

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

NPT
136

SECRET

April 5, 1967

275-9

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : S/P - Henry Owen ^{WS}

SUBJECT: New Proposals Re Securing Non-Nuclear Countries'
Adherence to a Non-Proliferation Treaty:
ACTION MEMORANDUM

1. Purpose: The attached memorandum suggests actions not now in train which we might take, in order to enhance our chances of getting an NPT in such a way as to promote our long-run objectives (including non-proliferation) in India, Japan, Germany, and Italy.

2. Clearance: These proposals cut across the responsibilities not only of ACDA but of several areas of the Department. I have discussed them with Ambassador Kohler's office and others, but have not sought clearance - in line with your urging that we give you S/P's new ideas in their unvarnished state.

Recommendation: That you assign responsibility for reviewing these proposals, in light of ACDA and Bureau comments, and for co-ordinating State's role in any needed follow-up action to one of your 7th floor colleagues.

Approve Assignment to ACDA

Disapprove _____

cc: - U - The Under Secretary
M - Mr. Rostow
S/C - Mr. Bowie
G - Mr. Kohler

SECRET

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 72893

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Additional Action that Might Be Taken to Meet
Concerns of NPT Signatories

1. Introduction. This memorandum deals with actions not now in train^{1/} which might help to meet key concerns of nuclear-capable countries and thus to persuade them to sign an NPT. It treats actions to meet three major categories of these countries' concerns:

- (a) concerns over civil uses of nuclear technology;
- (b) concerns over security;
- (c) concerns over second class status.

I. Concerns Over Civil Uses

2. Technology. The fear of losing technological ground through not having access to civil data secured through military nuclear research exists in Germany, Italy and, to a lesser extent, Japan.

Proposal: To meet this concern, the US and UK should:

(a) offer to join others in creating an international corporation, which would make available to all its members peaceful technology developed through military nuclear programs of any member;^{2/}

(b) undertake to supply all peaceful knowledge acquired through their national nuclear programs to EURATOM, thus (i) giving new life to that ailing organization, and (ii) providing it with compensation for the pain which it is being caused on other fronts by the NPT. (EURATOM already acts

1/ It does not, therefore, deal with such issues as safeguards and an international agency to perform peaceful explosions which are already under active consideration.

2/ In the US, AEC makes this technology available only to American industry - which might well howl at losing this exclusive privilege.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

as a clearing house for information among its members and thus should be able easily to handle an extension of this function.)

3. Fuel. The FRG has sought, and other nuclear capable countries will probably seek, assurances of a continued supply of fissionable material.

Proposal:

(a) The US should make another public multi-year pledge of nuclear fuel to IAEA and offer a further increase in that pledge if the Soviets will match it. (Even though the IAEA does not now face a fuel shortage, this new and large offer would help to reassure non-nuclear countries for the future.)

(b) The US should offer to join an IAEA study of the possibility of building an internationally owned nuclear fuel facility in the US, to meet other countries' future needs for nuclear fuel, if these are judged likely to exceed presently projected production. (Other countries may not take up this offer, preferring to build national or EURATOM production facilities on their own territory, but the mere fact of the offer might earn us some points.)

II. Security Concerns

4. Guarantees. Guarantees are a special problem for non-aligned India; Japan, Germany and Italy are covered by existing treaties. India is now seeking Soviet assurances. Regardless of how this comes out, there will remain the problem of what, if anything, the US should do to make its own (October 1964) assurances more persuasive.

Proposal: We should offer to hold private US-Indian discussions of possible contingencies involving ChiCom nuclear blackmail, as recommended in the interagency paper which NEA and S/P submitted to the Secretary in December 1966 on "The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem", and endorsed

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

recently by Embassy Delhi. This would not be a guarantee, but it would meet some Indian concerns. (To take this action, we would need either to overcome JCS reservations or to get SecDef, who did not take a position on the paper, to override these reservations.)

5. Nuclear Role. The Japanese do not have the equivalent of the NATO Special Nuclear Committee. They are not ready, politically, for such an ambitious measure; some Japanese officials may, however, see this as the next step, after presently envisaged security consultations get underway.

Proposal:

We should inform the Japanese that we would be ready to join them in creating a bilateral US-Japanese nuclear consultation mechanism, whenever they might wish.

III. Second Class Status

6. Problem. The most basic of the nuclear-capable countries' concerns is their fear of being frozen indefinitely into second class status. This concern has been reflected in suggestions or comments by the non-nuclear countries regarding:

- (a) the duration of the treaty;
- (b) the nuclear powers' commitment to disarmament;
- (c) the special status of the UK.

Each of these is treated below.

7. Duration.

(a) The Italians, Germans, and some Japanese officials have suggested that the NPT have a fixed duration. Japanese planners report this to be the Indian view. Senator Gore has proposed "a non-proliferation agreement with a definite time span -- say ten years -- subject at the end of this period to renegotiation or renewal".

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

(b) President Chatenet of EURATOM has suggested that the same object be achieved by the non-nuclear powers' making clear how they proposed to interpret the treaty: "The non-nuclear countries...might say that they were making a contribution to non-dissemination through accepting the treaty but that this was a concession limited in time and dependent upon the nuclear countries taking some action to redress the balance."

(c) The FRG has proposed that the withdrawal clause be changed to provide that any non-nuclear country may withdraw if its sovereign rights and interests are violated or threatened by a nuclear weapon state.

Pressure for thus liberalizing the withdrawal clause, or limiting the duration of the treaty, or linking that duration to progress on disarmament will probably grow. The ACDA March 17 memo points out that "a major confrontation between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers over this issue is apt to emerge in the sharpest terms during the course of further negotiations".

Proposal: If future negotiations indicate that an NPT cannot be secured without some major action to meet the non-nuclear countries' concerns re permanent second class status, we should suggest that a loose withdrawal clause would present fewer difficulties than the proposals outlined under (a) and (b) above.

Such a withdrawal clause might be modeled after the outer space treaty, which permits a country to withdraw with one year's notice, without giving cause.

This would avoid both the "deadline" problem which would result from a treaty with a fixed duration and the strains that would be caused if the non-nuclear and nuclear countries were to interpret treaty language in different ways.

Nor is it clear that the effective life of an NPT would be shortened by our acquiescing in such a withdrawal.

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

clause. No NPT can be counted on to restrain the key nuclear-capable powers over the longer term, unless it is followed by disarmament or other changes which mitigate their sense of discrimination. Indeed, by implicitly recognizing this fact, a loose withdrawal clause might actually put some heat on the USSR to get on with disarmament.

8. Disarmament. The nuclear-capable countries would, in any event, find it easier to sign an NPT if there were some evidence of the nuclear countries' intent to move seriously toward disarmament.^{1/}

Proposal: In addition to strengthening the NPT preambular language on disarmament, the President should indicate, as NPT negotiations move forward, that he intends to ask ACDA's General Advisory Panel to undertake a searching review of past US disarmament positions, to see whether new US proposals can be developed in light of continuing technological advances. A small Executive Committee of that Panel, made up of members who could devote substantial time to the enterprise, might be asked to tackle this job as a matter of urgency.

It's been some time since we reviewed our disarmament position (except for issues involved in the current ABM talks); a new hard look at our past positions, in light of changing technology, might be rewarding.

If ABM/missile talks with the Soviets prove useful, this review could surface proposals to throw into that hopper. If the talks don't get anywhere, such a publicized US review could pave the way for eventual wider negotiations.

Quite aside from the effect of such a Presidential announcement on nuclear-capable countries' attitudes toward the NPT, public opinion in the US and elsewhere would welcome this evidence of US desire to move on from budding US-Soviet agreement on NPT to wider disarmament.

^{1/} In the long run, of course, this progress will have to include China, if India and Japan are to be impressed.

SECRET

- 6 -

9. UK Status. The non-nuclear countries' concern over second class status is accentuated by Japanese and Continental resentment of the UK's special status as a nuclear power. These medium-sized powers find it even harder to accept discrimination from one of their own ilk than at the hands of the super-powers.

Proposal: We should encourage Prime Minister Wilson to indicate, in line with his pre-election position, that he does not favor indefinite maintenance of the UK's separate national nuclear program, and hopes that progress toward either disarmament or a politically unified Europe will eventually make it possible to phase out that program.

This position (which would, as the London Economist points out, also brighten HMG's image on the Common Market front) would be the more credible if the UK desisted from going on to the next round in the arms race: Poseidon's and MIRV's. We should bear this in mind in fixing the US position, if we are asked to sell these advanced weapons to the UK.

IV. Conclusion

10. Presidential Speech. The Japanese, Indian, German, and Italian concerns re NPT discussed in this memo are shared by public opinion, as well as governments, in these countries. Actions to meet these concerns will need, therefore, to be understood by public opinion, as well as governments, if they are to yield the desired result. A Presidential speech might be useful to this end, if it had enough new substance so that it did not appear to be simply arm-twisting.

Proposal: If some of the suggestions outlined above prosper - notably those for a special US disarmament study, new arrangements for sharing of nuclear technology, and assurances regarding future supply of nuclear fuel, they should be surfaced in a major Presidential address on non-proliferation and disarmament.

SECRET

**NATIONAL
SECURITY
ARCHIVE**

This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu