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Central Intelligence Agency  
Inspector General

# SPECIAL REVIEW



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(TS) [REDACTED] COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND  
INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES  
(SEPTEMBER 2001 – OCTOBER 2003)  
(2003-7123-IG)  
7 May 2004

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
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number of psychologists, physicians, Physician's Assistants,<sup>39</sup> and COBs completed the training for familiarization purposes. Students completing the Interrogation Course are required to sign an acknowledgment that they have read, understand, and will comply with the DCI's Interrogation Guidelines.

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69. (TS) [redacted] In June 2003, CTC established a debriefing course for Agency substantive experts who are involved in questioning detainees after they have undergone interrogation and have been deemed "compliant." The debriefing course was established to train non-interrogators to collect actionable intelligence from high value detainees in CIA custody. The course is intended to familiarize non-interrogators with key aspects of the Agency interrogation Program, to include the Program's goals and legal authorities, the DCI Interrogation Guidelines, and the roles and responsibilities of all who interact with a high value detainee. As of September 2003, three of these training sessions had been conducted, with a total of [redacted] individuals completing the training. CTC/RDG was contemplating establishing a similar training regimen for Security Protective Officers and linguists who will be assigned to interrogation sites.

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**DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OPERATIONS AT** (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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70. (TS) [redacted] The detention and interrogation activity examined during this Review occurred primarily at three facilities encrypted as [redacted] was the facility at which two prominent Al-Qa'ida detainees, Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri, were held with the foreign host government's knowledge and approval, until it was closed for operational security reasons in December 2002. The two detainees at that location were

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<sup>39</sup> (U) Physician's Assistants are formally trained to provide diagnostic, therapeutic, and preventative health care services. They work under the supervision of a physician, record progress notes, and may prescribe medications.

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[redacted]

**DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OPERATIONS AT** [redacted]

70. [redacted]

[redacted]

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then moved to [redacted] located in another foreign country. Eight individuals were detained and interrogated at [redacted] including Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri.

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**Staffing and Operations** (b)(3) NatSecAct

71. (TS/ [redacted] CTC initially established [redacted] to detain and interrogate Abu Zubaydah. [redacted] was operational between [redacted] December 2002. [redacted] had no permanent positions and was staffed with temporary duty (TDY) officers. Initially, Abu Zubaydah's Agency interrogators at [redacted] included an [redacted] officer, who also served as COB, and a senior Agency security officer. They were assisted by [redacted] various security, medical, and communications personnel detailed to [redacted] to support the interrogation mission. An independent contractor psychologist with extensive experience as an interrogation instructor at the U.S. Air Force SERE School also assisted the team.

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72. (TS/ [redacted] Once the Agency approved the use of EITs [redacted] in August 2002, a second independent contractor psychologist with [redacted] years of SERE experience joined the team. This followed a determination by the CIA personnel involved in debriefing that the continuation of the existing methods would not produce the actionable intelligence that the Intelligence Community believed Abu Zubaydah possessed. The team was supervised by the COB and supported by the on-site team of security, medical, and communications personnel.

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73. (TS/ [redacted] The responsibility of the COB [redacted] was to ensure the facility and staff functioned within the authorities that govern the mission. In conjunction with those duties, the COB was responsible for the overall management and security of the site and the personnel assigned to support activities there. The COB oversaw interrogations and released operational and intelligence.

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[redacted]

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cables and situation reports. The COB coordinated activities with the Station and Headquarters and reported to the CTC Chief of Renditions Group.<sup>40</sup>

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74. (TS/ [redacted]) The two psychologist/interrogators at [redacted] led each interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri where EITs were used. The psychologist/interrogators conferred with the COB and other team members before each interrogation session. Psychological evaluations were performed by both Headquarters and on-site psychologists. Early on in the development of the interrogation Program, Agency OMS psychologists objected to the use of on-site psychologists as interrogators and raised conflict of interest and ethical concerns. This was based on a concern that the on-site psychologists who were administering the EITs participated in the evaluations, assessing the effectiveness and impact of the EITs on the detainees.

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75. (TS/ [redacted]) The interrogation intelligence requirements for Abu Zubaydah were generally developed at Headquarters by CTC/Usama Bin Laden (UBL) Group and refined at [redacted] CTC/RDG, CTC/LGL, CTC/UBL, and [redacted] provided input into the rendition and interrogation process.

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[redacted] staff maintained daily dialogue with Headquarters management by cable and secure telephone, and [redacted] officers initiated a video conference with Headquarters to discuss the efficacy of proceeding with EITs.

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76. (TS/ [redacted]) Abu Zubaydah was the only detainee at [redacted] until 'Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri arrived on 15 November 2002. The interrogation of Al-Nashiri proceeded after [redacted] received the necessary Headquarters authorization. The two

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<sup>40</sup> (TS/ [redacted]) In August 2002, the group name became Renditions and Detainees Group, indicative of its new responsibilities for running detention facilities and interrogations. For consistency purposes in this Review, OIG subsequently refers to this group as CTC/RDG.

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[redacted]

74. (TS/ [redacted]) psychologist/interrogators [redacted] led each interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri where EITs were used. The psychologist/interrogators conferred with [redacted] team members before each interrogation session. Psychological evaluations were performed by [redacted] psychologists [redacted]

75. [redacted]

[redacted]

76. (TS/ [redacted])

[redacted] 15 November 2002. The interrogation of Al-Nashiri proceeded after [redacted] the necessary Headquarters authorization. [redacted]

[redacted]

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psychologist/interrogators began Al-Nashiri's interrogation using EITs immediately upon his arrival. Al-Nashiri provided lead information on other terrorists during his first day of interrogation. On the twelfth day of interrogation, the two psychologist/interrogators administered two applications of the waterboard to Al-Nashiri during two separate interrogation sessions. Enhanced interrogation of Al-Nashiri continued through 4 December 2002.

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77. (TS/ ) Headquarters had intense interest in

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including compliance with the guidance provided to the site relative to the use of EITs. Apart from this, however, and before the use of EITs, the interrogation teams at decided to

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78. (TS/ ) OIG reviewed the videotapes, logs, and cables in May 2003. OIG identified 83 waterboard applications, most of which lasted less than 10 seconds.<sup>41</sup> OIG also identified one instance where a psychologist/interrogator verbally

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<sup>41</sup> (TS/ ) For the purpose of this Review, a waterboard application constituted each discrete instance in which water was applied for any period of time during a session.

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threatened Abu Zubaydah by stating, "If one child dies in America, and I find out you knew something about it, I will personally cut your mother's throat."<sup>42</sup> OIG found 11 interrogation videotapes to be blank. Two others were broken except for one or two minutes of recording. Two others were broken and could not be reviewed. OIG compared the videotapes to [redacted] logs and cables and identified a 21-hour period of time, which included two waterboard sessions, that was not captured on the videotapes.

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79. (TS/ [redacted] OIG's review of the videotapes revealed that the waterboard technique employed at [redacted] was different from the technique as described in the DoJ opinion and used in the SERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the detainee's breathing was obstructed. At the SERE School and in the DoJ opinion, the subject's airflow is disrupted by the firm application of a damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the Agency interrogator [redacted] continuously applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose. One of the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency's use of the technique differed from that used in SERE training and explained that the Agency's technique is different because it is "for real" and is more poignant and convincing.

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80. (TS/ [redacted] From December 2002 until [redacted] September 2003, [redacted] was used to detain and interrogate eight individuals.

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[redacted] During this time, Headquarters issued the formal DCI Confinement Guidelines, the DCI Interrogation Guidelines, and the additional draft guidelines specifically

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<sup>42</sup> (U//FOUO) See discussion in paragraphs 92-93 regarding threats.

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[redacted] During this time, Headquarters issued the formal DCI Confinement Guidelines, the DCI Interrogation Guidelines, and the additional draft guidelines specifically

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