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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Approved in S 10/2/67

DATE: September 16, 1967

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

PLACE: The Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty (Part II of II)

PARTICIPANTS: Takeo Miki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Takeso Shimoda, Ambassador of Japan
Makoto Watanabe, interpreter

The Secretary
U. Alexis Johnson, Ambassador to Japan
James J. Wickel, interpreter

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The Secretary asked whether Japan had any concerns with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Miki said that the preamble of the present treaty refers first to the desirability of reducing international tensions and then to the ultimate goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament and he asked whether this can be redrafted to state more clearly the intent of achieving nuclear disarmament as a means of reducing international tensions. The people of Japan have already renounced forever the possibility of developing nuclear weapons and are concerned that this will leave them in an adverse position vis-a-vis the nuclear powers. The people of Japan therefore strongly favor a declaration of intent to achieve an ultimate nuclear disarmament guarantee.

Seemingly, while Japan does not desire a loophole to permit the development of nuclear weapons, it should be understood that Japan requires annually 100 million tons of crude oil, 99% of which is imported, to provide for 60% of her energy requirements. The peaceful development of nuclear

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energy, therefore, is of great interest to Japan because her energy requirements are expected to continue to increase. Japan intends to become a great power in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the NPT must not prevent this. Furthermore, Japan does not wish to be denied the opportunity of using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes when these are fully developed.

Japan hopes that the safeguard provisions in the treaty will be applied on an equitable basis when they are finally agreed to and that inspection, including inspection of nuclear material, can be as fully automated as possible. While the Soviet Union does not agree to be inspected, nevertheless, the nuclear powers should also be inspected. Japan hopes that the U.S. and England can support such an inspection. Finally, there is a question of review after five years. There is also the most important question of security guarantees for the non-aligned nations who do not have security arrangements. For their benefit, perhaps, such guarantees should be provided in the form of a United Nations resolution. The Government of Japan is trying to incline public opinion toward acceptance of such a treaty so that it can be ratified with popular approval. Other matters are not normally taken up on a bipartisan basis in Japan but the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been.

The Secretary said that on the first point American readiness to accept nuclear disarmament is complicated by two factors: (1) the failure of Peking and President DeGaulle to participate in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and (2) our unwillingness to accept nuclear disarmament as a legal requirement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is a difference between referring to nuclear disarmament in the preamble and in the operational clauses of the draft treaty. One nuclear power is already one too many and it was a great tragedy that the Baruch Plan was not adopted in 1946, but now there are other nuclear powers. On the basis of discussions this morning with Ambassador Foster, who is back from Geneva on consultation, it would seem possible to strengthen the preambular language of the draft treaty. He asked whether this would raise particular difficulties for Japan. Miki said the preamble is acceptable but in its present form the draft states a desire to reduce international

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tensions so that complete nuclear disarmament can become possible. Japan prefers to reverse the order of the clauses, stating that complete nuclear disarmament is desirable in terms of reducing international tensions.

The Secretary said that the United States is anxious to begin talks with the Soviet Union on both offensive and defense nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union has said it would discuss this matter but has not yet set a date. At Glassboro, it was pressed as to whether it could begin the following Wednesday or the following Friday but it has not yet set a date. The United States is deeply interested in making progress on this matter with the Soviet Union and is confident that we will.

The Secretary said that there is one important problem to keep in mind. The United States has security arrangements with Japan, the Republic of Korea and other nations in the Pacific. The United States has a population of 200 million people. Mainland China has a population of 700 million or possibly a billion people and the United States will not permit itself to bleed to death in a fight with Mainland China armed only with conventional weapons. The question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is no particular problem because the NPT applies only to weapons. The United States has an understanding on this point with the Soviet Union and the treaty will not interfere with the development of peaceful uses.

Miki said that the United States had promised to send experts to Japan to discuss this question. The Secretary said that we will satisfy Japan on this. He also said there is a particular problem raised by Brazil, that is, the development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. Nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes are no different from nuclear explosives used in weapons. We see this as a pretext which cannot be permitted because the nuclear explosives which are used to destroy a mountain can also be used to destroy a city. On this question, the nuclear powers can make an arrangement to provide explosives for peaceful use to those nations which need them. We cannot,

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however, accept the view that the development of nuclear explosives by non-nuclear nations is a matter independent of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Miki said that Canada has stated that another treaty on the development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes might be desirable. The Secretary said that the United States thinks it may be possible to provide for such explosives for a few non-nuclear nations, but even this lies far in the future because of the problem of nuclear fallout. The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed that some arrangement might be made for nations which require nuclear explosives to dig a harbor, for example, or to level a mountain without violating the treaty on non-proliferation. Miki asked whether there can be a guarantee on the matter of nuclear explosives for peaceful uses in a separate treaty. The Secretary said that the United States is prepared to look into the matter.

With respect to safeguards, the Secretary said that it is hard to get agreement with Euratom because President DeGaulle is a complication. Italy has raised some problems in Euratom because apparently for reasons of national prestige it has no real wish to renounce publicly its option of developing nuclear weapons. It fears that the big five or the big six nuclear powers will not include Italy. The Secretary said that he hopes that an arrangement can be made with Euratom for inspection on which both the United States and Japan could agree. Miki said that such arrangements with Euratom and the IAEA should be kept as simple as possible to prevent giving the impression of interference. The Secretary said that he agreed.

Miki asked whether there can be United States-Soviet agreement on Article III, Inspection, which is now left blank. The Secretary said there is not yet agreement but there is a draft. Ambassador Roshchin without the approval of the Soviet Government proposed a draft to meet the needs of Euratom and IAEA. A copy of this text was provided Japan. But Euratom has not yet replied and President DeGaulle is of no help.

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The Secretary said that eternity is a long time and that some limit perhaps 25 years should be included in the treaty, with provision for review and amendment of the arrangements at some point. Miki said that it would be helpful for the Government of Japan in persuading the people of Japan to accept the treaty if it provided for such review every five years. The Secretary said this would depend on what is to be reviewed. If the fundamental idea of providing for non-proliferation is to be reviewed every five years the United States would be deeply concerned. In effect a number of nations could remain 8 months pregnant waiting for the conclusion of the five year period. They could develop their technology looking ahead to the end of the five year period. India, Israel, Brazil, Germany, Italy and others could prepare to develop weapons at the end of a five year period.

Miki said that he did not intend to say that the fundamental purpose of the treaty should be reviewed but that arrangements could be reviewed, for example to see whether the treaty does or does not in fact interfere with the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or whether it is creating a feeling conducive to steps toward nuclear disarmament. The Secretary said that he understands that Japan would have no great difficulty in accepting the NPT in principle and that it is essential to find a common answer to the question of review.

Miki said the treaty must be enforced to prevent absolutely any weapons development. Japan feels strongly that the treaty must attack strongly the roots of the argument that five years hence it may be possible to develop nuclear weapons. At the same time, Japan is equally concerned with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Therefore, some improvement in the text of the draft treaty is desirable to allay some possible fears of the results of its application. The Secretary said that the United States might be able to accommodate Japan with respect to peaceful uses. The United States is ready to participate in scientific and technical discussions to clarify these points. With respect to inspection, the United States is ready to consider accepting inspection on its peaceful facilities but the Soviet Union is not, and will not yield on these points.

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Ambassador Johnson asked if Miki had discussed this matter in Moscow. Miki said he had. The Soviet's responded by asking him, in bad humor, why Japan wished to apply the treaty to a nation which had already developed nuclear weapons and asked whether the purpose of the NPT was not to insure against the development of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear nations. The Secretary said the United States does not object to such pressures on the Soviet Union. In fact he has talked with Foreign Minister Gromyko on the same point, but Gromyko has said that the Soviets will not consider this question.

The question of security guarantees for the non-aligned nations is a serious one for the United States because it involves the United States in a pledge of 100 million American lives in the first hour of a nuclear war. Miki asked if it would be equally difficult to meet the needs of the non-aligned nations for reasonable assurances in the form of a United Nations resolution. The Secretary said that the only possibility would be some form of commitment by the Security Council to act on the assurance that such action would be taken jointly by the permanent members of the Security Council. If India wants the United States to agree to enter a nuclear war on her behalf in the event, for example, of a war between India and the Soviets, as a condition for signing the NPT this is absolutely impossible for the United States to do. Miki asked whether a French veto would be possible in such an event in the Security Council. The Secretary said that he and Foreign Minister Gromyko have a full understanding on this point. While something may be possible in the Security Council, the United States will not agree to engage in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union simply to get India to sign the NPT.

Miki asked whether Indian participation is not essential. He had talked to Deputy Premier Desai recently in Tokyo on this point, urging that India accept the NPT. If India does not sign, neither will Pakistan. The Secretary said that Deputy Premier Desai had recently told him that India did not attach any particular importance to such an announcement of guarantees. The United States simply cannot guarantee others against nuclear attack in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ratification of a treaty with such a clause would be most difficult in the United States Congress and would even be difficult for the Soviet Union to accept. The only solution

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might be a United Nations resolution. Ambassador Shimoda said that he had been impressed by increasing Indian concern for assurances such as those contained in the Kosygin proposal. India is not anxious to secure assistance for nuclear development but simply requires guarantees against nuclear attack by nuclear powers. Kosygin guaranteed India that the Soviet Union would not attack with nuclear weapons. The Secretary said that Kosygin does not speak for Communist China. Miki said that India seems to wish to have guarantees against a nuclear attack by both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Secretary said that joint assurances by the permanent members of the Security Council is quite different from such a unilateral guarantee. Miki said it is essential to have the greatest number of nations possible participate in the treaty. Should India and Italy, for example, not agree to sign Japan would also find it most difficult to do so.

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