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Authority NND 72893

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Tokyo, Japan

May 19, 1967

The Honorable
William C. Foster
Director,
U.S. Arms Control &
Disarmament Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Attached is a draft Memorandum of Conversation of your talks with Foreign Minister Miki. The memorandum has been cleared within the Embassy, but I am sure you will think of points which we missed and nuances which you would like brought out. Please make whatever corrections you think desirable, and we assume you will distribute the final MemCon to those offices you feel should have copies.

I am also enclosing press clippings and pertinent translations concerning your visit, including a photograph of a cartoon which I thought might amuse you. I find the latter somewhat typical of the Japanese penchant for ambiguity.

I want you to know how very pleased we were with your visit. The Foreign Minister was obviously delighted and the great inconvenience to you cannot but assure the Japanese that the U.S. is serious in its desire to consult with Japan on NPT and other important problems. As a personal note, I would like to add that I enjoyed the privilege of meeting you and being with you during your visit.

All best wishes for successful negotiation.

Sincerely yours,

Lewis M. Purnell
First Secretary of Embassy

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Foreign Minister MIKI
Vice Foreign Minister USHIBA
Deputy Vice Minister KONDO
Ambassador TANAKA
Kazuo MURAKAMI, Private Secretary to
Foreign Minister
Teruyuki SANAI, UN Bureau, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Chief, Disarmament Section)
Goro HATTORI, Director, UN Bureau, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Foster
Minister Osborn
Mr. J. O. Zurhellen, Jr., Counselor of Embassy
Mr. Lewis M. Purnell, First Secretary

PLACE: Foreign Minister's Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DATE: May 8, 1967; 11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty

cc:

After numerous photographs were taken and photographers cleared from the Conference Room, the participants settled down in a comfortable informal circle. The Foreign Minister expressed his appreciation to Ambassador Foster for having come to Japan. He said he realized how full Ambassador Foster's schedule is and was deeply grateful that the Ambassador had taken the time for these talks. He said that inasmuch as there was little time available he would like to begin discussions immediately, and asked Ambassador Foster's appraisal of the prospects for a Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially the attitudes of NATO and the non-aligned countries and how the US-USSR negotiations were proceeding. He said he realized this was a broad question but he was particularly interested in knowing how Ambassador Foster visualized the schedule of negotiations. The Foreign Minister noted that he had recently called in the Soviet Charge' d'Affaires to explain Japan's position regarding the NPT and had stressed that the nuclear nations and non-nuclear nations should both be subject to the same inspection procedures, and that

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peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear weapon countries should be guaranteed. Ambassador Foster expressed his pleasure in being able to accept the Foreign Minister's invitation to come to Tokyo. He said the objective of the U.S. was to put before the ENDC as soon as possible a reasonably agreed upon formulation which we hoped would be internationally acceptable. We had had numerous negotiations with the Russians and had worked out Articles 1 and 2 with them as a result of Secretary Rusk's talks with Gromyko and Mr. Foster's own talks with Roshchin. The two articles were then discussed with our NATO allies, and Secretary Rusk had discussed Article 1 during his last visit to Japan, Article 1 being all that we had agreement for at that time. Later we worked out Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6. We now had suggested to our allies that we should get a treaty out in the open so that all could see the language which was being proposed. The treaty has still not been tabled primarily because of problems over the safeguards provision; even after the recess in March, we have yet to table a draft. Mr. Foster stressed that we did not visualize the draft as the last word, but rather formulations which might lead toward final negotiations. Mr. Foster mentioned his meeting with NAC April 20 at which time he discussed our latest draft and got the green light to proceed with negotiations with the Soviets. He mentioned that some of the suggestions which had arisen in both discussions with our NATO allies with Japan might better be presented after the draft is tabled; that some of these suggestions can be tabled by our allies and others, e.g., peaceful uses, might best be proposed by unaligned nations. He mentioned that arms reduction will presumably be taken care of in the preamble, as the operative part of the treaty has been designed to cope with what is prohibited, and he noted that when you began including in the body of the treaty things which people wanted, it could

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become five miles long. Ambassador Foster stressed that if we can prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries, we will have taken a first but a very important step toward assuring peace. He mentioned that the last five presidents of the U.S. have had very strong feelings that as new countries obtain nuclear weapons dangers to international peace are greatly increased. Mr. Foster reiterated our long-standing interest in lessening world tensions and specifically noted achievement of the Test Ban Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, the hot line and the agreement to cut back on production of fissionable material - all of which the Soviet^s agreed to, although it is difficult to tell whether they have lived up to commitments regarding fissionable material. We visualize the NPT as the keystone in a larger structure which hopefully will lead to general and complete disarmament. Ambassador Foster also mentioned that we ^{are} already engaged with the Soviets concerning AMBs and delivery vehicles and hopefully we will be able to proceed to discussions concerning the reduction of fissionable material and the destruction of warheads and the use of that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

He said that many things could go into the preamble, e.g., interest in the reduction of weapons and reducing world tensions, but he thought it important that the treaty should not be just a collection of New Year's resolutions - not to be taken seriously. He saw in the review conference procedure a way for non-nuclear nations to satisfy themselves that the nuclear nations had in fact carried out their commitments. Ambassador Foster recognized Japan's interest in the review conference and Japan's views that reviews should be automatic. He said the U.S. does not oppose this concept but thinks that additional review conferences could better be taken care of at the first review conference itself. But this problem may be settled during the ENDC negotiations. He said he would rather

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have these points brought out at the ENDC than try to negotiate them at this time. As for amendments, we have tried to take into account Japan's views, but the Soviets have rejected any suggestion of simple majority rule. Perhaps a two-thirds majority might have some chance and there is some interest in a U.K. suggestion that approval of all members of the Board of Governors of IAEA might be required. This would give non-nuclear countries a chance to participate and would not be discriminatory. Ambassador Foster noted that he had not given up on the question of amendments, but that the Soviets were being very difficult.

Ambassador Foster then referred to Japan's interest in being assured that its peaceful uses would not be jeopardized and explained that Paragraph 5 of Article 3^{is} in response to such concern and that this is the one exception in the body of the treaty which otherwise mentions only things prohibited. We have shown this new language to the Soviets but they seem to be much more concerned with the problem of Euratom, and as yet we do not see a solution to the IAEA/Euratom problem. Mr. Foster said it might be best to table the treaty, leaving Article 3 blank, noting that it was still under negotiation. NATO doesn't like this suggestion and wants an agreement before the treaty is tabled. Ambassador Foster said that he would rather get the draft formulations on the table since the rest of the world is not well informed of the details and there is already too much misinformation abroad. He saw little chance of agreement with the Soviets on this point before May 18. still They/insist on their Article 3 and we ours. However, as the other non-nuclear nations, except India, now have only a general outline of the treaty, but none of the precise wording, they are anxious to be better informed and we are anxious to get the formulations tabled so that they will be available to the world and, hopefully, will set to rest many of the current misapprehensions and permit

truly open negotiations. He stressed that the formulations have not been agreed upon by anyone including the U.S. and the USSR, but has the basic elements which may help to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Foreign Minister Miki thanked Ambassador Foster for his explanations and asked whether there were any other major problems between the U.S. and the USSR other than the veto, safeguards and Euratom.

Ambassador Foster said that it was difficult to tell at this stage. The Russians do not accept Euratom as an international agency and we tried to meet this by suggesting IAEA verifications of Euratom, but this was unacceptable to the Euratom countries.

Mr. Foster mentioned his own long-standing interest in applications of nuclear energy and how important the safeguards problem can be. The U.S. Government, he stressed, has probably the most rigid safeguards imaginable, and that a plant he was involved with cost some 12 million dollars to build but the safeguards cost an additional 15 million.

Ambassador Foster mentioned Paragraph 2 of Article IV which had been altered and changes in the preamble which spell out in more detail the possibilities of instrumented safeguards. These changes/^{did}not seem to bother the Soviets, nor did those in Paragraph II. Other than Article III and Paragraph 2 of Article IV, the only serious questions with the Soviets arise over our interpretations. He said we had received no official comment from the Soviets yet because of the May Day holidays in Moscow last week. Ambassador Foster said that all of our interpretations have been stated to the Soviets by Secretary Rusk or himself at one time or another during the negotiations, and while they were unwilling to state their agreement with them, they have said they would not object; on the other hand, neither would they endorse them. What their reaction will be now that they see all our interpretations put together is hard to tell.

It is our intention to make public our interpretations during the ratification of the treaty in response to questions which we will make certain are raised in the U.S. Senate. Our replies to these questions will become part of the legislative history of the treaty.

Ambassador Foster said that relations with the Soviets seem to be in several compartments, e.g., the Soviets are shipping massive equipment to NVN and there is some indication that their relations with the U.S. are hardening. However, as far as relations with his opposite numbers, Ambassador Foster said they could only be described as cordial, and that there was no doubt but that they have^a desire to achieve a Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ambassador Foster described himself as a congenial optimist, but he said he felt we were closer than ever to an NPT. He realized, however, that the last mile was the hardest and that there would be great difficulties not only with the Russians but with our allies. He mentioned that the Germans have difficulty with the treaty now proposed and that although Brandt seems to understand our position he is, nevertheless, a member of a coalition government. Ambassador Foster also alluded to the concerns of India.

Foreign Minister Miki interrupted to ask what Ambassador Foster thought were the real issues yet to be settled with our allies.

Ambassador Foster replied that Germany's concern seemed to be two-fold. First, a concern over the unlimited duration of the treaty which is the reason for the suggestion of a five or ten-year duration. To this Secretary Rusk has noted that on the first day of the sixth year all the potential nuclear countries would be ready with nuclear weapons out of fear that their neighbors would be doing the same. The second concern of Germany seemed to be a desire for some kind of Europe in which it could share nuclear weapons. Ambassador Foster alluded to the history of MLF discussions and noted that in our interpretations we have made it clear that we accept the possibility

of a federated European state which would have the nuclear weapons of the U.K., and France as part of the weapons of that unified state. Such a state, however, must be truly unified and cannot be merely a group of countries which decides it wants nuclear weapons. Germany also feels that if Euratom is succeeded by IAEA, Germany will be vulnerable to industrial espionage. Ambassador Foster said that we do not ourselves believe that Euratom is a truly international organization and he noted that when Euratom was established it was expected that it would be subsumed by an international agency at some time in the future. However, Euratom now seems to have a being and bureaucracy all its own. Ambassador Foster added that he did not see why IAEA should be unacceptable to the Germans since it was understood that individual inspectors could be rejected if there were any grounds to suspect they might not be impartial.

Ambassador Foster noted that we have attempted to reassure the Euratom countries on the question of industrial espionage for example by taking into account the possibilities of instrumentation.

Ambassador Foster described our problems with Italy as somewhat kindred to those with Germany. He said the Italian argument went something like this, "How can we accept limitations when our neighbors may develop nuclear weapons," and when queried the Italians named Albania as such a possible neighbor. Foster said the Italians also have some reservations over peaceful nuclear explosions, but he noted that any country which has the capability of performing nuclear explosions, in fact, has a nuclear weapon capability which could kill hundreds of thousands of people. On this point, Ambassador Foster elaborated that if peaceful nuclear explosions became feasible, then the U.S. does not want a monopoly and we have pledged, and the Soviets have joined us, to make available such explosions under an international agency such as IAEA, when such clean explosions become possible. Ambassador Foster digressed and noted that for 15 years scientists have been telling him that a peaceful explosion might be

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that

developed within five years, but/it hasn't been developed yet. During a recent meeting with scientists they had insisted such an explosion was not really possible without spending hundreds of millions of dollars. He said that such a device would have to be thermo-nuclear to be clean and that in considering the possible use of such a device to excavate a new Panama Canal, people would have to be evacuated for 300 miles of either side of the excavation and that it would certainly appear to be cheaper to spend the money improving conventional earth-moving techniques.

Ambassador Foster said that India's concerns are somewhat different. Chagla says India is a unique country - threatened by China - with a potential to develop nuclear weapons and yet non-aligned. India appears to want assurances regarding peaceful uses and to retain the right to peaceful explosions. India also believes she is entitled to guarantees against nuclear attacks. On this point Ambassador Foster noted that the Indians had not been given the latest draft of the NPT, although some countries may have discussed it with her. Ambassador Foster said that on the question of guarantees which India wants, we would have to take into account so many contingencies that the U.S. Congress would not accept such commitments. Ambassador Foster mentioned that he had told Chagla that it was odd that India wanted guarantees for itself when India was unwilling to give such guarantees to others. Chagla's reply was that India is an unusual nation. The Ambassador mentioned that he had reminded Chagla of all the assistance we had given India since the Marshall Plan, and called his attention to President Johnson's statement regarding the U.S. position on nuclear blackmail. Ambassador Foster said that we were willing to broaden President Johnson's statement by some UN action but that we were unwilling to go along with Kosygin's proposal in 1966 in which Kosygin had suggested assurances to countries which did not have nuclear weapons

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in their territories. We could not accept this since it was an obvious attempt to wreck NATO. Mr. Foster also mentioned that last fall the Soviets had agreed that if there were a NPT, we and they should promote a resolution by the ENDC regarding assurances, perhaps we could broaden President Johnson's proposal and include part of Kosygin's suggestion, but it is difficult to say whether this will satisfy India. Mr. Foster mentioned that L.S. Jha had received a draft of assurances from the Soviets, but that we continued to believe that the UN was the forum for tackling this problem. It was certain the U.S. Senate would not agree to a commitment in advance, but it might be possible to pursue the Johnson-Kosygin proposals. Ambassador Foster explained that the Soviet suggestion to the Indians only referred back to UN Article 51 commitments which, of course, we could support.

Prime Minister Miki said that from the Japanese standpoint, he shared the desire to put an end to nuclear proliferation but as a non-nuclear nation, accepting the wisdom of the treaty as a first step, Japan feels the treaty should lead to disarmament rather than just a weapons freeze. The non-nuclear nations should have some assurances of the willingness of the nuclear countries to scale down and eventually disarm. He felt that unless such commitments were embodied in the treaty it would be difficult to convince the non-nuclear nations they should join the treaty.

Ambassador Foster agreed and noted that his agency had been established to achieve just that purpose. He reiterated our interest in general complete disarmament, that we had such a draft treaty prepared, and that we would like to see a complete cutoff of nuclear weapons production, the destruction of thousands of warheads and the application of their use for peaceful purposes; we would visualize a freeze followed by reduction of present levels of weapons and had proposed the destruction of BS7s and Polaris As. The question

is how to accomplish these objectives. He did not think that we could try to put these proposals into the NPT and still get a meaningful treaty. He stressed that we must proceed one step at a time, but that we were willing to insert in the treaty a statement of intentions and let the review conference look into the progress being made. If no progress is made and a country's sovereign interests are being threatened, such countries can, of course, withdraw from the treaty. However, if we attempt to put disarmament commitments into a treaty, we will never get a treaty.

The Foreign Minister mentioned Japan's concern over its security in light of the no-war clause in its constitution and was particularly anxious to promote international peace. He mentioned that something more might be done through a UN proposal. Ambassador Foster thought some amplification of the UN Charter might be helpful and if the ENDC so desired a general statement could be included in the NPT preamble. A UN Resolution could be done as a follow-up to the NPT.

The Foreign Minister noted that Japan has its security treaty with the U.S., but inquired what Mr. Foster thought of the future of NATO.

Ambassador Foster noted that the Belgians had suggested a possible safeguards setup but that as far as we know Germany and the other NATO allies intend to stick with the NATO treaty.

The Foreign Minister said one of the things Japan was most deeply interested in was the question of peaceful uses. He said Japan imports over 100 million tons of petroleum each year and appreciates the great potential importance of nuclear energy. He asked whether, after the NPT is tabled, the U.S. would be willing to dispatch a group of scientists and technicians for talks with the Government of Japan. He added that Japan is especially interested in being assured of regular sources of nuclear energy and that her research and development will not be hindered, nor will the development of nuclear fission. He expressed the hope that these concerns might

be taken care of in the treaty in some form or other. Ambassador Foster agreed that far-reaching developments in nuclear energy were likely to take place and that we would have to depend on nuclear fission for power if we were going to have great progress in the development of nuclear energy. He said that recent research with the funnel effect looked promising. He said nuclear fission in some places in the U.S. is now cheaper than conventional fuel and that within a short time we expect that half our energy to be produced by nuclear energy. He said our capabilities for producing fuel are great enough, certainly for our allies and friends, and we could certainly supply Japan's needs. He said we will be glad to sell. On research and development, Ambassador Foster said the AEC has made available its research, except that concerning weapons and this is the reason why gas diffusion information was recently restricted. He explained that reference to peaceful uses had been moved from the preambular clause into Paragraph 5 of Article 3 and the Soviets have expressed no objection. (Ambassador Foster then read the new draft formulation of Paragraph 5 of Article 3.)

The Foreign Minister thanked Ambassador Foster for this important change and expressed hope that the Ambassador can convince the Soviets and other colleagues to accept inspection.

Ambassador Foster said that he had tried strongly to sell the idea, but without success. He noted we have offered to put our peaceful uses under IAEA inspection as has the United Kingdom. Mr. Foster cautioned that we had asked the NAC to treat this information with confidence. He said that as yet not all of the U.S. Congress accepts the idea. We would very much like to bring the Soviets to accept the idea of IAEA inspection because it is important to the next step in disarmament; we would like to have checks on their territory. Mr. Foster noted the Soviets had accepted inspection of their facilities outside the USSR, e.g., the Antarctic and outer space, but they are still violently opposed to any inspection on their territory. Mr. Foster

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said probably the best we could do is make known the U.S. and the U.K. take the same position as the non-nuclear.

The Foreign Minister said he thought it might be a good idea for the non-nuclear powers to get together to make representations on this point and Ambassador Foster said he thought they should do so.

The Foreign Minister then referred to Project Plowshare and said he thought the possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions seemed quite near. He would like to tell his people that, in the event peaceful uses can be distinguished from weapons, this will be a topic for treaty review.

Ambassador Foster said that we are willing to guarantee to make available nuclear explosions when they become practical for peaceful uses and we will detonate them, but we do not see the possibility of a nuclear explosive device which can be distinguished from a weapon. The Ambassador then referred to additional language which was included in the NPT draft to assure benefits of peaceful explosions.

Mr. Miki again asked whether he could make a public statement to that effect that the treaty might be changed at a future date to permit ^{peaceful} nuclear explosions to which Ambassador Foster again reviewed the unlikelihood of peaceful nuclear explosions ever being differentiated from weapons.

Mr. Miki mentioned the rapid advance in science and thought that one way to allay the non-nuclear's fears of discrimination would be to have a treaty review every five years. Ambassador Foster said that there would be an automatic review after the first five years and that he hoped the ENDC might discuss the possibility of setting up a steering committee which would set the agenda for the review. Such a steering committee could also recommend an additional conference five years hence. Ambassador Foster again noted our concern if the treaty were limited to a five-year duration, and mentioned Ambassador Rusks' observation that by the end of a five-year period, five

countries would be 8-months pregnant. In other words, too many nations would be preparing to go nuclear unless the treaty were of unlimited duration. Ambassador Foster referred to an additional draft formulation of Article IV regarding the five-year review, but noted that this had not been given to the Soviets and was one of those items which we expected to be brought up in the ENDC. We were prepared to accept language concerning the preparatory commission and its role in a review conference.

The Foreign Minister again commented that the non-nuclear nations who had the capability of becoming nuclear might well be reassured by a review of the treaty every five years and Ambassador Foster again noted that the preparatory commission mechanism could provide for a review every five years. He said an automatic five-year review could certainly be considered as a possibility for inclusion in the treaty but we would prefer to leave the question open so that if for security or other reasons a conference would be inappropriate, one need not be held every five years.

The Foreign Minister said that he hoped Ambassador Foster understood how sorry the Japanese Government was in asking him to make such a long trip, but that the request was necessary because Japan was not a member in the ENDC. He said he hoped the U.S. Government would support Japan's membership in the ENDC and that he had already discussed the possibility with the Soviets. He said that he assumed that since the troika principle had been dropped that it would not apply to Japan's membership. Ambassador Foster said that Japan had been one of our first nominees in 1961 but that the Soviets had rejected our proposal. Our only concern now is that the ENDC not be expanded to a point where it loses its usefulness. He said that Japan, and perhaps one or two others, would be all right, but that once the group goes beyond 20 or 21 its effectiveness would be reduced by the square of the number of new members. He noted the Soviets appear less objectionable now than previously and perhaps

... something can be worked out. He said Yugoslavia also wants to be a member and the Soviets will certainly want an East European.

The Foreign Minister said that Japan always has in mind the problem of Communist China and wondered if there weren't some way of getting Communist China and France to participate in the treaty. Ambassador Foster agreed to the desirability of their membership but did not know how they could be enticed at this time.

There was some discussion as to a general line for the press and the meeting broke up at 12:45, at which time the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Foster met briefly with the Japanese press.

At luncheon the Foreign Minister asked Ambassador Foster whether the U.S. would be willing to join the seismic detection group, to which Ambassador responded that we would be willing but preferred that all the nuclear powers belong as well in order to make it effective. The Foreign Minister also asked whether Ambassador Foster thought the Soviet Union could be trusted and Foster replied that while he had no illusions about the Soviet Union, and was certain she was still bent on extending her influence and control over the entire world, he was also convinced that the Soviet Union wanted a Non-Proliferation Treaty and that this was something which was in her own national interest. The Foreign Minister asked whether Ambassador Foster had thought Germany and France would sign the treaty, to which the Ambassador responded that he thought Germany would sign, although it was doubtful France would sign in the near future. The Foreign Minister also asked the Ambassador whether he could make a public statement that the U.S. was willing to put its peaceful uses under IAEA inspection, and Ambassador Foster explained that it would be better to say no more than the U.S. had such a proposal "under consideration." The Foreign Minister said that when Mr. Brandt arrives this week, he will take the opportunity to try to get him to agree to a joint statement urging equality of all nations on matters of inspection. Mr. Miki said that while Japan agreed with the purposes of the NPT, he could not tell at this stage whether Japan

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would sign the treaty. He said he must bring along his people and referred to the interparty consultations now taking place on NPT. Ambassador Foster said he could certainly appreciate Japan's position and that the U.S. at this stage could not commit itself either to the treaty since all we were dealing with at the moment were draft formulations which were still subject to much negotiation.

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