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August 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS -- LEADING TO TABLING OF NPT

WCF phoned the Secretary at 1:00 p.m. today to inform him of the Geneva situation. Roshchin had called Bunn and told him that the Soviet Union was willing to make a joint tabling if we were willing to accept two or three modifications. These modifications appear so far to us to be minor and acceptable but since the Soviet Co-Chairman was anxious to have WCF return to Geneva to discuss all of this WCF said he would report in more detail upon his return. The first point they made was that they preferred alternative two in our amendments clause, Paragraph iv of Article V which says that amendments must be approved by a majority, including the nuclear powers and the members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA at the time of the passage of the amendment. This is a more restrictive form, but since we had stated we would accept either form this must be acceptable to us. Secondly, they had proposed a new preambular paragraph on nuclear disarmament as follows:

"Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control,"

This appeared to WCF to be based on the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and some language from the draft of our General and Complete Disarmament Treaty and, therefore, this, too, should be acceptable.

They also do not wish to have our tabling statement refer to the willingness of the Co-Chairmen to accept amendments for presentation since they feel this would encourage a flood of such amendments, even though they continue to be willing to present same if they are submitted.

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The Secretary said he was delighted with the news, congratulated WCF; his only suggestion was that WCF attempt to present these facts to Senator Gore's Subcommittee on Disarmament of the SFRC. WCF said he would attempt to do so.

WCF also attempted to call the President, but in his absence talked to Walt Rostow. He informed him of the above situation and said that he would be available up until Saturday afternoon if the President wished to discuss this with him.

The Secretary called WCF back to tell him that it suddenly occurred to him that if things proceeded as they appeared possible, i.e., tabling on Tuesday, that this might be very bad on the first day of the Kiesinger visit. The Secretary suggested advising the Germans in advance. WCF said he was fearful of leaks.

Rostow called WCF back; said he had gotten to the President. The President wanted WCF to come over to announce this. WCF said there were two more issues to negotiate. The President also asked why talk to Gore in advance.

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