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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, GENEVA, LONDON, MADRAS, MOSCOW, OTTAWA, TOKYO, USUN

FROM : Amembassy NEW DELHI DATE: April 30, 1968

SUBJECT : NPT: Canadians Continue Efforts to Enlist Indian Adherence

REF : New Delhi A-540, December 12, 1967

BKS

File India

RECEIVED
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ANALYSIS BRANCH

Summary

The Canadians have made another effort with the Prime Minister to persuade her of the importance of the GOI's adherence to NPT. Mrs. Gandhi has responded she does not view NPT as a step toward peace. She sees no advantage accruing to India in signing the treaty. In her view the tripartite security assurances resolution is not credible.

End Summary

In their continuing effort to enlist GOI support of the NPT, Canadian High Commissioner GEORGE delivered an Aide-Memoire to the Prime Minister on April 5, 1968 (copy enclosed). According to a Canadian source, this latest initiative was intended 1) to counter GOI objections to the draft, and 2) to "start a dialogue" in the hope of eliciting specific suggestions from the Indians for improving the draft.

Mrs. Gandhi's Comments on NPT

Following the High Commissioner's point-by-point explanation of the Aide-Memoire, Mrs. Gandhi promptly made the observation that

Enclosure: *all w.m.*
Copy of Aide-Memoire

Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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FORM 4-62 *RNV*

Drafted by: PE/EX:RNViets:wjv 4/19/68

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the present draft was not a step toward peace; it was merely a consolidation of the status quo between the nuclear haves and have nots. She saw no advantages accruing to India in signing the NPT, nor could she understand the importance the super powers assigned to Indian adherence. In her view West Germany was the main reason Moscow and Washington were promoting NPT; it now appeared the Germans were going to sign and therefore the Russians and Americans should be satisfied. In passing, the Prime Minister also observed that Mr. George was the first Chief of Mission to make a representation to her on NPT.

No Credence to Security Assurances

The Prime Minister told Mr. George she gave no credence at all to the recent security assurances resolution sponsored by the U. S., U. K. and the U.S.S.R. She said where India's national security was concerned her policy was not to depend on promises made by anyone; promises too often were broken. Mrs. Gandhi stated she had sent L. K. Jha to Moscow, London and Washington last spring not to secure a security guarantee for India but to find out what Prime Minister Shastri had previously discussed on this subject. She said Shastri had left no records of any conversations on the topic of security assurances.

Reactions of the High Commissioner

Mr. George is reported to have been extremely discouraged by the encounter. He found Mrs. Gandhi's understanding of the treaty and her comprehension of its international implications to be very weak. She gave him no encouragement that the GOI would sign the treaty. Neither did she offer any response to the initiative contained in the Aide-Memoire to commence bilateral discussions leading to possible improvements to the draft.

Subsequent to the High Commissioner's meeting with the Prime Minister a copy of the Aide-Memoire was given to R. Jaipal, Joint Secretary, MEA by First Secretary Eric WANG. In the ensuing conversation Jaipal told Wang in the strictest confidence that he had just completed an independent investigation of various AEC nuclear programs. He

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said to his surprise he found there had been no updating of the Bhabha report on the cost of a nuclear weapons development program prepared three years ago. Furthermore, he could discover no program currently underway in AEC which could quickly be diverted to weapons development. In fact, Jaipal said, he had been unable to locate any personnel in authority at AEC seriously interested in nuclear weapons research or development. (Please protect source)

Comment

In common with other Missions in New Delhi, the Canadians have recently been dismayed by the increasing rigidity in Mrs. Gandhi's public and private pronouncements on NPT. Whereas the Canadians even three weeks ago were reasonably sure the GOI eventually would sign, that optimism has now disappeared.

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AIDE-MEMOIRE

CANADIAN VIEWS ON THE DRAFT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

As Indian authorities are aware Canada attaches high priority to the non-proliferation treaty and considers it to be one of the most urgent arms control measures now under consideration. We believe that in halting the further spread of nuclear weapons, the treaty would make a fundamental contribution to the maintenance of international peace, security and economic stability, particularly from the point of view of the non-nuclear-weapon states which would have the most to lose in the extension of the nuclear arms race. We recognize that in terms of security Canada's concerns may be different from that of India. Nevertheless we think that there are decisive arguments in favour of a non-proliferation treaty along the lines of the present draft. In the light of our earlier exchanges about the treaty, we would welcome the opportunity to discuss India's reservations about the present draft and in particular any specific suggestions India may have to offer for improving it.

Nuclear Disarmament

2. We would be glad to know, for example, how India would propose to strengthen treaty provisions relating to measures of nuclear disarmament. Our own assessment is that the practical difficulties of securing specific agreement on nuclear disarmament measures among the nuclear powers at the present time are so great that to tie such measures to a non-proliferation treaty would be to delay the treaty indefinitely. We think we should realistically confine ourselves to treaty modifications that might reasonably find acceptance, since modest steps in the right direction are better than no step at all.

3. The treaty as now drafted envisages, in our view, both a clear and persuasive declaration of intent by nuclear parties to undertake concrete measures of disarmament and the means for non-nuclear-weapon parties, through the treaty review and withdrawal procedures, to exert effective influence on the nuclear powers to live up to that declaration.

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4. We accept in advance that international efforts to prevent further nuclear proliferation will be limited by the fact that two nuclear powers are unlikely to sign the treaty. However it seems obvious that if the treaty is to be effective, it is of the greatest importance that as many other powers as possible, and particularly all potential nuclear powers, should sign it. Unless this can be achieved, the essential purpose of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and thus avoiding the dangerous consequences of additional countries acquiring such weapons will not be attained. We believe that it will be a safer world for all of us if the acquisition of nuclear weapons by further countries is not only checked but also seen to be checked within the framework of a broadly accepted multilateral treaty.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

5. In assessing the economic balance sheet, we see no basis for the concern expressed in some quarters that the non-proliferation treaty might impose restraints on the development of peaceful nuclear technology and trade in nuclear materials and equipment by non-nuclear-weapon states. Parties to the treaty will merely be putting into effect a system of safeguards based upon that of the IAEA. In a more general way, signatories will benefit from the increased confidence which will facilitate international exchange of information, technology and components under bilateral peaceful nuclear programmes. As a major international supplier of nuclear fuel, technology and components Canada is particularly conscious of the importance of a climate of confidence in facilitating unimpeded movement of nuclear goods and services across international borders. Indeed Canada has a major interest in maintaining its position in the peaceful nuclear field and, in accepting the treaty and its proposed safeguards provisions we are convinced that we shall not be jeopardizing this position or opening the way to industrial espionage. Moreover the undertakings of nuclear-weapon parties in respect of the applications of peaceful nuclear explosive technology is in our view concrete assurance that non-nuclear-weapon parties will reap the potential benefits of this technology without discrimination and at nominal cost excluding the enormous cost of research and development. We see no reason why this offer cannot be elaborated in a subsequent international agreement.

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A-1037 from New DelhiBalance of Mutual Obligations

6. That the nuclear-weapon parties are themselves prepared to undertake significant obligations under the treaty is demonstrated by their readiness to make declarations of intent in respect of disarmament, by their commitments in respect of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and as indicated above in respect of peaceful nuclear explosive technology. Recent declarations by the U.S.A. and U.K. to accept the same international safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities as non-nuclear-weapon parties are both an emphatic expression of belief and confidence in treaty safeguards and a significant reciprocal undertaking.

Security

7. In the last month, specific attention has been directed to the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon states, particularly as they may feel exposed to nuclear intimidation by nuclear weapon powers. Assurances have been offered in the form of a draft Security Council resolution, which, in the light of the non-aligned status of those states most in need of such assurances and the existing security commitments of the nuclear powers, would appear to represent the most appropriate and practical vehicle for assurances short of establishing new defensive military alliances. We do not interpret the draft resolution as in any way inhibiting a party from coming unilaterally to the assistance of a victim of nuclear aggression either at the invitation of the latter or in fulfilment of formal or informal bilateral commitments.

8. In providing flexible procedures for review, amendment and withdrawal, moreover, the draft treaty takes into account the inability of non-nuclear-weapon parties to foresee all contingencies affecting their national security and provides them with a means to change the terms of the treaty, to withdraw from the treaty on three months notice in event of national emergency and to bring collective pressure to bear on nuclear-weapon parties which might in any sense be departing from the spirit and letter of the treaty.

9. It is in a spirit of continuing friendship and cooperation and mutual benefit that we have felt free to present our views to you frankly at this important time in the non-proliferation negotiations. We would greatly welcome India's comments and suggestions in the same spirit and the opportunity to continue the dialogue.

New Delhi, April 5, 1968

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