

TELEGRAM

STATES OF AM

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 01083 01 OF 02 051712Z

42
ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

file USSR

P R 050928Z OCT 67
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5441
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS 1134
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 450
USMISSION USUN NY 1266

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 1083

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LIMDIS

REF: GENEVA 1055

SUBJECT: NPT DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET DELOFFS

IN INFORMAL MEETING BETWEEN ANTYASOV AND SHUSTOV (USSR) AND
US DELOFFS (DEPALMA AND NEIDLE) FOLLOWING POINTS WERE
DISCUSSED:

PAGE TWO RUFHGV 1083/1 S E C R E T

1. SOV DEL HAS NO FIRM INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO WRAP UP ENDC
CONSIDERATION OF NPTX AT END OF OCTOBER. HOWEVER, SOVS
WOULD LIKE SEE ART III AND NON-ALIGNED AMENDMENTS INCLUDED
BEFORE NPT PRESENTED TO UNGA, WHICH IN TURN THEY HOPED WOULD
BE BEFORE NOVEMBER SOVIET ANNIVERSARY. SHUSTOV EXPRESSED
VIEW THAT ALTERNATIVE OF PRESENTING CURRENT DRAFT TO UNGA,
WITH PLAN BY CO-CHAIRMAN TO INTRODUCE AMENDMENTS ONLY AFTER

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 01083 01 OF 02 051712Z

HEARING UNGA DEBATE, MIGHT NOT BE CONTROLLABLE SINCE NON-EXPERT DELS AT NEW YORK MIGHT INTRODUCE MANY MORE AMENDMENTS; BUT, IF AMENDMENTS ALREADY INCORPORATED BY CO-CHAIRMEN IN GENEVA, THESE WOULD PRESUMABLY COVER ALL PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES, THOUGH IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO MAKE SOME MINOR ADDITIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK. ANTYASOV INDICATED THAT SOVS ARE INCLINED DEAL WITH AMENDMENTS IN ENDC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE RATHER THAN WAIT TOWARD END OF SESSION.

2. ON MEXICAN-PROPOSED ARTICLE CONCERNING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, DEPALMA RAISED QUESTION CONCERNING TENTATIVE SOV RE-DRAFT CONTAINED IN PARA 4 OF REFTEL. HE SAID

PAGE THREE RUFHGV 1083/1 S E C R E T
REFERENCE TO "NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT" AS MEASURE NOT TIED TO GCD MIGHT RAISE QUESTION WHETHER NUCLEAR POWERS UNDERTAKE TO NEGOTIATE APART FROM GCD SUCH STEPS AS ELIMINATION ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THIS, OF COURSE, NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO ENDORSE AS OBJECTIVE. ANTYASOV SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF DELETING WORD "NUCLEAR" SO PHRASE WOULD READ: "TO ARRIVE AT FURTHER AGREEMENTS REGARDING THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT, AS WELL AS...." HE ALSO SAID SOV DEL HAD HEARD THAT MYRDAL (SWEDEN) HAD IN MIND SUGGESTING THAT EACH STATE PARTY RATHER THAN EACH NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY UNDERTAKE THE OBLIGATIONS OF THIS ARTICLE. SOV DELOFFS BELIEVED THIS CHANGE WOULD MAKE IT LOGICAL TO REFER ONLY TO WORD "DISARMAMENT" RATHER THAN "NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT." MYRDAL'S IDEA, THEY THOUGHT, WOULD ALSO STRENGTHEN POSITION OF THE NUCLEAR STATES AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE BY PROVIDING THEM WITH QUESTION THEY COULD POSE AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR STATES. AS REVISED BY SOVIETS, THEREFORE, THEIR SUGGESTION WOULD READ: "EACH STATE PARTY TO THIS TREATY UNDERTAKES TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH, WITH ALL SPEED AND PERSÉVERANCE, TO ARRIVE

PAGE FOUR RUFHGV 1083/1 S E C R E T
STATES OF AM

SECRET

PAGE 03

Department

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IN GOOD
PAGE FOUR RUFHGV
STATES OF AMERICA

Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 72893

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 01083 01 OF 02 051712Z

AT FURTHER AGREEMENTS REGARDING THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT, AS WELL AS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER STRICT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL."


3. SOV DELOFFS INDICATED THEY WERE SYMPATHETIC TO POSSIBILITY FISHER HAD EXPRESSED FOR OPERATIVE ARTICLE CONTAINING OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON PROVISION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (PARA 3 OF REFTEL) BUT THOUGHT QUALIFICATION ON UNDERTAKING TO NEGOTIATE "AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE" WOULD UNNECESSARILY DETRACT FROM THE PROVISION; THE QUALIFICATION WOULD NOT BY ITSELF CONSTITUTE AN ANSWER TO ANY TROUBLEMAKERS WHO ARGUED THAT IT WAS "PRACTICABLE" TO NEGOTIATE THE AGREEMENT RIGHT AWAY. DEPALMA WONDERED WHETHER PHRASE "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE" MIGHT BE CONSIDERED.

4. ON MEXICAN PROPOSAL FOR ART IV REGARDING PEACEFUL USES, SHUSTOV SUGGESTED THAT SECOND SENTENCE PARA 2 OF MEXICAN PROPOSAL COULD BE REVISED TO READ "THOSE PARTIES THAT ARE IN A POSITION TO DO SO, WILL (INSTEAD OF: HAVE THE DUTY TO)

PAGE FIVE RUFHGV 1083/1 S E C R E T
CONTRIBUTE....". DEPALMA SAID THIS REVISION WOULD NOT MEET US DESIRE AVOID A DUTY TO CONTRIBUTE. HE SUGGESTED TYPE OF LANGUAGE WE MIGHT EXPLORE WAS TO EFFECT THAT PARTIES IN A POSITION DO SO SHALL ALSO COOPERATE IN CONTRIBUTING ALONE OR TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, ESPECIALLY IN THE TERRITORIES OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON PARTIES. DEPALMA EXPLAINED THAT US WOULD PROBABLY NOT WISH INCLUDE REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENT OF "PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRIES," SINCE THIS MIGHT BE MORE SPECIFIC THAN NECESSARY. SOV DELOFFS SAID THEY PERSONALLY SAW NO DIFFICULTIES WITH US IDEAS.

5. ON UAR AMENDMENTS, SOV DELOFFS AGREED WITH US DELOFFS THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FIGURE OUT RESPONSE BY CO-CHAIRMEN WHICH WOULD NOT BE EMBARRASSING FOR EITHER SIDE. SOV DELOFFS APPEARED THINK THAT CO-CHAIRMEN'S ANSWER MIGHT

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 04 GENEVA 01083 01 OF 02 051712Z

STRESS THAT UAR AMENDMENTS WERE ALREADY COVERED BY ARTS I AND II TO EXTENT PRACTICAL QUESTIONS WERE RAISED AND THAT CO-CHAIRMEN HAD HAD IN MIND SUCH POSSIBILITIES WHEN

PAGE SIX RUFHGV 1083/1 S E C R E T
FORMULATING THE ARTICLES. ANTYASOV SAID THAT SECOND UAR AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE I REQUIRING NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES TO CONTROL PERSONS, COMPANIES, ENTERPRISES, ETC., SEEMED MOST IMPORTANT TO THEM. DEPALMA EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS PARTICULARLY AN AMENDMENT WHICH WE COULD SAY DID NOT RAISE ANY PRACTICAL NEW PROBLEMS. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR UAR TO BE PERSUADED, BY THOSE WHO COULD DO SO, NOT TO PUSH THEIR AMENDMENTS TOO FAR.

6. ON ASSURANCES, SOV DELOFFS INDICATED IMMEDIATELY THEIR UNDERSTANDING THAT KOSYGIN PROPOSAL WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US. ANTYASOV URGED TAT REAL ANSWER TO ASSURANCES PROBLEM WOULD BE COMMON PROPOSAL BY CO-CHAIRMEN FOR DEALING WITH ASSURANCES IN UN CONTEXT. SOVS CONTINUE BELIEVE THAT THIS IMPORTANT EVEN THOUGH TRIVEDI (INDIA) MAY NOT BE NOW STRESSING PROBLEM. DEPALMA AGREED IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF CO-CHAIRMEN COULD INDICATE THEY WORKING ON PROBLEM, BUT HE WAS NOT CERTAIN AS TO WHEN US DEL WOULD RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS. GP-3. TUBBY

STATES OF AMER

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 01083 02 OF 02 051204Z

42

ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

P R 050928Z OCT 67
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5442
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS 1135
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 451
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 1083

DISTRIBUTUS

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REF: GENEVA 1055

7. ANTYASOV INQUIRED RE US REACTION TO MEXICAN PROPOSAL THAT 60 COUNTRIES BE REQUIRED TO RATIFY NPT IN ADDITION TO NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES BEFORE NPT ENTERS INTO FORCE. DEPALMA SAID THIS SEEMED LIKE TOO LARGE A NUMBER AND THAT 30 TO 40 MIGHT BE BETTER. ANTYASOV SAID SOV DEL

PAGE TWO RUFHGV 1083/2 S E C R E T
HAS NO INSTRUCTIONS, BUT THIS SEEMED REASONABLE.

8. ANTYASOV ALSO INQUIRED AS TO US DEL VIEW OF MEXICAN SUGGESTION THAT THERE BE TWO NUCLEAR AND TWO NON-NUCLEAR DEPOSITARIES, INDICATING IDEA APPEALED TO SOVIETS. DEPALMA REPLIED THAT USE OF TEST BAN FORMULA OF THREE DEPOSITARIES WOULD TAKE CARE OF PROBLEMS WE HAD RE UNRECOGNIZED REGIMES. AS TO ADDITION NON-NUCLEARS, HE

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 1083 02 OF 02 051204Z

THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR NON-NUCLEARS TO AGREE ON ANY TWO, FOR EXAMPLE, IF INDIA HAD NOT DECIDED TO ADHERE, WE WOULD NOT WISH MAKE IT DEPOSITARY, BUT IF WE DID NOT DO SO, THEN THIS MIGHT ADD TO LIST OF INDIAN COMPLAINTS ABOUT TREATY. IN ADDITION, WOULD SOVS BE WILLING TO CONSIDER, FOR EXAMPLE, JAPAN AS ONE OF TWO NON-NUCLEAR DEPOSITARIES BECAUSE OF ITS NUCLEAR POTENTIAL. ANTYASOV SAID THAT NON-NUCLEAR DEPOSITARIES SHOULD BE TRULY NON-ALIGNED, E.G., MEXICO AND SWEDEN. US DELOFFS REMINDED ANTYASOV THAT GASTANEDA HAD PROPOSED NON-NUCLEAR, NOT NON-ALIGNED, DEPOSITARIES. DEPALMA SAID WE SHOULD ASCERTAIN WHETHER CASTANEDA HAD

PAGE THREE RUFHGV 1083/2 S E C R E T
THOUGHT THROUGH PRACTICAL PROBLEMS HIS PROPOSAL RAISED.

9. ON SWEDISH PROPOSAL TO RESTATE IN NPT PREAMBLE THE PREAMBULAR PLEDGE OF ORIGINAL PARTIES TO LIMITED TEST BAN (LTB) TO NEGOTIATE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, US AND SOV DELOFFS THOUGHT IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE TO LIST ONE MEASURE ALONE. US DELOFF SUGGESTED THAT, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT NOT BE POPULAR, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO INSIST THAT REITERATION OF PREAMBULAR CLAUSE FROM LTB WAS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE, IN FACT, LTB CONTINUED IN FULL FORCE AND THEREFORE ITS PREAMBULAR PROVISIONS CONTINUED IN FULL FORCE.

10. ON SWEDISH PROPOSAL THAT CO-CHAIRMEN PROVIDE INTER-
PRETATION OF WORDS "NON-DISCRIMINATORY" RELATING TO
PROVISION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, US AND
SOV DELOFFS THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE BEST TO EXPLAIN IN PLENARY
WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN STATED (E.G., BY FOSTER) THAT NON-
NUCLEARS WOULD NOT BE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BECAUSE OF
EXTRANEOUS POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. DEPALMA COMMENTED
THAT IF MYRDAL WISHED TO REQUIRE THAT NUCLEAR POWERS OBTAIN

PAGE FOUR RUFHGV 1083/2 S E C R E T
SAME LICENSE FROM INTERNATIONAL AGENCY WHICH NON-NUCLEARS

SECRET

Department of

TELEGRAMSECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 01083 02 OF 02 051204Z

WOULD HAVE TO OBTAIN, MERELY TO HAVE APPEARANCE OF COMPLETE NON-DISCRIMINATION, THIS WOULD RAISE DIFFICULTIES. BUT IF MYRDAL WAS CONCERNED THAT NUCLEARS MIGHT NOT PROVIDE DEVICES BECAUSE THEY WOULD INSIST ON TAKING CARE OF THEIR OWN NEEDS FIRST AND THERE WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO GO AROUND, THEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ASSUAGE HER CONCERN SINCE, ACCORDING TO DEPALMA'S UNDERSTANDING, THIS WAS NOT A REAL PROBLEM AND IN ANY EVENT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH WHEN SEPARATE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED.

11. DEPALMA INQUIRED WHETHER SOVS HAD THOUGHT ABOUT JAPANESE IDEAS FOR NPT AMENDMENTS. SHUSTOV SAID THAT IDEA FOR PERIODIC REVIEW DID NOT NECESSARILY SEEM HARMFUL. SOVS SAID PREPARATORY COMMITTEE TO PREPARE FOR SUCH CONFERENCES APPEARED TO INTEREST JAPAN. US DELOFF THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADVANTAGES IN CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF ASSURING THROUGH TREATY THAT NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD PARTICIPATE WITH NON-NUCLEARS IN PREPARATION OF REVIEW CONFERENCE RATHER THAN BE CONFRONTED WITH ARRANGEMENTS

PAGE FIVE RUFHGV 1083/2 S E C R E T
BY SELF-APPOINTED NON-NUCLEAR COMMITTEE. BOTH US AND SOV DELOFFS THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO APPEAR TO SATISFY ANOTHER DESIRE OF NON-NUCLEARS FOR INCREASED STATUS UNDER THE TREATY. SHUSTOV WITHOUT PROMPTING RAISED POSSIBILITY THAT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MIGHT CONSIST OF MEMBERS OF IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS. US AND SOV DELOFFS AGREED TALK ABOUT THESE POSSIBILITIES FURTHER.

12. DEPALMA AGREED NOTIFY SOVS AS SOON AS INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON REGARDING AMENDMENTS.

GP-B. TUSBY

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