOULD ADOPT LOWER PROFILE IN THIS AREA AT SAME TIME IT ENCOURAGES INCREASED ASIAN INITIATIVES. THE ERA WE HAVE ENTERED FOR BILATERAL AS WELL AS REGIONAL ASSISTANCE CLEARLY CALLS FOR A TRIMMING OF AMERICAN REPRESENTATION AS WELL AS ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHEAD IN CONSONANCE WITH THE REDUCED RESOURCES BEING MADE AVAILABLE BY CONGRESS.

2. AN IMMEDIATE MOTIVATION FOR THE EMBASSY'S PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE CONSOLIDATION OF ALL ECONOMIC AID ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT FROM THAILAND WAS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF SEPARATE ENTITIES IN THIS AREA REPORTING DIRECTLY TO AMBASSADOR. SECOND OBJECTIVE WAS TO EFFECT GREATER DEGREE OF COORDINATION AMONG AID ACTIVITIES IN BANGKOK WHEN SUPPORT ACTIVITIES FOR USAID PHONG PENH ARE BEING EXPANDED AND THOSE FOR LAOS ARE CONTINUING IN RESPONSE TO STILL UNCERTAIN POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

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FOR THOSE COUNTRIES.

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE DEPARTMENT (REF A) WOULD INTERFERE WITH RED CONTINUING TO PERFORM A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF REDUCTION IN US INTERESTS. THE EMBASSY HAS PROPOSED THAT KENNETH KASBY AS DIRECTOR OF RED BE GRANTED THE SAME DIPLOMATIC TITLE OF COUNSELOR, REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AS HIS PREDECESSOR. MOREOVER, WE ACCEPT WASHINGTON DECISION THAT THE DIRECTOR OF RED REPORT DIRECTLY TO AMBASSADOR ON ESAFE MATTERS.

4. THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN DEVELOPED LOCALLY BETWEEN USOM AND RED ON BASIS OF DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REF A. ALTHOUGH THE SIGNERS OF THE DISSENT CABLE (REF B) HAVE SUBSCRIBED TO IT, THEY EXPECT IT TO BE IMPLEMENTED ONLY IN THE EVENT THE DECISION CONTAINED REF A IS REAFFIRMED. IN EMBASSY'S VIEW THIS REAFFIRMATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE. OFFICIALS IN COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS WILL STILL BE DEALING WITH AN OFFICER OF COUNSELOR RANK AS BEFORE WHO SERVES AS CHIEF OF RED. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE WILL BE THAT THIS OFFICER WILL NOW REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR THROUGH THE DIRECTOR OF USOM RATHER THAN DIRECTLY, AND THE AMBASSADOR WILL HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF HIS SENIOR AID OFFICER IN COUNTRY FOR COORDINATION OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES BEING CARRIED ON BY THIS BANGKOK BASED STAFF. DEPTN TEXT, AID/W, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF EAST ASIA/STATE, HAS DETERMINED TO INTEGRATE CERTAIN RED FUNCTIONS WITH USOM/THAILAND OPERATIONS UNDER THE DIRECTOR OF USOM AND OVERALL DIRECTION OF THE AMBASSADOR.

BECAUSE OF THE DESTABILIZING OF MAINTAINING A DISTINCT REGIONAL PROGRAM, RED WILL CONTINUE AS A SEPARATE OFFICE WITH ITS OWN DIRECTION, WITH PROGRAM AUTONOMY WITHIN THE GENERAL GUIDELINES SET DOWN BY AID

AND STATE. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS THE GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED AMONG RED, USOM AND THE EMBASSY CONCERNING HOW RED AND USOM WILL FUNCTION UNDER THIS NEW ARRANGEMENT:

1. THE DIRECTOR OF RED WILL BE RESPONSIBLE, UNDER THE GENERAL SUPERVISION OF THE DIRECTOR OF USOM/THAILAND ACTING UNDER SUCH INSTRUCTIONS AS MAY FROM TIME TO TIME BE PROVIDED BY THE REGIONAL

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ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AID/W, FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REGIONAL PROGRAM AND FOR THE PREPARATION OF PROGRAM AND PROJECT PROPOSALS; HIS OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WILL INCLUDE ALL NEGOTIATIONS AND HANDLING OF DETAILS OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION WITH THE DIRECTORS AND STAFFS OF ASIAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATION.

2. FOR THOSE REGIONAL PROGRAM ACTIVITIES IN THAILAND HE WILL OBTAIN THE CONCURRENCE OF THE DIRECTOR OF USOM/THAILAND. FOR THOSE RED ACTIVITIES IN THE OTHER SEVEN SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS THE DIRECTOR OF USOM MAY SUBMIT COMMENTS AS HE FEELS THESE ARE APPROPRIATE FOR JOINT CONSIDERATION WITH RED RECOMMENDATIONS.

3. GENERAL PROGRAM GUIDELINES, INCLUDING ANNUAL SUBMISSIONS TO WASHINGTON, AND ANY NEW AND MAJOR ACTIVITIES OR CHANGES IN PROGRAM DIRECTION, WILL BE APPROVED BY THE USOM DIRECTOR. IF THERE ARE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR OF RED AND THE USOM DIRECTOR WHICH CANNOT BE RESOLVED, THE RED DIRECTOR WILL SUBMIT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS TO WASHINGTON AND THE USOM DIRECTOR WILL SUBMIT COMMENTS THEREON.

4. THE RED DIRECTOR WILL BE THE ALLOTTEE FOR RED FUNDS AND WILL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SIGN OBLIGATING DOCUMENTS, TRAVEL AUTHORIZATIONS, CABLES, ETC. WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY AID/W.

5. RED WILL MOVE ITS OFFICES ABOUT MID-AUGUST TO THE USOM BUILDING. ALL THOSE PERSONNEL WHO REPORT EXCLUSIVELY OR PRIMARILY TO RED WILL BE HOUSED CONTIGUOUSLY.

6. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR BOTH RED AND USOM WILL BE LODGED IN A SINGLE OFFICER WHO WILL REPORT TO THE USOM DIRECTOR. THE TRAVEL FUNCTIONS, CLEANING SERVICES AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS WILL BE INTEGRATED. RED WILL, HOWEVER, MAINTAIN ITS OWN CENTRAL FILES.

7. THE DIRECTOR OF USOM/THAILAND SHALL PREPARE THE ANNUAL PER FOR THE DIRECTOR OF RED.

8. ALL ACTIVITIES OF RED AND USOM WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE SUBJECT TO THE OVERALL DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION OF THE AMBASSADOR.
END TEXT.
KINTNER

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L/AF - [unclear]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

RELEASE IN FULL

DATE: October 2, 1974

SUBJECT: Gabonese Efforts to Acquire DC-8/63CF

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Morris Licht, Office of Export Administration,
Bureau of East-West Trade,
Department of Commerce

B. Keith Huffman, L/AF

COPIES TO: AF/C - Mr. Cutler
AF/S - Mr. Cole

After unsuccessful calls to each other, I reached Mr. Licht at approximately 4 P.M. and indicated that, while the Department had decided not to object to the sale of the DC-8/63CF with conditions, there had been strong disagreements with this course of action within the Department; that these disagreements were recorded in a dissent memorandum to the Secretary of State, and that he or any other Commerce representative would be welcome to come to the Department and review this memorandum.

Mr. Licht indicated that he had been aware that the Department was not "all of one mind" on the sale but that a dissent memorandum would only be of historical interest to Commerce since it acted upon decisions of the Department of State. In this case, he said the license was about to be issued with all the restrictions requested by the Department. He requested that I forward to him a copy of the dissent paper for his records with any restrictions we might wish to place on its dissemination. I said I thought this would be possible in light of his specific request.

At approximately 5:15 P.M. Mr. Licht called me back to say he had just been informed that the license had been issued and picked up. He also said that upon instructions of a Mr. Wolinsky of Commerce he was withdrawing his request for a copy of the dissent memorandum, at least for the time being. He could offer no explanation for this last statement.

[Handwritten initials]
L/AF: BKHuffman:mmp

ATTACHMENT

RELEASE IN
FULL

THE EL SALVADOR EDUCATION SECTOR ANALYSIS: 23 ANALYTICAL WORKING DOCUMENTS
(AWDs)

EFFICIENCY

1. Basic Education

a. Identification and Quantification of Problems

- AWD #1: Indicators of Access to Education: 1950-1971 (completed)
- AWD #2: Dropout, Repetition, and National Achievement Exam Results (completed and under revision)
- AWD #3: The costs of Basic Education (completed and under revision)
- AWD #4: Current Access to Basic Education, the Utilization of its Physical Plant and its Teaching Personnel (completed and under revision)
- AWD #5: Major Conclusion of Recent Studies Concerning ETV

b. Analysis of Factors

- AWD #6: The Relations of Social, Economic and Cultural Factors and National Achievement Exam Results (to be completed in July)
- AWD #7: The Relations of National Achievement Exam Results and Combination of Inputs and Other School Characteristics
- AWD #8: The Detailed Analysis of Achievement Exam Results From the Point of View of Curriculum and Instructional Methods
- AWD #9: Attitudes and Practices of Supervisors and School Principals and their Relations to National Achievement Exam Results

c. Policy

- AWD #10: Principal Findings, Costs and Priorities of Alternative Policies for Increasing the Efficiency of Basic Education

2. Kindergarten

a. Identification and Quantification of Problems

- AWD #11: Principal Findings, Costs and Priorities of Alternative Policies for Increasing the Efficiency of Kindergarten (a + b in one document)

3. Bachillerato

a. Identification and Quantification of Problems

- AWD #12: Enrollments, Costs and Final Graduation Exam Results of the Bachilleratos

b. Analysis of Factors and Policy

- AWD #13: Principal Findings, Costs and Priorities of Alternative Policies for Increasing the Efficiency of Bachillerato

4. Higher Education

a. Identification and Quantification of Problems

AWD #14: Enrollments, Graduation Rates, Total, Per Student and Per Graduate Costs of the Various Faculties and Departments and Other Institutions of Higher Learning

b. Analysis of Factors and Policy

AWD #15: Principal Findings, Costs and Priorities of Alternative Policies for Increasing the Efficiency of Higher Education

5. Out-of-School or "Non-Formal" Education

a. Identification and Quantification of Problems

AWD #16: Programs, Enrollments, Graduation Rates and Costs of Non-School Education Carried Out with Public Funds

b. Analysis of Factors and Policy

AWD # 17: Principal Findings, Costs and Priorities of Alternative Policies for Increasing the Efficiency of Out-of-School Education

RELEVANCE

a. Identification and Quantification of Problems

AWD #18: Some Relations Between Educational Attainment and Income, Literacy, Fertility, Occupation and Employment (CONAPLAN Survey)

AWD #19: Some Relations Between Educational Attainment and Selected Data from the 1972 Economic Censuses, and Expressed Citizen Preferences Concerning Programs of Practical Instruction... (Audiencia Survey)

AWD #20: A Tracer Study of Specialized Bachilleratos Graduates: Their Occupation and Earnings

b. Analysis of Factors and Policy

AWD #21: Alternative Measures and Costs for Improving the Relevance of Basic Education, Bachillerato, Higher Education and Out-of-School Education

ACCESS

a. Identification and Quantification of Problems

AWD #1

AWD #3

AWD #4

AWD #5

AWD #10

AWD #12

AWD #14

AWD #16

AWD #18

- 3 -

b. Alternative Combinations of Feasible Enrollment Targets and Improvement Programs

- AWD #22: Estimates of Resource Availabilities in 1986 and the Year 2000, and Feasible Alternative Combinations of Enrollment Targets for the Five Levels and Kinds of Education, Programs to Increase Efficiency, and Programs to Improve Relevance
- AWD #23: Education Sector Analysis Methodology: Description, Evaluation and Recommendations.

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Department of State

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: HA

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

FOR [] FROM S/P - KREISBERG, ACTING

B6

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ON AID CUTS IN A HAITIAN HEALTH PROJECT. MS. HARRIET HENTGES OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISSENT CHANNEL REGULATIONS, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE A. I. D. ADMINISTRATOR, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. CHRISTOPHER

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July 22, 1977

RELEASE IN PART
B6

TO: IO - Mr. Dalley

FROM: IO/LAB -

SUBJECT: Ambassador Vanden Heuvel's Proposal on the
ILO

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Vanden Heuvel's proposed scenario is that:

- a) the July 26/27 talks be used by Assistant Secretary Maynes to explore the Vanden Heuvel proposal (VP) with our allies and with the Secretariat, rather than for the purpose of finding out what our allies will do on their own initiative in the ILO;
- b) he then proposes that the VP be accepted by the USG and we persuade the two private groups to go along if possible;
- c) even if we do not get the two private groups agreement, he then proposes major consultations with the EC/IMEC group to extract a commitment from them in return for our implementing the VP;
- d) we then work hard with our allies towards achieving goals at the June 1978 conference (even if the US workers/and employers are boycotting it);
- e) assuming a successful outcome, we then cancel the letter of intent and become full members instead of "suspended members".

Before critiquing this scenario let me refute several false assumptions: (1) he states the ILO will collapse when we leave - I know of no one who believes this. (2) He states members of the UN community are bewildered at the prospect of US withdrawal. Comment: we have been made extensive demarches starting in November 1975 explaining our problems in the ILO and reiterating our intent to withdraw. Bewilderment seems to indicate that people have not been paying any attention until the last minute of the crisis. (3) He states that our goals were too difficult to achieve in the two-year period -- Apparently he has not understood our posture, wherein for two years we have stated we sought not "victory" but

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support. (4) He states that many diplomats in Geneva believe a majority of ILO members are in favor of having the Report of the Committee on Application of Conventions and Standards accepted by the plenary. -- He gives no reasons why the diplomats believes this, and fails to comment on the fact that one month ago a majority of ILO members readily rejected the Report despite warnings from many Western speakers that this would be a very damaging blow to the ILO mechanism.

Critique of Scenario:

The VP (of putting our letter of intent in suspense by not paying our final assessment) is of dubious legal validity and could make our membership and participation in the ILO subject to continual challenge by those hostile to the US, i.e. by majority of the ILO membership. (see analysis done by L).

a) The July 26/27 talks have already been programmed for having the West take the lead in making suggestions, etc. We have told the diplomats who have contacted us that we have no proposal for the talks; we want to hear from them about how they see the ILO whether the US leaves or stays in. The talks start Tuesday afternoon. There is insufficient time to change the nature, content, and objectives of these talks, especially as all the implications of the VP have not yet been analyzed in the USG and it would therefore be premature to present them to foreign governments until we are sure the VP is one we are going to pursue.

Furthermore, the time pressure is such that the Geneva talks are our last chance to find out what the West thinks before the CLC meets to make its recommendation. If we change the agenda to discuss the VP, we will have no chance to carry out the original purpose of the talks and thus will be missing an important element when we go to the CLC meeting.

b) We could use the Geneva talks for their original purpose (omitting any discussion of the VP) and then try to "sell" it to the Departments of Commerce and Labor, before approaching the two private groups. Preliminary reaction of the two Departments is negative towards the VP. If we cannot get their agreement, we will find it impossible to "sell" the two private groups; it would be almost impossible even if the two Departments agree.

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c) He then proposes major talks with the West, to "extract" a commitment from them in return for our implementing the VP. Aside from the great difficulties of delaying our ILO decision further, and the greater difficulty of having only the State Department in favor of the VP, "extracting" promises under pressure is exactly what we have been doing for two years. The result has been grudging "support" of the most minimal kind, intended to keep us in the ILO. I have no doubt that we could get the same "support" in return for the VP (although it might take a month or so for each government to get this approved by its bureaucracy.) Such a commitment would be even less worthwhile than the commitments we obtained while we were using the letter of intent to extract "support", because our failure to leave on November 6 would undermine our credibility.

d) Consequently, the idea of then working hard with our allies to achieve progress in 1978 is very unrealistic; we would be in the same old posture of prodding and pushing in order to get "support", because we would have gotten their agreement under duress, instead of with basic agreement on principles. It is impossible to hold a gun at someone's head; say "tell me what you really think"; and get an honest answer; you will get the answer the victim thinks will keep you from pulling the trigger.

The Ambassador mentions that US workers and employers would probably fail to participate in this effort but says nothing about the disastrous impact this would have on the USG effort in a tripartite organization. To any impartial observer, the USG voice, whether in talking to the West or lobbying with the Third World or speaking in an ILO meeting, would lose all substance if the US workers and employers were boycotting the ILO. We would be subject to constant criticism by ILO members hostile to us, and this is a majority, as the June 1977 conference shows.

We would be working under more adverse conditions than during the period November 1975 to June 1977, so why should we expect to achieve anything at the June 1978 conference?

e) As noted in (d) above, our chances of achieving any success would be less than during the previous period, (a) because of our loss of credibility (caused by our

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4

failure to withdraw), (b) because our membership status would be dubious and subject to challenge; and (c) because we would be participating solely as a government, without US worker or employer membership. We would not achieve any progress; we would slide back, and have to "get out" (either by waiting two years, if you assume we had actually rejoined by not leaving November 6, 1977) or by making our final payments and finishing off the withdrawal. Either way, we would merely postpone the agony, and leave in greater defeat than in July 1977, with the additional burden of a year of fruitless flailing around.

IO/LAB: :of

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F.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI FY. 1975 PL. 480 TITLE I REQUIREMENTS

- REF: A. STATE 92149
- B. TEL AVIV 2698
- C. STATE 126140

1. IN PREPARING REFTEL B WE OF COURSE KNEW OF GOY REQUEST LAST AUGUST FOR PL 480 COMMODITIES VALUED THEN AT ABOUT \$180 MILLION. (THE SAME QUANTITIES WOULD COST ABOUT \$99.3 MILLION AT PRICES SPECIFIED IN REF A, USING CORN COST FOR FEEDGRAIN.) WE HAD ALSO BEEN TOLD (REF A) THAT TITLE I REQUESTS WERE EXPECTED TO EXCEED COMMODITY AVAILABILITIES IN FY-75. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE PROPOSED WHAT WE CONSIDERED TO BE A REASONABLE PROGRAM, AND WHICH COULD BE CARRIED OUT. WE AERE AWARE THAT THE AGREEMENT FOR ISRAELI LAST YEAR PROVIDED FOR COMMODITIES TOTALLING \$82.6 MILLION BUT IN THE EVENT WE WERE ABLE TO SUPPLY ONLY \$37.6 MILLION WORTH.

2. IN LIGHT OF THE SUBSTANTIALLY LARGE QUANTITIES NOW EXPECTED TO BE AVAILABLE IN FY-75 (STATE 126140), WE BELIEVE A CASE CAN BE MADE FOR A LARGER PROGRAM FOR ISRAEL THAN THAT SUGGESTED IN OUR MESSAGE. ISRAEL WILL HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS WHICH TITLE I PROGRAMS CAN MEET. FACT THAT THESE LONG-TERMS LOANS PUSH ISRAEL'S FOREIGN DEBT EVEN HIGHER AND HAVE CREATED SOME DIFFICULTY RECENTLY IN DISPOSING OF EXCESS SOYBEAN OIL, APPARENTLY HAS NOT LESSENED GOY INTEREST IN OBTAINING LARGE TITLE I PROGRAM. THUS, IN LIGHT OF COMMODITY AVAILABILITIES AND STRONG GOY INTEREST EMBASSY HAS NO OBJECTION

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Department of State **TELETYPE**

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ANY FY-75 PROGRAM IN RANGE OF LAST YEAR'S APPROXIMATELY 900 MILL.
OR HIGHER IF SUPPLY SITUATION PERMITS.
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S/P:JAARZT:BDM
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S/P:JAARZT

S/P-OFP:PJLYDON {DRAFT}

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE ABU DHABI

DISSENT CHANNEL
FOR ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINS, SU

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: ABU DHABI 1432

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CABLE ON THE OFFICIAL WELCOME TO PRESIDENT NIMEIRI. MR. DONALD PETERSON OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR CABLE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE OPEN FORUM PANEL. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. 44

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PAGE 01 NEW DE 23621 01 OF 02 101545Z

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 NEW DELHI 3621
DISSENT CHANNEL

R.O. 115521 GDS

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL; DEVELOPMENT AID AS A POLITICAL WEAPON

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED] REGIONAL LEGAL ADVISOR, USAID.

2. THE DEPARTMENT'S RECENT DECISION TO POSTPONE TALKS ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO INDIA RAISES IMPORTANT ISSUES WHICH GO FAR BEYOND THE CURRENTLY TROUBLED STATE OF INDO-US RELATIONS:

(1) ARE GOOD POLITICAL RELATIONS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT AN EFFECTIVE AID PROGRAM? (2) WHAT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE? (3) SHOULD DEVELOPMENT AID BE USED TO PUNISH OR REWARD GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR POLITICAL BEHAVIOR? WHILE IT MAY BE TOO LATE FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE INDIA DECISION FOR FY 76, A DISPASSIONATE ANALYSIS OF SUCH ISSUES SHOULD PREVENT THAT DECISION FROM BECOMING A POLICY PRECEDENT (IN INDIA AND ELSEWHERE) AND TURN OUR ATTENTION TO THE DESIGN OF AN INNOVATIVE DEVELOPMENT AID POLICY FOR FY 77.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

A. RELEVANCE OF POLITICAL CLIMATE
THERE IS VISCERAL LOGIC IN RESOLVING NOT TO FREE THE MOUTH THAT BITES US, BUT WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER'S VERBAL ACCUSATIONS THWART OUR ABILITY TO ADMINISTER AN EFFECTIVE

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PAGE 02 NEW DE 23621 21 OF 22 191645Z

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



...ID PROGRAM IS ANOTHER QUESTION. OF COURSE BREAKING OFF
 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, EXPELLING AID OFFICIALS, REFUSING
 OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE OR FAILING TO NEGOTIATE PROJECT AGREEMENTS
 WOULD FRUSTRATE BILATERAL AID. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
 HOWEVER THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS TAKEN SUCH EXTREME
 ACTIONS OR THAT IT HAS BEEN UNCOOPERATIVE IN RECENT
 EFFORTS TO REESTABLISH A DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.
 TO THE CONTRARY THE GOI MADE KNOWN ITS DESIRE TO RECEIVE
 AMERICAN AID ONLY LAST FALL. NOTWITHSTANDING THE INDIAN
 POLITICAL CLIMATE, OTHER U.S. PROGRAMS SURVIVE. THE WORK OF
 THE JOINT COMMISSION PROCEEDS WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. (EVEN
 A NEW FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM HAS BEGUN). MILITARY TRAINING PROPOSALS
 WIN RAPID APPROVAL. WITH ONLY MINOR DELAY, NEGOTIATION OF A
 NEW TITLE I AGREEMENT (ESTIMATED AT \$112 MILLION) IS SET TO
 BEGIN. OUR TITLE II PROGRAM (\$98 MILLION) CONTINUES AS BEFORE.
 A RESIDENT USAID STAFF MAINTAINS SATISFACTORY CONTACTS WITH
 THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND MONITORING
 OF A SIZEABLE PORTFOLIO OF RESIDUAL PROJECTS. YET WITH ALL
 THIS BUSINESS AS USUAL, THE DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN
 DESCRIBED THE "ATMOSPHERE" AS INAPPROPRIATE FOR DISCUSSION
 OF A \$75 MILLION DEVELOPMENT AID PROGRAM (STATE 43308). IT
 SEEMS INCONSISTENT IF NOT CHIMERICAL TO DENY THE POSSIBILITY
 OF THE LATTER, WHILE OTHER AND LARGER PROGRAMS CARRY ON AS
 BEFORE.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

LET US BE HONEST WITH OURSELVES ON THE FACTS: WE HAVE CHOSEN
 (RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY) TO DEMONSTRATE OUR POLITICAL DIFFERENCES
 BY SACRIFICING THE AID PROGRAM SIGNIFICANTLY. IT WAS THE
 NASCENT DEVELOPMENT AID PROGRAM, AMONG ALL OUR VARIOUS
 DIPLOMATIC, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC CONTACTS WITH THE GOI,
 WHICH WAS SINGLED OUT AS THE PRIME INSTRUMENT OF RETALIATION.
 I BELIEVE THAT DECISION WAS WRONG BECAUSE IT FAILED TO TAKE
 INTO ACCOUNT PARAMOUNT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN
 BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT AID.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN DEVELOPMENT AID
 REASONABLE MINDS MAY DIFFER AS TO WHAT FOREIGN POLICY

OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE SERVED BY DEVELOPMENT AID. BUT CONGRESS
 HAS ALREADY SPOKEN TO THE POINT. U.S. POLICY INTERESTS ARE
 DEFINED IN SECTION 122 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF
 1961, AS AMENDED. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT SECTION ESTABLISHES

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PAGE 03 NEW DE 25621 01 OF 02 101545Z

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

THE IMPORTANCE

"TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY THAT THE UNITED STATES... ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE THE KNOWLEDGE AND RESOURCES ESSENTIAL FOR DEVELOPMENT..."

WHILE CONGRESS HAS EVINCED ITS WILL TO SUSPEND ASSISTANCE TO ANY COUNTRY THAT HAS SEVERED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, IT HAS NOT GONE SO FAR AS TO MAKE COUNTRIES INELIGIBLE FOR THEIR UNFRIENDLY POLITICAL STATEMENTS. EVEN THE NEW SECTION 116 PERMITS AID TO GOVERNMENTS WHICH VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS IF OUR ASSISTANCE "WILL DIRECTLY BENEFIT THE NEEDY PEOPLE". INDEED

THE "NEW DIRECTIONS" EMBODIED IN THE RECENTLY ENACTED INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOOD ASSISTANCE ACT REINFORCE A CENTRAL POLICY THRUST OF THE FACTS A COMMUNITY OF FREE, SECURE AND PROSPERING NATIONS BEST SUSTAINS THE FREEDOM, SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF THE UNITED STATES. THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE NO QUESTION THAT DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE SERVES LONG-TERM U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD.



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DISSENT CHANNEL

C. AID AS A WEAPON

THE DECISION TO POSTPONE INDIAN AID TALKS AND RECENT NEWS-
PAPER REPORTS THAT CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD BE PENALIZED FOR
THEIR

U.N. VOTING RECORD SUGGEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT MAY IN FACT BE
USING DEVELOPMENT AID AS A POLITICAL WEAPON. IF THIS IS SO,
IT IS MOST UNFORTUNATE. IN MY VIEW, DEVELOPMENT AID SHOULD NOT
BE USED TO PUNISH POLITICAL "FOES" AND REWARD "FRIENDS" FOR
THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

--SUCH A USE DEFEATS U.S. POLICY INTERESTS URGED IN THE
FACT AS AMENDED (SEE PARA 20 ABOVE).

--SUCH A USE IS CONTRARY TO THE NEW DIRECTIONAL MANDATE
TO HELP "NEEDY PERSONS" (AS OPPOSED TO GOVERNMENTS).

--SUCH A USE IS UNLIKELY TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR,
EXCEPT PERHAPS IN THOSE FEW COUNTRIES WHERE OUR ASSISTANCE
LEVEL IS HIGH ENOUGH TO COMMAND LEVERAGE. (THESE LATTER COUNTRIES
WOULD CERTAINLY NOT INCLUDE INDIA).

THERE ARE, MOREOVER, SERIOUS RISKS IN WIELDING AID AS A SWORD:

--IT SUBSTITUTES CYNICISM AND POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY FOR
HUMANITARIAN CONCERN AND LONG-TERM GOALS.

--IT PROVIDES A VISIBLE ISSUE FOR CRITICS OF THE U.S. TO
EXPLOIT.

--IT JEOPARDIZES "MATURE" POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS OF THE
TYPE WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO CREATE IN INDIA.

FINALLY, IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THE "BULKINESS" OF AID

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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PROGRAMS, WHICH MAKES THEM POORLY SUITED TO SUDDEN STARTS AND STOPS. THE LEADTIME REQUIRED FOR FISCAL YEAR OBLIGATIONS, STAFFING PATTERNS AND CLOSING OUT ACTIVITIES CANNOT EASILY BE SHORTENED TO REFLECT THESE UPS AND DOWNS OF A POLITICAL

RELATIONSHIP. IN SUM, WE HAVE LITTLE OR NOTHING TO GAIN FROM USING AID AS A POLITICAL WEAPON AND MUCH TO LOSE BY IT.

3. IN JUSTIFYING A RESUMPTION OF DEVELOPMENT AID OF INDIA, IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO DISMISS THE POLITICAL REASONS FOR POSTPONEMENT. WE NEED THOUGHTFUL ANSWERS TO SUCH QUESTIONS AS "HOW MUCH AID?" AND "FOR WHAT ACTIVITIES?" MORE IMPORTANTLY, WE NEED TO KNOW THAT THE U.S.

CONTRIBUTION (WHICH MIGHT BE DEPLOYED EFFECTIVELY ELSEWHERE) WON'T SIMPLY BE ANOTHER DROP IN A LARGE BUCKET.

SIGNIFICANTLY, THE DRAFT WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT ON INDIA IS CALLING ON CONSORTIUM MEMBERS TO CONSIDER AID ON DEVELOPMENTAL CRITERIA AND RECOMMENDS AGAINST BALANCE OF PAYMENTS "GAP-FILLING" (NEW DELHI 3231). RECOGNIZING THE RELATIVE SOPHISTICATION OF 50% DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND THE CONSISTENCY OF FIFTH PLAN OBJECTIVES WITH AID LEGISLATION, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO UNDERTAKE MEANINGFUL AID ACTIVITIES WITHOUT INCREASES IN SCHEDULED FUNDING OR STAFF. FURTHERMORE, SUCH ACTIVITIES WOULD ALLOW US TO RETAIN OUR DONOR'S SEAT IN THE INFLUENTIAL AID TO INDIA CONSORTIUM. IN MY VIEW, THE TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT LOAN ASSISTANCE PACKAGE (GIVEN THE PROBABLE LIMITED SIZE OF WHAT PACKAGE) MAY BE OBSOLETE. IN PREPARATION FOR THE UPCOMING MAY CONSORTIUM MEETING, WE SHOULD BEGIN NOW TO EXPLORE A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE INITIATIVES FOR FY 77 (INCLUDING MULTILATERAL PROGRAMS, THE NEW TITLE XII, AND FVD GRANTS THROUGH THE WELL-DEVELOPED VOLAG NETWORK IN INDIA). BY STRESSING INNOVATIVE RURAL-ORIENTED PROJECTS ADMINISTERED BY INTERMEDIARIES WE COULD CONTINUE OUR LONG ASSOCIATION WITH INDIAN DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT EXACERBATING POLITICAL FRICTIONS.

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PART B6

TELEGRAM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0335

Room 3446

UNCLAS VIENNA 04851

AFSA

DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: N/A
SUBJECT: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE

REF: STATE AFSA 75499

1. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS RIGHTLY PROHIBITED BY FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION. SUCH BEHAVIOR HAS NO PLACE IN AN ORGANIZATION OF ANY SORT. ALL RIGHT-THINKING MEN AND WOMEN SUPPORT THE SUPPRESSION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE EXTENSIVE MEANS OF DEALING WITH SUCH ABUSES AND HAVE THE ASSURANCE THAT CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.

2. WHY THEN MUST AFSA, WHICH SHOULD BE CONCENTRATING ON LABOR MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND DEFEATING THE ASSAULT ON OUR PENSION PLAN, STICK ITS NOSE WHERE IT DOES NOT BELONG? NATURALLY WE ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT, BUT THE AFSA GUIDELINES MAKE IT APPEAR THAT EVEN THE MOST INNOCENT GESTURE IS REPREHENSIBLE AND SUBJECT TO SEVERE DISCIPLINARY ACTION. WITH ITS OPEN INVITATION TO SECRETLY "BLOW THE WHISTLE" ON ANYBODY THAT MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE INTENDED OFFENSE, AFSA HAS CARRIED THE WORKPLACE'S LEGITIMATE CONCERN WITH SEXUAL HARASSMENT TO DANGEROUS AND EXAGGERATED HEIGHTS. ONE IS REMINDED OF THE RUMOURS OF J. EDGAR'S DIRTY LITTLE FILE ON POLITICIANS WHO MIGHT TRY TO UNSEAT HIM. THE INFORMAL DENOUNCING SYSTEM (SHADES OF GEORGE ORWELL'S 1984 -) SET UP IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF REFTEL SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY AND PUBLICLY RETRACTED. THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSES OF THIS UNREGULATED SPY SYSTEM IS STAGGERING.

3. AT LEAST THE PERSONAL INFORMATION-GATHERING APPARATUS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS CONTROLLED BY THE PRIVACY ACT AND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT. WHO CONTROLS AFSA'S FILES? AFSA MUST GET OUT OF THE SPY BUSINESS AND GO BACK TO ITS AREAS OF COMPETENCE -- AS DEFINED IN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER -- NOW.

4. IN TRANSMITTING REFTEL, AFSA EXCEEDED ITS CHARTER. THAT ERROR MUST BE RECTIFIED BEFORE MANAGEMENT USES IT AS AN EXCUSE TO CENSOR AFSA CABLES PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION -- OR TO TAKE OTHER ACTION DETRIMENTAL TO AFSA AS THE SOLE BARGAINING RPT BARGAINING AGENT FOR FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL.

5. LOCAL AFSA REP SAW THIS TELEGRAM PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION.

[redacted] AFSA MEMBER, AND OTHERS. CHEERS
POLANSKY *Cheryle*

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT RPT NOT PASSED AFSA BY OC/T.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Secretary of State

RELEASE IN PART B6

rec'd S/P 7/28 (Fri)

FROM : Amembassy TRIPOLI

DATE: July 11, 1977

11652 : GDS

SUBJECT: Libya's Involvement in Northern Chad

FABRC/DA/WC

REF :

TAGS : PBOR, PINS, LY, CD, XI

22 5 PM 21 JUL 77

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DISSENT CHANNEL: POLITICAL OFFICER []

SUMMARY: Libya's involvement with the Muslim tribes of northern Chad antedates the activities of Col. Qadhafi's regime. As early as the 16th century the Fezzan tribes of southern Libya fled Ottoman rule and sought refuge amongst the Islamic tribes of the Tibesti region which the French annexed to the colony of Chad in 1930. During the entire period of French colonial occupation, the Muslim tribes of this region resisted French occupation and claimed allegiance to the religious Islamic sect of the Senussi of Libya.

The cultural, religious and language differences between the Senussi-dominated tribes of the B.E.T. (Boukou, Ennedi and Tibesti) and the African tribes of southern Chad contain the origins of the present internal dispute in northern Chad.

A separate, but related dispute is Libya's claim to the "Aouzou Strip." Libya's support of Frolinat also stems from its refusal to recognize the 1930 French annexation of Tibesti to Chad.

COMMENT: It is questionable whether the U.S. should become involved in this dispute by giving military aid to the Chadian Government. Such assistance would only

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encourage a military solution to an internal, essentially tribal dispute in northern Chad and the related issue of Chad's border dispute with Libya. END SUMMARY.

Libya's present involvement in northern Chad antedates the activities of Col. Qadhafi's regime, King Idris' rule of Libya and indeed the establishment of a modern Libyan state. To a considerable extent, the historical involvement of Libya with Muslim tribes in northern Chad regions of Boukou, Enndi and Tibesti predates the Turkish conquest of the Fezzan in the 16th century.

During Turkish attempts to conquer the Fezzan of Libya, two of the Fezzan's largest tribes, the Oueld Suleman and Oueld Hamid, fled and sought refuge amongst the mountainous nomads of Borkou, Enndi and Tibesti who had earlier been converted to Islam during the Arab conquest of North Africa. Indeed, the Toubbou tribe of Tibesti controlled Koufra in Libya until the 18th century when it was liberated by the Senussi. By 1870 the Senussi movement had succeeded in converting the already Islamicized tribes of the B.E.T. to the Senussi Order.

Senussi dominance of the B.E.T. lasted effectively until 1913 with the defeat of the Senussi army in Faya by the French Colonel Largeau. After the French conquest of the area, the paramount chief or dardai of the largest Tibesti clan, the Tomaghera, escaped the Tibesti and sought refuge in Koufra in 1914. Chief Shahai Bogar-Mi was allowed by the French to return to the Tibesti in 1920 when the French gave Chad the status of a colony. This Senussi chief ruled the Tibesti as a semi-autonomous area under French tutelage until his death in 1939. In 1930 France extended the 1920 border of Chad's colonial territory to incorporate the Tibesti region into Chad. Throughout French rule of this area, French authorities had nominal control of the Tibesti.

The B.E.T. had traditionally been an ungovernable area and remained so after France granted Chad independence in August of 1960. French administration continued in

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3

this rebellious area until 1965. From the imposition of French control of the Tibesti in 1867 until the present, the Tibesti tribes adhere to the tenets of Libya's Senussi Islamic sect. In an attempt to control the B.E.T. administrative areas, the French exploited the traditional animosity of the Islamic tribes of the north and the Christian and animist tribes of southern Chad. The French brought to the northern area administrators, police and security forces from southern Chad. These "tirailleurs" were once slaves of the Muslim Ounia. The Ounia resisted every effort by the French and their southern African allies to control Ounianga.

The religious, cultural and language differences between these northern Muslim tribes and the southern Sara tribe dominated by the Bantu contain the origins of the present conflict in the northern Chad region in which Libya has become directly involved. The rebellion in the Aouzou Strip in 1965 with the withdrawal of the French and in early August 1968 reflected the deep animosity between the northern Muslim Toubou and their former vassals and slaves. Indicative of the desires of the northern Muslims was the stated goals of the Frolinat in 1968. The organization insisted upon a separate identity for the Muslim Arabic-speaking north.

The following of Frolinat originates in the tribes of Anakazzas and Kokordas who once had as their serfs and slaves the Kamarjas and Dozas (Gorane) tribes of the lowland. The Anakazzas of Faya and Yarda were in turn once the slaves of the Toubous. All of these Muslim tribes share an historical animosity towards the Christian and animist tribes of southern Chad. As a result of Muslim tribal intermarriage and conquest, the Muslim tribes constitute a similar regional grouping with little in common with their southern countrymen.

It may be argued that the present internal dispute of Chad, to a considerable degree, has its origin in the legacy of French colonialism. During this period the French, as other colonial powers, arbitrarily delineated

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Tripoli A-25

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4

their African colonial possessions without regard to ethnic, religious or tribal groupings. The resultant problem created by the legacy of Chad's colonial past and the future territorial integrity of present Chad is a question which virtually every former African colony confronts. The self-assertion of tribal, ethnic, religious and cultural groupings will continue to be the source of internal conflict for these states. The ability of their governments to peacefully resolve internal tribal conflicts will test their metal for generations to come.

The contiguous territories of African states will also generate border disputes between neighboring states where borders drawn by the former colonial powers separate these groups.

Present Libyan Involvement

Libya's claim to the "Aouzou Strip" and its support for the Frolinat in northern Chad is directly related to the refusal of both the Libyan Government and the Muslim tribes of northern Chad to accept the delineation of a border drawn in 1930 by the French colonial administration. Today the French have a vested interest in shoring up the regimes of their former African colonies to enable them to maintain the territorial integrity of areas the French originally established. French military and political initiatives to maintain the integrity of its former possessions is readily understandable, yet it is highly questionable whether the U.S. should become involved in such an intractable political and territorial dispute whose origins often antedate the period under which this area was subjected to European colonial rule.

The present crisis in northern Chad does not have its origins in policies of Col. Qadhafi's regime nor the

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5

designs of the Soviet Union. While the Soviet, Egyptian and Sudanese Governments may wish to exploit the dispute between Libya, the northern Muslim rebels and the Chad Government, it would behoove the U.S. not to become directly involved by military assistance to the Chadian Government in what is essentially two separate issues; i.e., one of territory between Libya and Chad, and the other an internal dispute between northern Muslim rebels and the Chad Government. The Chad Government appears to be attempting to solve both disputes by resorting to military domination of Chad's northern tribes.

Since the grievances of the northern Muslim tribes of Chad appear legitimate, the U.S. Government should make every effort to encourage the Chadian and Libyan Governments to solve this conflict by peaceful means.

Libyan involvement in northern Chad is directly attributable to the historical identification of Libyan tribes with those of the B.E.T. If the grievances of the northern Chadian Muslim tribes were redressed then, in all probability, Libyan support for them would cease.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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April 18, 1978

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DISSENT CHANNEL

[Redacted]

New Delhi

Dear [Redacted]

I am writing in reply to your dissent channel message sent to the Secretary on February 19, concerning US arms sales to developing countries and to Pakistan in particular.

As was indicated in our telegram of acknowledgement, your message was received too late to have any impact on our decision to lift the arms embargo in South Asia. I can assure you, however, that this step was taken after a painstaking review of all of the factors involved, including ones of the general type that you raise.

Your message did, however, arrive in good time to be considered in connection with a general review of arms sales policy that is underway in the Department. As you are perhaps aware, interest in this subject is very high in Congress and in the media, particularly because of the large arms sales that we have made to the Persian Gulf states. I have instructed the members of my staff who are concerned with arms sales policy to give consideration to the points that you raise, and I have forwarded a copy of your message to Under Secretary Maw, the senior Department official concerned with arms transfers, and to Mr. Vest, Director of Politico-Military Affairs.

As you know, the issues raised in your telegram are not new ones nor are there easy answers. We have often agonized over the harmful impact of arms sales (and follow-on costs) on development; the danger of whetting military appetites; and the risk of use in ways that are not in line with US interests. We have made mistakes in all of these areas in the past and may do so again. That, however, is unfortunately true in almost all policy choices and, as you point out, the only way to avoid the danger is not to sell arms at all.

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-2-

A non-sales policy, however, would also bring with it many other problems, perhaps just as severe. The United States is, after all, a principal security support of many nations and it would be hard to fill that role if we denied ourselves the right to sell or otherwise provide military equipment to our friends. Also, there are numerous examples (e.g., Jordan) where our ability to supply military equipment has clearly benefited both our interests and those of the recipient. Thus I doubt that a self-denial policy would be feasible. It is, however, something that we should periodically reexamine and I am glad that you once again have raised the issue.

I do not want to enter into a debate on specific points, but the following two do spring to mind:

-- There is unfortunately ample evidence that other arms suppliers can and do jump into gaps that are opened when we implement a restrictive sales policy: the most obvious cases are in Latin America and, indeed, India where US reluctance to sell arms in the mid-1960s opened the door for massive Soviet sales.

-- I am not at all sure that refusal to sell arms would strengthen the hand of civilian vs. military leaders. The Indian military, for example, has not been made politically potent by the vast quantities of materiel it has received over the past decade. Conversely, the history of Latin America and Africa abounds with examples of military coups by armed forces that had only the most rudimentary military equipment.

On the other hand, the economic and civil repression arguments against arms sales weigh heavily and we take them very seriously in making our decisions. I can certainly assure you that the profit motive is not a major factor in arms sales to poor countries. The much-publicized sales in the Persian Gulf have been to countries that are scarcely "poor" and, in any event, commercial motivation has been only one -- and by no means the largest -- element in our calculations in those cases.

With specific regard to Pakistan, the scope of the likely arms sales will be of a magnitude that should have no deleterious effect in the areas you describe. You have no doubt seen the criteria that we have set forth; I hope you find them reassuring.

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-3-

My letter is not meant to be negative. Of necessity, I have replied to your argumentation more than I have expressed agreement with the valid points that you have raised in drawing attention to difficult problems inherent in the arms transfer field. Your concern is universally shared within the Department. I appreciate your concern and am grateful to you for helping us think through these matters again. Your contribution to the ongoing process of policy review in this field is a thoughtful one and has been stimulating to all of us.

Sincerely yours,



Samuel W. Lewis
Acting Director
Policy Planning Staff

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INVESTIGATION

TO : S/P - Mr. Winston Lord

DATE: September 13, 1974

FROM : INR/CIS -

B6

SUBJECT: Dissent Message

Attached is a paper entitled "Section 212(a) 15 of the INA: Eliminating Public Charges of the Working Poor?", which I would like to submit through the Dissent Channel. Mr. Carl Shepard in the Visa Office has expressed an interest in seeing the paper. It is unclassified.



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R.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: EAD, EAGR, IS:
SUBJECT: ISRAELI FY. 1975 PL. 400 TITLE I REQUIREMENTS

REF: A. STATE 92148;
B. TEL AVIV 2698;
C. STATE 126140

1. IN PREPARING REFTEL @ WE OF COURSE KNEW OF GOI REQUEST
LAST AUGUST FOR PL. 400 COMMODITIES VALUED THEN AT ABOUT \$100
MILLION. (THE SAME QUANTITIES WOULD COST ABOUT \$99.3 MILLION AT
PRICES SPECIFIED IN REF A, USING CORN COST FOR FEEDGRAIN.) WE
HAD ALSO BEEN TOLD (REF A) THAT TITLE I REQUESTS WERE EXPECTED TO
EXCEED COMMODITY AVAILABILITIES IN FY-75. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
WE PROPOSED WHAT WE CONSIDERED TO BE A REASONABLE PROGRAM, AND
WHICH COULD BE CARRIED OUT. WE AERE AWARE THAT THE AGREEMENT FOR
ISRAELI LAST YEAR PROVIDED FOR COMMODITIES TOTALLING \$92.0 MILL.
BUT IN THE EVENT WE WERE ABLE TO SUPPLY ONLY \$47.6 MILLION WORTH.

2. IN LIGHT OF THE SUBSTANTIALLY LARGE QUANTITIES NOW EXPECTED
RE AVAILABLE IN FY-75 (STATE 126140), WE BELIEVE A CASE CAN BE
MADE FOR A LARGER PROGRAM FOR ISRAEL THAN THAT SUGGESTED IN OUR
MESSAGE. ISRAEL WILL HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED FOREIGN EXCHANGE
REQUIREMENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS WHICH TITLE I PROGRAMS CAN
MEET. FACT THAT THESE LONG-TERMS LOANS PUSH ISRAEL'S FOREIGN
EVEN HIGHER AND HAVE CREATED SOME DIFFICULTY RECENTLY IN
DISPOSING OF EXCESS SOYBEAN OIL, APPARENTLY HAS NOT LESSENERED
INTEREST IN OBTAINING LARGE TITLE I PROGRAM. THUS, IN LIGHT OF
AVAILABILITIES AND STRONG GOI INTEREST EMBASSY HAS NO OBJECTION

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ANY FY16 PROGRAM IN RANGE OF LAST YEAR'S APPROXIMATELY 800 MILL.
OR HIGHER IF SUPPLY SITUATION PERMITS.
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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12055: GDS 9/4/87 [] DR-3
TAGS: PINT
SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ COSTA RICA'S ECONOMIC CRISIS

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1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING IS A DISSENT CHANNEL SUBMISSION. DRAFTER IS []

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3. TO DATE THE DEPT'S RESPONSE TO COSTA RICA'S ECONOMIC CRISIS HAS BEEN LIMITED TO ATTEMPTS TO COBBLE TOGETHER FRONT AND BACK DOOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ASSISTANCE TO GET THE COUNTRY THROUGH A "DIFFICULT PERIOD." THERE IS, OF COURSE, A CERTAIN APPEALING APPARENT LOGIC TO THIS APPROACH: THE THREAT TO COSTA RICA'S POLITICAL STABILITY IS AN IMPENDING STATE OF ECONOMIC SEMI-COLLAPSE, ERGO THE CURE IS ALSO ECONOMIC. WHETHER OR NOT SUCH A STRATEGY WAS EVER REALISTIC IS DOUBTFUL; HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR AFTER EVEN A CURSORY LOOK AT THE NUMBERS THAT NO ACHIEVABLE RPT ACHIEVABLE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC AID FROM WHATEVER SOURCES CAN HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE EFFECT TOWARD STAVING OFF SERIOUS RELATIVE ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION HERE. IT'S TOO LATE. THIS MEANS THAT OUR ATTEMPTS NOW TO REDUCE THE CHANCES OF SERIOUS POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN COSTA RICA AND THE RESULTING PROBABLE THREAT TO OUR REGIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS BY PROVIDING ECONOMIC AID ARE SIMPLY FUTILE, EMOTIONALLY SATISFYING PERHAPS BUT STILL FUTILE.

4. THEREFORE, WHILE STILL ATTEMPTING TO PUT TOGETHER SOME SMALL AMOUNT OF EMERGENCY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ASSISTANCE TO THE GOCR, WE SHOULD ASSUME THE POLITICAL/ECONOMIC WORST CASE AND BEGIN CONSIDERING WHAT EFFECTIVE NON-ECONOMIC RESPONSE WE CAN MAKE. TO WAIT UNTIL THE WORST CASE (I.E., FINANCIAL CHAOS, ACCELERATING ECONOMIC HARDSHIP AND STREET VIOLENCE, FOLLOWED BY A LEFTIST POWER GRAB) ACTUALLY ARRIVES IS TO PLACE OUR INTERESTS AT AN UNNECESSARY AND PERHAPS FATAL DISADVANTAGE. OBVIOUSLY WE CAN DO LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE YET; WE CAN, HOWEVER, BEGIN LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR RAPID ACTION IF THE NEED ARISES. (IN THIS CONTEXT WE SHOULD SPECIFICALLY STOP VIEWING COSTA RICANS WHO FEAR THAT THEY MAY SOMEDAY HAVE TO FORCEFULLY RESIST A LEFTIST TAKE-OVER ATTEMPT AS "RIGHTISTS" WHO SOMEHOW POSE A GREATER THREAT TO OUR INTERESTS THAN THE COUNTRY'S DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED MARXISTS. NO MATTER HOW MUCH WE MAY ADMIRE COSTA RICAN DEMOCRACY, IT IS CLEARLY IN OUR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST THAT IN ANY EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE FOR POWER THE LEFT FAIL DECISIVELY, A POINT WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF EVEN WHILE TRYING TO AVOID SUCH A SHOWDOWN).

5. OUR APPRECIATION OF THE DEPTH OF COSTA RICA'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES HAS CONSISTENTLY LAGGED SIGNIFICANTLY BEHIND EVENTS AND STILL DOES: WE DON'T YET SEEM TO ACCEPT THAT THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NOW WAY TO HALT -- LET ALONE REVERSE -- COSTA RICA'S ECONOMIC SLIDE IN THE SHORTRUN, SAY TWO YEARS. IF OUR APPRECIATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS FOR COSTA RICAN STABILITY (AND HENCE OUR OWN INTERESTS) LAGS IN A SIMILAR FASHION, WE COULD EXPERIENCE SOME EXTREMELY UNPLEASANT SURPRISES HINE

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DISSENT CHANNEL

AIDAC

FOR: MR. AVELARDO VALDEZ, AA/LA

INFO: MR. TONY SABB, OFFICE OF AID ADMINISTRATOR

E. O. 11652: N/A

SUBJECT: AID/W CUTS IN HAITI HEALTH PROJECT NO. 521-0006
STRENGTHENING HEALTH SERVICES II

SUMMARY

BECAUSE OF AN AID/W DECISION TO COMMIT SUBSTANTIAL FUNDS FOR A RURAL HEALTH PROGRAM IN HAITI, EXTENSIVE PLANNING WITH THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT WAS CONDUCTED OVER AN 18-MONTH PERIOD TO DEVELOP THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY SYSTEM. AID/W HAS NOW REVERSED ITS POSITION AND CUT THESE FUNDS, LEAVING THE USAID IN A DIFFICULT POSITION VIS-A-VIS ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THE HAITIAN HEALTH SECTOR AND HALTING THE MOMENTUM WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED IN DEVELOPING HEALTH SERVICES FOR HAITI'S RURAL POOR. THIS DECISION MUST BE RECONSIDERED TO AVOID LONG-TERM HARM TO HEALTH PROGRAMS IN HAITI. THIS CABLE IS IN THE DISSENT CHANNEL ONLY BECAUSE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF THE USAID MISSION LEADERSHIP THAT THE AID/W DECISION IS IRREVOCABLE, AND NOT BECAUSE OF ANY SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES WITH THE POSITION SUBMITTED HEREIN. THE AUTHOR OF THIS CABLE IS [REDACTED] OFFICER.

TEXT

1. IN THE FALL OF 1975, THE USAID TO HAITI SUBMITTED TO AID/W THE FIRST HEALTH PROJECT PROPOSAL OF ANY MAJOR CONSEQUENCE SINCE THE RESUMPTION OF US ASSISTANCE TO HAITI IN LATE 1973. THE ONLY HEALTH ACTIVITY WHICH AID HAS MAINTAINED IN HAITI DURING THE REGIME OF DR. FRANCOIS DUVALIER HAD BEEN A MALARIA CONTROL PROJECT, AND ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW PROJECT WAS TO STRENGTHEN THE MALARIA EFFORT TO TRY TO BRING THIS DISEASE UNDER FIRM CONTROL AFTER YEARS OF ASSISTANCE TO THE HAITIAN MALARIA AGENCY (SHEM) WHICH HAD BEEN CREATED BY A CONSORTIUM OF A.I.D., THE PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION AGENCY AND UNICEF. THE NEW PROJECT (CALLED STRENGTHENING HEALTH SERVICES II) ALSO ADDRESSED A SECOND MAJOR PROBLEM, THE INTEGRATION OF THE LARGELY AUTONOMOUS SHEM INTO THE MUCH SMALLER CENTRAL MINISTRY, THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND POPULATION (DSPP).

2. UNTIL THIS TIME, HEALTH ACTIVITIES IN HAITI HAD HAD A TENDENCY TO BE CARRIED OUT IN PIECEMEAL PROJECTS MANAGED BY DIFFERENT HAITIAN AGENCIES, BUT WITHOUT THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF THE DSPP IN THE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION OF THESE PROJECTS. AID, FOR EXAMPLE, FUNDED HEALTH, POPULATION AND NUTRITION ACTIVITIES WITH THREE SEPARATE COA AGENCIES, AND ONE OF THESE (NACHOI) WAS NOT EVEN PART OF THE DSPP ORGANIZATION CHART. OTHER FOREIGN CONCEPTS FOLLOWED THE SAME PATTERN, AND THE EMERGENCE OF AN INTEGRATED HEALTH SERVICE WAS RETARDED BY A LACK OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITY TO ADDRESS NATIONAL NEEDS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR AND TO PLAN A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL PROGRAM.

3. THE NEW HEALTH PROJECT WHICH WAS PRESENTED FOR AID/W REVIEW

SOUGHT TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM DIRECTLY BY SUPPORTING THE DSPP WITH A LOAN OF DOLS 1.4 MILLION OVER A 5 YEAR PERIOD (1978-1982) TO BUILD UP THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE AND TO ALLOW THEM TO BEGIN CARRYING OUT HEALTH SERVICES. IN ADDITION, SHEM WAS TO RECEIVE A LOAN OF DOLS 5.6 MILLION TO CONTINUE ITS OPERATIONS THROUGH 1982. THE LOAN APPROACH SIGNALLED THE END OF LONG-TERM US SUPPORT FOR THE MALARIA GROUP AS A VERTICAL ORGANIZATION, AND REFLECTED THE AID/W AND USAID THE MALARIA COULD BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL WITH A CONCERTED EFFORT OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD. THE NEW PROJECT ALSO FORECAST A MAJOR HAITIAN CASH CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROJECT-- DOLS 5.6 MILLION DOLLARS -- BUT THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI (GOH) TO SECURE A COMMITMENT OF THIS MAGNITUDE WERE STILL TO BE CONDUCTED.

4. DURING THE AID/W REVIEW OF THE NEW PROJECT, ON NOVEMBER 17, 1975 THE DAEC EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE BROADER HEALTH NEEDS OF HAITI AND PROPOSED ADDING TO THE PROJECT AT LEAST DOLS 3.5 MILLION IN GRANT FUNDS TO SUPPORT A MORE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL HEALTH EFFORT.

IN AS MUCH AS NO PLANNING HAD BEEN DONE TO JUSTIFY AN EXPENDITURE OF THIS MAGNITUDE, THE USAID/HAITI REPRESENTATIVE AT THE DAEC REVIEW OBJECTED TO THIS INCREASE IN FUNDING IN THE ABSENCE OF PRIOR PLANNING

THE DAEC DECIDED, HOWEVER, TO WRITE THESE FUNDS INTO THE PROJECT IN KEEPING WITH THE HIGH PRIORITY GIVEN TO HAITI IN THE LATIN AMERICAN REGION, AND TO REFLECT THE CONSENSUS THAT THE GOHTE

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UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 5 PORT AU PRINCE 2945

DISSENT CHANNEL

AIDAC

HEALTH NEEDS OF HAITI WERE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS UNUSUAL PRIOR COMMITMENT OF FUNDS, WHICH IN ANY CASE WERE NOT TO BE DISBURSED UNTIL 1978, OVER TWO YEARS FROM THE DATE OF THE MEETING.

5. THE NATIONAL HEALTH PLANNING NEEDED TO PROGRAM THESE FUNDS WAS TO BE ASSISTED BY A CONTRACT GROUP WHICH THE USAID HAD REQUESTED BY (P/0/7) IN JUNE 1975 AS PART OF THE FIRST TENTATIVE STEPS TAKEN TO STRENGTHEN THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE SDPP TO UNDERTAKE NATIONAL HEALTH PLANNING AND TO PREPARE FOR THE GRADUAL ABSORPTION OF SNEH UNDER DSPP ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL.

ONE OF THE EARLY CONSULTANTS WHO HELPED PREPARE THE NEW PROJECT DESCRIBED THE INTEGRATION OF SNEH WITH THE DSPP AS POURING WATER INTO A BUCKET, BUT FIRST, HE SAID, ONE NEEDED TO CREATE THE BUCKET. THE ENTIRELY INADEQUATE CAPABILITIES IN ADMINISTRATION AND PLANNING, THE VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND TRAINING FACILITIES, AND THE INADEQUATE LEVELS OF SUPPLIES AND BUDGETARY SUPPORT FACED BY THE DSPP MEANT NOTHING LESS THAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FROM THE GROUND UP.

6. THE PICTURE WAS NOT ENTIRELY BLEAK, HOWEVER, IN THAT SEVERAL PROMISING DEVELOPMENTS HAD OCCURRED WHICH OFFERED SOME PROMISE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RURAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR HAITI. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FOCUSING ON ITS HEALTH PROBLEMS BY ESTABLISHING A POLICY OF "REGIONALIZATION" IN ITS 1975 NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN. UNDER WHICH HEALTH ADMINISTRATION WAS TO BE STRENGTHENED IN THE FIVE REGIONS OF HAITI TO BRING CLOSER LINKS BETWEEN SERVICE DELIVERY POINTS AND THE NATIONAL SUPPORT STRUCTURE. TWO REGIONS IN PARTICULAR THE NORTHERN AND THE SOUTHERN, WERE TO RECEIVE INITIAL EMPHASIS WITH ACTIVE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OF RESIDENT ADVISORS FROM THE PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION (PAHO). SECONDLY, THE INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK HAD CONCLUDED A DOLS 6.3 MILLION LOAN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOH FOR RENOVATING, CONSTRUCTING AND EQUIPPING OVER SIXTY CLINICAL FACILITIES IN THESE TWO REGIONS. THIRDLY, THE EXISTING USAID PROJECTS IN NUTRITION, FAMILY PLANNING, AND MALARIA CONTROL HAD SEEN THE GRADUAL EMERGENCE OF HAITIAN EXPERTISE IN CARRYING OUT DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELATED HEALTH SERVICES. THE FAMILY PLANNING PROJECT, IN PARTICULAR, HAD TAKEN THE LEAD IN DEVELOPING AND TESTING MODELS OF COMMUNITY BASED RURAL HEALTH WORKERS. PAHO HAD STRENGTHENED ITS STAFF OF RESIDENT ADVISORS, ASSIGNING FIVE PROFESSIONALS TO SNEH ALONE. AND FINALLY, THE GOH HAD BROUGHT IN FROM THE PROVINCES A VIGOROUS NEW MINISTER OF HEALTH WHO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DISTRICT HEALTH OFFICER IN LES CAYES, HAD MANAGED TO ORGANIZE A REASONABLY EFFECTIVE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM ON A SHOESTRING BUDGET. THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND RELATED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE POLITICAL CLIMATE FORESHADOWED A SUBTLE SHIFT ON THE PART OF THE GOH TOWARD A COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE PUBLIC SERVICES, INCLUDING HEALTH SERVICES, TO THE RURAL POOR OF HAITI AFTER YEARS OF VIRTUAL NEGLECT.

7. FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER 1975 DAEC REVIEW, THE AID MISSION BEGAN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

HEALTH AND POPULATION TO ACCELERATE THE HEALTH PLANNING PROCESS IN ORDER TO DEVELOP THE LARGER HEALTH PROGRAM WHICH THE DAEC HAD MANDATED. BECAUSE OF LENGTHY DELAYS IN CONTRACTING PROCEDURES, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE AID CONTRACT HEALTH PLANNING GROUP WOULD NOT ARRIVE IN HAITI IN TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FIRST STAGES OF THIS PLANNING, AND INDEED THEY DID NOT REACH HAITI UNTIL JANUARY, 1977, EIGHTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE USAID HAD REQUESTED AID/M TO EXECUTE A CONTRACT. THE USAID MISSION, HOWEVER, WAS FORTUNATE TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE EXPERTISE IN THE PERSON OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICER, WHOSE EXPERIENCE IN DEVELOPING AND ADMINISTERING COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH PROGRAMS IN OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, SUPPLEMENTED BY TOY CONSULTANTS FROM AID/M AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, ALLOWED FOR SUBSTANTIVE HEALTH PLANNING TO PROCEED.

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UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 5 PORT AU PRINCE 2945

DISSENT CHANNEL

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DSPP TO THE MORE AMBITIOUS HEALTH PROJECT WAS POSITIVE. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE ADDITIONAL \$3.5 MILLION MANDATED BY AID/W GAVE A CERTAIN AIR OF REALITY TO THE PLANNING PROCESS. (THE ORIGINAL REQUEST OF \$1.4 MILLION AND THE ADDITIONAL \$3.5 MILLION WERE EVENTUALLY PARED DOWN TO A TOTAL OF \$4.5 MILLION) THE DSPP KNEW THAT THEY WERE INVOLVED IN NO PAPER EXERCISE AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE THE RESOURCES TO TRANSLATE THE PLANNING PROCESS INTO A FUNCTIONING HEALTH SERVICE IN ORDER TO GAIN OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND TO CONDUCT EVALUATION AND ON-GOING PLANNING IN A REAL-WORLD ENVIRONMENT. SECONDLY, THE USAID BEGAN TO SUPPORT THE DSPP'S EMERGENCE AS A FUNCTIONING MINISTRY BY FUNDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BUREAU OF PLANNING AND A BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION, BY RENOVATING THE CENTRAL OFFICES, BY FUNDING TRAINING PROGRAMS, AND BY PROVIDING BUDGETARY SUPPORT TO ADDRESS SOME OF THE IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL NEEDS OF THE DSPP. THIS ASSISTANCE WAS PART OF THE LAST TWO YEARS OF THE ONGOING MALARIA PROJECT (STRENGTHENING HEALTH SERVICES I, PROJECT NO. 070) AND WAS VIEWED AS THE FIRST OF THREE PHASES IN A LONG-TERM EFFORT OF NATIONAL HEALTH DEVELOPMENT. THE SECOND PHASE WAS TO BE THE PROJECT MANDATED BY THE DAEC, AND THE THIRD PHASE TO BE FOLLOW-ON EFFORT TO EXTEND THE MODEL OF HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY DEVELOPED UNDER PHASE TWO IN ORDER TO COVER AT LEAST 70 PERCENT OF HAITI'S RURAL POPULATION. AID'S COMMITMENT TO HEALTH SERVICES IN HAITI WAS THUS VIEWED BY THE DSPP AS A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT OF LASTING IMPORTANCE AND THEY BEGAN TO FOCUS THEIR ENERGIES ON THIS EFFORT.

5. THE HIGH PRIORITY WHICH AID ASSIGNED TO ASSISTANCE TO HAITI WAS STRENGTHENED IN JANUARY, 1977, WHEN LOAN PROGRAMS WERE CONVERTED TO GRANTS TO CARRY OUT THE US ANNOUNCEMENT AT UNCTAD IV THAT OUR ASSISTANCE TO THE RELATIVELY LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WOULD HENCEFORTH BE ON MORE CONCESSIONAL TERMS. THIS POLICY DETERMINATION WAS OF GREAT HELP IN NEGOTIATING THE PROPOSED HAITIAN GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROJECT OF \$5.6 MILLION IN CASH, BUT THE KEY ELEMENT IN THE TALKS ON GOR CONTRIBUTIONS WAS OUR COMMITMENT TO MAKE A STERLING INPUT TO THE DSPP, AS DISTINCT FROM OUR FUNDING FOR SHER--FUNDING WHICH WAS TO GRADUALLY DECLINE TO ZERO AT THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR PROJECT.

10. BY EARLY 1977, THE COLLABORATIVE PLANNING EFFORT WITH THE DSPP HAD PROGRESSED TO THE POINT WHERE BOTH PARTIES HAD AGREED ON THE BASIC STRATEGY FOR THE PROJECT AND HAD DEVELOPED SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO BEGIN PREPARING THE PROJECT PAPER FOR AID/W REVIEW. THE DESIGN FOCUSED ON THREE ELEMENTS: 1) IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND PLANNING CAPABILITY OF THE DSPP, 2) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOGISTICAL SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT A RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY SYSTEM, AND 3) THE FINAL DESIGN AND TESTING OF A RURAL HEALTH SERVICE MODEL TO BE EXTENDED NATION WIDE (WITH CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM THE FOLLOW-ON AID PROJECT). THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE STRENGTHENING HEALTH SERVICES II PROJECT CONSISTED OF LONG TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION, BUDGETARY SUPPORT FOR OPERATING COSTS RELATED TO PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADEQUATE FIELD TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, THE CREATION OF A CENTRAL SUPPLY FACILITY, THE PROCUREMENT OF MEDICAL COMMODITIES FOR THE NASCENT RURAL HEALTH SERVICE, THE PROVISION OF SUPPORT TO FIELD RESEARCH PROJECTS TO FURTHER REFINE A MODEL OF SERVICE DELIVERY, THE RENOVATION OF FIFTEEN FIELD DISPENSARIES, SUPPORT FOR FIELD TRAINING FOR HAITIAN STUDENTS IN COMMUNITY MEDICINE, FUNDING FOR TECHNICAL EXCHANGE WITH US PUBLIC HEALTH INSTITUTIONS, AND SUPPORT FOR THE TRAINING OF BASIC HEALTH WORKERS. CERTAIN OF THESE PROJECT COMPONENTS, SUCH AS THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, COULD BE DEFINED AND BUDGETED WITH PRECISION. BUT BECAUSE OF THE EMERGING NATURE OF THE RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY SYSTEM, OTHER PROJECT COMPONENTS, SUCH AS THE MEDICAL FORMULARY, WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER REFINEMENT AS PART OF THE ONGOING PLANNING PROCESS. INDEED, THE FINAL DESIGN AND COMPOSITION OF THE THIRD PHASE OF AID'S ASSISTANCE PACKAGE IN HEALTH TO HAITI (PROJECT NO. 031, RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY SYSTEM) WAS TO DERIVE FROM THE EXPERIENCE AND

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UNCLAS SECTION 4 OF 5 PORT AU PRINCE 2945

DISSENT CHANNEL

AIDAC

THE TESTING OF DELIVERY MODELS UNDER THE STRENGTHENING HEALTH SERVICES II PROJECT. BUT IN ORDER TO ASSURE ADEQUATE SPECIFICITY DURING PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, A SERIES OF CONDITIONS PRECEDENT WERE BUILT INTO THE DRAFT PROJECT AGREEMENT TO MAKE DISBURSEMENTS CONDITIONAL TO DETAILED COMPONENTS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS AT EACH STEP OF THE WAY.

11. PLANNING FOR THE MALARIA CONTROL ELEMENT OF THE PROJECT WAS CONSIDERABLY MORE STRAIGHT-FORWARD BECAUSE OF THE EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE OF THE SHEN ORGANIZATION TO DATE. THE KEY OBJECTIVE OF INTEGRATING SHEN INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND POPULATION NEVERTHELESS DEPENDED ON STRENGTHENING THE DSPP SO THAT IT COULD EFFECTIVELY ASSESS AND ADMINISTER THE NATIONAL MALARIA CONTROL EFFORT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF A NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE. THE FINAL PROJECT FUNDING BREAKDOWN PROVIDED \$4.5 MILLION FOR THE DSPP, AND \$5.6 MILLION FOR SHEN, WITH A GOR CASH CONTRIBUTION OF \$5.6 MILLION. FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLICITY, THIS GOR CONTRIBUTION WAS TO GO INTO SHEN EXCLUSIVELY IN GRADUALLY INCREASING INCREMENTS OVER THE FIVE YEAR LIFE OF THE PROJECT.

12. IN JUNE, 1977, THE DAEC RECONVENED IN AID/W TO REVIEW THE PROJECT PAPER. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE DAEC REQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE PP, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE NATURE OF THE RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH WAS TO BE DESIGNED DURING THE COURSE OF THE PROJECT. THERE WAS A GENERAL CONSENSUS, HOWEVER, THAT ASSISTANCE IN THE HEALTH SECTOR WAS OF HIGH PRIORITY FOR HAITI. THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE AID/W REVIEW WERE THEN ADDRESSED BY USAID AND LA/DR STAFF, WORKING OVER THE ENSUING MONTH IN WASHINGTON AND PORT-AU-PRINCE, AND THIS SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION WAS SUBMITTED IN LATE JULY. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, THE USAID COMPLETED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE DRAFT PROJECT AGREEMENT FOR THE OBLIGATION OF FUNDS, INCLUDING THE GOR CONTRIBUTION OF \$5.6 MILLION AND A COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOR TO EMBARK ON A PROGRAM OF LOW COST HEALTH SERVICES FOR THE RURAL POOR.

13. ON AUGUST 12, THE USAID RECEIVED CABLED NOTIFICATION INFORMING US THAT THE DAEC HAD CUT THE DSPP SIDE OF THE PROJECT FROM \$4.5 MILLION TO \$1.525 MILLION, LEAVING THE SHEN PORTION INTACT AT \$5.0 MILLION AND THE

GOR CONTRIBUTION AT THE ORIGINAL LEVEL OF \$5.6 MILLION. AID SUPPORT TO THE DSPP WAS TO BE CUT FROM FIVE TO TWO YEARS, WHILE SUPPORT TO SHEN WAS TO REMAIN AT FIVE YEARS. ELIMINATED ENTIRELY FROM THE DSPP SIDE OF THE PROJECT WERE FUNDS FOR THE TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, THE CENTRAL SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS FACILITIES, MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE EMERGING HEALTH SERVICE, AND RENOVATIONS FOR FIELD DISPENSARIES. REDUCED SUBSTANTIALLY WERE FUNDS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, TRAINING, OPERATIONAL COSTS, AND LOCAL PERSONNEL. THE CABLE ALLEGED THAT THE PROJECT CALLED FOR "STOCKPILING" COMMODITIES WITHOUT DETAILED PLANS FOR THEIR USE. TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE USAID AND LA/DR INDICATED THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF REINSTATING ANY OF THESE CUTS OR OF PROVIDING INCREMENTAL ALLOCATIONS OVER THE LIFE OF THE PROJECT. THE DAEC HELD OUT HOPE THAT THE CUTS COULD BE LATER ADDED ON TOP OF THE PROPOSED FOLLOW-ON PROJECT, BUT ONLY AS PART OF AN ENTIRELY NEW PROJECT SUBMISSION TO BE REVIEWED BY THE DAEC AT A LATER DATE IN THE FUTURE.

14. IN OUR OPINION, THIS ACTION OF THE DAEC IS NOTABLE FOR ITS INCONSISTENCY AND LACK OF TECHNICAL SOUNDNESS. THE OBJECTIVE OF INTEGRATING SHEN AND THE DSPP IS NOW UNATTAINABLE WITH THE ELIMINATION OF THE SUPPORT NEEDED TO TRANSFORM THE DSPP INTO A FUNCTIONING ENTITY. SHEN WILL REMAIN AS A SEMI-AUTONOMOUS VERTICAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. CUTS IN LONG-TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO THE DSPP WILL GREATLY RETARD ITS EMERGENCE AS AN EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION CAPABLE OF PLANNING AND ADMINISTERING HEALTH PROGRAMS FOR HAITI'S RURAL POOR. THE CUTS IN SUPPORT TO FIELD DISPENSARIES WILL RENDER INEFFECTIVE THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION AND EVALUATION OF THE TRAINING PROGRAMS NEEDED TO DEVELOP A CADRE OF BASIC HEALTH WORKERS. THE ABSENCE OF A TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS NETWORK AND THE ELIMINATION OF HEALTH COMMODITIES WILL

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UNCLAS SECTION 5 OF 5 PORT AU PRINCE 2945

DISSENT CHANNEL

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OBVIATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FUNCTIONING RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY SYSTEM AND WILL HALT THE MOMENTUM WHICH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN MOVING TOWARD REGIONALIZATION OF THE DSPP STRUCTURE. THESE CUTS WILL ALSO PRECLUDE ADEQUATE TESTING OF SERVICE DELIVERY MODELS INVOLVING VARIOUS TYPES OF HEALTH PERSONNEL, DIFFERENT LEVELS OF COVERAGE, AND DIFFERENT SERVICE COMPONENTS. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE COMMITMENT OF THE GOH TO CONTRIBUTE \$5.5 MILLION TO THIS PROJECT AND TO FULLY ABSORB THE OPERATIONAL COSTS TO THEM WILL BE CAREFULLY RE-EXAMINED BY THE GOH IN THE LIGHT OF THIS SHORTFALL ON THE U.S. SIDE.

15. IN OUR VIEW, THE MOST SERIOUS ERROR IN TECHNICAL JUDGEMENT THAT THE DAEC HAS MADE HAS BEEN TO INSIST THAT HEALTH PLANNING BE UNDERTAKEN AS AN ISOLATED EXERCISE IN THE ABSENCE OF THE EXPERIENCE AND FEEDBACK WHICH CAN ONLY BE GAINED BY OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS. FAR FROM "STOCKPILING" COMMODITIES FOR SOME UNSPECIFIED USE, THE PLANS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE TO DATE, WILL BE UNABLE TO ESTABLISH THE STRUCTURE OF THE EMERGING RURAL HEALTH SERVICE, AND WILL BE UNABLE TO UNDERTAKE PRACTICAL REFINEMENTS AND ANALYSES OF VARIOUS APPROACHES TO SERVICE DELIVERY.

NO EFFECTIVE PLANNING OCCURS IN A VACUUM, PARTICULARLY FOR AN UNDERTAKING AS COMPLEX AS A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM, AND IT IS ONLY BY DEALING WITH THE PRACTICAL REALITIES OF MANAGING PROGRAMS THAT MEANINGFUL PLANNING AND REFINEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR THE DESIGN OF A RURAL HEALTH SERVICE. THE DAEC HAS NOW ELIMINATED THE WHEREWITHALL TO ESTABLISH THE BEGINNINGS OF A FUNCTIONING NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, BUT IT STILL EXPECTS A COMPREHENSIVE AND DETAILED PLAN FOR AN NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM TO BE DEVELOPED, AND SEARCHED FOR NATIONWIDE REPLICATION IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE FUTURE FUNDING.

16. A MORE IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE, HOWEVER, OF THE DAEC'S ACTION IS THE EFFECT IT WILL HAVE ON AID'S ROLE AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE IN THE HAITIAN HEALTH SECTOR. OUR OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO MOVE AWAY FROM TRADITIONAL HOSPITAL-BASED MEDICINE AND INTO LOW COST PROGRAMS OF RURAL HEALTH SERVICES. BECAUSE OF OUR ABILITY TO FULFILL OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE PROJECTS WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN SINCE OUR RELATIVELY RECENT RETURN TO HAITI, WE HAVE GAINED THE CONFIDENCE OF HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

HEALTH OFFICIALS. AID'S PERFORMANCE IN THE HEALTH SECTOR HAS BEEN MORE RELIABLE THAN OTHER DONORS AND WE HAVE GAINED A STRONG POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF HEALTH DEVELOPMENT IN HAITI. WE FEEL THAT THE CUTS MADE BY THE DAEC WILL SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE OUR EFFECTIVENESS AS CREDIBLE PROponents OF CHANGE IN THE HAITIAN HEALTH SECTOR AND WILL UNDERCUT OUR INFLUENCE ON THE DIRECTIONS TAKEN BY THE GOH IN HEALTH DEVELOPMENT. WE MIGHT ALSO SPECULATE THAT THE GOH MAY BEGIN TO VIEW OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR OVERALL AID PROGRAM WITH GREATER SKEPTICISM BECAUSE OF THIS ACTION.

17. IN OUR OPINION, THE CUTS MADE BY THE DAEC MUST BE FULLY REINSTATED TO ALLOW THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE HEALTH SERVICE TO REACH HAITI'S RURAL POOR AND TO RESTORE THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO MEANINGFUL ASSISTANCE TO THE HAITIAN HEALTH SECTOR. JONES

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Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART B6

October 13, 1978

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MEMORANDUM

To : S/P - Mr. Lake

From : INR/RNA/NE - [redacted]

DISSENT CHANNEL

Subject: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: The US and Syria:
The Special Relationship Crumbles

This memorandum presents a Dissent Channel view-
point of [redacted], INR/RNA/NE. The drafter
does not wish to restrict distribution of this
message, and suggests that distribution include INR,
NEA, NEA/ARN, and Ambassador Talcott Seelye.

The special relationship between the US and
Syria, established with considerable difficulty
following the 1974 Golan Disengagement Agreement,
has largely crumbled during recent months.
Consequently, the drift of bilateral relations toward
incompatibility continues, and is likely to accelerate
as a result of the Camp David summit and the
fighting in Beirut.

The drift was stimulated by three developments:

- differences about the direction of Middle
East peace negotiations which surfaced
after the Sadat visit to Jerusalem;
- the Syrian perception of declining US
support for Damascus' burdensome intervention
in Lebanon; and
- the overall unfavorable impact on the Damascus
leadership of the cutback and restoration of
the AID program to Syria.

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The Decline of US Influence

The drift is serious because it undercuts the ability of the US to influence Syrian policy at a critical juncture when:

- priority attention is being devoted to promoting support in the Arab world for the Camp David Framework for Peace; and
- urgent attempts are underway to strengthen the fragile ceasefire in Beirut in order to contain the fighting from escalating and provoking renewed Arab-Israeli clashes.

Amidst efforts to achieve the above two goals, it may be worthwhile to pause and reappraise the utility of the special relationship. While it flourished, it seemed to hold forth the prospect of gradually expanding cooperation toward peace with Israel. In this environment of growing trust, the US was able to influence Syrian policy by fostering serious expectations within the Damascus leadership that Syria's willingness to coexist with Israel would be rewarded by tangible progress in the direction of a settlement.

Assad's startling break with Syria's traditional Lebanese leftist and Palestinian clients during an earlier phase of the Lebanon civil war appeared to reinforce the inclination in Washington to cultivate the Syrian leader. The emergence of tacit common interests between Syria and Israel in Lebanon, moreover, served as a valuable adjunct to the US-Syrian link.

Rebuilding the Relationship

The uncertain prospects for implementing the Camp David Framework and for restabilizing Lebanon in the weeks ahead without Syrian cooperation draw attention to the potential damage resulting from the drift in bilateral ties. Mutual confidence has diminished to the point that:

- Assad has become sharply critical about the lack of US responsiveness to Syrian concerns; while

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--decisions by the Syrian leader have stoked suspicions in the US about the authenticity of his commitment to a Middle East settlement and of Syria's intentions in Lebanon.

But the assets that Assad possesses with the Palestinians, the Jordanians and Lebanese, logically, would be useful -- and perhaps crucial -- to those intending to facilitate a resolution of the West Bank and Lebanon issues. Bearing in mind the potential cost to US interests of proceeding ahead on these two fronts in the face of Syrian obstructionism, policymakers might consider the advantages of undertaking concerted efforts to rebuild the special relationship.

A successful rebuilding effort, however, would require some rethinking of assumptions by officials on both ends of the bilateral relationship. In the US, assumptions regarding Syria seem to have remained intact despite the transition of the peace process from the start-up phase to the implementation stage. In this new context, Assad appears well-positioned to help integrate the components of a comprehensive settlement, if the special relationship were reconstructed.

It is perhaps not too late to restore ties to a satisfactory working level. Several alternative strategies might advance this goal. A discussion of these alternatives remains premature, however, until a commitment is made to reappraise the utility of US-Syrian relations. The decision for US policymakers at present, accordingly, is whether to approach the new realities created by the Camp David accords without first attempting to rebuild the special relationship with Syria.

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DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [Redacted] FROM MLORD DIR POLICY PLANNING

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINS, SU, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT NIMEIRI'S CALL ON PRESIDENT FORD

REFERENCE: ABU DHABI 1432

1. THE DEPARTMENT ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT YOUR ARGUMENTS SUBMITTED THROUGH THE DISSENT CHANNEL AGAINST PRESIDENT NIMEIRI MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN LIGHT OF NIMEIRI'S ROLE IN RELEASE OF EIGHT BLACK SEPTEMBER MURDERERS OF AMBASSADOR NOEL AND OCM MOORE.

2. PRESIDENT NIMEIRI HAS MADE A GOODWILL PRIVATE VISIT TO US JUNE 9-20 TO PROMOTE TRADE WITH SUDAN. THIS UNOFFICIAL VISIT GREW OUT OF INVITATIONS FROM SEVERAL STATE GOVERNORS WHO HAD PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH SUDAN. IN

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RESPONSE TO SUDANESE REQUEST, WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY OUR EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM, PRESIDENT FORD MET BRIEFLY WITH NIMEIRI ON JUNE 10.

3. DEPARTMENT FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE STRONG FEELINGS THAT FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES OF CLEO NOEL AND CURTIS MOORE HAVE ABOUT THE GOS RELEASE OF THEIR MURDERERS TO EGYPTIAN CUSTODY. IN REACTION TO THIS RELEASE WE WITHDREW OUR AMBASSADOR FOR FIVE MONTHS AND SUSPENDED PROGRAMS OF

BILATERAL AID AND ASSISTANCE FOR 21 MONTHS. THE GOS UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED THE NECESSITY FOR THE USG TO TAKE THESE ACTIONS, AND WE BELIEVE THEY FORCEFULLY MADE OUR POINT TO THE GOS.

4. WHERE YOU AND DEPARTMENT SEEM TO DIFFER IS ON HOW LONG NIMEIRI GOVERNMENT IS TO BE PUNISHED. WE DO NOT BELIEVE USG SHOULD CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AGAINST A COUNTRY WHICH IS OF MINOR BUT GROWING ECONOMIC CONCERN AND NOT INSIGNIFICANT REGIONAL POLITICAL INTEREST TO US. TWO YEARS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THE EIGHT KHARTOUM TERRORISTS WERE SENT TO EGYPT, THEY ARE STILL IN DETENTION IN CAIRO, AND THE GOS HAS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN FREEING ALL FIVE OF THE AMERICANS KIDNAPPED LAST YEAR BY ERITREAN INSURGENTS, AS WELL AS HELPING OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE FIVE AMERICAN TENNECO CAPTIVES IN 1974.

5. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE DEPARTMENT SHARES YOUR CONTINUING SENSE OF OUTRAGE AND SORROW OVER THE MURDERS AS WELL AS THE ROLE OF SUDAN AT THE TIME. THE DECISION TO NORMALIZE REFLECTED THE CONSIDERED OPINION OF THE EXECUTIVE THAT, SINCE WE HAD MADE OUR POINT, SINCE IT HAD BEEN CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE GOS, AND IN VIEW OF THE LATTER'S WISH FOR BETTER RELATIONS AND ITS COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE USG, NOTABLY IN CASE OF ERITREAN KIDNAPPERS, THE TIME HAD COME FOR SUCH A MOVE.

6. THE DEPARTMENT THANKS YOU FOR USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WISHES TO ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR VIEWS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY NOTED AT HIGH LEVELS WITHIN THE

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PAGE 03 STATE 164702

DEPARTMENT, KISSINGER

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Belgrade, Yugoslavia

SV
YOUR ACTION!

RELEASE IN
PART B6

February 21, 1974

Michael A. G. Michaud, Esquire
NEA/IRN
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Michael:


I have seen some recent airgrams noting your name in connection with the Open Forum Panel, and besides wanting to renew contact, I am writing to you in that capacity.

About a year ago, I had the gall to send a dissent message (Belgrade A-3559) to the Department proposing that membership in the Communist Party be dropped as a ground of ineligibility to receive a U. S. visa. I was somewhat encouraged when the Department responded a short time later with a telegram informing me of the rather wide distribution which was given to my proposal. After that however, there has been a sad silence.

It was my impression that all such dissent messages, like suggestions, had to receive a response informing the drafter of the final action, if any, taken on his communication. Would you mind checking with the appropriate people in the Department and letting me know what happened to my lone policy contribution?

Belgrade is great; we are all fine and join in sending warmest regards to you, Grace and the little ones.

Sincerely,



B6

Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 NAIROBI 19374 02 OF 06 281438Z
ACTION SP-02

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 06 NAIROBI 19374

DISSENT CHANNEL

7. IN ORDER FOR ESF MONEY TO BE DISBURSED AND TRANSFERRED BEFORE THE KENYA FISCAL YEAR ENDS ON JUNE 30, THE GOA REQUEST FOR DISBURSEMENT MUST BE PROCESSED BY JUNE 29 AT THE LATEST. IT IS URGENT, THEREFORE, THAT THIS MESSAGE BE TRANSMITTED TO THE RELEVANT ACTION OFFICES IN AF, ED, AND IN USAID/AFR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PLEASE DISTRIBUTE EXPEDITIOUSLY. END SUMMARY.

8. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH DISCUSSION OF THE POLICY DIALOGUE OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS OR SO. WE REPEATEDLY HAVE TALKED WITH THE KENYA GOVERNMENT ABOUT NECESSARY ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGES. THE WORLD BANK HAS ESTABLISHED CONDITIONS FOR STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT FOR ITS STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN, AND THE IMF HAS SET UP STRINGENT CONDITIONS FOR A SERIES OF STANDBY AGREEMENTS. THE IMF HAS BEEN FIRM: FIVE STANDBY AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED BEFORE COMPLETION. THE IBRD, DESPITE FREQUENT ALLEGATIONS THAT IT IS TOO SOFT, ALSO IS STANDING RELATIVELY FIRM AT THIS MOMENT. ON MARCH 23 US\$50 MILLION WAS TO HAVE BEEN DISBURSED UNDER THE SECOND TRANCHE OF THE SAL. IN THE ABSENCE OF REAL MOVEMENT ON IMPORT ADMINISTRATION, ON GRAIN MARKETING OR ON AN INVESTMENT PLAN, THE BANK HAS NOT DISBURSED THAT MONEY. IT IS RATHER IRONIC IN THIS SITUATION THAT THE US GOVERNMENT, WITH ALL ITS TALK OF CONDITIONALITY, POLICY REFORM, AND THE POLICY DIALOGUE, SHOULD NOW BE PREPARING TO DISBURSE US\$28 MILLION TO A GOVERNMENT WHICH REPEATEDLY HAS FAILED TO LIVE UP TO ITS PROMISES. IN FACT, THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT NOW INCLUDED IN OUR ESF AGREEMENT ARE SO WATERED DOWN THAT THEY ARE EVEN LESS DEMANDING THAN PAST AGREEMENTS.

9. BY PROVIDING US\$28 MILLION TO THE GOX AT THIS TIME WE RUN A VERY SERIOUS RISK OF SUBVERTING ANY GAINS WE HAVE MADE TO DATE. WE RUN THE RISK OF SIGNALLING TO THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE WILL PROVIDE THEM MONEY NO MATTER WHAT THEIR PROGRESS TOWARD STRUCTURAL REFORM MAY BE. WE WILL REINFORCE AN EXISTING BELIEF THAT U.S. MONEY IS CONTINGENT ON USE OF FACILITIES IN MOMBASA, RATHER THAN BEING DEPENDENT ON EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES, EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED. IF WE FOLLOW THIS COURSE THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT THE GOX WILL IN FACT COMPLY WITH THE IBRD CONDITIONS. THERE REMAINS A FAIR CHANCE THAT THE IMF BUDGET CEILINGS WILL NOT BE EXCEEDED, BUT ACTION ON IMPORT ADMINISTRATION STILL IS LACKING. THERE ARE TWO ELEMENTS IN THE CURRENT REQUEST TO DISBURSE ESF MONEY TO KENYA. THE FIRST IS PROGRESS TOWARD ECONOMIC REFORM AND ACTION WHICH MEETS CONDITIONS PRECEDENT SET FORTH IN THE ESF AGREEMENT ITSELF. THE SECOND IS ACTUAL NEED, AS DEMONSTRATED IN BUDGET DATA.

10. LAST SEPTEMBER WE SIGNED AN ESF AGREEMENT FOR

US\$20.7 MILLION. THE SOLE CONDITION PRECEDENT WAS EXPORT INCENTIVES. WE ASKED THAT THE KENYANS PAY EXPORT COMPENSATION TO THOSE FIRMS DAMAGED RETROACTIVELY BY CANCELLATION OF THE PROGRAM ON JUNE 17, 1982; ASKED THAT A NEW INCENTIVE PROGRAM (AS PROMISED BY THE GOX ON JUNE 17) BE INSTATED BY NOVEMBER 1, 1982; AND THAT THE NEW PROGRAM BE RETROACTIVE TO JUNE 18, 1982. ONLY THE EXPORT COMPENSATION PART OF THOSE CONDITIONS HAS BEEN MET. ON NOVEMBER 9, 1982, THE GOX WROTE US STATING THAT A "COMPREHENSIVE" EXPORT PROGRAM WOULD BE IN EFFECT WITHIN SEVEN MONTHS, AND A REPORT WAS PROMISED FROM AN INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE TO THE CABINET BY JAN 2, 1983. ON DECEMBER 10, 1982 THE GOX WROTE THAT IT WOULD UNDERTAKE SIMPLIFICATION OF EXPORT DOCUMENTATION PROCEDURES WITHIN THREE MONTHS. THE ESF MONEY WAS THEN DISBURSED BEFORE THE END OF 1982, DESPITE GOX FAILURE TO MEET THE LETTER OR CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.

11. SINCE DECEMBER, EMBASSY AND AID OFFICERS' REPEATEDLY HAVE BEEN ASSURED BY GOX OFFICIALS THAT EXPORT INCENTIVES WERE ON THE WAY. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THE NEED FOR PROGRESS WHEN HE SAW PRESIDENT MOI IN MAY. VARIOUS OFFICERS IN VARIOUS MINISTRIES WERE SAID TO BE WORKING ON THE PROGRAM. WHEN NEGOTIATIONS WERE BEGUN ON THE CURRENT ESF MONEY, THESE ASSURANCES WERE REPEATED. HOWEVER, WHEN USAID DIRECTOR AND ECONCOUNSELOR WENT TO TREASURY MAY 27, EXPECTING TO BE GIVEN A COMPLETE LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN OR UNDER WAY, WE WERE GIVEN AN INSIGNIFICANT VERBAL PRESENTATION STARTING OUT WITH THE FACT THAT THE ALLOWANCE FOR BUSINESSMEN TRAVELING ABROAD HAD BEEN RAISED FROM KSH 600 TO

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PAGE 01 NAIROB 19374 03 OF 06 281448Z
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 06 NAIROBI 19374

DISSIDENT CHANNEL

1800. THE AID DIRECTOR SUBSEQUENTLY DRAFTED A SUGGESTED LIST OF EXPORT INCENTIVES WHICH THE PERMANENT SECRETARY SAID WAS THE BEST EFFORT HE HAD SEEN TO DATE--THIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS PEOPLE SUPPOSEDLY HAD BEEN WORKING ON THE SUBJECT SINCE JUNE OF 1982, AND THE AID DIRECTOR HAS NO EXPERIENCE IN EXPORTING OR EXPORT DOCUMENTATION.

12. WHEN WE ORIGINALLY BEGAN NEGOTIATING FY 83 ESF WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT COMPLIANCE WITH IMF CONDITIONS WAS MANDATORY, A CONDITION PRECEDENT. BECAUSE OF GOK OBJECTION TO INCLUDING SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO IMF AND IBRD IN A BILATERAL DOCUMENT, WE AGREED TO LIST THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF FUND AND BANK. IN ONE SUBMISSION FROM USAID TO THE PS WE SPELLED OUT THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE PREVIOUS CATEGORY OF IMPORTS AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE AUTOMATIC FOREIGN EXCHANGE, WITHOUT LIMIT, WOULD BE REDUCED AND REVISED INTO A NEW CATEGORY (IA), ALSO TO RECEIVE AUTOMATIC FOREIGN EXCHANGE. IN ONE EARLY MEETING THE PS IN TREASURY STATED THE GOK WOULD HAVE NO TROUBLE MEETING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES REQUIRED BY THE FUND ON IMPORT PROCEDURES. WE NOW KNOW THAT THE DECISION TO ADOPT THE NEW IMPORT PRIORITIES WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED BY CABINET UNTIL JULY 7, DESPITE ASSURANCES TO THE FUND THAT THE SCHEME WOULD BE COMPLETE BY JUNE 15 AND IN PLACE BY JULY 1. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE CENTRAL BANK STILL HAS NOT ACCEPTED THE NEW SCHEDULES, HAS NOT PRINTED THE NEW IMPORT LICENSE FORMS WHICH ARE REQUIRED, AND HAS NOT MADE THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES IN THE OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE WHICH ARE REQUIRED. (THIS LATTER IS A FIRST HAND REPORT FROM THE EXPAT WHO HAS BEEN WORKING UP THE NEW SCHEDULES.) WE HAVE REQUIRED A LISTING OF ITEMS INCLUDED IN IA AS AN INCENTIVE TO EXPORTERS, AND HAVE RECEIVED SUCH A LIST.

13. WE ALSO HAVE STRESSED IN THE PAST THAT THE GOK MUST TAKE STEPS TO COMPLY WITH THE IBRD STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM. THAT CONDITION HAS, AS NOTED ABOVE, BEEN PROGRESSIVELY WEAKENED. CHANCES THAT THE GOK WILL COMPLY ALSO HAVE LESSENED. THE PS IN TREASURY TOLD ECCHCOUNSELOR ON JUNE 24 THAT HE WAS VERY WORRIED BECAUSE THE GOK DID NOT HAVE AN INVESTMENT PLAN READY FOR FY 1983/84. WORLD BANK OFFICER, DAVID THOMAS, NOTED THE SAME IN A CONVERSATION THE SAME DAY. THOMAS ALSO NOTED THAT THE GOK HAD REFUSED EVEN TO DISCUSS GRAIN MARKETING WITH THE IBRD TEAM EXAMINING GOK COMPLIANCE WITH STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CONDITIONS, SAYING ONLY THE PS FOR CABINET AFFAIRS COULD DISCUSS THE ISSUE. PS FOR PLANNING TOLD ECCH COUNSELOR ON JUNE 22 THAT THE GRAIN MARKETING REVISIONS EXPECTED BY THE BANK, AND SUGGESTED

BY AN IN-HOUSE STUDY OF HARVARD EXPERTS IN THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, HAD BEEN REJECTED BY THE CABINET. HE SAID THE MATTER WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT COME UP AGAIN UNTIL SEPTEMBER WHEN THE MARKETING STUDY NOW UNDERWAY BY A PRIVATE FIRM IS COMPLETED. THIS STUDY HAD BEEN PROMISED IN THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AGREEMENT BY MARCH 23.

14. IT IS NOT ONLY IN ESF NEGOTIATIONS OR COMPLIANCE WITH BANK AND FUND CONDITIONS THAT THE GOK IS DELINQUENT. IN APRIL IT CAME TO OUR ATTENTION THAT THE GOK WAS EXPORTING MAIZE FROM KENYA. THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT SOME OF THAT MAIZE WAS FROM PL480 SHIPMENTS IN 1981. WHETHER OR NOT EXPORTS WERE FROM US-ORIGIN MAIZE, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE GOK HAD VIOLATED ITS PL480 COMMITMENT TO REQUEST PERMISSION BEFORE EXPORTING ANY REPEAT ANY MAIZE, REGARDLESS OF ORIGIN. OUR REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION, FOR EXAMINATION OF GOK RECORDS, WAS MET WITH DISDAIN. THE SPECIFIC PERMISSION FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CEREALS AND PRODUCE BOARD (ALSO THE PS FOR CABINET AFFAIRS) TO EXAMINE WAREHOUSE RECORDS HAS STILL NOT BEEN RECEIVED. THE GOK CERTAINLY HAS TAKEN MANY LAUDABLE ACTIONS IN THE PAST NINE MONTHS. HOWEVER, ALL SUCH DECISIONS WERE TAKEN AS A RESULT OF IRRESISTIBLE PRESSURE: DEVALUATION, HIGHER INTEREST RATES, CURTAILED GOVERNMENT SPENDING--ALL WERE THE RESULT OF THE IMF STANDBY AGREEMENT. IN CASES WHERE LESS PRESSURE HAS EXISTED -- FROM THE US AND THE IBRD -- LITTLE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. EVEN UNDER THE FUND PROGRAM NO REAL IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE GOK'S ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY

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PAGE 01 HAIROB 19374 04 OF 06 281442Z
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 06 NAIROBI 19374

DISSENT CHANNEL

ADMINISTER A BUDGET, OR TO MAINTAIN ACCOUNTABILITY
OVER CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT OFFICIALS.

15. DOES THE GOK REALLY NEED USDOL 28 MILLION FROM THE U.S. BEFORE JUNE 30? WE HAVE OBTAINED THE LATEST GOK PROJECTION FOR KFY 82/83 BUDGET OUTCOME. THIS PROJECTION SHOWS A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT KENYA MAY BE ABLE TO STAY WITHIN IMF CEILINGS FOR JUNE 30. HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF ITEMS COULD WELL HAVE BEEN FUDGED. WE WILL NOT KNOW THE OUTCOME UNTIL WELL AFTER THE IMF TEAM COMES TO KENYA FOR FORMAL EVALUATION. IN MID-JULY. THE NUMBERS GIVEN HERE ARE CURRENT FOR JUNE 18.

16. LATEST FIGURES SHOW RECURRENT REVENUE DOWN BY ABOUT KSH 326 MILLION AGAINST PROJECTIONS MADE IN APRIL (REFTEL 8). THE PRIMARY CAUSE FOR THE DROP IS A SHORTFALL IN DONOR GRANTS OF SOME KSH \$92 MILLION-- 134 MILLION OF THAT TOTAL IS THE RESULT OF CALCULATING ON ONLY USDOL 10 MILLION ESF FROM THE US. THE REMAINING 358 MILLION IS DUE TO THE SHORTFALLS FROM DONORS WHICH WE SUGGESTED IN REFTEL. IN FACT, THE KENYANS HAD ONLY 756 MILLION ACTUALLY IN HAND AS OF END MAY, SO THE SHORTFALL COULD BE OVER 200 MILLION LARGER. ORDINARY REVENUE IS, HOWEVER, SOME KSH 266 MILLION LARGER THAN PROJECTED IN MAY. ACCORDING TO OUR CONTACTS, THE PERMANENT SECRETARY IN TREASURY HAS BEEN CALLING IN THE VARIOUS COMMISSIONERS OF REVENUE (INTERNAL, CUSTOMS AND EXCISE, ETC.) AND DEMANDING ITEM BY ITEM ACCOUNTING. INASMUCH AS MANY TREASURY OFFICIALS SIT ON BOARDS OF PARASTATALS AND PRIVATE FIRMS, MOST LARGE ARREARS ARE KNOWN TO SOMEONE IN TREASURY. IT HAS THUS BEEN VERY HARD FOR THE COMMISSIONERS TO FUDGE OR SUSPEND PAYMENTS. LITTLE MORE REMAINS TO BE MILKED FROM THAT COV, HOWEVER, SO IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF TOTAL RECURRENT REVENUE FALLS SHORT OF THE PROJECTION. IF THE FULL ESF USDOL 28 MILLION IS TRANSFERRED, HOWEVER, THE GOK PROBABLY CAN REALIZE THE FULL KSH 17,228 MILLION PROJECTED AS RECURRENT REVENUE. THE GOK ALSO HAS BEEN DOING BETTER THAN EXPECTED ON HOLDING DOWN RECURRENT SPENDING, A SAVINGS OF KSH 430 MILLION IS NOW EXPECTED VIS A VIS THE APRIL PROJECTION. PART OF THIS IS DUE TO SIMPLE FUDGING, FAILURE TO PAY CONTRACTS DUE, ETC., BUT SOME ACTUAL SAVINGS HAVE BEEN RECORDED. THIS SUCCESS ON THE RECURRENT SIDE HAS, HOWEVER, ENCOURAGED THE GOK TO DECIDE TO UNDERTAKE SOME KSH 100 MILLION MORE IN SPENDING ON DEVELOPMENT THAN WAS PLANNED. THUS, TOTAL EXPENDITURE IS ONLY KSH 280 MILLION LOWER THAN PROJECTED IN APRIL. THE GOK ALSO HAS REVISED UPWARDS THE "ADJUSTMENT" ENTRY. THIS REPRESENTS THE PAYMASTER GENERAL'S ACTUAL OPERATING ACCOUNT, AND IS REALLY BEYOND THE GOK ABILITY TO FORECAST. IT ALSO REPRESENTS SPENDING BY MINISTRIES IN EXCESS OF BUDGETED LIMITS. AN INCREASE OF KSH

573 MILLION COULD BE AN INDICATION OF REAL TROUBLE. THE TOTAL DEFICIT IS SOME KSH 619 MILLION MORE THAN WAS PROJECTED IN APRIL, AND SOME 133 MILLION MORE THAN CALLED FOR BY THE IMF PROGRAM. THE KENYANS HOPE TO FINANCE THIS LARGER DEFICIT PARTLY BY AN INCREASE IN FOREIGN FINANCING. EVEN AT THE LARGER AMOUNT PROJECTED THEY WILL STILL BE SOME KSH 351 MILLION BELOW THE AMOUNT EXPECTED WHEN THE IMF PROGRAM WAS SET UP IN DECEMBER. END MAY FIGURES WOULD INDICATE THAT THE GOK DOES HAVE A REAL CHANCE OF REALIZING THE FULL SUM NOW PROJECTED. A FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL SAVING HAS BEEN REALIZED BY A REDUCTION IN RE-PAYMENTS TO DONORS OF ABOUT KSH 160 MILLION OVER THE APRIL PROJECTION. THE GOK ALSO PLANS NOW TO RAISE MORE FINANCING FROM DOMESTIC SOURCES, A TOTAL OF ABOUT KSH 168 MILLION. SOME OF THAT TOTAL WILL BE DRAWN FROM TREASURY BILLS AND STOCKS, BUT THE GOK PLANS ALSO TO DRAW SOME 140 MILLION MORE FROM THE BANKING SECTOR THAN IS PERMITTED UNDER THE IMF PROGRAM. SO FAR, THE TREASURY HAS BEEN ABLE TO CONVINCE TREASURY BILL HOLDERS TO ROLL OVER THEIR BILLS, AND KEPT THE AMOUNT OF REPAYMENTS AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL. THEY NOW PROJECT ONLY KSH 369 MILLION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR. AN INCREASE IN AVAILABLE FINANCING OF SOME KSH 49 MILLION. GOK EXPERTS ALSO STILL HOPE TO HOLD FINANCING OF THE CEREALS AND SUGAR FINANCE CORPORATION UNDER THE KSH 133 MILLION NOW PROJECTED. THE GOK ALSO HAS BEEN EXERTING CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON BOTH PARASTATAL AND PRIVATE FIRMS TO REDUCE BANK DEPOSITS IN FAVOR OF TREASURY BILLS. WE ARE AWARE THAT IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS BANKERS

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PAGE 01 HAIROB 19374 05 OF 06 281444Z 5989
ACTION SP-02

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 06 NAIROBI 19374

DISSENT CHANNEL

TRUST AND IRVING HAVE OFFERED THE GOK SHORT TERM CREDITS AGAINST IMF, ESF AND/OR IBRD MONEY. THOSE CREDITS WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT FALL UNDER THE IMF EUROCURRENCY RESTRICTION BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE LESS THAN ONE YEAR MATURITY. OTHER EUROPEAN BANKS AND THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO REPORTEDLY HAVE MADE SIMILAR OFFERS, ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT CONFIRM THOSE STORIES. WE CAN CONFIRM, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOK HAS TURNED DOWN ALL OFFERS. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY POSSIBLE FOR THE GOK TO HELP TIDE ITSELF OVER ITS IMMEDIATE DIFFICULTIES VIA SHORT TERM BORROWING ABROAD. IN FACT, THERE IS NO REASON THE GOK SHOULD NOT BEAR PART OF THE COST OF SHORT TERM ADJUSTMENT, ESPECIALLY INASMUCH AS MOST OF THE PROBLEMS IT FACES ARE OF ITS OWN MAKING.

17. OUR BEST GUESS AT THIS TIME IS THAT THE GOK HAS SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN A 50/50 CHANCE OF REDUCING THE TOTAL DEFICIT, OR AT LEAST TOTAL BORROWING FROM THE BANKING SECTOR, BY ENOUGH TO STAY WITHIN FUND CEILINGS. LEEWAY FOR FUDGING ON CONTRACT AND OTHER PAYMENTS WAS PROBABLY RATHER LIMITED IN JUNE, BUT IT WILL STILL BE POSSIBLE TO PAY WAGES AND SALARIES IN JULY RATHER THAN LATE JUNE. IT IS JUST AS LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT DONOR GRANTS, ONLY KSH 756 MILLION AT END MAY, WILL NOT INCREASE BEYOND THE KSH 973 MILLION PROJECTED ABOVE EVEN WITH A FULL TRANSFER OF ESF MONEY. MOREOVER, THE IMF COULD REFUSE TO ACCEPT SOME OF THE GAMES NOW BEING PLAYED BY THE GOK. FOR EXAMPLE, EEC MONEY (ONLY AROUND KSH 45 MILLION) IS BEING CARRIED IN DONOR GRANT REVENUE EVEN THOUGH EVERYONE CONCERNED KNOWS THAT ALL SUCH REVENUE WILL ACTUALLY SIMPLY BE PAID DIRECTLY TO FARMERS. WE PROBABLY WILL NOT HAVE EVEN AN INCLINATION AS TO THE OUTCOME OF THE GOK EFFORT TO MEET FUND CRITERIA UNTIL WELL AFTER THE FUND TEAM ARRIVES IN MID-JULY. IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE INCORRECT TO SAY THAT A DECISION NOT TO DISBURSE THE FULL US\$28 MILLION WOULD CAUSE THE GOK TO FAIL TO MEET IMF CONDITIONS. AMPLE OPPORTUNITY HAS BEEN PRESENT TO ENABLE THE GOK TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION. IN FACT, IN THE FACE OF REPEATED WARNINGS FROM EMBASSY AND USAID OFFICIALS, THE GOK HAS, AS NOTED ABOVE, ACTUALLY REDUCED THE AMOUNT NOW PROJECTED FROM THE U.S. IN THIS KENYAN FISCAL YEAR TO ONLY US\$20 MILLION.

18. IS IT POSSIBLE TO DELIVER ESF MONEY NOW, IN THE HOPES THAT US\$20 MILLION NEXT FISCAL YEAR SOMEHOW WILL BRING ABOUT THE CHANGES NOT APPARENT THIS YEAR? IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE HOW WE COULD HAVE MORE LEVERAGE THAN WE HAVE HAD OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS WHEN THE GOK HAS BEEN TRYING, OFTEN DESPERATELY, TO FIND A WAY OF RETAINING THE IMF STANDBY AGREEMENT. WE NEED TO STAND FIRM NOW.

IF NOT WE WILL HAVE REINFORCED THE KENYAN BELIEF THAT THE US WILL BAILE OUT THE MOI GOVERNMENT NO MATTER HOW BADLY THAT GOVERNMENT PERFORMS. PRESIDENT MOI MADE IT CLEAR TO THE AMBASSADOR IN MAY THAT HE INTENDED TO APPEAL TO THE USG ON POLITICAL GROUNDS, AND WAS ONLY DISSUAGED FROM MAKING THE POLITICAL APPROACH HIS SOLE GROUNDS FOR APPEAL BY THE PS FOR CABINET AFFAIRS. THE USG ALREADY HAS GIVEN THE GOK A SIGNAL THAT IT NEED NOT FULLY LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS BY DISBURSING US\$20 MILLION IN 1982. TO REPEAT THAT ACTION NOW WOULD CONFIRM THE GOK BELIEF THAT OUR MONEY IS AVAILABLE FOR THE ASKING ON POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC, GROUNDS. THE POLICY DIALOGUE WILL BE A DEAD ISSUE.

19. THE US MUST NOT DISBURSE ESF MONEY AT THIS TIME. IF A POLITICAL GESTURE IS NECESSARY, US\$20 MILLION ONLY SHOULD BE DISBURSED, EVEN IF THE IMF STANDBY AGREEMENT IS LOST AS A RESULT, WE MUST AT ALL COSTS DEMONSTRATE TO THE KENYANS THAT THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. DEPENDS ON RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR. ANY OTHER COURSE WILL BE AS MUCH A DISSERVICE TO THE KENYANS AS TO THE U.S.

KENYA BUDGET FY 82/83
MILLIONS OF KENYA SHILLINGS

	IMF PROG 1982/83	APRIL PROJ- ECTION	LATEST PROJ- ECTION	OVER-UNDER IMF PROG.
I. RECURRENT REVENUE				
NO GRANT	19540	17546	17228	+ 2328

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PAGE 01 NAIROBI 19374 06 OF 06 281445Z 5987
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 06 OF 06 NAIROBI 19374

DISSENT CHANNEL

A. RECURRENT REVENUE	17970	15981	16247	- 1723
B. FOREIGN GRANTS	1570	1565	973	- 597
-1. CASH GRANTS	1180	1175	583	
II. EXPENDITURE AND NET LENDING	23478	20496	20216	- 3262
A. RECURRENT EXPENDITURE	16180	15729	15249	- 931
-1. NET ISSUES, RECURRENT	11459	11508	11120	
-6. CONSOLIDATED FUND SERV.	3085	3085	2493	
B. DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE	7298	4767	4967	- 2331
IV. ADJUSTMENT (REV. 0 EXP.	-278	-224	-797	
V. OVERALL DEFICIT (PERCENT OF GDP)	-3660 (4.7)	-3174 (4.4)	-3793 (4.9)	133
VI. FINANCING	3660	3174	3793	519
A. FOREIGN FINANCING (NET)	1850	1133	1499	- 351
-1. DRAWINGS (GROSS)	3518	2891	3007	
-A) CASH LOANS	780	394	600	
-2. REPAYMENTS	-1668	-1668	-1508	- 1508
B. DOMESTIC FINANCING (NET)	1810	2041	2294	
-1. NON-BANK	785	1010	1129	
-1) STOCK ISSUES	1800	650	660	
-1) TREASURY BILLS	378	746	818	
B) REPAYMENTS	-1433	- 438	- 389	
-2. BANK AND CSFC	1025	1025	1165	140
A) BANKING SYSTEM	1025	1025		
B) CSFC	0	0	- 133	HARROP

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

*file
Dissent +*

MEMORANDUM

May 4, 1977

sf

To: Theodore Moran
Policy Planning Staff

From:

B6

Subject: Attached Cable: "L.A. Sector Analysis Activities
and Support"

Attached for your information, is the subject cable, and my April 21 memo to Mary Ann Casey. I assume that, at the appropriate moment, I will be given the opportunity to communicate my views concerning what I perceive to be errors, oversights, and inconsistencies in the statement of "rationale", "mode of implementation", and other parts of the cable, particularly with respect to their bearing on the immediate and long-range issues of my April 11, 1977 Dissent Channel memorandum.

cc: Mary Ann Casey

RELEASE IN PART
B6



Washington, D.C. 20520

R. Smith

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 3, 1975

[Redacted]

Chief, Bangkok Operations Office
USAID/Laos

Dear [Redacted]:

I am writing at the request of the Secretary in response to your letter of December 3 to him in which you expressed your dissenting views with regard to US-Thai official relations.

Your letter has been read with a great deal of interest. Most of the comments and observations have received careful consideration; there is no fundamental disagreement with your basic recommendations. The Department shares the view that negotiations with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) must be conducted in a business-like manner. In this regard, I would like to emphasize we have never taken the position that "unless we do everything the RTG wants they will throw us out"; but in the conduct of our relations with Thailand, it has been necessary, on occasion, to recognize certain political and social realities which exist and require an accommodating policy.

Our dealings with the Express Transport Organization (ETO) provide an illustrative example of the problems we confront in Thailand. As you know, ETO is a government-sponsored operation with monopoly privileges in certain categories of land transportation, including sole right to haul US Government freight. Unfortunately, we have incurred extra costs as a result of our inability to contract with any trucking firm other than the ETO. We do not like to pay these extra costs and have made our disapproval known to the RTG. We have had to weigh the actual financial costs we incur against the potential political and other costs which might be involved in seeking to force removal of ETO's excess charges. To date, the conclusion has been that the latter far exceeds the former. However, we will--without identifying the source of our information--investigate the discrepancy which you indicate exists between what USAID/Laos pays

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and what the US military pays ETO for the same service over the same route. You may be sure that efforts will be undertaken to bring the latter into conformity with the USAID/Laos rate, if circumstances do warrant such action.

You also mentioned, as a second example of how to deal with the RTG, the successful negotiations of USAID/Laos in obtaining a Thai waiver of its export premium and taxes on US shipments of Thai rice in support of our program in Laos. We agree that this is an example of effective negotiation, and we will call it to the Embassy's attention as a useful precedent.

Again, I wish to thank you on the Secretary's behalf for your initiative in bringing these matters to our attention. It is through such actions that a stronger and more self-reliant foreign service can be created.

Sincerely,



Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

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Section 212 (a) 15 of the INA: Eliminating
Public Charges or the Working Poor?

RELEASE IN PART

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The Department's airgram of September 1, 1973 entitled "Determination of Public Charge" was a valiant attempt to instill some objectivity into the interpretation of Section 212 (a) 15 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Relying on "common sense" as had been urged by one Consul General had resulted in grossly different standards and refusal rates not only among posts in the same country but among officers at the same post, with the prevailing interpretation reflecting too often the personal prejudices and political philosophy of each officer. Disagreement by Junior Officers with whatever the prevailing view of the head of the visa section held, whether "liberal" or "conservative" resulted in negative sanctions in efficiency reports written by officers convinced that after twenty five years they were the law in the area. Veteran consular officers tended to feel that the upstart changing the section's refusal percentage was either unreasonable on one hand, or had no guts for enforcing the letter of the law on the other hand. This situation must have given potential immigrants the first impression that the United States government was just like the government of the country they were leaving, irrational and arbitrary. In this situation any attempt at rationality and consistency had been overdue since the proliferation of public assistance programs in the 1960's, and what follows is not meant to detract from the significance of the effort made by the Visa Office.

The September 1st airgram falls short in two areas. First, it does not allow for any sort of special status for the spouses of American citizens, a status which the drafting officer feels is constitutionally required by recent Supreme Court decisions. Second, the general income levels chosen are not related to any program which would make a person a public charge by the Department's own reasoning.

The privileged position of the marital union has been recognized by the Supreme Court in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut.¹ That case held that in placing restrictions on the use of birth control pills in a marital relationship the state was infringing on a "right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights." Although the case involved action by a State Government it is obvious that the same right would be held against the Federal Government in view of the invocation of the ninth amendment and Justice Harlan's description of the right as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." In the case of an immigrant

¹ 381 U.S. 479 (1968).

separated from an American citizen spouse on the basis of 212 (a) 15 of the INA, the state of marital privacy is not only being interfered with, it is being effectively destroyed. The only way the couple can exercise that right is for the U.S. citizen to leave the United States. The government must have an overwhelming interest in causing this separation, and the prospect of losing a few dollars on "welfare" would not provide that interest, even to a conservative Supreme Court, as shown by the position of Justice Harlan. We tend to forget in the case of IR spouses that there is now another person involved, an American citizen, who according to one view has literally become one flesh and one spirit with the immigrant before us.² The separation of spouses is the thing that understandably causes most of the Congressional correspondence on visas.

It seems possible that the Supreme Court would extend the Griswold rationale to the spouses of resident aliens under the rationale of Graham v. Richardson.³ Graham was a unanimous decision holding that any classification based on alienage, such as those based on nationality or race, was inherently suspect, thus indicating that any right given to alien spouses of American citizens would have to be granted to alien spouses of resident aliens. The specific holding of Graham was that a state could not deny welfare benefits to an alien on the basis of alienage, or even place residence requirements on the time an alien had to be in the state.

Whether or not spouses of resident aliens were recognized as having a fundamental right to be in the United States, certain classes of immigrants would remain who would not be given "equity" on the basis of a spouse in the United States. The rest of this paper is written on the assumption that these immigrants would be subject to the public charge provision of the INA. An attempt will be made to develop a standard which is more reasonable than the current "Table M" interagency poverty guidelines being used.

Section 212 (a) 15 has remained the principal basis for refusing an immigrant visa, in spite of the fact that the requirement of a Labor Certification under 212 (a) 14 has eliminated applicants without basic equity since 1965. Most

²During the past year the drafting officer was on LWOP and consequently would not have had sufficient resources to meet the Schedule M income guidelines to bring an alien non-English speaking wife into the U.S., an injustice which seems to greatly outweigh the cost of the public assistance which probably would have been needed if that situation had existed.

³403 U.S. 365 (1971).

consular desire to establish a high potential income standard comes from (1) a feeling that an alien who is eligible for any kind of assistance is a public charge, or from (2) an attempt to cut down on the number of illegals who subsequently immigrate on the basis of a family tie in the United States, by refusing to let an immigrant return to the low paying job he held while in the United States illegally. The first attitude is precluded by previous decisions of the VO, as will be developed below, and the second attitude is a classic case of barn-door closing post horse. In the second approach the consular officer may feel that the family tie was established as part of a scheme to evade the requirement for a Labor Certification. If this can be proven the visa should of course be refused. However, the refusal must be made explicit on this basis, not as an underlying rationale for setting a high income standard. It has not been proven that setting high standards for 212 (a) 15 has discouraged a single alien from crossing the border illegally. Even if the idea of having a child or acquiring a spouse in the United States exists in the back of an alien's mind, the overwhelming majority are not sophisticated enough in terms of our laws to think in terms of using that relationship to evade the public charge provision, and are simply coming looking for work. The reality is that several million illegals cross our border every year, that the problem will become worse as countries such as Mexico double their populations in the next twenty years, and that the illegals will keep coming in an increasing flood as long as our borders are not physically sealed off and sanctions applied against employers who hire the illegals. Less than ten percent of the illegals entering every year acquire any sort of family tie in the United States. Therefore even if this small percentage who show up at Consulates asking for IV's were totally shut out, the flood crossing and recrossing the borders would still go on. It is not rational, perhaps not constitutional, for consular officers to take out their justified outrage at illegal immigration by using one section of the INA as a punitive stick, aimed at a tiny minority of the actual malefactors.⁴

Most IV applicants will present a legitimate job offer at the first interview, often to return to the place where they were employed illegally, doing farm labor or washing dishes.

⁴This is not to deny that closing off illegal crossing completely would greatly reduce the number of legal immigrants. 2/3ds of the applicants in a sample done at Ciudad Juarez in November 1972 admitted having worked illegally in the U.S. If the "equity" were established while in the U.S. illegally in every case and illegal immigration were cut off entirely, then presumably family equity would be established only through legitimate intercourse across the border, and legal immigration from Mexico would be cut by 2/3ds.

When confronted by a consular request that they obtain a job offer paying them three dollars an hour rather than \$1.90 an hour, they will simply regard the request as another irrational demand of an unfeeling bureaucracy. This is a situation they confronted in their native country and they didn't really expect much different from the American Consul. No matter how many stories they heard about how tough it was to get "working papers", that hadn't stopped them from crossing the border illegally the first time. The prime object then was to work, unlike the second time when they cross again in search of a better job offer.

Obtaining a legitimate job offer to meet the Table M guidelines would be difficult enough if the applicants were legally present in the United States and could go personally to the job site. The first step will be to go back to the visa fixer who may be able to bribe someone in the personnel office of a company to write an employment letter at the appropriate salary. Among one small sample of job offers which the Consulate in Ciudad Juarez investigated two years ago, ninety percent turned out to have been written without the knowledge of the person who allegedly signed the letter. These services of course cost money, which will drive the applicants further into debt before they immigrate. If they cannot immediately obtain a letter they will probably cross into the United States again in search of a better job offer, or to earn money to pay the visa fixer. In addition to asking for a high job offer one consular officer of long experience in Mexico was in the habit of asking that the job offer be accompanied by an IRS-943, the employer's business income tax form, ostensibly to see that the applicant was being offered at least as much as half of the other employees were making and to check the job turn-over at the firm. Since most firms wish to protect the confidentiality of these forms this constituted another block in the aliens' path which usually blocked the issuance of a visa for six months or a year. When it was pointed out that this would only encourage fraud and drive the United States resident members of the family onto welfare in the absence of the breadwinner, the officer described the process as "a paper game." This thesis is an attempt to stop "playing paper games" with people's lives and develop public charge standards which both serve the legitimate interests of the United States Government and are fair to the immigrant.

The system would have reached the height of its absurdity in operation, if not in theory, had the Department ruled that recipients of food stamps were public charges. Food stamps or surplus commodities are given in every county in the United States, and fifty million Americans are currently eligible to receive them because the income standards are set so high.

The use of the food stamp net income guidelines as the public charge threshold would possibly have resulted in a ninety percent first interview refusal rate at a post like Ciudad Juarez, if the standards were applied rigorously and honestly by the interviewing officers. It is clear that such a refusal rate would lead to the collapse of a post's immigrant visa processing function, because of the number of repeat interviews generated, a flood of Congressional correspondence, and visits by irate relatives.

Some officers have felt that the "law" must be enforced no matter what and may in fact have been aiming for the type of crisis confrontation depicted above as a means of drawing attention to the illegal alien problem. It is possible that the courts would find the above process so unreasonable that they would establish their own definitions of "public charge". A more certain result would be Congressional action, either on a formal or informal level to initiate new guidelines. The Department has already shown an inclination to instill some fairness and concepts of due process into the interview process, even though it recognizes that aliens outside the United States have no rights under the United States Constitution. The new requirements for finding ineligibility under 212 (a) 19 (false documents) issued in the fall of 1972 and the Department's airgram of May 18, 1973 to all Mexican posts concerning Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) and Old Age Assistance point the way out of our dilemma.

Under the AFDC program, if the breadwinner is separated from a family with children, the family receives AFDC "welfare" payments in all states and is automatically eligible for food stamps. (Twenty-five states pay welfare (AFDC) even to united families with unemployed breadearners.) The result is that keeping an alien with natural or step-children separated from his family costs the government more money in twenty-five states than if he were admitted and did not work at all, as the reunification of the family would make the family ineligible for welfare in twenty-five states, no matter how low its income. The only universal income supplement program available is the Food Stamp program. The Department's May 18th airgram suggests that if the alien is going to one of the states where reunification of the family would make it ineligible for AFDC, the visa should be issued, if the applicant has a job offer sufficient to support himself without regard for capability of supporting the family. The Department has thus moved towards establishing a definition of public charge that does not regard someone who is working as a public charge, even though he is working at a sub-poverty level income when family size is considered.

Seen in this light, the Department's holding that recipients of AFDC are public charges, while recipients of food stamps are not, is not reasonable. Since the Department did not adopt the actual AFDC income guidelines, which are much higher than the Table M poverty guidelines actually adopted, it has indicated that it is not going to engage in the confrontation scenario of ninety percent refusal rates. In view of the holding that recipients of food stamps and public housing or rent supplements are not public charges, it is not logical to call recipients of AFDC, who likewise get federal money for food and housing, public charges. The money is coming out of the Federal Treasury in both cases, simply under programs with a different name. It would seem that an AFDC recipient should be regarded as a public charge only if he did not have sufficient income to meet needs other than those for his housing and food. This would entail setting public charge guidelines much lower than those in Table M.

The May 18th, 1973 Airgram also dealt with the problem of Old Age Assistance. I had pointed out in my airgram of January 31, 1973 that persons over sixty-five were eligible for Old Age Assistance no matter what the income of their sponsors if they themselves did not have an income of at least one hundred thirty dollars a month. Thus, nearly every elderly person joining his children in the United States is eligible for Old Age Assistance, even if the sponsors are millionaires, as relatives' income is not considered as part of the applicants' resources. Rather than making the impossible decision to completely cut off immigration of non-rich elderly people, the Visa Office agreed with my suggestion that we simply analyze the total situation and determine the likelihood of the immigrant making an application for welfare, and not simply reject him because he would be eligible for aid.

From these two decisions it is possible to see two principles emerging. One is that a person is not a public charge if he is receiving aid for his housing and food, but is working in attempt to provide himself with his other needs and as much of his subsistence needs as possible. The second is that, even in the face of theoretical eligibility for a program which has been designated as a public charge program, the consular officer must feel that the alien will actually make application for such a program. The problem in setting income standards is then to set standards which will not keep out an alien simply because he will theoretically be eligible for aid for that proportion of his income which will be allotted to housing and food. The Table M Interagency guidelines the Department has adopted represent a total standard of poverty which can be related in a rough way to eligibility for most of the federal assistance

programs. However, they act to exclude people who in fact will not receive any aid which would make them public charges. An example would be a Mexican family of four with an income of \$3,328 a year. They would be able to fulfill their food needs through the food stamp program and pay the rent through rent subsidies, thus not getting any aid from a program which made them public charges under the Visa Office's own decisions. If they were in a state which found it more feasible to pay them out of federal funds under the AFDC program it would not be consistent to say that receipt of money for their food and housing would make them public charges.

The Department's rationale for adopting Table M as a guideline is based on the popular idea that the welfare field is hopelessly complicated and that it would take a "qualified social worker" to determine welfare eligibility on a jurisdiction to jurisdiction basis. However, the Table M guidelines result in the exclusion of immigrants who are going to live in poverty in the United States, not people who are going to be public charges. While the major judicial decisions of the last fifty years are inconclusive as to who is a public charge under the immigration laws, they cannot possibly be used to justify excluding immigrants who are going to be poor for several years after they enter. Such a policy goes against the entire history of immigration in the United States, and what must have been the legitimate interests in the framers of the Immigration and Nationality Act when they inserted Section 212 (a) 15 in the Act. Further, as argued here, such a position is not logically required even by the internal logic of the Visa Office's recent decisions.

As shown in the table below, most of a family's AFDC money could be expected to go for food and housing, items which the Labor Department says should take up 50 percent of the total budget of a family of four with an \$8,181 gross annual income.

Summary of annual budget for an urban family of four ⁵			
Total Family consumption		6,580	% of Total Budget
Food	2,440		30
Housing	1,627		20
Transportation	563		7
Clothing	696		8
Personal Care	205		2
Medical Care	660		8
Other consumption (Entertainment etc.)	389		5
Other Items (Savings etc.)		385	5
Taxes		1,216	
Social Security	492		6
Income Tax	724		9
Total Budget		\$8,181.	\$100

⁵Adapted from Table A of U.S. Department of Labor USDL: 74-304, June 16, 1974. "Autumn 1973 Urban Family Budget".

Food and housing comprise sixty two percent of the consumption budget, that which is available for spending after taxes, savings and other similar items which are minimal or nonexistent for the newly immigrated family. In addition, the budget includes allowances for savings, gifts, life insurance, membership in group hospital and surgical plans, and a number of trips to doctors and dentists. Since these expenses are also minimized by immigrants it is apparent that easily over eighty percent of the budget of our typical poverty level immigrant may be used for food and lodging, items which are provided in non-public charge programs. For the sake of discussion, however, I will assume that fifty percent of the total budget of any size family in any geographic area will go for food and lodging. The following table is an adaption of the Table M figures currently being used, showing how much money different size families would have to earn to keep off AFDC to fill needs which they could not fill through food stamps or rent supplements.⁶ Excluding food or housing needs the threshold for AFDC is fifty percent of the poverty threshold.

Size of family	Poverty Threshold			
	Nonfarm	\$50	Farm	\$50
1	\$2,244	1122	1900	950
2	2,896	1448	2442	1221
3	3,552	1776	3020	1510
4	4,550	2275	3880	1940
5	5,368	2684	4575	2287
6	6,038	3019	5157	2578
7	7,426	3713	6310	3160

The minimum wage for industrial labor is now \$2.00 an hour (\$4,160 per annum), for service workers, \$1.90 (\$3,952 per annum), and for farm labor \$1.60 (\$3328 per annum). It would thus be virtually impossible for an employer to make a legal full time job offer that would not cover the fifty percent of an immigrant's income that could potentially be covered by AFDC or state supplemental benefits. However, it is entirely likely that use of the full Table M guidelines, without the suggested fifty percent deduction, will result in large numbers of non-English speaking immigrants, with

⁶Adapted and weighted with a ten percent cost of living increase from Department of Commerce Pub. 60 no. 86, Current Population Reports Series, "Consumer Income Characteristics of Low Income Population", Table M.

moderate size families, having their legitimate work offers at the minimum wage rejected.

The argument for using the Table M guidelines is that under the Federal plans of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled, each state has traditionally had power to decide who was eligible for the programs, and how much aid each person would get. In addition, each state has its own General Assistance welfare programs to supplement the federal programs, and these programs have different eligibility standards. Using one national poverty guideline is therefore seen as a means of avoiding having complex public charge thresholds for each of the states under 212 (a) 15. This problem as to aid to the aged, blind and disabled has been resolved because, since January 1974 these programs have been absorbed into a new Federally administered program called Supplemental Security Income. Under AFDC the only significant difference affecting 212 (a) 15 among state standards is the requirement in twenty-five states that the breadwinner abandon the family before the family is eligible for cash payments, and the Visa Office has already spoken to this issue in its May 18, 1973 airgram to all Mexican posts.⁷

The problem then remains as to the State General Assistance programs. Assuming that 212 (a) 15 requires the Federal government to define its immigration policies with regard to State welfare programs,⁸ it can be argued that, in spite of the complications, the Visa Office should develop separate public charge guidelines for each of the States. After all, we know it takes more to live in New York City than in a Texas border town as a "commuter alien." However, we are spared this problem by two generalizations which can be made about the States' programs. The first is that the State programs are supplemental to the Federal programs. Aid under the non-Federally supported General Assistance Programs comprised only 3.6 percent of the total for public assistance given in January 1974. Second, in every case the income standards are the same or more restricted than those of the Federally funded programs. Differences seem to come mainly in the payment of medical costs or in the evaluation of owned property. These exceptions can be handled on an individual basis under the Visa Office's guidelines on "rebuttable presumptions" of welfare eligibility.

⁷As far as the drafting officer knows this airgram, requiring the consular officer to inquire as to which state system the immigrant would be subject, was only sent to Mexican posts. If his suggestions had merit as stated in the Airgram, these instructions should be sent to all consular posts along with appropriate information to implement them.

⁸Graham, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), stated that the State laws conflicted with "overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government." State alien residency requirements "encroach upon exclusive federal power; "This holding may, analogy, eliminate the consideration of purely state programs under 212 (a) 15.

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Once we have escaped from the necessity of mechanically applying the eligibility standards under AFDC and General Assistance, our analysis can be framed in the context of an alien's contribution to our society versus the cost of having him here. A full time agricultural worker with a job offer at the minimum of \$3,328 p.a., and three dependents, will make a contribution to our society that outweighs the fact that he may buy low cost food with food stamps, or that a few "liberal" states such as New York or California may supplement his income out of state funds so he can pay his rent. Such people ought not to be considered public charges anymore than the widow on her Social Security pension. When one looks at the big picture, such a ruling seems totally inconsistent with our history and national spirit. The reunification of families and their work contribution to our society outweigh the cost of supplementing their incomes as they adjust to this country. Other countries, such as Australia and Sweden make nearly total support payments to the new immigrant. This is not an argument that we should abandon 212 (a) 15, but that we should not get hung up on technicalities of saying that someone who buys his food with Food Stamps is not a public charge, while someone who buys his groceries with AFDC cash is a public charge, when the money comes out of the same Treasury. Someone who is working on a full time job is making at least enough money to pay all of his other needs besides housing and food. The holding that anyone with a credible full time job offer is not a public charge would also put the Department more in line with the interpretation of 212 (a) 15 as administered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

References:

Department's Airgrams of May 18, 1973 to all Mexican posts, and September 1, 1973 to all Diplomatic and Consular posts
Consulate Ciudad Juarez' Airgram of January 31, 1973

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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/28/87 [] OR-E
TAGS: EFIN, CS
SUBJ: DISSENT CHANNEL: COSTA RICA, THE IMF... AND THE WOLF

REF: SAN JOSE 6078

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2. FOLLOWING IS A DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. DRAFTER IS []

3. REFTEL ARGUES THAT THE GOCR HAS FINALLY BITTEN THE EXCHANGE RATE BULLET AND AS A RESULT WE SHOULD PRESSURE THE IMF TO QUICKLY SEND YET ANOTHER FUND MISSION HERE IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESURRECT ITS EXTENDED FUND FACILITY AGREEMENT WITH COSTA RICA.

4. UNFORTUNATELY THE GOCR HAS NOT IN FACT FREED UP THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET BUT RATHER HAS MERELY INSTITUTED YET ANOTHER, DIFFERENT SCHEME TO HOLD THE DOLLAR/COLON EXCHANGE RATE AT UNREALISTICALLY LOW LEVELS -- OR IF POSSIBLE ACTUALLY BEGIN DRIVING IT DOWN. (A 40 TO ONE AND HIGHER EXCHANGE RATE IS NOT AT ALL UNREALISTIC IF EXPECTED NEAR-TERM INFLATION AND CAPITAL FLIGHT DEMAND ARE FACTORED IN, AS THEY MUST BE) AS OF 27 OCTOBER THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE "FREE BANK RATE" (30) AND THE TRUE FREE MARKET RATE WAS 2-3 COLONES/US DOLLAR AND GROWING. AND TO NO ONE'S SURPRISE THE STATE BANKS ARE NOT CAPTURING DOLLARS IN ANY SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY.

5. FEW IF ANY KNOWLEDGEABLE COSTA RICANS BELIEVE THE GOCR HAS FINALLY DECIDED TO ACQUIRE IN EVEN A REASONABLE CLEAN FLOAT, AND THE IMF -- POSSIBLY BEFORE ITS MISSION LANDS HERE, BUT CERTAINLY SOON AFTER -- WILL ITSELF REALIZE THAT THE CARAZO GOVERNMENT ISN'T YET RESIGNED TO REALITY. LACKING A LOCAL PRESENCE, THE IMF CLEARLY DEPENDS HEAVILY ON THE DEPT FOR ITS UNDERSTANDING OF THE GOCR'S ECONOMIC MANEUVERING. THEREFORE, WE SHOULD BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL NOT TO INADVERTENTLY MISLEAD FUND PERSONNEL ON THE CRUCIAL MATTER OF WHAT THE GOCR IS REALLY UP TO. IT WOULD PROVE HIGHLY EMBARRASSING (AND SERIOUSLY DAMAGING TO OUR CREDIBILITY) IF AGAIN WE PREVAIL ON THE IMF TO HURRIEDLY DISPATCH YET ANOTHER MISSION TO COSTA RICA ONLY TO HAVE IT FIND OUT ON ARRIVAL THAT THE GOCR STILL PERSISTS IN ITS HABITUAL AVOIDANCE OF PAINFUL REALITY.

6. ON A MORE BASIC LEVEL NEITHER A REVIVIFIED FUND AGREEMENT NOR ASSEMBLY PASSAGE OF A FORMAL DEVALUATION HAVE MUCH, IF ANYTHING, TO DO WITH ECONOMIC "RECOVERY" HERE. NOR IS THE CREDIT GUARANTEE IDEA MENTIONED AT THE END OF REFTEL PARA 9, A WISE OR WORKABLE IDEA. (THOSE FIRMS DESERVING A CREDIT GUARANTEE DON'T NEED ONE; THOSE WHICH DON'T ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO PAY AND THE GUARANTEE FUND WILL SOON BE DEPLETED WITH THE US TAXPAYER THE POORER.) AND FINALLY, OUR URGENT EFFORTS TO "SAVE" COSTA RICA ECONOMICALLY ARE NOT ONLY DOOMED BY THE NUMBERS AS ILLICID, BUT, WORSE, KEEP US FROM THE NECESSARY TASK OF CONSIDERING HOW TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF COSTA RICA'S UPCOMING UNAVOIDABLE ECONOMIC SEMI-COLLAPSE. REFTEL STATES THAT "WE'VE WAITED TO CRY WOLF UNTIL WE COULD COUNT THE HAIRS ON HIS NOSE". UNFORTUNATELY THE WOLF IS ALREADY IN THE DOOR.

THE ONLY JOB LEFT FOR US NOW IS TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THE RIGHT PEOPLE PICK UP THE PIECES -- AND THAT'S A POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC ENDEAVOR.

7. AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT. THAT COSTA RICA IS GOING TO HELL AND THAT THIS ENDANGERS SOME OF OUR CENTRAL POLITICAL AND SECURITY INTERESTS IS NO SECRET TO THE READERS OF THIS EMBASSY'S CABLES OVER THE PAST YEAR, IN THIS RESPECT, [] FOUR DISSENT MESSAGES HAVE DISCOVERED THE WHEEL. HE HAS NOT BEEN PRIVY TO THE EMBASSY'S SENSITIVE TRAFFIC -- PERHAPS PART OF THE PROBLEM -- BUT HE WAS OFFERED THE OPPORTUNITY TO READ RELEVANT EXDIS MESSAGES IN THE READING FILE AND DID NOT AVAIL HIMSELF OF THIS PROCEDURE. INCIDENTALLY, HIS DESCRIPTION OF EXCHANGE RATE BEHAVIOR IS INCORRECT, THOUGH IT COULD GO THAT WAY GIVEN THE GOCR'S EARLIER DEALING WITH THE EXCHANGE RATE AS THE EMPEROR DEALT WITH HIS NEW CLOTHES.

8. THE ANALYSIS ASIDE, A COUNSEL OF DESPAIR IS NOT A POLICY. IF WE STAND BY AND WATCH COSTA RICA GO SHASH WITHOUT MAKING EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO MITIGATE THE DAMAGE, TI WILL NOT BE LOST ON EITHER FRIENDS OR ENEMIES, MAKING IT MUCH EASIER FOR SOMEONE ELSE TO PICK UP THE PIECES.
MCNEIL

*Tom -
Believe for your account
also while Ambassador
for commenting on
this message.*

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RELEASE IN FULL

PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 159532

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STATE 159532

ORIGIN 10-14

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AMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY
AMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
AMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

Has been reported to all diplomatic posts July 15, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 159532

FOR SCRENSON FROM MAYNES
E.O. 11652-605

TAGS:PLAB, ILO

SUBJECT:U.S. POSITION ON THE ILO

REF: (A) GENEVA 5420; (B) STATE 145981

1. IN ANY FURTHER TALKS WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS ABOUT ILO, YOU SHOULD REFRAIN FROM VOLUNTEERING ASSESSMENTS OF SITUATION BUT FOLLOWING IS OUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT WHICH YOU MAY USE AS BACKGROUND.

A. WE OBVIOUSLY VERY DISAPPOINTED ABOUT JUNE 1977 CONFERENCE WHICH ROLLED BACK SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS MADE IN 18 MONTHS BEFORE AND DURING MARCH 1977 GOVERNING BODY MEETING. FROM YOUR REPORTS, HOWEVER, IT APPEARS MANY MISSIONS, WHICH DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THEIR DELEGATIONS' VIEWS OR VIEWS IN CAPITALS, HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD AND ARE DISTORTING U.S. POSITION AT CONFERENCE. WE ARE DISTURBED BY THIS BECAUSE WHETHER U.S. STAYS OR LEAVES ILO, IT ESSENTIAL FROM STANDPOINT OF UN SYSTEM AS WHOLE THAT WE NOT LOSE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN LAST TWO YEARS IN DRAWING ATTENTION OF GROWING NUMBER OF COUNTRIES TO UNHEALTHY TRENDS. SOME MISSIONS APPEAR TO BE SAYING THAT 1) U.S. HAD TOTALLY INFLEXIBLE BOTTOM LINE POSITION -- "EITHER SUPPORT ALL KEY U.S. POSITIONS WITH A MAJORITY VOTE OR U.S. WILL GET OUT"

AND 2) SINCE POSITION SO CATEGORICAL, OUTCOME WAS INEVITABLE. IN FACT, U.S. STEADFASTLY RESISTED OVER TWO YEAR PERIOD EFFORTS BY OTHERS TO FORCE US TO DRAW SUCH AN INFLEXIBLE BOTTOM LINE. AS STATED IN OUR FINAL CIRCULAR

TO ALL POSTS PRIOR TO JUNE 1977 CONFERENCE, "OUR PURPOSE IS NOT TO FORCE OUR VIEWS ON OTHERS BUT WITH THE BENEFIT OF THIS EXTRAORDINARY TWO-YEAR EFFORT AT CONSULTATION AND STUDY TO DETERMINE IF THERE REMAINS WITHIN THE ILO SUFFICIENT COMMUNITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE ILO AND OTHER MEMBERS OVER THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSES OF THE ILO." WE WERE NOT INSISTING ON VICTORY ACROSS THE BOARD BUT EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING MOMENTUM, SUSTAINED PROGRESS. WE WERE CONCERNED WITH PROGRESS IN CONCRETE FORM WHICH WOULD REFLECT MODIFICATION OF TRENDS ENUMERATED IN NOVEMBER 1977 LETTER.

B. AGAINST THIS STANDARD, THE HEARTENING ASPECT OF THE LAST TWO YEARS WAS CLEARLY THE AWAKENING OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED, DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES, WHICH COLLECTIVELY STOOD TOGETHER AS AT NO TIME IN THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING OUR LETTER OF INTENT TO WITHDRAW. WITH THIS GROUP OF COUNTRIES, THE LAST TWO YEARS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS "SUFFICIENT COMMUNITY OF INTEREST." A SENIOR AFL-CIO OFFICIAL, WHO FINDS CONFERENCE RESULTS UNACCEPTABLE, NEVERTHELESS REMARKS THAT IT WAS "NO MEAN ACHIEVEMENT" IN LIGHT OF THE PAST TO RALLY 135 VOTES FOR POSITIONS OF CRITICAL INTEREST TO AFL-CIO AND USG.

C. THE GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE JUNE CONFERENCE WAS THE RESPONSE OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, MANY OF WHOM HAD ASSURED US IN HIGH-LEVEL CONVERSATIONS IN CAPITALS THAT THEY WOULD WORK WITH THE US FOR A FAVORABLE RESOLUTION OF SOME OR ALL OF THE KEY ISSUES COMING BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOME -- CAMBODIA, HONDURAS, COLOMBIA, FIJI, NEPAL, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, JAMAICA, KENYA, SWAZILAND, SURINAM -- THIRD WORLD DELEGATIONS EITHER AVOIDED THE ISSUE BY ABSENTING THEMSELVES FROM THE DELEGATION HALL OR BY JOINING THE COMMUNIST AND ARAB COUNTRIES IN ABSTAINING, A PROCEDURAL DEVICE DESIGNED TO DEFEAT KEY ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE US. SOME OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHICH OPPOSED US IN JUNE 1977 IN AN OPEN BALLOT HAD IN FACT SUPPORTED US IN MARCH 1977 ON SOME ISSUES UNDER THE SECRET BALLOT RULE OF THE GOVERNING BODY.

D. CLEARLY THE RECORD OF THE JUNE CONFERENCE WILL BE A CENTRAL FACTOR IN FINAL US DECISION. HAD THE CONFERENCE BEEN SUCCESSFUL, GIVEN THE POSITIVE RECORD OF THE PAST TWO YEARS, THERE WOULD BE A CLEAR EXPECTATION THAT US

WOULD REMAIN IN THE ILO. BUT THE CONFERENCE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE STRONG SHOWING BY THE WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, TURNED OUT NEGATIVELY AND THE US IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING ITS OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ILO, INCLUDING THE COMPLETE RECORD OF LAST TWO YEARS.

E. REGARDING SOME IMEC (INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES) MISSION REPRESENTATIVES REPORTED "STATE OF SHOCK; AND MOUNTING FEARS THAT SOVIETS AND G-77 WILL NOW DOMINATE ILO FOR ANTI-WESTERN PURPOSES, THIS WILL DEPEND MORE ON POLICIES IMEC NOW DECIDE TO ADOPT THAN ON WHETHER US IN OR OUT. IF THERE IS AN IMEC RETREAT TO PASSIVE ATTITUDES PRIOR TO LAST TWO YEARS, THEN MOST EXTREME IMEC FEARS WILL BE REALIZED. BUT IF IMEC CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE ACTIONS THEIR COLLECTIVE INTEREST IN INSISTING THAT OTHER ILO MEMBERS ADHERE TO CERTAIN PRINCIPLES, THERE IS LESS REASON TO LOSE HEART. AFTER ALL, WITH OR WITHOUT US, IMEC COUNTRIES COLLECTIVELY CAN EXERT ENORMOUS INFLUENCE IN ILO. WITHOUT US THEY CONTRIBUTE APPROXIMATELY 40 PERCENT OF BUDGET. THEY CONTROL 6 OF 10 PERMANENT SEATS. THEY HAVE COLLECTIVE ABILITY TO VETO CHANGES IN ILO CONSTITUTION.

IN SHORT, IF IMEC COUNTRIES NOW MOVE BEYOND POLICY OF

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PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 159532

5. MERELY VOTING TOGETHER TO POLICY OF COORDINATED LOBBYING IN CAPITALS THERE IS NO REASON WHY SMALL CORE OF SUPPORT WITHIN THIRD WORLD CANNOT INCREASE IN SIZE. THIS POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING THIRD WORLD SUPPORT ASSUMES GREATER PROPORTIONS WHEN IT IS REALIZED THAT THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES CAN NO LONGER COUNT ON WHAT THEY PERCEIVED AS A STANDOFF BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE US TO FACILITATE ACHIEVEMENT OF THEIR OBJECTIVES IN THE ORGANIZATION. THIS COORDINATED LOBBYING IS IN IMEC INTERESTS REGARDLESS OF WHETHER US REMAINS A MEMBER. PRIOR TO JUNE 1977 CONFERENCE, ONLY US WAS WILLING TO MAKE ILO ISSUES MATTERS OF ITS BILATERAL DIPLOMACY. LESSON OF JUNE 1977 SHOULD NOT BE THAT WEST CANNOT WIN BUT THAT ONE COUNTRY -- THE US -- WORKING ALONE CAN DO A GREAT DEAL BUT NOT ENOUGH. TOGETHER, HOWEVER, THE IMEC COUNTRIES COULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE. WHETHER THE IMEC COUNTRIES NOW COALESCE AND WORK TOGETHER WILL, IN FACT, DETERMINE WHETHER ILO REMAINS AN INSTITUTION IN THE FUTURE THAT DEMOCRATIC STATES WISH TO REMAIN IN, OR ASSOCIATE WITH.

6. THERE ARE, AS THE MISSION UNDERScores, DIFFERENT VALUE SYSTEMS AT WORK IN THE ILO. THESE ARE DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE. BUT THIS IS A PROBLEM THE IMEC COUNTRIES FACE IN EVERY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION. ELSEWHERE THEY HAVE FOUND THAT COALITIONS THAT SEEM MONOLITHIC OR BEYOND

INFLUENCE CAN CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP OR DIRECTION. WITH OR WITHOUT THE US, THIS CAN HAPPEN IN THE ILO. THIS DOES NOT REQUIRE CONFRONTATION WITH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BUT ENGAGED COORDINATED DIPLOMACY, SOMETHING THUS FAR LACKING. IN THIS REGARD, WHATEVER FINAL US DECISION, ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS ILO IN FUTURE WILL NECESSARILY REFLECT WHAT IT SEES. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS CRITICAL NOT TO RETURN TO PRE-1975 POLICIES.

2. WHEN APPROPRIATE, YOU MAY POINT OUT TO IMEC DELEGATIONS THAT US DELEGATE MCGROVITZ PROMISED THAT US WOULD CONSULT WITH IMEC BEFORE ANNOUNCEMENT OF US DECISION. VANCE

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Room 5254A
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear :

Thank you very much for sending the Department your views, in Tel Aviv's 3305 of 19 June 1974, about PL 480 sales to Israel. Your use of the Dissent Channel to register views is especially appreciated. We deeply regret that our tardiness prevented this reply from reaching you while you were still in Tel Aviv.

Your message made the point that "Israel's increasing prosperity has progressively eroded Israel's case" for PL 480 assistance since its per capita GNP is relatively high and because it is receiving substantial amounts of assistance of other kinds.

The Department understands your reasoning, but believes, on the other hand, that PL 480 assistance had helped maintain Israel's healthy balance of payments position while facilitating security purchases of military equipment on the civilian market abroad. Moreover, the Department believes that Israel does have need of food assistance.

It is clear that the policy issues you raised are relevant beyond the immediate context in which you raised them, and this enhanced the value of your raising them. I am pleased that you and a member of my staff have had an opportunity to discuss these matters directly, particularly since this gave us an opportunity more fully to appreciate your views.

In view of your conversation here, I understand that you consider further substantive response to your message unnecessary. I should, however, like again to express my thanks for sending us your views.

Sincerely,

Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff

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Drafted: S/P:GSAustin:vb
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART B6

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July 16, 1974

[Redacted]

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear [Redacted]

Thank you for your letter of July 11, 1974 to Mr. Lord as well as for your dissent message on the subject of a proposed sale of a second DC-8 to Gabon.

We note that your position was endorsed in the AF memorandum to the Secretary (S/S 7412693) which you codrafted and which went forward with the date of July 11, 1974.

I am herewith returning your material to you since your recommendation that the issue be reviewed through the Dissent Channel prior to its submission to the Secretary was overtaken by the AF memorandum. If the position you prefer is not chosen, you of course have the option of submitting a new dissent message.

Thank you once again for your initiative in making use of this important policy mechanism.

Sincerely,

Peter B. Swiers
Special Assistant to the Director
Policy Planning Staff

- cc: AF - Mr. Reams
- OFP - Ms. Vogelgesang
- P - Mr. Djerejian
- S - Mr. Gompert
- S/S - Mr. Springsteen

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ACTION SP-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6978

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DISSENT CHANNEL////////////////////////////////////

E.O. 11652: GDS
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY
 ACTING AID DIRECTOR
KEVIN O'DONNELL CONCURS IN THIS DISSENTING VIEW.

2. SUMMARY. USG SHOULD NOT ONLY RETAIN EMBARGO ON SUBCONTINENT BUT ADOPT SIMILAR EMBARGO POLICY WITH RESPECT TO COUNTRIES AND REGIONS WHERE PRIMARY US INTEREST IS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. AMONG OTHER NEGATIVE EFFECTS, IDENTIFICATION OF USG WITH ARMS SALES TO POOR COUNTRIES TENDS TO: (1) ENHANCE STATUS OF MILITARY OVER CIVILIAN OFFICIALS; (2) ENCOURAGE "GUNS" OVER "BUTTER" DECISION-MAKING; (3) DEMORALIZE DEVELOPMENT-MINDED ELEMENTS OF BUREAUCRACY; AND (4) ASSOCIATE USG WITH POSSIBLE LATER USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST DISSIDENT POPULATION OR FRIENDLY COUNTRY. CURRENT ISSUE OVER ARMS TO PAKISTAN OUGHT TO RAISE BROADER QUESTION OF "WHY SELL ARMS TO ANY POOR COUNTRY" RATHER THAN NARROWER ONE OF "WHY TREAT PAKISTAN AS SOLE EXCEPTION TO WORLDWIDE SALES POLICY." END SUMMARY.

3. PUTTING TO ONE SIDE POSSIBLE ADVSE EFFECTS ON INDO-US RELATIONS, INDO-PAK RAPPROCHEMENT AND REGIONAL TRANQUILITY (WHICH I ASSUME HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED BY US POLICY MAKERS), RESUMPTION OF US ARMS SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN RAISES A BROADER QUESTION OF POLICY WHICH MAY NOT HAVE RECEIVED THE A ATTENTION IT DESERVES. SIMPLY PUT, WHY SHOULD WE SUPPLY ARMS TO ANY COUNTRY IN WHICH OUR PRIMARY INTEREST IS DEVELOPMENTAL

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RATHER THAN POLITICAL-SECURITY ORIENTED? THE "CURIOUS" EXCEPTION TO WORLDWIDE USG ARMS SUPPLY POLICY WHICH THE SECRETARY NOTED WITH RESPECT TO PAKISTAN QUESTIONS THE WISDOM OF THE GENERAL RULE AS WELL AS THE RATIONALE OF THE SOLE EXCEPTION, WHAT IS THE REASON FOR PERMITTING US SALES OF SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO COUNTRIES WITH PREDOMINATELY POOR POPULATIONS?

-- TO SUPPORT THEIR LEADERS VIS-A-VIS IMPATIENT GENERALS, UNSOUND. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT ANY HARDWARE ONLY WHETS THE MILITARY APPETITE FOR MORE AND NEWER ITEMS. WITH RESPECT TO PAKISTAN, I WOULD JUDGE THAT MR. BHUTTO HAS ENHANCED HIS POWER MORE BY CLIPPING GENERALS' WINGS AT CRITICAL POINTS THAN BY TRYING TO "SATISFY" THEM. IF THIS IS SO, WE MAY BE DOING BHUTTO ULTIMATELY A GREATER SERVICE BY DENYING ARMS THAN BY SUPPLYING THEM.

-- TO PROVIDE MERELY WHAT OTHERS WOULD DO IF WE DIDN'T, AGAIN UNSOUND. ANY POPPY GROWING ASIA COUNTRY COULD MAKE THE SAME STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPIUM TRADE. WHERE IS THE EVIDENCE THAT POOR COUNTRIES WOULD BUY ELSEWHERE TO THE SAME EXTENT AND TO THE SAME DEGREE OF SOPHISTICATION IF WE REFUSED TO SELL? IN ANY EVENT THE ARGUMENT OVERLOOKS THE POTENTIAL EMBARRASSMENT OF HAVING US ARMS DEPLOYED AGAINST A DISSIDENT CITIZENRY OR A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY FRIENDLY TO THE US.

-- TO EARN NEEDED FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR THE UNITED STATES. LET US HOPE THAT OUR NATIONAL FORTUNES HAVE NOT SUNK TO THE POINT THAT THEY DEPEND UPON TRAFFIC IN LETHAL WEAPONRY. BUT IF THEY HAVE, LET US BE HONEST ENOUGH TO OURSELVES TO STATE THE CASE OPENLY.

4. AGAINST THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM CITED ABOVE, I SEE AT LEAST FOUR IMPORTANT REASONS FOR EXTENDING THE ARMS SALE EMBARGO POLICY TO ALL COUNTRIES IN WHICH OUR PRIMARY INTEREST IS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS OPPOSED TO POLITICAL-SECURITY:

A. ARMS SALES TEND TO ENHANCE THE STATUS OF MILITARY AS OPPOSED TO CIVILIAN LEADERS. AS THE GENERALS' INTERNAL POWER AND PRESTIGE INCREASE SO DOES THE RISK OF COUPS, MILITARY ADVENTURISM AND REPRESSION. WHILE WE CANNOT - SHORT OF ARMSFREE ZONE CONVENTIONS - PREVENT ALL THIS FROM HAPPENING, WE DON'T HAVE TO

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ASSOCIATE WITH IT.

B. ARMS SALES TEND TO ENCOURAGE "GUNS" OVER "BUTTER" DECISION MAKING, THEREBY REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR AID PROGRAM AND THWARTING OUR DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES. ONE WONDERS WHAT THE "SPREAD EFFECTS" ARE IN A POOR COUNTRY FOR EACH NEW ITEM OF MILITARY HARDWARE. CERTAINLY THE LOCAL COSTS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT AND UTILIZE IMPORTED ARMS REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT DRAIN ON RESOURCES OTHERWISE AVAILABLE FOR DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES.

C. ARMS SALES TEND TO DEMORALIZE DEVELOPMENT-MINDED SEGMENTS OF THE BUREAUCRACY. IN MOST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES A NUMBER OF DEDICATED OFFICIALS AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT WORK HARD TO GET RATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES THROUGH THEIR BUREAUCRATIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS. WE SUPPORT THEIR EFFORTS WITH DEVELOPMENT AID; WE UNDERCUT THEM WITH ARMS SALES.

D. ARMS SALES TEND TO EMBARRASS US (MORALLY AND POLITICALLY) WHEN US ARMS ARE USED AGAINST FRIENDLY NATIONS OR AGAINST THE RECIPIENT'S OWN PEOPLE. RECENT HISTORY IN THE SUBCONTINENT IS PROOF ENOUGH OF THAT FACT.

5. FOR THESE REASONS, I RECOMMEND THAT ANY FINAL DECISION TO RELAX THE ARMS SALE EMBARGO IN THE SUBCONTINENT BE DELAYED UNTIL THE BROADER QUESTION OF ARMS SALES TO POOR COUNTRIES IN GENERAL IS CAREFULLY REVIEWED. I WOULD HOPE THAT IN THE PROCESS OF REVIEW, SOME RATIONAL CRITERIA FOR US ARMS SUPPLY POLICY WORLDWIDE WOULD EMERGE.
SCHNEIDER

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ASUNCI 01499 02 OF 02 141619Z

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ACTION SS-14

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8375

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 ASUNCI 1499

DISSENT CHANNEL

III. EMBASSY BE INSTRUCTED INFORM GOP NOT LATER THAN JUNE 26 THAT AMBASSADOR WILL NOT RETURN IN EVENT RICORD EXTRADITION CASE NOT FAVORABLE RESOLVED BY THEN. RECOMMENDED ACTION BEFORE AUGUST 1;

IV. EMBASSY BE INSTRUCTED MAKE CLEAR TO GOP DURING JULY THAT UNLESS DRUG LAW PASSED, RICORD EXTRADITED, AND 1961 SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTICS AMENDMENTS SIGNED, U.S. WILL BEGIN PHASE OUT MILGP, AID ASSISTANCE, AND SALES OR GRANTS MATERIEL.

V. THAT IF DRUG LAW PASSED AND RICORD EXTRADITED DURING JULY, EMBASSY BE AUTHORIZED OFFER BNDD ADVISOR TO MINISTRY OF HEALTH FOR IMPLEMENTATION DRUG LAW, AND OFFER SHARE COSTS OF EQUIPPING POLICE NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION UNIT ALONG LINES REF. (B) PAGE 10.

9. PHASE TWO: THREE RECOMMENDATIONS DESIGNED TO EXTRACT BENEFITS FROM GOP FAILURE TO COOPERATE, BASED ON OUR ESTIMATE OF USG GLOBAL STRATEGY IN FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS AND POSITION OF PARAGUAY WITHIN STRATEGY.

10. IF PARAGUAY REMAINS UNCOOPERATIVE, U.S. INTERESTS MIGHT BEST BE SERVED BY DECISIVE STEPS AGAINST PARAGUAY, WHICH OFFERS OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE MEASURES AT MINIMUM COST TO U.S. INTERESTS AND, PERHAPS, WITH POLITICAL BENEFIT. MOREOVER, FAILURE TO TAKE MEASURES IN FACE PARAGUAYAN INTRANSIGENCE CAN BE INTERPRETED IN FOREIGN CAPITALS AS RELUCTANCE ON PART USG TO UTILIZE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ASUNCI 01499 02 OF 02 141619Z

AVAILABLE MEANS TO ENCOURAGE COOPERATION. WE DOUBT THAT USG WILL BE ABLE TO SPEAK WITH CREDIBILITY IN PROBLEM COUNTRIES IN WHICH IT HAS IMPORTANT STRATEGIC INTERESTS IF IT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE ITS RESOLVE IN PARAGUAY. IF THIS ANALYSIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OVERALL USG VIEW, WE RECOMMEND FOLLOWING:

I. IF GOP HAS NOT TAKEN SATISFACTORY ACTION ON INITIATIVES IN PHASE ONE BY SEPTEMBER 1, EMBASSY BE INSTRUCTED TO ADVISE GOP THAT UNDER PROVISIONS OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PARAGUAY HAS BEEN FOUND UNCOOPERATIVE AND THAT PRESENTLY PROGRAMMED MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WILL BE DISCONTINUED AND RESUMPTION NOT RECONSIDERED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS GOP DEMONSTRATES TO SATISFACTION OF USG ITS FULL AND WILLING COOPERATION.

II. USG SHOULD RAISE ISSUE OF PARAGUAYAN COMPLACENCY ABOUT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IN APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL FORUMS OF WHICH BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE MEMBER.

III. GOP REQUESTS FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL LENDING AGENCIES IN WHICH USG HAS VOICE SHOULD BE GIVEN "SPECIAL" CONSIDERATION AND U.S. CONCURRENCE ONLY ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS.

GP-3. BREWIN

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C	P	IO	TO : Department of State			HANDLING INDICATOR		
L	POB	AID	Dissemination - SECRET					
GR	CON	FRD	FROM : Amembassy BELGRADE			DATE: February 24, 1973		
HT	LAD	TAR	SUBJECT : Dissent Message					
R	AMB	AIR	REF : A-3559					
NAVY	CIA	NAVY	DISSENT CHANNEL					
SD	USIA	NSA	THIS airgram transmits a dissenting view submitted by [redacted] Chief of the Consular Section.					

COPY TO: [redacted]

A Policy Initiative--Elimination of Section 212(a)(28)(c) from the Immigration and Nationality Act

I urge the Department to take an active and vigorous lead within the Administration to formulate and have introduced an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act eliminating Section 212(a)(28)(c)--in essence, membership in a communist party or its affiliates--as a ground of ineligibility to receive a visa to the United States.

This section of the law which was born in the traumatic times of the early 1950's has outlived whatever usefulness it may have had. If it need be pointed out, one has to look only to the past year to see how dramatically and wisely our policy has changed toward those who are by definition "excludable"--along with, I might add, criminals, carriers of communicable diseases and prostitutes.

Furthermore, this section of the law has little effect in practice, thanks to pragmatic administrative measures which get around its awkward and untoward effects. For example, waivers are wisely and routinely granted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to permit members of communist parties to enter the United States as nonimmigrants. In addition, the Department of State humanely reaches findings of "involuntariness" in immigrant visa applications so regularly as to be almost pro forma.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Classified by: [redacted] Date: 2/7/73
 Classification Approved by: [redacted]

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Belgrade A-132

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Beyond this, there is of course a persuasive body of thinking which argues that the exclusion from the United States of persons for the political beliefs they hold is disharmonious in the extreme with the philosophy of our Republic.

Therefore, at a time when I assure we are seeking bold, new ways to build mutual confidence in our greatly improving relations with the socialist countries, I believe that striking this anachronism from our laws (a) would be in our national interest, (b) would constitute no danger to our security, (c) would be truer to our national precepts, (d) would eliminate the costly and patently bureaucratic "waiver process", and (e) could have a profound symbolic effect in our relations with Eastern Europe and the world.

While I have held this belief for some time, it is in the euphoria of peace, in the spirit of the realistic and indeed inspiring foreign policy of this Administration, and emboldened by the anguish of having to apply daily this sorry statute that I offer my policy-making contribution--which dissents with our law--from this admittedly narrow vantage point in the Balkans.

E.O. 11652: GDS



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4/28/77 EXT 26279
LA/DR: CWEINBERG

USDA: MFOX (PHONE)
LA/DR/RD: DCHAIJ (DRAFT)
LA/DR: WSIGLER (DRAFT)
LA/DP: DERBE (DRAFT)

BUCEN/RSSA: RBARTRAM (PHONE)
LA/DR/EST: HLUSK (DRAFT)
LA/DR: MBROUN (DRAFT)

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E.O. 11652: N/A

CU
JR

TAGS:

SUBJECT: L.A. SECTOR ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES AND SUPPORT

REF: STATE 071533

1. SUMMARY: ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE FORMERLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECTOR ANALYSIS DIVISION OF LA/DR ARE BEING DECENTRALIZED. THIS DIVISION WILL CEASE TO EXIST AND PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES, WHEN THEY ARE UNDERTAKEN, WILL NOW REST WITH THE MISSIONS. APPROPRIATE BACKSTOPPING IN AGRICULTURE, EDUCATION AND HEALTH/NUTRITION WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES, AND HEALTH AND NUTRITION DIVISIONS OF LA/DR, RESPECTIVELY. BACKSTOPPING FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE MULTISECTORAL ACTIVITIES DIVISION.

AS A RESULT OF THIS SHIFT, IN-COUNTRY ACTIVITIES OF BUCEN WILL BE COVERED UNDER MISSION-FUNDED PASAS RATHER THAN CENTRALLY FUNDED RSSA. MISSIONS SHOULD THEREFORE INCLUDE NEEDS FOR FY 78 AND BEYOND IN THE FY 79 ADS SUBMISSION. IN ADDITION BUCEN WOULD LIKE TO DETERMINE EXTENT TO WHICH MISSIONS PLAN TO USE ITS SERVICES IN ORDER TO ESTIMATE FY 78 MANPOWER COMMITMENTS.

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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

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2. DECENTRALIZATION OF SECTOR ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES:

A. RATIONALE. WITH THE EXPERIENCE ACCRUED DURING THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS AND THE MATURATION OF APPROACHES TO SECTOR ANALYSIS, THE OBJECTIVES OF THE DECENTRALIZATION ARE TO:

1) IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY OF SECTOR ANALYSIS WORK BY PLACING THE MANAGEMENT AND PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MISSIONS WHERE THE PROJECT AND RELATED FIELDWORK ARE ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT;

2) IMPROVE INTEGRATION OF SECTOR ANALYTIC WORK WITH OTHER MISSION AND BUREAU DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES, THEREBY INCREASING THE IMPACT OF SECTOR ANALYSIS ON PROGRAMMING AND IMPLEMENTATION; AND

3) PROJECTIZE SECTOR ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES TO STRENGTHEN HOST-COUNTRY INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITIES IN DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND SECTOR PLANNING.

B. MODE OF IMPLEMENTATION. FUTURE SECTOR ANALYSIS PROJECTS, WHEN THEY ARE UNDERTAKEN, WILL BE IMPLEMENTED BY HOST COUNTRIES AND USAIDS. ASSISTANCE IN DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND MONITORING OF IMPLEMENTATION WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE TECHNICAL DIVISIONS OF LA/DR BUT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECTS WILL BE BUDGETED BY AND BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MISSIONS. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS REASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY, LA/DR/SA WILL CEASE TO EXIST AND THE CENTRALLY FUNDED SECTOR ANALYSIS SUPPORT PROJECT, AS A VEHICLE FOR FINANCING THE PERSONNEL AND COMPUTER COSTS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT SECTOR ANALYSIS WORK, WILL BE PHASED OUT. REQUISITE TECHNICAL SERVICE REQUIREMENTS FOR SECTOR ANALYSIS PROJECTS IN THE FUTURE WILL BE ACQUIRED THROUGH MISSION CONTRACTS WITH LOCAL OR U.S. PRIVATE FIRMS, MULTI-LATERAL INSTITUTIONS OR PASA ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE, FOR FY 78 AND BEYOND MISSIONS SHOULD COMMUNICATE THEIR NEEDS FOR SECTOR ANALYSIS PROJECTS THROUGH THE NORMAL FY 79 ADS/ CONGRESSIONAL PROCESSES UNDER THESE REVISED PROCEDURES.

3. SECTOR ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS SUPPORT:

A. AGRICULTURE. NEW GUIDELINES FOR FULFILLING DAP II REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPANDED AND UPDATED AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ASSESSMENTS WERE POUCHED TO THE MISSIONS ON MARCH 28, 1977.

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1977. AS PER REFTEL, LEVELS OF EFFORT WHICH ARE RECOMMENDED TO IMPLEMENT THE GUIDELINES VARY AMONG COUNTRIES. FOR ALL ASSESSMENT LEVELS, TECHNICAL BACKSTOPPING IN DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION WILL BE AVAILABLE FROM LA/DR/RD. (DETAILS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THIS SUPPORT CAPABILITY WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE MISSIONS WHEN FINALIZED). FOR DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSESSMENT-RELATED ACTIVITIES, MISSIONS WILL CONTRACT WITH APPROPRIATE SOURCES AND MAY WISH TO CONSIDER MISSION-FUNDED PASA ARRANGEMENTS WITH USDA OR BUCEN, PARTICULARLY IN LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS IN WHICH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HOST-COUNTRY STATISTICAL AND ANALYTICAL CAPACITY IS A CENTRAL COMPONENT.

B. OTHER SECTORS. SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECTOR ASSESSMENT/ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES HAVE NOT YET BEEN FORMALIZED FOR OTHER SECTORS. IN THE SHORT RUN, HOWEVER, LIMITED TDY ASSISTANCE FROM LA/DR WILL BE AVAILABLE. IN ANY EVENT, MISSIONS SHOULD BUDGET FULLY IN THE FY 79 AOS IF SECTOR ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE UNDERTAKEN. BOTH BACKSTOPPING AND IMPLEMENTATION SERVICES ARE OBTAINABLE FROM BUCEN (SEE BELOW) UNDER MISSION-FUNDED PASA ARRANGEMENTS.

4. SERVICES AVAILABLE FROM BUCEN: THE REGIONAL STAFF OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL PROGRAMS CENTER OF BUCEN WAS CREATED IN RESPONSE TO A.I.D. REQUESTS FOR PROGRAM- AND PROJECT-ORIENTED STATISTICAL ASSISTANCE. THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 40 PERMANENT STAFF MEMBERS IN THIS GROUP WHO ARE ABLE TO CALL ON THE FULL RANGE OF TALENTS AND EXPERIENCE IN THE REST OF BUCEN. THROUGH DIRECT ARRANGEMENTS WITH MISSIONS, THIS STAFF CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT OF SECTOR ANALYSIS WORK AND TO ADDRESS OTHER MISSION PROBLEMS REQUIRING DATA COLLECTION, DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS EXPERTISE.

A PARTIAL LIST OF SERVICES CURRENTLY BEING PROVIDED TO AID BY THIS GROUP IS: COLLECTION AND COMPILATION OF EXISTING DATA, SAMPLE AND SURVEY DESIGN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, PROGRAM AND PROJECT EVALUATION, FORMS AND QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN, PUBLICATION PREPARATION, SURVEY METHODOLOGY, STATISTICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS, TRAINING IN SURVEY AND CENSUS METHODOLOGY, PREPARATION OF TRAINING MATERIALS, COMPUTER PROGRAMMING, USAGE OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE PACKAGES, STATISTICAL AND DATA PROCESSING CONSULTATION, TRAINING IN DATA PROCESSING, AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATISTICAL PROCESSES. BUCEN HAS ALSO DEVELOPED A SERIES OF PLANNING MODELS THAT REQUIRE ONLY ONE TO TWO-WEEK SEMINARS TO INSTALL. THEY INCLUDE DEMOGRAPHIC

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ANALYSIS, POPULATION PROJECTS, EDUCATION, LABOR FORCE,
HEALTH AND HOUSING SERVICES PROJECTIONS.

TRAINING AND DOCUMENT PREPARATION IS DONE IN SPANISH AND
ENGLISH, EITHER IN WASHINGTON OR IN THE HOST COUNTRY.
DATA PROCESSING IS CARRIED OUT EITHER ON HOST COUNTRY
EQUIPMENT OR AT THE LARGE FACILITY AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON
—OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH. BUCEN HAS ASSISTED
-- OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH. BUCEN HAS ASSISTED IN THE
AREAS OF AGRICULTURE, EDUCATION, HEALTH, NUTRITION, RURAL
DEVELOPMENT, WATER, RURAL ELECTRIFICATION, AND DEMOGRAPHY.
IN ADDITION TO SECTOR ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES, THE BUCEN
GROUP HAS UNDERTAKEN OR ASSISTED WITH HOUSEHOLD SAMPLE
SURVEYS, PROJECT EVALUATIONS, AND TECHNICAL ADVISORY
SERVICES TO MISSIONS FOR ON-GOING STATISTICAL WORK BEING
DONE BY HOST COUNTRY AGENCIES AND/OR PRIVATE CONTRACTORS.

A PRELIMINARY MISSION RESPONSE WILL ASSIST AID/W AND BUCEN
IN DISCUSSING FUTURE BUCEN ASSISTANCE AND THE SIZE OF
REGIONAL STAFF REQUIRED TO MEET FIELD REQUIREMENTS IN
FY 78 AND BEYOND. PLEASE CABLE LA/DR WITHIN TWO WEEKS,
IF POSSIBLE, THE TECHNICAL AREAS IN WHICH THE MISSION
POSSIBLY HAS NEED FOR THE ABOVE-MENTIONED BUCEN SERVICES
AND THE AMOUNT AND TYPE OF SERVICES REQUIRED. WE TDYS CAN
BE ARRANGED TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES IF SO DESIRED. YY


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ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES:

LA/CAR, WRHODES, JLOCKARD, HBUCKLEY (DRAFT)
LA/SA, RUEBER, JEYRE, DROGERS, MKRANZ (DRAFT)
LA/CEN, RDEVIVERO, ECARTER, TMEHEN, PFARLEY (DRAFT)
LA/PAH, HMARWITZ (DRAFT)

CABLEROOM-SEND TO ALL COUNTRIES ON LIST-L EXCEPT:

MEXICO



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S/P:JAARZT:BDM
6-3-76 EXT. 29716
S/P:JAARZT

S/P-OFP:PJLYDON {DRAFT}

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE ABU DHABI

DISSENT CHANNEL
FOR AMBASSADOR [] ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINS, SU

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: ABU DHABI 1447

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE SUPPORTING []
[]'S DISSENT MESSAGE ON PRESIDENT NIMEIRI'S OFFICIAL
VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. WE HAVE INFORMED []
THAT MR. DONALD PETERSON OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF
HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE
REPLY. WE COMMEND BOTH YOUR AND HIS USE OF THE DISSENT
CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO
THE VIEWS YOU HAVE EXPRESSED. YY

JAA/B6
JAA

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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S/P:MELY:HE
X-22562 5/13/76
S/P:RBARTHOLOMEW, ACTING

EUR/EE - MR. ANDREWS {SUBS}
S/P - MR. P. LYDON

C - MR. J. MONTGOMERY

IMMEDIATE BUCHAREST

State 119702

DISSENT CHANNEL
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM S/P - REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW, ACTING

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EEWT, ETRD, US, RO

SUBJECT: US-ROMANIAN LONG-TERM COOPERATION AGREEMENT

REFS: {A} BUCHAREST 2463; {B} STATE 117020; {C} BUCHAREST 2704 {ALL DISSENT CHANNEL}

RB
ME *AK*
EUR *AK*
C *AK*
S/P *AK*

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE IT HAS BEEN PROPOSED IN THE DISSENT CHANNEL THAT THE US OBJECTIVES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE US-ROMANIAN LONG-TERM COOPERATION AGREEMENT BE SHIFTED FORWARD OBTAINING CONCESSIONS FROM THE GOR ON OBTAINING INFORMATION ESSENTIAL FOR BUSINESS DECISIONS AND BETTER ACCESS TO ROMANIANS FOR BUSINESSMEN.

2. WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS ALREADY WELL UNDERWAY {BUCHAREST 2653} AND WITH ANY CHANGE OF INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRING INTERAGENCY CLEARANCE WE RECOGNIZE THAT IT MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE OR DESIRABLE TO REOPEN NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, WE SEEK YOUR VIEWS AS TO WHETHER {1} YOU BELIEVE: THE TWO POINTS RAISED ARE NEGOTIABLE, EITHER IN THESE OR SOME SUCCEEDING DISCUSSIONS; {2} IF SO, SHOULD THEY BE INTRODUCED, AND WHEN. WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE {3} WHETHER SOME LANGUAGE COULD BE FOUND, SHORT OF A BINDING COMMITMENT WHICH MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN, WHICH COULD BE USED

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ON THE GOR TO FLAG THESE ISSUES AND GIVE US A BETTER BASIS ON WHICH TO PROTEST TO THEM.

3. IN ORDER TO GET THIS EXCHANGE ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS OUT OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL, SUGGEST YOU REPLY IN NORMAL CHANNEL (WITHOUT REFERENCES TO THIS MSG). RECAPITULATING THE TWO POINTS AND GIVING US YOUR VIEWS. YY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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B6

October 18, 1978

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MEMORANDUM

TO : INR/RNA/NE -

FROM : S/P - Paul H. Kreisberg, Acting *PH*

SUBJECT : Your Dissent Channel Message on Syria

B6

This will acknowledge receipt of your dissent channel message entitled "The U.S. and Syria: The Special Relationship Crumbles." I have designated William Kirby of the Policy Planning Staff as coordinator in charge of a substantive response. In accordance with Dissent Channel procedures and your express wishes, your memo is being distributed to the following: the Office of: the Secretary, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Executive Secretary of the Department, the Chairman of the Secretary's Open Forum, the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, the Director of NEA/ARN, and Ambassador Seelye in Damascus. I commend your use of the Dissent Channel and assure you that we will respond to the issues you have raised as soon as possible.

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S/P:TTORNTON:AG
12/30/81, EXT 28328
S/P:PWOLFOWITZ

ROUTINE SAN JOSE

DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/R WOLFOWITZ

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12/17/86 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL)

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REFERENCE: SAN JOSE 7210

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE DEALING WITH COSTA RICA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND THE U.S. RESPONSE THERETO. IT HAS BEEN GIVEN THE SAME CAREFUL ATTENTION AS YOUR PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT AND WE HAVE COME TO MUCH THE SAME CONCLUSION AS BEFORE. WHILE THE PROBLEMS THAT YOU CITE ARE REAL AND THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS ARE OPEN TO LEGITIMATE QUESTION, THE DEPARTMENT REMAINS OF THE OPINION THAT THE EFFORT IS WORTH MAKING. ALSO, THE DEPARTMENT IS NOT PRESSURING THE IMF, SO THE CHANCES ARE ABOUT AS PROMISING AS ONE CAN REALISTICALLY HOPE FOR UNDER ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. GIVING THE MATTER OUR BEST TRY DOES NOT, OF COURSE, MEAN THAT WE SHOULD KEEP OUR EYES CLOSED NOR THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE THINKING OF HOW BEST THE PIECES CAN BE PICKED UP IF THAT IS WHAT IT COMES TO. YOUR CONTINUED CONCERN CAN HELP ENSURE THAT AMERICAN INTERESTS ARE FURTHERED EFFECTIVELY.

yy

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T

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PART B6

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tripoli

D/c.
by 10/3

September 11, 1977

9/20

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OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Anthony Lake, Esquire
Director of Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Lake:

Thank you for your August 29 comments on my July 11 dissent channel message concerning the advisability of the United States becoming directly involved in the dispute in Northern Chad.

It is not my desire to initiate a prolonged correspondence on the subject. Nevertheless, I would like to respond to some of your comments. I agree that we cannot ignore current politics and ideology involved in this dispute. The purpose of my rather extensive reference to the historical antecedents was to place this problem within its proper historical content. Obviously, these antecedents have a continuity extending into the present dispute.

You are quite accurate to point out that current Libyan claims to the Aouzou strip ignore Libya's previous acceptance in the 1955 Franco-Libyan treaty on the conventional boundary from 1889-1902 which the United States presently recognizes. Needless to say, the Libyan Government of King Idris is obviously not that of Colonel Qadhafi. I believe that the radical change that has taken place in this country is indicative of changes that are occurring in other parts of Africa as these nations undoubtedly must face the question of the desirability of borders that fail to reflect a semblance of ethnic and geographic continuity. Today,

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the most blatant example of the phenomenon is the Somalia aim of territorial aggrandizement in Ethiopia and potentially in Kenya.

We both agree that a military solution to the Northern Chad dispute is not feasible nor should it be encouraged, particularly by direct United States military assistance. More importantly, as you indicated, the United States must continue to support mediation efforts undertaken by the Organization of African Unity. I might suggest that strenuous U. S. efforts are called for to support the efforts of the OAU's newly established mediation office which was especially created to deal with disputes between African states. As I stated in my dissent channel message, the present borders of Africa are artificial and invariably the dynamics of ethnic and racial sentiment of its population will cause future disputes between African states. It is, therefore, essential that the OAU's mediation office be strengthened to resolve these issues.

I appreciate the United States rationale for giving paramount consideration to the views of Egyptian President Sadat concerning the designs of Colonel Qadhafi, because of the crucial role Sadat must play in our present Middle East peace initiative. President Sadat appears absolutely correct in his assertion that Colonel Qadhafi continues his attempts to subvert Sadat's government. However, as you suggest, it is questionable whether the events in Chad are a part of this Libyan effort.

Indeed, it may be argued that the present "friendship" of General Malloum's government with the United States is mere expediency. In light of the coup d'etat that brought General Malloum to power, his initial flirtation with the Soviets, and now his efforts to closely

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identify with the United States and perhaps receive military assistance, I wonder how much the United States needs friendship of such military regimes, particularly regimes where not even a semblance of democracy exists. Invariably, in Chad as in Libya and elsewhere in Africa, political stability has become a most essential goal of these regimes. That stability has more often than not translated itself into the suppression of any viable political opposition. For your perusal I have enclosed a paper I originally wrote for the Open Forum. It was never published. However, I believe that many of its general observations are germane to future U. S. relations with Africa.

I am deeply appreciative of your response to my dissent channel message. While I doubt that U. S. support of such friendly regimes as Chad will cease, I nevertheless appreciate the opportunity for this brief, but enjoyable exchange of comments concerning U. S. policy.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature]

Political Officer

Enclosure:

Paper by [Redacted]
"International Stability" and
Political Change in Africa

B6

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Bridgetown, Barbados

Handwritten: Killoran P...
2-V file
Dissent

December 30, 1975

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Winston Lord, Esquire
Director
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Lord:

Thank you for your letter and the copy of your memorandum to Mr. Killoran. My sincere thanks as well for the way the matter was concluded.

Unfortunately Mr. Killoran's refusal to forward our last dissent channel telegram was only one example--and a very minor one by comparison--of his seriously flawed judgment while in Luanda. A preference on his part for Sermon on the Mount-style ethics over the more normal practice of considering concrete U. S. interests seriously delayed an early understanding of the Angolan mess. And compounding that penchant for moral judgments on what was "good for the Angolan people" was the far graver practice of suppressing facts not supporting his case.

Happily, long before Mr. Killoran's departure, the Angolan matter was removed from those who seemed to operate more on the basis of fervently-held personal philosophies than an appreciation of our interests as a nation. However, it remains interesting to me why, in the earlier stages of the Angolan drama, the Bureaus concerned consistently misjudged what was happening and almost always failed to appreciate the significance. (I'm not referring to the separate matter of the wisdom of U. S. involvement but only to the analytical failure.)

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The reasons seem to be those which on a broader scale led to the "global outlook policy." With Angola, it is possible to tick-off specific examples of how in-group attitudes ("hang-ups" could well be used) toward Africa and Africans led geographic Bureau personnel to miscalling the play, time after time. In the early stages it was basically a lack of understanding of the forces and motivations at work, not those of the Russians at that point, but internal Angolan and African ones. However later, as the matter developed, some appear to have understood where things were headed but, fearing U. S. involvement, failed to call attention to the probable outcome in the hope the problem would somehow conveniently disappear.

All of this would make interesting--but best left unpublished--journalism.

Again, my thanks to you and Peter Lydon. I hope Peter didn't take too much static for sending the follow-up cables on his own.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature box]

Economic/Commercial Officer

B6

P.S.

While not claiming any extraordinary talents as an FSO, my Angola experience is unique and could, I think, be put to some use by the Department. My contacts among middle level UNITA personnel could prove particularly valuable if the Administration is trying to sell Savimbi as an authentic Angolan movement worthy of our renewed assistance. I think that idea could prove saleable to the Congress if the Soviet/Cuban involvement continues and MPLA keeps refusing supervised elections.

I'm volunteering for any possible role in our Angola effort and hope you'll let me know if you become aware of any possibility.

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74 TEL AVIV 3306

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19 June 74

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 03306 191019Z
41

ACTION AID-59
INFO OCT-01 NEA-09 ISO-00 EB-05 IGA-02 L-03 SWF-02 /081.W
075551

R 190951Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2786
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEL AVIV 3306
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S FY 1975 PL 480 TITLE I REQUIREMENTS
REF: A. STATE 92148;
B. TEL AVIV 2698;
C. STATE 126140

*USG selling for 1975
commodities to Israel
other uses of Israel
foreign exchange*

1. IN PREPARING REFTEL B WE OF COURSE KNEW OF GOI REQUEST
LAST AUGUST FOR PL 480 COMMODITIES VALUED THEN AT ABOUT \$150
MILLION. (THE SAME QUANTITIES WOULD COST ABOUT \$99.3 MILLION AT
PREICES SPECIFIED IN REF A, USING CORN COST FOR FEEDGRAINS.) WE
HAD ALSO BEEN TOLD (REF A) THAT TITLE I REQUESTS WERE EXPECTED TO
EXCEED COMMODITY AVAILABILITIES IN FY-75. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,
WE PROPOSED WHAT WE CONSIDERED TO BE A REASONABLE PROGRAM, AND ONE
WHICH COULD BE CARRIED OUT. WE AERE AWARE THAT THE AGREEMENT FOR
ISRAEL LAST YEAR PROVIDED FOR COMMODITITES TOTTALLING \$62.5 MILLION,
BUT IN THE EVENT WE WERE ABLE TO SUPPLY ONLY \$47.6 MILLION WORTH.
2. IN LIGHT OF THE SUBSTANTIALLY LARGE QUANTITITES NOW EXPECTED TO
BE AVAILABLE IN FY-75 (STATE 126140), WE BELEIVE A CASE CAN BE
MADE FOR A LARGER PROGRAM FOR ISRAEL THAN THAT SUGGESTED IN OUR
MESSAGE. ISRAEL WILL HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED FOREIGN EXCHANGE
RRQUIREMENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS WHICH TITLE I PROGRAMS CAN HELP
MEET. FACT THAT THESE LONG-TERMS LOANS PUSH ISRAEL'S FOREIGN DEBT
EVEN HIGHER AND HAVE CREATED SOME DIFFICULTY RECENTLY IN
DISPOSING OF EXCESS SOYBEAN OIL, APPARENTLY HAS NOT LESSENED GOI
INTEREST IN OBTAINING LARGE TITLE I PROGRAM. THUS, IN LIGHT INCREASED
AVAILABILITIES AND STRONG GOI INTEREST EMBASSY HAS NO OBJECTION TO

argument raised before

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 03306 191019Z

ANY FY-75 PROGRAM IN RANGE OF LAST YEAR'S APPROXIMATELY \$50 MILLION,
OR HIGHER IF SUPPLY SITUATION PERMITS.
KEATING
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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 932

PAGE 01 STATE 019599

RELEASE IN PART B6

64
ORIGIN SS-14

INFO OCT-01 /015 R

DRAFTED BY S/PC:RRPETERSON:JK
2/1/73 EXT 22972
APPROVED BY S/PC:WICARGO
S/S - MR. BARNES

103109

R 012233Z FEB 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION BERLIN

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DISSENT CHANNEL

FROM DIRECTOR OF S/PC

SUBJ: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM [REDACTED]
BERLIN 2055

B6

1. THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF BERLIN 2055, DATED NOVEMBER 28, 1972, A DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE CONCERNING AIR AGREEMENTS WITH THE GDR.

2. INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE TO THE DIRECTOR OF PLANNING AND COORDINATION, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT, EUR, EUR/CE, EB, EB/OA, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. ROGERS

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Department of State

Spill
TELEGRAM

WJC

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PAGE 01 STATE 119316

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ORIGIN SS-14

INFO OCT-01 /015 R

DRAFTED BY ARA:RHURWITCH/WSTEDMAN/MSKOL;S/PC;SEATON;MRC
6/30/72 EXT 28148
APPROVED BY S/PC:AHARTMAN
ARA:JHCRIMMINS (DRAFT)
ARA:GLISTER (DRAFT)
S/NM:RDIGILIO (DRAFT)
ARA/ISA:DBLACK (DRAFT)
T:GNEWMAN (SUBS)
PM:FEATHERSTONE (DRAFT)
S/S
L:PPFUND (DRAFT)
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
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P 302320Z JUN 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 119316

DISSENT CHANNEL
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE! NARCOTICS CONTROL

REFS: A. ASUNCION 1499; B. ASUNCION A-54; C. STATE 115151;
D. STATE 115857

1. REF A. HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF A-54
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT. THOUGHT, EFFORT AND CONVICTION
WHICH WENT INTO ITS PREPARATION ARE COMMENDED. ITS
RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE GIVEN FULL WEIGHT BY THE DEPARTMENT
IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPING THE POLICY PROGRAM DIRECTED
BY PADM 31. APPROPRIATE PORTIONS WILL ALSO BE USED BY THE
DEPARTMENT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH A-54, WITHIN THE INTER-
AGENCY COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS CONTROL IN LATIN AMERICA.
WE WILL ADVISE EMBASSY OF RESULTS WHEN WE COMPLETE OUR
CONSIDERATION. THIS MESSAGE IS AN INTERIM RESPONSE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 119316

2. WE HAVE HAD THE OBJECTIVE OF PERSUADING THE GOP THAT COOPERATION IN CONTROLLING ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFIC IS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST; THIS IS A BASIC ASSUMPTION IN PADM 31. THE IG/ARA INCLUDED IN THE CASP AND THE DECISION MEMORANDUM A SIMILAR STATEMENT AS WELL AS A FORESHADOWING OF THE NEGATIVE IMPACT FROM GOP FAILURE TO COOPERATE IN DRUG TRAFFICKING. REF A AND AIRGRAM ARE IN ACCORD WITH POLICY IN PADM AND IG DECISION MEMORANDUM. THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN AND REMAINS DISSATISFIED WITH GOP POSTURE TOWARD THIS SERIOUS PROBLEM AND WE INTERPRET REF. A AS SHARING THIS FEELING.

3. DIFFERENCES EXIST, HOWEVER, OVER TACTICS TO EMPLOY THAT WILL ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE. HIGHLY PUBLIC OR PUBLICIZED ACTIONS TOGETHER WITH DEADLINES SUCH AS PROPOSED IN REF A WOULD RESULT IN UNMISTAKABLE PUBLIC CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE US AND PARAGUAYAN GOVERNMENTS. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE GOP MAY WELL SHIFT THE FOCUS FROM DRUG PROBLEM ITSELF TO BROADER ISSUES WHICH COULD STIMULATE NATIONALISTIC SENTIMENT AGAINST US, E.G. BY ALLEGING INJURY TO NATIONAL DIGNITY AND BY INVOKING THE "DAVID-GOLIATH" IMAGE. THIS SITUATION MAY MARKEDLY DIMINISH THE LIKELIHOOD OF OBTAINING THE COOPERATION WE SEEK, PERHAPS IRRETRIEVABLY. NEVERTHELESS, WE MAY ULTIMATELY CONCLUDE THAT, DESPITE THEIR COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE ASPECTS, THESE COURSES OF ACTION MAY CONSTITUTE THE ONLY REMAINING AVENUES WORTH EXPLORING.

4. THE DEPT. HAS ADOPTED TACTICS DESIGNED TO IMPRESS UPON GOP THAT FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH THE US IN ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFIC WILL NOT BE WITHOUT ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES IN OUR RELATIONS, WHILE AVOIDING FORCING THE GOP INTO A CORNER OVER THE ISSUE AT THIS TIME.

5. WITH REGARD TO THE THREE SPECIFIC ACTIONS PROPOSED IN REFTL TO BE TAKEN BEFORE JULY:

A. OUR VIEWS ON JULY 4TH CELEBRATION HAVE BEEN COMMUNICATED BY TELEPHONE TO CHARGE BREWIN AND IN REF (C).

B. DEPARTMENT OFFICERS HAVE BEEN KEEPING PARAGUAYAN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 STATE 119316

EMBASSY HERE POSTED AS TO RELATIONSHIP GOP COOPERATION AND USG ASSISTANCE. DEPTOFF MET WITH PARAGUAYAN MILITARY ATTACHE JUNE 27 AND TOLD HIM EXPLICITLY ABOUT RECENT DELAYS IN MILITARY ITEMS AND REASONS THEREFORE. EMBASSY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PASS SAME MESSAGE, NOT AS THREAT, BUT AS FRANK INDICATION OF DEVELOPING SITUATION, TO APPROPRIATE GOP OFFICIAL (REF D.).

C. MATTER OF TIMING OF AMBASSADOR YLITALO'S RETURN HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION AND DECISION WILL BE COMMUNICATED SEPARATELY. AMBASSADOR WILL IN ANY CASE NOT RETURN BEFORE JULY 4 (REF C). IRWIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIRGRAM

*PER [Signature],
Rose*

S/PC-2

RS/R	REP	AF	ARA
EUR	FE	NEA	CU
INP	E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID	<i>S/S /10</i>
AGR	COM	FRB	INT
LAB	TAR	TR	XMB
AID	ARMY	NAVY	OSD
USIA	NSA	CIA	

Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

~~SECRET~~

A-23

HANDLING INDICATOR
TO : Department of State

NOTE Any further Distribution Must be Cleared in S/PC RS/AN

12 26 PM '73
BRANCH

(5021)

FROM : AmEmbassy ADDIS ABABA

DATE: February 7, 1973

SUBJECT : Dissent Message

RELEASE IN PART B6

REF :

DISSENT CHANNEL

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

This airgram transmits a dissenting view submitted by _____ of the Embassy Political Section. We request that this airgram receive the same distribution as the messages it addresses (see below).

B6

I. The purpose of this message is to record our disagreement with the analysis and recommendations of "Implications for U.S. Policy of the Somali Threat to Ethiopia" (Addis 782 of 1/22/73 and A-13 of January 24, 1973). Since our interpretation of recent developments, internal and external, differs from the Country Team's assessments, we find the options and recommendations inappropriate to the situation and counter-productive to U.S. interests. We believe that there is an alternative approach to the current situation.

pal 19-8 US-eth

II. ASSESSMENT

While we are not in a position to assess the military significance of the recent arms shipments to Somalia, we consider that the Country Team's paper exaggerated the "Somali threat" by not giving proper weight to the following factors: the domestic interests and problems of the Ethiopian ruling elite; the mutual responsibility for the Ethio-Somali conflict; the presence of Djibouti in the equation; the impact of Ethiopia's current relations with Sudan and Kenya; and the role of Israel.

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Action Taken:

Date:

FORM 64 DS-323

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For Department Use Only

Initials:

In Out

Drafted by:

Drafting Date:

Phone No.:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

2/6/73

DCM - Parker D. Wyman

B6

O - 1263

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Addis Ababa A-23

p. 2

1. Internal Situation

We believe that the Ethiopian ruling elite's perception of and reaction to the "Somali threat" has been greatly intensified by domestic stresses and risks to its future survival. The Emperor's 80th birthday and continuing uncertainty regarding a successor regime (further heightened by the Crown Prince's recent illness) have focused attention on the possibilities of internal chaos and risks to the future position of the present ruling elite. Reasons for the establishment's concern and consequent appeals for U.S. support include: serious institutional deficiencies and the prevailing moods of frustration and of absence of effective leadership within the government machine; discontent among ethnic groups and many of the educated class because of the corrupt and repressive system; failure of the "Amharazation program" to cement a unified Ethiopia under Shoan Amhara domination; results of their unwillingness to institute land and other reforms which would have broadened the regime's appeal and reduced domestic tensions in the long run; failure to work with and "win over" elements of the population, most notably in Eritrea and the Ogaden, who are striving for greater local autonomy; and inefficiency in the military organization.

We interpret the IEG's reaction to the "Somali threat" and pressure on the U.S. for assistance and psychological support [] largely as attempts:

- (a) to insure the ruling group's ability to maintain its power and wealth during and after the succession;
- (b) to develop a rationale for a new pipeline to U.S. political, financial and military support in the event Kagnev Station should close down;
- (c) to provide a justification for increased military expenditures and for further delays in acting on significant economic and social reforms which are increasingly being pressed on the ruling elite by domestic interests and by foreign aid donors.

2. External

We believe that Ethiopia also bears some responsibility for the recent deterioration in Ethio-Somali relations, which have never been close since Somalia's independence in 1960. In recent months, the economic stakes of both sides in the disputed Ogaden region have increased greatly, as indications of the eventuality of probable commercial oil discoveries have become known. Moves by both sides led to border incidents in November, which were followed by two

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~~SECRET~~Addis Ababa A-23
p. 3

sessions of bilateral talks at the Foreign Minister level. From all available evidence, it appears that neither side made any substantial concession from its previous, well-known position. Inevitably, both sides used strong talk, with President Siad making what the Ethiopian Foreign Minister reports as a veiled threat to resort to force. At present, bilateral negotiations appear to be completely stalled, and the prospects for further talks over the Ogaden seem questionable without external pressures on both parties.

Somalia and Ethiopia have conflicting claims to Djibouti as well as to the Ogaden, which contributes substantially to their rivalry. Despite President Pompidou's recent statements of French intention to remain in the TFAI and the apparent acceptance of this by both sides (at least in the short run), neither has abandoned its claim, and each is probably prepared to move militarily to protect its interests, if and when France leaves Djibouti.

Other developments in the general area have sharpened the political confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia. The recent satisfactory border settlement and general detente with Sudan have, at least for the foreseeable future, removed any "threat" to Ethiopia from the North, thus freeing resources for the Somali "front". Kenya and Ethiopia are on the verge of renewing their defense agreement and are keeping in close touch over the "Somali threat".

During the past year, five African states have broken relations with Israel. This has made Israel increasingly concerned about its position in Ethiopia, the "linchpin" of Israeli interests in Africa. We assume that Israel has encouraged Ethiopian concern over the "Somali threat".

III. OUR REACTION TO THE CT'S RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of our analysis of the current situation, we believe that the Country Team's options and recommendations not only do not address the real problems of Ethiopia but also are laying new groundwork for a continued U.S. military involvement in Ethiopia in the event that the USG decides to close Kagnev.

1. Military

We believe that what appears to be the Country Team's principal recommendation, the increase in military aid to \$11.5 million, is only the foot in the door. The referenced airgram provides a shopping list (page 8, para 3) in the event of Soviet deliveries of T-54 and MIG-21's, revealing the expectations of the Ethiopian government and the Country Team. The response to the Country Team's proposals should be framed with the next group of Ethiopian "requirements" clearly

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Addis Ababa A-23

p. 4

in mind, and with the realization that having taken the first step it will be difficult to refuse other "Somali threat"-related demands. We question the Country Team's assessment that additional arms deliveries to Ethiopia would be a stabilizing factor.

We consider it important to note that, given the inadequacy of the Ethiopian military, increments in weaponry have much less than commensurate effect on its overall capability. For example, large deliveries of modern communications equipment have not enabled Ethiopian forces in Eritrea to coordinate air support with ground maneuvers. In this context, the volume and cost of weaponry needed to assure "security" as the Ethiopian government perceives it, would involve a political and financial burden on the U.S., which we find unacceptable. A major weapons program would probably have a negative impact on U.S. interests by reinforcing the Ethiopian belief in a U.S. commitment and by raising the cost of disengagement. Furthermore, the Country Team ignores the real possibility that additional weapons would be used in Eritrea, thereby seeming to involve the U.S. in the decade-old insurgency, with possible risks to Kagnev.

2. Political

We believe that a "summit" meeting between the President and Emperor (and to a lesser extent, any meeting at the Cabinet level) should be avoided at the present time. Agreement to a "summit" meeting would signal to the Ethiopian Government that we accept their version of the "Somali threat" and would make it very difficult for the U.S. to avoid further military commitments.

We see no objections to consultations with other allies for an exchange of views (since we believe most other allies, as has France already, would tend to down-play the alleged "Somali threat".) However, we strongly disagree with the Country Team's option that the U.S. solicit military aid for Ethiopia from third countries, and particularly with the notion that the U.S. encourage Israel to become even more involved with the Ethiopian military.

3. Economic

The AID-related possibilities and recommendations for action in the Country Team's messages appear to us clearly contrary to the purpose of economic assistance. While the messages take note of the technical drawbacks to the various options, the overall significance and in our minds danger of shifting the priorities of U.S. economic assistance in Ethiopia from developmental to military are not properly weighed.

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Addis Ababa A-23

p. 5

We consider that one of the purposes of U.S. assistance is to encourage the receiving country to concentrate on economic and social development. By broadening the Agriculture Sector Loan to allow shifting of IEG funds for military purposes, by using part of a housing investment guarantee to allow purchases of military equipment, or by providing PL-480 wheat indirectly for military purposes, the USG would undermine long-term development prospects in Ethiopia, and thus its own interests.

We are concerned that "colonization" of the Ogaden could exacerbate the tension in that area and between Ethiopia and Somalia. We are also disturbed by recent indications of U.S. Mission encouragement of the Ethiopian Government to move ahead with such plans.

IV. OUR RECOMMENDATIONS

U.S. policy guidelines on Africa call for less direct U.S. involvement in African affairs, particularly military; African governments to solve their own problems; emphasis on regional economic development projects; and international cooperation. Therefore, a viable long-term U.S. policy would avoid a commitment to the defense of Ethiopia and its territorial claims, or to maintenance of Ethiopia's military strength relative to its neighbors. It would also encourage the use of diplomatic channels for the settlement of bilateral disputes and in a longer term framework, promote cooperative ventures on the economic side. To this end we submit the following recommendations:

1. Mission officers should make it clear to the Ethiopian Government that the U.S. considers Ethiopia capable of meeting the foreseeable Somali military pressures, provided that it takes necessary measures to rationally allocate its resources, and to eliminate nepotism, corruption and political influence in the military program. They should also suggest that Ethiopia could enhance internal security in the Ogaden through a more equitable and development-oriented policy. At the same time, it should be made clear that the U.S. does not have any "special relationship" with Ethiopia other than existing treaty commitments, our desire for good bilateral relations, and our continued interest in Ethiopia's economic and social progress; nor does the U.S. have any intention of competing with the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa.

2. The U.S. should strongly urge Ethiopia and Somalia to approach the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the proper forum for discussion and mediation of the territorial and other disputes. The approaching 10th anniversary celebrations provides the IEG with the opportunity to set this in motion. Ethiopia has the stronger case by OAU standards since all African states have ample reason to avoid re-drawing colonial boundaries, the OAU being on record to this effect. Focusing attention in the OAU on Soviet arms deliveries to Somalia may

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Addis Ababa A-23
p. 6

encourage limitations on deliveries of offensive weapons. In an era of limited U.S. commitments, Ethiopia should develop a more self-reliant role in the world in which it must live.

3. We recommend planning now for expansion of Ethio-Somali economic cooperation, particularly in the Ogaden. (An example of a continuing technical joint venture is the campaign against rinderpest.) The U.S. and other foreign donors should encourage joint exploitation of natural resources affecting both countries, e.g. oil and the Webe Shabelle River. Such cooperation would exploit the area's potential in an efficient manner, develop the neglected land and people of the Ogaden, and reduce tension between Ethiopia and Somalia.

ADAIR

Classified by Parker D. Wyman, DCM.
Subject to Gen. Declass. Schedule of
Exec. Order 11652. Automatically down-
graded at 2-year intervals and declass-
ified on 12/31/81.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART B6

Dominican Republic ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 057

PAGE 01 SANTO 02190 231546Z

63
ACTION SS-14

ACTION COPY
C/4/22

INFO OCT-01 /015 W

012365

R 231440Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8145

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SANTO DOMINGO 2190

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: YOUTH PARA: DISSENTING VIEW

REF: A) STATE A-3559, APR. 18, 1972; B) STATE 070302;
C) SANTO DIMINGO 1787; D) SANTO DOMINGO 2102

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY FSOs

B6

2. SECTION IV OF REFS C) AND D) OUTLINES THE COUNTRY TEAM'S VIEWS ON THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF "YOUTH" IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND RECOMMENDS LEVELS OF PERSONNEL TIME AND PROGRAM RESOURCES TO BE DEVOTED TO THE MISSION'S YOUTH PROGRAM. IT IS OUT VIEW THAT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY A SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER PROFILE IN THE YOUTH FIELD, AT A TIME WHEN THE INTERESTS OF THE USG IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HAVE SHIFTED AWAY FROM AN INVOLVEMENT IN THE DETAILS OF DOMINICAN POLITICAL LIFE AND WHEN THE TOTAL MANPOWER AND RESOURCES OF THIS MISSION ARE BEING REDUCED, IT SEEMS INAPPROPRIATE TO INCREASE THE EMPHASIS ON AN AMORPHOUS AND NARROW "YOUTH SECTOR".

3. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT IN SECTION IV, "THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF YOUTH" BE REDUCED TO "MINIMAL" AND THAT THE SPECIFIC PERCENTAGES OF PERSONNEL TIME AND PROGRAM RESOURCES BE LOWERED ACCORDINGLY. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD RESULT IN A WASTEFUL SEARCH FOR YOUNG PERSONS WHOSE RELATIVE NON-IMPORTANCE IS ONLY TEMPORARILY CAMOUFLAGED BY THE INTEREST OF THE USG.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
46

FORM DS-1652



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 SANTO 02190 231546Z

4. OUR DISSENT, HOWEVER, IS NOT SO MUCH FROM REFS C AND D (WHICH ARE UNDERSTANDABLE RESPONSES GIVEN THE PARAMETERS SET IN STATE'S 070302), BUT FROM THE WHOLE YOUTH/PARA SYNDROME REFLECTED IN STAT'S 070302 AND OTHER MESSAGES WHICH SEEM RELICS OF A PREVIOUS ERA WHEN: 1) THERE WERE LARGER MISSIONS ABROAD; 2) THE USG BELIEVED ITS VITAL INTERESTS WERE AT STAKE IN ALMOST ANY UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRY; AND 3) USG OFFICIALS WERE CONFIDENT THAT IF THEY WORKED AT IT PROPERLY THEY COULD INFLUENCE GREATLY OR EVEN DETERMINE EVENTS IN THOSE COUNTRIES.

5. THE DISSENTERS ARE PLEASED THAT OVERALL U.S. POLICY NOW REFLECTS A MUCH MORE REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF U.S. INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S YOUTH PROGRAM BE REVISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT CHANGE.
MELOY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

5045 TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 225131

66
ORIGIN SP-03

INFO OCT-01 ES-02 /006 R

DRAFTED BY S/P MARMACOST
APPROVED BY S/P SLEWIS
MIDBROWN
OFF: KQUINN (DRAFT)
M/D GINDAVIS
S/I GIRLYOST
EA PHABIB

RELEASE IN PART B6

S/S JPMOFFAT

099145

O 112113Z OCT 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 116521 ADB, DECLASS 3/1/75

TAGS: OGEN

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE FROM [REDACTED]
REF: A-442 BELGRADE
199302 STATE
FOR [REDACTED]

B6

B6

1. WE HAVE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE AND HAVE CONSULTED FULLY WITH KEY OFFICERS IN THE DEPARTMENT ON IT. WE APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER. THE DISSENT CHANNEL WAS CREATED FOR THIS PURPOSE AND SHOULD BE USED IN TIMELY FASHION WHENEVER APPROPRIATE.

2. AS WE SEE IT, YOU HAVE RAISED TWO SEPARATE BUT RELATED ISSUES. FIRST, THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE REPORTING FROM OUR MISSION IN VIETNAM AS TO ITS THOROUGHNESS AND ACCURACY IN

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FORM 8-1052



Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 225131

PERMITTING WASHINGTON POLICYMAKERS TO REACH SOUND POLICY JUDGMENTS; AND SECOND, THE NEED TO SUPPLEMENT THE REGULAR INSPECTION SYSTEM WITH SPECIAL INVESTIGATORY PROCEDURES TO REVIEW POLITICAL REPORTING FROM KEY MISSIONS.

3. IN CONSIDERING THE MOOSE-MEISSNER REPORT, DEPARTMENT OFFICERS RESPONSIBLE FOR VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS RECENTLY REVIEWED THE CONTENT OF REPORTING FROM THE SAIGON MISSION. THEY OBSERVED--AS YOU ALSO NOTED IN YOUR MESSAGE--THAT THERE IS A HEAVY MASS OF REPORTING FROM THE MISSION THROUGH

A NUMBER OF CHANNELS--STATE, CIA, USIA, DOD, AID. WHILE THERE IS SOME OVERLAPPING IN COVERAGE, THERE IS ALSO A CONSIDERABLE "DIVISION OF LABOR" BETWEEN THE VARIOUS AGENCIES NECESSITATED BY THE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES AVAILABLE. IN ADDITION TO A WIDE VARIETY OF OFFICIAL REPORTS, POLICYMAKERS HAVE THE BENEFIT OF EXTENSIVE PRESS COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN VIETNAM, AND PERIODIC DEBRIEFINGS OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL VISITORS TO THE AREA. IN OUR JUDGMENT--AND VIEWED FROM THE VANTAGE POINT OF THE CONSUMER--WE BELIEVE THAT THE GAPS THAT YOU PERCEIVED WHILE IN VIETNAM ARE ADEQUATELY COVERED THROUGH OTHER REPORTING CHANNELS WHICH WERE UNAVAILABLE TO YOU IN THE FIELD. IN SHORT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TOTALITY OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO WASHINGTON POLICYMAKERS ON VIETNAM IS SUFFICIENT TO AFFORD THE DEPARTMENT AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF EVENTS AND TRENDS IN THAT COUNTRY.

4. WITH RESPECT TO YOUR SUGGESTION THAT A SPECIAL PANEL BE CREATED TO INVESTIGATE FOREIGN SERVICE REPORTING, WE ARE NOT PERSUADED THAT IT IS WISE OR NECESSARY TO CREATE A SPECIAL PANEL WHEN THE MANDATE OF THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL ALREADY INCLUDES PRECISELY THE SORT OF ISSUE YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED. A REVIEW OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REPORTING IS ONE OF THE NORMAL FEATURES OF POST INSPECTIONS, AND SPECIAL ATTENTION IS GIVEN TO EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CONTENT OF THIS REPORTING. A REGULARLY SCHEDULED INSPECTION OF OUR POSTS IN VIETNAM WILL TAKE PLACE IN JANUARY-APRIL 1975. DUE TO THE SIZE OF OUR OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM AND THE UNIQUE FEATURES OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN THAT COUNTRY, THE INSPECTION WILL BE

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PAGE 03 STATE 225131

CARRIED OUT BY AN AUGMENTED TEAM OF SIX INSPECTORS. AS WE INDICATED TO YOU IN THE REFERENCED TELEGRAM, A COPY OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL.

5. WE WOULD NOT EXPECT THE INSPECTION REPORT TO BE FINISHED BEFORE MID-SPRING. THEREAFTER, IF YOU WISH, THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL WILL BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THOSE ASPECTS OF THE REPORT WHICH BEAR ON THE CONCERNS OUTLINED IN YOUR MESSAGE WHEN YOU ARE NEXT IN WASHINGTON.

6. YOU URGED THAT THE CONGRESS BE KEPT INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS OF THE REVIEW OF FOREIGN SERVICE REPORTING FROM SAIGON. THERE ARE WELL ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES THROUGH WHICH INTERESTED MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS REGULARLY ARE GIVEN ACCESS TO THE FINDINGS IN POST INSPECTION REPORTS. NATURALLY WE WILL OF COURSE ADHERE TO THOSE PROCEDURES IN

THIS CASE.

7. WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSURING OPEN CHANNELS FOR CONVEYING A FULL RANGE OF VIEWS ON IMPORTANT POLICY ISSUES. WE THINK WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS ON THIS THROUGH THE CREATION OF A VARIETY OF CHANNELS FOR IN-HOUSE DISSENT AND THROUGH REMINDERS TO THE FIELD THAT THE POLICY DIALOGUE IN WASHINGTON IS ENHANCED THROUGH THE RECEIPT OF DIVERGING VIEWS FROM THE FIELD. AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN FAM 243.2 WERE DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY TO ASSURE REPORTING OFFICERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO TRANSMIT THEIR VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL QUESTIONS IN UNUSUAL CASES. THOSE REGULATIONS PROVIDE THAT "WHEN THERE ARE CONFLICTING DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON RELATIVELY IMPORTANT MATTERS WHICH CANNOT BE RESOLVED TO THE MUTUAL SATISFACTION OF THE DRAFTING AND REVIEWING OFFICERS, THE DRAFTING OFFICER'S REPORT SHALL BE SUBMITTED AND ACCOMPANIED BY WHATEVER COMMENTS OTHER OFFICERS MIGHT WISH TO MAKE." IT IS OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT THESE PROVISIONS ARE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF CHIEFS OF MISSION AND MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFFS AT FREQUENT AND PERIODIC INTERVALS, AND WE WILL SEE THAT THIS IS DONE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 04 STATE 225131

8. IF YOU WISH TO COMMUNICATE FURTHER ON THIS SUBJECT AT THIS TIME OR FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE POST INSPECTION, WE WOULD WELCOME ANY ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS YOU MAY HAVE, EITHER THROUGH THE DISSENT CHANNEL OR THROUGH DIRECT CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL, THE DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, OR THE DIRECTOR GENERAL, INGERSOLL

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

6052 Conf

RS

RELEASE IN PART B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 27, 1974

MEMORANDUM

TO: AF/C -
FROM: S/P - Winston Lord *W/L*
SUBJECT: Dissent Channel - DC-8 Sale to Gabon

B6

This memorandum will acknowledge receipt of your dissent message of September 24, 1974 on the proposed sale of a DC-8 to Gabon.

Mr. Willard A. DePree of the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) has been named coordinator in charge of substantive response to this dissent message. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your memorandum has been circulated to the offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff and the Secretary's Open Forum Panel. Additional copies will be sent to the Assistant Secretaries for African Affairs and for Economic and Business Affairs.

As you were informed by Mr. Swiers of my office, the original draft of your dissent message was attached to the AF memorandum when it went to the Secretary. Your request that your message be distributed outside the Department of State is being reviewed by the coordinator with the concerned bureaus.

Per your request to Mr. Swiers, your revised final two pages were substituted in your dissent message and the originals returned herewith.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN PART
B6

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REB789

PAGE 01
ACTION 8P-02 JIDDA 01322 151458Z

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R 180845Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7326

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L JIDDA 1322~~

STADIS //

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SA
SUBJECT: ~~DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE - POLICY ON KIDNAPPING OF
DIPLOMATS AND RANSOM~~

REF: JIDDA 057 JIDDA 1237

THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF
[REDACTED] E/C. IT IS REQUESTED THAT IT BE DIS-
TRIBUTED AT THE APPROPRIATE POLICY LEVELS IN THE
DEPARTMENT.

B6

SUMMARY: WHILE I SHARE THE CONCERN OF THE ORIGINATORS
OF REFTELS, MY DEEP PERSONAL CONSIDERATION OF THE
DANGEROUS POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A POLICY THAT REWARDS
TERRORISTS OR KIDNAPPERS IN ANY WAY FORCES ME TO
EXPRESS THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND OPINIONS THAT CON-
FLICT WITH THE SUGGESTION OF RESPECTED COLLEAGUES TO
CHANGE THE PRESENT POLICY. I DO, HOWEVER, BELIEVE
THAT THE U.S. ANTI-TERRORIST POLICY HAS BEEN
REMISS IN THE LACK OF PUNITIVE AFTER-ACTION
WHICH I FEEL, IF EFFECTED, WOULD ALSO DETER
TERRORISM AGAINST MY COLLEAGUES. END SUMMARY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02

JIDDA 71322 161458Z

1. THERE WAS A TIME WHEN A PERSON WITH DISBUISSING CLAIMS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP, MOTIVATED A STATEMENT BY ONE OF OUR LEADERS, "I WANT PERDICARIS ALIVE OR RASULLI DEAD," WHICH STRUCK A COMBINATION OF FEAR AND RESPECT IN THE HEARTS OF, RESPECTIVELY, FOES OR FRIENDS. THE RESCUE OF THE CREW OF THE MV VASQUEZ RECENTLY, THOUGH AN ILL-HANDLED AND ILL-TIMED EXERCISE IN THE FAR EAST, CAUSED A BURST OF PRIDE FOR EVERY AMERICAN.

2. THE PAYMENT OF A RANSOM OR ACQUIESCENCE TO ANY DEMANDS FOR THE SAFE RETURN OF OUR PERSONNEL IN MY OPINION MAKES US PAYING AND CAN ONLY MAKE US MORE ATTRACTIVE AND VULNERABLE TRADING COMMODITIES FOR THE FRUSTRATED AND NON-FRUSTRATED MADMEN OF THIS WORLD. THE SACRIFICES, THUS FAR, TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NO RANSOM HAVE BEEN DEEP HURTS. I KNEW CURT MOORE, CLEO NOEL, AND BOB WARING WELL. FRANK MELOY, MY DCM IN ITALY, WAS THE ULTIMATE GENTLEMAN. ALL OF THESE AND THE OTHERS SACRIFICED FOR A PRINCIPLE WOULD BE DEEMED IF NOW THE POLICY WERE TO CHANGE. THEY DIED FOR SOMETHING. IT WAS NOT TO REWARD THE TERRORISTS OF THE PRESENT AND CERTAINLY NOT FOR THE TERRORISTS OF THE FUTURE. A CHANGE OF POLICY WOULD BE A MOCKERY TO THEIR MEMORIES, IF IT WERE TO ACCEDE IN ANY WAY TO THE ELEMENT OF RANSOM. WHETHER WE REALIZE IT OR NOT, WE ARE THE "SOLDIERS ON THE FRONT LINE" AS EULOGISTS HAVE POINTED OUT. WE SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE DANGERS AND BE ABLE TO ENDURE THE PROSPECT OF RISKS. WE ARE VOLUNTEERS IN A SENSE. THE ONLY THING I FEEL WORTHY OF IS TO ACCEPT THE SAME CONDITIONS IN THE HOPE AND BELIEF THAT THEIR SACRIFICE DEMONSTRATED THE USELESSNESS OF THE TERRORISM.

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PAGE 03

JIDDA 21322 161459Z

3. WHAT MORE CAN WE DO? ALL OF THE CRISES WERE MET WITH QUIET DIPLOMACY AND TENDER EXPRESSIONS OF REGRET, TINGED WITH DISMAY OF THE HORRORS. IN MANY CASES WE KNEW OR KNOW WHERE THE TERRORISTS ARE AND THE PERSONS IN POWER IN THE COUNTRY OF THE OFFENSE WHO LET THE MURDERERS GO ARE THE SAME, EXCEPT THAT THEY ARE NOW POTENTIAL AID RECIPIENTS. THE MISSING FACTOR IN OUR POLICY TO DETER TERRORISTIC CRIMES AGAINST OUR SERVICE AND OUR CITIZENS HAS BEEN ABSENCE OF ANY FORCEFUL RETRIBUTION. WE CAN STILL SPEAK SOFTLY BUT WE NEED THAT BIG STICK IN TODAY'S WORLD. FOR WHATEVER IT MIGHT BE WORTH, I SUGGEST AN OFFICIAL DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM, THE CREATION OF AN ELITE CORPS OF RESCUEES WITHIN OUR MILITARY SERVICES, THE ISSUANCE OF WEAPONS IN SPECIAL SITUATIONS TO MEMBERS OF OUR SERVICE AND BOLD PUBLICITY ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS THAT WE INTEND TO FIGHT BACK AND PROTECT EVERY AMERICAN, OFFICIAL OR PRIVATE, AND THOSE WHO SERVE US ABROAD SUCH AS THAT WONDERFUL PERSON [REDACTED] IN BEIRUT AND THE HUNDREDS OF OTHERS NOW COMMITTED TO US WITHOUT BENEFIT OF CITIZENSHIP.

4. WHY THIS EMPHASIS ON RETRIBUTION? BECAUSE SOME TERRORISTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO PERFORM THEIR DEEDS NOT FOR MONEY OR RANSOM OR RELEASE OF CO-TERRORISTS, BUT TO DRAW THE WORLD'S ATTENTION TO WHAT THEY CONSIDER POLITICAL INJUSTICE OR FRUSTRATIONS. PERHAPS THE ONLY DETERRANT FOR THESE IS THE THREAT OF RETRIBUTION.

PORTER

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TERRORISM AGAINST MY COLLEAGUES. END SUMMARY.
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B6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

3/17

March 14, 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

TO: S/P, Mr. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff
FROM: ASIA/PT, [redacted]
A.I.D.
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: Normalization of
Relations with Vietnam -- Steps Along the Way

B6

1. This memorandum presents a dissent channel viewpoint of [redacted] Office of Philippines and Thailand Affairs, Asia Bureau, A.I.D. In addition to normal distribution to policy planning staff, I desire distribution to officers in the EA and EB Bureaus in State who deal with the subject matter. I intend to arrange for distribution within the Asia and PPC Bureaus of A.I.D.

B6

2. I wish to associate myself with the dissent channel message dated February 15, 1977 on "US Policy towards the IMF, IBRD and ADB in Vietnam," by [redacted] Asia/DCS, A.I.D. [redacted] presents a convincing case for encouraging, rather than resisting, economic relationships between the SRV and the international financial institutions. Such contacts, he argues, will foster SRV "tendencies to pragmatism and openness." Certainly, if normalization is our ultimate goal (as I think it should be), those Vietnamese tendencies are worth cultivating. In a fast-changing and interdependent world it makes good sense for the United States not only to overcome the emotionalism and bitterness of past conflict but actually to promote Indochinese participation in the community of nations.

B6

3. Supporting an SRV stake in the IFIs is a desirable step toward normalization. Amending our aid and PL 480 legislation is another. In the first instance, we should seek removal of all legislative constraints on other country trade and aid to Vietnam (in particular those contained in Section 620 (n) of the FAA and Section 103 (d) of PL 480). In

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GDS

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-2-

current policy terms, both of these wartime provisions are essentially obsolete and should be repealed. Additionally, we should begin now to seek removal of the legislative prohibitions on aid to Vietnam. (In particular, Section 108 of the FY 77 Appropriation Act). Depending upon progress of the current U.S. delegation on MIA issues, bilateral assistance may be a distant possibility. Nevertheless an attempt now to seek repeal of the legislative prohibition would provide an opportunity for developing Congressional and public support for normalization. Prohibitions on aid were enacted in the immediate aftermath of the American withdrawal from Vietnam. If we are to begin healing the wounds of war we need to remove the constraints to that process.

A/PT:LMichael Hager:mem
03/15/77

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PAGE: 01 BRIDGE 01720 101524Z

AS
ACTION SP#02.

INFO OCT#01 ES#01 ISO#00... (TECE)... W... ..

103198

R 092035Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1409

*Deleted to
ARA, PER, S/EG*

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DISSENT CHANNEL FROM WILLIAM S. DIEDRICH

EO 11652: NA
TAGS: APER, ELAB
SUBJECT: ARA LABOR ATTACHE CONFERENCE

1. LABOR ATTACHES AT ARA POSTS HAVE BEEN INVITED TO ATTEND THE ARA LABOR ATTACHE CONFERENCE AT SAN JOSE FROM SEPTEMBER 20 TO 25. AS THE DESIGNATED POLITICAL LABOR OFFICER, I ORDINARILY WOULD HAVE ATTENDED THIS CONFERENCE, AND IN FACT WAS TOLD BY THE AMBASSADOR THAT I WOULD GO. I NOW UNDERSTAND FROM THE DCM THAT THE ECONOMIC OFFICER IS TO ATTEND IN MY STEAD. THE DCM EXPLAINED, IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION AS TO WHY I WAS NOT TO ATTEND, THAT THE AMBASSADOR CONSIDERED THAT I SHOULD NOT BECAUSE I HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT (AIFLD).

2. INDEED I AM CRITICAL OF AIFLD, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY OF THE BRIDGETOWN OFFICE OF AIFLD. I QUESTION THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF AIFLD AND THE ORGANIZATION'S EFFECT ON US INTERESTS. I DISSENT FROM THE VIEW THAT THE SAN JOSE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE ATTENDED ONLY BY THOSE WHO APPROVE OF AIFLD AND ITS WORKS. ON THE CONTRARY, IF THERE IS TO BE A USEFUL DISCUSSION OF AIFLD THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT IS NOT WANTED.

3. (THIS IS A DISSENT, NOT A GRIEVANCE. THE ECONOMIC OFFICER AND I ARE NOT RIVALS FOR RESPONSIBILITY IN
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PAGE 02

BRIDGE 01720 101524Z

LABOR AFFAIRS. HE HAD NO PARTICULAR DESIRE TO REPLACE ME. IN MY VIEW HE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONFERENCE.)

4. REQUEST DISTRIBUTION (OUTSIDE DISSENT CHANNEL TO ARA, INR, PER, S/IL, [REDACTED] AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS NO OUTSIDE DISTRIBUTION. BRITTON

B6

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

2

PAGE 01 STATE 265529
ORIGIN SP-02

RELEASE IN PART
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INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 /004 R

DRAFTED BY S/P: RFEINBERG
APPROVED BY S/P: PKREISBERG
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S/P ONLY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 265529

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [] ONLY FROM KREISBERG, S/P

B6

E.O. 11652: GDS

AGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT
CARTER TO PRESIDENT PINOCHET

REF: A) SANTIAGO 9018 B) STATE 262398

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RAPID AND THOUGHTFUL DISSENT
MESSAGE.

2. YOUR OPINIONS WERE GIVEN HIGH-LEVEL CONSIDERATION,
BUT IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE LETTER TO PRESIDENT PINOCHET
AS SIGNED BY PRESIDENT CARTER AND CONTAINED IN REF (B)
SHOULD GO FORWARD UNALTERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. A MORE LENGTHY RESPONSE TO YOUR PARTICULAR ARGUMENTS
WILL FOLLOW. YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL IS
COMMENDED. CHRISTOPHER

Dissent file

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OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
UNCLASSIFIED

August 1, 1972

Mr. G. Larry Englebrake,
American Embassy
Guatemala City, Guatemala

Dear Mr. Englebrake:

Thank you for your letter of June 13 endorsing
Mr. [] earlier dissent message and requesting
that the policy underlying the provisions of 3 FAM 629
be reconsidered. I can assure you that this policy
is currently under review in Personnel and I am
hopeful that an early decision will be reached on
this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
William I. Cargo

William I. Cargo
Director
Planning and Coordination Staff

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ACTION	
EUR	FE
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COM	FRD
LAB	TAR
XMB	AIR
CIA	NAVY
USIA	NSA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Per Peaslee,
Shaw-Lee L
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TO : Department of State

INFO : OTTAWA

FROM : Amconsul HALIFAX

SUBJECT : Dissent Message: U.S. Government Responsibility for My Lai

REF : State A-3559, April 8, 1972

RECEIVED: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 26 4 43 PM '72

RS/AN ANALYSIS BRANCH DATE: July 17, 1972

RELEASE IN PART B6

DISSIDENT CHANNEL

This airgram transmits a dissenting view submitted by FSO-2 [redacted] principal Officer at this post.

"I note that procedures for retirement from the Foreign Service no longer require the retiring FSO to submit a letter to the Secretary of State outlining reasons for departure from the Service. This appears to be an unfortunate step in the direction of a further reduction of communications between officers and the Secretary. I believe it would be useful if means were retained for retiring officers to present the reasons for their action, hopefully so that the Service may profit from their comments.

PORTIONS ILLEGIBLE

"In the absence of such a channel of communication, the dissent channel is used to express this officer's unwillingness to be further associated with the actions of the executive branch of a government that initiated no steps to discipline a military unit that took action at My Lai similar to that perpetrated by the Nazis at Lidice. The steps that were taken were initiated outside of the executive branch of the United States Government and only then did the Army reluctantly move.

"In addition, there has been much testimony by Vietnam combat veterans of the eye-witness accounts of the systematic use of electrical torture, beatings, and in some cases, murder, of men, women and children, by their military units in Vietnam.

"At the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials the principle was established by the United States Government that military and public officials were responsible for war crimes committed by troops under

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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 In Out

Prepared by: [redacted] Contents and Classification Approved by: [redacted]

Transmitted: [redacted]

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Halifax 4-81

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2

their own command. Do we practice this ourselves ?

"I vividly recall the remarks made during the 1940's about how all German officials should have protested and refused to cooperate with a government that permitted Lidice and similar actions to happen. One of my reasons for retiring at the age of 50 after 29 years of government service is that I do not want to be associated with the actions of an executive branch that takes no effective steps against atrocities too similar to those of the Nazis. I do not want to be associated with torture and murder, whether this is done by a communist or fascist government, or the executive branch of the United States Government. I particularly do not want to be associated with a government that initiates no action when babies are deliberately killed.

"A-3559 states drafters may indicate the distribution they desire. I desire that this airmgram be distributed to each Foreign Service Officer. My obvious purpose is to help create an atmosphere in which the executive branch of the United States Government will not permit its units to murder and torture. If Foreign Service and other U.S. officers made known their disgust and horror at such actions as My Lai, hopefully pressure can be developed to prevent a recurrence of such an event."

NOTE: Declassify to Unclassified on August 1, 1972.

* For those who think this sort of thing always happens in war, I recommend a careful reading of the reports on My Lai of such correspondents as Seymour Hersh.

"In addition, those of the executive branch, and in some their military units

"At the Nuremberg trial... officials were reprimanded

...the Executive branch... a letter to the Secretary... from the Service... of a number... returned for raising of... action, especially so that...

"a unwillingness to be... branch of a government that... unit that took action at My Lai... of the executive branch of the United States Government... and the Army voluntarily were.

"...systematic use of chemical warfare... of men, women and children, by

"...the principle was... military and public... crimes committed by troops under

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

RF

UNCLASSIFIED 1658

PAGE 01 QUITO 05375 142225Z

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ACTION SP-03

ACTION COPY

INFO OCT-01 ES-02 /006 W

R 142026Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2127

072033

UNCLAS QUITO 5375

DISSSENT CHANNEL

F.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: APER
SURJ: DISSSENT LETTER

REF: DISSSENT CHANNEL LETTER OF FEBRUARY 25, 1974
BY

B6

DISSSENTING VIEW PRESENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISSSENT CHANNEL GUIDELINES BUT NO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIVED. SUBJECT CONSIDERS REFTEL LETTER TO BE DISSSENT LETTER RATHER THAN FORMAL GRIEVANCE AS LETTER CONCERNS DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY OR LACK THEREOF. REF LETTER SENT FROM PREVIOUS POST, TEGUCIGALPA. REQUEST REPLY.
RRFWSTER

X 22342

2/1/ Guatemala desk checking files

Ask Peter Swens if he recalls

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FORM DS-1652

109

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March 18, 1978

TO: M - Mr. ^{Richard} Wilson
FROM: S/P - Peter B. Swiers

I am forwarding this letter from [redacted] of our Embassy in Tegucigalpa to you for appropriate action. Mr. Young asks guidance on alleged misuse of government facilities by visiting congressmen. Please send a copy of any reply to our office.

B6

Attachment:

As stated.

M-Bauchard
127757

Daguer

cc: S/S - Mr. Springsteen
H - Mr. Aherne

C-87

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART B6

OPTIONAL FORM 185 (OCT 1961) (Rev. 6-77)
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/P: TTHORNTON: WHINKLE: VMY
7/29/82 X21009
S/P: PWOLFOWITZ

ARA/CEN: RBLOHM
INR/IAA: LLICHT
OFF: ESVENSON

ARA: SWBOSWORTH
HA: DROBERTS

ROUTINE. GUATEMALA

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P PAUL WOLFOWITZ

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/29/88 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL)

TAGS: CASC, PINS, SHUM

SUBJECT: RECOGNITION OF RIOS MONTT PRESIDENCY

REF: GUATEMALA 4173

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE (RETEL) WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN THE DISTRIBUTION YOU REQUESTED AS WELL AS CUSTOMARY DISTRIBUTION TO THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT.

2. SEVERAL OF THE POINTS THAT YOU MAKE IN YOUR TELEGRAM ARE SHARED HERE. THE FUTURE COURSE OF GUATEMALA UNDER A RIOS MONTT PRESIDENCY IS CERTAINLY OPEN TO QUESTION, THE ABSENCE OF AN ELECTORAL TIMETABLE IS DISTURBING, AND THE POLICY THAT RIOS MONTT WILL ULTIMATELY TAKE TOWARD THE GUERILLAS IS UNCERTAIN. THE OBJECTIVES THAT YOU HAVE FOR GUATEMALA ARE, I BELIEVE, UNIVERSALLY SHARED HERE--A FULL RESTORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND A RETURN TO REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

3. WE ARE LESS PESSIMISTIC THAN YOU ARE, HOWEVER, AND BELIEVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN, SINCE THE MARCH COUP, A MODEST POSITIVE TREND THAT IS WORTH PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING. THE MOST DIFFICULT PART OF ANY POLICY THAT IS HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS IS PRECISELY THE STAGE

PAUL WOLFOWITZ
TT/WH
RB
SWB
LL
DR
ES

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

OPTIONAL FORM 125-A (OCR) (10-75)
Formerly DS-322-A (OCR)
Dept. of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AT WHICH WE ARE IN GUATEMALA--THE GRADUAL REPLACEMENT OF PUNISHMENTS BY REWARDS AS A MEANS OF RECOGNIZING PROGRESS MADE AND OF ENCOURAGING FURTHER PROGRESS. STRAIGHT-OUT CONDEMNATION AND FULL-SCALE PRESSURE ARE ALTERNATIVES, BUT ONLY IF THEY WORK. ON THE BASIS OF PAST PERFORMANCE IN GUATEMALA, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL. THEY COULD WELL RESULT IN A REVERSAL OF THE PROGRESS MADE AND THE END OF THE MODEST, BUT REAL, INFLUENCE THAT WE HAVE OVER THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA.

4. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS A REASONABLE POSSIBILITY THAT RIOS MONTT WILL PROVIDE POSITIVE LEADERSHIP IN GUATEMALA. OBVIOUSLY THIS IS BY NO MEANS ASSURED; HE IS A MERCURIAL PERSONALITY AND MUST BE WATCHED CLOSELY. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO LOOK BEHIND HIS RHETORIC TO SEE JUST WHAT HE DOES, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE AMNESTY PERIOD DRAWS TO AN END. YOUR PREDICTION MAY TURN OUT TO BE CORRECT, BUT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO PREJUDGE A SITUATION THAT MAY HAVE A POSITIVE OUTCOME, ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE IS NO READILY APPARENT BETTER ALTERNATIVE.

5. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GUATEMALA IS INDEED NOT DEMOCRATIC, BUT HARDLY LESS SO THAN THE JUNTA ITSELF (OR, FOR THAT MATTER, OF ANY LIKELY SUCCESSOR REGIME). I AGREE THAT WE MUST PRESS FOR A RETURN TO DEMOCRACY IN GUATEMALA, ALTHOUGH THE NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK MAY EVEN BE LESS BRIGHT THAN ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT. AGAIN, IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY POSITIVE EFFECT, IT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH INCENTIVES RATHER THAN SANCTIONS. I FAIL TO SEE ANY REASON WHY, ON INSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS, WE SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM RIOS MONTT WHEN WE ARE WILLING TO DEAL WITH THE OTHER EQUALLY UNDEMOCRATIC JUNTA.

6. THE PROGRAMS THAT WE PROPOSE TO UNDERTAKE IN GUATEMALA ARE LIMITED IN SCOPE AND DESIGNEDLY SO SINCE THEY ARE RESPONDING TO EVIDENCES OF PROGRESS THAT ARE ALSO LIMITED AND A SITUATION THAT IS AMBIVALENT. THEY DO, HOWEVER, SERVE THE DUAL PURPOSE OF ENCOURAGING PROGRESS WHILE STRENGTHENING GUATEMALA'S CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH FORCES WHOSE TRIUMPH WOULD HARM OUR INTERESTS AND THOSE OF GUATEMALA. OUR ASSISTANCE SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS SUPPORT FOR RIOS MONTT AS AN INDIVIDUAL, BUT FOR THE REFORM PROGRAM. WE BELIEVE THAT IT PROVIDES THE BEST LEVERAGE FOR ENCOURAGING FURTHER IMPROVEMENT.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

OPTIONAL FORM 185-A (OCR) (10-75)
Formerly DS-322-A (OCR)
Dept. of State

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7. I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR EXPRESSING YOUR VIEWS THROUGH THE DISSENT CHANNEL ON THIS ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT MATTER. WE ARE DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTIES IN THE FUTURE AND EVEN, TO SOME EXTENT, IN THE PRESENT. HAVING WEIGHED THE POSSIBILITIES, INCLUDING THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT YOU HAVE PUT FORTH, THE DEPARTMENT REMAINS OF THE VIEW THAT A POLICY OF MODEST INCENTIVES IS BEST FOR US AND BEST FOR GUATEMALA. THIS POLICY WILL HAVE TO BE KEPT UNDER CLOSE REVIEW BY THE DEPARTMENT AND THE EMBASSY TO MAKE SURE IT IS SERVING ITS PURPOSE. I AM GLAD THAT YOUR SENSITIVE CONCERN FOR THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA IS ONE OF THE INPUTS TO THAT REVIEW PROCESS. YY

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S/P: BDMILETICH: BDM
EXT. 22972 11-18-77
S/P: ALAKE

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE PORT AU PRINCE

DISSENT CHANNEL


E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DELETION OF FUNDING IN HAITI PROJECT 086 OF AID
FOR HEALTH DELIVERY SERVICES

REF: STATE 261096

1. REFTEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SLUGGED
FROM S/P DIRECTOR LAKE". 44



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LA/CAR/H:WGRHOADS:JWK
10/21/77 EXT.:22129
S/P:WALAKE

LA/DR: RGOMEZ (DRAFT)
AA/LA: EW COY
S/P: HHENTGES (DRAFT)

LA/DR: MBROWN (DRAFT)
S/P (OPEN FORUM):DKINNEY (DRAFT)
LA/CAR:GFGOWER

ROUTINE PORT AU PRINCE

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR [] FROM S/P DIRECTOR LAKE
SUBJECT: DELETION OF FUNDING IN HAITI PROJECT DB6 OF A.I.D.
FOR HEALTH DELIVERY SERVICES

WAL
WGR
EWC
GFG

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REFS: (A) PAP 2945; (B) STATE 165854; (C) PAP 2647;
(D) STATE 186639; (E) PAP 3087; (F) STATE 2488

1. SUMMARY: THE ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR THE HEALTH PROJECT IN HAITI ADVOCATED IN YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE CAN BE INCLUDED IN THE NEW FY 1978 HEALTH PROJECT FOR HAITI. A.I.D.'S LATIN AMERICA BUREAU HAS NOT WITHDRAWN ITS SUPPORT FOR A MAJOR PROGRAM TO DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT A RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY SERVICE IN HAITI, BUT BEFORE ANY ELEMENT OF ANY PROJECT IN THE SERIES CAN BE AUTHORIZED, A PROPERLY PREPARED PROJECT PAPER MUST BE ON HAND THAT CAREFULLY PREPARED PROJECT PAPER MUST BE ON HAND THAT CAREFULLY PROGRAMS AND JUSTIFIES ALL PROPOSED EXPENDITURES, AND RELATES THEM TO THE LONG RUN GOAL OF THE PROJECTS.

2. IN YOUR DISSENT CABLE, (REF. A), YOU OBJECTED TO THE DECISION IN THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (DAEC) OF THE LATIN AMERICA BUREAU TO CUT FUNDING FOR PROJECT DB6 - HEALTH PROJECT II - BY ABOUT THREE MILLION DOLLARS, THEREBY ELIMINATING ALL FUNDS FOR THE GOH MINISTRY OF HEALTH TO BE USED FOR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS, DRUGS AND

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SUPPLIES, VEHICLES, POL, CONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION, AND MAINTENANCE; AND FOR FUNDING YEARS 3, 4, AND 5 OF THE PROJECT. YOUR OBJECTION WAS BASED ON TWO GROUNDS: (1) IT BROKE FAITH WITH THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH, WHICH HAD BEEN ASSURED IT WOULD RECEIVE THE FUNDS IN THE NEW PROJECT AS PART OF A LONG RANGE PLAN TO DEVELOP A LOW COST RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY SYSTEM (RHDS) TO COVER AT LEAST 70 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION AND (2) IT WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP (DESIGN AND TEST) A PRACTICAL RHDS THAT COULD BE REPLICATED COUNTRYWIDE BY LATER PROJECTS. IN THE BELIEF THAT AID/W HAD DECIDED NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO CONSIDER PROVIDING THE DELETED FUNDS AT A LATER DATE, YOU REQUESTED THE FULL RESTORATION OF THE ENTIRE AMOUNT WHICH HAD BEEN CUT.

3. THE L.A. BUREAU BELIEVES YOUR OBJECTION WAS BASED ON SEVERAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAVE SINCE BEEN RESOLVED, SO THAT THE PROJECT IS NOW MOVING FORWARD PROPERLY.

4. FIRST, THE L.A. BUREAU AND AID/W HAVE NOT RETREATED FROM A POLICY OF WORKING WITH THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH TO DEVELOP A WIDESPREAD RHDS IN HAITI. ONE OR MORE ADDITIONAL PROJECTS ARE PLANNED FOR THIS PURPOSE, AND IF A SATISFACTORY PROJECT PAPER CAN BE PREPARED, THE L.A. BUREAU HOPES TO AUTHORIZE A NEW PROJECT FOR THIS PURPOSE, NO. 091, IN FY 1978. THE ACTING MISSION DIRECTOR WAS ASSURED OF THIS COMMITMENT BY THE DIRECTOR OF LA/DR ON AUGUST 18, 1977, INCLUDING THE INFORMATION THAT THE ITEMS DELETED FROM PROJECT 086 CAN BE INCLUDED IN PROJECT 091 IF A PROPER JUSTIFICATION IS RECEIVED.

5. SECONDLY, WHILE PREFERRING THIS APPROACH, THE L.A. BUREAU IS ALSO WILLING TO CONSIDER A REQUEST FROM USAID/HAITI FOR AMENDING PROJECT 086 IF THE MISSION SHOULD WISH TO ARGUE THAT THIS COURSE IS PREFERABLE AND PRESENTS A SOUND JUSTIFICATION (REF. F).

6. THIRDLY, WHILE THE LATIN AMERICA BUREAU PLANS AND DESIRES TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT THE RHDS, IT HAD BY NO MEANS PROMISED, MANDATED OR COMMITTED THE FUNDS TO THE MISSION FOR THE PROJECT ELEMENTS WHICH WERE LATER DELETED BY THE DAEC. NOTWITHSTANDING THE LONG TERM COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE, EACH SPECIFIC COMMITMENT OF FUNDS FOR A PROJECT MUST DEMONSTRATE ADEQUATE PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND COSTING AND BE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY AID/W. THERE

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WAS NO EXEMPTION FROM THIS REQUIREMENT FOR PROJECT DB6. FOR THIS REASON, ALL A.I.D. MISSION STAFFS MUST TAKE CARE IN DISCUSSING PROPOSED PROJECT ASSISTANCE WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO AVOID CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT AN A.I.D. COMMITMENT EXISTS PRIOR TO BUREAU REVIEW AND AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDING FOR THE PROJECT.

7. THE L.A. BUREAU IN LATE JUNE HAD IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF WEAKNESSES IN THE PROJECT PAPER FOR DB6 WHICH HAD TO BE CORRECTED BEFORE ALL PROJECT ELEMENTS COULD BE AUTHORIZED, AND NOTIFIED USAID/HAITI OF THIS IN REF {B}. IT PROVIDED TDY ASSISTANCE TO HELP THE MISSION PROVIDE THE ADDITIONAL PLANNING AND JUSTIFICATION REQUIRED, BUT SINCE YOU WERE ON HOME LEAVE DURING THIS PERIOD, YOU MAY NOT HAVE BEEN FULLY AWARE OF THESE REQUIREMENTS, AND OF

COURSE, COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS. WHEN THE DAEC REVIEWED THE REVISED PROJECT, IT FOUND THAT A NUMBER OF ITS SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION HAD NOT BEEN MET. CONSEQUENTLY, FAILURE TO MEET STANDARDS OF COSTING, PLANNING, AND JUSTIFICATION FOR CERTAIN PARTS OF THE PROJECT REQUIRED THAT THEY BE DELETED IF THE REST OF THE PROJECT WERE TO BE AUTHORIZED. SPECIFICALLY, DETAILS ON DEVELOPING AND TESTING THE MODEL RHDS WERE NOT SUPPLIED. WITHOUT INFORMATION ON THE TIMING FOR DETERMINING THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL RHDS AND DETAILED COST ESTIMATES FOR STAFFING AND OPERATING A WELL JUSTIFIED NUMBER OF PROTOTYPE RHDS UNITS, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO JUDGE THE NEED, TIMING OR REASONABLENESS OF THE ELEMENTS OF LOGISTICAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT AND THE OPERATION OF THE PROTOTYPES FOR WHICH FUNDING WAS BEING REQUESTED. THE REVISED PROJECT PAPER INCREASED THE NUMBER OF CLINICS TO BE REHABILITATED FROM 5 TO 15, BUT PROVIDED NO COST ESTIMATES OR JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CHANGE, LEAVING THE REQUESTED FUNDS FOR THIS PART OF THE PROJECT UNCHANGED; VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS ALSO WERE CHANGED BUT NO JUSTIFICATION WAS SUPPLIED FOR THE VEHICLES REQUESTED OR FOR THE FACT THAT THE FUNDING REQUEST WAS UNCHANGED. THE REQUEST FOR FUNDING OF MEDICINES WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN TERMS OF DEVELOPING THE RHDS AND APPEARED AS GENERAL BUDGET SUPPORT FOR THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH. SINCE THE PROTOTYPE RHDS HAD NOT YET BEEN DEVELOPED, THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE THIRD, FOURTH, AND FIFTH YEARS OF PROJECT EXPENDITURE COULD NOT BE COSTED AND JUSTIFIED.

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THESE POINTS WERE MADE BY THE L. A. BUREAU NOT TO CRITICIZE THE MISSION, FOR IT REALIZED THAT DELAYS IN SECURING CONSULTANTS UNDER A PRIOR PROJECT HAD DELAYED PROJECT PREPARATION AND PERHAPS MADE PARTS OF IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PREPARE BY THE DEADLINE FOR FY 1977 FUNDING, BUT SIMPLY TO POINT OUT THAT THE DAEC HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ELIMINATE THE PROJECT ELEMENTS FOR WHICH PROPER PLANNING, COSTING AND JUSTIFICATION COULD NOT BE SUPPLIED.

B. IT IS HOPED THIS RESPONSE CLARIFIES THE STATUS OF AID/W FUNDING DECISIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RHDS IN HAITI. WE HOPE THAT THESE APPARENT DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION ADDRESS AND ANSWER RESPONSIVELY THE POINTS RAISED IN THE DISSENT CHANNEL. IF NOT, PLEASE LET US KNOW. WE APPRECIATE HAVING THE ISSUE RAISED SO THAT CLARIFICATION CAN BE MADE. YY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

August 4, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO : Distribution Addressees
FROM : S/P - Richard J. Harrington *RJH*
SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Message

Attached is a dissent channel memorandum by [redacted] on Ambassador Vanden Hueval's proposal on the ILO. Cameron Hume of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply.

TO: S, S/S, S/P-OF, IO *sp files*
cc: IO/LAB - [redacted]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART B6

Handwritten: [Signature]
10/1
Handwritten: [Signature]

Mr. Swiers:

I am enclosing a new version of the last two pages of my dissent memo, which I would appreciate your substituting.

I am also enclosing a letter requesting distribution of the memo to Commerce and EXIM.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature Box] B6

Handwritten: PS



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PAGE 01, ABU DH 01447 300918Z

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ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 08-01 190-00 7004 W

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R: 300840Z MAY 76
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4416

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ABU DHABI 1447

R.O. 1118521 GDS
TAGS 1 PROR, PINS, BU
SUBJECT 1 OFFICIAL WELCOME TO PRESIDENT NIMEIRI

DISSENT CHANNEL

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE DRAFTED BY AMBASSADOR MICHAEL STERNER:

2. MY DCM, [REDACTED], HAS JUST SENT A MESSAGE IN THE DISSENT CHANNEL STATING HIS DISAGREEMENT WITH WASHINGTON'S REPORTED DECIS.

TO RECEIVE SUDANESE PRESIDENT NIMEIRI ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT. I DO NOT WANT ANYONE TO THINK THAT BECAUSE THIS CHANNEL WAS USED [REDACTED] IS DISSENT WAS WITH ME. TEAM MUCH OF HIS PERSUASION, AND I THINK HE MAKES A VALID POINT ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN, ON THE ONE HAND, MAINTAINING CORRECT RELATION OR EVEN EXTENDING ASSISTANCE WHICH IS OF BENEFIT TO A POOR COUNTRY, AND ON THE OTHER TAKING AN ACTION WHICH IS AN HONOR PERSONALLY TO THE MAN WHO RELEASED THE MURDERERS OF MOORE AND NOEL. MR. PEALE'S ADDITIONAL POINT, THAT DOING THIS HARDLY SQUARE WITH A TOUGH POSTURE AGAINST TERRORISM, IS ALSO IMPORTANT.

3. SINCE WE AT THIS POST OBVIOUSLY DO NOT HAVE THE FULL STORY OF THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT LED TO THIS DECISION, I HAVE FELT IT APPROPRIATE TO KEEP [REDACTED]'S VIEWS, AND MINE, IN THE DISSENT CHANNEL. I WOULD NEVERTHELESS LIKE TO REGISTER MY OWN BELIEF THAT, FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US, [REDACTED]'S ARGUMENT AGAINST RECEIVING NUMIERI APPEARS COGENT.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 7, 1978

MEMORANDUM

TO : INR/RNA -

FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake

SUBJECT : Dissent Channel Message: The US and Syria:
The Special Relationship Crumbles

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Your memorandum on US-Syrian relations is a timely and thoughtful reminder of an inherent problem confronting any global power when it attempts to bring its influence to bear on regional problems. Inevitably, one or more states within that region will take umbrage with the regional policy being pursued, with attendant strains on bilateral relationships. Having made our decision a year ago to support the Sadat initiative as the most likely course to produce tangible movement toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement, and having pursued that course to the threshold of a treaty between Egypt and Israel while confronting differences along the way over Lebanon as well, the fact that our relationship with Syria remains as good as it is can be viewed as cause for satisfaction.

Ambassador Seelye has, in fact, described the US-Syrian relationship as "Troubled But Intact" in a cable assessing that relationship, which was sent to a number of posts and was prompted specifically by your memorandum. I am attaching a copy of that cable with which those in the Department who have reflected on your memorandum are in substantial agreement.

I would like to address one assumption which appears to form the basis of your concern -- that US policy-makers are not convinced of the importance of US-Syrian relations. I can assure you this is not the case.

US efforts in the summer of 1977 to reconvene the

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GDS 12/7/84 (LAKE, Anthony)

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-2-

Geneva Conference were undertaken at least partly because it was deemed that in that context Syrian interest could best be aroused. President Sadat's initiative occurred at a time when it had become apparent that we were unlikely to be successful in returning to Geneva and that, accordingly, Egyptian-Israeli negotiations offered the best hope of movement toward a comprehensive peace. The decision to support that initiative was made with the full realization that such a course would not be popular with the Syrian government. As a result, the administration, while remaining engaged in the peace process as it has unfolded, has at the same time taken special pains to preserve the bilateral aspects of our relationship with Syria. The prime example of this was the restoration of the full economic assistance program in the face of strong Congressional opposition, an effort in which the highest levels of the government were engaged. If, as you state, consideration of the AID bill had a negative effect on US-Syrian relations, the problem may in some respects be an understandable one of Syrian perceptions of US actions rather than the actions themselves.

You raise a very good point at the end of your memorandum by alluding to the increased importance of a positive Syrian role as the peace process moves beyond the conclusion of an Egyptian-Israeli treaty to negotiations concerning the future of the West Bank and the complex of Palestinian issues. Indeed, the eventual cooperation of Syria will be crucial to the success of those negotiations. You suggest in your final paragraph that alternative strategies may be available to elicit such cooperation, but you do not spell them out.

Starting from the premise that our policy-makers are indeed concerned about the state of US-Syrian relations and about Syria's posture toward the peace process, I would welcome your further thoughts on specific steps our government might take to produce a more favorable Syrian attitude toward negotiations based on the Camp David Framework. I assure you that your recommendations will be shared with those most closely involved in our mediation effort.

Drafted: S/P:WKirby
x28986:11/29/78

Clearance: NEA/ARN:WCluverius

Open Forum: Galen Fox

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RELEASE IN FULL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FORM DS 322 (OCR)

ACK MRN DTG SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION SPECIAL CHARGES

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SPECIAL HANDLING CAPTIONS

DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJ: DISSSENT MESSAGE FROM ASUNCION ON NARCOTICS CONTROL
REF: ASUNCION 1499

DEPARTMENT ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF REFERENCED DISSENTING MESSAGE ON NARCOTICS CONTROL. THIS MESSAGE HAS RECEIVED INITIAL DISTRIBUTION TO DEPARTMENT PRINCIPALS, INTERESTED FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHIC OFFICES WITHIN DEPARTMENT, AND CHAIRMAN OPEN FORUM PANEL. MORE DETAILED RESPONSE WILL FOLLOW. YY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

SEP 18 1975

TO : EUR/EE - Mr. Nicholas Andrews
FROM : S/P - Samuel W. Lewis. *SL*
SUBJECT: Inspection Report on Eastern Europe --
Requested Response on Recommendation #57

Recommendation #57 in the Inspection Report on our relations with Eastern Europe (Inspector's Memorandum on the consular function in Yugoslavia) was that the Department (S/P) should give [redacted], Chief of the Belgrade Consular Section, a reply to his dissent message of February 24, 1973.

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The attached letter and annexes were sent to [redacted] in June of 1974. The Chairperson of the Open Forum Panel who sent them out considered the packet to be a definite reply to Mr. Hutson and to end the exchange of communications on the subject. Mr. Hutson understood the June 11 material to be an interim reply, partly because it came on Open Forum rather than Department stationery, and expected a further response. He mentioned this expectation to the inspectors, and it was reflected in their Recommendation #57.

[redacted] is now assigned in the Department. The current Open Forum Chairperson has informed him in conversation that no further reply to his original communication is planned. In the same conversation, [redacted] kindly consented to chair an informal Open Forum working group which will have a fresh try at reforming the obsolete portion of the visa law to which Mr. Hutson raised objections from Belgrade.

Drafted: S/P: PJLydon: bdm
9-15-75

cc: CU/EE: [redacted]

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T. Thornton

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN FULL

December 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM

TO : ARA - Ambassador Thomas O. Enders
EB - Ambassador Robert D. Hormats
S/S - Mr. L. Paul Bremer, III

FROM : S/P - Paul Wolfowitz *Paul*

SUBJECT : Costa Rica Dissent Channel

The following Dissent Channel message has been received and is forwarded for your comments and review. Mr. Thomas Thornton of the S/P staff will be preparing a coordinated response. Would you please provide any comments to Mr. Thornton (X28328) by C.O.B. Wednesday, December 9.

Attachment:

San Jo 7210

CONFIDENTIAL-ATTACHMENT

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ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /004 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7738

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BUCHAREST 2463

DISSENT CHANNEL

DRAFTING OFFICER REQUEST HANDLING AS NODIS TO THE
SECRETARY; COPIES TO THE ACTING SECRETAGI AND COUNCELOR

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR EEW ETRD US RO
SUBJECT: U S-ROMANIAN LONG-TERM ECONOMIC INDUSTRIAL AND
TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT

REF: STADIS BUCHAREST TELEGRAM NOV 3-4, 1974, KISSINGER
VISIT, BUCHEAREST 2239, VIETS/LORIMER TELECON OF APRIL 27, 1976

1. FROM [REDACTED] ECONOMIC SECTION, AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST.
2. PROBLEM: NEGOTIATION WITH GOR ON LONG-TERM COOPERATION
AGREEMENT TO BEGIN IN BUCHAREST MAY 10 . CURRENT USG DRAFT,
FROM WHICH WE CAN EXPECT SOME RETREAT, OF LITTLE ECONOMIC OR
POLITICAL VALUE TO US. DANGER OF MISLEADING AMERICAN BUSINESS.
GOR, IN ROLE OF SUITOR IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD REAP
POLITICAL GAINS IN ITS BALANCING ACT WITH USSR, WITHOUT
CONCEDING MUCH TO USG. NEITHER EMBASSY NOR WASHINGTON WORKING
LEVEL BUREAUCRACY WILLING TO EXPLOIT OUR ADVANTAGEOUS
POSITION BY HARDENING TERMS, BECAUSE THEY PERCEIVE THAT YOU
AND THE PRESIDENT ARE PRESSING FOR SWIFT CONCLUSION OF
AGREEMENT.

3. BACKGROUND: A STADIS TELEGRAM (COPY NOT RETAINED IN
EMBASSY FILES) SENT DURING YOUR NOVEMBER 3-4, 1974, VISIT TO
BUCHAREST DIRECTED THAT AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF TRADE

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PAGE 02 BUCAR 02463 041839Z

AGREEMENT BETWEEN U S AND ROMANIA, WE SHOULD PROCEED TO NEGOTIATION OF LONG-TERM COOPERATION AGREEMENT. THOSE TWO DOCUMENTS WOULD DEMONSTRATE ROMANIA'S FAVORED RELATIONSHIP WITH U S COMPARED TO OTHER EE COUNTRIES, IN KEEPING WITH NSDM/CIEPDM 212 ORDER OF PRECEDENCE. DENUNCIATION BY OTHER EE COUNTRIES OF TITLE IV OF TRADE ACT OF 1974 LEFT ROMANIA AS ONLY COUNTRY TO HAVE ENTERED INTO TRADE AGREEMENT WITH U S UNDER ITS TERMS.

4. BOTH IN EMBASSY AND AT WORKING LEVEL IN STATE, PERCEPTION REMAINS THAT YOUR STILL-CURRENT DESIRE IS FOR US TO MOVE QUICKLY IN NEGOTIATION OF LONG-TERM COOPERATION AGREEMENT. MOMENTUM WHICH THAT PERCEPTION CREATES UNDERCUTS ANY ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT OUR POSITION OF STRENGTH VIS-A-VIS GOR ON THIS MATTER TO HARDEN OUR TERMS. RESULT WILL BE ANOTHER GENERALLY WORDED COSMETIC AGREEMENT SIMILAR TO U S-SOVIET ONE. WHILE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS (MAINTENANCE OF MOMENTUM IN U S-SOVIET RELATIONS DESPITE COLLAPSE OF SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT) MAY HAVE PROMPTED OUR DECISION IN THAT INSTANCE, NO SUCH NECESSITY COMPELS US IN ROMANIAN CASE.

S/

S/

5. TWO CONCRETE PROVISIONS WE ARE SEEKING WITH ROMANIA WOULD DIFFERENTIATE IT FROM SOVIET PREDECESSOR:

(1) EXPROPRIATION RIGHTS CLAUSE, (2) ANNEX ON RIGHTS OF JOINT VENTURES. GOR MAY WELL YIELD ON EXPROPRIATION; BUT ANNEX, INSOFAR AS IT DIFFERS FROM ROMANIAN DECREE OF 1972 ON JOINT VENTURES, IS UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED.

6. BOTH THESE PROVISIONS LAUNCH OUT IN THE WRONG DIRECTION ANYWAY, THAT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP BY U S CITIZENS OF MEANS OF PRODUCTION IN ROMANIA. LAST FOUR YEARS HAVE SEEN ESTABLISHMENT OF ONLY SIX JOINT VENTURES IN ROMANIA. OTHER FORMS (LICENSING, PLANT INSTALLATION WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING, BUY-BACK) DOMINATE ROMANIA'S INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION.

7. USG DRAFT SHOULD ADDRESS ITSELF TO FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC SYSTEM WHICH HAVE PLAGUED PAST AND CURRENT AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION IN ROMANIA (GENERAL

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PAGE 03 BUCAR 02463 041839Z

TIRE'S RADIAL TIRE PLANT AND SINGER PRODUCT'S BATTERY PLANT AS TWO EXAMPLES) AND REMAIN AS BASIC IMPEDIMENT TO FUTURE OF COOPERATION. TWO NECESSITIES: (1) HARD ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, AND COMMERCIAL DATA (IN EXCESS OF BARE-BONES REQUIREMENTS OF CSCCE) UPON WHICH TO BASE SOUND BUSINESS DECISIONS, AND (2) FREEDOM FOR RESIDENT AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN FROM ROMANIAN SECURITY'S CONTROL OVER SMALLEST ASPECT OF ON-JOB CONTACT

WITH ROMANIANS. WITHOUT SUCH FREEDOM, MEANINGFUL COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED; WITHOUT PROVISIONS FOR SUCH EXEMPTION FROM CONTROL, LONG-TERM COOPERATION AGREEMENT COULD DANGEROUSLY MISLEAD AMERICAN COMPANIES INTO BELIEVING THAT CONDITIONS AT LEAST AS UNHINDERED AS THOSE IN REST OF EE EXIST IN ROMANIA FOR INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION.

8. STRINGENCIES OF TRADE ACT FORCED US TO SEEK, AND OBTAIN, FROM ROMANIA MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TRADE AGREEMENT WE NOW HAVE IN FORCE WITH ANY COUNTRY. ONE-SIDENESS OF SOME OF ITS PROVISIONS (SUCH AS PROTECTION FROM MARKET DISRUPTION) SHOW EXTENT OF ROMANIAN POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS. IN RECENT CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR, FOREIGN MINISTER MACOVESCU (REPORTED IN BUCHAREST 2239) SAID IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO FIND NEW FORMULAS TO PROVIDE MOMENTUM TO TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION (PARA 11), THAT WILLY NILLY WE NEEDED EVIDENCE OF RAPID IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. (PARA 12). WE SHOULD EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY TASHOW CONGRESS THAT WITHOUT THEIR INTERFERENCE WE CAN SECURE MEANINGFUL, ADVANTAGEOUS CONCESSIONS FROM GOR. DURING CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW THIS SUMMER OF U S-ROMANIAN TRADE AGREEMENT, CONCLUSION OF LONG-TERM INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT COULD SOUR ATMOSPHERE IF FACTORS FUNDAMENTAL TO COOPERATION ARE NOT ADDRESSED.

9. CONCLUSION: OUR SIGNATURE OF LONG-TERM AGREEMENT BASED ON CURRENT USG DRAFT WOULD MISREPRESENT EXISTING CONDITIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION WITH ROMANIA AND, ON THE MARGIN, MIGHT LEAD AMERICAN BUSINESSES INTO BAD DECISIONS. TWO SOLUTIONS: (1) SECURE MEANINGFUL CHANGES IN EXISTING CONDITIONS OR (2) DISCONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS. FORMER APPEARS POSSIBLE, BECAUSE OF STRONG GOR POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENT. DECISION ON LATTER CAN BE POSTPONED UNTIL

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PAGE 04 BUCAR 02463 041839Z

WE HAVE EXHAUSTED EFFORTS AT FORMER. TO PREVENT PREMATURE
CAVING-IN TO GOR, INDICATION IS NECESSARY FROM YOU TO U S TEAM
THAT YOUR DECISION TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENT IS NOT SET IN CEMENT.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. THAT DEPARTURE OF DELEGATION FROM WASHINGTON MAY BE POSTPONE
UNTIL USG CAN DEVELOP CREATIVE PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH
ISSUES OF INFORMATION AND OF IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION POSED
BY SECURITY FORCES EVER-TIGHTENING GRIP;

B. THAT EMBASSY BUCHAREST BE DIRECTED TO TABLE THOSE PROPOSALS
AND COOPERATIVE GOR RESPONSE BE OBTAINED BEFORE DELEGATION BE
DISPATCHED TO BUCHAREST;

C. THAT YOU DIRECT THAT IF USG ENCOUNTERS INTRANSIGENCE FROM
GOR, WE BE PREPARED TO INDEFINITELY SHELVES SUBJECT OF LONG-TERM
AGREEMENT.
HAAS

NOTE: THIS TELEGRAM BEING TRANSMITTED WITHOUT CHARGE CLEARANCE
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S/P DISTRIBUTION ONLY

ROUTINE MEXICO CITY

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS: CPAS, PFOR

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: MEXICO 6753

FOR [] - MEXICO

SWL
PTL PTL
CWK CWK

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1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF REFERENCED DISSENT CABLE.

2. MR. C. WILLIAM KONTOS OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF (S/P) HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR CABLE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, AND THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. COPIES WILL ALSO GO TO M - DEPUNDSEC FOR ADMINISTRATION.

4. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO YOUR CONCERN. YY

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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

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PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF HOLDING A DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT CONSIDERABLE DILUTION OF THE STRICT ISSUANCE CRITERIA. THE DEPARTMENT HAS LONG BEEN AWARE THAT, IN MANY COUNTRIES, HOST GOVERNMENT POLICIES REGARDING FOREIGN MISSIONS MAY BENEFIT INDIVIDUALS WHO HOLD DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS BUT FAIL TO CONFER ADVANTAGES ON THOSE WHO DO NOT. THIS SITUATION IS REGRETTABLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE SOME OF THE DISADVANTAGES ARE FINANCIAL IN NATURE. SINCE ITS INCEPTION, HOWEVER, THE ISSUANCE AND USAGE OF A DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT HAS BEEN A TOOL OF DIPLOMACY BY ALL NATIONS AND CLEARLY SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED OR EMPLOYED AS A DOCUMENT OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE, FAVOR OR SOCIAL STANDING.

4. MINDFUL OF THESE INEQUITIES, THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL HAS SEVERAL TIMES SOUGHT TO EXPLORE THE RECOMMENDATION MADE IN 1970 BY THE SALTONSTALL COMMITTEE TO FACILITATE TRAVEL THAT THE THREE TYPES OF PASSPORTS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BE REPLACED WITH A ONE-CLASS SYSTEM. I AM AWARE THAT YOUR SUGGESTION IS NOT TO ESTABLISH A ONE-CLASS PASSPORT FOR EVERYONE, BUT TO RETAIN THE DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT FOR ALL USG EMPLOYEES. THIS, HOWEVER, WOULD ITSELF DISCRIMINATE AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS WHO SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE EQUAL TREATMENT WHEN TRAVELING OVERSEAS. THE REGIONAL BUREAUS HAVE OPPOSED MODIFICATION OF THE PRESENT THREE-CLASS PASSPORT SYSTEM, POINTING OUT THAT TO ISSUE DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS TO ALL USG EMPLOYEES ABROAD WOULD ABROGATE THE RAISON D-ETRE OF THE DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT, AND WOULD ENCOURAGE A SIMILAR PROLIFERATION OF ISSUANCES BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

5. CLEARLY, THE DEPARTMENT IS AMBIVALENT AS TO THE ABOLITION OF THE DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PASSPORT, BUT I AM NOT CONVINCED THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO SEEK ESTABLISHMENT OF ANOTHER TYPE OF PASSPORT SYSTEM. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PASSPORTS DO, AT CERTAIN TIMES AND PLACES, CONFER SPECIAL PROTECTION ON PERSONS WHO CARRY THEM, AND I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT IS TIMELY TO REMOVE THIS PROTECTION FOR USG EMPLOYEES WHO ARE TOO OFTEN POLITICAL TARGETS. NONETHELESS, IT IS MY FIRM BELIEF THAT THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD NOT TOLERATE THE MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT, AND I STRONGLY SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD STRIVE TO ELIMINATE THE SPECIAL INTERESTS, INEQUITIES, AND DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES WHICH SPRING FROM THE MISUSE OF THIS DOCUMENT. THANK YOU AGAIN FOR BRINGING THIS MATTER TO MY ATTENTION.44

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Department of State

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ACTION AYD-39

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F.O. 11652; N/A
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, IS:
SUBJECT: ISRAELI FY. 1975 PL. 400 TITLE I REQUIREMENTS

Get back's copy this telegram and copies of these

- REF: A. STATE 921481 ←
- B. TEL AVIV 26981 ←
- C. STATE 126140 ←

1. IN PREPARING REFTEL B WE OF COURSE KNEW OF GOI REQUEST LAST AUGUST FOR PL 480 COMMODITIES VALUED THEN AT ABOUT \$100 MILLION. (THE SAME QUANTITIES WOULD COST ABOUT \$92.3 MILLION AT PRICES SPECIFIED IN REF A, USING CORN COST FOR FEEDGRAIN.) WE HAD ALSO BEEN TOLD (REF A) THAT TITLE I REQUESTS WERE EXPECTED TO EXCEED COMMODITY AVAILABILITIES IN FY-75. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE PROPOSED WHAT WE CONSIDERED TO BE A REASONABLE PROGRAM, ONE WHICH COULD BE CARRIED OUT. WE AERE AWARE THAT THE AGREEMENT FOR ISRAEL LAST YEAR PROVIDED FOR COMMODITIES TOTALLING \$62.0 MILLION BUT IN THE EVENT WE WERE ABLE TO SUPPLY ONLY \$47.6 MILLION WORTH.

2. IN LIGHT OF THE SUBSTANTIALLY LARGE QUANTITIES NOW EXPECTED BE AVAILABLE IN FY-75 (STATE 126140), WE BELIEVE A CASE CAN BE MADE FOR A LARGER PROGRAM FOR ISRAEL THAN THAT SUGGESTED IN OUR MESSAGE. ISRAEL WILL HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS WHICH TITLE I PROGRAMS CAN MEET. FACT THAT THESE LONG-TERMS LOANS PUSH ISRAEL'S FOREIGN INTEREST EVEN HIGHER AND HAVE CREATED SOME DIFFICULTY RECENTLY IN DISPOSING OF EXCESS SOYBEAN OIL, APPARENTLY HAS NOT LESSENED HER INTEREST IN OBTAINING LARGE TITLE I PROGRAM. THUS, IN LIGHT OF AVAILABILITIES AND STRONG GOI INTEREST EMBASSY HAS NO OBJECTION.

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ANY FY-75 PROGRAM IN RANGE OF LAST YEAR'S APPROXIMATELY 800,000
OR HIGHER IF SUPPLY EVOLUTION PERMITS.
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TELEGRAM

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ACTION SP-02
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FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI.
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7217

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NAIROBI 19384

DISSENT CHANNEL
FROM AMBASSADOR

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: EAID
SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE ON ESF

REF: NAIROBI

1. I HAVE READ [REDACTED] DISSENT MESSAGE (REFTEL) ON THE CURRENT USDOL 28 MILLION ESF GRANT TO KENYA. HE HAS BEEN MUCH INVOLVED IN THE POLICY MAKING AT THIS POST. I BELIEVE HIS SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED ARE SINCERE AND DEEPLY FELT. UNFORTUNATELY, [REDACTED] WROTE THIS MESSAGE ON HIS FINAL DAY IN THE OFFICE, LEAVING IT WITH ME AS HE DEPARTED LAST NIGHT. I DOUBT HE WOULD HAVE WRITTEN IT THE WAY HE DID HAD HE BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED IN THE FINAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR THIS GRANT. HE WAS, DURING THAT PERIOD, INVOLVED WITH PACKING OUT AND CLEARING HIS AFFAIRS.

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2. AS TO [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION THAT WE NOT DISBURSE, I AND THE AID DIRECTOR, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE REGIONAL LEGAL ADVISOR, ARE REVIEWING ACTIONS THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA HAS TAKEN AND IS TAKING TO MEET CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR DISBURSEMENT OF THE USDOL 28 MILLION PROVIDED IN OUR ESF AGREEMENT. I WILL MAKE A DECISION TO DISBURSE ONLY IF I AM CONVINCED OF FULL SATISFACTION OF THOSE CONDITIONS. HARRCP

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DIARY

Attachment

1. Prior to the 63rd ILC no Western government asked its Embassies to make demarches on key issues; yet such a procedure is normal in any diplomatic effort in an international forum. Also, the EC-9 (chaired by UK) did not caucus ahead of time to decide on policy, tactics, etc. (see attached cables).
2. We had told our allies we would meet with them in Geneva to discuss strategy on Article 17. USG Representative Horowitz had dinner with representatives of UK, Australia and Canada May 23 and later said it was a waste of time because they had had no ideas ready on strategy. Horowitz therefore suggested to them that ^{the} West should start with the present text and make concessions later: the US had to suggest the strategy.
3. At the same dinner, Horowitz asked what chairmanships in the ILC the allies would seek; they had no ideas. Two days later (May 25) he asked the UK (chairman of EC-9) again about chairmanships; the EC-9 still had no ideas. UK said the EC-9 would caucus when ^{the} conference plenary started. Horowitz said that was too late and urged action but got none. Horowitz then got an officer of the ILO Secretariat to suggest to the UK that the EC-9 ought to caucus at once; they finally did, on the last day of the GB but only as the result of the foregoing prodding. Klotz (FRG) told Upton (USDEL) he understood the US wanted a chairmanship.

Upton said Horowitz had already told the UK we did not; Klotz replied that the failure of the UK to tell this to the EC-9 showed lack of communication and coordination among EC-9.

At staff meeting Horowitz commented that we had had the same problem in June 1976; the West never did any prior work, and as result of their apathy, the Soviet bloc and G-77 had made deals on chairmanships. Horowitz said we would have to come up with ideas and sell them to the West because otherwise the West's inertia would lead to disaster.

4. We wanted Klotz (member of FRG delegation) to accept a key chairmanship; Haase, head of FRG delegation, would not allow it.

5. Westerners then put forth Yeldkamp (Netherlands) despite their knowledge that we opposed him because of his hostile role at June 1976 conference (he was instrumental in preventing Czechoslovakia from being cited in a special paragraph). The West did this because Netherlands wanted him to be elected and the West preferred to support one of their own rather than the US, on this issue.

6. We wanted Ventejol (head of French delegation) - our strongest supporter - to accept a chairmanship. He refused. He did not come to Geneva until June 2, after the ILC had started. He was not in town for the Governing Body and other events at which much lobbying and planning was done in preparation for ILC. He continued to come and go throughout the plenary, rather than work consistently.

3

7. Ambassador Cook, head of Australian delegation, refused to seek the chairmanship of the Selections Committee, despite our urging.

8. The Netherlands employer representative (Cornelia Hak) said to Upton May 25, "why not send Article 17 amendment to the Structure Committee?" This was only two weeks after she had had a long talk by phone with Horowitz in Washington in which he had explained that sending Article 17 to the Structure Committee would be defeat.

9. May 26: Horowitz said that at the IMEC meeting earlier in week, the West had said the US was too rigid in what it was doing.

10. June 2 - staff meeting: Shire (Labor Dept. lawyer) said that in Committee on Application of Conventions (CACR) he needed help from the West. Specifically: the Australian, Canadian and UK government representative were often not there (in Committee) because they were also serving on other committees. Horowitz said he would speak to their heads of delegation but it was a problem caused by their small delegations (query: in view of the importance of this conference, couldn't our allies have sent a couple more people so we had adequate coverage everywhere?)

Later, it was the absence of our IMEC friends from CACR meeting which caused the situation where the USG was the only Government to vote for putting Ethiopia on the "special list". IMEC had first agreed that all IMEC

4

governments would vote that way; then IMEC changed its collective mind, but failed to get the word to the USG because key IMEC government representatives were out of the room when the item came to a vote. Apparently Horowitz' request to heads of IMEC delegations to have their representatives stay put in this key committee did not have any effect.

11. June 3 - during the debate on part of the DG's report (on the Arab-Israel issue) the UK government representative spoke in favor of sending it to the Resolutions Committee. When he was asked by us later why he had not said he was speaking on behalf of the EC-9 he said it was because the EC-9 had not caucused to agree on its position. (Comment: therefore we lost an opportunity to have our allies' views known).

Also: note that the UK and Canadian Government speeches were not exactly fiery (see attached). They could have been far more outspoken.

12. Fortuit, a French government delegate, told Palmer (USDEL) he had to return to Paris June 6 to meet with Ventejol and others "to decide on our policy towards the ILO." (Comment: this seems rather late) He suggested to Palmer that the US should try to find some policy or formula which would attract some members of the G-77 and break up the bloc. He did not seem to feel that France needed to take any initiative along these lines, but rather that it was up to the US to solve the problem. Finally, he asked Palmer if the US would withdraw if we were not satisfied. Palmer said we would. The fact that he asked indicates he had not believed the numerous statements we had made during the preceding eighteen months.

13. June 7 - after we lost our initial effort on Article 17, we wanted to try for a joint committee discussion on the amendment. Horowitz spoke to the UK just before a meeting of EC-9, and the UK agreed to try to avoid having the EC-9 take a final position until we could see what degree of support there was for a joint committee. (again, the US was the one taking the initiative). The final result was that the Structure Committee rejected the joint committee idea. Horowitz reported to staff meeting that our Western allies did not speak in favor of the joint/idea because they believed it would not be adopted. They were silent because they wanted to avoid a fight. USDEL therefore said in the Structure Committee that we would not oppose Article 17 being discussed in the Structure Committee (we were the only Western government which had wanted to press for the joint committee.)

14. June 13 - The IMEC group (^{IN THE} Committee on application of conventions) caucused with the US and it was agreed that IMEC would speak along with US about conditions in USSR. The West German delegate told the US he would deliver a real "blast" at conditions in the USSR. Yet only two Western~~er~~ government representatives besides the US spoke (FRG and Australia) and their interventions were brief and mild. The workers' leader, Houthuys (Belgian), moved for closure, and the employer's leader (Australian) supported it; the employers had not spoken in the debate at all. Although the closure motion was defeated, the atmosphere towards further

6

debate was so cold that after it only a few very brief remarks were made. The US worker, who had prepared a fifteen-minute speech criticizing conditions in the USSR, spoke only for a moment, and later said that the closure motion had prevented him from "building the record" in the committee which would have justified a strong "special paragraph" against the USSR.

The paragraph was drafted by the Committee officers (British, Australian, and Belgian), and was weak. When the draft committee report was presented to the committee for approval, the paragraph was rushed through by the Committee officers, who cut off debate before any committee member had time to speak about the text or suggest changes. None of our IMEC allies objected to this.

Afterwards, the Japanese government representative asked us if that was enough to satisfy us (IMEC had been unwilling to go for the "special list" and reluctant even to support a special paragraph. The US had to take the lead).

15. On Article 17, IMEC agreed with US not to present new texts to the Structure Committee but to wait until a drafting committee was formed (the new texts were from the employers group and from the Canadian government). But on June 14, in the Structure Committee, the Swedish employer presented a new text on Article 17 (despite agreement the day before not to do so); Horowitz was very critical of the text (stating it was worse than Article 17 as it now stands), in the Committee. The Australian Government delegate told Upton later that the US would lose because of our failure to negotiate. / Australian representative told Horowitz/^{the} US was too pushy. The British

Ambassador told Sorenson (Charge) that the US was not listening to the West's concerns and that our "consultations" consisted of our telling them what we wanted. Other IMEC representatives said they did not like being "lectured at".

When a small group met to consider drafts of Article 17, the French government representative (Ventejol) was not there because he had gone back to France; his deputy left the meeting when it was only halfway through its deliberations.

(Note: the French are supposed to be our strongest allies in the ILO.)

16. June 15 - late in the day the EC-9 met and agreed to support the US tactic of starting to discuss the text of Article 17 in the Structure Committee while also seeking to kill the G-77 resolution on structure. However, the EC-9 asked Horowitz if the US would instead of pushing for amending standing orders on Article 17, agree to a resolution in plenary stating the principles of Article 17. Horowitz said "no" (note: interesting that after we had told everybody that we were going all the way on Article 17, they should still ask us to accept a compromise to avoid a confrontation -- this is the same attitude that led to the letter of intent).

17. June 16 - in Structure Committee, Mainwaring (our Canadian ally) began discussing the substantive part of the G-77 resolution, despite explicit IMEC/US agreement that substantive discussion would not begin until IMEC had caucused to decide on its position. Horowitz said the next day that he never thought he would have to tell off Mainwaring for

8

"~~breaking ranks~~" but in fact he had had to do just that the morning of June 17, because Mainwaring had violated the agreement.

18. Also in Structure Committee, during discussion of reform of the composition of the Governing Body, Ventejol, our best ally, said his government/^(France) was in favor of negotiating on changing Article 7 and 36 (dealing with permanent seats and veto power). We have consistently said we are against this.

19. June 21 - Horowitz said at staff meeting that although it was clear that the report of the Structure Committee would be unacceptable to/^{the} US, he had decided not to push for a vote because IMEC didn't want one and the US had to maintain good relations with IMEC in order to get their future cooperation (note: at this point, the US was supporting IMEC rather than the other way round!)

Late on June 21 there was a long IMEC meeting on the content of the draft report of the Structure Committee. IMEC said the report as it now was, was the best that could be accomplished and wanted us to accept it. US then took a leadership role

We insisted the language had to be changed. More meetings took place but no satisfactory language was achieved. Azimi (chairman of SC) then drafted the report which was to be considered in various groups the morning of June 22.

(Note: Palmer was sitting next to Kirkland in plenary during the afternoon and asked him what was happening.

9

He said, "the Westerners are leaving us; they want us to accept a report that we can't accept, so Horowitz has to go into the IMEC meeting and stand with his back against the wall; we can't give in on this".)

20. June 22 - IMEC and other groups met; agreed to accept report of Structure Committee; we said we could not - and we were left alone.

During the final hours of the plenary on the last day, when the report of the Committee on Structure was being discussed, the US was the only government to disassociate itself from the report because the report failed to include important principles (Article 17) which we had been striving towards. All other Western speakers accepted the report.

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Rec'd 9/12/74



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~Secret~~
Attachments

Sept. 15, 1974

Dear Mr. Lord,

I am again submitting my dissent paper, since AF is now recommending sale of the DC-8 to Gabon.

I have prepared a brief critique of AF's memo, rebutting the assertion that we now have President Bongo's personal assurances that the plane will not go into Rhodesian trade. I have placed this rebuttal on top of my original dissent paper.

I realize that the Secretary's extremely heavy schedule makes it unlikely he will read the entire dissent paper or even part of it. I hope that he can be at least orally briefed on the major points, contained in my critique dated Sept. 15 and in the first section of my dissent paper.

I would greatly appreciate expeditious handling of this paper.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature box]

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Mr. Winston Lord
S/P

CC: [Redacted]
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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0800

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: DESIGNATION OF PART III OF PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCES ASSESSMENT - AS STADIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SECRETARY MADE IN PART III OF THE SANTIAGO PARM SUBMISSION

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [] PUBLIC AFFAIRS, USIA. THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE. HE SUGGESTS THAT DISTRIBUTION BE MADE TO THE DIRECTOR OF USIA; THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF USIA (LATIN AMERICA), THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CULTURAL AFFAIRS, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERAMERICAN AFFAIRS.

2. I AM FILING THIS CABLE TO DISSENT FROM:

A. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY TO REQUIRE AMBASSADOR'S SECRETLY TO RECOMMEND CUTS IN THE PERSONNEL OF OTHER AGENCIES UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION WITHOUT CONSULTING THE DIRECTORS OF THESE AGENCIES TO OBTAIN THEIR COMMENTS. THIS REQUIREMENT WAS MADE BY THE DEPARTMENT BY REQUIRING PART III OF THE PARM TO BE DESIGNATED STADIS.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE AMBASSADOR, WITH THE ADVICE OF THE DCM AND THE OTHER THREE COUNSELORS OF EMBASSY AT THIS POST, WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE COUNSELOR FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, FOR A 60 PERCENT CUT IN THE AMERICAN OFFICER COMPLEMENT DEVOTED TO CULTURAL AFFAIRS IN CHILE.

3. ADDRESSING POINT (A), I DISSENT FROM THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE DEPARTMENT IN PARM III THAT THE AMBASSADOR IS TO KEEP HIS RECOMMENDATIONS SECRET FROM OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE MISSION. THIS IS DIRECTLY OPPOSITE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION FOR AS MUCH OPENNESS AS POSSIBLE IN DIPLOMACY. I DISSENT FROM THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW THAT THIS IS NECESSARY TO GIVE THE AMBASSADOR FREEDOM OF ACTION IN MAKING CANDID RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT. RECOMMENDATIONS, MADE IN SECRET WITHOUT SOLICITING THE VIEWS OF THE RESPONSIBLE OFFICER MOST CONCERNED WITH THE SPECIFIC QUESTION, MAY BE CANDID BUT ALSO CAN EASILY LACK THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF INFORMED OPINION FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO MAKE LOGICAL DECISIONS.

4. THIS OFFICER WAS ASKED TO WORK LONG AND HARD WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM TO DRAFT THE PHILOSOPHY EXPRESSED IN PART I OF THE PARM. THEN HE WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE MEETINGS WHICH DETERMINED PART III OF THE SAME EXERCISE.

5. IN THIS REGARD I POST THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. IF THE STATE DEPARTMENT CAN'T HAVE OPEN DIPLOMACY WITHIN ITS OWN EMBASSIES BETWEEN FELLOW FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS, HOW CAN IT SINCERELY SUPPORT PRESIDENT CARTER'S POLICY OF OPEN DIPLOMACY WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE?

B. CAN ANY SO-CALLED MEMBER OF THE COUNTRY TEAM EVER SERIOUSLY CONSIDER HIMSELF A MEMBER OF THE COUNTRY TEAM IF DECISIONS INVOLVING HIS ROLE IN THE EMBASSY ARE MADE SECRETLY BY SELECTED OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM?

C. IF THE STATE DEPARTMENT CAN'T TRUST ITS AMBASSADORS TO HAVE THE COURAGE TO FACE THEIR OWN STAFFS WITH DIFFICULT MANAGEMENT DECISIONS, HOW CAN THEY EXPECT THEM TO HAVE THE NECESSARY FORCEFULNESS TO FACE A MEMBER OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT WITH A DIFFICULT INSTRUCTION?

D. DOES THE DEPARTMENT NEED A SECRET SYSTEM TO GET HONEST DECISIONS OUT OF ITS AMBASSADORS?

6. ADDRESSING POINT (B), I DISSENT FROM THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE AS A POLICY DECISION BY THIS MISSION FOR A 60 PERCENT CUT IN THE CULTURAL COMPONENT OF THE MISSION WHEN INCREASED CULTURAL CONTACT WITH LATIN AMERICANS HAS BEEN MADE A PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY AS EXPRESSED IN HIS RECENT SPEECH BEFORE THE OAS AND EMPHASIZED BY THE VISIT OF MRS CARTER TO LATIN AMERICA.

7. THERE ARE 11 AMERICANS ASSIGNED TO USIS CHILE PLUS TWO REGIONAL POSITIONS WHO SPEND VERY LITTLE TIME IN SANTIAGO AND ARE BASED HERE AS A CONVENIENCE TO THE AGENCY. OF THESE 11 AMERICANS, ONE IS A SECRETARY, TWO ARE INFORMATION OFFICERS, ONE IS THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND ONE IS THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER. THE REMAINING SIX ARE THE CULTURAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, THE DEPUTY CULTURAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, THE ASSISTANT CULTURAL AFFAIRS OFFICER, AND THREE BINATIONAL CENTER DIRECTORS.

8. THE MISSION IS RECOMMENDING THAT FOUR OF THESE SIX CULTURAL POSITIONS BE ABOLISHED -- THE DCAO, THE ACAO AND TWO OF THE THREE BINATIONAL CENTER DIRECTORS. I DISSENT FROM THIS RECOMMENDATION SINCE IT WOULD CUT THE CULTURAL PROGRAM IN CHILE AT A TIME WHEN, BECAUSE OF TENSENESS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, IT IS IMPERATIVE TO KEEP U.S. CULTURAL AND PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PROGRAMS NOT ONLY ALIVE BUT THRIVING.

9. WITHOUT ANY APPARENT CONCERN FOR THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS DECISION NOR THE EFFECT ON THE MANY IN CHILE WHO LOOK TO OUR CULTURAL CENTERS TO INCREASE THE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF BOTH NATIONS, THE MISSION HAS RECOMMENDED ABOLISHING AMERICAN CENTER DIRECTORS IN CONCEPCION WHERE FOR 35 YEARS THERE HAS BEEN AN AMERICAN OFFICER AND IN VALPARAISO WHERE THERE HAS BEEN AN AMERICAN FOR 21 YEARS. I DISSENT FROM THIS DECISION.

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PROR, PINS, SU
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL WELCOME TO PRESIDENT NIMEIRI

DISSENT CHANNEL

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE DRAFTED BY FSO [] DISTRIBUTIO
LEFT TO DEPT'S DISCRETION.

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2. WIRELESS FILE OF THURSDAY, MAY 27, CARRIES ITEM IN NEWS ROUND
REFERRING TO REUTERS REPORT OUT OF KHARTOUM TO EFFECT THAT SUDANE
PRESIDENT NIMEIRI WILL VISIT THE U.S. FOR TWO WEEKS IN JUNE AND W
BE RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT FORD AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. I CAN ONL
HOPE THAT REUTERS IS WRONG, COMPLETELY AND TOTALLY WRONG. SADLY,
HOWEVER, I ASSUME THAT USIA WOULD NOT HAVE PUT THE ITEM IN THE
WIRELESS FILE IN THE FIRST PLACE IF IT WERE NOT CORRECT. HENCE T
MESSAGE TO EXPRESS MY STRONG DISSENT FROM THE POLICY DECISION WHI
ALLOWS NIMEIRI TO BE GIVEN AN OFFICIAL WELCOME IN THE U.S.

3. FRANKLY THE THOUGHT OF PRESIDENT FORD RECEIVING NIMEIRI IN TH
WHITE HOUSE ALMOST MAKES ME PHYSICALLY ILL. ONE DOES NOT
HAVE TO HAVE SERVED IN KHARTOUM IN MARCH 1973, ONE DOES NOT
NEED TO HAVE BEEN A CLOSE FRIEND OF CURT MOORE OR A DEER
ADMIRER OF CLEO NOEL TO BE APPALLED AT THE THOUGHT OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, OR OUR PRESIDENT, WELCOMING THIS MAN WHO
RELEASED THE MURDERS OF THESE TWO FOREIGN SERVICE COLLEAGUES.
IT IS WRONG, JUST PURELY AND SIMPLY WRONG.

4. I AM NOT OF THE PERSUASION OF SOME THAT WE SHOULD HAVE
BROKEN OFF RELATIONS WITH THE SUDAN IN 1974 WHEN THE MURDERS

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WERE RELEASED. NOR WAS IT WRONG TO SEND AMBASSADOR BREWER BACK TO KHARTOUM AFTER A TIME. NEITHER DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS NOR THE PRESENCE OF AN AMBASSADOR IN ANY WAY CONDONES WHAT NIMEIRI DID. AND I CAN EVEN ACCEPT SOME U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE SUDAN (ALTHOUGH THE DIFFICULTY IN MAKING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HELP FOR ONE OF THE WORLD'S POOREST NATIONS AND SUPPORT FOR NIMEIRI'S NOT ALWAYS SO POPULAR REGIME IS BOTHERSOME). MOREOVER FOR THOSE SERVING IN THE SUDAN, IT IS PROBABLY DIFFICULT NOT TO WANT TO SEE RELATIONS IMPROVE. IT IS AGAINST HUMAN NATURE TO JUST SIT THERE GIVING THE SUDANESE THE COLD SHOULDER FOR TWO YEARS. WASHINGTON, HOWEVER, DOES NOT FACE THE SAME PRESSURES.

5. ONE CAN ALSO ANTICIPATE THE LIKELY ARGUMENT THAT NIMEIRI HELP US WITH THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICANS HELD BY THE ERITREAN REBELS AND DESERVES SOME SIGN OF APPRECIATION IN RETURN. MAYBE SO, BUT THE PRESS REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAS ALREADY SENT A MESSAGE OF THANKS TO NIMEIRI. THAT IS MORE THAN ENOUGH. TO GO FURTHER IS SOMEHOW TO ARGUE THAT ALL IS FORGIVEN. THAT EITHER TIME OR SOME OTHER ACTION (E.G. THE ERITREAN BUSINESS) MAKES THE RELEASE OF THE KILLERS OF OUR TWO DIPLOMATS ALL RIGHT. WHAT OTHER INTERPRETATION CAN BE GIVEN TO THE ACT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GIVING NIMEIRI AN OFFICIAL WELCOME IN WASHINGTON? PERHAPS WE HAVE NO GROUNDS FOR DENYING HIM A VISA FOR A PRIVATE VISIT (ALTHOUGH WE COULD, AND IN MY VIEW SHOULD, DISCOURAGE HIM) BUT I BELIEVE IT IS BOTH POLITICALLY WRONG (IN TERMS OF OUR ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY) AND A DISHONOR TO OUR MURDERED COLLEAGUES TO GIVE HIM ANY OFFICIAL INDICATION HE IS WELCOME IN OUR COUNTRY. WHAT HE DID CAN NEVER BE FORGIVEN. ONE CAN UNDERSTAND PERHAPS SOME OF THE REASONS WHY HE DID IT, BUT THAT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE. HE FAILED TO LIVE UP TO HIS COMMITMENTS TO US. HIS DECISION WAS WRONG. NOW HE MUST LIVE WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTION. THAT IS WHAT BEING HEAD OF STATE IS ALL ABOUT. UNTIL NIMEIRI LEAVES POWER VOLUNTARILY OR OTHERWISE, THERE MUST IN MY VIEW BE DISTINCT LIMITS BEYOND WHICH WE WILL NOT GO IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SUDAN AND MOST PARTICULARLY WITH ITS HEAD OF STATE. AND PRESIDENT FORD AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS GOBBETING NIMEIRI IN WASHINGTON IS MILES BEYOND THOSE LIMITS. AGAIN I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THE REUTERS REPORT IS WRONG.

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PAGE 01 ASUNCI 01499 01 OF 02 141640Z

51 ACTION SS-14

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8374

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 ASUNCION 1499

DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE; NARCOTICS CONTROL

REF: (A) DEPT A-3559 OF APRIL 8; (B) ASUNCION A-54 OF JUNE 12; (C) ASUNCION A-9 OF JANUARY 31 (COUNTRY ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY PAPER)

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY [redacted] FSO-5; [redacted] FSO-6; AND [redacted] FSO-5, BNDD SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, CONCURS SUBSTANCE OF MESSAGE. RECOMMEND THIS CABLE RECEIVE SAME DISTRIBUTION AS REF. (B).

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2. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS RECOMMENDED MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BY U.S. IN LIGHT PARAGUAYAN GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF COMMITMENT TO COOPERATE IN NARCOTICS FIELD. REF (B), POUCHED JUNE 12, UPDATES EMBASSY'S NARCOTICS ACTION CONTROL PLAN. IN OUR OPINION, THIS UPDATED PLAN SATISFACTORY AS FAR AS IT GOES, BUT LACKS SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON U.S. ACTIONS AND TIME FRAMES FOR COHERENT IMPLEMENTATION. THE TIME IS LATE, AND CONCRETE MEASURES MUST NOW SUPPLEMENT WORDS IF WE ARE EITHER TO OBTAIN GOP COOPERATION OR BRING HOME TO GOP CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO COOPERATE.

3. BACKGROUND: LACK OF PARAGUAYAN POLITICAL COMMITMENT. REF. (B) OUTLINES LACK OF GOP COMMITMENT, BUT WE BELIEVE FACTS SET FORTH THEREIN SHOULD BE INTERPRETED EVEN MORE UNFAVORABLE AGAINST GOP. ITEM: TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, GOP HAS NOT MADE HARD DRUG ARREST ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE IN

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PAGE 02 ASUNCI 01499 01 OF 02 141640Z

PAST FEW YEARS. THOUGH THREE COCAINE TRAFFICKERS ARRESTED LATE MAY 1972, BASED ON INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY BNDD, GOP HAS HUSHED UP ARRESTS. THOUGH IT HAS PRIVATELY STATED INTENTION PROSECUTE EX POST FACTO UNDER TO-BE-PASSED DRUG LAW, WE BELIEVE GOP KNOWS PROSECUTION WILL FAIL ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS.

4. ITEM: SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT CONCLUSION THAT DELAY IN APPROVAL PENDING DRUG LEGISLATION IS RESULT OF INTERVENTION BY PRESIDENT STROESSNER, RATHER THAN "LOW PRIORITY" HE ASSIGNED TO PASSAGE. HAD HE WISHED, LAW WOULD BE PASSED BY NOW.

5. ITEM: EVENTUAL DEPORTATION AUGUSTE RICORD EVEN TO COOPERATING THIRD COUNTRY WOULD STILL NOT DEMONSTRATE FULL COMMITMENT TO COOPERATE WITH U.S. ON DRUG PROBLEM. EVEN IF EVENTUALLY RESULTING IN U.S. CUSTODY OF RICORD, WOULD SUGGEST TO THIRD COUNTRIES U.S. MORE INTERESTED IN "SACRIFICIAL LAMBS" FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES THAN IN OBTAINING BASIC POLITICAL COMMITMENTS TO COOPERATE IN DRUG CONTROL. IN FACT, EVEN EXTRADITION AT THIS LATE DATE WOULD SHOW PRECIOUS LITTLE COMMITMENT.

6. STROESSNER'S REFUSAL TO RECEIVE AMBASSADOR WHEN LATTER HAD RETURNED FROM CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE SPECIFICALLY TO SEE STROESSNER IS, AT VERY LEAST, SYMPTOM OF WHAT WE BELIEVE IS HIS FAILURE TO COMPREHEND SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH U.S. VIEWS TRAFFICKING, DESPITE CONSIDERABLE U.S. EFFORTS. TO DATE, HOWEVER, STROESSNER HAS HEARD ONLY WORDS FROM US. WE BELIEVE U.S. MUST GO BEYOND WORDS NOW TO ENSURE THAT STROESSNER UNDERSTANDS CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO COOPERATE AND GIVE HIM OPPORTUNITY GET MESSAGE ONE LAST TIME.

7. WE OWE STROESSNER OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO ACTS BECAUSE DURING PAST YEAR BOTH OUR WORDS AND ACTS HAVE CONVEYED MIXED SIGNALS ABOUT DEPTH OF OUR CONCERN WITH PARAGUAYAN COMMITMENT. EMBASSY OFFICERS AND SOME USG VISITORS HAVE TRIED REPEATEDLY CONVEY OUR DESIRES, BUT ONE HIGH DOD OFFICIAL INTENTIONALLY OMITTED DISCUSS DRUGS WITH STROESSNER. IN CONTRAST AMBASSADOR'S HARD-LINE APPROACH TO FOREIGN MINISTER TWO WEEKS AGO, STROESSNER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 ASUNCI 01499 01 OF 02 141640Z

INVITED TO USMILGP RECEPTION THIS WEEK "TO HONOR INALTERABLE FRIENDSHIP" BETWEEN U.S. PARAGUAYAN ARMED FORCES. MEANWHILE, OUR ACTS OVER SAME PERIOD HAVE ALMOST CERTAINLY GIVEN STROESSNER IDEA THAT ALL IS WELL: PASSAGE SUGAR QUOTA, APPROVAL AID LOANS, DELIVERY 20,000 RIFLES AND 13 HELICOPTERS EARLY 1972, AND DELIVERY TWO MAF BULLDOZERS WOTH \$90,000 LAST WEEK.

8. PHASE ONE, FIVE RECOMMENDATIONS DESIGNED TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATION REF. (C) PAGE 7 TO USE ALL MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO ELICIT A POLITICAL COMMITMENT FROM GOP BEFORE AUGUST 1, DEMONSTRATED BY CONCRETE ACTS. RECOMMENDED U.S. ACTION BEFORE JULY 1!

I. EMBASSY BE INSTRUCTED CANCEL FOURTH OF JULY RECEPTION UNLESS RICORD EXTRADITION CASE DECIDED FAVORABLY BY APPEALS COURT BY JUNE 26.

II. EMBASSY BE INSTRUCTED CONVEY FOLLOWING TO GOP THIS WEEK, EITHER INFORMALLY OR BY NOTE: A) U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PARAGUAY WAS CUT THIS YEAR, PARTLY DUE LACK OF SATISFACTORY PARAGUAYAN PERFORMANCE DRUG FIELD; B) DELIVERY 600 BAR RIFLES, TWENTY CANNON NOW ON HIGH SEAS, RIFLE AMMUNITION AND OTHER MATERIEL IN SUPPLY CHANNEL BEING DELAYED SAME REASON.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN PART
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AIRGRAM

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 Department please Pass
 INFO : BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, MOSCOW, PRAGUE, SOFIA, WARSAW
 NO Later Distribution Per Mr Richard R Peterson
 2-28873

FROM : Amembassy BELGRADE

DATE: February 24, 1973

SUBJECT : Dissent Message

REF : A-3559

DISSENT CHANNEL

This airgram transmits a dissenting view submitted by [redacted] Chief of the Consular Section.

A Policy Initiative--Elimination of Section 212(a)(28)(C) from the Immigration and Nationality Act

I urge the Department to take an active and vigorous lead within the Administration to formulate and have introduced an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act eliminating Section 212(a)(28)(C)--in essence, membership in a communist party or its affiliates--as a ground of ineligibility to receive a visa to the United States.

This section of the law which was born in the traumatic times of the early 1950's has outlived whatever usefulness it may have had. If it need be pointed out, one has to look only to the past year to see how dramatically and wisely our policy has changed toward those who are by definition "excludable"--along with, I might add, criminals, carriers of communicable diseases and prostitutes.

Furthermore, this section of the law has little effect in practice, thanks to pragmatic administrative measures which get around its awkward and untoward effects. For example, waivers are wisely and routinely granted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to permit members of communist parties to enter the United States as nonimmigrants. In addition, the Department of State humanely reaches findings of "involuntariness" in immigrant visa applications so regularly as to be almost pro forma.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

replied by:

CON: [redacted]

2/7/73

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM [redacted]

learned

[redacted]

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RELEASE IN PART
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S/P: TTHORNTON:AG
10/14/81 - EXT 22972
S/P: PWOLFOWITZ

ROUTINE SAN JOSE

DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR [] FROM S/P WOLFOWITZ

E.O. 11652: GDS, 10/14/87 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL)

TAGS:

SUBJECT: COSTA RICA'S ECONOMIC CRISIS

REFERENCE: SAN JOSE 5764

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE HAVE RECEIVED YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE OF SEPTEMBER 8, STUDIED IT CAREFULLY, AND BROUGHT IT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SENIOR CONCERNED OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT. I APPRECIATE THE THOUGHT THAT YOU HAVE GIVEN TO THIS MATTER AND THE INITIATIVE THAT YOU HAVE TAKEN IN DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION OF COSTA RICA AND SOME OF ITS POSSIBLE EFFECTS.

3. YOUR CONCLUSION THAT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE IS NOT AN ADEQUATE SAFETY NET FOR COSTA RICA IS INCONTESTABLE. WE ALSO AGREE -- WHILE WE MUST PURSUE WAYS TO INCREASE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO COSTA RICA -- THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT EVEN INCREASED LEVELS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE MAY NOT SUFFICE TO PREVENT A SEVERE DETERIORATION IN THE COSTA RICAN ECONOMY. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ECONOMIC HARDSHIP WILL NECESSARILY LEAD TO A FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY IN COSTA RICA OR THAT A TAKE-OVER BY EITHER LEFT OR RIGHT IS INEVITABLE. THERE ARE OTHER POLITICAL FACTORS AT WORK IN COSTA RICA AND EVEN TO APPEAR

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PWOLFOWITZ
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 2

THERE ARE OTHER POLITICAL FACTORS AT WORK IN COSTA RICA AND EVEN TO APPEAR TO GIVE UP ON CENTRIST ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, COULD UNDERMINE THE BEST HOPE THAT COSTA RICA HAS.

4. NONETHELESS, WE DO NEED TO CONSIDER A FULL RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES AND OPTIONS, INCLUDING THE ONE THAT YOU HAVE SET FORTH IN GENERAL TERMS. WE WOULD WELCOME SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND RELATED POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE EMBASSY BELIEVE WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE FORMULATION OF MID AND LONGER TERM U.S. POLICY TOWARDS COSTA RICA.

5. THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF THE DISSIDENT CHANNEL. YY

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Ms. Mary Ann Casey S/P

April 21, 1977

[REDACTED]

April 11, 1977 Dissent Channel Memo

1. I failed to list the three attachments at the end of the memo, and I would appreciate it if the following could be added:
"Attachments: a) March 1977 issue of the Foreign Service Journal; b) March 15, 1977 memo to John R. Eriksson; c) List of the EI Salvador Education Sector Analysis documents."

2. As you know, the proposed abolishment of the Sector Analysis Division in the Latin American Bureau is one of the issues dealt with in the memo. I have argued that the policy implications of this decision have not been fully considered. Yesterday I was told that a cable informing the missions that the division is being abolished has been circulated in the Bureau and is about to be sent.

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S/P-01

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CASE CLOSED

(f)

Suitable for
Journal?

S/P:RFEINBERG:RYM
9/27/78 EXT 20822
S/P:ALAKE

S/P-GFOX
HA:

ARA/AND-MBARNEY

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE SANTIAGO

DISSENT CHANNEL - FOR [] FROM S/P-LAKE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

AL
RF/FF
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1. FIRST, I WOULD LIKE TO COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISSENT CHANNEL PROCEDURES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF BUREAU OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS.

2. WE AGREE WITH MANY OF THE POINTS EXPRESSED IN YOUR CABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT THE GOC ECONOMIC STRATEGY HAS EMPHASIZED REDUCING LABOR COSTS, BOTH TO CONTROL EFFECTIVE DEMAND AND INCREASE THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF CHILEAN EXPORTS. WAGES HAVE BEEN A MAJOR EXCEPTION TO THE GOC POLICY OF ALLOWING PRICES TO BE SET ON THE FREE MARKET.

3. THE DANGERS FACING WORKERS WHO DARE TO PROTEST, AS OUTLINED IN PARA 6 OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE, ILLUSTRATE THAT, WHILE THE WORST FORMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES HAVE BEEN SHARPLY REDUCED, MANY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 2

OF REPRESSION REMAIN IN PLACE. THE RAPID ARREST AND RUSTICATION OF WORKERS IN THE CHUQUICAMATA MINE DISPUTE ILLUSTRATE GOC WILLINGNESS TO EXERT SUFFICIENT FORCE AS REQUIRED BY ITS PERCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS AND ACCEPTABLE WAGE RATES.

4. THE REJECTION BY THE COPPER WORKERS OF THE GOC-APPOINTED LEADERS POINTS OUT THE FLAWS IN THE GOC'S ATTEMPT TO SUBSTITUTE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED UNIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC ONES. ON THE OTHER HAND, FINANCE MINISTER DE CASTRO'S ARGUMENT THAT COPPER WORKERS ARE ALREADY AMONG THE BEST PAID CHILEAN WORKERS IS CERTAINLY TRUE, AND IS IRONICALLY REMINISCENT OF ALLENDE'S OWN CRITICISMS OF THE OPPOSITION-INSPIRED COPPER WORKERS' STRIKE DURING THE UP'S LAST MONTHS.

5. THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF POLITICALLY-ORIENTED CHILEANS DURING THE PROTEST SHOULD NOT CLOUD AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST AN ADJUSTMENT OF WAGES OR OTHER BENEFITS. OF COURSE, WE REJECT THE GOC LABEL OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY WITHIN LABOR UNIONS AS SUBVERSIVE. WORKERS SHOULD BE FREE TO FORM THEIR OWN ORGANIZATIONS AND TO ELECT LEADERS, AND IT IS PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE FOR THEM TO CHOOSE POLITICALLY AFFILIATED LEADERS IF THEY BELIEVE IT TO BE IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS.

6. AGAIN, LET ME THANK YOU FOR SHARING YOUR VIEWS WITH US. I HOPE THAT THESE COMMENTS ARE RESPONSIVE TO YOUR CONCERNS.
44

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APPROVED BY S/P: PLESVENOVSEN
S/P: DBANDLER

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O: 12356 N/A
TAGS: EFIN, EAID, KE
SUBJECT: FY83/84 ESF: USG SHOULD NOT DISBURSE US\$200
28 MILLION IN CASH GRANT TO THE GOK

REF: A) NAIROBI 19384, B) NAIROBI 19374

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT DISSENT MESSAGE ON THE
FY83/84 ESF FOR GOK.

2. COPIES OF YOUR CABLE HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO THE
FOLLOWING:

- THE SECRETARY;
- THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY;
- THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS;
- DIRECTOR, POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS;
- BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS;
- BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS;
- S/S - CHARLES HILL;
- S/P; AND
- AID - AFR.

2. AN APPROPRIATE MEMBER OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF
WILL COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY.

3. I COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. DAM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
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September 19, 1974

[Redacted]

Office of Central African Affairs
Room 4238

Dear [Redacted]

Thank you for your letter to Mr. Lord of September 15, 1974 in which you resubmitted your dissent message concerning the sale of a DC-8 to Gabon. I have discussed your paper with Mr. Lord and other responsible Members of the Policy Planning Staff. We would plan, as indicated in my letter to you of July 16, 1974, to bring your dissent to the attention of the Secretary if the Bureau of African Affairs were to make a recommendation with which you were not able to concur.

As you acknowledged in your letter of September 15, the Secretary's schedule would make it unlikely that he could read the large number of documents which you forwarded under the cover of that letter. I am of the opinion that an oral briefing, as you recommended, would be inappropriate and would like to make the suggestion that you condense your dissent message to a memorandum to Mr. Lord of about two pages. The memorandum should be on Department stationery. I believe a document of this length would have the best chance of receiving the Secretary's full attention.

I hope this suggestion meets with your approval and await the revised dissent memorandum at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Peter B. Swiers

Special Assistant to the Director
Policy Planning Staff

cc: P - Mr. Djerejian
OFP - Mr. Smith

P.S.: Your letter of September 19, 1974 was received after the typing of the above. I also attach the two substitute pages which you enclosed with your letter.

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PPT:LPETERSON/SCA:GLEBEDEV:HRA
9/25/75: CODE 128/28176
M:LSEAGLEBURGER

S/P:CUKONTOS
S/P:RBARTHLOMEW

S/P-0FP:PJLYDON

ROUTINE

MEXICO

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: NA

TAGS: CPAS

SUBJECT: SAME PASSPORTS FOR ALL USG EMPLOYEES

FOR [REDACTED] FROM DEPUNSEC EAGLEBURGER

Handwritten:
LSE
LP/GL
CUK... *ak*
PJE... *PJR*
RB

1. I AM PLEASED THAT MY MESSAGE ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND DISCRIMINATION PROMPTED YOUR THOUGHTFUL TELEGRAM, AND I HOPE THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WILL CONTINUE TO BRING TO MY ATTENTION THOSE AREAS WHICH MUST BE EXAMINED IN ORDER TO REMOVE DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES AGAINST USG EMPLOYEES.

2. SECTION 51.3 OF TITLE 22 OF THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS CLEARLY DEFINES THE CATEGORIES OF U.S. EMPLOYEES WHO MAY BE ISSUED DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS: QUOTE A FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, A PERSON IN THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE OR TO A PERSON HAVING DIPLOMATIC STATUS EITHER BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF HIS FOREIGN MISSION OR BY REASON OF THE OFFICE HE HOLDS. UNQUOTE.

3. DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS ARE, OF COURSE, INTENDED TO REFLECT THE TITLE AND STATUS OF THE USG EMPLOYEES AS AGREED UPON BETWEEN HOST GOVERNMENTS AND THE U.S., AND TO ENABLE USG BUSINESS TO BE CONDUCTED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE

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Department of State

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PAGE 01 STATE 149739

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DRAFTED BY S/P-OPP - SYOGELGESANG
APPROVED BY S/P - PBSWIERS
S/P - ROAKLEY

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TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: EAID, FAGR, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S FY 1975 PL 480 TITLE I REQUIREMENTS

REF: TEL AVIV 3305

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE REFERENCED DISSENT CHANNEL TELEGRAM OF JUNE 19, 1974.

2. MR. ROBERT OAKLEY OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF (S/P) HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO [REDACTED]'S DISSENT MESSAGE.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, [REDACTED]'S TELEGRAM HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL.

4. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO YOUR CONCERN. KISSINGER

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OUTGOING
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DRAFTED BY S/P: MACASEY: BDM
APPROVED BY S/P: PHKREISBERG
M/MO - MR. SKODA
S/P: RHHARRINGTON
S/P-OF: NABOYER
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TO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES

REF: A) SANTIAGO 452, B) SANTIAGO 4556, C) SANTIAGO 4623

FOR [redacted] & CHARGE BOYATT ET. AL FROM KREISBERG, ACTING,
POLICY PLANNING STAFF

1. I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES CONCERNING PARM PROCEDURES AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SANTIAGO'S OFFICER COMPLEMENT IN THE CULTURAL AFFAIRS SECTION.
2. SINCE YOUR DISSENT DEALT WITH MANAGEMENT MATTERS, COPIES OF REFTELS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO THE STAFF DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE FOR MONITORING OVERSEAS DIRECT EMPLOYMENT (MODE), WHO WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE. COPIES HAVE ALSO BEEN SENT TO ARA AND USIA. TO ASSURE PROMPT ACTION ON FUTURE MESSAGES OF THIS NATURE, PLEASE CAPTION MODE INSTEAD OF DISSENT IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF YOUR MESSAGE. VANCE

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S/P:MACASEY:BDM
8-22-77 EXT. 29716
S/P:PHKREISBERG

S/P:HHENTGES

S/P-OF-DSKINNEY

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE. PORT AU PRINCE

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: HA

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

PHK
MAC
HH
DSK

FOR [] FROM S/P - KREISBERG, ACTING

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1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ON AID CUTS IN A HAITIAN HEALTH PROJECT. MS. HARRIET HENTGES OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISSENT CHANNEL REGULATIONS, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE A.I.D. ADMINISTRATOR, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. 44

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FORM DS 322(CCR)

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S/PC:RRPETERSON:JK
2/22/73 EXT 22972
S/PC:WICARGO

S/S - MR. HARRY BARNES

ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA

DISSENT CHANNEL

SUBJ: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM MESSRS. [REDACTED]
AND [REDACTED]

REF: ADDIS ABABA A-23, DATED FEB. 7, 1973

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF REF AIRGRAM DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE.
2. INITIAL DISTRIBUTION HAS BEEN MADE TO THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE BUREAUS OF AFRICAN, EUROPEAN, AND ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL. YY

WIC
RRP
HB

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MAC

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SECRET

S/P:GSAUSTIN:VB
6/22/77:X29571
S/P:PKREISBERG

S/P-0FP:NABOYER {IN DRAFT}

NEA/ARN:MDRAPER {IN DRAFT}

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE DAMASCUS

STADIS
DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SYRIA, ISRAEL AND
LEBANON: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

REF: DAMASCUS 1482; STATE 54187

FOR [] FROM PAUL KREISBERG, ACTING DIRECTOR, S/P

1. I'M SORRY THAT SO MUCH TIME HAS ELAPSED SINCE OUR INTERIM RESPONSE TO YOUR DISSENT. YOUR MESSAGE HAS RECEIVED ATTENTION IN NEA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE DEPARTMENT.

2. OUR THINKING HAS BEEN SIMILAR TO YOURS IN MANY WAYS. AS YOU ARE PROBABLY AWARE, WE EXERTED MAJOR EFFORTS IN NOVEMBER OF 1976, AS WELL AS IN LATE JANUARY AND EARLY FEBRUARY, TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS THAT IT WAS IN THEIR INTEREST TO ALLOW A LIMITED MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN ADF FORCES INTO SOUTH LEBANON TO CONTAIN THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE THERE AND TO ESTABLISH THE AUTHORITY OF THE SARKIS GOVERNMENT.

3. WE TRIED OUT ON THE ISRAELIS A VARIETY OF FORMULAS SIMILAR TO YOUR PROPOSALS. LIKE YOU, WE HAD SOME HOPES

PHK
GSA
NAB
MD

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SECRET

FORM DS 322A (OCR)

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THAT THE TACIT ISRAELI-SYRIAN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT SYRIA'S MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON WOULD REMAIN. BUT WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE IN OCTOBER 1976 AND AS SYRIAN MILITARY PRESSURES UPON THE PALESTINIANS BEGAN TO EASE AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE ISRAELIS APPARENTLY DECIDED THEY COULD NOT TOLERATE A SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE BEYOND THE LITANI RIVER.

4. AT AN EARLIER STAGE IN THE CONFLICT, ISRAELI LEADERS, SUCH AS PEREZ, HAD CONDITIONED THE ISRAELI PUBLIC TO ACCEPT A LIMITED SYRIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON. THEY DID NOT DO SO AFTER OCTOBER 1976, AND PARTLY AS A RESULT, ISRAELI PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE SOUTHWARD MOVE OF SYRIAN FORCES GREW. ISRAELIS ALSO FEARED, AND WANTED TO FRUSTRATE MOVES THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS IMPLEMENTING THE SO-CALLED "GREATER SYRIA" CONCEPT.

5. WE APPRECIATED HEARING YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS DIFFICULT QUESTION. THANK YOU FOR USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL. ♡♡

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FORM DS 322 (OCR)

CONFIDENTIAL

S/P: JOHN FORBES
1/4/77: JX22972
S/P: JOHN FORBES

S/P: NBOYER

CLEARANCES

ST/S/ST/S/P: ONR, SVP ONLY

ROUTINE BRIDGETOWN

INFO PREFERENCE

ACTION PREFERENCES

INFO ADDRESSES

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR CAPIONS

STALS B6

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PINS, PGOV, PFOR, EAID, BB, GJ, XL, CU

SUBJECT: US POLICY IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

REF: BRIDGETOWN 2452, 2488

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CABLE ON US POLICY IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN. MR. LUIGI EINAUDI OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR CABLE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE OPEN FORUM. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

JF
JF
NB

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN PART
B6

S/P:PBSWIERS:BDM
5-7-76 EXT. 22972
S/P:RBARTHLOMEW

S/P-0FP:PJLYDON

S/P ONLY

IMMEDIATE BUCHAREST

DISSENT CHANNEL
FOR [] ONLY

E.O. 11652, GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EEWT, ETRD, US, RO

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REF: BUCHAREST 2463

1. THIS CABLE WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE: "US-ROMANIAN LONG-TERM ECONOMIC INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT". WE ARE PUZZLED, HOWEVER, BY YOUR REQUESTED DISTRIBUTION. "DISSENT CHANNEL" IS A HANDLING INDICATOR IN THE SAME MATTER AS "NODIS" AND THEREFORE TO HANDLE THE MESSAGE AS NODIS WOULD BE REDUNDANT. YOU WILL NOTE FROM DEPARTMENT AIRGRAM A-3592 OF APRIL 29, 1974 THAT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES ARE AUTOMATICALLY DISTRIBUTED TO THE SECRETARY, THE S/P DIRECTOR AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; THUS, YOUR MESSAGE WOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED SOLELY TO THE SECRETARY IN ITS INITIAL DISTRIBUTION. FURTHER, AS YOUR MESSAGE IS NOT OF UNUSUAL SUBSTANTIVE SENSITIVITY, IT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE OPEN FORUM PANEL CHAIRPERSON AS WELL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT AIRGRAM. WE WOULD ASK FOR A FURTHER EXPLANATION OF YOUR REQUEST THAT COPIES OF YOUR MESSAGE BE GIVEN TO THE ACTING SECRETARY (P) AND THE COUNSELOR. DID YOU MEAN THAT YOU WISHED THOSE OFFICES ESPECIALLY TO RECEIVE COPIES OR THAT THERE BE NO DISTRIBUTION BEYOND THEM. IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS WE WOULD DISTRIBUTE A COPY TO THE CONCERNED

RB
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM DS 322A(OCR)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12

BUREAU AND, IN YOUR PARTICULAR CASE, DO NOT BELIEVE THAT
EUR SHOULD BE EXCLUDED WHEN THE COUNSELOR'S OFFICE IS ON
DISTRIBUTION. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO REPLY IMMEDIATELY.

2. IT WAS NOTED AT THE CONCLUSION OF YOUR MESSAGE THAT
THE CHARGE HAD NOT CLEARED. WE WISH TO POINT OUT THAT
IN THE DISSENT CHANNEL IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE POST HAS NOT
CLEARED SUBSTANTIVELY ALTHOUGH IT HAS AUTOMATICALLY
APPROVED A DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE FOR TRANSMISSION.

3. IN THE MEANTIME, MR. MICHAEL ELY OF THE POLICY PLAN-
NING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A
SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT
CHANNEL AND WILL PROVIDE A REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

RS

CONFIDENTIAL

September 27, 1974

MEMORANDUM

TO: AF/C - [redacted]

B6

FROM: S/P - Winston Lord *W.L.*

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel - DC-8 Sale to Gabon

This memorandum will acknowledge receipt of your dissent message of September 24, 1974 on the proposed sale of a DC-8 to Gabon.

Mr. Willard A. DePree of the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) has been named coordinator in charge of substantive response to this dissent message. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your memorandum has been circulated to the offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff and the Secretary's Open Forum Panel. Additional copies will be sent to the Assistant Secretaries for African Affairs and for Economic and Business Affairs.

As you were informed by Mr. Swiers of my office, the original draft of your dissent message was attached to the AF memorandum when it went to the Secretary. Your request that your message be distributed outside the Department of State is being reviewed by the coordinator with the concerned bureaus.

Per your request to Mr. Swiers, your revised final two pages were substituted in your dissent message and the originals returned herewith.

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASE IN
PART B6

*Sent out via Cable
form - 10/14/81*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

October 13, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DISSENT CHANNEL

[Redacted]

B6

American Embassy
San Jose, Costa Rica

Dear Mr. Porter:

We have received your Dissent Channel message of September 8 (San Jose 5764), studied it carefully, and brought it to the attention of the senior concerned officers of the Department. I appreciate the thought that you have given to this matter and the initiative that you have taken in drawing attention to the difficult economic situation of Costa Rica and some of its possible effects.

Your conclusion that the current level of external assistance is not an adequate safety net for Costa Rica is incontestable. We also agree -- while we must pursue ways to increase economic assistance to Costa Rica -- that we should consider the possibility that even increased levels of economic assistance may not suffice to prevent a severe deterioration in the Costa Rican economy. However, we do not believe that economic hardship will necessarily lead to a failure of democracy in Costa Rica or that a take-over by either left or right is inevitable. There are other political factors at work in Costa Rica and even to appear to give up on centrist alternatives to the present government, especially before the elections, could undermine the best hope that Costa Rica has.

Nonetheless, we do need to consider a full range of contingencies and options, including the one that you have set forth in general terms. We would welcome specific scenarios and related policy recommendations that you and your colleagues in the Embassy believe would be useful for the formulation of mid and longer term U.S. policy towards Costa Rica.

Thank you again for your constructive use of the Dissent Channel.

Sincerely yours,

Paul Wolfowitz
Paul Wolfowitz
Director

RELEASE IN PART
B6



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

9/5/83

DB --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FYI - [redacted] was very disappointed that the post used the Dissent Channel. It was his understanding when departing post that they were going to send it in regular channels in order to get it in time to stop the payment (or at least give people time to think about it).

B6

[redacted]
c/o M
Offi-
Stat
Den'

Dear [redacted]

p

With your transfer, Pearson Program, this letter ... reaching you, but we did feel you ... your June 28 dissent channel message on ...

ar on the
g-time in
answer to
SF.

B6

We sent your message to AF, EB, PM, T, P, and AID/AFR for comments. As you are doubtless aware, the decision to release the ESF was made virtually as your message was received so that your primary request -- that we not proceed -- was quickly overtaken by events. Hence, the comments we received, (from EB, AF, PM and AID) deal with whether the decision to release the funds was justified.

In reading the comments, there was some disagreement on the facts, but the main differences were those of judgement. The Embassy and AID's judgement were (a) that sufficient progress had been made by the Kenyans to meet the CP's, and (b) that release of the ESF was the best way to keep the reform momentum going. According to AID's officers who responded to your memo, AID conditions precedent to disbursement of the program grant were very precise. AID asked for the following: evidence that the GOK had simplified export documentation and licensing procedures since December 30, 1982; evidence that Import Schedule I had been subdivided to establish high priority items for which unlimited foreign exchange is freely available; evidence that agricultural imports especially fertilizer, will receive a specified amount of foreign exchange, and that a Fertilizer Advisory Committee be established. These CPs were clearly met. Other conditions, i.e., from IMF and World Bank loans, were included only after President Moi refused to accept general reference to those loans in the AID document. Only two Bank conditions have given us serious difficulty, i.e., those

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~
(UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT
ATTACHMENT)

- 2 -


regarding grain marketing and a public investment plan. Regarding the former, the GOK has agreed to accept the results of a consultant's study, due to be released shortly, and has also agreed to accept Bank assistance to prepare the latter. Both arrangements are acceptable to the Bank. It was on this basis that AID and the Embassy recommended proceeding with disbursement of the ESF tranche.

On a broader front, your message (as EB and PM pointed out) underlines the ambivalence of our ESF program. Titled economic support fund, it logically should be conditioned on the existence of effective economic policies by recipients, but since it is directed to nations which are politically important to the U.S., the existence of this political relationship undermines our willingness to apply conditions. Hence, the Fund can end up underwriting poor policies and poor performance -- exactly the opposite of its purpose.

There are no easy answers to this dilemma which tends, paradoxically, to grow with the size of individual ESF programs. In Kenya, for instance, AID feels that while a strong case could be made to provide sizeable ESF solely on political/military grounds, a conscious decision had been made to use these funds to encourage economic policy reform, and this effort, though not without problems, is praiseworthy and has been increasingly successful.

Regardless of the merits of the Kenya example, the issue you raise regarding conditioning our economic assistance on performance is a serious one which requires continued attention. My own feeling is that we are giving more attention to policy questions and doing better at using assistance to promote policy reform than we were a few years ago, but there is no doubt that further improvement can be made.

Sincerely,



Stephen Bosworth
Director
Policy Planning Staff

DMA
Draft: S/P: TARndt: rs
8/3/83 x21724 W-0025X

Clearances:

AF/EPs: PLande *DMA*
AID/AFR: SChernenkoff *DMA*
EB/IFD/DFP: RDWoody *DMA*
S/P: JReinhertson *DMA*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

RELEASE IN FULL

August 12, 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: The Acting Secretary

FROM: S/IL - Dale E. Good

SUBJECT: IO's Memorandum Entitled "The Effect of Possible Withdrawal From the ILO Relative to Positions of Communist and Democratic Labor Unions in Western Europe"

In my view the additional points made by government officials from Western Europe to Bill Maynes on this subject are not considered by these officials themselves as serious arguments for the following reasons:

1. The policies and practices of West European governments indicate that these governments do not believe that communist influence in the labor field is the grave matter they would suggest. These governments encourage East-West labor exchanges. Governments of countries with sizeable communist-controlled labor movements nominate communist labor representatives to participate in ILO meetings. West European governments also support the concept of using the ILO as an umbrella organization for holding East-West European labor conferences, hoping that communist labor movements will somehow be influenced for the better.

2. As our European friends are aware, U.S.S.R. policy in the entire post-war period has been to achieve unity of the international labor movement and make it an instrumentality to serve Soviet foreign policy interests. Soviet strategy is to utilize organizations such as the ILO to gain additional access to Western labor movements in pursuit of this larger objective. The "bitter competition" between democratic and communist labor organizations, as it is characterized by the Europeans, is taking place primarily within certain countries, where the issue will be decided, not the ILO.

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GDS

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

3. The legitimacy of a labor organization depends upon whether it is an independent movement free from domination by government or political parties. The ILO cannot "legitimize" any labor movement which is not genuine, but can point out government law and practice which prevents the development of free labor organizations.

I venture to suggest that European government representatives in making these arguments are doing so more out of a belief that they will fall on receptive ears, than because of a conviction of their correctness. Since the validity of the argumentation is suspect, I question whether these points should be brought to the attention of the Secretary, let alone the President.

cc: P - Mr. Habib

Drafted by: S/IL:DEGood:fl
ext. 23662

CONFIDENTIAL



OPEN FORUM FILE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

TO :

FROM : S/P - Reginald Bartholomew, Acting

SUBJECT: Your Dissent Message of September 15
Regarding the Sale of a DC-8 to Gabon

B6

The purpose of this memorandum is to report to you what actions were taken by S/P in response to your dissent message of September 15.

With Respect to the Secretary

- On September 16 Mr. Swiers notified Mr. Gompert of the Secretary's staff that S/P had received your draft dissent message and requested that if, as you expected, AF recommended approval of the issuance of an export license for the sale of a DC-8 to Gabon, he bring your draft dissent message to the Secretary's attention before the Secretary acted on the recommendation.

- On September 19, after receiving AF's Action Memo of September 16, Under Secretary Sisco's office attached and forwarded to the Secretary Mr. Djerejian's copy of your dissent message. We understand that the Secretary read your dissent message before making his decision.

- Although the Secretary had already acted on AF's memo before we received the final version of your dissent message, we nonetheless forwarded it to the Secretary's office. This final version was returned to us on October 16 with the note that "The Secretary has seen the attached dissent memo."

SECRET

RELEASE IN PART
B6

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PAGE 01 MEXICO 06753 322331Z

12
ACTION SP-92

INFO OCT-21 ES-91 ISQ-90 7004 W

009274

R 322313Z JUL 75
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9172

UNCLAS MEXICO 8753

DISSENT CHANNEL

FOR DEPUNDESEC W/EAGLEBURGER FROM [REDACTED], USIS-MEXICO

B6

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: CPAS
SUBJECT: SAME PASSPORTS FOR ALL USG EMPLOYEES

1. YOUR RECENT MESSAGE ON DISCRIMINATION GAVE ME COURAGE TO
SUBMIT THIS PROPOSAL-THAT STATE ISSUE DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS
TO ALL USG EMPLOYEES ABROAD RATHER THAN ONLY TO A FEW, MAINLY
IN STATE AND USIA. PRESENT POLICIES HAVE THE EFFECT OF DIS-
CRIMINATING AGAINST OTHER AGENCIES AND AGAINST LOWER-PAID
EMPLOYEES OF STATE AND USIA, ESPECIALLY SECRETARIAL AND COM-
MUNICATIONS PERSONNEL, WHO ARE FREQUENTLY WOMEN OR OF MINORITY
GROUPS.

2. THIS PROPOSAL IS BEING SENT THROUGH THE DISSENT CHANNEL
BECAUSE THE EMBASSY DID NOT WISH TO ENDORSE IT AS AN OFFICIAL
MESSAGE.

3. IN MANY COUNTRIES, PERHAPS A MAJORITY, THE CHIEF BENEFITS
ACCRUING FROM OWNERSHIP OF A DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT ARE OF A
PERSONAL NATURE RATHER THAN OFFICIAL--THE AVOIDANCE OF
CERTAIN LOCAL TAXES, THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE DUTY-FREE SHIP-
MENTS THROUGHOUT ONE'S TOUR, THE DISPLAY OF DIPLOMATIC
TAGS ON A VEHICLE, AND THE PRIVILEGE OF SELLING AN AUTO-
MOBILE.

4. IN THE YEAR 1975, WHEN SO MANY OTHER INEQUITIES AND
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AGE 02 MEXICO 08753 322331Z

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

BARRIERS TO EQUAL TREATMENT HAVE BEEN REMOVED, WE SHOULD REVISIT ANY LAST VESTIGES OF OFFICIAL DISCRIMINATION. BY THE TIME JULY 4, 1976 ARRIVES WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE USG CONSIDERS ALL ITS EMPLOYEES ENTITLED TO EQUAL PROTECTION AND PRIVILEGES. PASSPORT DISCRIMINATION SHOULD BE ENDED QUICKLY AND VOLUNTARILY BY THE DEPARTMENT BEFORE IT IS FORCED TO TAKE SUCH ACTION BY THE CONGRESS, COURTS OR EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATIONS.

S. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION.
JOVA



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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RELEASE IN FULL

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72 SANTIAGO 6227

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PAGE 01 SANTIAGO 06227 022207Z

ACTION 4RA-15

INFO OCT-21 ISO-22 HA-25 SSO-27 NSCF-07 ICAF-22
CIAE-00 DODF-00 PM-05 H-01 INF-10 L-23 NSAI-00
PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 INRE-00 COME-00 EB-08 LAF-04
SIL-01 /071 W

-----039212 022247 /66

O 022121Z SEP 78

FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

TO SFCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 445

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SANTIAGO 6227

P.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ELAF, FTDR, SHUM, PINT, CI

SURJ: CHUQUICAMATA: MORE DETENTIONS AS NEGOTIATIONS RESUME

REF: SANTIAGO 6224

1. SUMMARY: THE NUMBER OF PERSONS DETAINED FOR ALLEGED
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN CALAMA AND CHUQUICAMATA IS NOW
49. MAY APPEAR TO BE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (PDC) BUT THE
MAPYIST PARTIES ARE ALSO REPRESENTED. THE MINISTER OF
INTERIOR SEPTEMBER 7 REPEATED CHARGES THAT THE POLITICAL
PARTIES ARE BEHIND THESE AND OTHER RECENT DISTURBANCES.
COPPER WORKER LEADERS HELD A FIRST, REPORTEDLY NOT EN-
COURAGING, MEETING WITH CODELCO MANAGEMENT SEPTEMBER 8
ON OUTSTANDING ECONOMIC ISSUES. FINANCE MINISTER DE
CASTRO PLAYED DOWN THE LIKELIHOOD OF SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC
GAINS AT A PRESS CONFERENCE SEPTEMBER 7. AS APPARENT
CONCILIATORY GESTURES CODELCO IS MAKING LOANS TO SOME
WORKERS AND WILL MAKE ADVANCE PAYMENT OF PART OF THE
ANNUAL BONUS. END SUMMARY

2. TEN OF THE 13 PERSONS ARRESTED AUGUST 31 REMAIN IN
DETENTION; SECURITY FORCES IN CALAMA AND CHUQUICAMATA

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PAGE 02 SANTIAGO 06227 022207Z

ARRESTED AN ADDITIONAL 22 PERSONS SEPTEMBER 6/7 AND 17
MORE PERSONS SEPTEMBER 7/8 -- MAKING A CURRENT TOTAL IN
CUSTODY OF 49. THOSE ARRESTED IN THE LAST FEW DAYS APPEAR
TO INCLUDE A NUMBER WHO ARE NOT EMPLOYEES OF CODELCO AND,
TO THE EXTENT PARTY IDENTIFICATION IS EVIDENT, APPEAR TO
BE MIXTURE OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, COMMUNISTS AND
SOCIALISTS. ONE OF THOSE DETAINED IS CESAREO CASTILLO --
A PDC GOVERNOR DURING THE FREI PERIOD. THOSE ARRESTED
ARE ACCUSED OF FOMENTING LABOR UNREST AND DISTRIBUTING
SUBVERSIVE PAMPHLETS. THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION AS
YET WHAT LEGAL ACTION, IF ANY, THE GOC INTENDS.

3. INTERIOR MINISTER FERNANDEZ AT A PRESS CONFERENCE
SEPTEMBER 7 REPEATED GOC CHARGES THAT THE LABOR UNREST
AT CHUQUICAMATA AND ELSEWHERE IS BEING DIRECTED BY THE
POLITICAL PARTIES. FERNANDEZ DIRECTED HIS FIRE PRIMARILY
AT THE PDC AND THE COMMUNISTS AND REFERRED PRINCIPALLY
TO THE SITUATION AT CHUQUICAMATA. COPPER WORKERS AT THE

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PAGE 1

MCLEANEY SAMUEL H
79 SANTIAGO 6027

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EL SALVADOR MINE HAVE ALSO BEEN CARRYING OUT A NO-LUNCH PROTEST BUT HAVE RECEIVED NO PRESS ATTENTION AND THERE HAS BEEN NO GOC CRACKDOWN AS YET. DURING THE PAST THREE DAYS A REPORTED ONE-THIRD OF THE LABOR FORCE AT THE HUACHIPATO STEEL MILL HAS ALSO CONDUCTED A NO-LUNCH PROTEST.

4. COPPER WORKERS LEADERS ARE BACK IN SANTIAGO TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ECONOMIC ISSUES THAT SPARKED THE PROTEST MOVEMENT AT CHUQUICAMATA. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY ONE OF THE LEADERS THAT THEY HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY PINNING DOWN THE CODELCO MANAGEMENT TO A MEETING TIME BUT DID FINALLY MEET WITH CODELCO PRESIDENT URBINA THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 9. THE LABOR LEADER SOURCE SAYS THAT THE MEETING DID NOT GO WELL AND THAT URBINA TOOK A HARSH LINE ON POSSIBLE ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS. IT

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PAGE 23 SANTIAGO 06927 082207Z

HAS BEEN GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD HERE THAT WAGE INCREASES DEPEND UPON AGREEMENT BY FINANCE MINISTER DE CASTRO. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE SEPTEMBER 7 DE CASTRO ARGUED THAT COPPER WORKERS ARE ALREADY AMONG THE BEST PAID CHILEAN WORKERS AND THAT THE COPPER MINES AND THEIR PROFITS BELONG TO ALL CHILEANS, NOT SIMPLY TO THE WORKERS.

5. APPARENTLY, IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE LABOR PRESSURE AT CHUQUICAMATA, CODELCO HAS IN RECENT DAYS AGREED TO ADVANCE ALL WORKERS 5,220 PESOS OF THEIR ANNUAL BONUS AND TO PROVIDE LOANS TO WORKERS WHO ARE BEHIND IN THEIR PAYMENTS ON GOVERNMENT BUILT HOUSING. THE SIX WORKERS FIRED IN LATE AUGUST HAVE BEEN FORMALLY REINSTATED.

6. COMMENT: THE GOVERNMENT IS PROBABLY CORRECT THAT THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC, COMMUNIST AND PERHAPS OTHER PROSCRIBED POLITICAL PARTIES ARE ACTIVE IN THE CHUQUICAMATA DISPUTE. IT IS NOT CORRECT IN ASCRIBING LABOR UNREST THERE ENTIRELY OR EVEN PRIMARILY TO SUCH POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT. THE APPARENT UNWILLINGNESS OF THE GOC TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS WITH LABOR LEADERS IS NOT A GOOD SIGN FOR AN EARLY, PEACEFUL END TO THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.

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PAGE 2



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN
PART B6

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PAGE 01 TEGUCI 02313 082033Z

70/16
ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 1015 W

R: 072205Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2183

UNCLAS TEGUCIGALPA 02313

DISSENT CHANNEL

C I O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR GARBLED PORTIONS PARA 2 AND 3

1. THIS CABLE TRANSMITS A DISSENTING VIEW SUBMITTED BY
[REDACTED] GENERAL SERVICES OFFICER.

2. OUR POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION IN BURUNDI DURING MASSIVE MURDERING OF HUTU TRIBESMEN COULD BE A REPEAT OF REVENT EVENTS IN BANGLADESH. WE SEEM TO BE WAITING UNTIL REPORTED "SELECTIVE GENOCIDE" HAS RESULTED IN THE ELIMINATION OF ANY DISSIDENT HUTU LEADERS. SUCH DISPLAY OF TUTSI POWER MAY INDEED RESULT IN SUBSEQUENT TRANQUILITY IN BURUNDI BUT IT WOULD SEEM FOOLISH TO DISPEL THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUTU MAJORITY.

3. IF IT IS TRUE THAT WE DO NOT HAVE LEVERAGE IN BURUNDI AND WE CANNOT ALTER THE SITUATION THEN I SHOULD HOPE OUR POLICY WOULD FOLLOW THAT OF VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES WHICH SUSPENDED ASSISTANCE. SINCE WE HAVE NO AID PROGRAM, POTENTIAL ELIMINATION OF FUTURE AID RATHER THAN SUSPENSION MAY PROVIDE THE LEVERAGE. DISASTER RELIEF IS OF DUBIOUS VALUE TO THE HUTUS, AND WILL PROBABLY BE MORE BENEFICIAL TO THE CONTROLLING TUTSI GOVERNMENT. IF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WERE TO VOTE ON THE ISSUE OF SUPPORTING THE BURUNDI GOVERNMENT DURING THIS CRISIS THEY MAY WELL PREFER BREACH OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS TO AUGMENTATION OF DISASTER RELIEF.
RYAN

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM DS-1652

ACTION COPY

S/PC
026697

Note all except 3 + ES
copies to S/PC

B6

RELEASE IN PART
B6

DISSENT ACTION FORM

Message

Type Memorandum - SECRET
Date July 4, 1974
Number --
Drafted by [redacted]
Office or Post AF/C

10/29
10/22

B6

S/P Action

Date Received July 5, 1974
Action Officer Willard Deane
Initial Distribution [redacted]
Acknowledgment Sent 9/27/74 (revised version)
Date _____
Number of Message None

App. pending nature of ref. Action memo.

Further Action:

Final Disposition:

Final Report Sent to Drafter

Date _____

Number of Message _____

OFF Action

Initial Notification

7-8-74: Sam Lewis asked Vogelgesang to check on Action memo w. Peter Reams & then proceed as appropriate

Action:



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

2 - Dissent file
Mike Honnblom
M/DG

RELEASE IN PART
B6

June 22, 1972

5009

MEMORANDUM

TO: M/DG - Ambassador Hall
FROM: S/PC - Arthur Hartman, Acting Director
SUBJECT: Dissent Case -- Policy Toward Officers Who Have Recently Married Aliens

S/PC in cooperation with the administrative area of the Department has recently responded to a dissent message from Guatemala City concerning the transfer of a FSSO to Washington for the purpose of "Americanization" of his wife. At the time of our negative response I had some qualms myself about whether or not we shouldn't look more deeply both into this specific case and our general policy.

I have now received the attached letter from [redacted] supervisor, and it leads me to believe that a more detailed examination should proceed. I understand that Ambassador Bowdler will also be raising this question.

B6

Would it be possible for you to ask the Office of Personnel to have another look at this specific case, and also at the same time set up a small panel to examine the basic policy implicit in 3 FAM 629? At least one reason which occurs to me for such a re-examination is the fact that the Department has recently completed and promulgated an imaginative and new look at the role of spouses in the Foreign Service. I think we might also examine whether or not, if the policy is wise for FSOs, it ought to be applied to other categories of employees as well.

Attachment: Letter of June 13 from Embassy Guatemala

CCs: M - Mr. Macomber S/PC - Mr. Cargo



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

June 13, 1972

Director
Planning and Coordination
Room 7246
Department of State

RELEASE IN PART B6

Dear Sir:

You have recently been involved in a decision concerning employees who have married foreign nationals. The particular case I am concerned with involves a [redacted] on my staff here in Guatemala. Your reply, State 103836, to a dissent cable sent by [redacted] was received by the subject employee and myself with considerable disappointment. I am therefore writing you this informal letter at my own initiative and without the knowledge of [redacted] since there remains in my own mind the question of whether the Department has addressed itself fully to the point of dissent originally expressed by [redacted] in his cable.

I first wish to say that both [redacted] and myself fully support the Department's efforts to uphold uniform applicability of 3FAM629 and in no way expect an exception in the application of this policy as it affects [redacted]. We do, however, expect the Department to apply its policy to only those persons which should be affected by 3FAM629. And this seems to be our point of difference. The Department appears to be interpreting 3FAM629.1-1b to read that "an employee assigned abroad who marries an alien will be transferred as quickly as feasible to the U.S.". However, this sentence continues to read "in order to provide the spouse an opportunity to become better acquainted with life in the U.S. and to acquire citizenship". Now, the wording of this sentence as it appears in 3FAM629 is obviously intended to benefit the spouse and is not intended to penalize the employee for marrying a foreign national. And in most instances this will be the case since most alien spouses are not naturalized in such a brief time span as was [redacted] and therefore would normally expect to return to the U.S. to accomplish this naturalization process. As you know, however, [redacted] is a naturalized citizen and well acquainted with the U.S. as pointed out in [redacted] cable to you. Additionally, Ambassador Bowdler has made a personal appeal while on consultation in the Department as well as having written a letter in which he

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expressed his view that [redacted] does not need "Americanization". The Deputy Chief of Mission was not even aware that [redacted] was a naturalized citizen until this matter was brought to his attention recently. The Mission in general has also expressed its opinion in an official cable that [redacted] does not need "Americanization". It therefore seems to me that the Ambassador, the DCM and other officials of this Mission who have worked or known [redacted] for nearly two years are in a better position to determine whether [redacted] requires "Americanization" that the Department who is not at all acquainted with [redacted]

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In closing, I would like to ask you once again to take a very close look at the wording of 3FAM629 to be certain that the Department is absolutely satisfied with its interpretation of the alien policy as it applies to [redacted]. While I recognize your belief that a regular Departmental assignment is the best method of exposing a foreign-born spouse to the U.S., it, of course, is not the only method of exposure that can be affective.

B6

I thank you for your time and patience in discussing this matter. I would sincerely appreciate an early reply and hopefully a reconsideration of your earlier decision to assign [redacted] to Washington in the pouch room.

B6

Sincerely yours,

[redacted signature block]

B6

Guatemala City

AIRGRAM

Per Peaslee
Alexander L
FOR RM USE ONLY

RA	EUR	FE
EA	CU	JMR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AIB
GR	COM	FRB
NT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
RMV	CIA	NAVY
SD	USIA	NSA

A-81
NO.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : OTTAWA

FROM : Amconsul HALIFAX

SUBJECT : Dissent Message: U.S. Government Responsibility for My Lai

REF : State A-3559, April 8, 1972

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUL 26 4 43 PM '72

5014

RS/AN BRANCH
ANALYSIS BRANCH DATE: July 17, 1972

RELEASE IN FULL

DISSENT CHANNEL

This airgram transmits a dissenting view submitted by FSO-2 Alexander L. Peaslee, Principal Officer at this post.

"I note that procedures for retirement from the Foreign Service no longer require the retiring FSO to submit a letter to the Secretary of State outlining reasons for departure from the Service. This appears to be an unfortunate step in the direction of a further reduction of communications between officers and the Secretary. I believe it would be useful if means were retained for retiring officers to present the reasons for their action, hopefully so that the Service may profit from their comments.

"In the absence of such a channel of communication, the dissent channel is used to express this officer's unwillingness to be further associated with the actions of the executive branch of a government that initiated no steps to discipline a military unit that took action at My Lai similar to that perpetrated by the Nazis at Lidice. The steps that were taken were initiated outside of the executive branch of the United States Government and only then did the Army reluctantly move.

"In addition, there has been much testimony by Vietnam combat veterans of the eye-witness accounts of the systematic use of electrical torture, beatings, and in some cases, murder, of men, women and children, by their military units in Vietnam.

"At the Nuremburg and Tokyo war crimes trials the principle was established by the United States Government that military and public officials were responsible for war crimes committed by troops under

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FORM 4.82 DS-323

In Out

1972 JUL 26 PM 5 25

COPYFLO-PDR

Drafted by: ALPeaslee:alp *alp*

Contents and Classification Approved by: ALPeaslee *alp*

Clearances:

AIRGRAM

Halifax A-81
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their own command. Do we practice this ourselves ?

"I vividly recall the remarks made during the 1940's about how all German officials should have protested and refused to cooperate with a government that permitted Lidice and similar actions to happen. One of my reasons for retiring at the age of 50 after 29 years of government service is that I do not want to be associated with the actions of an executive branch that takes no effective steps against atrocities too similar to those of the Nazis. I do not want to be associated with torture and murder, whether this is done by a communist or fascist government, or the executive branch of the United States Government. I particularly do not want to be associated with a government that initiates no action when babies are deliberately killed.

"A-3559 states drafters may indicate the distribution they desire. I desire that this airgram be distributed to each Foreign Service Officer. My obvious purpose is to help create an atmosphere in which the executive branch of the United States Government will not permit its units to murder and torture. If Foreign Service and other U.S. officers made known their disgust and horror at such actions as My Lai, hopefully pressure can be developed to prevent a recurrence of such an event."

PEASLEE

NOTE: Declassify to Unclassified on August 1, 1972.

* For those who think this sort of thing always happens in war, I recommend a careful reading of the reports on My Lai of such correspondents as Seymour Hersh.

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DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON

RELEASE IN PART B6

September 26, 1974

MEMORANDUM

TO: S/P - Mr. DePree

FROM: M - Donald J. Bouchard

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Letter from [redacted]

B6

After carefully reviewing [redacted] letter, this office believes that the current guidance to the field (A-10315, attached) regarding Congressional travel is adequate.

B6

In our opinion, situations such as those described in [redacted] letter can best be dealt with at post. The occasional unethical request from an unscrupulous traveler can usually be handled in good conscience by a resourceful (and moral) Foreign Service employee. To raise the question of unethical behavior on the part of CODELS in general guidelines to posts abroad would imply that such requests are common and could be a source of embarrassment to the Department.

B6

Seeking Department guidance on a blow-by-blow basis as suggested in the last paragraph of [redacted] letter would only lead to confusion and misunderstanding. It also suggests that the "Department" can approve illegal dealings, which is, of course, untrue. Principal Officers abroad should have the ability and integrity to deal with issues such as those raised in [redacted] letter without step-by-step direction from Washington.

B6

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Incidentally, I understand "H" is working on an update of A-10315.

Attachment: Airgram No. 10315.

(RBS)

~~SECRET~~

RELEASE IN PART B6

EA/LC:JDROSENTHAL:LR
7/1/75 X23132
S/P:SWLEWIS

EA - MR. MILLER
S/P - DPIKE

EA - MR. HABIB
S/P-OPP - RFSMITH

S/P DISTRIBUTION ONLY

IMMEDIATE BANGKOK

IMMEDIATE VIENTIANE

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: APER DISSENT

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE

REFS: A. BANGKOK 10830; B. STATE 136379

FOR

SWL
JDR JDR
RM RM
PH PH
DP
RFS

B6

1. YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS REF A REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS FOR USAID WITHDRAWAL FROM LAOS ARE APPRECIATED BUT, AS YOU KNOW, HAVE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS.

2. THE ATTITUDE AND ACTIONS OF THE PGNU PREVENTED SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS OF ANY KIND BY ANY US REPRESENTATIVES ON THIS SUBJECT AND RESULTED IN OUR UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF USAID MISSION AND RELINQUISHMENT OF AID PROPERTY JUNE 26 WITHOUT AGREEMENT. THIS ATTITUDE BECAME INCREASINGLY EVIDENT SOON AFTER THE MAY 27 AGREEMENT, AND THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT A DIFFERENT NEGOTIATING TEAM AS YOU SUGGESTED WOULD HAVE ALTERED THE OUTCOME. AS IT WAS, WE BELIEVE OUR OFFICIALS IN VIENTIANE PERFORMED VERY WELL UNDER THESE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES AND FULLY AND EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTED THE USG POSITION AND CARRIED OUT US POLICY ON THIS MATTER.

3. YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NEVERTHELESS WELL-TAKEN AND.

~~SECRET~~

FORM DS 322A(OCR)

~~SECRET~~

1 2

WERE GIVEN FULL CONSIDERATION BY APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES
HERE. ONCE AGAIN WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT
CHANNEL. 44

~~SECRET~~

RELEASE IN PART
B6



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 22, 1975

TO :

FROM : S/P - Samuel Lewis

SUBJECT: Dissent Paper on Department's
Policy on Terrorism

This will acknowledge the receipt of your dissent paper on the Department's policies on terrorism. Mr. Harry Blaney of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your paper has been circulated to the offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff and the Chairperson of the Open Forum Panel. We commend your use of the dissent channel for the ~~third~~ time and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

S/P - Mr. Lydon

To file in new

file on this

B6

RELEASE IN
PART B6

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S/P:MACASEY:BDM
EXT. 29716 6-21-77
S/P:PHKREISBERG

M/MO - MR. SKODA
S/P-OF:NABOYER

S/P:RJHARRINGTON

S/P ONLY

PRIORITY SANTIAGO

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES

REF: A) SANTIAGO 4523, B) SANTIAGO 4556, C) SANTIAGO 4623

FOR [REDACTED] & [REDACTED] ET AL FROM KREISBERG, ACTING,
POLICY PLANNING STAFF

1. I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES CONCERNING PARM PROCEDURES AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SANTIAGO'S OFFICER COMPLEMENT IN THE CULTURAL AFFAIRS SECTION.
2. SINCE YOUR DISSENT DEALT WITH MANAGEMENT MATTERS, COPIES OF REFTELS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO THE STAFF DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE FOR MONITORING OVERSEAS DIRECT EMPLOYMENT (MODET), WHO WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE. COPIES HAVE ALSO BEEN SENT TO ARA AND USIA. TO ASSURE PROMPT ACTION ON FUTURE MESSAGES OF THIS NATURE, PLEASE CAPTION MODE INSTEAD OF DISSENT IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF YOUR MESSAGE. YY

PHK
MAC will
S. will for
RJH will
NAB will

B6

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OUTGOING MESSAGE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE IN
PART B6

CONFIDENTIAL

S/P: MACASEY: BDM
5-17-77 EXT. 2971b
S/P: PHKREISBERG

S/P: RJHARRINGTON
S/P: OF-NABOYER

S/P: SVOGELGESANG

S/P ONLY

*Slate 114244 per OAT 9/3/77
5/29/77*

PRIORITY MADRID

STADIS*****

STADIS
DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

FOR [] FROM KRESIBERG-S/P, ACTING

PHK

MAC

RJH

SV

NAB

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE ON THE VISIT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT. NORMAL DISSENT PROCEDURES STIPULATE THAT AN S/P MEMBER COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY TO DISSENT PAPERS. GIVEN THE NATURE AND TIMING OF THE SUBJECT, S/P EXPEDITED NORMAL TREATMENT OF A DISSENT MESSAGE BY TAKING THE STEPS OUTLINED IN TELCON FROM S/P MEMBER VOGELGESANG, MAY 13. IN ADDITION, IT WAS DECIDED THAT S/P DIRECTOR TONY LAKE WOULD TALK DIRECTLY WITH YOU DURING HIS MADRID VISIT. FOR THE RECORD, COPIES OF YOUR DISSENT WERE ALSO DISTRIBUTED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT. YOUR TIMELY USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL IS COMMENDABLE. YY

CONFIDENTIAL

B6

~~SECRET~~Addis Ababa A-23
p. 2

1. Internal Situation

We believe that the Ethiopian ruling elite's perception of and reaction to the "Somali threat" has been greatly intensified by domestic stresses and risks to its future survival. The Emperor's 80th birthday and continuing uncertainty regarding a successor regime (further heightened by the Crown Prince's recent illness) have focused attention on the possibilities of internal chaos and risks to the future position of the present ruling elite. Reasons for the establishment's concern and consequent appeals for U.S. support include: serious institutional deficiencies and the prevailing moods of frustration and of absence of effective leadership within the government machine; discontent among ethnic groups and many of the educated class because of the corrupt and repressive system; failure of the "Amharazation program" to cement a unified Ethiopia under Shoan Amhara domination; results of their unwillingness to institute land and other reforms which would have broadened the regime's appeal and reduced domestic tensions in the long run; failure to work with and "win over" elements of the population, most notably in Eritrea and the Ogaden, who are striving for greater local autonomy; and inefficiency in the military organization.

We interpret the IEG's reaction to the "Somali threat" and pressure on the U.S. for assistance and psychological support largely as attempts:

- (a) to insure the ruling group's ability to maintain its power and wealth during and after the succession;
- (b) to develop a rationale for a new pipeline to U.S. political, financial and military support in the event Kagnev Station should close down;
- (c) to provide a justification for increased military expenditures and for further delays in acting on significant economic and social reforms which are increasingly being pressed on the ruling elite by domestic interests and by foreign aid donors.

2. External

We believe that Ethiopia also bears some responsibility for the recent deterioration in Ethio-Somali relations, which have never been close since Somalia's independence in 1960. In recent months, the economic stakes of both sides in the disputed Ogaden region have increased greatly, as indications of the eventuality of probable commercial oil discoveries have become known. Moves by both sides led to border incidents in November, which were followed by two

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Addis Ababa A-23

p. 3

sessions of bilateral talks at the Foreign Minister level. From all available evidence, it appears that neither side made any substantial concession from its previous, well-known position. Inevitably, both sides used strong talk, with President Siad making what the Ethiopian Foreign Minister reports as a veiled threat to resort to force. At present, bilateral negotiations appear to be completely stalled, and the prospects for further talks over the Ogaden seem questionable without external pressures on both parties.

Somalia and Ethiopia have conflicting claims to Djibouti as well as to the Ogaden, which contributes substantially to their rivalry. Despite President Pompidou's recent statements of French intention to remain in the TFAI and the apparent acceptance of this by both sides (at least in the short run), neither has abandoned its claim, and each is probably prepared to move militarily to protect its interests, if and when France leaves Djibouti.

Other developments in the general area have sharpened the political confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia. The recent satisfactory border settlement and general detente with Sudan have, at least for the foreseeable future, removed any "threat" to Ethiopia from the North, thus freeing resources for the Somali "front". Kenya and Ethiopia are on the verge of renewing their defense agreement and are keeping in close touch over the "Somali threat".

During the past year, five African states have broken relations with Israel. This has made Israel increasingly concerned about its position in Ethiopia, the "linchpin" of Israeli interests in Africa. We assume that Israel has encouraged Ethiopian concern over the "Somali threat".

III. OUR REACTION TO THE CT'S RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of our analysis of the current situation, we believe that the Country Team's options and recommendations not only do not address the real problems of Ethiopia but also are laying new groundwork for a continued U.S. military involvement in Ethiopia in the event that the USG decides to close Kagnev.

1. Military

We believe that what appears to be the Country Team's principal recommendation, the increase in military aid to \$11.5 million, is only the foot in the door. The referenced airgram provides a shopping list (page 8, para 3) in the event of Soviet deliveries of T-54 and MIG-21's, revealing the expectations of the Ethiopian government and the Country Team. The response to the Country Team's proposals should be framed with the next group of Ethiopian "requirements" clearly

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Addis Ababa A-23

p. 4

in mind, and with the realization that having taken the first step it will be difficult to refuse other "Somali threat"-related demands. We question the Country Team's assessment that additional arms deliveries to Ethiopia would be a stabilizing factor.

We consider it important to note that, given the inadequacy of the Ethiopian military, increments in weaponry have much less than commensurate effect on its overall capability. For example, large deliveries of modern communications equipment have not enabled Ethiopian forces in Eritrea to coordinate air support with ground maneuvers. In this context, the volume and cost of weaponry needed to assure "security" as the Ethiopian government perceives it, would involve a political and financial burden on the U.S., which we find unacceptable. A major weapons program would probably have a negative impact on U.S. interests by reinforcing the Ethiopian belief in a U.S. commitment and by raising the cost of disengagement. Furthermore, the Country Team ignores the real possibility that additional weapons would be used in Eritrea, thereby seeming to involve the U.S. in the decade-old insurgency, with possible risks to Kagnew.

2. Political

We believe that a "summit" meeting between the President and Emperor (and to a lesser extent, any meeting at the Cabinet level) should be avoided at the present time. Agreement to a "summit" meeting would signal to the Ethiopian Government that we accept their version of the "Somali threat" and would make it very difficult for the U.S. to avoid further military commitments.

We see no objections to consultations with other allies for an exchange of views (since we believe most other allies, as has France already, would tend to down-play the alleged "Somali threat".) However, we strongly disagree with the Country Team's option that the U.S. solicit military aid for Ethiopia from third countries, and particularly with the notion that the U.S. encourage Israel to become even more involved with the Ethiopian military.

3. Economic

The AID-related possibilities and recommendations for action in the Country Team's messages appear to us clearly contrary to the purpose of economic assistance. While the messages take note of the technical drawbacks to the various options, the overall significance and in our minds danger of shifting the priorities of U.S. economic assistance in Ethiopia from developmental to military are not properly weighed.

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~~SECRET~~Addis Ababa A-23
p. 5

We consider that one of the purposes of U.S. assistance is to encourage the receiving country to concentrate on economic and social development. By broadening the Agriculture Sector Loan to allow shifting of IEG funds for military purposes, by adding part of a housing investment guarantee to allow purchase of military equipment, or by providing PL-480 wheat indirectly for military purposes, the USG would undermine long-term development prospects in Ethiopia, and thus its own interests.

We are concerned that "colonization" of the Ogaden could exacerbate the tension in that area and between Ethiopia and Somalia. We are also disturbed by recent indications of U.S. Mission encouragement of the Ethiopian Government to move ahead with such plans.

IV. OUR RECOMMENDATIONS

U.S. policy guidelines on Africa call for less direct U.S. involvement in African affairs, particularly military; African governments to solve their own problems; emphasis on regional economic development projects; and international cooperation. Therefore, a viable long-term U.S. policy would avoid a commitment to the defense of Ethiopia and its territorial claims, or to maintenance of Ethiopia's military strength relative to its neighbors. It would also encourage the use of diplomatic channels for the settlement of bilateral disputes and in a longer term framework, promote cooperative ventures on the economic side. To this end we submit the following recommendations:

1. Mission officers should make it clear to the Ethiopian Government that the U.S. considers Ethiopia capable of meeting the foreseeable Somali military pressures, provided that it takes necessary measures to rationally allocate its resources, and to eliminate nepotism, corruption and political influence in the military program. They should also suggest that Ethiopia could enhance internal security in the Ogaden through a more equitable and development-oriented policy. At the same time, it should be made clear that the U.S. does not have any "special relationship" with Ethiopia other than existing treaty commitments, our desire for good bilateral relations, and our continued interest in Ethiopia's economic and social progress; nor does the U.S. have any intention of competing with the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa.

2. The U.S. should strongly urge Ethiopia and Somalia to approach the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the proper forum for discussion and mediation of the territorial and other disputes. The approaching 10th anniversary celebrations provides the IEG with the opportunity to set this in motion. Ethiopia has the stronger case by OAU standards since all African states have ample reason to avoid re-drawing colonial boundaries, the OAU being on record to this effect. Focusing attention in the OAU on Soviet arms deliveries to Somalia may

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Addis Ababa A-23
p. 6

encourage limitations on deliveries of offensive weapons. In an era of limited U.S. commitments, Ethiopia should develop a more self-reliant role in the world in which it must live.

3. We recommend planning now for expansion of Ethio-Somali economic cooperation, particularly in the Ogaden. (An example of a continuing technical joint venture is the campaign against rinderpest.) The U.S. and other foreign donors should encourage joint exploitation of natural resources affecting both countries, e.g. oil and the Webe Shabelle River. Such cooperation would exploit the area's potential in an efficient manner, develop the neglected land and people of the Ogaden, and reduce tension between Ethiopia and Somalia.

ADAIR 

Classified by Parker D. Wyman, DCM.
Subject to Gen. Declass. Schedule of
Exec. Order 11652. Automatically down-
graded at 2-year intervals and declass-
ified on 12/31/81.

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



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PAGE 01 BRIDGE 02452 01 OF 02 131626Z
ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 08-01 180-00 2004.W

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R 131322Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1924

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BRIDGETOWN 2452

DISSENT CHANNEL FROM [REDACTED]

B6

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PGOV, PFOR, EAD, BB, GJ, XL, CU
SUBJ: US POLICY IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

REF: (A) BRIDGETOWN A-012; (B) STATE 000300

1. THE EMBASSY'S 1976 CASP SUBMISSION (BRIDGETOWN A-012) MADE TWO POINTS WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DELETED BY THE DEPARTMENT: (A) THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE AN INCREASE IN CUBAN INTEREST AND ACTIVITY IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN AND (B) THAT OUR POLICY OF EXCLUSIVELY MULTILATERAL AID TO THE REGION'S SMALLER ENGLISH SPEAKING ISLANDS (THE ASSOCIATED STATES, BARBADOS AND GRENADA) IS NEITHER EFFECTIVELY PROVIDING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NOR SERVING US POLITICAL INTERESTS. THIS MESSAGE IS A DISSENT FROM OUR INTENT TO CONTINUE CHANNELING ALL REGIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, CARICOM, AND CERTAIN OF THE AREA'S OTHER MULTINATIONAL ENTITIES. I MUST ALSO QUESTION THE DEPARTMENT'S ALMOST A PRIORI ASSUMPTION THAT THE CUBANS WILL NOT MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT, INCLUDING COVERT ACTIVITY, TO BRING TO POWER RADICAL MARXIST REGIMES IN, FOR OPENERS, DOMINICA, ST. LUCIA, ST. VINCENT AND GRENADA.

2. OUR POLICY OF ONLY MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC AID TO THE SMALL ISLANDS OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SEEMS ROOTED BOTH IN A THEORETICAL COMMITMENT TO "REGIONALISM" AND "POLITICAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION" AND AN UNDERSTANDABLE DISTINCLINATION TO FIELD MULTIPLE MINISCULE BILATERAL AID PROGRAMS IN A HALF DOZEN ISLAND MICRO STATES. UNFORTUNATELY REGIONAL DISINTEGRATION IS A CLEAR AND ACCELEBATING TREND HERE AND OUR SUPPORT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 02 BRIDGE 02452 21 OF 32 1316202

FOR MULTILATERALISM, NO MATTER HOW VIGOROUS, STANDS NO CHANCE OF REVERSING IT. (FOR EXAMPLES OF LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD REGIONALISM, HERE ARE A FEW RECENT ONES: JAMAICAN AND GUYANESE VIOLATIONS OF THE SPIRIT OF THE CARICOM TREATY WITH REGARD TO TEXTILE IMPORTS, ST. LUCIA - BARBADOS SQUABBLING OVER AIR CARRIER LANDING RIGHTS, THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN CURRENCY AUTHORITY FIGHT OVER THE EXCHANGE RATE, THE ST. LUCIA-ST. VINCENT FLOUR MILL FRACAS, ST. LUCIA'S UNILATERAL ABROGATION OF THE PETIT MARTINIQUE ACCORD AND MONTserrat's VETO OF THE CARICOM LOCAL CONTENT AMENDMENT.)

FAR WORSE THAN SIMPLY BEING INEFFECTIVE, OUR PRESENT POLICY IS ROBBING US OF A DECENT OPPORTUNITY TO FAVORABLY INFLUENCE THE DIRECTION OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIVE SOON TO BE INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATED STATES. THE SMALL ISLAND LEADERS CONSISTENTLY HAVE EXPRESSED TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL THEIR DEEP DISSATISFACTION WITH REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR FEELINGS THAT IN SPITE OF THE ISLANDS' SUPERFICIAL SIMILARITIES, THEIR INTERESTS ARE IN FACT DIVERGENT, OFTEN FROM ONE ANOTHER AND ALWAYS FROM THOSE OF TRINIDAD/TOBAGO, JAMAICA, BARBADOS AND GUYANA. THE OTHER, LARGER MEMBERS OF THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (COB) AND CARICOM, THE SMALL ISLAND PREMIERS ARE BEWILDERED BY WHAT THEY CONSIDER OUR BLINDNESS TO REGIONAL REALITY AND TELL US THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF REAL ASSISTANCE ON TERMS RELEVANT TO THEIR PROBLEMS THEY COULD WELL BE REPLACED -- AND RATHER QUICKLY -- BY RADICAL PRO-CUBA AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES HOSTILE TO THE US.

3. DEPARTMENT AND AID PERSONNEL OFTEN DISPUTE THE CONTENTION THAT REGIONALISM HERE IS TRULY ON THE DECLINE, EVEN WHEN ACCEPTING THAT IT IS, THEY STILL SEEM PUZZLED AS TO WHY REGIONAL POLITICIANS FAIL TO SUPPORT THE CONCEPT IN PRACTICE. I THINK OUR PROBLEM IN UNDERSTANDING WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THIS REGARD PROBABLY RESULTS FROM TWO FACTORS IN OUR OWN MENTAL SET. FIRST, BECAUSE OF OUR OWN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE WE SEE EVER-WIDENING INTEGRATION -- ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL, ANYWHERE AT ANY TIME -- AS THE ONLY RATIONAL COURSE. HOWEVER, IN ADDITION TO BELIEVING, CORRECTLY I FEEL, THAT ECONOMIC REGIONALISM IS NOT IN THEIR TRUE INTERESTS, ISLAND LEADERS ASSOCIATE INTEGRATION WITH COLONIALISM

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PAGE 03

BRIDGE 02452 01 OF 02 131625Z

(AFTER ALL THE AREA HAS AS "INTEGRATED" AS IT'S EVER BEEN UNDER THE COLONIAL SYSTEM) AND THE SAME DESIRE TO END BRITISH CONTROL SEES THEM NOT AT ALL ANXIOUS TO SUBMIT TO CONTROL BY ANYONE ELSE. INTEGRATION OF COURSE ALWAYS INVOLVES A SURRENDER OF INDEPENDENCE NO MATTER WHAT ITS MATERIAL REWARDS. SECOND, BECAUSE OF OUR OWN HABIT OF RELATIVE FRANKNESS WE ASSUME REGIONAL LEADERS MEAN WHAT THEY SAY PUBLICALLY ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY AND POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED REGIONALISM. IT IS TRUE THAT THE OLDER PREMIERS (BIRD, BRADSHAW AND CATO) STILL HAVE A RESIDUAL COMMITMENT TO THE OLD DREAM OF REGIONALISM BUT EVEN THEY ARE PESSIMISTIC. (IT SHOULD ALSO BE REMEMBERED THAT WHEN THEY YEARN FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION, EACH ASSUMES HE WOULD BE THE BOSS.) THE YOUNGER LEADERS ARE -- IN PRIVATE AND INCREASINGLY IN PUBLIC -- OPENLY CONTEMPTUOUS OF BOTH ITS EFFICACY AND CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

4. FINALLY IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE ISLAND ELECTORATES ARE GROWING INCREASINGLY ANTI-CARICOM, BELIEVING CORRECTLY THAT IT CONTRIBUTES TO A HIGHER COST OF LIVING AND BENEFITS ONLY JAMAICA, TRINIDAD, BARBADOS AND GUYANA. HERE THE POLITICIANS BOTH LEAD AND FOLLOW THEIR VOTERS. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT NOT EVEN I FORESEE THE FORMAL DISMANTLING OF CARICOM, MUCH LESS THE CDB. THE CARICOM TREATY WILL RATHER SIMPLY BE INCREASINGLY IGNORED (AND OCCASIONALLY AMENDED) UNTIL ONLY THE SHELL REMAINS.

5. THE CASP REVIEWERS JUSTIFIED THEIR DECISION NOT TO ACCEPT OUR OBSERVATION THAT CUBAN ACTIVITY IN THE REGION HAD INCREASED BY NOTING THAT THE INCREASE "HAD NOT BEEN CONFIRMED" (STATE 090300). WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE CORRECT AT THE TIME IS DEBATABLE, WHAT IS NOT DEBATABLE, HOWEVER, IS THAT AT THIS POINT IT IS CLEAR CUBAN INTEREST IN THIS CORNER OF THE CARIBBEAN HAS OBVIOUSLY RISEN CONSIDERABLY. BEYOND THAT, I THINK THAT AS THIS ACTIVITY BECOMES MORE VISIBLE AND HOPEFULLY OUR MONITORING OF IT IMPROVES WE WILL HAVE REASON TO BECOME FAR MORE CONCERNED. UNFORTUNATELY OUR PAST ATTITUDES ON POSSIBLE CUBAN AIMS HERE INCLUDED SOMETHING OF NOT SEEING THAT WE DIDN'T WANT TO SEE.

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OF STATE TELEGRAM

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PAGE-01 BRIDGE 02452 02 OF 02 131625Z
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DISSENT CHANNEL FROM [REDACTED]

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6. THE INCREASE OF APPARENT CUBAN INTEREST IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN, PARTICULARLY DOMINICA AND ST. VINCENT, RAISES THE QUESTION OF CUBA'S ULTIMATE INTENTIONS. I AM AT BEST ONLY AN AMATEUR OBSERVER OF CUBAN STRATEGIES; HOWEVER, I AM NOT CONVINCED BY DEPARTMENTAL ARGUMENTS THAT CASTRO WILL PROBABLY LEAVE THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN MINI-STATES ALONE BECAUSE INVOLVEMENT HERE COULD JEOPARDIZE HIS HOPES OF HEMISPHERIC POLITICAL RESPECTABILITY. IN SPITE OF SIMILAR REASONING, JUST PRIOR TO CUBA'S MASSIVE ANGOLAN INTERVENTION SUCH CONSIDERATIONS DID NOT FINALLY DETER HIM THERE - A POTENTIALLY FAR RISKIER ACT THAN POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY, SUPPORT FOR "LEGAL" RADICAL OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE SMALL EASTERN CARIBBEAN ISLANDS. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT WITHOUT AT LEAST MODEST DIRECT US INVOLVEMENT IN THE AREA, THE STEADILY DETERIORATING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WILL ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF GEORGE ODLYM IN ST. LUCIA, MIKE BROWN IN ST. VINCENT, ROSIE DOUGLAS IN DOMINICA AND POSSIBLY TIM HECTOR IN ANTIGUA.

7. AT THIS POINT IT IS CERTAINLY REASONABLE TO ASK HOW CUBA COULD HOPE TO PROFIT FROM INVOLVEMENT IN THIS AREA. AFTER ALL, THE ISLANDS TOTALLY LACK RESOURCES, NATURAL OR OTHERWISE. THEIR PROBABLE ATTRACTION, HOWEVER, IS THE OPPORTUNITY THEY COULD PRESENT CASTRO TO DEMONSTRATE HISTORY MOVING IN HIS DIRECTION. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF, IN SUCCESSION, THE DECLARATION OF "THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF DOMINICA," "THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF ST LUCIA," ETC., CANNOT REASONABLY BE DENIED. FURTHERMORE THEY COULD BE RELATIVELY CHEAP VICTORIES, EVEN WITHOUT THE PROBABLY SOVIET SUBSIDY.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BRIDGE 02452 02 OF 02 131625Z

8. WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS? WE CAN CONTINUE OUR PRESENT AID POLICY AND GIVE UP ANY CHANCE OF PREVENTING THE EMERGENCE OF UP TO SIX COMMUNIST MICRO STATES (EACH PRESUMABLY WITH A UN SEAT) IN OUR BACKYARD. OR WE CAN DECIDE THAT THE THE EXTRA ADMINSTRATIVE EXPENSE--ADMITTEDLY LARGE RELATIVE TO AID INJECTED, BUT MINUTE IN RELATION TO OUR TOTAL AID BUDGET-- OF SEVERAL TINY BILATERAL AID PROGRAMS IS NOT AN UNREASONABLE PRICE TO PAY TO AVOID AN OUTCOME THAT NOW SEEMS INEVITABLE. OBVIOUSLY THERE'S NO GUARANTEE OF SUCCESS. NOR SHOULD WE DELUDE OURSELVES THAT WE CAN BUY MUCH REAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA) ALL WE CAN ACCOMPLISH IS TO FORESTALL A SERIES OF UNPLEASANT POLITICAL OUTCOMES. FORTUNATELY WE COULD DO SO AT A PRICE EQUAL TO OR VERY POSSIBLY LOWER THAN WHAT WE ARE NOW PAYING IN A FUTLE ATTEMPT TO BUY REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE COB.

9. I HOPE THE DEPARTMENT WILL SERIOUSLY REEXAMINE OUR PRESENT COMMITMENT TO MULTIALATERAL AID AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN LIGHT OF THAT POLICY'S HONEST CHANCES OF ACHIEVING THAT AIM OR ANY OTHER US GOAL. WE SHOULD AVOID THE TEMPTATION TO JUSTIFY MULTILATERALISM ON THE BASIS OF ITS EMOTIVE APPEAL OR TEXTBOOK NEATNESS, JUST AS WE SHOULD NOT IGNORE THE FAILURES OF REGIONALISM IN SOUTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICAN AND EAST AFRICA. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD TAKE A HARD LOOK AT THE AID-COB LOANS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR REGIONAL COMMON SERVICES AND CARICOM'S REGIONAL FOOD SYSTEM. IN SPITE OF THEIR EMINENT RATIONALITY ON PAPER NEITHER OF THESE TWO REGIONAL PLANS HAS EVEN SCANT PRACTICAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS GIVEN INTER-ISLAND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RIVALRIES AND EACH ISLAND LEADER'S DESIRE TO BE UNDISPUTED MASTER IN HIS OWN HOUSE, NO MATTER HOW MEAN.

IT SEEMS ADVISABLE THAT A REVIEW OF THE FUTURE OF MULTIALATERAL AID HERE SHOULD NOT LIMIT ITSELF TO CONTACT WITH COB AND CARICOM PERSONNEL (WHO HAVE AN UNDERSTABLE PERSONAL VESTED INTERESTED IN BOOSTING REGIONALISM AND ARE THEREFORE HARDLY OBJECTIVE COMMENTATORS) BUT SHOULD SURVEY THE FEELINGS OF THE ISLAND GOVERNMENTS THEMSELVES.

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PAGE 03

BRIDGE 02452 02 OF 02 131825Z

10. THE ENGLISH SPEAKING SMALL ISLANDS OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN -- INCLUDING BARBADOS -- TOGETHER HAVE LESS THAN 800 THOUSAND INHABITANTS AND THEIR TOTAL LAND AREA IS HARDLY NOTICEABLE. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, CLOSE TO NORTH AMERICAN (ABOUT 1400 MILES ON THE AVERAGE) AND THEY ARE ALL GOING TO BE (LUDICROUS AS IT SEEMS) INDEPENDENT STATES.
BRITTON



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART

September 24, 1974

~~SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

MEMORANDUM

TO : S/P - Mr. Winston Lord

FROM : AF/C - [redacted] Country Director

SUBJECT: Dissent from AF Action Memorandum on DC-8

B6

I continue to believe [redacted], that no assurances from Bongo have value. However, this analysis is submitted to rebut the arguments of those officials who believe that assurances are of value and that the telegram from Bongo provides assurances on Rhodesia which are credible.

A. The AF memo states we now have Bongo's personal written assurances that the plane will not be used in Rhodesian trade. I state that Bongo, advised by his French counselors, has very carefully not given such assurances. We have three documents from Bongo:

1. A telegram to the Secretary stating that Bongo "renews the guaranties given in the note verbale of June 28 and on the occasion of the special mission's visit concerning the utilization of the aircraft for my personal use and in addition...for Air Afrique...under IATA regulations. This would exclude all countries under sanction by the UN, of which Gabon is a member and whose decisions have Gabon's full support and approval."

Comment: The word "guaranties" appears nowhere in the note verbale of June 28; the special mission provided no oral guaranties or assurances with regard to Rhodesia (see Enc. A - Memcon prepared by L/AF).

The note verbale contains many statements (not guaranties) about the plane; it would be maintained by Air Afrique, it will be used in accordance with the Treaty

SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD

~~SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

2.

of Yaounde, a contract has been signed for its purchase, its use will not compete with existing airlines, the plane is for Bongo's personal use, it will not be used to benefit countries sanctioned by the UN. Bongo did not repeat that key statement in his telegram.

Bongo has known for months of our concern that the plane will be used in Rhodesian trade. Furthermore, because we did not approve the export license after we received the note verbale (indeed, AF recommended against the sale, after we received the note), Bongo has known that note from his Ambassador did not provide sufficient assurances/guarantees on that point. Therefore, his personal message to the Secretary should, at the very least, have specifically repeated the statement that the plane will not be used to benefit Rhodesia. Instead, he simply repeated that the plane is for his personal use and for Air Afrique, statements which we received over his signature twice before and considered insufficient (see pgh # 2 and # 3 below).

I believe Bongo has intentionally avoided putting his own name to a statement that the plane will not be used in Rhodesian trade, and instead has given us a "guarantee" that the plane is for his personal use and for Air Afrique, which guarantees nothing. The sentence beginning "this would exclude all countries, etc" must be carefully looked at:

If the word "this" refers to its immediate antecedent "under IATA rules", it is meaningless, because L/AF informed us IATA rules do not prohibit member airlines from flying to Rhodesia, and two members (Portugal and South Africa) fly there regularly.

If the word "this" refers to usage by Air Afrique/UTA, it is meaningless because Bongo does not control that airline, and UTA has been involved in sanctions violations anyway.

If the word "this" refers to "personal use by Bongo" it is meaningless because the first plane was for Bongo's personal use and went immediately to Rhodesia.

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3.

In other words, the two key sentences simply read "I, guarantee the plane is for my personal use and for Air Afrique and this means the plane won't go to Rhodesia". Based on the analysis above, we have no guarantee over Bongo's signature about Rhodesia.

(Note: The telegram contains other statements which are misleading or false: Gabon does not fully support the UN; a fleet of planes flies from Libreville to Rhodesia regularly. Bongo did not receive approval from Chiefs of State and the OAU: Gowon of Nigeria (while temporarily President of the OAU) told Bongo it was inappropriate to give either approval or disapproval of the proposed purchase.)

2. Some months ago our Ambassador received a letter from Bongo saying the plane was for his personal use and for Air Afrique. No assurances on Rhodesia.

3. Exim received a letter from Bongo, repeating the two uses of the plane but saying nothing about Rhodesia. The letter did say the plane would be used in accordance with the Treaty of Yaounde. When a copy of the letter was given our Ambassador by Roland Bru (French advisor, and long-time agent of Foccart; Bru is described as "nefarious" and "bitterly Anti-American"), Bru said the Treaty of Yaounde provided the assurances we wanted on Rhodesia. AF researched the Treaty and found it was signed in 1961 (seven years before sanctions) and simply set up Air Afrique. In other words, we were given this letter and told it contained the assurances we wanted, but this was a false statement.

Given the consistent pattern of false statements (the June 28 note verbale contains innumerable blatant falsehoods - see Enc. B) made to us either in writing or orally there seems no reason to believe the statement in the note verbale concerning Rhodesian sanctions, and in fact AF did not do so. The "new element" in this situation is the telegram from Bongo, which gives no guarantees on Rhodesia. Why, therefore, should the State Department shift from its position of July 11 "don't sell" to its position of Sept. 16 "sell without any conditions"?

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B. Further comment on the statements in AF's memo:

1. AF states that the "assurances" in the Bongo telegram are the best we can get. Yet we have a copy of a letter from a GOG Minister to EXIM stating the plane will not be used in Rhodesian trade. This is better than the statement contained in the Bongo telegram. However, it is the same quality of assurance that we received in 1972, just before we approved the export license for the first plane which went immediately into Rhodesian trade.
2. AF States the assurances will protect us from criticism if the plane is mis-used. Yet we were criticized after allowing the first plane to go to Gabon when we knew Gabon was involved in Rhodesian trade, and our defense that we had prior assurances did not help us. Having been betrayed on the first plane, how can we explain our selling the second plane? By again referring to assurances?
3. AF states the costs to Bongo (of violating his guarantees) will include criticism from the OAU, the UN, the USG, and the press. Yet he is still incurring these "costs" on the first plane, and it doesn't bother him. In June 1974 the OAU reported that Rhodesia had obtained the use of this fleet of planes only because Gabon had "impersonated" Rhodesia. The planes are still flying out of Libreville to Rhodesia. There are no "costs" to Bongo because he declines to feel ashamed or embarrassed.
4. AF states Bongo must realize the possibility of bilateral action against him if he misuses the second plane. Why "must" he realize this? He knows of the flak we got on the first plane, yet bilateral relations have improved since 1972 and we are doing everything we can to increase American investment and he knows it. I believe he does not expect adverse action if he mis-uses the plane, and I doubt that the reference (in the proposed diplomatic note attached to AF's memo) to bilateral relations will be interpreted as a serious commitment from us to take action against him.
5. AF's memo refers to possible adverse action by Bongo against us if we refuse the sale. Yet the actions we anticipated have, in the most part, already been taken (rejections of bids, etc) and the DC-8 situation has only

2.

been one of the reasons the GOG has turned us down. The remaining possible adverse actions are so minor (i.e. the GOG assumes majority control of a manganese company in which US Steel has an interest) that they no longer form a significant motivation for acting positively on the export license.

Recommendation: by diplomatic note to the GOG Embassy, and by note verbale to the GOG from our Embassy in Libreville, let us tell the Gabonese that we were worried about the possible mis-use of the first plane before we sold it and therefore asked for and got assurances, but nevertheless the plane went into Rhodesian trade and is still there. Because the USG decided at the time the export license was issued in 1972 that mis-use would be prejudicial to sale of future aircraft to Gabon, we are now implementing that decision. In doing this, we are making no judgement about how the GOG would have used the second plane if we had approved the sale. We could add orally that since we believe a DC-8 can be purchased elsewhere (or a similar aircraft) our refusal to sell should in no way inconvenience President Bongo in fulfilling his need for a plane for his personal use.

In making this recommendation I am expressing my own views. However, these views are supported by the views expressed by other Foreign Service Officers, including those familiar with President Bongo and the Rhodesian sanctions problem, who feel the sale of the plane will be a mistake.

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Department of State

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APPROVED BY S/P: PWOLFOWITZ

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 254937

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [] FROM S/P PAUL WOLFOWITZ

B6

E. O. 12065: GDS, 9/22/86 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL)

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REFERENCE : SAN JOSE 5764

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE.
WE HAVE DISTRIBUTED COPIES TO THE SECRETARY, THE COUNSELOR,
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE OPEN FORUM.
THOMAS THORNTON, POLICY PLANNING STAFF MEMBER, WILL
COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. CLARK

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RELEASE IN PART B6

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 054339
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DISSENT CHANNEL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM LAKE S/SP

FOL REPEAT DAMASCUS 1482 ACTION SECSTATE DTD 5 MAR.

QUOTE

SECRET DAMASCUS 1482

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SYRIA, ISRAEL AND LEBANON:
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [] POLITICAL OFFICER. THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE, AND SUGGESTS THAT DISTRIBUTION INCLUDE NEA, NEA/ARM, INR, EMBASSY DAMASCUS AND EMBASSY BEIRUT.

2. PARTIAL CONVERGENCE OF SYRO-ISRAELI INTERESTS OPERATIVE IN LEBANON FOR APPROXIMATELY PAST YEAR HAS BEGUN TO SHOW SIGNS OF SERIOUS SLIPPAGE. PRIOR TO RECENT NABATIYAH AFFAIR INCREMENTAL INSERTIONS OF SYRIAN TROOPS INTO LEBANON AND THEIR SHIFTS AROUND COUNTRY WERE TOLERATED BY ISRAELIS -- SUBSEQUENT TO VIGOROUS EXCHANGES AMONG PARTIES FACILITATED BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN GOOD OFFICES -- AND REFLECTED UNDERLYING COMMON INTERESTS OF BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA IN FORESTALLING ESTABLISHMENT OF WHAT THEY VIEWED AS RADICAL, PALESTINIAN-DOMINATED REGIME IN LEBANON. ISRAELI UNWILLINGNESS TO TOLERATE SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT TO NABATIYAH SIGNALLED Waning OF SYRO-ISRAELI CONVERGENCE AND ENTRANCE INTO NEW PHASE OF LEBANESE CRISIS IN WHICH SYRIAN AND ISRAELI ACTIONS POTENTIALLY GOVERNED BY DIVERGENCE OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

3. SYRO-ISRAELI DISHARMONY IN SOUTH LEBANON APPEARS TO HAVE INITIALLY CAUGHT DAMASCUS BY SURPRISE. WHETHER OR NOT BOTH SIDES CONSCIOUSLY REALIZED FULL IMPORT OF RELATIONSHIP OF PARTIAL MUTUALITY WHICH HAD DEVELOPED SINCE EARLY 1976, SYRIANS HAD BECOME RELATIVELY ACCUSTOMED TO GENERAL PATTERN OF ACTIVITY IN LEBANON WHICH MAINTAINED SOME PREDICTABILITY: STIMULUS (INCREMENT OR SHIFT OF SYRIAN GROUND FORCES IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING CONDITIONS AMONG LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS), CRISIS (ISRAELIS, SYRIANS AND LEBANESE COMMUNICATED WITH EACH OTHER OFTEN THROUGH U.S. AND JORDANIAN GOOD OFFICES TO APPLY EXISTING TACIT GROUND RULES TO NEW SITUATION), AND PERCEPTION (GENERAL ISRAELI ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT MOST RECENT STIMULUS DID NOT UNDOUBTLY THREATEN THEIR UNDERLYING INTERESTS AND AIMED AT RESTRICTING LEBANESE LEFTIST-PALESTINIAN COALITION). ATTAINMENT OF SUCCESSIVE PLATEAUS OF UNDERSTANDING REACHED OUTER LIMIT OF THIS INFORMAL AND MAKE-SHIFT PROCESS WHEN SYRIAN FORCES BELONGING TO ADF ENTERED NABATIYAH.

4. SYRO-ISRAELI DIVERGENCE IN NABATIYAH AFFAIR AND RESULTING DISORDER IN SOUTH HAVE VEXED ASAD REGIME AND OTHER OBSERVERS AS WELL. FROM DAMASCUS VANTAGE POINT, EXPLANATION OF RECENT DIFFICULTIES CAN BE SUMMARIZED RATHER BRIEFLY: SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS COOPERATED IN LEBANON. BUT ISRAELIS WERE UNWILLING TO COOPERATE TO ASSIST SYRIA TO IMPLEMENT POST-ARAB SUMMIT GOAL OF EXTENDING SARKIS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY INTO SOUTH LEBANON, WHERE ISRAELIS PERCEIVE PRESENCE OF SYRIAN ADF TROOPS AT NABATIYAH AND BEYOND AS THREAT TO THEIR NORTHERN BORDERS, A THREAT MAGNIFIED BY ISRAELI ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

5. I BELIEVE THIS ALTERED STATE OF AFFAIRS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT OUR GREATER REGIONAL INTERESTS IN SEVERAL WAYS, MOST DIRECTLY BY UNDERMINING SYRIA'S WILLINGNESS TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN BRINGING PALESTINIANS INTO SETTLEMENT PROCESS ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES AND TO EXPLORE WITH SOME CONFIDENCE FURTHER ACCOMMODATION TO ISRAEL'S EXISTANCE IN REGION. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROCESS WHICH SECRETARY KISSINGER HELPED NURTURE FOLLOWING OCTOBER 1973 WAR AND WHICH SEEMED TO STALL WITH SIGNING OF 1975 SINAI ACCORD PICKED UP SOME MOMENTUM IN MUTATED FORM ON SYRO-ISRAELI FRONT BEGINNING IN 1976 ALONG LINES SUMMARIZED ABOVE PARA 3. IN UNPLANNED AND UNEXPECTED MANNER, SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS IN MIST OF EXTREME VIOLENCE AND MOUNTING PRESSURES GROPED TOWARD REGIONAL ACCOMMODATION IN LEVANT. ACCUSTOMED BY YEARS OF STERILE POLITICAL DEBATING AND INTERMITTENT WARFARE TO REGARD EACH OTHER WITH SUSPICION AND HOSTILITY, THEY SUDDENTLY FOUND THEMSELVES CONFRONTED BY COMMON DANGER, THE THREAT OF A RADICAL STATE ON THEIR BORDERS, DESPITE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED FOREBODINGS, ISRAEL ULTIMATELY PERMITTED ABOUT 30,000 SYRIAN TROOPS TO ENTER LEBANON. AND DESPITE FEARS THAT ISRAELIS MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR MILITARY WEAKNESS ON GOLAN, ASAD WHEN HE DETERMINED IT WAS NECESSARY DEPLETED HIS GOLAN FRONT OF SOME MECHANIZED, INFANTRY AND MISSILE BRIGADES TO MEET WHAT HE PERCEIVED AS GREATER THREATS IN LEBANON AND ON IRAQI BORDER. WHILE BOTH PARTIES RECEIVED OUR INPUT BEFORE THEY REACHED THEIR DECISIONS, AT EACH CRISIS POINT THEY ULTIMATELY RISKED RELYING UPON THEIR OWN PERCEPTIONS OF MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST TO EVOLVE A STRATEGY THAT SUCCEEDED.

6. SYRO-ISRAELI CONVERGENCE IN LEBANON CONTAINED POTENTIAL FOR SPILLING OVER INTO OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AN OVERALL REGIONAL SETTLEMENT. FIRST, IT GENERATED MOMENTUM AND PROMISED TO SOFTEN THE HARSH EDGE OF GENERALLY HOSTILE MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS. SECOND, IT RAISED PROSPECT THAT IN FUTURE STAGES OF NEGOTIATIONS WHEN PALESTINIAN ISSUE WOULD BE DELIBERATED, ISRAELIS COULD AGAIN FIND CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THEIR INTERESTS AND INTERESTS OF SYRIA IN WORKING OUT ACCEPTABLE MANNER FOR PARTIES TO DEAL WITH PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND IN PREVENTING EMERGENCE OF RADICAL PALESTINIAN STATE ON WEST BANK. THEIR GROPING FOR A GEOGRAPHICAL ACCOMMODATION OF INTERESTS, PERHAPS SIGNIFICANTLY, SEEMED TO ADD NEW DIMENSION TO CURRENT FORMULATIONS OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF PEACE, WHEREBY ISRAELIS SEEKING RELATIVELY SELF-ENFORCING ACCORD THROUGH OPEN ACCESS TO NEIGHBORING SOCIETIES WHILE SYRIANS FOR THEIR PART DISPLAY VERBAL PREFERENCE FOR MORE STATIC ARRANGEMENT COMPRISING SIGNING OF TREATY ENDING STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, AGREEMENT ON DEMILITARIZATION AND STATIONING OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES BUT PERHAPS LITTLE ELSE. CONVERGENCE SUGGESTED THAT BOTH PARTIES HAD DISCOVERED SOME COMMON GROUND TO CONTAIN PERHAPS INHERENT VOLATILITY OF THIS REGION. TO SOME EXTENT, THEY WERE EVOLVING TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY HAD THEY BEEN AT PEACE, FOR

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OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 054339

EVEN A PEACE BASED UPON THE ISRAELI MODEL WOULD NOT HAVE GUARANTEED A COOPERATIVE RESPONSE TO INTER-ARAB CONFLICT IN THE LEVANT AND ELSEWHERE IN THE ABSENCE OF PEACE HINDERED CONVERGENCE TO EXTENT THAT COOPERATION IN LEBANON OF NECESSITY WAS IMPLICIT AND EXHIBITED RELIANCE UPON INTERMEDIARIES FOR EXCHANGING COMMUNICATIONS.

7. CURRENT SIGNS OF DIVERGENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON THREATEN TO DISRUPT PROGRESS ALREADY ACHIEVED AND COULD LEAD TO REGIONAL CONFLICT. ~~WHAT IS DISTURBING, HOWEVER, IS THAT INITIAL SUCCESS OF ISRAELIS AND SOME ARABS TO COME SO VERY CLOSE TO WORKING OUT THEIR OWN REGIONAL PROBLEMS WITHOUT RESORTING TO BY NOW FAMILIAR FALLBACK TACTIC INTERPOSING SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF UN FORCES BETWEEN DISPUTANTS MAY BE PERMITTED TO DISSIPATE, LEAVING SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO SEEK FURTHER AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST WITH ISRAEL AND U.S. TO POSSIBLY WANE AS WELL.~~

8. WILLINGNESS OF THE DEPARTMENT TO MAINTAIN OPEN MIND ABOUT INSERTION OF UN TROOPS INTO SOUTH LEBANON IS EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE WILL TO TAKE SOME RISKS TO RESOLVE SOUTH LEBANON ISSUE, BUT AS NOTED ABOVE PARA. 1 I HAVE DOUBTS THIS IS MOST PROPER INVESTMENT OF OUR POLITICAL CAPITAL. ~~I SUGGEST AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY THAT WILL HELP TO END DISORDER IN SOUTH AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ENHANCE SYRIA'S DESIRE TO ASSUME ACTIVE ROLE IN OVERCOMING NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES TO REACH COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WITHOUT SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO OVERALL SETTLEMENT. I PROPOSE THAT WE INVEST NECESSARY POLITICAL CAPITAL TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO TOLERATE LIMITED INSERTION OF SYRIAN ARMY FORCES INTO SOUTH LEBANON TO RESTORE CENTRAL GOVT AUTHORITY TO THAT REGION; AND TO OBTAIN SYRIAN CONSENT TO CEASE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS AND PROVIDE TIMELY DETAILED INFORMATION ON THEIR FORCES AND MISSIONS IN THE SOUTH. THIS WOULD NECESSITATE U.S. TAKING DIPLOMATIC LEAD TO FASHION ARRANGEMENTS SUITABLE TO BOTH SIDES TO BRIDGE GAP THAT HAS OPENED, BUT IT SEEMS WE COULD BUILD UPON COMMON GROUND THAT ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS HANGED TO UNCOVER OVER PAST YEAR AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MODIFICATIONS IN PERCEPTIONS BETWEEN THESE TWO PARTIES. I DO NOT MINIMIZE THE DIFFICULTIES IN CONVINCING BOTH PARTIES TO FOLLOW THIS COURSE AFTER OUR UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT IN FEBRUARY. IT RISKS ANTAGONIZING THE ISRAELIS WHEN WE SEEKING THEIR COOPERATION TO RESUME SENSITIVE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD OVERALL SETTLEMENT, BUT THIS ANTAGONISM MAY BE SHORT-LIVED IF SYRIANS SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCT THEIR MISSION AND KEEP TO THE TERMS OF WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS ARE CONCLUDED. BASED UPON OUR EXPERIENCE OVER THE LAST YEAR, WE HAVE REASONABLE GROUNDS TO DEPEND ON SYRIAN PERFORMANCE. AND SINCE SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON HAS BEEN A MAJOR DETERMINANT OF ITS WILLINGNESS TO PLAY POSITIVE ROLE IN REACHING SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, POLITICAL CAPITAL INVESTED IN THIS STRATEGY WOULD STAND A REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF ADDING TO RATHER THAN DEPLETING OUR FUTURE NEGOTIATING ASSETS.~~

MURPHY

UNQUOTE VANCE

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TO
ACTION 8P-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISD-00 7004.W.....

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUCHAREST 2888

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR 87P-REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW ACT FROM AMBASSADOR:

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EEWT, ETRD, US, RO
SUBJECT: US-ROMANIAN LONG-TERM COOPERATION AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 119702

I HAVE DELAYED SENDING EVEN AN INTERIM REPLY TO YOU SINCE [redacted] IS PRESENTLY OUT OF TOWN TOURING NORTHERN ROMANIA WITH HIS PARENTS. I HAVE SPOKEN TO HIM ONCE ON THE PHONE IN APPROPRIATE GUARDED TERMS AND WE'RE TO TALK AGAIN TONIGHT OR TOMORROW NIGHT. HE HAS AGREED THAT WE WILL WORK ON A TELEGRAM SETTING FORTH EMBASSY COMMENTS ON THE TWO POINTS HE HAS RAISED. I WOULD PREFER TO HAVE HIM SEE WHAT WE ARE SENDING AND DISCUSS IT WITH HIM BUT HE HAS INDICATED HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HAVE IT GO OFF PRIOR TO HIS RETURN THIS WEEKEND. IN ANY CASE, FROM HERE ON WE WILL USE NORMAL CHANNEL.
BARNES

B6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



RELEASE IN PART B6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Sept. 19, 1974

Dear Mr. Lord,

If it is not too much trouble, I would appreciate your substituting the attached two pages for the first two pages of the dissent paper I submitted earlier this week.

In the hopes that the Secretary may not yet have made a decision I have taken time to try to improve the presentation, and also do a better typing job, making it easier to read.

I appreciate your cooperation.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature box]

CC: Mr. Djerejian

B6

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

July 20, 1972

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DISSENT CHANNEL

[Redacted]

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After the Department received your telegram (#2313) of July 7, I consulted with the Bureau for African Affairs and other interested officers in the Department. This further response to your message outlines in some detail the Department's actions in relation to the crisis in Burundi.

As soon as the crisis in Burundi erupted on April 29, 1972, with a coordinated Hutu attempt to overthrow the Tutsi regime, the U.S. Government tried to be helpful from both the humanitarian and political points of view. In response to the initial requests from the Burundi Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services, and Caritas International, we supplied \$80,000 worth of relief supplies to help victims of the initial hostilities. We are reasonably certain that these first supplies reached the intended recipients without discrimination against any ethnic group.

On the political side, we joined with other governments represented in Burundi in an appeal to the Burundi Government to refrain from reprisals and repression against the Hutu majority. In view of the fact that we have no aid program in Burundi beyond a modest self-help program (\$35,000 in FY 72), and that traditionally the United States has been identified with the Hutus because of American missionary activity, we felt that the most effective influence on the regime to cease the repression could be exerted by other African governments. We actively pursued contacts with African leaders who are well known and respected in Burundi, such as President Mobutu of

[Redacted]

American Embassy,
Tegucigalpa.

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2

Zaire, President Ould Daddah of Mauritania, and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Apart from Mobutu who sent a special envoy to Burundi to urge moderation, all the other Africans appeared reluctant to interfere in what they considered an internal matter of a sovereign African state. The annual summit conference of the Organization of African Unity in June 1972 did not even discuss the problem.

As soon as it became clear that subsequent distribution of humanitarian assistance was being controlled in such a manner as to deprive the Hutus in favor of Tutsis, we suspended all consideration of providing further aid. Other organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross also suspended plans for providing assistance.

In late June, the Secretary General of the United Nations sent a mission to Burundi to determine the facts and to recommend courses of action. The mission was sent with our encouragement, and Embassy Bujumbura assisted the mission in obtaining an accurate picture of the situation despite Burundi Government efforts to the contrary. We are now awaiting the Secretary General's reaction, and are encouraging his associates to move quickly because the killing and suffering continue.

In addition to the suffering within Burundi, a serious refugee problem has developed in neighboring countries, especially along Lake Tanganyika in eastern Zaire, and in Tanzania. Most of the refugees, including many Hutu students who escaped execution squads, are in terrible condition. The Department has requested the posts in the area to focus on this problem and to make recommendations. We have urged the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to take an urgent interest in the matter, and he has agreed to send a representative to the area immediately to coordinate assistance. The Catholic Relief Services is already working there, and the Department gave that organization a grant of \$50,000 on July 14th to start the relief program going while we obtain more details.

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3

I believe that from the foregoing you will agree that the U.S. Government has been doing the maximum within its limited capabilities to help the Hutus and to encourage a return to peaceful conditions.

Sincerely yours,

Signed
William I. Cargo

William I. Cargo
Director
Planning and Coordination Staff

Drafted: AF/C: HJCohen
SP/C: HJSpiro/ebd

Concurrence:

AF - Mr. Newsom

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RELEASE
IN PART B6

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

11

PAGE 01 617 SANTIAGO 04556 031720Z
ACTION 03F-02

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DISSENT CHANNEL//////////

E. O. 11652: N/A
TAGS:
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: COMMENTS ON DISSENT CHANNEL
MESSAGE SANTIAGO 4523 RE PART III OF PARM

REF: SANTIAGO 4523

1. THE DRAFTERS OF THIS MESSAGE ARE [REDACTED]

AND [REDACTED] THIS CABLE COMMENTS ON THE MESSAGE SUBMITTED BY [REDACTED] BY DISSENT CHANNEL (SANTIAGO 4523, REFTEL). THE DRAFTERS DO NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE. THEY SUGGEST DISTRIBUTION BE THE SAME AS THAT MADE IN REFTEL, I.E., DIRECTOR OF USIA; THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF USIA (LATIN AMERICA), THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CULTURAL AFFAIRS; THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERAMERICAN AFFAIRS; AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT CHILE DESK. (ALSO FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER.)

2. THIS MESSAGE DOES NOT ADDRESS THE PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE POINTS RAISED BY FRO BELL IN REFTEL. THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO DIFFERING VIEWS AND ARE NO DOUBT CURRENTLY BEING DEBATED IN WASHINGTON IN THE PARM PROCESS. HOWEVER, REFTEL CONTAINS MISREPRESENTATIONS, INNUENDOS, AND UNFOUNDED PERSONAL ATTACKS ON AMBASSADOR DAVID H. POPPER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION THOMAS D. BOYATT, AND THE COUNSELORS INVOLVED IN THE EMBASSY'S PARM III EXERCISE. THESE MATTERS REQUIRE COMMENT.

3. MISREPRESENTATIONS: REFTEL STATES THAT THE AMBASSADOR WITH THE ADVICE OF THE DCM AND THE OTHER THREE COUNSELORS OF EMBASSY RECOMMENDED A 60 PERCENT CUT IN THE AMERICAN OFFICER COMPLEMENT DEVOTED TO CULTURAL AFFAIRS IN CHILE. THIS IS MISLEADING. THE PARM III RECOMMENDATIONS WERE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF FOUR OF USIA SANTIAGO'S ELEVEN COUNTRY POSITIONS. USIA SANTIAGO WOULD STILL BE COMPOSED OF SEVEN U.S. PERSONNEL OF WHICH A SIGNIFICANT PORTION WOULD DEVOTE THEIR EFFORTS TO CULTURAL ACTIVITIES. NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO RESTRUCTURE A REDUCED USIA, BUT OFFICERS IN SEVERAL POSITIONS COULD CLEARLY DO BOTH INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL WORK.

4. INNUENDOS: THE THRUST OF REFTEL IS TO POINT THE AMBASSADOR, DCM AND COUNSELORS AS BEING SOMEHOW ANTI-CULTURAL. WE MUST REJECT THIS ALLEGATION. IN FACT THE OFFICERS CONCERNED ARE STRONG SUPPORTERS OF A BROADLY DESIGNED CULTURAL PROGRAM IN CHILE AND ARE GREATLY INTERESTED IN A MEANINGFUL INTERCHANGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHILE. OUR POINT IS THAT ENHANCED CULTURAL ACTIVITIES CAN BE ACHIEVED AND SHOULD BE ACHIEVED WITH FEWER PEOPLE AT LESS EXPENSE. WE WERE AND ARE SERIOUSLY PURSUING PRESIDENT CARTER'S GOAL OF BETTER GOVERNMENT WITH FEWER PEOPLE AT LESS COST. IN REVIEWING THE ENTIRE MISSION STAFF STRUCTURE, WE HAVE APPLIED EXACTLY THE SAME CRITERIA TO ALL ELEMENTS -- STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES. IN KEEPING WITH THE STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS WERE RECOMMENDED IN MOST SECTIONS.

5. PERSONAL ATTACK ON DCM: IN REFTEL, [REDACTED] ALLEGES THAT "THE DCM ORDERED THE OTHER COUNSELORS SPECIFICALLY NOT TO TELL THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS HAD BEEN MADE TO CUT USIA." THIS IS A MISREPRESENTATION. THE SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS INVOLVED IN PARM II AND III WERE AWARE OF THE STADIS NATURE OF THE OPERATION. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE DCM MENTIONED THE MATTER, HE WAS REMINDING THOSE INVOLVED THAT THE SUBJECT WAS STADIS

AS ORDERED BY THE DEPARTMENT, AND NOT IMPOSING SOME SORT OF PERSONAL GAG RULE.

6. PERSONAL ATTACK ON THE AMBASSADOR: [REDACTED] STATES THAT HE WAS ASSURED BY AMBASSADOR POPPER THAT [REDACTED] COUNSEL WOULD BE SOUGHT DURING THIS "SECRET DRAFTING PROCESS". [REDACTED] GOES ON TO SAY, "IT THIS COUNSEL WAS NOT (SOUGHT) AND [REDACTED] WAS UNAWARE UNTIL LAST WEEK THAT SUCH EXTREME CUTS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED". IN FACT, [REDACTED] SUBMITTED TO THE AMBASSADOR A MULTI-PAGED MEMORANDUM CONCERNING PERSONNEL LEVELS IN USIA WHICH THE AMBASSADOR CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PARM II/III GROUP. THE DETAILS OF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH [REDACTED] WITHOUT TRANSGRESSING THE STADIS GUIDELINES. HAVING CONSIDERED ALL VIEWS, AMBASSADOR POPPER OPTED FOR THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PARM GROUP RATHER THAN FOR [REDACTED] [REDACTED] WAS SO INFORMED IN AN OPEN PARM MEETING.

7. COMMENT: PUBLIC LAW 93-475 GIVES CHIEFS OF MISSION "FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DIRECTION, COORDINATION, AND SUPERVISION OF ALL U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THAT COUNTRY, EXCEPT FOR PERSONNEL UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE U.S. AREA MILITARY COMMANDER".

8. THE DRAFTERS OF THIS MESSAGE HAVE SOME SYMPATHY FOR [REDACTED] OBJECTION TO THE STADIS PROCEDURE, WHICH EXCLUDED HIM FROM PARM III DELIBERATIONS AT POST. THIS PROCEDURE, HOWEVER, WAS MANDATED BY THE DEPARTMENT. AMONG THE RESPONSIBILITIES PLACED UPON THE CHIEF OF MISSION UNDER PUBLIC LAW 93-475 IS A REGULAR, OBJECTIVE, AND INDEPENDENT LOOK AT PERSONNEL STAFFING. HE IS NOT OBLIGED UNCRTICALLY TO ACCEPT WERE DEFENSES OF THE STATUS QUO.
BOYATT

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RELEASE IN PART B6

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE #1 MADRID 03663 01 OF 02 111616Z 8529
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GET OVER THIS HURDLE, AND ACCUSATIONS THAT WE DID NOT REALLY SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE CREDENCE.

11

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 MADRID 3663

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT-THE NEED FOR CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SPECTRUM

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [REDACTED] IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL QUITE RESTRICTED DISSENT CHANNEL DISTRIBUTION, HE ASKS THAT THE MESSAGE BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, THE NSC, AND, IN STATE, TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESIGNATE VEST AND, IF APPROPRIATE, TO ALLARD LOMENSTEIN AT USUN, WHO HAS EXPERT CREDENTIALS ON SPANISH OPPOSITION ATTITUDES.

2. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP, COMING ON THE HEELS OF PRIME MINISTER SUAREZ' VISIT TO THE U.S., AND THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MADRID, HAS TAKEN ON THE UNDESIRABLE ASPECT OF A DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN BOOST FOR PRIME MINISTER SUAREZ, WHO IS OF COURSE NOW A DECLARED CANDIDATE AND NO LONGER AT ALL ABOVE BATTLE DESPITE HIS KEY ROLE IN BRINGING THE SPANISH DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS ALONG TO WHERE IT IS TODAY. IN AN IDEAL WORLD, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF THE VICE PRESIDENT COULD HAVE COME TO MADRID AFTER THE ELECTIONS WITH THE RESULTS IN HAND AND A GOVERNMENT, ALMOST CERTAINLY STILL A SUAREZ GOVERNMENT, CONFIRMED IN OFFICE. BUT HIS EUROPEAN TRIP, FOR SUBSTANTIVE REASONS APART FROM OUR INTERESTS IN SPAIN, IS OBVIOUSLY A NECESSITY. AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HARD, COMING TO NEIGHBORING PORTUGAL AND SEVERAL OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, TO LEAVE SPAIN ASIDE.

3. HAVING SAID THIS, WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT DOES AND DOES NOT DO HERE WILL MAKE A DIFFERENCE. HIS CURRENT SCHEDULE SUGGESTS TO ME THAT WE ARE ABOUT TO COMMIT AN UNNECESSARY MISTAKE OF QUITE SERIOUS PROPORTIONS. MANY SPANIARDS OF DEMOCRATIC PERSUASION, AND NOT A FEW AMERICANS, WOULD ARGUE THAT RIGHT AFTER WORLD WAR II WE SHOULD HAVE LEANED HARD ENOUGH UPON FRANCO FOR FORCE HIM OUT AND THAT, IN THOSE DAYS, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO PUT IN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (C.F. JAPAN AND GERMANY) AND WITH THE MARSHALL PLAN GET SPAIN ON THE ROAD TO RECOVERY FROM HER CIVIL WAR. ARGUING ABOUT WHAT DID NOT HAPPEN IS A PARLOUR EXERCISE. WHAT DID HAPPEN, HOWEVER, HAS A GREAT DEAL TO DO WITH CURRENT SPANISH ATTITUDES. UNDER THE PRESSURES OF KOREA AND THE COLD WAR, WE FORGED SOMEWHAT UNCOMFORTABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS REGIME THAT IN THE EYES OF BOTH OPPONENTS AND BACKERS KEPT FRANCO AFLOAT MANY YEARS LONGER THAN WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN THE CASE. AND WHEN HIGH LEVEL VISITS OCCASIONALLY TOOK PLACE, THEY SYMBOLIZED OUR VISIBLE SUPPORT FOR THE FRANCO REGIME, NOT FOR DEMOCRACY. CONSEQUENTLY, SPAIN HAS BEEN A FAIRLY FERTILE PLACE IN WHICH TO PROPAGATE THE IDEA THAT AMERICANS DON'T GIVE A FIG FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. AT LEAST WHEN IT COMES TO OTHERS, BREEDING RESENTMENT AMONG THE TRADITIONAL DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION AND CYNICISM AMONG BOTH THOSE WHO ACQUIESCED IN FRANCO AND THOSE WHO SUPPORTED HIM. THE PAST ADMINISTRATION DID SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION (A BIT CAUTIOUSLY PERHAPS) BUT IT COULD NEVER

4. IN THE CONTEXT JUST DESCRIBED HERE, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED REMARKABLY WELL BY A BROAD SPECTRUM OF DEMOCRATICALLY MINDED PEOPLE FROM CONSERVATIVE TO SOCIALIST. THIS IS LARGELY DUE TO THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH HAS BEEN PERCEIVED TO BE GENUINE BY MANY HERE BECAUSE IT EVENHANDEDLY EXTENDS NOT ONLY TO COMMUNIST OPPRESSION, BUT TO DICTATORSHIPS OF THE RIGHT, TO ILLUSTRATE, JOAQUIN RUIZ GIMENEZ, AN INTERNATIONALLY KNOWN HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATE, A MAJOR FIGURE IN THE OPPOSITION TO FRANCO, AND NOW THE LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC TEAM, HAS WARMLY PRAISED THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE. MORE SURPRISINGLY, LEADERS OF THE MAJOR SOCIALIST GROUP, THE PSOE OF FELIPE GONZALEZ WHO HAS CLOSE TIES TO BRANDT AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT WITTERANDI HAVE PRAISED THE ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDES, MOSTLY IN PRIVATE, ON HUMAN RIGHTS DESPITE THEIR USUAL REFLEX SUSPICIONS OF U.S. MOTIVES.

5. UNFORTUNATELY, AND EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE NOT KILLED IT, THIS ADMINISTRATION IS NOW BEING ACCUSED OF DOING BUSINESS AT THE SAME OLD STAND. THIS DOES SUAREZ NO MORE GOOD THAN IT DOES US, FOR HE MAY WEIGH HIM DOWN ON THE TIGHTROPE THAT HE STILL MUST WALK. SUPPORT FOR THE KING, THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND THE REMARKABLE JOB SUAREZ HAS DONE IN MOVING IT ALONG IS ONE THING, BUT PERCEIVED SUPPORT FOR SUAREZ THE CANDIDATE MORTGAGES OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS OF PRESENT OR FUTURE POTENTIAL.

NOTE BY OC/F: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MADRID 3663

DISSENT CHANNEL

6. THE SUAREZ TRIP TO THE U.S. GAVE A BOOST TO THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS, PERHAPS A CRUCIAL ONE, COMING AT A TIME WHEN THE SPANISH MILITARY WERE MOST RESTIVE AFTER HIS COURAGEOUS DECISION TO LEGALIZE THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE TO CLIP HIS WINGS AND SKEW THE ELECTIONS TOWARDS THE CONSERVATIVE (EVEN NEO-FRANCOIST) ALIANZA POPULAR. BUT THE IMAGE OF REPEATED ATTENTION TO SUAREZ DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, UNRELIEVED BY HIGH ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS WITH HIS OPPOSITION, HAS NOW CAUSED PRIVATE COMPLAINTS, INNUEENDO IN THE PRESS, AND A RECURRENCE OF CYNICISM ABOUT OUR MOTIVES.

7. THE ALIANZA POPULAR HAS VOICED LOW KEY COMPLAINTS TO US (AND ALMOST CERTAINLY LOUDER ONES TO THIRD PARTIES). THE SOCIALISTS HAVE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE IRRITATION, THOUGH GONZALEZ PERSONALLY HAS COUCHED HIS CONCERNS TO THE AMBASSADOR IN DIPLOMATIC FASHION. FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER AREILZA, EASED OUT OF THE POLITICAL LIMELIGHT BY SUAREZ, EARLIER EXPRESSED CONCERN TO ME. I TEND TO THINK OF FRAGA (AND AREILZA TOO) AS A MAN OF THE PAST, RATHER THAN OF THE FUTURE BUT HE REMAINS IMPORTANT NOW. HIS GROUPS' IRRITATION WILL EVENTUALLY SPILL OVER, PERHAPS IN A GAULLIST ATTITUDE TOWARD NATO, AND THEY HAVE FRIENDS AMONG THE CONSERVATIVE MILITARY, WHO MUST BE BROUGHT AROUND ON NATO. IN CONTRAST, THE RELATIVELY MODERATE GONZALEZ, WHO HAS LITTLE FAITH IN THE COMMUNISTS, IS QUITE POSSIBLY A MAN OF THE FUTURE, EVEN THOUGH NO ONE CAN PREDICT WHERE THE SOCIALISTS ARE GOING WITH SURETY. THEY ARE THE LARGEST FORCE ON THE LEFT TODAY, AND IT IS NECESSARY TO CULTIVATE A DECENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS.

8. IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTERACT THIS DISTURBING SITUATION, THE AMBASSADOR PROPOSED A MAJOR RECEPTION BY THE VICE-PRESIDENT FOR LEADERS OF ALL WALKS OF SPANISH LIFE, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO A BROAD SPECTRUM OF POLITICAL FIGURES. WE EXCLUDED GROUPS ALIEN TO THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION, FALANGISTS AND FAR RIGHT GROUPS AND THE COMMUNISTS AND FRINGE ELEMENTS TO THEIR LEFT. THIS IS CONSONANT WITH CURRENT POLICY, WHICH HAS THE MADRID EMBASSY INITIATING CONTACTS WITH SPANISH COMMUNISTS AFTER THE ELECTION, WHEN THEY CANNOT USE CONTACTS WITH THE USG TO HELP THEIR ELECTORAL RESPECTABILITY. UNLIKE ITALY AND FRANCE, WHERE THEY ARE MAJOR ELECTORAL FORCES, THE COMMUNISTS ARE NOT GOING TO GET MUCH OF THE VOTE, THIS TIME ANYWAY, AND THERE IS NO USE IN OUR GIVING THEM AN INADVERTENT BOOST. THE IDEA OF A RECEPTION WAS TURNED DOWN, AND IF THE PRESENT SCHEDULE GOES FORWARD, THE VICE-PRESIDENT WILL SEE NO POLITICIANS IN MADRID EXCEPT SUAREZ AND HIS CABINET ALLIES.

9. I RESPECTFULLY REQUEST RECONSIDERATION OF THE RECEPTION PROPOSAL. IF THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE, I SUGGEST AN ALTERNATIVE, EXPLORE LAYING ON THREE INDIVIDUAL ENCOUNTERS WITH GONZALEZ, RUIZ-GIMENEZ, AND FRAGA, THE MOST IMPORTANT LEADERS OF THE LEFT, CENTER AND RIGHT WHO WILL CONTEND WITH SUAREZ IN THESE ELECTIONS. IN THIS ALTERNATIVE, I DIFFER WITH THE AMBASSADOR WHO JUDGES INDIVIDUAL MEETINGS TO BE TOO POINTED A SINGLING OUT OF CERTAIN LEADERS AMONG THE MANY.

AND IT CERTAINLY DOES HAVE THE DISADVANTAGE OF EXCLUDING SMALLER GROUPS, BUT THE COMMUNISTS WILL HAVE PLENTY OF COMPANY IF THAT IS A CONSIDERATION.

I.E. IN SUM, ANY PROPOSAL TO HAVE ANYTHING OTHER THAN A PROGRAM WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY HAS ITS COMPLEXITIES AND DRAWBACKS. NOT EVERYONE WILL MAKE IT TO A RECEPTION, INCLUDING PERHAPS SOME OF THOSE WE MOST WANT, NOR WILL PRIVATE MEETINGS BE EASY TO ARRANGE MUCH LESS MAKE EVERYONE HAPPY, EVEN THOUGH SUAREZ CERTAINLY SAW REPUBLICANS IN THE U.S. BUT NONE OF THESE QUITE REAL COSTS AND DIFFICULTIES ARE NEARLY AS TROUBLESOME AS THOSE INVOLVED IN GOING THROUGH WITH THE VISIT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CURRENT PLAN. I WOULD ONLY ADD THAT IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY SAD TO LOSE THE HISTORICAL MOMENT AND ENDANGER THE ADMINISTRATION'S CLEARLY NOW CREDIBILITY ON THE DEMOCRATIC ISSUE. I APOLOGIZE FOR THE LENGTH BUT THINK IT INCUMBENT UPON THE DISSENTER TO MAKE HIS ASSUMPTIONS CLEAR. STABLER

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES TO THE TABLES

RELEASE IN FULL

G = Government delegate

E = Employer delegate

W = Worker delegate

+ = A vote consonant with the side supported by the U.S. delegation

- = A vote not consonant with the side supported by the U.S. delegation

blank = Absence for whatever reason

1974 = Vote on a resolution concerning "the policy of discrimination, racism and violation of trade union freedoms and rights practised by the Israeli authorities in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories."

1975 = Vote on the so-called "Hawke Amendment" to ensure that ILO bodies considering inviting a liberation movement, such as the PLO, will first have to be assured "that the liberation movement in question fully recognizes the principles of the ILO and its Constitution and the right of all member States to continue in existence and participate in the work of the Organization."

1977 I = Vote concerning a proposed amendment to Article 17 of the Standing Orders of the International Labor Conference previously approved by the Governing Body and designed to exercise closer control over the introduction of resolutions at ILO conferences.

1977 II = Vote on the adoption of a report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations and involving in particular the conclusions of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations with regard to the Soviet Union, other Communist countries, and Israel.

	1974				1975				1977 I				1977 II			
	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W
Australia	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Austria	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Denmark	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Finland	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	
Germany (West)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Greece	-		+	-	-	-		-	+	+		+	+	+	+	+
Iceland	+	+		+					+							
Ireland	+	+	+		-	-	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
*Israel	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Italy	+	+	+	+	-	-	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Japan	+	+	+		-	-	-		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Luxemburg			+	+	-	-	+		+	+		+	+	+		
Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Norway	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Portugal	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-
Spain	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+			+	+
Sweden	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+
Switzerland	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United States	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
*Cyprus	-	-		+	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	+	-
*Malta	-	-			-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-

	1974				1975				1977 I				1977 II			
	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W
Byelorussia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cuba	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czechoslovakia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany (East)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hungary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mongolia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rumania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
USSR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yugoslavia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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	1974				1975				1977 I				1977 II			
	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W
Algeria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bahrain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Egypt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iraq	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jordan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kuwait	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lybia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Morocco	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Qatar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Somalia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Syria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
United Arab Emirates	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yemen Arab Republic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Democratic Yemen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	1975				1975				1977 I				1977 II			
	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W
Angola									-				-			
Benin									-				-			
Burundi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cameroon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+
Central African Empire	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					-	-		
Chad													-	-		
Congo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					-	-		
Dahomey	-				-											
Ethiopia	+				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gabon	-				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ghana	-				-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-				
Guinea					-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea-Bissau									-							
Ivory Coast					-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kenya	+	+	+	+					-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+
Liberia					-	-	-	-	+	+	+					
Madagascar	-				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malawi	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-					+	+		
Mali	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritius	-								-	-	-	-				
Mozambique									-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Niger	-				-	-	-	-					-	-	-	-
Nigeria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			+		-	-		
Rwanda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Senegal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone					-								+			
Swaziland					-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Tanzania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Togo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					-	-	+	+
Uganda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Upper Volta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Zaire	-				-				-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Zambia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	1974				1975				1977 I				1977 II			
	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W
Afghanistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-								
Bangladesh	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-								
Burma	+	+	+	+												
India	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			+					
Indonesia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-								
Iran	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+				
Laos					-											
Malaysia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-								
Nepal					-	-	-	-								
Pakistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-								
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-							+	
Singapore					-	-	-	-								
Sri Lanka	-			-	-	-	+	-								
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-								
Fiji				+	+			+					+	+		+
Papua													+	+	+	+

	1974				1975				1977 I				1977 II			
	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W	G	G	E	W
Argentina	-	-	+		-	-			-				-	-		
Bolivia					-	-										
Brazil	+	+		+	+	-	-		-	-	+	+	-	-		
Chile	+		+		-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-		
Colombia	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+			
Costa Rica					-	-						+				
Ecuador	+	+	+	+	-	-	-		-	-	-		-			+
El Salvador	+			-			+									
Guatemala				+	-	-										
Honduras				+					+	+		+	+	+	+	
Mexico	-	-	+		-	-	+					+	-	-	+	
Nicaragua				+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+				
Panama	-		+	-	-	-			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Peru	-	-	-		-	-	-		-	-		+	-	-	+	+
Uruguay	+	+	+		-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+				+
Venezuela					-	-			-		+					+
Barbados	+	+					+		+	+	+	+				+
Guyana					-											
Jamaica	+	+	+						+		+	+	+			+
Surinam													+	+	+	+
Trinidad	-	-			-	-	+				+	+			+	+

Effect of Withdrawal from ILO on US Participation in Other Specialized Agencies

An assessment of what effect our withdrawal from the ILO might have on our participation in other UN specialized agencies must deal with three principal considerations: the nature and purposes of these agencies; the extent to which the problems we face in these organizations are common, and the extent to which they are different; and how we participate and make decisions in each of these organizations. For purposes of this assessment, the following three major specialized agencies are selected for comparison: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO).

FAO

The FAO had its origins in the UN Conference on Food and Agriculture held at Hot Springs, Va. in 1943. It was formally established in 1945 by representatives of 37 governments, including the U.S.

The purposes for which the FAO was established are to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to secure improvements in the efficiency of production and distribution of food and agricultural products.

The policymaking body of FAO is the biennial conference. Between sessions of the conference a 42-member council elected by the conference carries on the program of work approved by conference.

Problem areas include introduction of political issues (anti-Israel resolution) and sharp increases in the organization's budget.

UNESCO

Plans for the establishment of UNESCO began in 1942 with U.S. participation. The UNESCO constitution came into force in 1946. The U.S. became a member in 1946.

The purpose of UNESCO is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among member states in the fields of education, science and culture.

The major body is the biennial general conference, composed of all members, which makes general policy and approves a detailed program of activities. A 40-member Executive Board, elected by the conference acts for the conference between its sessions.

Problem areas include substantial budget increases, and political issues--preventing Israel from full participation and proposed action which would inhibit free flow of information. These issues led to withholding of funds by the U.S. Recent developments have corrected these trends sufficiently to permit resumption in the payment of U.S. contributions.

- 2 -

WHO

The establishment of WHO in 1948 was the result of efforts initiated at the UN Conference in 1945, with the U.S. playing a leading role. U.S. membership dates from 1948.

The purpose of the organization is the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. WHO acts as a coordinator on international public health work, stimulates programs to eradicate disease, promotes adoption of international standards with respect to food, biological and pharmaceutical products, and other health related programs.

The policymaking body is the Annual Assembly, which determines broad policy and approves the program of work. The assembly elects a 30-member Executive Board, which represents the assembly between sessions.

Problem areas include budgetary expansion and political issues such as anti-Israel resolutions.

This brief examination of these three specialized agencies indicates the similarities and differences between the ILO and other specialized agencies. A major difference is that other specialized agencies are governmental organizations. The ILO is unique in that it is tripartite, which affects in a fundamental way its organizational structure, and the way in which the U.S. conducts its participation. As regards structure, it should be noted that the ILO Governing Body has a higher degree of authority than most other major specialized agencies. The ILO Constitution defines separate roles for the conference, the Governing Body and the Office. The relationship is an interlocking one of checks and balances rather than that of a hierarchy. Other major specialized agencies do not have non-elective seats on their executive boards, comparable to the 10 states of chief industrial importance. The UN Security Council comes closest in this regard.

The major purposes of each specialized agency are rather carefully defined. The purposes of the ILO are different from those of other agencies, although in some areas may be complementary. There is nothing to compare with the human rights conventions and the supervisory machinery to implement ILO conventions in the work of other specialized agencies.

While some political issues are common in the ILO and other specialized agencies (anti-Israel resolutions), by and large the major issues in the ILO (the four points in the Kissinger letter), do not face us in other specialized agencies.

- 3 -

The conclusions which may be drawn from this brief analysis are the following:

1. U.S. withdrawal from the ILO, which would certainly affect the work of the ILO, would not affect the work of other specialized agencies--which basically are different from that of the ILO-- in any major way.

2. U.S. withdrawal could affect our participation in other specialized agencies in the sense that in demonstrating that we mean what we say, U.S. positions in these agencies would be taken more seriously. In other respects, our participation would not necessarily be affected because of the different purposes of each agency, and the different way in which decisions are made by the U.S. in participating in the ILO. In other specialized agencies, U.S. decision-making is a purely governmental affair. In the ILO government control of this process is circumscribed because of the joint participation of worker and employer representatives.

3. Experience indicates that major problems affecting U.S. participation in one agency do not necessarily spill over into other agencies. The serious problems affecting U.S. participation in the ILO in the early 1970's, which resulted in withholding our contributions, had no effect on our participation in other agencies. The recent problems in UNESCO, which also resulted in withholding the U.S. contributions, did not affect our participation in other agencies. There is no reason why problems in one agency cannot be confined to that agency, if that is what we wish to do.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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November 3, 1978

DISSENT CHANNEL

MEMORANDUM TO: L/HR -
FROM: S/P - Anthony Lake
SUBJECT: Your Dissent Channel Message:
South Africa's Presence in Namibia

B6

Thank you for sharing your views with us. In accordance with Dissent Channel distribution procedures, we have forwarded a copy of your message to the Office of the Secretary, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Executive Secretary of the Department, the Chairman of the Open Forum, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, the Legal Adviser, and Ambassador Young. I can assure you that your views will be given proper consideration by those involved as we continue to deal with the difficult problems posed by the situation in Namibia and South Africa's role in it. Your use of the Dissent Channel is to be commended.

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PAGE 01 BUENOS 06275 01 OF 02 112248Z
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BUENOS 06275 01 OF 02 112248Z

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 6275

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS SHUM, AR, KPOL, PIHT
SUBJECT PROPOSED VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY ARGENTINE NAVY JUNTA
MEMBER AND CINC MASSERA

REF: A USDAO MESSAGE 021233Z AUG 78 (QIOTAL)
B) BUENOS AIRES 5899; C) CNO 101415Z AUG 78

1. DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE. THE FOLLOWING IS AN
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE PROPOSAL FOR
THE US CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TO INVITE ARGENTINE
NAVY JUNTA MEMBER ADMIRAL MASSERA TO THE US FOR AN
OFFICIAL VISIT, PREPARED BY POLITICAL OFFICER [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THIS MESSAGE HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH THE
VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THIS MISSION AND IT REPRESENTS
SOLELY A PERSONAL VIEW. DRAFTER DESIRES DISTRIBUTION TO
ARA, HA, CNO AND USCINCSO.

2. ISSUE ----

RETIRING ARGENTINE JUNTA MEMBER AND NAVY CINC ADMIRAL
MASSERA HAS REQUESTED A SERVICE TO SERVICE INVITATION FROM
THE US CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS PRIOR TO HIS RETIREMENT
ABOUT SEPTEMBER 15, 1978. THE US CNO'S RESPONSE TO
THE INVITATION REQUEST (REF C) SHOULD HAVE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT A NUMBER OF COMPLICATED POLITICAL FACTORS
WHICH HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH WITHIN THE
EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES BUT WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN
ADDRESSED IN A MESSAGE TO THE DEPARTMENT NOR IN EMBASSY'S
SHORT COMMENT TO THE MILITARY GROUPS MESSAGE TO THE
CNO AND USCINCSO (REF B).

3. BACKGROUND ---

IN EARLY JULY NAVY DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL LUCETTA
APPROACHED EMBASSY ON POLITICAL LEVEL TO DISCUSS
ARRANGING MEETINGS FOR ADMIRAL MASSERA WITH SENIOR
USG OFFICIALS DURING PROPOSED PRIVATE VISIT TO
THE UNITED STATES AT CONCLUSION OF MASSERA'S VISIT TO
VENEZUELA. LOCAL PRESS IN MID JULY CARRIED STORY THAT
MASSERA PLANNED TO UNDERGO EXTENSIVE MEDICAL EXAMINATION
AT WALTER REED HOSPITAL. ON JULY 19 LUCETTA CALLED
ON AMBASSADOR REGARDING ARRANGING US MEETINGS AND IN ABSENCE
DEPARTED ENCOURAGEMENT SAYING HE BELIEVED VISIT WOULD BE
CANCELLED. SUBSEQUENTLY LUCETTA INFORMED EMBASSY POLOFF THAT
MASSERA VISIT HAD BEEN CALLED OFF ON PRETEXT OF
POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM EXIM BANKS CREDIT
REFUSAL.

NAVY THEN TURNED FROM EMBASSY TO US NAVY CHANNELS
TO PURSUE THE INVITATION. THE NEXT DAY, ON JULY 20,
ADMIRAL MASSERA INFORMED THE US NAVY'S MILITARY GROUP
COMMANDER THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE AN INVITATION
FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TO VISIT THE US AS
HEAD OF THE ARGENTINE NAVY PRIOR TO HIS RETIREMENT ON
SEPTEMBER 15, 1978. THE FOLLOWING DAY, ADMIRAL LUCETTA
REPEATED THE REQUEST FOR AN INVITATION TO US NAVY
MILGROUP CHIEF.

ON AUGUST 3, AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION WITHIN
THE EMBASSY A PERSONAL TELEGRAM FROM THE FORMER US NAVY
MILGRP CHIEF TO THE CNO AND USCINCSO RECOMMENDING

THAT MASSERA BE INVITED WAS RELEASED WITH A SHORT
EMBASSY COMMENT OF NONCURRENCE (SEE PARA 6, REFTEL B).
ON AUGUST 9, ADMIRAL LUCETTA INFORMED POLOFF
THAT IF ARGENTINE NAVY DID NOT RECEIVE POSITIVE REPLY
WITHIN A WEEK TO THE REQUEST FOR AN INVITATION FOR
ADMIRAL MASSERA, ARGENTINE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITAS
EXERCISE WOULD BE CANCELLED. HE NOTED THAT
ARGENTINE NAVY SAW UNITAS PRIMARILY AS A POLITICAL
EVENT. ON AUGUST 01, SHORT MESSAGE FROM CNO TO NAVAL
ATTACHE HERE WAS RECEIVED DECLINING TO ISSUE
INVITATION ON BASIS OF EMBASSY'S COMMENT (REF C).

4. DISCUSSION ---

THE SURFACE ISSUE IS WHETHER ADMIRAL MASSERA
SHOULD BE INVITED TO THE US AS A GUEST OF THE CHIEF
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE UNDERLYING ISSUE
IS HOW THE USG SHOULD DEAL WITH THE ARGENTINE NAVY
AND THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL OPPOSITION (MASSERA
BEING LEADING REPRESENTATIVE OF BOTH).
THE PROBLEM FOR THE POLICY MAKER IS THAT
EXTENDING THE INVITATION WILL DISTURB THE ARMY INNER
CORE WHO HAVE THE FINAL SAY HERE, BUT NOT EXTENDING
THE INVITATION WILL ANGER THE NAVY AND MASSERA WHO
HAVE BEEN ADVOCATING INITIATIVES IN LINE WITH OUR
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY OBJECTIVES.

5. THIS QUESTION IS FILLED WITH STRAWMEN ARGUMENTS.

HERE ARE A FEW FOR EXTENDING THE INVITATION:

A) NOT TO EXTEND THE INVITATION WILL BE
SEEN BOTH AS ANOTHER SLAP AT THE NAVY AND FURTHER
CONFIRMATION THAT THE USG AND THIS EMBASSY ARE
TILTED TOWARDS THE ARMY'S VIDELA-VIOLA POWER
CENTER.

B) MASSERA IS THE MOST CAPABLE, RESOURCEFUL,

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PAGE 01 BUENOS 06275 02 OF 02 112240Z
ACTION SP-02

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BUENOS 06275 02 OF 02 112240Z

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 6275

DISSENT CHANNEL

INTELLIGENT, AND CHARISMATIC POLITICAL FIGURE IN ARGENTINA TODAY. (HE IS ALSO AN OVERLY AMBITIOUS, PROMISE-THEN-ANYTHING POLITICIAN, WITHOUT ANY FIRM IDEOLOGICAL CAST.) THAT THE USG SHOULD CULTIVATE PROMINENT ARGENTINE OPPOSITION POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS AGREED. THIS ENBASSY HAS JUST RECOMMENDED THAT THE DEPARTMENT RECEIVE FORMER ARGENTINE PRESIDENT LANUSSE DURING HIS PRIVATE VISIT TO THE US AT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL DUE TO HIS IMPORTANCE AS A FUTURE POLITICAL LEADER (SEE BUENOS AIRES 5932). MASSERA IS MUCH MORE POLITICALLY IMPORTANT. HE HAS CAREFULLY CULTIVATED WIDE SUPPORT AMONG FORMER PERONISTS, TRADE UNION LEADERS, AND OTHER SMALLER OPPOSITION GROUPS. HE IS IMPORTANT AND SHOULD BE CULTIVATED, NOT OFFENDED.

C) MASSERA HAS TAKEN THE LEAD WITHIN THE JUNTA, AND INCREASINGLY IN PUBLIC, TO SUPPORT KEY ISSUES TIED TO IMPROVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. SPECIFICALLY, HE HAS URGED THAT THE MILITARY FORCES RECOGNIZE PUBLICLY THEIR SECRET PRISONERS, THAT THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION BE INVITED TO VISIT ARGENTINA, THAT THE JUNTA HAND DOWN FIRM SENTENCES OR RELEASE PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION BY THE GOVERNMENT'S STATE OF SIEGE POWERS OR BY ITS BILL OF ATTAINDER AUTHORITY UNDER THE ACTA INSTITUCIONAL, THAT JACOBO TINERMAN BE RELEASED, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, HE HAS PUBLICLY PROPOSED THAT THE MILITARY SERVICE PUBLISH A LIST OF "THOSE KILLED IN BATTLE" IN THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION. MASSERA HAS TAKEN THESE POSITIONS BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THEY ARE GOOD POLITICAL ISSUES IN ARGENTINA, BUT THEY ARE ALSO PROPOSALS THAT WE SUPPORT AS KEY ELEMENTS IN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS EFFORTS HERE. A FLAT LOW-LEVEL REJECTION OF THE NAVY-TO-NAVY VISIT BY THE ONLY OFFICIAL IN THE JUNTA WHO INDEPENDENTLY HAS SUPPORTED A NUMBER OF OUR KEY POLICY CONCERNS HERE, INVITES (PERHAPS DEMANDS) LESS FUTURE EFFORT FROM HIM ON THESE ISSUES. WE SHOULD BE RECOGNIZING AND ENCOURAGING HIS ACTIONS.

D) ALTHOUGH THE ARMY WILL NOT BE PLEASED WITH A MASSERA INVITATION, IT WILL NOT BE A MAJOR DETERMINANT OF GOA POLICY TOWARDS THE US. IN COMPARISON TO THE US'S CLOSING DOWN THE EXIM WINDOW, ASSISTANT SECRETARY DENIAIS'S STRAIGHT FORWARD TESTIMONY ON ARGENTINA ON AUGUST 9 AND THE UPCOMING HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT WHICH WILL CLOSE THE MILITARY SUPPLY DOORS, AN INVITATION TO MASSERA WILL BE A SMALL EVENT FELT PRINCIPALLY AMONG THE ARGENTINE ARMY'S LEADERSHIP. BUT A REJECTION, UNLESS MOST CAREFULLY HANDLED, COULD WELL BE AN ENBITTERING EVENT FOR THE ADMIRAL.

6. RECOMMENDATION --

AMIDST ALL THE STRAWMEN, THERE IS ONE ARGUMENT WHICH STANDS OUT. GENTLEMEN (AND ESPECIALLY DIPLOMATS AND NAVAL OFFICERS) NEVER UNINTENTIONALLY INSULT. FOR OVER A MONTH, HERE AND IN WASHINGTON, THE ARGENTINE NAVY HAS BEEN SIGNALING FOR SOME SORT OF A MASSERA VISIT. WE ARE PROPOSING A CURT RESPONSE. SWEEPING ASIDE ALL THE ARGUMENTS, WE ARE ABOUT TO INSULT (PERHAPS UNINTENTIONALLY) THE ADMIRAL AND THE ARGENTINE NAVY. WE CAN DO BETTER.

THE CNO SHOULD PREFERABLY EXTEND THE INVITATION OR ALTERNATIVELY CONVEY A "GOLDEN TURNDOWN" WITH A PERSONAL LETTER AND/OR PHONE CALL EXPRESSING HOPE THAT FUTURE MEETINGS CAN BE ARRANGED WITH THE CNO AND SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS. IN ADDITION, THE CNO SHOULD CONSIDER AN EARLY INVITATION TO MASSERA'S SUCCESSOR, ADMIRAL LANDRUSCHINI (WHOSE DAUGHTER WAS RECENTLY KILLED IN BOMB ATTACK HERE).

7. CONCLUSION --

THE MAJOR ISSUE WHICH THIS RUSHED CABLE DOES NOT ADDRESS IS HOW THE USG SHOULD DEAL WITH OPPOSITION AND HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS IN ARGENTINA TO PROMOTE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER POLICY OBJECTIVES.

MASSERA IS OPENLY STARTING AN OPPOSITION MOVEMENT HERE. HE IS SPEAKING EVERYDAY, CAREFULLY SEPARATING HIMSELF FROM THE VIDELA GOVERNMENT ON TWO ISSUES--THE ECONOMY AND POLITICAL NORMALIZATION. HE, NO DOUBT, SEES A HIGH VISIBILITY VISIT TO THE US AS OF IMPORTANCE TO HIS POLITICAL PLANS. OUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY TAILORED BY THE FUTURE DIPLOMATIC PATHS WE WILL WISH TO FOLLOW HERE. AT A MINIMUM, WE SHOULD KEEP OUR OPTIONS OPEN.

OUR COLD SHOULDERING OF THE MASSERA INVITATION IS NOT THE SKILLFUL RESPONSE, I BELIEVE THE SITUATION DEMANDS. END

MESSAGE.
CASTRO

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: ENRG, IEA, SW

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE []

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REF: (A) STOCKHOLM 2209 (B) STOCKHOLM 2238

THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE REGARDING US POLICY TOWARD THE SWEDISH REQUEST FOR TRIGGERING OF THE IEA SHARING AGREEMENT. KARIN LISSAKERS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF S/P, IS COORDINATING A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN KEEPING WITH DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS ON DISSENT MESSAGES WE FORWARDED A COPY OF REF B TO THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: S, S/S, P, EUR, EUR/NE AND EB/FSE. I COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. VANCE

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The ~~following~~ ^{attached} "diary" discusses examples (by no means all of them) of our Western allies' letting us down at the 63rd ILC. When "Western support" is used as an example of our "success" in reforming the ILO, it needs to be put into context of several factors:

A. Voting

1. At ILO conferences prior to our notice of withdrawal, we had few Westerners voting with us; since November 1975 we have fairly consistently had a hard core we could count on because of our threat of withdrawal. This is not the kind of support we were seeking, and Amb. Silberman told our IMEC friends this in early 1976 (see para J, EXDIS telegram - ^{Geneva 2953} attached) ^{7/15/76}. These votes, obtained under duress, are as meaningless as the 99% votes cast when a government is "elected" in the Iron Curtain countries.

2. We have been guilty of causing erosion of tripartism on our side just as much as the radicals have on their side. We have gotten the votes of government, worker, and employer representatives from Western countries as a solid bloc (within each delegation) because of the political pressure of our notice of withdrawal. While it is gratifying to have gotten the votes that we did, we cannot use a "double standard" by criticizing the radicals for pressuring other delegates into non-tripartite bloc voting against us, yet accepting bloc voting as a "plus" when it is in our favor.

B. Other Activity

A vote should be the last step taken in support of a particular objective; it should be preceded by weeks and months of preparation, lobbying, making demarches, holding tripartite

meetings of each country's delegation to decide on policy and tactics, taking initiatives in regional group meetings to plan strategy, seeking chairmanships of key committees, coordinating with allies before making speeches, etc.

The Westerners either failed to do these things at all, or did them only in response to the pressure of our threat of withdrawal, and even then needed specific goading by the USDEL. When they did get involved, they usually did the minimum required, did it late, and/or did it unenthusiastically.

Comment

Someone who wants to defend the minimal and reluctant role of our allies might say: "after all, this was an American battle and we could not expect our allies to do more than provide supporting fire."

Yet, this is the very situation which led to the letter of intent, namely that it has been the US which has been fighting, protesting, lobbying, etc., in the ILO, while our allies "held our coat". In past years, our allies have told us that they wished to avoid confrontation and therefore they gave in to G-77/Soviet pressure. The letter of intent was issued because we felt that one compromise after another had taken place, to the point where there was soon going to be little left of the ILO as we had originally joined it. The letter of intent said, to our allies: "here we draw the line; no more compromises; no more avoidance of the issues; no more leaving the US to fight alone. Are you with us?"

3

The answer from our allies (as their actions, not words, demonstrated); "we are with you to the extent that we will do the absolute minimum which may result in your staying in the ILO. We do not agree with you on substance and/or tactics, and we resent being badgered and hectorred ~~and~~ ^{and} having to stand up and be counted."

The ~~two~~ ^{two} allies (Canada and the UK) whom we would have expected to give us the strongest support have been most outspoken in disagreeing with us. Mainwaring (Canada) told Dan in my presence last year that Canada does not agree with us on the most fundamental issue -- structure of the GB -- but would support (?) the US position in order to keep us in the ILO. Mainwaring "broke ranks" with us on structure in the last days of the conference.

The British Government delegate said to me twice in March at the Governing Body, that his government would decide the issues to support (?) the US on only after we told them whether the UK's support would keep us in the ILO (the implication was that if the US wasn't going to stay, why bother?). This attitude necessitated a special trip to the UK by Dan in the middle of the March Governing Body, to get across to our ally that we wanted support based on agreement with us, not support designed to keep us in.

4

The fact that Lane Kirkland says the AFL-CIO is satisfied with the Western support we got is interesting but not decisive since, unfortunately, it was not the AFL-CIO but the US Government which made world-wide demarches and which has repeatedly told our allies we wanted support based on agreement on fundamental principles, not support ~~under~~ threat of our withdrawal.

It is the US Government which must assess its own degree of satisfaction with the results; we cannot shrug our shoulders and say, "if Meany is happy, why should we worry?" The USG has interests and concerns beyond those of 16th Street.

The US Government conclusion about Western "support": it was minimal, provided under duress, and transitory. Such "support" does not justify our staying in the ILO, and our Western allies were told ^{this} by Amb. Silberman, at the beginning of our reform effort. They were given fair warning about what criteria we would use in our test. They failed the test.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RELEASE IN FULL

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

February 10, 1981

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: M/DG - Ms. Clark
FROM: S/P - Paul Wolfowitz *pw*
SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Message

Attached is a Dissent Channel message recently submitted by a Foreign Service Officer under the Foreign Affairs Manual procedure on airing dissenting views on policy issues. In brief, the chief objective of the Dissent Channel, which was founded by Secretary Rogers in 1971, is to bring to light policy views which may not otherwise come to the attention of policy makers.

As Director of the Policy Planning Staff, I am charged with the responsibility of supervising the functioning of the Dissent Channel and protecting the right to dissent. The Chairman of the Secretary's Open Forum monitors the Dissent Channel. Dissent Channel messages are initially distributed to the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, and those principals who I believe would be interested in the policy issue addressed (the drafter's desires for distribution are taken into account).

In the future you will receive other Dissent Channel messages from Foreign Service Officers on a variety of subjects. In the past, messages have averaged about 12 to 15 annually. I urge you to consider the authors' views carefully. As is evident from this message, a fair amount of time and effort was expended by the officer in drafting this message and he is entitled to a careful, thorough, response. A member of my staff will be assigned responsibility for preparing a substantive reply to the author, after weighing his points carefully, and will be in contact with the appropriate officers in your bureau for clearances.

If you or members of your staff have questions about the Dissent Channel in general, or this message in particular, please contact either S/P Special Assistant Edward O'Donnell (22972) or Open Forum Chairman George Dragnich (28790).

Attachment:

Dissent message

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BUCHAREST 0463

DISSENT CHANNEL

DRAFTING OFFICER REQUEST HANDLING AS NOTIS TO THE
SECRETARY; COPIES TO THE ACTING SECRETARY AND COUNCELOR

E.O. 11659: GDS
TAGS: PFOR REWT ETRD US RO
SUBJECT: U BROMANIAN LONG-TERM ECONOMIC INDUSTRIAL AND
TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT

REF: STADIS BUCHAREST TELEGRAM NOV 3-4, 1974, KISSINGER
VISIT; BUCHAREST 2230, VIETS/LORIMER TELECON OF APRIL 27, 1978

1. FROM [REDACTED], ECONOMIC SECTION, AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST.

2. PROBLEM: NEGOTIATION WITH GOR ON LONG-TERM COOPERATION
AGREEMENT TO BEGIN IN BUCHAREST MAY 18. CURRENT USG DRAFT,
FROM WHICH WE CAN EXPECT SOME RETREAT, OF LITTLE ECONOMIC OR
POLITICAL VALUE TO US. DANGER OF MISLEADING AMERICAN BUSINESS.
GOR, IN ROLE OF SUITOR IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD REAP
POLITICAL GAINS IN ITS BALANCING ACT WITH USSR, WITHOUT
CONCEDING MUCH TO USG. NEITHER EMBASSY NOR WASHINGTON WORKING
LEVEL BUREAUCRACY WILLING TO EXPLOIT OUR ADVANTAGEOUS
POSITION BY HARDENING TERMS, BECAUSE THEY PERCEIVE THAT YOU
AND THE PRESIDENT ARE PRESSING FOR SWIFT CONCLUSION OF
AGREEMENT.

3. BACKGROUND: A STADIS TELEGRAM (COPY NOT RETAINED IN
EMBASSY FILES) SENT DURING YOUR NOVEMBER 3-4, 1974, VISIT TO
BUCHAREST DIRECTED THAT AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF TRADE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

WITH U.S. COMPARED TO OTHER EE COUNTRIES, IN KEEPING WITH NSDM/CIEPDM 212 ORDER OF PRECEDENCE, DENUNCIATION BY OTHER EE COUNTRIES OF TITLE IV OF TRADE ACT OF 1974 LEFT ROMANIA AS ONLY COUNTRY TO HAVE ENTERED INTO TRADE AGREEMENT WITH U.S. UNDER ITS TERMS.

4. BOTH IN EMBASSY AND AT WORKING LEVEL IN STATE, PERCEPTION REMAINS THAT YOUR STILL-CURRENT DESIRE IS FOR US TO MOVE QUICKLY IN NEGOTIATION OF LONG-TERM COOPERATION AGREEMENT. MOMENTUM WHICH THAT PERCEPTION CREATES UNDERCUTS ANY ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT OUR POSITION OF STRENGTH VIS-A-VIS OUR ON THIS MATTER TO HARDEN OUR TERMS. RESULT WILL BE ANOTHER GENERALLY WORDED COSMETIC AGREEMENT SIMILAR TO U.S.-SOVIET ONE, WHILE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS (MAINTENANCE OF MOMENTUM IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS DESPITE COLLAPSE OF SOVIET TRADE AGREEMENT) MAY HAVE PROMPTED OUR DECISION IN THAT INSTANCE, NO SUCH NECESSITY COMPELS US IN ROMANIAN CASE.

5. TWO CONCRETE PROVISIONS WE ARE SEEKING WITH ROMANIA WOULD DIFFERENTIATE IT FROM SOVIET PREDECESSOR:

(1) EXPROPRIATION RIGHTS CLAUSE, (2) ANNEX ON RIGHTS OF JOINT VENTURES. GOR MAY WELL YIELD ON EXPROPRIATION, BUT ANNEX, INsofar AS IT DIFFERS FROM ROMANIAN DECREE OF 1972 ON JOINT VENTURES, IS UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED.

6. BOTH THESE PROVISIONS LAUNCH OUT IN THE WRONG DIRECTION ANYWAY, THAT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP BY U.S. CITIZENS OF MEANS OF PRODUCTION IN ROMANIA. LAST FOUR YEARS HAVE SEEN ESTABLISHMENT OF ONLY SIX JOINT VENTURES IN ROMANIA. OTHER FORMS (LICENSING, PLANT INSTALLATION WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING, BUY-BACK) DOMINATE ROMANIA'S INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION.

7. USG DRAFT SHOULD ADDRESS ITSELF TO FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC SYSTEM WHICH HAVE PLAGUED PAST AND CURRENT AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION IN ROMANIA (GENERAL

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PAGE 03 BUCHAR 02465 041830Z

TIRE'S RADIAL TIRE PLANT AND SINGER PRODUCTS BATTERY PLANT AS TWO EXAMPLES) AND REMAIN AS BASIC IMPEDIMENT TO FUTURE OF COOPERATION. TWO NECESSITIES: (1) HARD ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, AND COMMERCIAL DATA (IN EXCESS OF BARE-BONES REQUIREMENTS OF COCS) UPON WHICH TO BASE SOUND BUSINESS DECISIONS, AND (2) FREEDOM FOR RESIDENT AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN FROM ROMANIAN SECURITY'S CONTROL OVER SMALLEST ASPECT OF ON-JOB CONTACT.

THAT CONDITIONS AT LEAST AS UNHINDERED AS THOSE IN REST OF
EE EXIST IN ROMANIA FOR INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION.

8. STRINGENCIES OF TRADE ACT FORCED US TO SEEK, AND OBTAIN,
FROM ROMANIA MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TRADE AGREEMENT WE NOW HAVE
IN FORCE WITH ANY COUNTRY. ONE-SIDENESS OF SOME OF ITS
PROVISIONS (SUCH AS PROTECTION FROM MARKET DISRUPTION) SHOW
EXTENT OF ROMANIAN POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS. IN RECENT CON-
VERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR, FOREIGN MINISTER MACOVESCU
(REPORTED IN BUCHAREST 2839) SAID IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO FIND
NEW FORMULAS TO PROVIDE MOMENTUM TO TRADE AND ECONOMIC
COOPERATION (PARA 11); THAT HILLY NILLY WE NEEDED EVIDENCE
OF RAPID IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
(PARA 12). WE SHOULD EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW
CONGRESS THAT WITHOUT THEIR INTERFERENCE WE CAN SECURE
MEANINGFUL, ADVANTAGEOUS CONCESSIONS FROM ROM. DURING
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW THIS SUMMER OF U.S. ROMANIAN TRADE
AGREEMENT, CONCLUSION OF LONG-TERM INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
AGREEMENT COULD SOUR ATMOSPHERE. IF FACTORS FUNDAMENTAL TO
COOPERATION ARE NOT ADDRESSED.

9. CONCLUSION: OUR SIGNATURE OF LONG-TERM AGREEMENT BASED
ON CURRENT U.S. DRAFT WOULD MISREPRESENT EXISTING CONDITIONS
FOR INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION WITH ROMANIA AND, ON THE MARGIN,
MIGHT LEAD AMERICAN BUSINESSES INTO BAD DECISIONS. TWO
SOLUTIONS: (1) SECURE MEANINGFUL CHANGES IN EXISTING
CONDITIONS OR (2) DISCONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS. FORMER APPEARS
POSSIBLE, BECAUSE OF STRONG ROM POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS TO
CONCLUDE AGREEMENT. DECISION ON LATTER CAN BE POSTPONED UNTIL

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Washington, D.C. 20520

September 24, 1974

Dear Mr. Lord:

When you make distribution of my dissent paper, I request that it be made available not only to appropriate offices in the Department of State, such as EB/AV but also to the Department of Commerce, Attn. Mr. Raul Meyer, and to EXIM. Commerce has the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether to issue the export license after the State Department has given notice that it has no objections. EXIM has been requested by the Government of Gabon to provide financing of the sale. Both Government agencies are aware of the State Department's long scrutiny of the sale of both the first and second DC-8s, and of the Rhodesian problem. It seems to me to be in the interest of the US Government as a whole to make sure that any agency making a decision on this issue is aware of all the facts and of the arguments concerning the interpretation of these facts. Otherwise, decisions made by Commerce/EXIM might be made on an inadequate knowledge of the situation.

Sincerely,



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Received May 19

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S/P:MACASEY:BDM
EXT. 29716 3-8-77
S/P:TLAKE

S/P:GAUSTIN

S/P-OF:NBOYER

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE DAMASCUS

STADIS, DISSENT CHANNEL
FOR [] FROM TONY LAKE-S/P

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE : SYRIA, ISRAEL AND
LEBANON: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

REF: DAMASCUS 1482

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ON "SYRIA, ISRAEL AND LEBANON: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE". MR. GRANVILLE AUSTIN OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH AND EMBASSY BEIRUT. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

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111

BUTTAL TWISTING MY DISSENT FILED ON THE BASIS OF A DIFFERENCE IN POLICY AND HOW THIS EXERCISE WAS HANDLED HERE INTO: "A PERSONAL ATTACK ON THE AMBASSADOR."

PAGE(S) MISSING

9. HOWEVER, THE PEJORATIVE LANGUAGE USED IN THIS INSTANCE AND THROUGHOUT THEIR CABLE IN NO WAY CHANGES THE FACTS AS STATED BY ME ORIGINALLY.

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DISSENT CHANNEL

EO 11952: NA
TAGS: --
SUBJ: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: COMMENTS ON REBUTTAL TO DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE SANTIAGO 4523, RE PART 111 OF PARM

REF: SANTIAGO 4556

1. THE DRAFTER OF THIS MESSAGE IS [REDACTED] PUBLIC AFFAIRS, USIS. THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE. HE SUGGESTS THAT DISTRIBUTION BE MADE TO THE DIRECTOR OF USIA; THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF USIA (LATIN AMERICA); THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CULTURAL AFFAIRS; THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS. IN ADDITION HE SUGGEST DISTRIBUTION, TOGETHER WITH HIS ORIGINAL DISSENT MESSAGE (SANTIAGO 4523), TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT CHILE DESK AND AMBASSADOR POPPER.

2. I REGRET THAT MY STATE DEPARTMENT COLLEAGUES HAVE DECIDED TO REPLY TO A CABLE FILED ACCORDING TO STANDARD PROCEDURES AS SET FORTH IN STATE A-309, TO ENCOURAGE POLICY DISSENT BY ACCUSING THE DRAFTER OF MAKING "MISREPRESENTATIONS, INNUENDOS AND UNFOUNDED PERSONAL ATTACKS" ON THE AMBASSADOR. THE DCM AND THE STATE DEPT. COUNSELORS.

3. THE DRAFTER OF THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE WAS DISSENTING ON PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS FROM A STATE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTION SETTING FORTH THE PRECEPTS FOR PARM, PART 111 AND DISSENTING FROM THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THIS MISSION, UNDER THESE PRECEPTS, WHICH AFFECTED USIS CULTURAL PROGRAMMING. HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO GIVE AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF WHAT TOOK PLACE DURING THE PARM EXERCISE AT THIS POST. IN NO WAY DID HE INTEND TO MAKE ANY PERSONAL ATTACKS, MISREPRESENT THE FACTS NOR INDULGE IN INNUENDO. NOR DOES HE BELIEVE HE DID SO IN HIS CABLE.

4. ACCUSING THE DRAFTER OF A "PERSONAL ATTACK" ON THE DCM AND THE AMBASSADOR DOES NOTHING TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF DEBATE ON A SUBSTANTIVE MATTER NOR DOES IT ENCOURAGE THE FREE FLOW OF REASONED DISSENT WHICH I BELIEVE THE DEPARTMENT WISHED TO ENCOURAGE BY ESTABLISHING THE DISSENT CHANNEL.

5. I REGRET THIS REACTION BY THE DRAFTERS OF THE REBUTTAL CABLE SINCE I HAVE ENJOYED EXCELLENT PROFESSIONAL RELATIONS WITH THEM AND ESPECIALLY WITH AMBASSADOR POPPER WHOM THEY CHOOSE TO PICTURE AS A VICTIM OF A PERSONAL ATTACK BY ME.

6. IN NO WAY DO I SEE HOW MY DISSENT CAN BE REGARDED AS A "PERSONAL ATTACK ON THE AMBASSADOR".

7. THE AMBASSADOR AND I HAD AN EXCELLENT PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP AS REFLECTED IN MY OER WRITTEN BY HIM SHORTLY BEFORE HE LEFT THE POST. THE AMBASSADOR KNOWS I CONSIDER HIS LONG STATE DEPARTMENT CAREER TO BE A DISTINGUISHED ONE. AT A FAREWELL BUFFET [REDACTED] IN HIS HONOR BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, AT WHICH ALL USIS AMERICAN STAFF WAS PRESENT, I TOASTED THE AMBASSADOR AS: "ONE OF THE TWO FINEST CHIEFS OF MISSION WITH WHOM I HAVE SERVED IN MY 16-YEAR FOREIGN SERVICE CAREER."

8. THEREFORE I STRONGLY RESENT THE DRAFTERS OF THIS RE-

10. I EXPECTED TO BE CONSULTED BY THE AMBASSADOR BEFORE FINAL DECISIONS CONCERNING USIS WERE MADE SINCE HE HAD TOLD ME IN HIS OFFICE AT THE OUTSET OF THE PARM 111 EXERCISE THAT HE WOULD HAVE SUCH A DISCUSSION. THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS WHY SUCH A MEETING DID NOT TAKE PLACE; I.E., THE AMBASSADOR PERHAPS LATER DECIDED THAT HIS RESTRICTIONS PREVENTED HIM FROM TALKING OVER THE USIS STAFFING BUT RECOMMENDATIONS WITH ME, HE COULD HAVE FORGOTTEN OUR CONVERSATION OR HAVE HAD SOME OTHER REASON. HOWEVER, IT IS A FACT THAT WE DID NOT MEET AND HE WAS RELYING THROUGHOUT THE EXERCISE ON PAPERS WRITTEN BY ME TO MEMBERS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT PARM 111 TASK FORCE (NOT SUBMITTED BY ME TO THE AMBASSADOR AS INCORRECTLY STATED IN THEIR REBUTTAL) FOR HIS INFORMATION ON USIS STAFFING AND WHERE CUTS, IF NECESSARY, SHOULD BE MADE.

11. IT IS JUST THIS SORT OF PROCEDURE THAT I WAS OBJECTING TO PHILOSOPHICALLY IN MY CABLE. STATING THE FACT THAT THE AMBASSADOR DID NOT SEEK MY COUNSEL CAN HARDLY BE TERMED "A PERSONAL ATTACK ON THE AMBASSADOR".

12. A SUBHEAD IN THE REBUTTAL IS ENTITLED "PERSONAL ATTACK ON THE DCM". THIS "PERSONAL ATTACK" IS THEN DEFINED AS MY STATING THAT HE "ORDERED" THE OTHER COUNSELORS NOT TO TELL ME WHAT HAD BEEN DECIDED IN THEIR MEETING RE USIS PERSONNEL CUTS. THE DCM STATES HE "REMINDS" THOSE INVOLVED OF THE STAGIS NATURE OF THE EXERCISE. THIS SEMANTICAL DIFFERENCE IS THE BASIS FOR HIS ACCUSATION OF A PERSONAL ATTACK ON THE DCM. 13. "MENTIONING" TO THE OTHER COUNSELORS WHO REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE DCM THAT THEY SHOULD NOT REVEAL WHAT THEY HAD DECIDED TO ANYONE OUTSIDE THAT ROOM IS TO ME A EUPHEMISM FOR "ORDERING". I COULD JUST AS EASILY HAVE USED THE WORD "CAUTIONED". BUT WHETHER THE COUNSELORS WERE "ORDERED, CAUTIONED, ADVISED, REMINDS, IT WAS SUGGESTED" OR WHATEVER, THE POINT IS THE DCM GAVE THEM THE MESSAGE THAT THIS WAS STATE DEPARTMENT BUSINESS ONLY; THEY KEPT THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE RECOMMENDED CUTS IN USIS PERSONNEL [REDACTED] PER THEIR

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S/P file



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

October 27, 1978

TO: S/P - Mr. Lake
FROM: L/HR - [redacted]
SUBJECT: Dissent Channel: South Africa's
Presence in Namibia

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It is the purpose of this memorandum to communicate a view to the Secretary as the person, next to the President, most directly involved and responsible. It relates to decisions to be made before a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on Namibia. It urges a shift in U.S. perspective and suggests a logical outcome.

I recognize that it may be best not to take the Secretary's time. In that event, I shall accept the necessary limitations of the dissent channel and continue to see it as a useful thing.

Above all, I pray that this memorandum not be channelled to others concerned to formulate a reply. They have far more useful and urgent things to do than that. My conscience is helped by trying the channel; I don't want to take on abuse of others' time as a new worry.

L/HR: [redacted] :jv
10/27/78 ext. 23044

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
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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 130430
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DRAFTED BY S/P:PMCOCORAN
APPROVED BY S/P:ESVENDSEN
S/P:DKBANDLER

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: UNHRC, PREL, SHUM, UN, AORC, US
SUBJECT: THE NEW INSTRUCTIONS ON UN BUDGETARY RESTRAINT

1. ~~16~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT DISSENT MESSAGE ON THE NEW INSTRUCTIONS ON UN BUDGETARY RESTRAINT.
3. COPIES OF YOUR CABLE HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO THE FOLLOWING:
 - THE SECRETARY;
 - THE DEPUTY SECRETARY;
 - THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS;
 - AMBASSADOR HELMAN, DEPUTY TO THE UNDERSECRETARY;
 - THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS;
 - THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS;
 - AND
 - S/S - CHARLES HILL.
4. AN APPROPRIATE MEMBER OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF WILL COORDINATE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY.
5. I COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. DAM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 205205
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APPROVED BY S/P: JEFF GARTEN
S/P-OF-GFOX
S/P: RFEINBERG
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RJN

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TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 205205

DISSENT CHANNEL -- FOR [] FROM S/P-GARTEN, ACTG.

E. O. 11652; GDS

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE "PROPOSED VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY ARGENTINE NAVY JUNTA MEMBER AND CINC MASSERA" DATED AUGUST 11. MR. RICHARD FEINBERG OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN DESIGNATED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION PROCEDURES AND YOUR EXPRESS WISHES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, CNO AND USCINCSO. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL RESPOND AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. CHRISTOPHER

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Department of State

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FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9845

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 00530

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/29/87 (SMITH, R.) OR-N
TAGS: OGEN, ENRG, EPET, ANGT
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: ROLE OF STATE DEPARTMENT/
FOREIGN SERVICE IN USG INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [REDACTED] ENERGY OFFICER, AMERICAN EMBASSY OTTAWA. DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF MESSAGE AND IN ADDITION SUGGESTS MESSAGE BE DISTRIBUTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, THE HEAD OF FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS.

3. ENERGY MAY BE THE DOMINANT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUE OF OUR TIME. WITH IMPORTANT AND INTERRELATED STRATEGIC, MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND COMMERCIAL DIMENSIONS, ITS CHALLENGES TO US FOREIGN POLICY HAVE INCREASED DRAMATICALLY OVER THE PAST DECADE AND REALISTICALLY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO DO SO WELL INTO THE NEXT CENTURY. IN THESE CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES THE FOREIGN SERVICE SHOULD SEEK TO FOSTER INSTITUTIONAL EXPERTISE AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP CAPABLE OF MAKING A MAXIMUM CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROCESS OF PLANNING, DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING US INTERNATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY OVER THE LONG Haul. TO DATE, OUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD HAVE BEEN INSUFFICIENT, RELYING AS WE USUALLY DO ON EXCEPTIONAL INDIVIDUAL COMPETENCE FOR OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

4. AS FIRST STEPS TOWARD DEVELOPING THIS KIND OF INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITY I SUGGEST THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

- A. APPOINT IMMEDIATELY A SPECIAL AMBASSADOR FOR ENERGY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE AND CONDUCT USG BI-LATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL ENERGY NEGOTIATIONS.
- B. ESTABLISH AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POSITION WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT WILL BECOME THE NUCLEUS OF USG INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY.
- C. ESTABLISH A SPECIALIZED CORE OF "ENERGY ATTACHES" AS A NEW MID-CAREER 10-15 YEAR SPECIALTY THAT OVER TIME WILL DEVELOP OFFICERS CAPABLE OF STAFFING MOST USG INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POSITIONS.
- D. DEVELOP REALISTIC TRAINING AND CAREER MANAGEMENT FOR SUCH A SPECIALTY AND
- E. ESTABLISH NEW ENERGY OR PETROLEUM RELATED ECONOMIC-POLITICAL POSITIONS OVERSEAS AND IN WASHINGTON. ALSO CONSIDER REVIVING AND EXPANDING THE REGIONAL PETROLEUM ATTACHE CONCEPT.

WITH VISIONARY MANAGEMENT AND RELATIVELY SMALL MODIFICATIONS IN BUDGETARY AND PERSONNEL PROGRAMS THE DEPARTMENT CAN SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE LONG-TERM PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION. END SUMMARY.

5. EVENTS OF THE PAST DECADE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT ENERGY HAS BECOME ONE OF, IF NOT THE DOMINANT, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUE OF OUR TIME. ALL REASONABLE ANALYSIS INDICATES ITS IMPORTANCE TO AMERICAN SECURITY AND WELL-BEING WILL CONTINUE TO GROW INTO THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE - INDEED THERE IS NO SHORTAGE OF SPECIALISTS IN THE FIELD WHO CLAIM TO SEE THE SEEDS OF A THIRD WORLD WAR IN A STRUGGLE OVER ACCESS TO ENERGY SUPPLIES. THE STATE DEPARTMENT/FOREIGN SERVICE HAVE BEEN VALUABLE PARTICIPANTS IN DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING US ENERGY POLICIES. BUT I BELIEVE WE HAVE NOT YET MADE THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES NECESSARY TO BRING OUR INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITIES IN LINE WITH THE LONGER TERM IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY ISSUES TO OUR DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE LACK OF AN APPROPRIATE USG ORGANIZATIONAL FOCUS FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND IN THE VITAL TRAINING FIELD IN WHICH FSI RESOURCE ATTACHE PROGRAMS AND PETROLEUM TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES ARE ONLY A SHADOW OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO DEVELOP THE EXPERTISE IN ENERGY ISSUES REQUIRED IN OUR PERSONNEL SYSTEM. NONETHELESS EXISTING ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN EB/IEP AND AT FSI PROVIDE A SOLID FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO CONSTRUCT IMPROVEMENTS.

B6

2 Incl
D. Charles A. Alegrow
Tru. Eugene Douglas

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 04 OTTAWA 00530 02 OF 03 312156Z 9618 OTTAWA 00530 02 OF 03 312156Z
ACTION SP-02

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FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9046

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 OTTAWA 00530

DISSENT CHAIRMAN

6. LIKE MOST OF THOSE WHO WILL READ THIS CABLE I HOLD STRONG VIEWS ABOUT SOME OF THE MAJOR POLICY QUESTIONS FACING THE USG IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AREA. PREVIOUS CABLES, FROM JAKARTA, ATTEMPTED TO SKETCH WHAT I CONSIDERED TO BE SERIOUS THREATS TO US INTERESTS PRESENTED BY GROWING SOVIET POWER IN AND AROUND THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS CABLE IS NOW BASED ON SOMETHING LESS EXCITING BUT FUNDAMENTALLY MORE IMPORTANT - THE BELIEF THAT WITH SOME RELATIVELY SMALL BUDGETARY AND MANAGEMENT ADJUSTMENTS THE STATE DEPARTMENT CAN SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE USG CONDUCTS ITS ENERGY DIPLOMACY, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.

7. AS INITIAL STEPS TOWARD DEVELOPING SUCH INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY I SUGGEST THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

- A. ESTABLISH AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY POSITION FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AFFAIRS WHO WILL BE RESPONSIBLE NOT JUST FOR COORDINATING COMPETING USG VIEWS BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY FOR PREPARING A STRATEGY... AND POLICIES TO PROTECT US ENERGY INTERESTS. WE MUST GO BEYOND CONSENSUS TYPE COORDINATION AND ESTABLISH LEADERSHIP CAPABLE OF JUDGING PRIORITIES AND MAKING TRADE-OFFS THAT PERMIT THE PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL STRATEGY. THIS ASSISTANT SECRETARY POSITION SHOULD ASSUME INTER-AGENCY LEADERSHIP; AND ALSO ASSUME INTRA-DEPARTMENT OF STATE LEADERSHIP ON ENERGY ISSUES THAT HAVE BEEN LEFT TOO MUCH TO COUNTRY DESKS THAT LACK THE PERSPECTIVE TO MAKE EFFECTIVE TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN BI-LATERAL RELATIONS AND AN OVERALL INTERNATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY.
- B. APPOINT IMMEDIATELY A SPECIAL AMBASSADOR FOR ENERGY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE AND CONDUCT USG BI-LATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL ENERGY NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH AN APPOINTMENT IS NEEDED BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY OF IMPROVING USG ENERGY POLICIES AND A REALISTIC APPRAISAL THAT UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO ACTUALLY CREATE A NEW ASST. SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POSITION. THIS AMBASSADOR WILL INITIALLY BE ABLE TO DRAW IN EXISTING STATE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER AGENCY EXPERTISE AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO PROGRESSIVELY UPGRADE THE QUALITY OF US INTERNATIONAL ENERGY NEGOTIATIONS.
- C. CREATE A NEW 10-15 YEAR MID-CAREER FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY. CALL IT WHAT YOU WILL - ENERGY ATTACHES, PETROLEUM OFFICERS - IT IS POTENTIALLY ONE OF THE MOST EXCITING AND RELEVANT OF CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN SERVICE ACTIVITIES. THE OFFICERS CHOSEN FOR THIS SPECIALTY WILL OVER TIME CONSTITUTE THE HEART OF THE USG'S PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE WITH WORLDWIDE CONTACTS IN ENERGY DECISION CENTERS AND ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE IN THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF ENERGY AS IT RELATES TO US FOREIGN POLICY. THESE OFFICERS SHOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE STAFFS OF ALL USG AGENCIES HAV-

- ING INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INTERESTS. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THIS MID-CAREER PROGRAM MIGHT USEFULLY BE MODELED ON THAT OF THE LABOR ATTACHE PROGRAM THEREBY DRAWING ON INTERAGENCY AND NON-GOVERNMENT EXPERTISE FOR GUIDANCE AND STAFFING.
- D. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO MAKE PAPER ADJUSTMENTS INSTEAD OF REAL ONES. A MID-CAREER SPECIALTY IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY WILL REQUIRE APPROPRIATE TRAINING AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT AND NOT JUST AN AIRGRAM STATING SUCH A PROGRAM EXISTS WHEN YESTERDAY IT DIDN'T. SOME SUGGESTIONS OF THE KIND OF PREPARATION AND CONTINUING CAREER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATE TO THIS SPECIALTY MIGHT INCLUDE:
 - 1. A BEGINNING 6-8 WEEK FSI COURSE ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ISSUES.
 - 2. IMPROVING ON THE PETROLEUM AND RESOURCE UNIVERSITY PROGRAM THAT NOW EXISTS.
 - 3. UTILIZATION OF SUPERIOR PRIVATE SECTOR ENERGY TRAINING SUCH AS THE ARTHUR D. LITTLE PETROLEUM MANAGEMENT COURSE.
 - 4. IMPROVING OUR EXECUTIVE INTERCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH PRIVATE SECTOR ENERGY AND ENERGY CONSULTING COMPANIES.
- E. NEW STATE DEPARTMENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POSITIONS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED OVERSEAS AND IN WASH-

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01
ACTION SP-02

OTTAWA 00530 03 OF 03 312156Z

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 ES-01 /004 W
-----221017 012353Z /60

R 292011Z JAN 81
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9047

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 OTTAWA 00530
DISSENT CHANNEL

- WASHINGTON WITH PRIMARY REPORTING, REPRESENTATION AND
- ANALYTICAL RESPONSIBILITIES CENTERING ON THE POLI-
- TICS AND ECONOMICS OF ENERGY. THE FUNCTIONAL
- THRUST OF THESE POSITIONS OVERSEAS WOULD COME FROM
- A STRENGTHENED WASHINGTON ORGANIZATIONAL BASE IN
- THE NEWLY CREATED OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY
- FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OR THE SPECIAL AMBASSADOR
- BUT WOULD BUILD ON TRADITIONAL FOREIGN SERVICE
- STRENGTHS IN ESTABLISHING CONTACTS WITH ENERGY
- DECISION MAKERS AND IN ANALYTICAL AND SPOT REPORT-
- ING. ADDITIONALLY, THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONSIDER
- REVIVING AND EXPANDING THE REGIONAL PETROLEUM
- ATTACHE CONCEPT. SEPARATELY A FOREIGN POLICY
- ENERGY SPECIALIST SHOULD BE ASSIGNED AS A SPECIAL
- ASSISTANT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN EACH OF
- THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REGIONAL BUREAUS AND TO
- THE HEAD OF OTHER EXECUTIVE AGENCIES WITH ENERGY
- INTERESTS. THESE POSITIONS WOULD PLAY A LIAISON
- ROLE BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF THE NEWLY APPOINTED
- SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AND THE REGION-
- AL BUREAUS AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES.

8. THERE IS AN OBVIOUS NEED TO IMPROVE THE INSTITUTIONAL
CAPABILITIES OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE FOREIGN
SERVICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AREA. IF THE FOREIGN
SERVICE DOES NOT SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY OTHER AGENCIES
WILL TRY OR BE CREATED TO DO SO. THAT IS TO THEIR CREDIT.
I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THE NATIONAL INTEREST SUFFERS FROM
THE CONTINUING FRAGMENTATION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY GENERALLY AND IN THE ENERGY
FIELD IN PARTICULAR. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS THE
FUNCTIONAL MISSION AND HUMAN RESOURCES BEST SUITED TO
TAKING AN INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY ISSUES. WE NEED TO MAKE THE RELATIVELY SMALL BUT
NECESSARY ORGANIZATIONAL AND BUDGETARY ADJUSTMENTS THAT
WILL PERMIT US TO REALIZE OUR POTENTIAL FOR CONTRIBUTING
TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF US INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY.
SMITH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELEASE IN PART B6

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5425

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ROME 10207

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: KOR
SUBJECT: U.S. SECURITY POLICY TOWARD KOREA

FROM

1. THIS MAY NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE DISSENT CHANNEL BECAUSE THE COMMENTS ARE ADDRESSED TO OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND PRESS REPORTS ISSUED ELSEWHERE, WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE FULL POLICY DELIBERATIONS INVOLVED. AS THE OFFICER WHO HAS SPENT THE LONGEST TIME WORKING ON KOREAN POLITICAL SECURITY MATTERS, U.S. ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT 1946-1948, DEPARTMENT WORK ON KOREA 1978-1959 AND 1962-1965), HOWEVER, I FEEL CONSTRAINED TO CALL ATTENTION TO SOME KEY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAT I FEAR MAY BE LOST SIGHT OF IN THE CURRENT ARGUMENTS ABOUT A SCHEDULED WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. GROUND FORCES FROM KOREA.

2. THE KEY POINT IS NOT THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES PER SE BUT THE CLARITY OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DEFEND SOUTH KOREA AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE RENewed AGGRESSION. THE PREPONDERANCE OF SOUTH KOREAN POPULATION AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH OVER NORTH KOREA, AND THE RELATIVELY EVEN MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THEM ALSO ARE LARGELY IRRELEVANT, HAVING EXISTED EVEN AT THE TIME OF 1950. IT IS NOT SO MUCH TO NORTH KOREA THAT THE SIGNALS OF OUR COMMITMENT MUST BE CLEAR AS IT IS TO CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, WITHOUT WHOSE INVOLVEMENT NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND WOULD BE UNLIKELY IN THE FUTURE. AND IT IS NOT ONLY SOUTH KOREA THAT IS AT STAKE, BUT ALSO JAPAN, ONE OF WHOSE OLD LEADERS APTLY HAVING POINTED OUT THAT KOREA IS A DAGGER AIMED AT THE HEART OF JAPAN.

3. THE PRESENCE OF U.S. GROUND FORCES IS NOT A PERMANENT OR IMMUTABLE NECESSITY, BUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE HANDLED CAREFULLY. THE NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION OF 1950 FOLLOWED ONE YEAR AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES, AND AFTER STATEMENTS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAD MISLED NORTH KOREA, THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA INTO BELIEVING THAT SOUTH KOREA HAD BEEN PLACED OUTSIDE OUR PERIMETER OF DEFENSE. THE OBVIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLICY FACTOR TO CONSIDER NOW IS WHETHER AFTER THE COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER IN VIET-NAM AND OUR CHANGES OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA, A WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM KOREA MIGHT NORTH KOREA, CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO BELIEVE THAT OUR DEFENSE COMMITMENT TO SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN HAS CHANGED.

4. OF EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE THAN THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECLARATION OF THE SIXTEEN AT THE TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE IN 1953, IN WHICH WE AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES WHO HAD CONTRIBUTED FORCES TO THE UN MILITARY ACTION IN KOREA DECLARED THAT IF THE ARMISTICE WERE BROKEN WE WOULD RESPOND PROMPTLY AND THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONFINE THE HOSTILITIES TO KOREA. THIS WAS CLEARLY A WARNING OF NUCLEAR WAR RESPONSE BY THE UNITED STATES.

BELIEVE IS A GRAVE ERROR, PARTICULARLY AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE ANNOUNCING A WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. GROUND FORCES. THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR RESPONSE SHOULD IN MY OPINION BE KEPT OPEN.

5. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK BE CONSULTED, PARTICULARLY ON THE ISSUE OF THE DECLARATION OF THE SIXTEEN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. IN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, HE WAS ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR UN AFFAIRS AND WAS PERSONALLY FAMILIAR WITH THESE DECISIONS. I PARTICIPATED IN DISCUSSIONS OF THESE ISSUES WITH HIM LATER, IN 1964, WHEN HE WAS SECRETARY OF STATE.
GARDNER

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RELEASE IN FULL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

Septem

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: P - Mr. Joseph J. Sisco
FROM: AF - Donald B. Easum *DE*

Peter S
Attached is the
memo you requested with
number inserted - 45-5
says that SP was on
distribution but I don't
remember seeing the
memo.

Proposed Sale of DC-8

The Problem

The most significant development is the update memorandum on this subject and a personal message to you from President Bongo (at Tab B) urging that an immediate decision be made on the DC-8 and that you assign a special mission sent to Washington to press for the sale. In his message to you, Bongo "officially renews the guarantees" given in the GOG's note of June 28 (text at Tab C) which reads, inter alia, that "in no event will the DC8-63-CF be used in a different way that might somehow benefit any one of the countries censured by the international organizations of which Gabon is a member, such as the OAU, UN and CAMO." Bongo states further that he is surprised and disturbed that we would doubt his assurances, that the long delay is proving costly to Gabon and that a favorable decision is "indispensable."

The Analysis

As noted in our memorandum of August 27, the Gabonese had indicated that if they were not able to purchase the plane by mid-August they would have to make other arrangements. By appealing directly to you now, however, Bongo had made clear he intends to continue to press the issue with us and has, in effect, placed his personal integrity on the line. The assurances quoted above are the most comprehensive we have received and the first from Bongo addressed directly to the Secretary of State. AF believes that these assurances are the firmest we are likely to get and would avoid the legal problem for us which would arise from use of the plane in sanctions-busting. They would also serve to protect us from some of the criticism which we experienced following the sale of the first DC-8.

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-2-

The question remains whether, given Bongo's duplicity with regard to the first DC-8, his most recent assurances really mean anything or affect the assessment made in our July 11 memorandum that the DC-8 would probably go into Rhodesian trade. The positions of INR and CIA on this question are set forth in the memorandum at Tab D. Opinions in the Department are mixed. Several qualified observers oppose selling the plane. Our Ambassador to Gabon, while recognizing the risk of misuse, on balance favors the sale. The legal issue turns upon a political judgment: L does not oppose the sale on legal grounds unless the Department principal deciding the matter judges that the aircraft is likely to be used in sanctions-busting.

My own view is that, by communicating his personal assurances directly to you, Bongo has significantly escalated the costs to him of possible misuse of the aircraft and is not likely to risk these costs. They could include condemnation by the US, the UN, the OAU and the international press. Bongo must also realize that the US might react in other ways as well; certainly the extended delay in approving the export license has already made clear the seriousness with which we view this issue.

I think we must also take into consideration the effects which a negative decision or further delay may have on US interests in Gabon. In his September 10 call on AF, one of the Gabonese emissaries stressed the risk of Bongo's taking retaliatory actions. A note from the Gabonese Embassy delivered that day also refers to the "consequences" that a "dilatory reply" could have. While our course of action should not be guided by threats of retaliation, I believe there is an increasing likelihood that the mercurial Bongo might show his displeasure at being personally rebuffed by taking action against us, perhaps with respect to US investments and commercial interests. (These include oil concessions to nine US companies and US Steel participation in the manganese concession.) There is also a risk of damaging the good potential for increased US commercial involvement in the development of the expanding economy of Gabon, which already ranks as a major oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa.

Meanwhile, Seaboard continues to press hard for quick approval of the \$11,200,000 sale and claims that each day

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-3-

of delay is costing the company \$5,000 in insurance and other expenses. However, if the sale is blocked, Seaboard believes it can retain at least \$200,000 of the Gabonese down payment on the aircraft.

In the light of this revised assessment, I now believe we should approve the export license for the DC-8 on the basis of the personal assurances Bongo has communicated to you, making clear in a diplomatic note our understanding and expectation that the plane will not be used in any way to support Rhodesian trade. This note, a draft text of which is attached at Tab A, would constitute a reply to Bongo's message to you.

At the same time, we would inform the OAU and the UN sanctions committee of our decision based upon Gabon's assurances. This action would serve to demonstrate to these bodies our continuing concern for upholding sanctions and help deflect any public criticism of our decision, particularly just before the opening of the UNGA. In the event the plane were put into Rhodesian trade, such notification would help place the onus directly on the Gabonese. This prospect, I believe, should serve to mitigate any temptation Bongo might have to misuse the plane.

Recommendations:

-- That you approve the export license for the DC-8.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

-- That you approve the text of the diplomatic note at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab A - Draft note.
- Tab B - Message from President Bongo
- Tab C - Gabonese note of June 28.
- Tab D - INR assessment.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Drafted: ✓
AF/C - Mr. WLCutler:chg
9/16/74

Clearance:
L/AF - Mr. Huffman ✓
EB/ITP/EWT- Mr. Goodman ✓

RELEASE IN FULL

ORIGIN/ACTION AF-5			
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USIA	NBA 3	CIA 16	NSC 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

RS/R
By 19-8 45 Etc.

Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION
A-13

PRIORITY ~~SECRET~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : AmEmbassies MOGADISCIO, MOSCOW, USCINCEUR
Dept Pass BONN, LONDON, NAIROBI, PARIS, ROME, TEL AVIV, ASMARA

FROM : AmEmbassy ADDIS ABABA DATE: January 24, 1973

SUBJECT : Implications for U.S. Policy of the Somali Threat to Ethiopia

REF : Addis 0782

A. Summary

This airgram, which was summarized in the telegram under reference, has been approved by the Country Team but its recommendations are subject to the concurrence of Ambassador Adair, currently in Washington. Its gist is that we believe the U.S. should take immediate steps to assist Ethiopia in the light of the growing Somali military threat, the most important of these being the total elimination of the \$3 million shortfall in U.S. military assistance which presently appears likely for FY 73, and of any prospective shortfall in FY 74.

B. New Political Factors in the Situation

Since the spring of 1972, the IEG's concern with the longstanding but previously quiescent "Somali threat" over the territorial issue, a concern shared by all strata of Ethiopian society, has been considerably increased by the following developments:

1. The renewed insistence of Somali demands, in representations to the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Prime Minister and Emperor, by ranking emissaries

up to
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 In Out

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FORM 10-64 DS-323

Drafted by: **The Country Team :aag** Drafting Date: **1/23/73** Phone No.: _____ Contents and Classification Approved by: **Charge: Parker D. Wyman**

Clearances: **MAAG-General Collins** **POL/A-Mr. Lupton** **DATT-Col. Rosner**

~~SECRET~~

A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 2

up to and including President Siad Barre for the cession by Ethiopia to Somalia of the Ogaden ("one-third of our country"; cf. Addis 223).

2. The GSDR's ominous lack of interest in lesser IEG proposals to improve bilateral ties so long as Mogadiscio's major territorial demand remained unsatisfied (Addis 9832), highlighted during ministerial talks on bilateral relations between the two governments following last November's border incidents which reconfirmed the distance between them.

3. The threat also uttered by Siad in these conversations (in the Ethiopian version) that the GSDR would have the Ogaden, peacefully if possible but, if not, otherwise (Addis 223).

4. Raised stakes for both parties in the Ogaden following indications of the possible presence of oil in commercial quantities.

5. Seen from Addis, the premium placed by Sadat's expulsion of Soviet forces from Egypt on the USSR's Somali foothold, a premium deemed by the IEG bound to result in Moscow's greater willingness to satisfy GSDR requests for increased Soviet military aid.

6. Developments suggesting the possibility of greater external support for the ELF insurgency: "unity talks" between the two Yemens thought capable of leading to the extension of Aden's -- and Soviet -- influence on matters affecting ELF support and free passage through the Bab El Mandeb; the occupation of Kamaran Island, with its revelation of the scope of arms flows to the Eritrean insurgents.

7. Various interventionist acts of Colonel Qadhafi which suggest the possibility of Libyan support for Somalia in a future conflict with Ethiopia. The interventionism of Qadhafi to date includes: evidence of Libyan resupply to Aden-based ELF/PLF groups; LARG pressure to orient the Eritrean insurgency also against American interests, presumably including Kagnew; LARG's military intervention in a dispute involving East African states apparently on the basis of the Islamic link between Qadhafi and Amin; Libyan public attacks upon the person and policies of the Emperor; and Tripoli's inducements perceived as instrumental in the rupture of relations

between five

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A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 3

between five "Moslem" African states and Israel, with potential complications for the IEG's management of its own substantial Moslem population's reaction to Israel's presence and programs in Ethiopia -- IEG concerns which convergent Israeli worries can only reinforce.

8. Increased doubts regarding the constancy of USG support deriving from last spring's cut in MAP; the necessity for Imperial intervention to recoup the cuts; current uncertainties regarding the MAP level for FY 73; and current U.S. Congressional attitudes.

9. The GSDR's official adoption of "Scientific Socialism" as its model.

10. Concern with the risks of an early Ethio-Somali confrontation over Djibouti related to doubts concerning the future French presence in FTAI generated by sensitive upcoming French and Territorial elections.

11. The Emperor's 80th birthday, which focused attention as never before upon the Sovereign's advancing age, the Empire's continuing institutional shortcomings, its military inadequacies, and the risks to its vital interests -- its territorial integrity and national cohesion -- which the (impending?) succession, an optimum period for a Somali move, might entail.

C. New Military Factors in the Situation

Since July 1, 1972, Somali forces have reportedly been strengthened significantly by the addition of the following major items of Soviet equipment:

Armored Personnel Carriers	46
BTR-152's and 40's	
2-1/2 Ton Trucks	200
Heavy Duty Trucks	28
37 MM AA	134
SAM II "Guideline" Missiles	(Unknown number)
Radar, AA Type	(Unknown number)
Commo Vans	(Unknown number)
Helicopters "Hotnd"	10
Antonov 12 Transport Planes	2

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A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 5

In addition to the above Soviet deliveries, the first Chinese military arms reportedly were delivered in December:

100 MM AA Guns	6
Automatic Machine guns	18
Ammo	5 cases

D. The Ethiopian Reaction

The Ethiopian Government's perception of these developments generated an atmosphere of some alarm, evidenced not only in numerous expressions of concern to U.S. officials but also by the following:

1. It agreed to receive a Somali Ministerial delegation to discuss bilateral relations and to continue these discussions in Mogadiscio.

2. It approached this Mission in separate demarches at the Chief of Staff, MOD, Prime Minister and Imperial level (Addis 3744-LIMDIS, 6900-EXDIS) to solicit advice on improvements to IEMF Command and Control, and deployment postures.

3. The Prime Minister briefed and arranged for the Foreign Minister to brief the Ambassador (and probably other missions as well) on the contents of the Ministerial conversations with the Somalis (Addis 207).

4. The IEG initiated an internal review of its military posture in the Ogaden and its material requirements and began actively to seek to enlist the assistance of friendly governments (i.e., France, Israel, U.S.), with respect to the latter (Addis 8904 and Memcon of January 8, 1973).

IEMF top echelon views on the Empire's essential military requirements also evolved with Soviet deliveries to Somalia. A summary of the Ethiopian military leadership's current estimate of requirements follows, by service:

1. Army: To oppose the greater mobility and armored strength of Somalia, the minimum desired increase on the Ethiopian side is for a 3,600 man mechanized infantry brigade. Its desired major components are a command and control element, a battalion of M-60 tanks, a battalion of infantry in armored personnel carriers, an engineer

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~~SECRET~~A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 6

company, a self-propelled 155 mm field artillery battalion, an armored car reconnaissance unit, a ground surveillance and target acquisition unit, an anti-aircraft unit and a support battalion (i.e., supply, maintenance and the like). The support element needs extra fuel and water delivery capability for the long distances in desert terrain.

2. Air Force: To oppose Somalia's increasing air capability, the Ethiopian Air Force leaders consider these to be their major needs: a squadron (12 planes) of A-37's to replace the aging T-28D close air support aircraft; 12 F-5E air superiority and intercept aircraft; 12 forward air controller light fixed-wing aircraft; more powerful armaments (i.e., AIM-9B missiles to supplement 20mm cannon fire, larger bombs, high drag bomb devices and napalm); larger authorizations for training and war reserve ammunition; and increased air defense radar coverage.

3. Navy: To oppose seaborne delivery of men and arms to insurgents as well as interference with national sea routes of supply, the Ethiopian naval force commanders express the need for an increase of eight patrol craft with three-inch guns or missiles or both to counteract the Somalia P-6 craft, and one larger ocean-going vessel with at least three-inch guns.

In the light of this estimate, we view the most recent specific Ethiopian request for military assistance (USCINCEUR's 171729Z, January 1973) as quite restrained. Accordingly, we think it likely that more substantial requests will soon be pressed with greater urgency, all the more so, of course, if MIG-21's and T-54 tanks surface in Somalia. We note in this connection the Foreign Minister's recent prediction that his government, and possibly the Emperor himself, will soon request a basic discussion of the Somali threat with the Ambassador (Addis 9832).

E. Mission Views on Justification for the Ethiopian Reaction

Is the IEG justified in feeling deep concern over the Somali threat and in concluding that additional measures are necessary at this time in order to augment Ethiopia's military strength? Given the present situation in Ethiopia, including the understandable and justified fears regarding Ethiopia's vulnerabilities in the period immediately following the death of the Emperor, we believe that

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A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 8

coerce the IEG into a more flexible negotiating posture on the territorial issue.

Soviet deliveries to Somalia since last summer have noticeably increased Somali military potential but have not yet wrought a major change in the military balance between the two countries. Taking into account the deliveries of which we are presently aware, we consider the growth in the Somali capabilities sufficiently serious to make it a requirement of great importance that Ethiopia continue in full force the modernization program which is currently underway. Put in other terms, any financial shortfalls which force the Ethiopian Government to slow down the pace planned for this modernization program will expose Ethiopia to the possibility of successful Somali aggression at some time in the perhaps not-too-distant future.

If the Soviets within the next year deliver a significant number of SAM missiles, T-54 tanks, or MIG-21's, a major increase in Somali capabilities will occur and the military threat to Ethiopia will rise. Should the U.S. wish to help Ethiopia at that time to preserve a military balance, we believe it would need to consider the advisability of upgrading F-5 armaments and/or providing Ethiopia with such hardware as radar, Hawk missiles, F-5E aircraft, anti-tank weapons and M-60 tanks.

F. Results of Continuing Present U.S. Policy

If the U.S. reacts to current Ethiopian alarms with merely a continuation of recent attitudes and program trends, we anticipate the following consequences:

1. A growing conviction in the IEG that U.S. friendship is of little real value to Ethiopia when the chips are down, with consequent disillusionment and bitterness. It is considerably harder to judge what further consequences such disillusionment and bitterness would have for U.S. interests. They would certainly make it somewhat harder for the U.S. to attain its objectives with regard to a wide range of minor issues in U.S.-Ethiopian relations. We do not currently anticipate that it would cause a basic change in the government's attitude towards Kagnew or that Ethiopian resentment would result in significant damage to major U.S. interests. (The damage might be more serious, however, in the event that TENNECO soon discovers commercial quantities of oil.) We do not think that the disillusionment would be likely to drive a significant

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A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 9

number of Ethiopians into the Soviet or Chinese camps.

2. A vigorous Ethiopian effort to obtain military equipment on credit from other non-Communist sources. Depending upon the terms, this could involve the same disadvantages as inhere in U.S. credit sales (see below). However, such third country procurement might well complicate IEMF logistic arrangements.

3. A slowly growing conviction in many countries that the U.S. is letting down its principal friend in Africa and that its willingness to help its friends in times of stress has reached a very low level.

4. Some danger that a Libyan armed and financed ELF might decide to attack Kagnev if it clearly saw how disinclined the U.S. was to assume any further involvement in Ethiopia.

5. Somewhat greater danger of some form of hostile Somali action against Ethiopia than if the U.S. did more to sustain Ethiopian strength.

Should there eventually be an outbreak of some form of hostilities with Somalia, the disadvantages for the U.S. mentioned above would be intensified.

Although the disadvantages of U.S. inaction listed above are by no means equivalent to those which would result should the U.S. fail to respond strongly when some of its other traditional friends appeared to be threatened, they are sufficiently unpleasant to justify a search for additional actions which the U.S. can take at the present time to reassure Ethiopia, to strengthen its military capabilities, and to lessen the likelihood of Somali aggression.

G. Political Possibilities

In addition to steps designed to increase Ethiopia's military capabilities, which are discussed later in this airgram, the following U.S. options to meet the current problem deserve consideration:

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A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 10

1. A meeting between the Emperor and the President away from Washington, perhaps in connection with HIM's scheduled Latin America trip this spring. Regardless of the state of U.S. military assistance prospects at the time, the expression of interest in Ethiopia evidenced by the meeting would help to improve U.S.-Ethiopian relations, bolster Ethiopian confidence and hold within bounds the pressure for U.S. military assistance.

2. A U.S.-IEG meeting at the SecState or SecDef level to discuss the present Somali threat. The usefulness of this option can of course best be evaluated in light of the feasibility and content of the Presidential meeting discussed above.

3. A U.S. suggestion to the IEG, and possibly the GSDR, that it consider approaching the OAU and/or friendly African states (e.g., Sudan) with a request to mediate their bilateral tensions, as was done in 1964.

4. Meetings with allies and friends to share our assessments regarding developments in The Horn and discuss possibilities for assisting the IEG. A meeting in Washington or Jerusalem with the Israelis would appear particularly useful in this connection, while consultations in appropriate capitals with the French, Germans (increased police support), Italians (use their influence in Somalia), and British (absorption by HMG of Canberra rehabilitation costs - cf. IR 6830015272 of August 16, 1972), might be helpful.

5. A U.S. initiative to apprise the Soviets of our concern over the increased tension between Ethiopia and Somalia and to request Soviet cooperation to minimize the danger of an arms race and future hostilities. We understand that the IEG had decided to approach Pompidou with a request that he use his influence in Moscow to limit Soviet deliveries to Somalia (Addis 663). Washington will be in a better position than this Mission to evaluate the effectiveness and timing of such an approach.

6. A review of options for an improvement in U.S. relations with Somalia, and a consequent increase in U.S. influence there.

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A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 11

7. An increased number of naval calls and military visits to Ethiopia to demonstrate our interest in the area. Recent visits by USCINCEUR, the forthcoming visit of COMIDEASTOR's "La Salle" in connection with Navy Days, and the upcoming sojourn of the National War College group could be supplemented by calls at Massawa of detached 7th Fleet or other naval elements which could also exercise our free transit rights in the Bab El Mandeb, as circumstances might dictate.

H. Possible IEG Actions

1. The U.S. MAAG is encouraging IEG self-help measures to improve its military posture. There are many actions such as an improved command control structure and various deployment improvements which it has been recommending and which it will continue to promote vigorously. We believe that the IEG, because of its concern over the Somali threat, is noticeably more receptive to U.S. advice of this kind than has previously been the case.
2. There is considerable evidence of inefficiency in the execution by the IEG of the Ministry of Defense budget, particularly in regard to such items as POL. There are probably major "savings" that could be generated through tighter systems of control over POL distribution and use and possibly through centralized procurement of grain requirements for the armed forces, which is now handled on a unit basis. Beyond these measures general austerity could be made a requirement, thus freeing up not only budget resources, but equipment and manpower to be reallocated to priority tasks related to defense of the Eastern border. Rationalization and improved allocation of resources available to the MOD could materially enhance the defense capability in the Ogaden. The U.S. MAAG will do what it can to encourage rationalization of this kind.
3. The IEG could make an increased allocation to its defense budget for either local costs or foreign procurement. The MOD budget for FY 73 is E\$95 million. Additional spending for defense this year without breaching the understanding between the IEG and the IBRD on the limitation of defense spending could amount to E\$2 million. (The defense expenditures in FY 73 as currently budgeted will be

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A-13
Addis Ababa,
Page 12

only E\$2 million over MOD budgeted expenditures in FY 72, or 2 percent, whereas the IEG/IBRD understanding contemplated restraining increase in MOD expenditures to 4 percent.) The E\$2 million added to the MOD in FY 73 could come from resources freed up by a broadening of the U.S. Agricultural Sector Loan (see Section K(2) of this airgram), from domestic borrowing from the National Bank (which is feasible at present), or possibly by shifting existing IEG resources from another part of the total IEG budget.

An increase in the Ethiopian use of resources for military purposes would need, however, to consider the provisions of Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which calls for the President to take into account certain factors in providing economic assistance to recipient countries. The Executive Branch might have to deal with Congressional criticism growing out of the statement of purpose in Section 620(s), which in part states: "to insure that resources (of AID recipients) intended for economic development are not diverted to military purposes."

The individual provisions of Section 620(s) which the President has to take into account can probably be covered satisfactorily.

The first provision deals with the matter of direction of budget resources. Even though the percentage of the budget used for IEG military purposes would increase, we could probably demonstrate that the military budget would still be within the IBRD agreed limit, or close thereto, and within the limits established by State-AID for maximum security expenditures of AID-recipient countries.

The second provision of 620(s) on use by LDC's of foreign exchange for the acquisition of military equipment should not become an issue since the proportion of IEG free foreign exchange resources used for military procurement would still be very small, even if the IEG used its resources for foreign procurement.

Finally, we do not expect that the IEG would use its foreign exchange for the purchase of sophisticated weapons since these, if provided at all, would presumably be covered under grant military assistance from U.S. or non-U.S. sources.

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A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 13

Although the implications of 620(s) must be kept in mind in considering any additions to the IEG defense budget, it is not believed that the addition of as small a sum as E\$2 million in FY 73 would pose a problem.

4. Programs to establish a series of agricultural areas, perhaps along the Wabi from Gode to Kolafo or elsewhere, could be implemented through expansion of non-military elements of the budget and thus be eligible for various forms of external assistance, including use of U.S. Agricultural Sector Loan funds with U.S. agreement. Thus, IEG "possession" of the Ogaden might be strengthened.

The IEG is now investigating this agricultural settlement possibility further before deciding whether it would be advisable.

I. Possible U.S./Israeli Assistance

The Government of Israel could provide communications equipment (Motorola) or possibly other items including PGM-type ships in place of MAP-funded communications gear, thus freeing up some quantum of military assistance for funding of other items. Military assistance from Israel if not on a grant basis could be paid for by Ethiopian exports of wheat. It might be financed by the Israeli Government utilizing some part of the dollar funds available to it as a result of the U.S. \$50 million housing investment guaranty of 1972. If necessary and feasible, the U.S. could agree to increase the HIG by the amount represented by the equipment if it were furnished to Ethiopia as an Israeli grant.

In regard to Ethiopian export of wheat, this could conceivably be induced by the IEG without serious injury to domestic supply/consumption in the short run. Alternately, wheat of comparable value might be made available to Ethiopia under a PL-480 Title I sales agreement with payment by the IEG in local currency, with the local currency to be utilized (under PL-480 Section 104 f, g, or h) by joint agreement for agricultural or other development activities budgeted by the IEG, or for allocation under PL-480 Section 104(c) for defense expenditures.

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Addis Ababa
Page 14

The Mission wishes to bring the foregoing possibilities to the attention of the Department, but we recognize that they involve several disadvantages, particularly if the triangular arrangements did not involve direct U.S. grant assistance:

(1) Involvement of any third party in U.S. assistance to the IEG would complicate the arrangements and entail time delays.

(2) The sale of Ethiopian wheat to Israel would entail some subsidization since the wheat is of low quality and inland transport costs are high, thus pricing the wheat above the world market.

(3) Compensatory U.S. PL-480 wheat (a) would call for USDA to "forgive" the IEG's failure some years ago to honor a "Usual Marketing Requirement" (UMR) clause in a cotton sales agreement; (b) could cause some local market disruption since landed U.S. wheat shipped on U.S. bottoms would normally be priced above local wheat or other imported wheat; (c) would place a demand on short U.S. PL-480 supplies.

(4) Allocation of PL-480 local currency proceeds under Section 104(c) would openly involve the USG in direct support of the MOD budget, an act which might be subject to criticism in the U.S. Congress, and possibly in Ethiopia.

If the Department considers any of the triangular arrangements discussed above feasible from the U.S. standpoint, we recommend that they be included in the consultations with Israel referred to in Section G(4) above.

J. Possibility of Significant Increase in MAP

The FY 71-FY 78 program which calls for maintaining Ethiopian forces in-being, for a modest modernization program (weapons, communication and ships), and for replacing non-supportable equipment (e.g., T-28 aircraft with A-37) has been developed based on JSOP planning figures as follows:

<u>FY 73</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>
11.49	11.53	11.65	10.78	10.73	10.93

(Figures indicated are for materiel and training provided to IEMF and do not include supply operations and MAAG support cost.)

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~~SECRET~~A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 15

While there was a modest decrease in the FY 72 program, there will be a drastic decrease in FY 73 if the present \$8.5 million (not including supply operation and MAAG support costs) is maintained. Additionally, the initial planning figures for FY 74 already indicate a reduction of approximately one million in FY 74. Obviously reductions such as these, plus inflation factors, cannot accommodate the program described immediately above.

The levels of approximately 11-11.5 million were initially arrived at and justified based on rights to Kagnew Station and assistance to a long-standing friend in the Horn in providing for its self-defense. At that time the primary concern was the active insurgency in Eritrea. The growing Somali strength, and particularly Soviet deliveries there in recent months, have introduced an important new factor in the situation and provided considerable additional justification for U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia. There would indeed be some logic to the argument that the original U.S. planning figures for FY 73 to FY 78 should now be increased. However, if the MAP can be sustained at the 11-11.5 million level (not including supply operations and MAAG support costs) on a continuing basis and there is no large-scale introduction of sophisticated weapons such as the T-54 tank and the MIG-21 aircraft, the objectives of the current program can be accomplished in the time-frame indicated (FY 73-78) and a reasonable balance of power between Ethiopia and Somalia can be maintained.

The most effective and most desirable way to meet the looming shortfall of \$3 million for FY 73 and probably more for FY 74 would be to increase the MAP program. Bearing in mind the intense world-wide competition for the limited MAP funds, however, the Mission has attempted to evaluate other possibilities for meeting these shortfalls. These are discussed below.

K. Other Possible U.S. Actions to Enhance the IEG Defense Budget

1. The U.S. could offer military equipment on a credit sale (FMS) basis. The following table is based on an assumption of an agreement for delivery of the stated amounts in FY 73 with 10-year repayment at 6% interest, no grace.

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~~SECRET~~A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 16

	<u>Annual Effect of Repayment IEG Budget and Balance of Payments</u>	<u>Annual Repayments as Percentage of Projected Exports of Goods and Services</u>
U.S. \$3 million	U.S. \$0.42 million	0.18%
U.S. \$4 million	U.S. \$0.56 million	0.24%
U.S. \$5 million	U.S. \$0.7 million	0.30%

Since the ratio of Ethiopia's debt service payments to exports is already 12% and increasing, it would be prudent to limit FMS if selected as an option in order to place as little pressure as possible on the debt service burden, which is above the 10 percent "alert level" mentioned in IBRD/IMF studies of LDC debt service problems. As the table above indicates, however, the annual repayments involved in the event of FMS sales of US \$3-4 million in FY 73 would add little to Ethiopia's balance of payments burden.

The annual debt repayments, although small, could cause problems in connection with the current IEG understanding with the IBRD that budgetary expenditures for defense will not rise by more than 4 percent annually (see Section H(3)). A \$3 million credit sale in FY 73, for example, which involved an annual budgetary expenditure/repayment of \$0.42 million, would add about 1% to the IEG's current defense budget. This seems possible and would involve the need for discussions with the IBRD only in the event that the IEG planned to increase its budget expenditures from its own and other resources by more than 3 percent in the year of the required IEG expenditure for repayments to the U.S. If it were possible to have a grace period covering the period of concern with the Somali threat, the problem connected with this limitation on defense funds could probably be avoided.

It does not appear that the small annual increase of expenditures for debt repayments resulting from FMS sales of \$3-\$4 million to Ethiopia in FY 73 would create any significant problem in terms of Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act (see Section H(3) above).

2. The U.S. could agree to broaden the spectrum of eligible expenditures for the AID Agricultural Sector Loan for the purpose of picking up additional budget items, thus permitting the IEG to shift its budget resources to defense support. For example, we

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~~SECRET~~A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 17

could agree to finance construction and other capital budget support of rural schools, rural clinics, and certain other minor elements which are germane to rural development, but which are currently beyond the approved scope for ASL expenditures. Although this would not result in any net additional developmental effort, budgetary relief for defense could be achieved in this manner. From the standpoint of IEG absorptive capacities, we estimate the amount which could be made available through this route, taking the current year's budget as a guide, would be in the range of E\$5 million, or approximately the equivalent of US \$2 million this year, and presumptively a like amount in FY 74.

A proposal to broaden the eligibility for use of ASL funds would have intrinsic appeal to the IEG since the IEG has already informally requested such action in FY 73. USAID is prepared to consider the proposal following the April IBRD Consultative Group meeting, and action by the IEG on rural education programs within the context of discussions on the Education Sector Review. We could handle the question of widened eligibility at the technical level with the Minister of Finance and, if AID/W were to agree to broaden the ASL as suggested, the additional U.S. funds could be transferred quickly.

No problem in terms of the IBRD understanding with the IEG would arise if the Agricultural Sector Loan for FY 73 were increased by E\$2 million for this purpose (see Section H(3) above). However, an amount greater than that would push defense expenditures beyond the 4 percent increase level. This level is not sacred, of course, and it is possible that the IBRD could be persuaded of the need for somewhat larger IEG defense expenditures on the ground that direct U.S. grant military assistance was less in FY 73 than in previous years and that it was unreasonable not to expect the IEG to offset this loss in view of its great concern over the Somali threat.

It should be noted, however, that widening of the use of the Agricultural Sector Loan by several million U.S. dollars in FY 73 in order to permit the release of IEG funds for reallocation to defense

expenditures could

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A-13
Addis Ababa
Page 18

expenditures could be criticized as in conflict with the purpose of Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act.

3. The U.S. could provide a Supporting Assistance commodity import loan (or grant), as was done in 1965, or a Capital Development loan or grant for the ex post facto financing of general or a specified list of imports. The quickest way to effect a cash transfer and budget relief would be to pick up the financing of crude oil, ex-Persian Gulf, with the transaction effected with Mobil/New York. Use of this technique would necessitate use of AID's de minimis reimbursement procedures in order to generate the funds speedily.

If supporting assistance funds were used for a grant or loan to Ethiopia, however, such action could involve complications within the Executive Branch and in the Congressional Presentation, and would place Ethiopia in the non-developmental category of developing countries along with Southeast Asia and Jordan.

L. Conclusions

The Country Team's conclusions regarding actions which the U.S. should undertake at the present time are contained in paragraphs 9-15 of the telegram under reference.

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Subject to Gen. Declass. Schedule of
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 28, 1974
TIME: 4:30-5:30 P.M.

SUBJECT: President Bongo's Desire to Acquire a DC-8/63CF

RELEASE IN FULL

PARTICIPANTS:

Gabonese:

H. E. Vincent Mavoungou, Gabonese Ambassador
Mr. Roland Bru, Economic and Financial Adviser to
President Bongo
Mr. Jacques Pigot, Privy Counselor of President Bongo
Mr. Daniel Richon, Vice President of UTA

U.S.A.

Mr. John Foley, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs
Ms. Alison Palmer, Acting Director of Central African
Affairs
Mr. Keith Huffman, Assistant Legal Adviser for African
Affairs.

Mr. Alec Toumayan, Language Services

COPIES TO: Ambassador John A. McKesson III, Libreville, Gabon
AF/C - Ms. Palmer
AF/C - Ms. Diggs ✓
AF - Mr. Foley
AF/S - Mr. O'Neill, Jr.
AF/P - Mr. Linehan, Jr.
EB/OA/AVP - Mr. Ortman
Export-Import Bank - Mr. John W. Lentz

After introductions Mr. Foley stated that the Department representatives were delighted to meet with Ambassador Mavoungou and President Bongo's special mission.

Ambassador Mavoungou handed Mr. Foley a lengthy note in French which appeared to set forth President Bongo's efforts to acquire a DC-8/63CF

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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and requested an urgent response to these efforts. Mr. Foley stated that the Department would have the note translated and study it carefully.

Mr. Richon, speaking in French, referred to the Gabonese Government's agreement with Seaboard International to acquire a DC-8/63CF. He described the agreements whereby UTA would maintain and operate the aircraft and Air Afrique would use it on its regular runs when President Bongo was not using it. Mr. Richon further described the ~~close commercial~~ relationship between UTA and Air Afrique under which aircraft from both companies are pooled and maintained and crews are trained.

Mr. Richon said that when UTA had heard that President Bongo was going to acquire a plane, it had been concerned that this might disturb the fragile UTA-Air Afrique routes and disturb the system. Accordingly UTA had urged him to be loyal ("fidel") to UTA. UTA also encouraged President Bongo to acquire a McDonnell-Douglas aircraft which could be fitted into Air Afrique's McDonnell-Douglas fleet and maintenance operations. Mr. Pigot remarked that President Bongo also preferred DC-8's from his own flying experience, preferring to charter DC-8's whenever possible. Mr. Richon said that President Bongo had become convinced of the necessity for acquiring his own aircraft after UTA prepared a tally of Bongo's extraordinary expenditures for leasing aircraft in the past year.

Mr. Foley said he understood President Bongo might already possess one DC-8. All three members of the special mission feigned ignorance about any other DC-8 Bongo might have acquired. Mr. Foley again asked if there was not a DC-8 already in Gabon, in which President Bongo had some personal interest. After a moment of silence Mr. Pigot said "that is a private deal." (C'est une affaire privee.) Ms. Palmer asked if the plane was not with Affretair but received only silence as a reply. In response to a question from Mr. Foley, Mr. Richon stated that to his knowledge, UTA did not maintain the present Affretair DC-8. Mr. Richon also said that UTA had invested several hundred thousand dollars in a passenger pack for the DC-8/63CF. UTA's expenditure plus President Bongo's unhappiness towards UTA about the continued unavailability of the aircraft, which it had recommended, made the company extremely anxious to have the sale consummated. Accordingly, he wondered when the aircraft would be available.

Mr. Foley stated that actions by the sprawling U.S. bureaucracy on applications for export licenses took a long time. While he could not state when a decision would be made, he could say that he hoped it would occur very soon.

Mr. Pigot contrasted the speed with which the export license for the C-130 for the Gabonese military had been approved. He also noted that in the present case President Bongo had "cleared" the purchase with OAU.

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Mr. Bru then pressed Mr. Foley for more precise information on the impediments to the sale and a decision date noting that Bongo regarded the DC-8 as his own personal aircraft. Bru asked whether he could advise President Bongo that the DC-8 was now available or whether he should tell Bongo to acquire his aircraft elsewhere. Mr. Foley reiterated his statement regarding the normal delays experienced with the sale of large aircraft.

At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Foley stated that the United States Government prized its fruitful relations with President Bongo, and he requested that Mr. Bru convey the Department's warmest regards to the President and our hopes that a decision would be reached on the DC-8 matter very soon.

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Analysis of June 28 Note Verbale and Oral Statements
made by Personal Emissaries

The most recent indication of Bongo's lack of interest in maintaining good-faith relations was the behavior of his three "personal emissaries with plenti-potentiary powers" who tried to obtain the export license within 24 hours and when unsuccessful, called upon a Deputy Assistant Secretary in AF and made a number of false statements both orally and in writing. For example:

Roland Bru, the head of the delegation, stated that he was only the advisor to Bongo and knew nothing about airlines or airplanes; yet our files show him as a Director of the Air Transport Company of Gabon. Bru, a Foccart man, is bitterly anti-American.

M. Richon, another member of the delegation, a French Vice President of UTA, denied that UTA has maintained the first DC-8; yet UTA performed an engine change on the plane despite our efforts to prevent spare parts from reaching the DC-8. Richon is also with Foccart.

All three delegates denied any knowledge of the existence of the first DC-8, and responded with silence when asked if the plane was not being used by Affretair. Given the fact that all three Frenchmen are close advisors of Bongo, who has been several times told about the USG's concern about the use of the first DC-8 and who knows it is a factor in our delaying issuance of the license for the second plane, these denials are hardly credible.

The delegation presented a note discussing the history of Bongo's interest in acquiring the second plane (see Tab E). The note's false statements are rebutted below:

p. 2, pgh 2: EXIM did not offer any assurances of a favorable decision, since they have grave doubts about the use of the plane.

p. 2, pgh 5: Ambassador McKesson told Bongo during his visit in April that we had serious problems with the second plane because of the mis-use of the first plane; Bongo was very angry.

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p. 2, last pgh: we have explicitly stated our reservations, pertaining to mis-use.

p. 3, pgh 1: it was the USG which took the initiative to require documents establishing bona fide use of the second plane.

p. 3, pgh c: Bongo has told us orally that he plans to use the second plane to set up a competing airline, outside UTA.

pg. 3, pgh 2: Bongo did not inform OAU members, only the Secretary General who has no authority to make decisions. Moreover, the letters from the OAU officials simply acknowledge his having informed them of his intent to make the purchase; no approval was given.

pg. 2, last pgh: objections about Gabonese violations of sanctions were raised orally and in writing at the OAU summit.

pg. 4, pgh 1: Gabon's attachment to principles of African solidarity (e.g. support for sanctions) have frequently been shown to be non-existent.

pg. 4, last pgh: The "undoubtedly circumstantial incidents" could better be described as premeditated violation by the GOG of oral and written assurances to the USG concerning use of the first plane.

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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STADIS////////// [redacted] FROM TONY LAKE S/P
DISSENT CHANNEL FOR

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE : SYRIA, ISRAEL AND
LEBANON: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

REF: DAMASCUS 1482

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ON "SYRIA, ISRAEL AND LEBANON: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE". MR. GRANVILLE AUSTIN OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH AND EMBASSY BEIRUT. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED.
VANCE

B6

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 225566
ORIGIN MMO-02

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INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 SP-02 USIA-06 /021 R

RELEASE
IN PART B6

DRAFTED BY M/MO/DE: RGMAYS, JR.
APPROVED BY M/MO: JMCLARK
S/P - M. A. CASEY (DRAFT)
S/P - R. HARRINGTON (DRAFT)
OF: D. KINNEY (DRAFT)
ARA/MGT - J. SIMMONS (PHONE)
USIA - B. CHATTEN (PHONE)
M/MO - F. P. WARDLAW
M/MO - C. T. SKODA

-----052550 211041Z /21

R 201858Z SEP 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 225566

FOR [] FROM MODE STAFF

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: AODE, CI

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES

REF: (A) SANTIAGO 4523, (B) SANTIAGO 4556, (C) SANTIAGO
4623, (D) SANTIAGO 5308, (E) STATE 144252

1. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY ARA, S/P, AND USIA, ALL
OF WHICH HAVE RECEIVED COPIES OF THE REFERENCED DISSENT
TELEGRAMS.

2. I REGRET THE LONG DELAY IN REPLYING TO REFERENCED
DISSENT CHANNEL TELEGRAMS. WE BELIEVE OVERLY CRYPTIC DRAFT-
ING IN WASHINGTON MAY HAVE INADVERTANTLY RESULTED IN A LACK
OF CLARITY ABOUT PARM PROCEDURES, CONCERNING: (1) THE REA-
SON FOR THE STADIS DESIGNATION ON PARM MESSAGES; AND (2)
THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CHIEF OF MISSION
UNDER BOTH MODE AND PARM PROCEDURES.

3. WHILE THE STADIS CAPTION IS USED TO ENCOURAGE CANDOR
BETWEEN THE CHIEF OF MISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT, THE MODE
SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO FOSTER A MULTIPLE-INPUT METHOD OF
DECISION-MAKING. WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS OF THE
MODE SYSTEM PRECLUDE UNILATERALISM. AS NOTED IN THE MODE
GUIDELINES, THE CHIEF OF MISSION IS DIRECTED TO REVIEW

MISSION STAFFING IN CONSULTATION WITH SENIOR, IN-COUNTRY
AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES. ADDITIONALLY, OTHER-AGENCY HEAD-
QUARTERS ARE INVARIABLY CONSULTED AND INVOLVED IN THE
DECISION PROCESS, WHETHER IT INVOLVES INCREASING, REPRO-
GRAMMING, OR REDUCING RESOURCES, THEREBY ASSURING OTHER
AGENCIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONFER WITH FIELD REPRESENTA-
TIVES IF THEY SO DESIRE. THIRDLY, WHITE HOUSE DIRECTIVES
AND EXISTING GUIDELINES CLEARLY SPECIFY THAT THE AUTHORITY
FOR DECISION-MAKING RESTS WITH DEPARTMENT ASSISTANT
SECRETARIES RATHER THAN CHIEFS OF MISSION, THUS PROVIDING
STILL ANOTHER SOURCE OF JUDGMENT AND INPUT.

4. WE NOTE THE DISCUSSION ON CONSULTATIONS AT POST IN THE
REFERENCED MESSAGES. ALTHOUGH MODE GUIDELINES DO NOT
PRESCRIBE DETAILED PROCEDURES, THEY DO SPECIFY THAT CHIEFS
OF MISSION SHALL CONSULT WITH IN-COUNTRY AGENCY REPRESENTA-
TIVES IN REVIEWING MISSION STAFFING. HOWEVER, CHIEFS
OF MISSION MAY FORWARD RECOMMENDATIONS WITHOUT OBTAINING
A CONSENSUS OR SOLICITING OTHER-AGENCY VIEWS ON THOSE
RECOMMENDATIONS. VANCE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BRIDGE 02488 162025Z
ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 09-01 ISO-00 2004.W
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R 161806Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BRIDGETOWN 2488

DISSENT CHANNEL FROM

B6

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PGOV, PFOR, EAID, BB, GJ, XL, CU
SUBJ: US POLICY IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

REF: BRIDGETOWN 2452

THE FOLLOWING WAS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM REFTEL,
END OF PARA 12:

"AS THE BRITISH STEAL AWAY, THERE'S A GROWING POWER
VACUUM AND THE SMALL ISLANDS -- EXCLUDING FOR THE TIME
BEING, BARBADOS -- ARE UP FOR GRABS. (EVEN THE MAPIA IS
LOOKING OVER THE PROPERTY.) ALTHOUGH I DON'T BELIEVE SO,
IT MAY BE DECIDED THAT THE WISER COURSE IS TO STAY OUT OF
THE BIDDING AND LEAVE THE AREA TO THE CUBANS AND GUYANESE.
HOWEVER WE SHOULD MAKE THAT DECISION FREE OF TWO ILLUSIONS,
FIRST THAT EVENTS AREN'T MOVING AGAINST US (THEY CLEARLY ARE)
AND SECOND, THAT OUR CDB DUES WILL MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE.
FINALLY, I AM, LIKE MANY THESE DAYS, SKEPTICAL OF THE LEVERAGE
THROUGH-AID THEORY. ALL TOO OFTEN IN THE PAST, IT HASN'T
WORKED OR WE'VE BEEN AFRAID TO TRY IT. BUT FOR MULTI-
PLE REASONS IN THIS INSTANCE IT STANDS A GOOD CHANCE OF
SUCCESS.
BRITTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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RELEASE IN FULL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

South Africa's Presence in Namibia

Together with other states in the world, the United States has certain international legal obligations respecting Namibia. They are stated in the conclusions of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1971 and subsequent resolutions of the United Nations Security Council as accepted and supported by the United States. The second of the Court's conclusions was that:

"States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the validity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration."

The current effort to give South Africa time to run an election on its own terms, which we will regard as null and void, and to renew discussions between Steyn and Ahtisaari against the background of the not unambiguous statements of October 19 seems a step away from conscientious compliance with those legal obligations. In the present circumstances, to shield South Africa from the consequences of its continuing defiance of the United Nations' responsibility for Namibia, even though it is hoped that we and others might thereby be shielded from a confrontation in the Security Council, lends support and assistance to South Africa's illegal presence and administration. The apprehensions of African states and SWAPO in this regard are reasonable.

Our own problems may lie in not facing up to the lesson of thirty years, so recently reinforced during the changing of the guard within the Nationalist Party, which is that, on the question of giving real control over South Africa and Namibia to a majority of the black and white population, the Government of South Africa is consistently and adamantly negative and regularly uses force in violation of its duties under international law.

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-2-

Our problem may also be a judgment by this Administration at this time that we can not allow a Security Council decision on further "sanctions" sufficient to win majority support in that Council.

Inattention to recent history is remediable. Indeed, a frequently invoked reason for unwillingness to use more sanctions is precisely that the Nationalists, we have learned from experience, won't be deterred from their course by the threat or fact of such sanctions, up to and including cut-off of oil, trade, investment and international public and private credit. The view is taken that South Africa's first reaction will be to "go it alone", relying on possibilities for evasion of the Security Council resolutions, as well as on its military-economic bargaining position. Thus, the logic of a position that thirty years of granite obduracy can now be eroded by gestures of good will mixed with private persuasion and public deploring or denunciation is not impressive.

Our second problem is more difficult and complex. It reaches beyond this short dissent, which argues a shift in perspective. It is essential to see that the tragedy, so often perceived as taking place in South Africa, is on a different and bigger stage, with more actors. That stage is the whole industrialized "West", including South Africa. Its essence lies in the failure of the U.S. and Western Europe to dissociate from the present Government of South Africa with a clarity convincing at once to the Government of South Africa and to the world, including Africa. On that stage a principal actor is the United States itself. Pretoria was no Munich, but the risks of heightened massive violations of human rights by South Africa at home and wherever its control extends, cast a deepening shadow across the future. To achieve such clarity and diminish the risks, we shall have to be prepared, when the Security Council meets to consider sanctions, to cooperate in the adoption of a sanctions resolution acceptable to a majority, unless we have unequivocal assurance, acceptable to a majority, that South Africa will cooperate in facilitating the entry of UNTAG on a fixed date and will go on to implement the proposals of the 5.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 GENEVA B4449 D1 OF 04 100915Z

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1476

-- CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE CARE MORE ABOUT
SAVING A LITTLE MONEY THAN SAFEGUARDING HUMAN RIGHTS.

PARAGRAPH NINE OF THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS A
PROPOSED REVISION OF THE INSTRUCTIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA B4449

DISSENT CHANNEL

L.O. 12356: DECL: 9/6/89
TAGS: UNHRC, PREL, SHUM, UN, AORC, US
SUBJ: THE NEW INSTRUCTIONS ON UN BUDGETARY RESTRAINT

REFS: A) STATE 97998, B) STATE 104764

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. INTRODUCTION: THIS MESSAGE DISSENTS FROM, AND PROPOSES REVISIONS TO, THE DEPARTMENT'S RECENTLY-ISSUED STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS TO US DELEGATIONS ON "ACTION TO RESTRAIN GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ASSESSED BUDGETS" (REF A). THE AUTHOR IS

ISO [REDACTED] AT THE US MISSION IN GENEVA. [REDACTED] REQUESTS THAT THIS MESSAGE BE DISTRIBUTED TO:

- THE SECRETARY;
- THE DEPUTY SECRETARY;
- THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS;
- AMBASSADOR HELMAN, DEPUTY TO THE UNDERSECRETARY;
- THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS AND APPROPRIATE IO OFFICERS;
- AND
- THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AND APPROPRIATE MA OFFICERS.

sjs - Gibson Hill

3. SUMMARY: BECAUSE OF ITS LACK OF FLEXIBILITY, THE BUDGETARY POLICY SET FORTH IN REF A WILL PREVENT THE US DELEGATION TO THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION FROM ACHIEVING THE FIRST PRIORITY GOAL LISTED IN REF B, I.E., "REASSERTION OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS", BY--

-- REQUIRING THE US DELEGATION TO VOTE AGAINST RESOLUTIONS WHICH ADVANCE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE US POLICY OBJECTIVES, UNLESS CERTAIN IMPRACTICABLE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EXCEPTION CAN BE MET;

-- PREVENTING THE US DELEGATION FROM TAKING ANY BUT PURELY RHETORICAL INITIATIVES;

-- DEPRIVING THE US DELEGATION OF ANY EFFECTIVE MEANS TO INFLUENCE THE CONTENT OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS BY REMOVING THE INCENTIVE FOR OTHER DELEGATIONS TO NEGOTIATE WITH US;

-- ISOLATING US FROM OUR WESTERN ALLIES AND FROM THE THIRD WORLD MODERATES WHOSE SUPPORT WE HAVE TRIED SO HARD TO ENLIST AT RECENT COMMISSION SESSIONS, AND PLACING US INSTEAD IN THE

HOW TO DEFEAT OURSELVES AND ALIENATE FRIENDS IN THE PROCESS:

- IF THE NEW INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN IN EFFECT DURING THE COMMISSION'S 1983 SESSION, THE US DELEGATION WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN FORCED TO VOTE AGAINST AT LEAST TWO MAJOR RESOLUTIONS WE STRONGLY SUPPORTED.

- (1) EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE ON POLAND, AND
- (2) INITIATION OF MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE. IN THE FUTURE, THE RIGIDITY OF THE INSTRUCTIONS COULD WELL PREVENT US FROM SUPPORTING EQUALLY IMPORTANT PROPOSALS. PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING AN EXCEPTION TO POLICY ARE SO NARROW AND INFLEXIBLE AS TO BE UNWORKABLE IN PRACTICE: WE MUST CALL FOR A VOTE AND VOTE NO IF SPECIFIC "ABSORB THE COST" LANGUAGE IS NOT INSERTED IN THE

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04449 02 OF 04 100919Z
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1477

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 GENEVA 04449

DISSENT CHANNEL

TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION. WE MUST VOTE NO IF THE DEPARTMENT REACTS TOO SLOWLY TO THE DELEGATION'S REQUEST FOR AN EXCEPTION. HOW CAN A US DELEGATION CONDUCT A VIGOROUS, SUSTAINED ADVOCACY OF SUBSTANTIVE POLICY OBJECTIVES ON THIS BASIS? A MAJOR IRONY OF THE SITUATION IS THAT WE WILL NOW FIND OURSELVES IN THE COMPANY OF THE SOVIET BLOC ON A GREAT MANY ISSUES, AND ISOLATED FROM OUR WESTERN ALLIES AND THIRD WORLD FRIENDS.

3. FUTILITY:

AS OTHER DELEGATIONS WILL BE AWARE FROM THE OUTSET THAT THE US INTENDS TO VOTE NO ON FINANCIAL GROUNDS, THEY WILL HAVE NO INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH US ON SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES WE DESIRE. MOST OF THESE RESOLUTIONS WE DISLIKE FOR SUBSTANTIVE REASONS WILL PASS ANYWAY, REGARDLESS OF THEIR PRICE TAGS, BUT THEIR CONTENT WILL BE WORSE THAN THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN HAD WE BEEN ABLE TO PARTICIPATE EFFECTIVELY IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS. FAR FROM EXERCISING LEADERSHIP, THE US DELEGATION WILL BECOME A PASSIVE ENTITY, REACTING DEFENSIVELY AND NEGATIVELY TO EVENTS OVER WHICH WE NO LONGER HAVE ANY INFLUENCE.

6. THE DOUBLE STANDARD: THE NEW POLICY MAY HAVE THE UNINTENDED EFFECT OF FORCING US TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PERPETUATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DOUBLE STANDARD, I.E., ITS TENDENCY TO FOCUS EXCESSIVELY ON ABUSES IN ONE REGION OF THE WORLD, WHILE IGNORING EQUALLY SERIOUS VIOLATIONS ELSEWHERE. BECAUSE RESOLUTIONS WITH IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES COST MONEY, WE ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO COMBAT THE DOUBLE STANDARD BY TAKING MEANINGFUL INITIATIVES OURSELVES. FOR THE SAME REASON, WE MAY FIND OURSELVES OPPOSING SUCH INITIATIVES BY OUR ALLIES.

7. A PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY: DURING THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION'S ANNUAL SIX-WEEK SESSION, RESOLUTIONS ARE INTRODUCED AND ADOPTED AT VARIOUS POINTS, IN KEEPING WITH THE ORDER OF AGENDA ITEMS. WE CANNOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE TRADITIONAL ORDER OF THE AGENDA, ALTHOUGH WE TRY EVERY YEAR. MOST OF THE RESOLUTIONS WE FAVOR ARE VOTED ON LATE IN THE SESSION, AFTER THOSE WE OPPOSE HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH (AND USUALLY ADOPTED). ONCE THE COST OF THE RESOLUTIONS ALREADY ADOPTED EQUALS THE CURRENT TOTAL HUMAN RIGHTS BUDGET, WE MUST, PRESUMABLY, BEGIN TO VOTE AGAINST ALL OTHER RESOLUTIONS WITH FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR CONTENT OR PURPOSE. BSENT A SPECIFIC DEPARTMENTAL EXEMPTION.

HOWEVER, EVENTS NEAR THE END OF THE SESSION MOVE TOO RAPIDLY TO PERMIT THE KIND OF DELIBERATION IN WASHINGTON ENVISAGED BY THE NEW INSTRUCTIONS.

1. FREEDOM ISN'T FREE:

THE DEPARTMENT HAS REPEATEDLY AFFIRMED THE NEED TO INCORPORATE A POSITIVE ELEMENT IN US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. THE PRESIDENT'S DEMOCRACY PROGRAM GIVES CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO THE IDEA THAT IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO CRITICIZE AND CONDEMN; WE MUST ALSO ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE INSTITUTIONS WHICH GIVE PRACTICAL PROTECTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS. THE DEPARTMENT HAS ACCORDED HIGH PRIORITY TO THIS NOTION IN OUR MULTILATERAL POLICY STATEMENT QRF 01, WHICH SAYS THAT WE MUST "PROMOTE PROGRAMS PRACTICE THAT SAFEGUARD AND DEVELOP DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND PRACTICES" AS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF OUR EFFORT TO REASSERT AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE UN. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THIS MEANS SUPPORTING SUCH GOALS AS CREATION OF THE POST OF HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

PROGRAMS, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION MACHINERY FOR THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE. AS IN THE CASE OF OUR BILATERAL DEMOCRACY PROGRAM, THESE MULTILATERAL PROJECTS WILL REQUIRE FUNDS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04449 03 OF 04 100319Z
ACTION SP-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1478

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 GENEVA 04449

DISSENT CHANNEL

BUT WE ARE EMPHATICALLY NOT TALKING ABOUT MILLIONS. ✓
IF WE REALLY WANT THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS EFFORT TO
BECOME SIGNIFICANTLY MORE THAN A REPETITIOUS AND
LARGELY STERILE EXERCISE IN PUBLIC FINGER-POINTING,
WE MUST BE READY TO PAY OUR SHARE OF THE COST.
WE SHOULD TRY AS HARD AS WE CAN TO APPLY THE
SCALPEL TO MARGINAL, LOW-PRIORITY,
OR OBSOLETE PROGRAMS, BUT WE SHOULD NOT HOLD
WORTHWHILE NEW PROJECTS HOSTAGE TO THE FINANCIAL
BALANCE SHEET. WE MUST NOT WITHHOLD
OUR SUPPORT FROM PROJECTS WHICH CAN MAKE A REAL

DIFFERENCE IN THE WAY HUMAN RIGHTS ARE RESPECTED IN
THE WORLD.

9. THE SOLUTION:

-- REVISE THE INSTRUCTIONS TO RETAIN FOR US
DELEGATIONS SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO ADVOCATE
AND ACHIEVE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE POLICY GOALS.
THE REVISED GUIDANCE COULD LOOK LIKE THIS:

BEGIN TEXT:

INTRODUCTION: NO CHANGE FROM TEXT IN REF A:

A. WE MUST MAKE CLEAR AT THE OUTSET OF ANY
MEETING THE US COMMITMENT TO ZERO NET REAL
PROGRAM GROWTH AND ATTEMPT TO HAVE OTHER DELEGATIONS
JOIN US. ALL US DELEGATIONS TO MEETINGS SHOULD,
THEREFORE, BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ADMINISTRATIVE
SAVINGS AND LOWER-PRIORITY ACTIVITIES OF THE
ORGANIZATION RELEVANT TO THE MEETING WHICH COULD
BE ELIMINATED, REDUCED, OR DEFERRED AS TRADE-
OFFS FOR NEW HIGHER-PRIORITY ACTIVITIES WHICH THE
USG MAY WANT TO SUPPORT.

B. U.S. DELEGATIONS SHOULD ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN
APPROXIMATE COST ESTIMATES OF INITIAL AND ALTERNATIVE
PROPOSALS AS RESOLUTIONS OR DECISIONS ARE BEING
DISCUSSED AND DRAFTED. THIS WILL CREATE AN INCREASED
AWARENESS OF COST IMPLICATIONS AND THE NEED FOR
OFFSETTING TRADE-OFFS.

C. BEFORE A US DELEGATION CAN PROPOSE ANY PROGRAM
INITIATIVE WHICH WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL FUNDS,
THE US DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT,
THROUGH CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS AND
WITH THE SECRETARIAT, TO IDENTIFY SPECIFIC AND
REALISTIC OFFSETTING REDUCTIONS.

D. US DELEGATIONS MUST SEEK TO ASSURE THAT
SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS INCLUDE
SPECIFIC LANGUAGE THAT THE ACTIVITIES CALLED FOR
WILL TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE BE
IMPLEMENTED WITHIN EXISTING RESOURCE LEVELS.

E. IF (D) IS NOT FEASIBLE, US DELEGATIONS
WILL AS
A GENERAL RULE VOTE
AGAINST THE SPECIFIC PARAGRAPHS INVOLVING NEW
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS, UNLESS THERE ARE
IMPORTANT POLICY REASONS FOR SUPPORTING THE MEASURE
AS IS. THE DELEGATION WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO
CONSULT IN ADVANCE WITH THE DEPARTMENT ON THE NEED
TO TAKE SUCH ACTION. IF PARAGRAPHS VOTES ARE
TAKEN, THE DELEGATION WILL DELIVER AN
APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

F. IF THE US DECIDES TO PERMIT ADOPTION
OF SUCH A RESOLUTION BY CONSENSUS, WITHOUT SEPARATE
PARAGRAPH VOTES, IT WILL MAKE THE US BUDGETARY
POSITION CLEAR THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION
OF VOTE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04449 04 OF 04 100919Z
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1479

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 GENEVA 04449

DISSENT CHANNEL

G. IF SEPARATE PARAGRAPHS ARE ADOPTED OVER OUR OBJECTIONS, US DELEGATIONS WILL (ABSENT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS) EXERCISE DISCRETION IN DECIDING HOW TO VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE. IF WE VOTE YES, ABSTAIN, OR PERMIT ADOPTION WITHOUT A VOTE, THE DELEGATION WILL REITERATE OUR BUDGETARY CONCERNS THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

END TEXT.

10. THE [REDACTED] ASSOCIATES HIMSELF WITH THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE INSOFAR AS THEY APPLY TO THE USG ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 18, 1974

RELEASE IN PART B6

~~SECRET~~

A-289
1/15/75
responded

TO : EUR - Mr. Hartman
 C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
 INR - Mr. Hyland

FROM : S/P - Thomas W. Simons, Jr. *tw*

SUBJECT : Response to a Dissent Message entitled
 "A Policy Proposal: American
 Participation in Soviet Economic
 Modernization as a Catalyst for
 Completing the Detente Process"

Attached for your concurrence and/or comment is a draft response, cleared in S/P, to a dissent message on this subject by [redacted] of Amembassy Moscow (Moscow's B6 A-342, September 5, 1974, also attached.)

You will note that the "Dissent" is not really a dissent, and that the response is consequently a discussion rather than a rebuttal. Further, the response suggests to [redacted] that the exchange be submitted for publication B6 to the classified Open Forum Panel Magazine, as a contribution to detente dialogue within the foreign affairs community. Your concurrence would also include concurrence in this suggestion, unless you specify otherwise.

Since the response is already shamefully late, I would appreciate a reply by COB Friday, January 3, 1975.

Attachments:
As stated

cc: S/P-OFP - Mr. Ray Smith
S/P - Mr. Hickey

~~SECRET~~
GDS

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 24278 01 OF 02 311916Z

ACTION IC-14

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7823

INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY CAMPERRA

AMEMBASSY ACCRA

AMCONSUL MELBORNE

AMEMBASSY MEXICO

AMEMBASSY LOHA

AMEMBASSY RIYADH

USUN NEW YORK 4945

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 4278

IO FOR ASST SEC MAYNES; LABOR FOR ILAB

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PLAB ILO

SUBJECT: ILO: 63RD SESSION OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE (ILC)

1. SUMMARY: SITUATION IS STILL FLUID AND UNPREDICTABLE

BECAUSE PRINCIPAL DELEGATES HAVE JUST BEGUN TO ARRIVE.

SOUNDINGS BY USDEL AS OF MAY 30 SUGGEST MANY DELS HAVE

FLEXIBLE INSTRUCTIONS AND WILL WAIT TO SEE HOW REGIONAL

CAUCUSES GO BEFORE TAKING FINAL POSITIONS. ENCOURAGING

POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS ARE (1) LESIRE OF CAPT AMIDOME (GHANA)

(WHO WILL BE ILC PRESIDENT) FOR SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE AND

(2) THE POSSIBILITY THAT USDEL MIGHT ADDRESS REGIONAL MEETINGS.

BIGGEST PROBLEM WE FACE IS GETTING ARTICLE 17 PROPOSAL INTO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 22 GENEVA 04272 21 OF 22 311916Z

IIC STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE TO BE DECIDED ON ITS MERITS, WITHOUT PAYING THE PRICE OF A COMPROMISE "PACKAGE DEAL" DURING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO PRESELECT CANDIDATES FOR "HONORS POSITIONS", SECRETARIAT (AT US URGING) IS INSISTING THAT CANDIDATES BE QUALIFIED AND NOT NOMINATED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF REGIONAL AFFILIATION. END SUMMARY.

2. CAPT AMEDUME, GHANA LABOR COMMISSIONER WHO IS SLATED TO BE LICHTH IIC PRESIDENT, TOLD US HE WANTS A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE AND WILL UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE REGIONAL GROUPS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND ON THE "HONORS POSITIONS." ON THE LATTER POINT HE CLOSED THE SECRETARIAT BRIEFING BY SAYING HE WANTS QUALIFIED PEOPLE TO SERVE AS COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN. HE SPELLED OUT OUR POSITION ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN DETAIL, ESPECIALLY OUR POSITION ON ARTICLE 17. WE FOCUSED ON OUR DETERMINATION TO HAVE THE SELECTION COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 1

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77 GENEVA 4272

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REFER THE ARTICLE 17 PROPOSAL TO THE STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE AND ON THE NEED TO HAVE THE ARTICLE 17 PROPOSAL DECIDED ON ITS MERITS. AMEDUME WONDERED WHETHER PROGRESS COULD BE MADE IN THE IIC STRUCTURE COMMITTEE ON ARTICLES VII AND XXXVI. WE TLD HIM BECAUSE EMOTIONS WERE RUNNING HIGH, NO CONSENSUS WAS LIKELY. THUS WE FAVORED INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS OF STRUCTURE LATE IN THE YEAR, IN THE LATER CONTEXT OF HOW TO IMPROVE THE FUNCTIONING OF THE GOVERNING BODY. AMEDUME'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. POSITION SHOULD BE HELPFUL DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH REGIONAL GROUPS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. WE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL EXCHANGE WITH THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR AND HIS SENIOR STAFF. HE TRIED AT FIRST TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS CALLED FOR OPPOSITION TO THE ARTICLE 17 PROPOSAL ALONG THE LINES OF THE TRIPOLI RESOLUTIONS. HOROWITZ TOLD HIM THAT IF THE IIC FOLLOWED THE TRIPOLI RESOLUTIONS "THE US WOULD BE DRIVEN OUT OF THE ILO. THE TRIPOLI RESOLUTIONS ARE A FORMULA FOR DISASTER." HOROWITZ REMINDD HIM THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAD AGREED IN CAIRO ON THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ARTICLE 17 PROPOSAL BUT WANTED

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PAGE 23 GENEVA 04272 21 OF 22 311916Z

FURTHER NEGOTIATION ON THE TEXT. THE AMBASSADOR THEN SUGGESTED POSTPONEMENT, WHICH HOROWITZ TURNED DOWN.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 2

CIF DANIEL T
7 GENEVA 4278

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AGI 01 GENEVA 24276 02 OF 02 311936Z
SECTION 10-14
INFO OCT-01 AF-12 ARA-06 EA-07 NEA-10 ISO-02 IOE-02
CIAE-00 COMF-00 EL-07 INR-07 LAB-04 NSAF-02
SIL-01 INR1-00 EUR-12 CIC-02 SP-02 L-23 SSO-02
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M USMISSION GENEVA
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INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
MEMBASSY CAIRO
MEMBASSY CAKEERRA
MEMBASSY ACCRA
MCONSUL MELBORNE
MEMBASSY MEXICO
MEMBASSY DOHA
MEMBASSY RIYAH
SUN NEW YORK 4946

O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 4278
O FOR ASST SFC MAYNES; LABOR FOR ILAB
. THE EGYPTIANS MADE IT CLEAR THEY WANTED TO REOPEN THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL'S FOLLOWUP TO THE 1974 RESOLUTION TO GET
POLITICAL MILEAGE. HOROWITZ POINTED OUT THIS WOULD UNDERCUT
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE ILO THE EGYPTIANS THEN INQUIRED
ABOUT OTHER AVENUES IN ILO TO PURSUE CONDITIONS IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IT WAS AGREED THE ILO SECRETARIAT
WOULD BE A BETTER SOURCE OF ADVICE.
. THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR SUMMED UP GOE AGREEMENT NO HTE
OBJECTIVE OF THE ART. 17 PROPOSAL AND SAID THERE WAS A NEED
FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION BETWEEN GOE AND THE US LEGATIONS.
HE ALSO SUGGESTED USDEL ADDRESS REGIONAL GROUPS (EGYPT
SAIRS THE G-77) AND PROMISED TO LOCK INTO IT.
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CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER ARABS HAD BEEN LESS FORTHCOMING. QATAR LABORER AL ANSARI WAS NOT WELL-INFORMED AND WAS GIVEN FULL BRIEFING ON US POSITION. THIS MAY BE HELPFUL BECAUSE AL ANSARI IS INFLUENTIAL IN ARAB CAUCUSIS. RUSSIAN OF KUWAIT LABOR MINISTRY UNDERSTANDS ILO AND US POSITION BUT DEFERS DECISIONS TO KUWAIT LABOR MINISTER WHO HAS NOT YET ARRIVED. WE ARE HOPEING TO ARRANGE PRODUCTIVE TALKS WITH THE SAUDIS. 7. THE BRAZILIANS HAVE SUGGESTED WE TALK TO LATIN GROUP AND WE PLAN A LUNCHEON OR JOINT APPROACH TO KEY COUNTRIES. IN SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MEXICAN MISSOFF LOBERA (WHO IS STILL WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS) WE HAVE ARGUED US WILL DISASSOCIATE ITSELF FROM A TRADEOFF ON ARTICLE 17 FOR AGREEMENT IN STRUCTURE COMMITTEE ON MODIFICATION IN METHOD OF ELECTING ILO DIRECTOR GENERAL (THIS MODIFICATION WAS AGREED TO WITH IMPLEMENTATION "AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME" BY THE ILC STRUCTURE COMMITTEE LAST

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE

MCIE DANIEL T
77 GENEVA 4278

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YEAR, AND IS BEING FILL IN ABEYANCE UNTIL OTHER STRUCTURE ISSUES ARE RESOLVED). LOBERA HAS OBVIOUSLY CIRCULATED HIS VIEWS AND WE HAVE REITERATED TO THE SECRETARIAT AND TO OTHER DELS THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT A LINKAGE BETWEEN ARTICLE 17 AND STRUCTURE. THE CHILIANS HAVE TOLD US LOBERA HAS REPORTED TO THEM AND OTHER LATIN THAT THE US HAD REJECTED HIS PROPOSAL, WHICH HE FIRST MADE TO HOROWITZ MAY 27 IN INFORMAL CONVERSATION.

8. IN IMEC (INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES) CONSULTATIONS, WE HAVE TACIT AGREEMENT TO TEST THE WATERS IN THE THIRD WORLD ON ARTICLE 17 BEFORE ATTEMPTING IN-DEPTH CONSULTATION OURSELVES, AND WE HAVE AGREED ON THE NEED TO FILL AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE FIVE SENSITIVE COMMITTEES (SELECTION, STANDING ORDERS, RESOLUTIONS, APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS, AND STRUCTURE) WITH WESTERN REPS. ACIMI (IRAN) HAS ASIAN GROUP SUPPORT FOR STRUCTURE BUT THERE IS ALSO LATIN AND AFRICAN INTEREST. (MAINWARING (CANADA) HAS AGREED TO STAND FOR STALLING ORDERS OR SELECTIONS. WE HOPE EUROPEANS WILL

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PAGE 23 GENEVA 4278 02 OF 02 311936Z

PROVIDE TWO GOOD CANDIDATES FOR TWO OF SENSITIVE COMMITTEES AND, THOUGH THE ODDS ARE NOT GOOD, WE ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE THE ASIANS TO NOMINATE COCK (AUSTRALIA) FOR SELECTIONS. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DISCUSSIONS WITH USDEL THE SECRETARIAT (DDG BOLIA AND LEGAL ADVISER WOLF) IS INSISTING THE REGIONAL GROUPS FOCUS ON NAMING QUALIFIED CANDIDATES AND NOT JUST REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES. THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO LAST YEAR'S PRE-CONFERENCE INFORMAL NEGOTIATIONS TO FILL THESE POSIS. SOREKSON

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OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 314136
ORIGIN SP-02

9353

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /004 R

DRAFTED BY S/P: R. BARTHOLOMEW: WES
APPROVED BY ARA: MR. SHLAUDEMANN
M: LSEAGLEBURGER
S/S-O: S. GOLDSMITH
S/PRS: MR. BROWN

-----310517Z 040724 /14.

O 310509Z DEC 76 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MEXICO NIACT IMMEDIATE

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DISSENT CHANNEL FOR [] FROM R. BARTHOLOMEW, S/P

B6

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: CASC, PFOR, MX

SUBJECT: PRESS STATEMENT ON MOTOR TRAVEL IN SINALOA
REF: MEXICO 16290

1. YOUR NIACT IMMEDIATE DISSENT MESSAGE SLUGGED FOR DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN HAS BEEN REFERRED TO S/P, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES. DEPARTMENT IS CONSIDERING IT ON HIGH PRIORITY BASIS.
ROBINSON

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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B6

September 30, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO : ARA/CCA -

FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake *TL*

SUBJECT: Dissent Channel Message

B6

This will acknowledge receipt of your dissent channel memorandum on decontrol and release of LOU and unclassified material. Cameron Hume of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. Copies of your memo have been distributed to the Secretary, the Executive Secretary and the Chairman of the Open Forum, as well as to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and the Legal Advisor. We commend your use of the dissent channel and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN FULL

October 1, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: EXIM Financing for Bongo's DC-8

John Lentz told me October 1 that Seaboard and Gabon were still interested in EXIM financing for the plane. He said EXIM would write our prohibitions on use of the aircraft or its parts into the loan agreement as events of default triggering requirement for immediate repayment of the entire loan. If the Gabonese accepted these conditions Lentz felt this would be strong insurance against misuse of the plane. If the Gabonese balked we might draw some conclusions about their intentions.

The terms would probably involve a 10% cash payment, 30% private financing at 3/4% over prime (12%), 30% private financing guaranteed by EXIM at 1-3/4% over prime, and 30% financed by EXIM at 8%. Payment would be in 14 semi-annual installments beginning in April 1975.

Lentz said EXIM should complete its consideration by mid-October.

BKH
L/AF - B. Keith Huffman

cc: AF/C - Mr. W. Cutler
AF - Mr. John W. Foley
AF/S - Mr. T. Cole

L/AF:BKHuffman:mmp

RELEASE IN PART
B6

ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 ES-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 ONY 03/007 344
10/17/76 046419

O 101424Z MAY 76
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7835

S/P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUCHAREST 2608

DISSENT CHANNEL

S/S-O

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EWT, ETRD, US, RO
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL

S/S-O

REF: A) BUCHAREST 2463; B) STATE 110871

2

DISSENT CHANNEL FOR S/P MICHAEL ELY ONLY.

1. PARA 1, STATE 110871 CORRECTLY STATES ORIGINAL MESSAGE NOT OF UNUSUAL SUBSTANTIVE SENSITIVITY. NONETHELESS CONSIDERABLE BUREAUCRATIC SENSITIVITY REQUIRES THAT WIDER DISTRIBUTION THAN THE ONE REQUESTED NOT TAKE PLACE. DRAFTING OFFICER HAD EXHAUSTED ALL LEVELS OF CONSULTATION WITHIN EMBASSY BEFORE TRANSMITTING BUCHAREST 2463. THEREFORE, DEPARTURE OF DELEGATION (LORIMER EB/EWT) MAY 8 FROM WASHINGTON AFTER DEPARTMENT'S RECEIPT OF MESSAGE, AND POSSIBLE FEEDBACK TO EMBASSY THAT DISSENT MESSAGE ON THIS SUBJECT RECEIVED, COULD HAVE CAUSED REPERCUSSIONS. TO AVOID THAT, DISSENT CHANNEL HANDLING INDICATOR FELT TO BE INSUFFICIENTLY RESTRICTIVE.

2. ORIGINALLY REQUESTED DISTRIBUTION BASED ON STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS: 1) SECRETARY, BECAUSE OF HIS HAND IN SETTING CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN MOTION (PARAS 3 AND 4, BUCHAREST 2463), 2) ACTING SECRETARY, ONLY BECAUSE OF SECRETARY'S PRESUMED ABSENCE DUE TO NAIROBI UNCTAD MEETING, AND 3) COUNSELOR, BECAUSE OF HIS SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN OUR RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET UNION.

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PAGE 02 BUCAR 02608 101552Z

3. DRAFTING OFFICER UNDERSTANDS NECESSITY OF STAFFING ORIGINAL MESSAGE IN S/P, THEREBY INCLUDING S/P IN DISTRIBUTION. HE DOES NOT RPT NOT CONCUR IN DISTRIBUTION BEYOND THOSE FOUR RECIPIENTS, SPECIFICALLY NOT RPT NOT TO BUREAUS (EUR OR EB) NOR OPEN FORUM PANEL CHAIRPERSON. PLEASE INFORM DRAFTING OFFICER IF SEVENTH FLOOR PAPER FLOW REQUIRES HANDLING BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. IN ADDITION, LIST OF PERSONS TO WHOM BUCHAREST 2463 WAS DISTRIBUTED, BESIDES THOSE LISTED US PARA 2 ABOVE, REQUESTED IMMEDIATELY.

4. CHARGE'S SIGNATURE ON BUCHAREST 2463 WAS NOT SOUGHT. ACTIVATION OF DISSENT CHANNEL BY DRAFTING OFFICER, BECAUSE OF HIS PAST EFFORTS WITHIN EMBASSY ON THIS SUBJECT AND IMMINENT ARRIVAL OF DELEGATION, COULD EASILY HAVE LED CHARGE TO ACCURATELY INTERPRET SITUATION.

5. NOTE. THIS TELEGRAM BEING TRANSMITTED WITHOUT INFORMING AMBASSADOR.

B6

S/S-O

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INCOMING
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IN PART B6

PAGE 01 BELGRA 08015 151842Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3537

1) PNIK

~~SECRET~~ BELGRADE 8015

DISSENT CHANNEL

2) MAC - for
Dissent files

FOR S/P PAUL KREISBERG FROM FROM

B6

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC PINS
SUBJ: US POLICY ON TERRORISM

cc sent PH
DS/L

REF: STATE 272264

VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR HANDLING OF MY CABLE ON TERRORISM,
PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT WORD "DISCRETIONARY" NOW BEING
USED. BUT AS AN S/P TRAINED WORDSMITH AND CURMUDGEON, I
PERSIST IN VIEW THAT MEANING OF DEPARTMENT'S INITIAL CABLE
("POSTS SHOULD ADVISE ALL PERSONNEL TO REFRAIN FROM USING
LUFTHANSA ...") WAS THAT WE SHOULD NOT USE LUFTHANSA. IT
WAS SO INTERPRETED BY OTHER, COMPETENT AUTHORITIES AT THIS
POST. WHATEVER, ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL.
EAGLEBURGER

SECRET

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B6

S/P:RFEINBERG:HME
8-21-78 X20822
S/P:JWALKER, ACTING

ARA/ECA:NBOUTON
HA:RCOHN

S/P-OF:GFOX

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES

DISSENT CHANNEL -- FOR [REDACTED] FROM S/P-WALKER,ACTG.

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, AR, MPOL, PINT

SUBJECT: DISSENT MESSAGE ON MASSERA VISIT

REF: BUENOS AIRES 6275

JW
RF
NB
GF
RC

B6

1. THANK YOU FOR SHARING YOUR VIEWS WITH US. I CAN ASSURE YOU THEY WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN REACHING THE DECISION {WHICH BY NOW YOU WILL HAVE LEARNED ABOUT THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS} NOT TO FORMALLY INVITE MASSERA TO WASHINGTON, BUT TO DELIVER THE "GOLDEN TURNDOWN" YOU ALTERNATIVELY RECOMMENDED TO AVOID OFFENDING MASSERA AND THE NAVY.

2. THIS COMPROMISE SOLUTION WAS FELT TO BE THE BEST WAY TO AVOID INTROJECTING THE US INTO PERSONALITY DISPUTES AMONG ARGENTINE LEADERS AT AN ESPECIALLY DELICATE MOMENT IN US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HOPE THAT MASSERA WILL BE REASONABLY PLEASED BY CNO HAYWARD'S OFFER TO RECEIVE HIM SHOULD MASSERA MAKE A PRIVATE VISIT TO THE US AS FORMERLY SCHEDULED.

3. WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE COMMON OPINION REFERRED TO IN THE DISSENT MESSAGE THAT THE US QUOTE TILTS UNQUOTE TOWARD THE ARMY'S VIDELA-VIOLA POWER CENTER. WE DO VIEW THE ARMY AS THE MOST IMPORTANT MILITARY SERVICE, AND THE VIDELA-VIOLA GROUP AS A POSSIBLY MODERATING FORCE WITHIN THE

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| 2

VIOLA GROUP AS A POSSIBLY MODERATING FORCE WITHIN THE ARMY. HOWEVER, OUR REPEATED REPRESENTATIONS AND RECENT DECISIONS ON EXIMBANK LOANS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT INDICATE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE STIFF POSITIONS AS THE SITUATION WARRANTS.

4. SHOULD MASSERA VISIT THE US AND SEE USG OFFICIALS, WE WILL BE CERTAIN TO EXPRESS STRONG APPROVAL FOR HIS MORE RECENT POSITIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

5. WE AGAIN COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND TRUST THAT THE ATTENTION GIVEN YOUR MESSAGE WILL ENCOURAGE YOU TO USE THE CHANNEL WHENEVER YOU FEEL IT IS NECESSARY.
VV

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B6

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S/P:MACASEY
6/22/77 2971b
S/P:PKREISBERG

S/P:NBOYER

S/P:AROMBERG

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE ROME.

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR; KS

SUBJECT: US SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS KOREA

REF: ROME 10207

FOR [] FROM KREISBERG, ACTING DIRECTOR S/P

THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL.

MESSAGE ON US SECURITY POLICY TOWARD KOREA. ALAN ROMBERG OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU FOR POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. 44.

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NEB
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Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 145829
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file dissent

DRAFTED BY S/P: GSAUSTIN: VB
APPROVED BY S/P: PKREISBERG
S/P-OPP: NABOYER (IN DRAFT)
NEA/ARN: MDRAPER (IN DRAFT)
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S/P ONLY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

SECRET STATE 145829

STADIS////////////////////
DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: GOS

TAGS: PFOR, XF

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SYRIA, ISRAEL AND
LEBANON: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

REF: DAMASCUS 1482; STATE 54187

FOR [] FROM PAUL KREISBERG, ACTING DIRECTOR, S/P

B6

1. I'M SORRY THAT SO MUCH TIME HAS ELAPSED SINCE OUR INTERIM RESPONSE TO YOUR DISSENT. YOUR MESSAGE HAS RECEIVED ATTENTION IN NEA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE DEPARTMENT.

2. OUR THINKING HAS BEEN SIMILAR TO YOURS IN MANY WAYS. AS YOU ARE PROBABLY AWARE, WE EXERTED MAJOR EFFORTS IN NOVEMBER OF 1976, AS WELL AS IN LATE JANUARY AND EARLY FEBRUARY, TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS THAT IT WAS IN THEIR INTEREST TO ALLOW A LIMITED MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN ADF FORCES INTO SOUTH LEBANON TO CONTAIN THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE THERE AND TO ESTABLISH THE AUTHORITY OF THE SARKIS GOVERNMENT.

3. WE TRIED OUT ON THE ISRAELIS A VARIETY OF FORMULAS SIMILAR TO YOUR PROPOSALS. LIKE YOU, WE HAD SOME HOPES

THAT THE TACIT ISRAELI-SYRIAN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT SYRIA'S MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON WOULD REMAIN. BUT WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE IN OCTOBER 1976 AND AS SYRIAN MILITARY PRESSURES UPON THE PALESTINIANS BEGAN TO EASE AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE ISRAELIS APPARENTLY DECIDED THEY COULD NOT TOLERATE A SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE BEYOND THE LITANI RIVER.

4. AT AN EARLIER STAGE IN THE CONFLICT, ISRAELI LEADERS, SUCH AS PEREZ, HAD CONDITIONED THE ISRAELI PUBLIC TO ACCEPT A LIMITED SYRIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON. THEY DID NOT DO SO AFTER OCTOBER 1976, AND PARTLY AS A RESULT, ISRAELI PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE SOUTHWARD MOVE OF SYRIAN FORCES GREW. ISRAELIS ALSO FEARED, AND WANTED TO FRUSTRATE MOVES THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS IMPLEMENTING THE SO-CALLED "GREATER SYRIA" CONCEPT.

5. WE APPRECIATED HEARING YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS DIFFICULT QUESTION. THANK YOU FOR USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL. CHRISTOPHER

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INCOMING
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cc: [handwritten]
cc
ARA
USIA
MODE
w/mo

PAGE 01 SANTIAGO 05308 281512Z
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RELEASE
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FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO USIA WASHDC
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5423

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SANTIAGO 5308

USIAC FROM PAO

STATE FOR KREISBERG, POLICY PLANNING STAFF

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES

REF: A) STATE 144252, B) SANTIAGO 5150

1. WILL CAPTION FUTURE MESSAGES THIS SUBJECT MODE.
2. HOWEVER, BELIEVE, CONTRARY TO REFTELS, THAT THIS IS NOT STRICTLY A MANAGEMENT MATTER. NOR DO I AGREE WITH IMPLICATION THAT ORIGINAL MESSAGE WAS NOT PROPER SUBJECT FOR DISSENT.
3. BELIEVE DISSENT WAS BASED ON POLICY MATTERS AND IN AGREEMENT WITH DIRECTIVES SETTING FORTH CRITERIA FOR DISSENT.



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file [redacted] *12/13/76*

B6

S/P:MECELY:BDM
EXT. 22562 4-22-77
S/P:PKREISBERG

ARA/PPC - MR. EINAUDI
AID/LA/CAR - MR. WHEELER
S/P-OF - MR. BOYER

ARA/CAR - MR. HEAVNER

S/P ONLY

PRIORITY BRIDGETOWN

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, XL

SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

REF: BRIDGETOWN 2452

FOR [redacted] FROM TONY LAKE - S/P

PK
MECE
MR. E.
MR. H.
MR. W.
NAB

B6

1. THE TIMING OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE WAS FORTUITOUS. IT PRECEDED THE INITIATION OF PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM NO. 17 ON JANUARY 26, THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR WHICH INTER ALIA DIRECTED A REVIEW OF US POLICY IN THE CARIBBEAN.

2. THE ANALYSIS PREPARED FOR THE AREA SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED THE MAIN LINES OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION -- I.E., FOR GREATER BILATERAL ATTENTION TO AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE MICROSTATES -- AS A POLICY OPTION. IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT YOUR ANALYSIS OF PROSPECTIVE CUBAN ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA WAS CORRECT AS WAS LATER REFLECTED IN THE PRM.

3. THE ISSUE IS NOW UNDER FURTHER CONSIDERATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE REVIEW OF THE BRIDGETOWN PARM, FOR WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN TASKED TO COME FORWARD WITH RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE SHAPE AND CONTEXT OF A POSSIBLE BILATERAL PROGRAM. THIS MAY BE THE STICKING POINT.

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12

EVEN IF THE ANALYSIS IN YOUR TELEGRAM IS COMPLETELY CORRECT, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DESIGN AN AID PROGRAM WHICH WOULD OFFSET CUBAN INFLUENCE.

4. AS YOU KNOW, ANY SUCH PROGRAM WOULD HAVE TO MEET AID CRITERIA, WHICH ARE MORE THAN EVER OVERSEEN BY THE CONGRESS AND HAVE LESS THAN EVER FLEXIBILITY. BUDGETARY SUPPORT IS VIRTUALLY EXCLUDED, AND WOULD, IN ANY EVENT, TEND TO LEAN TOWARD A CLIENT STATE RELATIONSHIP WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE UNSUSTAINABLE IN THE LONGER RUN.

5. A FURTHER ELEMENT WILL BE THE VIEWS OF THE NEW AMBASSADOR. ASSUMING THAT HE WILL BE NAMED SOON, IT WILL TAKE HIM SOME TIME TO GET DEEPLY INTO THE BILATERAL VS. MULTILATERAL ISSUE. BETWEEN THE PRM, THE PARM AND THE AMBASSADOR, A VERY THOROUGH POLICY REVIEW WILL PROBABLY BE COMPLETED AROUND MID-JUNE, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT ALL POLICY OPTIONS REMAIN OPEN, INCLUDING THE ONE YOU HAVE PERSUASIVELY PUT FORWARD.

6. YOU ARE TO BE COMMENDED FOR USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL. I REGRET THE DELAY IN RESPONDING TO YOUR MESSAGE. 44

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

*Forwarded by Registered
mail*

RELEASE IN PART
B6

October 20, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DISSENT CHANNEL

[Redacted]

American Embassy
Ottawa, Canada

Dear [Redacted]

B6

B6

Thank you for your especially thoughtful and well-developed dissent message regarding possible measures which the State Department might consider to deal more effectively with international energy problems. Distribution of your message was made as you requested and responses were received from several senior officers. I have incorporated these into this letter.

There is full accord within the Department on your basic premise -- the need for greater Department competence in energy matters -- and that additional training opportunities should be created in the energy area. FSI has in fact moved in this direction. To provide mid-level officers with a basis to deal with energy related issues, the mid-level program which started in August (and may eventually be required of all officers at the 0-3 and tenured 0-4 levels) provides a general grounding in international energy issues. A more specialized follow-on course of about five weeks is offered to officers in all cones on an elective basis. This will deal with energy in its national security, economic, and technological dimensions. The Department now sends a number of officers to short courses in the energy field provided by various Government agencies, and as you know, also has an academic-year program for training officers at universities on energy matters. In addition, FSI has arranged short term cooperative programs in the private sector.

We have major reservations concerning your suggestions for institutional changes. The Secretary has expressed his skepticism about the desirability of such positions as the

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-2-

Special Ambassador for the Energy Negotiations that you propose. He prefers cleaner, more streamlined lines of authority. Multilateral and, particularly, bilateral negotiations related to energy usually involve a variety of other related economic and political issues that must be taken into consideration. The current practice of assembling a team of negotiators, containing needed technical backgrounds and headed by an appropriate policy-level official from the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) or the country Ambassador, seems to be working well. Recent examples include natural gas negotiations with Algeria and Mexico in which the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs headed delegations to both countries.

Similarly, energy is so entwined with other economic issues such as recycling of funds, trade in other commodities, and development, that it makes more sense to continue the current practice of vesting energy responsibilities in EB than establishing a new bureau. Both the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and the Assistant Secretary for EB are strongly interested in energy questions and plan to devote considerable attention to them. The Assistant Secretary has already established an interdepartmental group (IG) to address key international energy issues, including a thorough review of the IEA mechanism. State's chairing of this group will help assure leadership on international energy questions.

There are strong arguments that militate against the establishment of new specialized core of "energy attaches." There are currently at most some twenty positions worldwide that might be filled by such specialists, hardly enough around which to build a career. Also, the experience with labor and resource attache programs has not been an unqualified success. There is some evidence that such specializations impede the promotion of officers to the senior levels, and therefore good officers who might be well suited for such jobs tend to avoid them. Our own feeling is that it is better to give economic and political officers a firm grounding in energy issues, and help those who so desire to develop special expertise and hold several energy-related positions during their careers.

In sum, then, we agree with your underlying concerns and are moving to implement a training program along the lines of the one you recommended. Your message has been very helpful in supporting the need for additional training.

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
-3-

If you have further suggestions on training, I suggest you pass these on to the Director of FSI. The divergence in views on management issues reflects a difference in philosophy as to how to get the job best done. Although your proposals are not likely to be implemented, they have received consideration at high levels of the Department and served to focus attention on the issue. This is perhaps the most important mission of the Dissent Channel and we are grateful to you for using it in this constructive manner. I apologize for our delay in sending this reply and appreciate your understanding and patience.

Sincerely,

Paul Wolfowitz

Paul Wolfowitz
Director
Policy Planning Staff



It has taken us nine months to get our own energy expert for the Policy Planning Staff approved by the personnel bureaucracy. He arrives next month -- I hope. That's a measure of both my own conviction about the importance of the issue you have raised and my sympathy with you for the long delay in their reply to your thoughtful message.

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Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART B6

PAGE 01 STATE 272264
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APPROVED BY S/P: PKRESIBERG
D-DLAMB
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M-BREAD
CE-RBARKLEY
M/CT-JKARKASHIAN
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DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: (A) STATE 266580; (B) BELGRADE 7777; (C) STATE 269660

FOR [] FROM S/P-KREISBERG, ACTING

1. YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE INTERPRETS REPTEL (A) AS AN INSTRUCTION TO ALL PERSONNEL TO REFRAIN FROM USING LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS. IN FACT, WHILE THE USE OF THE WORD QUOTE ADVISE UNQUOTE MAY HAVE BEEN AMBIGUOUS IN THAT CONTEXT, THE SENSE OF THAT MESSAGE WAS THAT POSTS SHOULD CAUTION PERSONNEL ABOUT THE DANGERS INVOLVED NOT THAT US PERSONNEL WERE BEING PLACED UNDER MANDATORY INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO FLY LUFTHANSA.

2. OUR LATER ACTION AMPLIFYING ON DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF SUCH TRAVEL WAS DISCUSSED WITH TOP OFFICIALS OF THE FRG IN BOTH BONN AND WASHINGTON AND, IN FACT, REF (C) LED WITH FRG ADVISORY STATEMENT ITSELF.

3. COPIES OF YOUR MESSAGE AND MY REPLY HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS TO THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SECURITY AND THE DIRECTOR FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM.

4. I AM PLEASED THAT YOU RAISED THIS QUESTION THROUGH THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND HOPE YOU FIND THIS CLARIFICATION SATISFACTORY. VANCE

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IN PART
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INCOMING
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S/P File

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1054

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SANTIAGO 8390

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ELAB CI

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE; RECOMMENDED USG REACTION TO GOC
ANNOUNCEMENT OF TRADE UNION ELECTIONS OCTOBER 31

REF: SANTIAGO 8355

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [REDACTED] LABOR ATTACHE. THE AUTHOR DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION BUT WISHES TO ENSURE THAT S/IL, DOL AND ARA/MRSD/L RECEIVE COPIES. THE RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS TIME SENSITIVE.
2. THE GOC ANNOUNCED THAT TRADE UNION ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31 BUT HAS SO CIRCUMSCRIBED THE PROCEDURES AND RESTRICTED THE ABILITY OF PERSONS TO PARTICIPATE THAT IT CONSTITUTES A TRAVESTY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. IN ADDITION, AS ALL TRADE UNIONS VOTING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR ARE EFFECTIVELY DISSOLVED ON TUESDAY AND RE-ESTABLISHED AS EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS ON WEDNESDAY, MANAGEMENT AS WELL AS LABOR WILL BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN DEFINING UNIONS' GOALS IN FUTURE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS. THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS MAKE IT A CRIME REPEAT A CRIME TO CAMPAIGN FOR UNION OFFICE AND DISQUALIFIES ALL INCUMBENT UNION LEADERS AND ANY PERSON HAVING ENGAGED IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY EVEN PRIOR TO THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, WHEN SUCH ACTIVITY WAS PERMITTED AND ENCOURAGED.
3. THE NEW LAW ALSO ELIMINATES THE FINANCING OF NATIONAL CONFEDERATIONS FORBIDDING CHECKOFFS TO EITHER THE CONFEDERATION OF PRIVATE EMPLOYEES (CEPCH) OR THE ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES (ANEP) THEREBY GUARANTEEING THE EVENTUAL DEMISE OF THE TWO LARGEST TRADE UNION CONFEDERATIONS IN CHILE.
4. THE USG SHOULD NOT STAND SILENTLY ON THE SIDELINES WHILE UNDER THE GUISE OF HOLDING DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNIONISM IS BEING TRAMPLED IN CHILE. THE USG HAS STATED THAT IT WILL MAKE STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WHEN THERE IS A CLEAR STEP BACKWARDS BY A COUNTRY IN ITS RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. THE GOC LIMITATIONS ON THE OCTOBER 31 TRADE UNION ELECTORAL PROCESS IS SUCH A STEP.
5. THE AUTHOR BELIEVES THAT IT IS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES TO CALL TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOC TODAY OCTOBER 30 THAT THE RESTRICTIVE REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE OCTOBER 31 ELECTIONS DEBILITATE TRADE UNION INSTITUTIONS AND SO DISTORT DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES AS TO MAKE THE ELECTION A MOCKERY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.
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PAGE 01 STATE 146980
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APPROVED BY S/P: PKREISBERG
S/P: NBOYER
S/P: AROMBERG
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R 232316Z JUN 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ROME

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 146980

DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, KS

SUBJECT: US SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS KOREA

REF: ROME 10207

FOR [] FROM KREISBERG, ACTING DIRECTOR S/P

B6

THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL

MESSAGE ON US SECURITY POLICY TOWARD KOREA. ALAN ROMBERG OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGES YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU FOR POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. CHRISTOPHER

RMM
M. W. C.
[Signature]

RELEASE IN PART
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/P:MELY:HE
X-22562 5/12/76
S/P:RBARTHOLOMEW, ACTING

S/P - MR. LYDON
EUR/EE - MR. ANDREWS {SUBS}

C - MR. MONTGOMERY {SUBS}

IMMEDIATE BUCHAREST..

DISSENT CHANNEL
DELIVER ONLY TO GSO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EEQT, ETRD, US, RO

SUBJECT: US-ROMANIAN LONG-TERM COOPERATION AGREEMENT

REF: BUCHAREST 2608 AND 2463 {DISSENT CHANNEL}

RB
ME
PL
JM
NA
[Handwritten initials]

B6

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE DRAFTED IN S/P REFLECTS CONSULTATION WITH EUR BUREAU AND COUNSELOR'S OFFICE. WE WERE UNABLE TO DEAL WITH YOUR DISSENT WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH EUR AND THEREFORE SHOWED BUCHAREST 2463 TO NICHOLAS ANDREWS, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, EARLY IN THE PROCESS OF SEEKING CLEARANCE FOR THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS OUTGOING MESSAGE. ~~AFTER CONSULTING EUR DEPASSTSEC~~
AFTER CONSULTING EUR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARMITAGE, MR. ANDREWS DID NOT KEEP A COPY OF YOUR DISSENT, NOR WILL HE OR ARMITAGE FURTHER DISCUSS THE FACT OF IT BEING SENT OR WHO SENT IT WITHIN THE BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. WE DISCUSSED IN GENERAL TERMS THE POINTS RAISED IN YOUR DISSENT WITH MR. LORIMER OF EB BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, WITHOUT INDICATING TO HIM THAT YOU OR A DISSENT CABLE WERE THE SOURCE OF THE POINTS. LIST OF PERSONS YOU REQUESTED IN LAST SENTENCE OF PARA THREE OF YOUR SECOND MESSAGE THUS CONSISTS OF DEPARTMENT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OPEN FORUM CHAIRPERSON, AND DIRECTOR OF OFFICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM DS 322A-OCRJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 2

EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS {ANDREWS}. ALL ARE ALERT TO YOUR CONCERNS RE BUREAUCRATIC SENSITIVITIES YOU ALLUDED TO, AND WILL NOT TAKE ANY ACTION DAMAGING TO YOU OR TO PRINCIPLE OF DISSENT.

2. YOU RAISED USEFUL POINTS IN YOUR MESSAGE, BUT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THEM FULLY PRIOR TO MISSION'S MAY 8 DEPARTURE. ARGUMENTATION IN YOUR MESSAGE WAS NOT, IN ITSELF, SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION TO DELAY MISSION'S DEPARTURE WITH RESULTANT PUZZLING SIGNALS TO GOR.

3. ~~THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEGOTIATING MISSION MAY BE SOMEWHAT LESS URGENT THAN YOU ASSUMED IN YOUR MESSAGE. THE US NEGOTIATORS ARE UNDER NO SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCOMMODATE THE GOR IN ORDER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. IF IS TRUE THAT DURING HIS LATE JUNE VISIT TREASURY SECRETARY SIMON WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT FOR HIS SIGNATURE, BUT THIS IS NOT OVERRIDING.~~

4. YOUR SUGGESTIONS RE ACCESS TO ROMANIANS AND ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL DATA ARE WELL TAKEN. THE QUESTION IS: ARE THEY NEGOTIABLE SINCE THEY GO TO THE FABRIC OF ROMANIAN SOCIETY AND ARE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE FOR THE PRESENT REGIME? FROM THE DEPARTMENT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE THE FEASIBILITY OF INTRODUCING THESE ISSUES. AN EMBASSY VIEWPOINT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE, BUT BEFORE TASKING THE EMBASSY TO COMMENT ON THE ANGLES YOU RAISED, WE WOULD WANT YOUR CONCURRENCE AS A DISSENTER.

5. ~~IF YOU DO CONCUR WE WOULD ANTICIPATE ASKING FOR EMBASSY VIEWS ON THE FEASIBILITY OF INTRODUCING THE INFORMATION AND ACCESS ISSUES, BOTH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF {1} OBTAINING CONCRETE CONCESSIONS FROM THE ROMANIAN SIDE, OR {2} AS A FALLBACK, GETTING LANGUAGE WHICH, WHILE NOT IN ITSELF SUFFICIENT TO GUARANTEE FORWARD MOVEMENT, COULD BE USED ON THE GOR AS CASES ARISE.~~

6. REQUEST, AND ON THE MERITS OF THE POINTS YOU RAISE, URGE YOUR CONCURRENCE TO ASK AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST FOR SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ON YOUR ORIGINAL DISSENT MESSAGE. YOU HAVE RAISED SOME VERY INTERESTING SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS AND YOU ARE TO BE COMMENDED WHETHER OR NOT THE EVENTUAL RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS ALTERED.

7. ~~IN THIS CONNECTION, LET US TRY TO CLEAR UP AN AMBIGUITY WHICH HAS PERSISTED IN THE THREE MESSAGES EXCHANGED SO FAR ON THIS SUBJECT. IT IS OUR NORMAL PRESUMPTION THAT DISSENT MESSAGES HAVE BEEN READ BY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM DS 322A(OCR)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13

THE AMBASSADOR/CHARGE BEFORE TRANSMISSION AS PART OF THEIR PEROGATIVE AS HEAD OF THE COUNTRY TEAM TO READ ALL OUTGOING MESSAGES. IN CASE OF DISSENT, HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT CLEARING OFFICERS NOR CAN THEY OBSTRUCT TRANSMISSION. UNDER DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS, DISSENT IS A RIGHT NOT TO BE DENIED OR DISCOURAGED BY SUPERVISORS. TO BE EFFECTIVE AND FIRMLY INSTITUTIONALIZED, HOWEVER, THE DISSENT CHANNEL CANNOT RESEMBLE A CLANDESTINE OPERATION. YY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

DIVISION OF LANGUAGE
SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

1974 SEP 11 AM 10 45

LS NO. 43677

WD/JRP

French

Libreville --5006014--
September 7, 1974--16:25

To the personal attention of
Ambassador Mavoungou
Washington, D.C.

You are requested to transmit the following message as soon as possible to Secretary of State Kissinger:

Quote.

From President Bongo to the personal attention of Secretary Henry A. Kissinger, Washington.

I have the honor to confirm the utmost importance of the special mission dispatched to Your Excellency to learn your decision regarding the procurement of DC8-63 aircraft for my personal use. You are urgently requested to receive my personal representatives, Mr. Bru, Mr. Pigot, and Mr. Richon, who are presently in Washington awaiting an appointment with you. I officially renew the guarantees given in note verbale of June 28, 1974 and on the occasion of the special mission's first visit concerning the utilization of the aircraft for my personal use and, in addition, for commercial services on the routes of carriers Air Afrique and UTA, under IATA regulations. This would exclude all countries under sanction by the U.N., of which Gabon is a member and whose decisions have Gabon's full support and approval. The Organization of African Unity and African Chiefs of State have been

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OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART
B6

PAGE 01 STATE 235393
ORIGIN SP-02

2445 STATE 235393

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THAT THE GOC DOES NOT REQUIRE VISAS PRIOR TO ISSUING EXIT PERMITS.

DRAFTED BY S/P: EDDONHILL:GTM
APPROVED BY S/P: ALAKE
ARA/CCA: RBRIABRANT
CA/VO: VDEVLIH
L/ARA: FARMSTRONG (SUBSTANCE)
S/R: PCHICOLA (SUBSTANCE)
S/P: PHKREISBERG

6. I CONMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. VANCE

R 071950Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ASUHCION

-----081401 081553Z /42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 235393

DISSENT CHANNEL TO [] FROM LAKE

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SHUN, CU

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL CABLE OF AUGUST 7 - DAVID HENDERSON

REFS : (A) ASUHCION 3645 (B) STATE 204273

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL CABLE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA. WE SENT COPIES OF YOUR CABLE TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN THE BUREAU OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, THE LEGAL ADVISER, AND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN THE BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, PER YOUR REQUEST AND, IN KEEPING WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S REGULATIONS ON DISSENT MESSAGES, THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE CUBA DESK, AND THE AIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM PANEL.

2. SO FAR, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO HANDLE THE FLOW OF RELEASED POLITICAL PRISONERS COMING TO THE US THROUGH AIRCRAFT CHARTERED BY THE CUBAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY. THUS, THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS TO THE US HAS NOT BEEN A SIGNIFICANT BOTTLENECK. IN ANY EVENT, THE RESTORATION OF DIRECT COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL NORMALIZATION PROCESS, AND GIVEN THE NATURE OF OUR CURRENT RELATIONSHIP THE USG IS NOT NOW PREPARED TO TAKE THIS STEP.

3. USINT AND THE DEPARTMENT ARE CONTINUING TO EXAMINE WAYS TO ADMIT RELEASED POLITICAL PRISONERS INTO THE US MORE RAPIDLY. IN PARA 4 OF REFTEL B WE OUTLINED STEPS TAKEN IN THIS REGARD. SINCE OUR LAST MESSAGE, THREE MORE INS OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN SENT TO HAVANNA TO AUGMENT INS TEAM. WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF VISAS AND ANTICIPATE THIS WILL AT LEAST TRIPLE THE NUMBER OF VISAS ISSUED THIS MONTH. WE ARE CONTINUING TO EXAMINE WAYS TO MAKE PROCEDURAL IMPROVEMENTS SUCH AS CONDUCTING LESS DETAILED INTERVIEWS.

4. I AND CCA ARE COORDINATING WORK ON THE QUESTION OF THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE MOU AS AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION AND WILL BE COMPLETING THIS SOON. WE WILL ADVISE YOU OF THE OUTCOME.

5. USINT HAVANNA HAS REQUIRED EXIT PERMITS BEFORE ISSUING IMMIGRANT VISAS PRIMARILY TO INSURE THAT, WITH THE FLOOD OF APPLICANTS AND LIMITED CONSULAR PERSONNEL, THE ONES WHO GO THROUGH THE PROCESS AND RECEIVE VISAS CAN IN FACT LEAVE THE COUNTRY. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART B6

PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 054339
ORIGIN SP-02

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APPROVED BY S/P: RJHARRINGTON
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STADIS////////////////////
DISSENT CHANNEL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM LAKE - S/SP

FOL REPEAT DAMASCUS 146Z ACTION SECSTATE 010 5 MAR.

QUOTE

SECRET DAMASCUS 146Z

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: SYRIA, ISRAEL AND LEBANON:
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A DISSENT CHANNEL VIEWPOINT OF [] POLITICAL OFFICER. THE DRAFTER DOES NOT WISH TO RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MESSAGE, AND SUGGESTS THAT DISTRIBUTION INCLUDE NEA, NEA/ARN, INR, EMBASSY DAMASCUS AND EMBASSY BEIRUT.

2. PARTIAL CONVERGENCE OF SYRO-ISRAELI INTERESTS OPERATIVE IN LEBANON FOR APPROXIMATELY PAST YEAR HAS BEGUN TO SHOW SIGNS OF SERIOUS SLIPPAGE. PRIOR TO RECENT HABATIYAH AFFAIR INCREMENTAL INSERTIONS OF SYRIAN TROOPS INTO LEBANON AND THEIR SHIFTS AROUND COUNTRY WERE TOLERATED BY ISRAELIS -- SUBSEQUENT TO VIGOROUS EXCHANGES AMONG PARTIES FACILITATED BY U.S. AND JORDANIAN GOOD OFFICES -- AND REFLECTED UNDERLYING COMMON INTERESTS OF BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA IN FORESTALLING ESTABLISHMENT OF WHAT THEY VIEWED AS RADICAL, PALESTINIAN-DOMINATED REGIME IN LEBANON. ISRAELI UNWILLINGNESS TO TOLERATE SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT TO NABATIYAH SIGNALLED WARNING OF SYRO-ISRAELI CONVERGENCE AND ENTRANCE INTO NEW PHASE OF LEBANESE CRISIS IN WHICH SYRIAN AND ISRAELI ACTIONS POTENTIALLY GOVERNED BY DIVERGENCE OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

3. SYRO-ISRAELI DISHARMONY IN SOUTH LEBANON APPEARS TO HAVE INITIALLY CAUGHT DAMASCUS BY SURPRISE. WHETHER OR NOT BOTH SIDES CONSCIOUSLY REALIZED FULL IMPORT OF RELATIONSHIP OF PARTIAL MUTUALITY WHICH HAD DEVELOPED SINCE EARLY 1976, SYRIANS HAD BECOME RELATIVELY ACCUSTOMED TO GENERAL PATTERN OF ACTIVITY IN LEBANON WHICH MAINTAINED SOME PREDICTABILITY: STIMULUS (INCREMENT OR SHIFT OF SYRIAN GROUND FORCES IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING CONDITIONS AMONG LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS), CRISIS (ISRAELIS, SYRIANS AND LEBANESE COMMUNICATED WITH EACH OTHER OFTEN THROUGH U.S. AND JORDANIAN GOOD OFFICES TO APPLY EXISTING TACIT GROUND RULES TO NEW SITUATION), AND PERCEPTION (GENERAL ISRAELI ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT MOST RECENT STIMULUS DID NOT UNDULY THREATEN THEIR UNDERLYING INTERESTS AND AIMED AT RESTRICTING LEBANESE LEFTIST-PALESTINIAN COALITION). ATTAINMENT OF SUCCESSIVE PLATEAUS OF UNDERSTANDING REACHED OUTER LIMIT OF THIS INFORMAL AND MAKE-SHIFT PROCESS WHEN SYRIAN FORCES BELONGING TO ADF ENTERED NABATIYAH.

4. SYRO-ISRAELI DIVERGENCE IN NABATIYAH AFFAIR AND RESULTING DISORDER IN SOUTH HAVE YEXED ASAD REGIME AND OTHER OBSERVERS AS WELL. FROM DAMASCUS VANTAGE POINT, EXPLANATION OF RECENT DIFFICULTIES CAN BE SUMMARIZED RATHER BRIEFLY: SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS COOPERATED IN LEBANON, BUT ISRAELIS WERE UNWILLING TO COOPERATE TO ASSIST SYRIA TO IMPLEMENT POST-ARAB SUMMIT GOAL OF EXTENDING SARHIS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY INTO SOUTH LEBANON, WHERE ISRAELIS PERCEIVE PRESENCE OF SYRIAN ADF TROOPS AT NABATIYAH AND BEYOND AS THREAT TO THEIR NORTHERN BORDERS, A THREAT MAGNIFIED BY ISRAELI ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

5. I BELIEVE THIS ALTERED STATE OF AFFAIRS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT OUR GREATER REGIONAL INTERESTS IN SEVERAL WAYS, MOST DIRECTLY BY UNDERMINING SYRIA'S WILLINGNESS TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN BRINGING PALESTINIANS INTO SETTLEMENT PROCESS ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES AND TO EXPLORE WITH SOME CONFIDENCE FURTHER ACCOMMODATION TO ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE IN REGION. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROCESS WHICH SECRETARY KISSINGER HELPED NURTURE FOLLOWING OCTOBER 1973 WAR AND WHICH SEEMED TO STALL WITH SIGNING OF 1975 SINAI ACCORD PICKED UP SOME MOMENTUM IN MUTATED FORM ON SYRO-ISRAELI FRONT BEGINNING IN 1976 ALONG LINES SUMMARIZED ABOVE PARA 3. IN UNPLANNED AND UNEXPECTED MANNER, SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS IN MOST OF EXTREME VIOLENCE AND MOUNTING PRESSURES GROPED TOWARD REGIONAL ACCOMMODATION IN LEVANT. ACCUSTOMED BY YEARS OF STERILE POLITICAL DEBATING AND INTERMITTENT WARFARE TO REGARD EACH OTHER WITH SUSPICION AND HOSTILITY, THEY SUDDENTLY FOUND THEMSELVES CONFRONTED BY COMMON DANGER, THE THREAT OF A RADICAL STATE ON THEIR BORDERS. DESPITE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED FOREBODDINGS, ISRAEL ULTIMATELY PERMITTED ABOUT 30,000 SYRIAN TROOPS TO ENTER LEBANON. AND DESPITE FEARS THAT ISRAELIS MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR MILITARY WEAKNESS ON GOLAN, ASAD WHEN HE DETERMINED IT WAS NECESSARY DEPLETED HIS GOLAN FRONT OF SOME MECHANIZED, INFANTRY AND MISSILE BRIGADES TO MEET WHAT HE PERCEIVED AS GREATER THREATS IN LEBANON AND ON IRAQI BORDER. WHILE BOTH PARTIES RECEIVED OUR INPUT BEFORE THEY REACHED THEIR DECISIONS, AT EACH CRISIS POINT THEY ULTIMATELY RISKED RELYING UPON THEIR OWN PERCEPTIONS OF MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST TO EVOLVE A STRATEGY THAT SUCCEEDED.

6. SYRO-ISRAELI CONVERGENCE IN LEBANON CONTAINED POTENTIAL FOR SPILLING OVER INTO OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AN OVERALL REGIONAL SETTLEMENT. FIRST, IT GENERATED MOMENTUM AND PROMISED TO SOFTEN THE HARSH EDGE OF GENERALLY HOSTILE MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS. SECOND, IT RAISED PROSPECT THAT IN FUTURE STAGES OF NEGOTIATIONS WHEN PALESTINIAN ISSUE WOULD BE DELIBERATED, ISRAELIS COULD AGAIN FIND CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THEIR INTERESTS AND INTERESTS OF SARH IN WORKING OUT ACCEPTABLE MANNER FOR PARTIES TO DEAL WITH PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND IN PREVENTING EMERGENCE OF RADICAL PALESTINIAN STATE ON WEST BANK. THEIR GROPPING FOR A GEOGRAPHICAL ACCOMMODATION OF INTERESTS, PERHAPS SIGNIFICANTLY, SEEMED TO ADD NEW DIMENSION TO CURRENT FORMULATIONS OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF PEACE. WHEREBY ISRAELIS SEEKING RELATIVELY SELF-ENFORCING ACCORD THROUGH OPEN ACCESS TO NEIGHBORING SOCIETIES WHILE SYRIANS FOR THEIR PART DISPLAY VERBAL PREFERENCE FOR MORE STATIC ARRANGEMENT COMPRISING SIGNING OF TREATY ENDING STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, AGREEMENT ON DEMILITARIZATION AND STATIONING OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES BUT PERHAPS LITTLE ELSE. CONVERGENCE SUGGESTED THAT BOTH PARTIES HAD DISCOVERED SOME COMMON GROUND TO CONTAIN PERHAPS INHERENT VOLATILITY OF THIS REGION. TO SOME EXTENT, THEY WERE EVOLVING TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY HAD THEY BEEN AT PEACE, FOR

B6

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PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 054339

EVEN A PEACE BASED UPON THE ISRAELI MODEL WOULD NOT HAVE GUARANTEED A COOPERATIVE RESPONSE TO INTER-ARAB CONFLICT IN THE LEVANT AND ELSEWHERE IN THE ABSENCE OF PEACE HINDERED CONVERGENCE TO EXTENT THAT COOPERATION IN LEBANON OF NECESSITY WAS IMPLICIT AND EXHIBITED RELIANCE UPON INTERMEDIARIES FOR EXCHANGING COMMUNICATIONS.

7. CURRENT SIGNS OF DIVERGENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON THREATEN TO DISRUPT PROGRESS ALREADY ACHIEVED AND COULD LEAD TO REGIONAL CONFLICT. WHAT IS DISTURBING, HOWEVER, IS THAT INITIAL SUCCESS OF ISRAELIS AND SOME ARABS TO COME SO VERY CLOSE TO WORKING OUT THEIR OWN REGIONAL PROBLEMS WITHOUT RESORTING TO BY NOW FAMILIAR FALLBACK TACTIC INTERPOSING SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF UN FORCES BETWEEN DISPUTANTS MAY BE PERMITTED TO DISSIPATE, LEAVING SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO SEEK FURTHER AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST WITH ISRAEL AND U.S. TO POSSIBLY WANE AS WELL.

8. WILLINGNESS OF THE DEPARTMENT TO MAINTAIN OPEN MIND ABOUT INSERTION OF UN TROOPS INTO SOUTH LEBANON IS EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE WILL TO TAKE SOME RISKS TO RESOLVE SOUTH LEBANON ISSUE, BUT AS NOTED ABOVE PARA. I HAVE DOUBTS THIS IS MOST PROPER INVESTMENT OF OUR POLITICAL CAPITAL. I SUGGEST AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY THAT WILL HELP TO END DISORDER IN SOUTH AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ENHANCE SYRIA'S DESIRE TO ASSUME ACTIVE ROLE IN OVERCOMING NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES TO REACH COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WITHOUT SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO OVERALL SETTLEMENT. I PROPOSE THAT WE INVEST NECESSARY POLITICAL CAPITAL TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO TOLERATE LIMITED INSERTION OF SYRIAN ADF FORCES INTO SOUTH LEBANON TO RESTORE CENTRAL GOVT AUTHORITY TO THAT REGION; AND TO OBTAIN SYRIAN CONSENT TO CEASE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS AND PROVIDE TIMELY, DETAILED INFORMATION ON THEIR FORCES AND MISSIONS IN THE SOUTH. THIS WOULD NECESSITATE U.S. TAKING DIPLOMATIC LEAD TO FASHION ARRANGEMENTS SUITABLE TO BOTH SIDES TO BRIDGE GAP THAT HAS OPENED. BUT IT SEEMS WE COULD BUILD UPON COMMON GROUND THAT ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS HANGED TO UNCOVER OVER PAST YEAR AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MODIFICATIONS IN PERCEPTIONS BETWEEN THESE TWO PARTIES. I DO NOT MINIMIZE THE DIFFICULTIES IN CONVINCING BOTH PARTIES TO FOLLOW THIS COURSE AFTER OUR UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT IN FEBRUARY. IT RISKS ANTAGONIZING THE ISRAELIS WHEN WE SEEKING THEIR COOPERATION TO RESUME SENSITIVE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD OVERALL SETTLEMENT. BUT THIS ANTAGONISM MAY BE SHORT-LIVED IF SYRIANS SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCT THEIR MISSION AND KEEP TO THE TERMS OF WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS ARE CONCLUDED. BASED UPON OUR EXPERIENCE OVER THE LAST YEAR, WE HAVE REASONABLE GROUNDS TO DEPEND ON SYRIAN PERFORMANCE. AND SINCE SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON HAS BEEN A MAJOR DETERMINANT OF ITS WILLINGNESS TO PLAY POSITIVE ROLE IN REACHING SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, POLITICAL CAPITAL INVESTED IN THIS STRATEGY WOULD STAND A REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF ADDING TO RATHER THAN DEPLETING OUR FUTURE NEGOTIATING ASSETS.

MURPHY

UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE
IN PART B6

May 19, 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] Office of The
Coordinator for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs
Room 7802
Department of State

B6

Dear [redacted]

B6

This letter is in reply to your dissent channel memorandum of April 19 on "Changing United States CSCE Policy to take the Offensive".

U.S. strategic goals in CSCE seem closer to those you advocate than is recognized in your memorandum. The centerpiece of U.S. policy toward CSCE has been to press the Soviet Union and East European states for maximum feasible implementation of the Final Act. We have relegated new CSCE proposals at Belgrade to a lesser status out of concern that they might detract from the attention given to the review of implementation. Moreover, we hope to orient those limited new western proposals which we do advance in such a way as to promote implementation of existing Final Act undertakings.

As you correctly indicate, the Belgrade Review Conference is an instrument to promote our CSCE objectives rather than an end in itself. However, the Belgrade meeting affords us the prime source of that limited leverage we possess to press for implementation. We are all aware that Soviet compliance will not come easily given the character of the authoritarian Soviet political system and the history and traditions of the Russian state. But beyond the Soviet stake in relations with the U.S. and the West generally, the prospect of the Belgrade review and the Soviet fear of being placed in the dock, offers the best inducement for Eastern progress toward implementation.

Successful use of the Belgrade mechanism to promote implementation depends on a common western position. Were

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

we to get too far ahead of our allies, we could be isolated at Belgrade and put up against enormous pressure -- from West as well as East -- for hasty adjournment. Recent Danish and other allied efforts to establish a final date/target date to close the conference, indicate what could happen if allied confidence in U.S. purposes and commitment to a common CSCE approach were undermined.

This does not imply that the U.S. should subscribe to the lowest common allied denominator concerning how vigorously to press for compliance. Nor have we done so. In fact, the allied CSCE strategy paper approved at the recent spring NATO Ministerial Meeting reflects overwhelmingly the contributions and recommendations made by the U.S. over the last two years. We will want to continue this active U.S. involvement in Western policy-making, in NATO and in the Western caucus at Belgrade, while taking account of allied interests. In sum, close NATO consultations do not relegate the goal of CSCE implementation to a lesser status. Rather, as was borne out at Helsinki and Geneva, a common western position is a precondition for the accomplishment of U.S. objectives in CSCE.

Beyond Belgrade diplomacy, it is clear that bilateral diplomacy and other multilateral activity (as in the ECE) are important supplementary tools for promoting implementation. These diplomatic channels have been used throughout the last two years and will continue to be used. It should be noted that bilateral demarches in Eastern capitals are launched by the U.S. and without prior clearance with NATO allies.

I note your point that we should step up our use of bilateral demarches in Eastern capitals to press for implementation. We plan to continue the bilateral approaches we have been making since Helsinki. For example, we made a strong representation along the lines you suggest to the Romanians only two weeks ago. But I agree with your view that now is a good time, with the Belgrade meetings just ahead, to examine whether such diplomatic representations should be escalated in number or in level. I will ask the European Bureau to consider this matter and to initiate pertinent actions, including recommendations to the Deputy Secretary as appropriate.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

You have recommended that the U.S. seek confirmation at Belgrade of a CSCE state's "right of inquiry" regarding another CSCE state's compliance, along with the responsibility of the addressed CSCE state "to reply substantively to such inquiries on a timely basis". There are two difficulties with this recommendation. First, it is likely to produce a protracted theoretical debate; it would be rejected by the Eastern states, given CSCE consensus rules of procedure; and it would, in any case, be nearly impossible to carry out in practice (what is an adequate reply?). Secondly, your proposal could be a backward step. All Western countries have asserted the right of both inquiry and demarche concerning implementation during the two years since the Final Act was signed. This is standard international practice and has not been put in question by the Soviets. Your proposal could place this practice in doubt. The better approach would be simply to continue pressing for implementation -- before, during and after the Belgrade Review Conference.

Finally, you have proposed establishment of a new office, EUR/CSCE, to shape CSCE policy in connection with EUR offices, other interested Department Bureaus and the CSCE Commission. Under this approach, EUR/CSCE also would make use of designated U.S. Embassy officers to pursue bilateral representations. I take your purpose here to be to accord CSCE a higher policy priority by establishment of a separate CSCE office, and to increase personnel resources dedicated to advancing our CSCE objectives.

Given the importance of the NATO connection and the fine job done by EUR/RPM in pursuing our CSCE objectives, I do not believe you have made a case for shifting action to a new CSCE office. CSCE has already been accorded higher priority by the Secretary's designation of Mr. Christopher and Mr. Nimetz to oversee it from a seventh floor perspective. This is a task in which Mr. Lake, Ms. Derian and other seventh floor principals also participate. As to increased Department resources, I am sure you are aware that EUR has pursued this aim for some time. This issue has been brought to the attention of the Director General, who has weighed CSCE requirements against other priorities. As a result, the EUR/RPM CSCE staff has been augmented by two officers. Nonetheless, I am calling your view to the attention of Mr. Moose and the Director General for their further consideration. Concerning our East European posts, each concerned Embassy already is engaged in our bilateral representations, as well as in monitoring

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
CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

and reporting on CSCE implementation in their host countries. Our Embassys make use of their political, economic and consular officers in pursuing these objectives.

I appreciate your concerns, which we all share. CSCE policy must take into account implementation of the Final Act and other important U.S. foreign policy interests. These include our relationships with the Western allies, the USSR and East European states, the European neutrals and numerous East-West negotiations. I hope you will continue to contribute to the pursuit of our important CSCE objectives, both through your daily activities in D/HA and the CSCE Commission, and through your participation in the work of the Policy Steering Group.

Sincerely,



Paul H. Kreisberg
Acting Director
Policy Planning Staff

cc: S, D, P, C, EUR, DG, S/S, D/HA and M

S/P:PKaplan:jk 5/19/77

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CABINET LEVEL COMMITTEE (CLC) MEETING TO DISCUSS
STATUS OF ILO SITUATION AND POSSIBLE RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE PRESIDENT

RELEASE IN FULL

on

Tuesday, August 16, 1977

REFERRED FOR CONSULTATION White House

(Notes prepared by William J. vanden Heuvel)

The meeting began at 10:40 am in the Conference Room of the Department of Labor. The Secretary of Labor, Ray Marshall, presided. In addition, those in attendance included the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance; Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor; the Under Secretary of Commerce, Sidney Harman; Mr. George Meany, Mr. Lane Kirkland, and Mr. Irving Brown, representing the AFL-CIO; Charles Smith, President of U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Mr. Daniel Horowitz, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Labor; Mr. Charles Maynes, Assistant Secretary of State; Dale Good, Department of State; Ambassador William J. vanden Heuvel.

The Secretary of Labor, Ray Marshall (RM) opened the meeting by suggesting there were three options available for discussion: (1) withdrawal from the ILO and, if so, the form and tone of the announcement, (2) withdrawal of the letter of intent, and (3) an extension of the date of the letter of intent. RM further indicated that the CLC should discuss whether the President should make an immediate decision or whether his decision should be delayed to a date closer to the November 5 deadline. RM indicated what he thought the CLC should consider the kind of actions that would be necessary after the President makes the decision such as (a) the future of the CLC itself, (b) the impact of the President's decision in relation to other countries, and (c) an increase in bilateral labor activities by both the Government and the AFL-CIO. RM also raised the question as to what form would be best in formulating a report to the President, stating that one possibility might be a memorandum laying out the options which would have appended to it the additional comments that the individual members of the CLC thought it necessary to make. RM then took the occasion to wish a happy birthday to Mr. Meany who happened to be 83 on this day. Mr. Meany replied by saying that if he had known he was going to live so long he would have taken better care of his health.

Daniel Horowitz (DH) cited the two years of unique effort which had been made after Dr. Kissinger had sent the notice of intent to withdraw in November 1975. He pointed out that the letter itself was sent after a long period of frustration and disappointment regarding developments in the ILO. The Kissinger letter expressed concern about

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-2-

various trends in the ILO; it said if these trends were not significantly modified, the US will withdraw its membership. Under the direction of the CLC the initial focus was on the industrial democratic countries. A special envoy was dispatched to those countries to explain the American position and concern, and DH continued meeting with representatives of those countries after Ambassador Silberman's mission was completed. DH himself visited 32 developing countries to discuss the ILO problem in detail. There seemed to be promising interim progress at least through the Governing Body meeting in March 1977. The 1977 ILO Conference was a great disappointment. Pressure on the LDC's from the Soviet Union and the Arab nations resulted, overall, in the Conference's failure to modify those trends which we had identified as inimical to continued American membership. Worst of all; the effective machinery of the ILO regarding the protection of human rights, which has been used selectively in years past, was severely assaulted by the action of the Conference in "turning down the report of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CACR)". "DH pointed out that the abstention procedure was used which he described as the technical way of defeating something in an ILO Conference). The debate on the CACR report lasted six hours. It represented an orchestrated effort to repudiate the machinery that the ILO had developed over the years in the protection of human rights. Although the enormous effort of a number of parties at the Conference had avoided another Israeli resolution, the Arabs used the debate to argue that the ILO machinery has no application to Occupied Territories, thereby defending the condemnation of Israel without due process.

DH indicated that he emphasized the human rights aspect of the ILO problem because it is the most fundamental concern. He pointed out that the attempt to amend Article 17 had been approved by the Governing Body but the Conference referred the proposed amendment to the Committee on Structure where it knew no action would be taken because of the complicated restructuring proposals that were pending before it. The US failed in its objectives as outlined in the 1975 letter. If we stay beyond the designated two-year period we will be upholding the extremists' argument -- who have said consistently that the US never intended to withdraw and that the letter was an empty threat. The democratic industrial countries can carry the obligation of reform. We should leave the door open for return. If the democratic industrial countries can do what they say they intend to do, then we can look to an early return. Our withdrawal would force the LDC's to rethink their position. We would have considerable more bargaining power outside of the ILO.

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- 3 -

George Meany (GM). Two years ago, for reasons that were not frivolous, a letter of notice of intent to withdraw was sent by the U.S. Government to the ILO and this CLC was formed. Our intent at the time was to bring about changes that would enable the US to stay in the ILO. GM said that he could not think of anything more that could have been done in this two year period. The CLC reviewed every option. It designated Ambassador Silberman to talk to the European group to let them know the seriousness of our intentions; then Daniel Horowitz was assigned to visit the LDC's. Every possible effort was made. One of the trends we objected to was the double standard in ILO which saw resolutions against South Africa for Apartheid, but not against the Soviet Bloc countries. Through the 1976 ILO Conference, we made some progress, if only in lining up our allies in a solid position with us. We talked to the Director General, Francis Blanchard, because GM knows the Secretariat can be tremendously useful "if it wants to be". He felt that Blanchard did not take the US threat to withdraw seriously although he tried to be helpful toward the end (Spring 1977). GM approached the 1977 ILO Conference hopefully where, he said categorically, that the Soviets, not the Arabs, controlled the situation. GM said he had hoped that the Soviets would soften their stance when they saw the US determination to withdraw but that did not happen. The record is clear. Labor has made no official statement since February 1976. It has cooperated totally with the representatives of the Employers groups. GM expressed the opinion that the President should announce immediately that the 1975 letter stands and will take effect on November 6, 1977, but that we are prepared to work with any country and all countries to prepare for our return to the ILO. The ILO could call a special meeting of the Governing Body; it could do many other things if it was really anxious to make decisions that would affect our resumption of membership. He had been told by the Director General that an extension of the notice of withdrawal could not be done. GM now understands that the Legal Advisor of the ILO has a new and different opinion. This is another example of the Secretariat adjusting the charter and regulations of ILO for opportunistic purposes. We should withdraw. We can then go back as a member -- "it only takes a simple letter". After we are out we can work actively with our allies to "immediately go back".

Charles Smith (CS). On behalf of the Employer groups he expressed wholehearted agreement with Horowitz' recitation. CS complimented the Labor and Government roles and said that the four delegates to the 1977 ILO see this decision in the same way. Other employers in the world have informed him that they believe the US attitude is "absolutely right." Their only query is why the US has waited to

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- 4 -

long before withdrawing. CS said that he believes the repudiation of the 1977 ILO Conference was deliberate. He agrees with Mr. Meany that there is no way to change the ILO if the US backslides from its threatened withdrawal. The chance for change in the ILO is zero if we change our course. CS does not see any way to achieve realistic results unless we follow through on withdrawal. Otherwise, those who have always questioned our determination will use our present vacillation to prove that they were always right about US intentions.

Secretary Vance (SS) agrees that everyone was disappointed by the 1977 ILO Conference. But he believes that the bleakness of that disappointment should be softened by the knowledge that some important progress was made. For example, the solid support of the democratic industrial nations is heartening and we have seen since the adjournment of the 1977 Conference an increased acceptance by our allies that change in the ILO is necessary. The SS confessed to a bias, that he would hate to leave this important area of international labor relations to Soviet domination. Reliable reports from several governmental agencies indicate that attempted Soviet domination will be one of the results of US withdrawal from the ILO. He indicated that a benefit of US withdrawal would be the enhancement of American credibility that might come by our sustaining our threat to withdraw if certain results had not been achieved by November 1977. On the other hand, SS thought there were important limitations to this argument. For one thing, US withdrawal and our "enhanced credibility" would not bring about our objectives of reform. He raised the possibility of whether another year might not give us the time to affect those changes. The cost of US withdrawal would include a sharply critical international reaction, a possible spillover of resentments in the UN and in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. In the long run, he believes withdrawal would have serious foreign policy consequences. The shock to our European allies of our withdrawal from ILO would have an adverse impact on the Western Alliance. US withdrawal would be a bad precedent for how this Government is going to handle international crises. It would undermine our attempts to reach the Third World and to influence them toward moderate rather than radical viewpoints. In the absence of the US in the ILO the SS doubts that constructive changes would take place. If we stay we will sustain our objectives and our allies; if we leave we desert them. SS proposed an extension of our letter of notice to withdraw for one more year. There are a series of efforts that will take place, culminating in the 1978 ILO Conference. If we cannot see the substantial achievement of our objectives by that time he is willing to say "okay, let's go," but he is impressed by the countries that have come forward to urge support of our objectives

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- 5 -

and to express a willingness to work toward their achievement. He is not in a position to guarantee the various professions of help that have come from Third World governments but the fact is that many Third World countries have come forward with affirmative statements. SS urged that the meeting delay "any recommendations or conclusions because leaders of Congress have asked that it be consulted before a decision is made." We should prepare to lay out the alternatives for the President's consideration, express our individual views to the President, but again he urged that no conclusions be reached at this meeting.

Zbigniew Brzezinski (ZB). Whatever recommendation is made to the President would have a very significant impact on American involvement in international affairs. The CLC recommendations should represent the widest possible consensus so that the President will have solid support for whatever decision he reaches. If we recommend today to the President that the US withdraw from the ILO, we will in effect be taking a stand in August about an event that is not scheduled until November. If we recommend to the President an extension of our letter of withdrawal at this meeting, we undercut our effectiveness during the weeks between now and November, reducing our leverage to effect change and gaining nothing in return. We are aware of the "pernicious attitude" of the Soviets and some of the Arab nations in the ILO; we are also aware of rising anxiety within the ILO itself. ZB proposes that the action of the CLC today should be to let our threat stand. By October we will have a better view of the problem. We should postpone any recommendation until then, meanwhile maintaining our position supporting the seriousness of our determination to withdraw, and wait until October to make recommendations to the President so that intervening events, if any, can have their impact.

CS. There is no opportunity between now and November for anyone to do anything about the stated concerns and objectives of the November 1975 letter. There is no opportunity for the ILO to show either a disposition to progress or actual progress because the opportunity to make changes does not exist during this interim period. CS suggests that the CLC decision now, announcing our recommendation to the President to withdraw, might cause special action by the ILO and its member states.

ZB. This interim does provide an opportunity to other governments to take positions and to make those positions known to the President. There is no conceivable tactical gain for the CLC to make any decisions today. We deprive ourselves of nothing by waiting until October.

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- 6 -

LK. For two years we have conducted ourselves honorable in support of an honorable position. No country whose opinion we respect has disagreed with the objectives and the reasons for the 1975 letter. Throughout the history of US involvement in the ILO there has been no real commitment or support by the U.S. Government delegates. For example, in the 1974 Conference much time was spent by the Government, Labor and Employer representatives in reaching agreed positions to present at the ILO Conference. But when LK reached Geneva and asked to see the cable outlining the Government's instructions to the governmental delegates he was astonished to find that it authorized lobbying efforts at the conference to gain support for the agreed upon objectives but "no diplomatic effort would be made." This abstention from real effort was the Government's attitude for many years. One of the results of the 1975 letter has been a change in the Government's commitment. LK is not impressed by arguments that this decision affecting the ILO will have a profound effect on foreign affairs. The ILO has never been considered important before. The 1975 letter also served the purpose of showing what the US could do if we really tried. We wanted to be able to say to the world that if in fact we did withdraw it would only be after massive effort that would end with no stone left unturned. We have established that. The faults in the ILO are not caused by the US. We, including the Government, have done everything that we could possibly do. Our mutual efforts produced only a few more votes. LK concludes therefore that the flaws in the ILO are fundamental, that they are inherent in the organization itself and that our past and continued efforts cannot truly affect them.

Regarding the impact of withdrawal from the ILO on our alliances and other multilateral relations, LK expressed the view that those problems were considered when the letter was written and when the letter was reaffirmed. "If we were serious men when we authorized the 1975 letter" then those problems were part of our consideration and we determined our willingness to absorb the impact of possible withdrawal at that time. Sending the letter and President Carter's endorsement of it involve a willingness to accept the consequences of withdrawal. In LK's judgment, the impact of the US decision is marginal either way. His opinion is that US withdrawal will have no important effect. Our position in "these organizations" is not so rewarding that the decision we are about to make should be regarded as so crucial. The 1975 letter exists, its terms are clear, the major effort was made by the US in good faith, and as a citizen of the US, LK would be shocked and appalled if our Government now says that the letter was not meant seriously and it now finds a way to work around its terms. He suggested one overriding question: What

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- 7 -

does anyone propose to do now that we have not already done? As the saying goes, if you don't know, it doesn't really matter. LK has heard of no new effort, no added leverage, no new program, that should alter our determination to withdraw.

CS is convinced that many of the delegations at the ILO Conference did not believe that the US was serious in its threat to withdraw. They were convinced then and are convinced now that a reprieve will come and they based their voting on that conviction. Withdraw now -- we will give strength to our allies. There are 18 to 20 countries that are our friends. They have to convince countries like Somalia, Venezuela and Mexico that we were serious about our objectives. The only new element to add to their efforts is the event of our withdrawal.

SS replied, it is interesting that two of the three countries mentioned by CS, namely, Venezuela and Mexico, have made serious and direct statements to the SS regarding their hope that the US will remain a member of the ILO.

In response to LK, SS said that LK is right, that we do have to know what we want. The main effort will have to come from our allies but we should lose no time in defining what we want before considering the means of achieving it.

ZB. He does not disagree with what LK has said but those same remarks can be made in mid-October. The issue is whether the US can be effective, not alone serious, in its determination. ZB suggests that our position remain unchanged. The letter remains in effect which expresses our intent to withdraw by a certain date. We can have further discussions with other governments. Something might happen at the General Assembly that would influence our recommendation. In any event, many things can happen.

GM. In taking up what Dr. Brzezinski had said, GM repeated his understanding that ZB was saying that our positions should remain unchanged, that the letter relating our intent to withdraw was still in effect, and that we should meet in October to see what has happened, if anything, to change that determination to withdraw. If that is the recommended position for the CLC today that is okay with GM. He agrees -- no problem.

Sidney Harman, Commerce (SH). If he had heard LK's statement for the first time in October 1977 he would not hesitate to agree to recommend withdrawal.

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- 8 -

LK. If no action is to be taken by the CLC today, then one important thing is to deflect the growing attitude that Labor's intransigence is the principal pressure for withdrawal.

Irving Brown (IB) strongly supported LK's statement saying that growing propaganda around the world was making it appear that it was a reactionary combination of Labor and Employer representatives in the US who are working for withdrawal. If these next two months are to be useful, one question is what can be done to reinstitute the supervisory machinery that was denigrated by the Conference's refusal to accept the CACP report. IB said that as one of the ILO vice presidents he personally saw the Soviet Bloc-Arab Bloc alliance which effectively destroyed the opportunity for progress of the 1977 Conference.

DH challenged the proposal to extend the letter of withdrawal saying that the US has argued in the past that the charter should be applied as written. He personally had talked to the Legal Advisor of the ILO in 1976 who then told him that there was no way that the notice of intention to withdraw could be extended. Through 1976, one of our principal complaints has been that the Director General had bent the rules of the ILO in response to political pressure. For the US to seek the bending of a "clearly-stated legal conclusion" in the Charter will put us in a terribly awkward position. Technically, the Legal Advisor's opinion would still be subject to challenge. DH raised the question as to how seriously the US would be regarded if we accepted the extension proposal.

LK. He supports this statement by DH. When weak men leave the company of books they are inclined to make company with the devil.

SS. He has been informed that the EC-9 have asked for an official opinion regarding the possible extension of the notice of withdrawal from the Legal Advisor of the ILO. Let us wait and look at the opinion if it is rendered:

CS. What all of us are considering is what is best for the interests of the US. He has great sympathy for the State Department. We are like Gulliver tied to the ground by ropes with Somalia and Sri Lanka and 25 other little countries telling us what to do. It is the structural weakness of international organizations that disturbs him. It is very dangerous and goes way beyond the ILO. It affects the whole UN.

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- 9 -

Sidney Harman (SH). Our attitude has been to save the ILO but we should remember that Gulliver did escape from the Lilliputians, and certainly it is worth waiting to see what the next several months reveal.

CS. Agreed to go along with the decision to postpone any action until October but asks what we are going to do during the interim period.

SS. The SS indicated that he had been informed that the EC-9 countries and Canada, among others, were discussing an initiative related to the expected opinion from the Legal Advisor of the ILO regarding the possible extension of the notice of withdrawal. Many countries are giving urgent consideration to what might be said and done to encourage the US to remain as a member of the ILO.

DH. Questions relating to structural reorganization will now rise to the surface in the ILO debate. One of the structural changes that has been proposed relates to the composition of the Governing Body and to the non-elected membership of the ten leading industrial nations. The US has taken the position that there should be no change. After all, there was an increase in the membership of the Governing Body as recently as two years ago and the G-77 nations have a majority of its membership. Structural questions are not going to be resolved before November. The LDC's will demand as a price for their support of our principles that we agree to structural changes.

SS. The SS accepted Mr. Horowitz's remarks as indicating that it would be impossible for any agreement to be reached regarding structural changes before November, and the SS agrees that we should not put impossible standards in the path of searching out an appropriate recommendation to the President.

IB. The structural changes are aimed at the autonomy of the worker-employer groups. They must be resisted.

DH. Structural changes represent an effort to give the ILO Conference plenary authority within the ILO structure. Under the present circumstances, the Governing Body as now composed gives us a fighting chance to sustain our principles. If we allow the Governing Body to be changed we might as well throw in the towel. The proposal to eliminate the permanent non-elected seats in the Governing Body is really an attack on the Security Council of the United Nations. If the attacking forces are successful in the ILO the Security Council will be next.

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- 10 -

SS asks Mr. Kirkland what he would like to see accomplished in the next two months.

LK. The restoration of the supervisory machinery for the acceptance of the report of the Committee of Experts is the most important thing that can be done.

SS reminded Mr. Kirkland that although that objective was of the highest priority it could not be accomplished within the next two months.

GM. Meany suggested that the ILO could call a special conference on four months' notice. One of the reasons he wants a decision to withdraw is that it would pressure the ILO to search out any and all means, such as a special conference, to make decisions that would influence us.

(Someone pointed out that the ILO Charter provides that a special conference could only be called by the Governing Body which is not scheduled to meet until November so, therefore, a special ILO Conference could not be convened at the earliest before March of 1978.)

CS. We should tell those countries that are friendly to us that the CLC has made no decision today, that the ball is in their court, that we will remain in contact with them for the next two months, but that they must take the initiative in showing what can be done.

LK. The report of the Committee of Experts on the application of conventions and recommendations was particularly important in 1977 because its paragraph 31 acknowledged the principle that only a single standard of performance will be used in applying and monitoring ILO conventions. Labor regards this as critically important because for years its spokesmen have been arguing against the double standard which the Communist nations have sought in investigations that affect their countries.

[The actual text of paragraph 31 is as follows:

The committee discussed the approach to be adopted in evaluating national law and practice against the requirements of international labour Conventions. It reaffirms that its function is to determine whether the requirements of a given Conventions are being met, whatever the economic and social conditions existing in a given country. Subject only to any

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 11 -

derogations which are expressly permitted by the Conventions itself, these requirements remain constant and uniform for all countries. In carrying out this work the Committee is guided by the standards laid down in the Convention alone, mindful, however, of the fact that the modes of their implementation may be different in different States. These are international standards, and the manner in which their implementation is evaluated must be uniform and must not be affected by concepts derived from any particular social or economic system.]

GM. As the Director General said at the 1977 Conference, the conscience of the ILO is its Committee of Experts. When they rejected their report, the ILO Conference rejected its conscience. Mr. Meany pointed out that there is a campaign on to convince the President to stay in the ILO. He cited a letter from Senator Hubert Humphrey to the President which said that the ILO is a great defender of human rights. He pointed out that "another Labor leader" had addressed a public message urging the US to stay in the ILO [Douglas Fraser, President of the United Auto Workers, has sent a letter which was published by the WASHINGTON POST].

Mr. Meany also said that he had received a personal message yesterday (August 15) from Pope Paul VI urging him to consider his opposition to the American membership in the ILO. "Can you imagine, the Pope taking the trouble to send me a personal message."

The meeting ended at 12:10 p.m..

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

RELEASE IN FULL

LC NO. 42439
T-122/R-XXXIV
French

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF GABON IN THE UNITED STATES

No. 50404/AW

Washington, June 28, 1974

The Embassy of the Republic of Gabon in the United States of America presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to reiterate the extreme interest that its Government attaches to the immediate issuance of an export license for a McDonnell Douglas DC8-63-CF airplane now being purchased from Seaboard.

report in dept. of State

This aircraft is intended for the personal use of the President of the Republic of Gabon as well as for travel by official missions of the Gabonese Government. This transportation at present is provided by the expensive method of chartering flights on various airlines (Air-Afrique, UTA, Air Zaire, etc.);

of what kind?

On numerous occasions this matter has been brought to the Department of State's attention, through both the United States Embassy at Libreville and the Embassy of the Republic of Gabon at Washington. Furthermore, all pertinent documents were transmitted in due time to the American authorities.

Nonetheless, no decision has been taken, so the President of the Republic of Gabon decided to send a plenipotentiary and extraordinary mission to the Department of State, which the Ambassador of the Republic of Gabon had the honor to lead on Friday, June 28, 1974. The exceptional nature of

this mission underlines the importance that the Chief of State and the Gabonese Government attach to a prompt solution.

Indeed, it should be pointed out that:

1. On March 20, 1974, the Republic of Gabon, represented by its Minister of the Economy and Finance, signed the contract to purchase the aforesaid aircraft from Seaboard and immediately made a down payment of US\$ 400,000. The American authorities were advised of this transaction.

2. Concurrently, approaches were made to the Export-Import Bank of the United States, which offered the hope that a favorable decision would soon be forthcoming.

3. Furthermore, the American financial establishments consulted by the Gabonese Republic stated that they would make the additional financing available.

4. At that time, by letter of April 16, 1974, the President of the Republic of Gabon transmitted all relevant information concerning the use and operation of the aircraft to the President of the Export-Import Bank. The United States Ambassador at Libreville was also informed.

5. During his visit to the United States during the same period, the President of the Republic of Gabon was informed of no potential objections or restrictions concerning the purchase of the DCS-63-CF. Moreover, a contract for the purchase of a Hercules C-130 was concluded simultaneously with no difficulty being raised.

However, the delay in issuing the export license for the DCS-63-CF implied that the American authorities might have certain reservations that had never been explicitly stated.

*not true
likely
not made
Department
American
Government
from Paris
Application*

*Substantively, during visit
at D.C.*

*not true
no objection
American
Government
no*

*not
clearly
American
Government
no
no*

We held more than one meeting to OAU. The following is:

For that reason, in order to avert any restrictive interpretation, the Gabonese Government took the initiative of communicating fully all documents establishing the total regularity of the transaction, both economically and politically:

read OAU exchange

1. On the economic level, the conclusion of a technical management contract with UTA guarantees:

a. Suitable logistics, since UTA, which is certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, will provide industrial maintenance and supply, train, and supervise the trained crews required on a permanent basis;

b. An effort to ensure a sound rate of return by integration with the operations of the UTA-Air Afrique group (both companies are members of the International Air Transport Association and have a DC8 fleet);

is this totally correct?

c. Harmonization with the present air system. Consequently, there would be no danger of disturbing its equilibrium through the introduction of a potential outside the provisions of the Yaoundé Treaty of which the Gabonese Government, a founding member of Air-Afrique, is a co-signatory.

with dates Air Co come into all of this same of PA is

2. On the political level, the Gabonese Government stresses that it informed its fellow African Governments that are members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and, in that respect, it produced both a letter from the OAU Secretary General granting approval confirmed by a letter from the Organization's Acting President, General Gowon, President of the Republic of Nigeria. Both documents clearly established the unqualified approval of this transaction.

no, the Secretary General

is this responsible only authorized by the president to be a 201-?

Furthermore, the recent OAU meeting held in June 1974 at Mogadiscio reconfirmed the total absence of objections.

not true, Gabon was called in the report... commitment... absence.

As a founding member and partner of the multinational company Air-Afrique, as established by the Yaoundé Treaty, the Gabonese Government saw in this transaction an opportunity to point up its attachment to the principles of inter-African solidarity and therefore formally and publicly excluded any possibility of using the DC8-63-CF in contradiction to those principles.

*read
Rhetoric
Soviet
American
under the
hair*

The Gabonese Government again states, if necessary, that in no event will the DC8-63-CF be used in a different way that might somehow benefit any one of the countries censured by the international organizations of which Gabon is a member; such as the OAU, UN, and CANO.

*ment
in
Sept 51.*

Under these circumstances, the Gabonese Republic can only be surprised at the unexpectedly long period of time required to issue the export license essential for its purchase.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Gabon takes pleasure, however, in underscoring the quality of the bonds uniting the United States of America and Gabon. Furthermore, he notes that American enterprises have always met with cordial and understanding acceptance in his country, with whose development they are associated in many fields (manganese mining, petroleum prospecting, general equipment, etc.).

He is pleased that prompt approval could be given to the President of the Republic of Gabon concerning the supply of a ^{Lockheed} Hercules C-130 aircraft and hopes that similar arrangements will permit the immediate delivery of the DC8-63-CF.

*January
they
the
March
file
file
file
file*

If in the past undoubtedly circumstantial incidents at times have troubled the serenity of relations between the United States of America and Gabon, the two countries nonetheless remain united by the same trust in the free

RELEASE IN PART B6

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0055A

S/P:DCOHEH:EJW
04/17/84 EXT. 21724
S/P:PRODMAN

AID/LEG:KLUDDEN
S/P:JREINERTSEN
S/P:HJONES

AID/GC/NE:RJOHNSON

ROUTINE AMMAN

DISSENT CHANNEL, FROM RODMAN, S/P FOR [REDACTED]

B6

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EAID, SY, JO
SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE
REF: AMMAN 9761

PR *PMR*
DC *A*
KJ *[Signature]*
RJ *[Signature]*
JR *[Signature]*
HJ *[Signature]*

1. FIRST OF ALL, OUR APOLOGIES FOR THE DELAYED RESPONSE. WHILE LEGISLATIVE ACTION CREATED A FAIT ACCOMPLI PRIOR TO THE POSSIBLE RESPONSE TO YOUR MESSAGE, THE CONCERNS RAISED REFTEL REMAINED VALID. THE RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES WERE AWARE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF A UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF AID TO SYRIA. FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE CONGRESS WAS NOT TO BE DISSUADED FROM TAKING ACTION TO DE-OBLIGATE ALL REMAINING FUNDS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY OBLIGATED TO FINANCE GOODS AND SERVICES PROVIDED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA.
2. THE FINAL LEGISLATION SIGNED INTO LAW JUST SIX DAYS AFTER THE RECEIPT OF YOUR MESSAGE ADDRESSED YOUR SPECIFIC CONCERN REGARDING U.S. GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS ARISING

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

FROM TERMINATION OF U.S. AND THIRD COUNTRY CONTRACTS. IT ALSO PERMITTED THE CONTINUATION OF FINANCING THE TRAINING OF SYRIAN STUDENTS IN THE U.S. WHOSE COURSE OF STUDY HAD ALREADY BEGUN. WHILE THESE TWO EXCEPTIONS TO THE DEOBLIGATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT ADDRESS YOUR APPROPRIATE CONCERNS REGARDING U.S. COMMITMENTS TO THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT ITSELF, THE PRESENT EXCEPTIONS WERE AS FAR AS A DEMONSTRABLY ANGRY CONGRESS WAS WILLING TO GO.

3. I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL TO PROVOKE A GREATER DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE. WHILE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO FULLY SATISFY YOUR CONCERNS, YOUR MOTIVES AND PRESENTATION WERE HIGHLY COMMENDABLE.44

~~SECRET~~



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 NEW DE 02020 251658Z

TERMS. IT WOULD BE SILLY TO MAINTAIN THAT INDU-US RELATIONS ARE GOOD AND PROBABLY WISHFUL THINKING TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL CHANGE MUCH FOR THE BETTER IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. ALL OF THIS WAS KNOWN AT (#) CONSIDERED ITS RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S JANUARY SPEECH AT CHANDIGARH AND THE CHORUS OF OTHER STATEMENTS AND PRESS ARTICLES WHICH FOLLOWED. AT THAT TIME IT WAS DECIDED TO WITHDRAW THE USG OFFER TO PROVIDE DEVELOPMENT LOAN ASSISTANCE BUT MAINTAIN (THOUGH DELAY BY ONE MONTH) TITLE I ASSISTANCE. NOTHING NEW OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE HAS DEVELOPED SINCE THEN. TO WITHDRAW THE TITLE I OFFER AT THIS POINT WOULD BE SEEN AS A UNILATERAL USG ACTION WHICH COULD ONLY BE (AND WILL BE) TREATED IN POLITICAL TERMS.

4. US INTERESTS (POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC) IN INDIA (AND SOUTH ASIA AS A WHOLE) ARE ADMITTEDLY NOT LARGE. HOWEVER, TO THE EXTENT THEY EXIST, THEY ARE CONDITIONED BY THE FACT THAT INDIA OCCUPIES A PREEMINENT POSITION IN THE REGION AND A SIGNIFICANT POSITION IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS (E.G. CIEC) OF MAJOR INTEREST TO THE US. WE HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE INDIANS (AND THEY WITH US) HOWEVER MUCH THEY GET UNDER OUR SKIN.

5. US POLICY HAS BEEN TO TRY TO CONVINCE THE INDIANS THAT THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP IS UP TO THEM AND WE ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO INDIAN INITIATIVES. IMPLICIT IN THIS POLICY HAS BEEN THE REVERSE, I.E., WE WILL REACT NEGATIVELY TO ABUSE. SHOULD WE REACT NOW IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT CAUSE, PARTICULARLY IN SUCH A MULTILATERALLY SENSITIVE FIELD AS FOOD AID? IN MY VIEW, TO DO SO WOULD APPEAR TO BE PICKING A FIGHT AND A FIGHT WHICH COULD COME BACK TO HAUNT US MULTILATERALLY AS WELL AS BILATERALLY.

6. IF, DESPITE OUR PROTESTS AND DEVELOPMENT LOAN REACTION, THE PRIME MINISTER CHOOSES AGAIN TO USE THE USG AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL WE SHOULD REACT AND DETERMINATION OF A TITLE I PROGRAM MIGHT BE A REASONABLE USE OF ACTION. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, OUR OBJEC-

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 23 NEW OF 02820 251858Z

TIVE SHOULD BE TO TRY TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING. WITHDRAWAL OF OUR TITLE I OFFER IS LIKELY TO HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT.

7. WITHDRAWAL OF THE OFFER IS UNLIKELY TO PROVIDE THE USG WITH "LEVERAGE". IF THE GOI DOES NOT NEED THE FOOD (SEE BELOW) WITHDRAWAL OF THE OFFER WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH IMPACT. EVEN IF IT DOES NEED THE FOOD, IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT 400,000 TONS IS GOING TO CONSTITUTE MUCH "LEVERAGE" IN A SITUATION WHERE THE GOI IS LIKELY TO PROCURE DOMESTICALLY 20 TIMES THAT AMOUNT, WHERE TOTAL PRODUCTION OF FOODGRAINS IS OVER 250 TIMES THAT AMOUNT AND PURCHASES FROM THE US ARE TEN TIMES THAT AMOUNT.

8. TURNING TO THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST TITLE I, INDIA WILL INDEED PROBABLY HARVEST A RECORD CROP THIS YEAR, THOUGH IT MIGHT BE REMEMBERED THAT THIS WILL BE ONLY 1 - 3 MILLION TONS MORE THAN IN 1971 WHILE THERE ARE NOW 65 MILLION MORE INDIANS AVAILABLE TO CONSUME THIS BOUNTY. STORAGE CAPACITY IS A GENUINE PROBLEM AND LOSSES IN STORAGE HAVE BEEN A PROBLEM IN BAD YEARS AS WELL AS GOOD. WE ESTIMATE THAT THE GOI CURRENTLY HAS ABOUT 6 MILLION TONS IN STORAGE AND IT MAY PICK UP AN ADDITIONAL 4 MILLION TONS (MINUS SOME CONSUMPTION) OVER THE NEXT TWO MONTHS AS THE RABI CROP IS HARVESTED. MOST OF THIS ADDITIONAL PROCUREMENT WILL BE RICE. INDIA ONCE HAD RESERVES OF 9 MILLION TONS AND HANDLED THIS ADEQUATELY. NINE - TEN MILLION TONS WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS 1976 BUT NOT INSURMOUNTABLE ONES. MOREOVER, STORAGE PROBLEMS PRIMARILY OCCUR IN CERTAIN PARTS OF INDIA WHILE IMPORTED FOODGRAINS ARE LARGELY CONSUMED ELSEWHERE IN INDIA (400,000 TONS IS LESS THAN ONE HALF OF ONE MONTH'S NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THROUGH THE FAIR PRICE SHOPS).

9. FINALLY, ON A COMMERCIAL NOTE, INDIA HAS BEEN AND HOPEFULLY WILL CONTINUE TO BE A GOOD CASH CUSTOMER FOR US FOODGRAINS. IN 1975 IT BOUGHT FOUR MILLION TONS FOR CASH AND IN 1976 IT IS LIKELY TO BUY AN ADDITIONAL FOUR MILLION TONS. WITHDRAWAL OF A

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FORM



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 04 NEW DF 02020 251858Z

TITLE I OFFER WILL NOT HELP US FIRMS TO MAKE COMMERCIAL SALES OF GRAIN TO INDIA IN YEARS WHEN ALTERNATIVE SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE.
SAXBE

NOTE BY DC/T: NEW DELHI 2020--(*) TEXT GARBLED; CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

EL
CORR

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

~~SECRET~~ BELGRADE 7777

DISSENT CHANNEL

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3 DIMPTD
TAGS: ASEC PINS
SUBJ: US POLICY ON TERRORISM -- PLANNED ATTACKS ON LUFTHANSA

REF: STATE 266500

1. FOLLOWING IS DISSENT FROM REFERENCED CABLE BY FSO

B6

2. DEPARTMENT HAS INSTRUCTED ALL PERSONNEL TO "REFRAIN FROM USING LUFTHANSA FLIGHTS" IN FACE OF TERRORIST THREATS. THE CLEAR LOGIC OF THIS IS THAT IF PAN AMERICAN WERE SO THREATENED WE SHOULD ALSO BE INSTRUCTED NOT TO USE PAN AMERICAN. OTHERWISE WE ARE DISCRIMINATING AGAINST THE GERMANS, OUR CLOSEST ALLIES, SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT AMERICANS. AND WE ARE DOING SO IMMEDIATELY AFTER THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED GREAT COURAGE IN STANDING UP TO TERRORIST ACTS.

3. IT HAS BEEN USG POLICY TO ENCOURAGE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO JOIN US IN NOT REWARDING TERRORISM. SURELY WE CANNOT EXPECT OTHERS TO JOIN US WHEN WE ARE IN DIFFICULTIES IF WE REFUSE TO JOIN THEM WHEN THEY ARE BEING THREATENED. THE EFFECT ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH GERMANY SHOULD THIS INSTRUCTION LEAK OUT IS ALSO NOT INSIGNIFICANT.

4. THE DEPARTMENT DOES HAVE A DUTY TO WARN ITS EMPLOYEES OF SUCH DANGERS, BUT HAS NO OBLIGATION OR EVEN THE RIGHT TO TELL US WHAT TO DO. THAT SHOULD BE EACH INDIVIDUAL'S DECISION -- AND MANY IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO PUT THEIR LIVES ON THE LINE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. INSTRUCTING US TO RUN AWAY FROM OUR FRIENDS IS SIMPLY UNAMERICAN.
EAGLEBURGER

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 31 ACTION ARA-15

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4341

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STADIS////////////////////////////////////

ONLY FOR ROBERT STEVEN, ARA/AND/CH

E. O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OR-M ELAB, CI
SUBJECT: PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON LABOR SITUATION

K

1. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT EMBASSY AND DEPARTMENT CAN PERFORM MOST USEFUL ROLE IN SUPPORT OF CHILEAN PROGRESS TOWARD FREER TRADE UNION MOVEMENT BY SUPPORTING QUIET BEHIND-THE-SCENES EFFORTS AND, VERY SPECIFICALLY, AVOIDING PUBLIC STATEMENTS EITHER HERE OR IN WASHINGTON.

2. IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW DECREES AND INTERPRETATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESS IS STILL EVOLVING. WITH AFL/CIO REACTION IN MIND (OBTAINED AT OCTOBER 31 WASHINGTON MEETING), GOC SHOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS, INCLUDING NON-IMPLEMENTATION, REINTERPRETATION, OR SIMPLE NONCOMPLIANCE. STATEMENTS BY USG AT WHATEVER LEVEL AND HOWEVER BLAND RAISE ISSUE OF INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL MATTERS, UNDERCUT GOC FLEXIBILITY, AND VERY PROBABLY SLOW MOVEMENT TOWARD ACHIEVING JOINT AFL/CIO AND USG GOALS OF MORE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS HERE. EVEN MODERATE STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 1 (STATE 278109, IF USED, COULD ENGAGE GOC IN PUBLIC DEFENSE OVER "DISSOLUTION OF A LARGE NUMBER OF UNIONS" AND "RESTRICTED LOCAL ELECTIONS", THUS TEMPORARILY FREEZING A SITUATION WHICH OTHERWISE IS STILL MALLEABLE AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO MODERATION AND EVEN REVERSAL.

3. AS RELATED THOUGH, AFL/CIO FACES A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE IN PRESENT SETTING. THEIR REPRESENTATIVES ARE TRYING TO PROTECT A CADRE OF TRAINED DEMOCRATIC LABOR LEADERS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, PROMOTE THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. TO SUCCEED, THEY HOPE TO INDUCE THE DEMOCRATIC LABOR ELEMENTS AND THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT TO ENTER INTO A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. THE JARRING IMPACT OF WELL-INTENTIONED PUBLIC STATEMENTS COULD UNDETECT THESE VERY DELICATE EFFORTS.

4. AIFLD REP AND LABOR ATTACHE HAVE SEEN THIS MESSAGE AND CONCUR. LANDAU

Robert Steven Landau

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM ✓

PAGE 01 STATE 191351 POSS DUPE
ORIGIN SP-02

RELEASE IN PART⁴⁵⁰
B6

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 /003 R

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DISSENT CHANNEL

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: MARR, KS, US

SUBJECT: U. S. SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS KOREA

REF: ROME 10207

FROM S/P DIRECTOR LAKE FOR



B6

1. MY RESPONSE HAS BEEN DELAYED IN ANTICIPATION THAT ADMINISTRATION POLICY, WHICH IS BASED ON MANY OF THE SAME CONCERNS YOU HIGHLIGHT, WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY EXPLICIT, AS IT HAS, IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING (SCM) RECENTLY CONCLUDED IN SEOUL.
2. IN PARTICULAR, CLARITY OF THE US COMMITMENT TO DEFEND THE ROK AGAINST AGGRESSION WAS EVIDENT IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT PARK. IN ADDITION, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN MADE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO US NUCLEAR FORCE PROTECTION OF THE ROK IN REMARKS TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING THE SCM. COPIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AND BROWN STATEMENT POUCHED TO YOU.
3. PLANNED WITHDRAWALS, OF COURSE, COVER ONLY GROUND COMBAT FORCES, AND USG STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR INTENTION TO LIVE UP TO OUR TREATY COMMITMENTS. THE PRC AND USSR ARE WELL AWARE OF THESE FACTS, AND NORTH KOREAN REACTION HAS REVEALED THAT THEY, TOO, HAVE RECEIVED THE MESSAGE.
4. A REVIEW UNDERTAKEN SEVERAL YEARS AGO INDICATED THAT ATTEMPTS TO INVOKE THE "DECLARATION OF SIXTEEN" WOULD NOT BE PROMISING. IN ANY CASE, THE COMMITMENTS CITED ABOVE SHOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE ASSURANCES.
5. I COMMEND YOUR INITIATIVE IN USING THE DISSENT CHANNEL. IN THIS CASE, IT APPEARS WE ARE ALL ON THE SAME WAVE-LENGTH. CHRISTOPHER

Henderson Dissent file



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6

May 17, 1979

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Redacted]

American Embassy
Asuncion, Paraguay

Dear [Redacted]:

I wanted to follow up on my February 21, 1979 response to your dissent message "The State Department and Human Rights in Cuba".

The Department is still pursuing the two proposals regarding improved facilities for visa processing and the use of the diplomatic pouch for mail for U.S. prisoners. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has agreed to dispatch a team to Cuba to explore the feasibility and cost of sending a mobile health team from the U.S. Public Health Service to Havana with X-ray equipment. The Interests Section would contract with a local physician to perform the examinations.

status

The U.S. Interests Section in Havana has determined that normal international mail services are inadequate for regular transmission of letters to prisoners in Cuba. The Department is reviewing whether this finding meets all the criteria necessary to justify sending prisoner mail through the diplomatic pouch.

*status
D.L.?*

Your Dissent Channel message on "Human Rights in Cuba" has clearly made a difference and I again commend you for it. In this context, let me respond to the concerns you expressed in your letter of April 5 regarding your career status and prospects.

I have the greatest respect for those who actively exercise their right to dissent. You have clearly shown no hesitancy either to voice your

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reservations concerning certain U.S. policies and procedures or to suggest areas for improvement and innovation. However, I am not aware of any awards granted solely for dissent, or for use of the Dissent Channel per se. As you know, the Director General's award for outstanding reporting is given to several officers each year. My understanding is that these awards are based on an assessment of an officer's overall performance. Nominations thus typically come from an officer's immediate supervisors or others with broad familiarity with an officer's work. I obviously lack this perspective and would suggest, therefore, that you look to others more familiar with your performance. I would have no objection in this regard to your making use of this letter or of previous Dissent Channel correspondence, subject to regulations governing the handling of classified materials.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Director
Policy Planning Staff

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

RELEASE IN PART B6

~~BACK OF~~ STATE 035560
~~ORIGIN OF~~

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APPROVED BY S/P: PDWOLFOWITZ
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DISSENT CHANNEL TO [] FROM S/P WOLFOWITZ

E. O. 12065: GDS 2/10/87 (WOLFOWITZ, PAUL)

TAGS: N/A

SUBJECT: YOUR DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE

REF: OTTAWA 00530

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE CONCERNING THE ROLES OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT/ FOREIGN SERVICE IN USG INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FAM REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE DISSENT CHANNEL AND TAKING YOUR REQUEST INTO CONSIDERATION, I HAVE DISTRIBUTED COPIES OF YOUR CABLE TO THE FOLLOWING: THE SECRETARY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, THE OFFICES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, THE HEAD OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM. A MEMBER OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF WILL BE COORDINATING A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE.

3. I COMMENT YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. HAIG

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
B6


September 24, 1974

~~SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

MEMORANDUM

TO : S/P - Mr. Winston Lord

FROM :



SUBJECT: Dissent from AF Action Memorandum on DC-8

I continue to believe, and INR concurs, that no assurances from Bongo have value. However, this analysis is submitted to rebut the arguments of those officials who believe that assurances are of value and that the telegram from Bongo provides assurances on Rhodesia which are credible.

A. The AF memo states we now have Bongo's personal written assurances that the plane will not be used in Rhodesian trade. I state that Bongo, advised by his French counselors, has very carefully not given such assurances. We have three documents from Bongo:

1. A telegram to the Secretary stating that Bongo "renews the guaranties given in the note verbale of June 28 and on the occasion of the special mission's visit concerning the utilization of the aircraft for my personal use and in addition...for Air Afrique...under IATA regulations. This would exclude all countries under sanction by the UN, of which Gabon is a member and whose decisions have Gabon's full support and approval."

Comment: The word "guaranties" appears nowhere in the note verbale of June 28; the special mission provided no oral guaranties or assurances with regard to Rhodesia (see Enc. A - Memcon prepared by L/AF).

The note verbale contains many statements (not guaranties) about the plane; it would be maintained by Air Afrique, it will be used in accordance with the Treaty

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~~SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

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of Yaounde, a contract has been signed for its purchase, its use will not compete with existing airlines, the plane is for Bongo's personal use, it will not be used to benefit countries sanctioned by the UN. Bongo did not repeat that key statement in his telegram.

Bongo has known for months of our concern that the plane will be used in Rhodesian trade. Furthermore, because we did not approve the export license after we received the note verbale (indeed, AF recommended against the sale, after we received the note), Bongo has known that note from his Ambassador did not provide sufficient assurances/guarantees on that point. Therefore, his personal message to the Secretary should, at the very least, have specifically repeated the statement that the plane will not be used to benefit Rhodesia. Instead, he simply repeated that the plane is for his personal use and for Air Afrique, statements which we received over his signature twice before and considered insufficient (see pgh # 2 and # 3 below).

I believe Bongo has intentionally avoided putting his own name to a statement that the plane will not be used in Rhodesian trade, and instead has given us a "guarantee" that the plane is for his personal use and for Air Afrique, which guarantees nothing. The sentence beginning "this would exclude all countries, etc" must be carefully looked at:

If the word "this" refers to its immediate antecedent "under IATA rules", it is meaningless, because L/AF informed us IATA rules do not prohibit member airlines from flying to Rhodesia, and two members (Portugal and South Africa) fly there regularly.

If the word "this" refers to usage by Air Afrique/UTA, it is meaningless because Bongo does not control that airline, and UTA has been involved in sanctions violations anyway.

If the word "this" refers to "personal use by Bongo" it is meaningless because the first plane was for Bongo's personal use and went immediately to Rhodesia.

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~~SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

3.

In other words, the two key sentences simply read "I, guarantee the plane is for my personal use and for Air Afrique and this means the plane won't go to Rhodesia". Based on the analysis above, we have no guarantee over Bongo's signature about Rhodesia.

(Note: The telegram contains other statements which are misleading or false: Gabon does not fully support the UN; a fleet of planes flies from Libreville to Rhodesia regularly. Bongo did not receive approval from Chiefs of State and the OAU: Gowon of Nigeria (while temporarily President of the OAU) told Bongo it was inappropriate to give either approval or disapproval of the proposed purchase.)

2. Some months ago our Ambassador received a letter from Bongo saying the plane was for his personal use and for Air Afrique. No assurances on Rhodesia.

3. Exim received a letter from Bongo, repeating the two uses of the plane but saying nothing about Rhodesia. The letter did say the plane would be used in accordance with the Treaty of Yaounde. When a copy of the letter was given our Ambassador by Roland Bru (French advisor, and long-time agent of Foccart; Bru is described as "nefarious" and "bitterly Anti-American"), Bru said the Treaty of Yaounde provided the assurances we wanted on Rhodesia. AF researched the Treaty and found it was signed in 1961 (seven years before sanctions) and simply set up Air Afrique. In other words, we were given this letter and told it contained the assurances we wanted, but this was a false statement.

Given the consistent pattern of false statements (the June 28 note verbale contains innumerable blatant falsehoods - see Enc. B) made to us either in writing or orally there seems no reason to believe the statement in the note verbale concerning Rhodesian sanctions, and in fact AF did not do so. The "new element" in this situation is the telegram from Bongo, which gives no guarantees on Rhodesia. Why, therefore, should the State Department shift from its position of July 11 "don't sell" to its position of Sept. 16 "sell without any conditions"?

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B. Further comment on the statements in AF's memo:

1. AF states that the "assurances" in the Bongo telegram are the best we can get. Yet we have a copy of a letter from a GOG Minister to EXIM stating the plane will not be used in Rhodesian trade. This is better than the statement contained in the Bongo telegram. However, it is the same quality of assurance that we received in 1972, just before we approved the export license for the first plane which went immediately into Rhodesian trade.

2. AF States the assurances will protect us from criticism if the plane is mis-used. Yet we were criticized after allowing the first plane to go to Gabon when we knew Gabon was involved in Rhodesian trade, and our defense that we had prior assurances did not help us. Having been betrayed on the first plane, how can we explain our selling the second plane? By again referring to assurances?

3. AF states the costs to Bongo (of violating his guarantees) will include criticism from the OAU, the UN, the USG, and the press. Yet he is still incurring these "costs" on the first plane, and it doesn't bother him. In June 1974 the OAU reported that Rhodesia had obtained the use of this fleet of planes only because Gabon had "impersonated" Rhodesia. The planes are still flying out of Libreville to Rhodesia. There are no "costs" to Bongo because he declines to feel ashamed or embarrassed.

4. AF states Bongo must realize the possibility of bilateral action against him if he misuses the second plane. Why "must" he realize this? He knows of the flak we got on the first plane, yet bilateral relations have improved since 1972 and we are doing everything we can to increase American investment and he knows it. I believe he does not expect adverse action if he mis-uses the plane, and I doubt that the reference (in the proposed diplomatic note attached to AF's memo) to bilateral relations will be interpreted as a serious commitment from us to take action against him.

5. AF's memo refers to possible adverse action by Bongo against us if we refuse the sale. Yet the actions we anticipated have, in the most part, already been taken (rejections of bids, etc) and the DC-8 situation has only

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been one of the reasons the GOG has turned us down. The remaining possible adverse actions are so minor (i.e. the GOG assumes majority control of a manganese company in which US Steel has an interest) that they no longer form a significant motivation for acting positively on the export license.

Recommendation: by diplomatic note to the GOG Embassy, and by note verbale to the GOG from our Embassy in Libreville, let us tell the Gabonese that we were worried about the possible mis-use of the first plane before we sold it and therefore asked for and got assurances, but nevertheless the plane went into Rhodesian trade and is still there. Because the USG decided at the time the export license was issued in 1972 that mis-use would be prejudicial to sale of future aircraft to Gabon, we are now implementing that decision. In doing this, we are making no judgement about how the GOG would have used the second plane if we had approved the sale. We could add orally that since we believe a DC-8 can be purchased elsewhere (or a similar aircraft) our refusal to sell should in no way inconvenience President Bongo in fulfilling his need for a plane for his personal use.

In making this recommendation I am expressing my own views. However, these views are supported by the views expressed by other Foreign Service Officers, including those familiar with President Bongo and the Rhodesian sanctions problem, who feel the sale of the plane will be a mistake.

S/P file

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S/P-OF: NBOYER

S/P ONLY

ROUTINE DAMASCUS

STADIS, DISSENT CHANNEL
FOR [] FROM TONY LAKE-S/P

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IS

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE : SYRIA, ISRAEL AND
LEBANON: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

REF: DAMASCUS 1482

1. THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE ON "SYRIA, ISRAEL AND LEBANON: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE". MR. GRANVILLE AUSTIN OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF HAS BEEN NAMED COORDINATOR IN CHARGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATED DISTRIBUTION FOR DISSENT MESSAGES, YOUR MESSAGE HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH AND EMBASSY BEIRUT. WE COMMEND YOUR USE OF DISSENT CHANNEL AND WILL REPLY AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE VIEWS YOU HAVE SUBMITTED. YY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASE IN PART
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February 17, 1976

TO : PM -

FROM : S/P - Reginald Bartholome *B*

SUBJECT: Dissent Paper on Arms Sales
to Pakistan

B6

This will acknowledge the receipt of your dissent paper on the Department's policies on arms sales to Pakistan. Mr. Thomas Thornton of the Policy Planning Staff has been named coordinator in charge of a substantive reply. In accordance with the stipulated distribution for dissent messages, your paper has been circulated to the offices of the Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff and the Chairperson of the Open Forum Panel. We commend your use of the dissent channel and will reply as promptly as possible to the views you have submitted.

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RELEASE IN FULL

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PAGE 01 STATE 269639

ORIGIN EUR-12

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SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 DOTE-00 EE-00 H-02 INR-07
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APPROVED BY EUR:JGOODEY

EUR/P:WGEHRON

S/PRS:KEROWN

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TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 269639

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ASEC, GW, PINS

SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 10: STATEMENT ON

TERRORIST THREAT TO LUFTHANSA

THERE FOLLOWS HEREWIT A VERBATIM TEXT OF THE PORTION
OF TODAY'S PRESS CONFERENCE DEALING WITH THE TERRORIST
THREATS AGAINST LUFTHANSA:

BEGIN TEXT:

A. I WANTED TO READ TO YOU AND BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION
THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE WEST
GERMAN GOVERNMENT EARLIER TODAY (I THINK ABOUT AN HOUR
AND A QUARTER AGO) THE TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS:

QUITE RECENTLY THREATS TO ATTACK GERMAN PASSENGER
AIRCRAFT HAVE BECOME KNOWN.

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PAGE 02 STATE 269639

AND LET ME GO BACK AND SAY THAT THIS IS A TRANSLATION
OF A GERMAN TEXT, SO IT MAY NOT--EVERY NUANCE--MAY NOT
BE EXACTLY RIGHT, BUT THIS IS BASICALLY THE TEXT
THAT I WOULD LIKE YOU TO HAVE.

QUITE RECENTLY, THREATS TO ATTACK GERMAN PASSENGER
AIRCRAFT HAVE BECOME KNOWN. INDEPENDENTLY OF THE FACTUAL
BACKGROUND, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TAKES THESE THREATS
SERIOUSLY, AS IT HAS ALL REPORTS OF DANGER OF RECENT
DAYS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN
COMPREHENSIVE, EFFECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES IN ORDER TO
PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST GERMAN AIRCRAFT. IN
THIS REGARD, IT HAS NOT RESTRICTED ITSELF TO MEASURES
WITHIN ITS BORDERS. ALONG WITH THE PRECAUTIONS THAT
EVERYONE CAN RECOGNIZE, ENERGETIC ADDITIONAL MEASURES
WERE EFFECTED.

UNDERSTANDING FOR THESE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IS ASKED
OF CITIZENS, AND ESPECIALLY OF FLIGHT PASSENGERS, WHOSE
SECURITY THESE MEASURES ARE PRIMARILY INTENDED TO SERVE.
THAT IS THE END OF THE WEST GERMAN ANNOUNCEMENT EARLIER

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PAGE 1

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TODAY.

NOW I DON'T HAVE MUCH MORE THAT I CAN ADD FOR YOUR INFORMATION ABOUT THIS, INCLUDING--

Q. DID THEY ASK YOU TO REPORT IT AT A BRIEFING?

A. NO.

Q. WELL WHY DID YOU READ IT?

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PAGE 03 STATE 269639

A. WE ARE READING IT TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION, JUAN, AND TO THE ATTENTION OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, THE WEST GERMAN MEASURES WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT I HAVE READ.

Q. JOHN, ARE YOU TELLING US THAT WEST GERMAN POLICE ARE GOING TO BE OPERATING OUT OF U.S. AIRPORTS?

A. NO, LARS, I WAS ABOUT TO SAY THAT I AM UNABLE TO GIVE YOU DETAILS OF WHAT THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT IS DOING. I ONLY WANTED TO BRING THIS TO YOUR ATTENTION. YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE TO ADDRESS YOUR QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT MEASURES THEY ARE TAKING TO THEM.

Q. JOHN,--I ADDRESS MY QUESTION TO YOU SINCE YOU VOLUNTEERED A STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

A. OK, I THINK YOU CAN ALL UNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT, AND IF YOU WANT TO TRY TO ASK ME QUESTIONS I AM UNABLE TO ANSWER, THAT IS UP TO YOU.

Q. DOES THE UNITED STATES APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF WHAT THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS DONE?

A. DO WE DISAPPROVE OR APPROVE?

Q. YES.

A. I THINK THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN A STEP WHICH THEY FEEL NECESSARY TO TAKE, AND I DON'T THINK WE ARE IN A POSITION OF APPROVING OR DISAPPROVING. OBVIOUSLY OUR POSITION ON TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAS BEEN STATED MANY TIMES, MURRAY.

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PAGE 04 STATE 269639

Q. I UNDERSTAND THAT. DID THIS REQUIRE SOME ACQUIESCENCE BY THE UNITED STATES AS TO MEASURES FOR SAFETY UNDERTAKEN BY THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL AFFECT THE BOARDING OF WEST GERMAN AIRCRAFT IN THIS COUNTRY?

A. I HAVE NOT BEEN SO INFORMED. I AM NOT SAYING THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE, BUT I AM NOT AWARE THAT ANY ACQUIESCENCE ON OUR PART FOR MEASURES IN THIS COUNTRY HAS BEEN GIVEN.

Q. CAN YOU FIND OUT?

A. SURE.

Q. IS THAT A NOTE ON LARS' ANSWER, WHEN HE ASKED YOU ABOUT WEST GERMAN POLICE BEING STATIONED AT US AIRPORTS? YOU SAID NO, OR YOU DIDN'T MEAN TO SAY NO.

A. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW. BUT WHAT I REALLY MEAN IS

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PAGE 2

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THAT YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE TO ASK THE GERMANS WHAT MEASURES THEY ARE TAKING. I AM JUST NOT INFORMED OF IT, AND MY PURPOSE IN ANNOUNCING THIS IS TO BRING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

Q. JOHN, A RELATED QUESTION ON POLICE--?

Q. INCLUDING THAT THEY SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS--I MEAN, WHEN FLYING LUFTHANSA TO THE UNITED STATES?

A. SAY THAT AGAIN?

Q. I MEAN, INCLUDING THAT AMERICANS SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS

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PAGE 05 STATE 269639

WHEN FLYING LUFTHANSA?

Q. DID PAN AMERICAN ASK YOU TO READ THIS?

(LAUGHTER.)

A. DO YOU WANT ME TO JUST JOKE ABOUT IT, OR DO YOU WANT A SERIOUS ANSWER TO A SERIOUS QUESTION? WHAT I AM TRYING TO DO, AS I SAY, IS OBVIOUS TO EVERYBODY. IF YOU WANT TO TRAP ME INTO STATEMENTS ABOUT THE THINGS THAT I AM NOT ABLE TO ANSWER, THAT IS FINE. I AM WILLING TO BE TRAPPED.

I AM SAYING THAT AMERICANS MUST MAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS ABOUT TRAVEL ON LUFTHANSA. WE ARE SIMPLY BRINGING THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT TO THEIR ATTENTION. WE ARE DOING IT THAT WAY BECAUSE THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT IS BEST ABLE TO ASSESS A THREAT TO ITS OWN AIRLINE. WE ARE SIMPLY RELAYING THEIR WORDS, THEIR MESSAGE, TO YOU AND TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

Q. DID YOU TELL THEM BEFORE THAT YOU WERE GOING TO MAKE THIS STATEMENT?

A. WE HAVE CONSULTED WITH THEM. YES.

Q. AND HAVE THEY ASKED YOUR COOPERATION AS FAR AS THE SECURITY MEASURES NOT WITHIN GERMAN BORDERS ARE CONCERNED? IS THE UNITED STATES GOING TO COOPERATE WITH THEM, OR IS IT SOMETHING PURELY GERMAN?

A. I AM SURE WE WOULD BE DISPOSED TO COOPERATE, OF COURSE, FRANCOIS. I JUST DON'T KNOW THE IN'S AND OUT'S OF THE CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH THE WEST GERMANS OR WHAT THEY HAVE ASKED AND WHAT WE HAVE RESPONDED. I JUST DON'T KNOW.

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PAGE 06 STATE 269639

Q. COULD YOU FIND OUT WHETHER THIS AFFECTS AMERICAN AIRLINES THAT TRAVEL TO GERMANY, OR WHETHER THE SECURITY MEASURES ARE GOING TO AFFECT THEM?

A. I DON'T THINK IT DOES, JOHN. THESE ARE MEASURES BEING TAKEN ON THE WEST GERMAN AIRLINE, AS FAR AS I KNOW.

Q. JOHN, WHAT REALLY IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STATEMENT? IS IT TO WARN AMERICANS?

A. I THINK I HAVE SAID IT TWO OR THREE TIMES.

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PAGE 3

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Q. IT IS NOT THE ONLY GOVERNMENT THAT IS DOING THIS,
AND YET I THINK IT IS THE FIRST TIME THAT YOU ARE
MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT.

A. IT MAY VERY WELL BE. THAT IS SAID WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT OR ANY OTHER AIRLINE. WE JUST
HAPPEN TO BE MAKING THIS AVAILABLE.

Q. I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHETHER YOU ARE SUGGESTING NOW
THAT THE GERMAN AIRLINES ARE MORE SECURE THAN OTHER
AIRLINES, OR ARE YOU SUGGESTING TO AMERICAN CITIZENS
TO CONSIDER WHICH AIRLINE--?

A. IDO, I AM NOT SUGGESTING ANYTHING. THE WEST
GERMANS HAVE MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THEIR OWN PUBLIC.
SINCE AMERICANS TRAVEL ON LUFTHANSA, WE THOUGHT THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC WOULD LIKE TO KNOW.

C. SO YOU ARE JUST TELLING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT
THEY MAY BE INCONVENIENCED IN THEIR TRAVELS TO PROTECT

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PAGE 07 STATE 269639

THEIR OWN SECURITY, IS THAT RIGHT?

A. WE ARE TELLING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHAT THE
WEST GERMANS HAVE ANNOUNCED AND LETTING THEM MAKE
THEIR OWN DECISIONS AS TO WHAT THEY WISH TO DO IF
THEY PLAN TO TRAVEL. END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

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PAGE 4

RELEASE IN PART B6

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Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: ELAB, PINT, CI

SUBJECT: DISSENT CHANNEL MESSAGE: AFL-CIO SOLIDARITY VISIT
DISSENT CHANNEL
REF: A) SANTIAGO 3615 P) STATE 116103

1. WE AGREE WITH THE SENTIMENT EXPRESSED IN YOUR DISSENT MESSAGE REGARDING THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF FREE TRADE UNIONS AS A GUARANTOR OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF THEIR MEMBERS. IN EXAMINING THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES OF COUNTRIES, WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO GIVE INCREASING ATTENTION TO THE TREATMENT ACCORDED TRADE UNIONS.

2. WHILE WE ARE SUPPORTIVE OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS THAT PROVIDE FOR WHICH ACTIVITY, WE DO NOT WANT TO SUPPORT OR APPEAR TO SUPPORT ANY PARTICULAR POLITICAL MOVEMENT, PARTY, OR GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS. WE APPRECIATE THAT THE GROUP OF TEN HAS BEEN ON THE FRONT LINES IN THE STRUGGLE TO RESTORE FREE TRADE UNIONISM IN CHILE AND THAT THEY DESERVE SPECIAL ATTENTION. NEVERTHELESS, OUR CONCERN TO AVOID APPEARING TO BE INTERFERING IN INTERNAL CHILEAN AFFAIRS PRECLUDES A POLICY OF PRIVILEGED SUPPORT FOR THEM OR ANY OTHER GROUP. HOWEVER, IN EXPRESSING OUR CONCERN THAT OVERLY EXCLUSIVE ATTENTION TO THE G-1, COULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, THE DEPARTMENT FELT THAT IT ALSO WAS NOT IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS

TO APPEAR TO BE TOO CLOSELY AND PREFERENTIALLY ALLIED WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN LIGHT OF THE PAST HISTORY OF CLOSE IDENTIFICATION OF THE US WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WE PRESUME THAT THE G-10 SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE TO THIS CONCERN.

3. THE BREAKDOWN IN 1973 OF CHILEAN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS WAS CAUSED, IN PART, BY THE DIVISIONS AMONG THOSE GROUPS WHO SHARED A CONCERN FOR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. STABILITY OF FUTURE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN CHILE WILL DEPEND UPON THESE GROUPS WORKING OUT A MODUS VIVENDI. WHEN APPROPRIATE, WE CAN TAKE STEPS THAT COULD FACILITATE SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING. BRINGING TOGETHER VARIOUS LEGITIMATE UNION REPRESENTATIVES FROM DIVERSE GROUPINGS UNDER THE REGIS OF THE AFL-CIO VISIT COULD WORK TOWARD THIS END.

4. REFTEL B WAS NOT MEANT TO CONVEY PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS, AS INFERRED IN PARA 4 OF REFTEL A, BUT TO EXPRESS THE DEPARTMENT'S GENERAL SENSE THAT IT WAS PREFERABLE TO AVOID EXCLUSIVE IDENTIFICATION WITH A SINGLE GROUP. AS REFTEL B INDICATED, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE VIEWS OF THE VARIOUS

PARTIES INVOLVED, MOST NOTABLY THOSE OF THE AFL-CIO ITSELF, WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

5. WE FEEL THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE US, THE G-10 AND OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY TOWARD CHILE ALL SUGGEST THAT THE AFL-CIO SOLIDARITY TEAM MEET WITH A BROAD RANGE OF LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVES OF CHILEAN LABOR, INCLUDING THOSE BOTH TO THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT OF THE G-10. WE WILL, HOWEVER, LEAVE IT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S JUDGMENT AS TO ATTENDANCE AT THE VARIOUS MEETINGS INVOLVING THE AFL-CIO TEAM, DECISIONS WHICH IN ANY EVENT WILL NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE TEAM ITSELF.

6. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISSENT CHANNEL PRACTICE, YOUR MESSAGE WAS DISTRIBUTED TO THE SECRETARY, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OPEN FORUM, AS WELL AS THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AND THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR LABOR AFFAIRS. YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL IS COMMENDABLE AND I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO YOUR THOUGHTS ON A SUBJECT THAT CLEARLY MERITS THE FULLEST CONSIDERATION OF DIFFERING VIEWS. VANCE

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Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM
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PAGE 01 STATE 327811
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APPROVED BY S/P/HJONES

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DISSENT CHANNEL; FOR [] FROM AMB. BOSWORTH

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E.O. 12356DECLAS. OADR
TAGS: EAID, SY, JO
SUBJECT: TERMINATION OF AID PROGRAM IN SYRIA

REF: AMMAN 9761

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ON THE RAMIFICATIONS OF POSSIBLE LEGISLATION AFFECTING U. S. AID PROGRAMS IN SYRIA.
3. A MEMBER OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF WILL COORDINATE A REPLY AFTER DISCUSSING YOUR PROPOSAL WITH APPROPRIATE OFFICES. IN ORDER TO GIVE YOUR IDEAS THOROUGH CONSIDERATION, WE HAVE FORWARDED COPIES OF YOUR CABLE TO THE FOLLOWING:
 - THE SECRETARY
 - THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
 - THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
 - THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
 - THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
 - THE LEGAL ADVISOR
 - THE ADMINISTRATOR OF AID
 - S/S ~ CHARLES HILL
 - THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECRETARY'S OPEN FORUM
4. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO LET US KNOW AT ANY TIME. I COMMEND YOUR USE OF THE DISSENT CHANNEL. SCHULTZ

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