



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

SECRET

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ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

R 021853Z OCT 67  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5413  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 446  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1125  
USMISSION USUN 1256

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 1055

LIMDIS

DISTO NATUS

SUBJECT: CO-CHAIRMEN'S MEETING, OCT. 2

1. FISHER INFORMED ROSHCIN THAT WESTERN FOUR WERE PREPARED TO SEE ENDC STAY IN SESSION AS LONG AS NEEDED TO FILL IN ART III AND CONSIDER NON-ALIGNED AMENDMENTS. HOWEVER, US DEL HAD NOT YET RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS CONFIRMING ITS RECOMMENDATION TO WASHINGTON THAT THIS

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BE OUR POSITION. FISHER NOTED THAT HE HAD HEARD POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK LEAD BY FAHMY (UAR), AND PERHAPS ASSISTED BY INDIANS, TO SHIFT LOCUS OF NPT NEGOTIATIONS TO NEW YORK. FISHER ASSUMED SOVS WOULD WISH DISCOURAGE THIS. ROSHCIN AGREED AND SUGGESTED THAT, IN ADDITION, CO-CHAIRMEN TALK TO VARIOUS MEMBERS OF EIGHT FOR SAME PURPOSE.

2. ON MEXICAN AMENDMENTS, FISHER SAID HE HAD RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS

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AND THEREFORE HIS COMMENTS WERE STRICTLY PRELIMINARY AND THOSE OF US DEL. RE NEW MEXICAN ARTICLE IV (PEACEFUL USES), HE THOUGHT IT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE BREAK ARTICLE INTO TWO PARAGRAPHS AND STRENGTHEN SECOND. HOWEVER, US WOULD NOT BE ABLE ACCEPT "DUTY TO CONTRIBUTE" TO ASSISTANCE. ROSHCIN AGREED WITH FISHER'S COMMENTS, INCLUDING UNACCEPTABILITY OF "DUTY" TO CONTRIBUTE, AND SUGGESTED THAT US AND USSR DELS MEET LATER TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE. HE STRESSED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DESIRABLE MEET WISHES OF MEXICAN DEL AND THEREFORE CO-CHAIRMEN SHOULD NOT OBJECT TO IDEA OF MEXICAN AMENDMENT EVEN IF WORDING HAS TO BE CHANGED.

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3. ON MEXICAN ARTICLE IV-A (PROVISION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES), FISHER EXPRESSED US DEL VIEW THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER RETAINING PRESENT PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AND ADDING TREATY ARTICLE IN WHICH PARTIES "UNDERTAKE TO COOPERATE IN NEGOTIATING A SEPARATE AGREEMENT AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE TO MAKE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AVAILABLE TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS." ABOVE POSSIBLE LANGUAGE FOR SUCH AN ARTICLE WAS GIVEN TO SOVIETS WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THEY WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING OUR PROPOSES APPROACH. FISHER EXPRESSED VIEW THAT AN OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE IN AN OPERATIVE ARTICLE WOULD SATISFY MAIN OBJECTIVE OF MEXICAN AMENDMENT. ROSHCIN SAID IT EXTREMELY DESIRABLE HAVE ARTICLE IN TREATY IN VIEW OF MEXICAN DESIRE HELP US, AND INSISTING ON PREAMBULAR CLAUSE ALONE WOULD BE SEEN AS REJECTION OF MEXICAN IDEA. HE SAID SOV DEL WOULD THINK OVER US DEL IDEA OF OPERATIVE ARTICLE ON UNDERTAKING TO NEGOTIATE.

4. ON MEXICAN ARTICLE IV-B (NUCLEAR FREE ZONES), FISHER SAID US DEL PERCEIVED NO OBJECTION TO MEXICAN SUGGESTION, BUT HE HOPED MOVING THIS PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH TO SUBSTANTIVE

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ARTICLE WOULD NOT LEAD TO HABIT OF MOVING PREAMBULARS INTO ARTICLES. ROSHCIN SAID HIS DEL ALSO SAW NO OBJECTION TO

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MEXICAN PROPOSAL.

4. MEXICAN ARTICLE IV-C (NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT). ROSHCHIN THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE INCLUDE OPERATIVE TREATY ARTICLE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: "EACH NUCLEAR-WEAPON-STATE PARTY TO THIS TREATY UNDERTAKES TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH, WITH ALL SPEED AND PERSEVERANCE, TO ARRIVE AT FURTHER AGREEMENTS REGARDING THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AS WELL AS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL." ROSHCHIN EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO DELETE LIST OF SPECIFIC MEASURES FROM MEXICAN TEXT. FISHER SAID HIS THOUGHTS WERE ALONG SIMILAR LINES, IF IT DID PROVE NECESSARY TO MOVE FROM PREAMBULAR PROVISIONS TO A SUBSTANTIVE ARTICLE; HOWEVER, HIS PREFERENCE WAS TO STRENGTHEN PREAMBULAR PROVISIONS, IF THIS WOULD SUFFICE. ROSHCHIN SAID "WE WILL BE NEGOTIATING HERE FOR MANY YEARS" AND THEREFORE NO HARM IN RECOGNIZING THIS IN TREATY.

5. ON UAR AMENDMENTS, FISHER SAID IT WOULD BE VERY UNDE-

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SIRABLE TO REOPEN ARTS I AND II TO RENEGOTIATION. ROSHCHIN SUGGESTED PRESENT TEXT THESE ARTICLES ALREADY COVERED UAR IDEAS. IF US AGREED, HE CONTINUED, CO-CHAIRMEN COULD MAKE STATEMENT IN ENDC THAT THEY INTERPRET PRESENT ARTS I AND II AS ALREADY COVERING UAR AMENDMENTS. FISHER SUGGESTED BEST LINE WOULD BE TO SAY THAT UAR AMENDMENTS RAISED MANY UNREAL AND IMPRACTICAL PROBLEMS, BUT TO EXTENT ANY REAL PROBLEMS WERE RAISED, THESE WOULD BE COVERED BY PRESENT ARTICLES. ROSHCHIN ASKED WHAT WOULD BE SITUATION IF FRG SENT A SCIENTIST TO SOUTH AFRICA TO ASSIST SOUTH AFRICA WORK ON BOMB. FISHER ANSWERED THAT UNDER THIS HYPOTHETICAL CASE, "ASSISTING" COUNTRY WOULD PROBABLY BE VIEWED AS VIOLATING TREATY BY ATTEMPTING MAKE BOMB. NO ONE WOULD BELIEVE IT WAS PROVIDING ALTRUISTIC ASSISTANCE TO A NON-NUCLEAR, NON-NPT PARTY. ROSHCHIN SAID IT WOULD MAKE GOOD IMPRESSION ON COMMITTEE TO GIVE SATISFACTION TO UAR BY SAYING ARTS I AND II ALREADY COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES RAISED BY UAR AMENDMENTS. FISHER REPEATED THAT HE WAS ONLY PREPARED CONSIDER SAYING THAT PRESENT ARTS I AND II COVER UAR IDEAS TO EXTENT THESE RAISED PRACTICAL AND SERIOUS PROBLEMS. FISHER ADDED GP-3. TUBBY

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5414  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 447  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1126  
USUN NEW YORK 1257

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 GENEVA 1055

LIMDIS

DISTO NATUS

THERE WOULD BE TWO PROBLEMS IN SOVIET APPROACH: FIRST, INDIANS AND OTHERS MIGHT PUT FORTH AMENDMENTS TO ARTS I AND II WHICH COULD NOT BE HANDLED IN SAME MANNER; SECOND, US ALLIES MIGHT HAVE DESIRE PUT FORTH AMENDMENTS IF OTHERS ALLOWED TO REOPEN ARTS I AND II. FISHER CONCLUDED BY SAYING IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR US AND SOVIETS TO COMPARE NOTES ON ANY PUBLIC RESPONSE TO UAR SUGGESTIONS. ROSHCIN SAID HE HAD EXPRESSED PRELIMINARY IDEAS. WE SHOULD TRY TO FIND BEST

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FORMULA TO SATISFY UAR, IF NOT FORMALLY AT LEAST INFORMALLY. HE SAID HE DID NOT DESIRE COMPLICATE SITUATION IN COMMITTEE.

6. ON UAR PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE KOSYGIN-TYPE ASSURANCES ARTICLE, FISHER SAID THIS WAS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US. ROSHCIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS, BUT MANY DELEGATIONS FAVORED THIS IDEA AND HE HOPED TWO CO-CHAIRMEN COULD GET TOGETHER

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SOON TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE WAYS OF MEETING WIDESPREAD CONCERN ABOUT ASSURANCES. FISHER SAID THAT IF HE HAD TO COMMENT PUBLICLY ON UAR PROPOSAL, HE WOULD INDICATE THAT REAL CONCERN OF INDIANS AS WELL AS OTHERS WAS OVER COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE; CHINESE DO NOT INTEND TO BE NPT PARTY; ACCORDINGLY, NPT PROVISION WOULD NOT CREATE JURIDICALLY INHIBITION ON RED CHINA; POLITICAL ACTION, SUCH AS ADOPTION OF UN RESOLUTION FOR POSITIVE ASSURANCES, WAS THEREFORE NEEDED. ROSHCIN SAID THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT SOUNDED REASONABLE. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DESIRABLE BY END OF ENDC CONSIDERATION OF NPT TO HAVE MET IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER ALL OUTSTANDING NON-ALIGNED CONCERNS. FISHER HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR CO-CHAIRMEN TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER, PARTICULARLY IF ENDC WERE TO REMAIN IN SESSION UNTIL NPT CONCLUDED.

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7. IN RESPONSE ROSHCIN'S QUESTION, FISHER SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE NEXT CO-CHAIRMEN'S MEETING ON AMENDMENTS AFTER HE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH HE EXPECTED SHORTLY.

8. COMMENT: WE CAME AWAY FROM MEETING WITH DISTINCT IMPRESSION SOVIETS FULLY AWARE IN ADVANCE OF UAR SUGGESTIONS AND WHILE STANDING FAST ON AGREEMENT NOT TO REOPEN ARTS I AND II, WOULD NOT BE ABOVE TRYING TO LOAD THEM WITH SOME PUBLIC INTERPRETATIONS OF KIND THEY HAD EARLIER DEVELOPED INCORPORATE INTO TREATY TEXT. PROBLEM WOULD BE ESPECIALLY ACUTE WITH TRIVEDI SUGGESTIONS (GENEVA 1007). I DO NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THEY WILL PRESS THEIR LUCK TOO FAR ON THIS BECAUSE TO DO SO MIGHT JEOPARDIZE NPT WHICH THEY OBVIOUSLY WANT. WE MUST HOWEVER CONTINUE DISABUSE THEM OF ANY NOTION WE COULD ALLOW THEM TO GET AWAY WITH SUCH TACTICS.

GP-3. TUBBY

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