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(b)(3):10 USC 424

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(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

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CONTROLS

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SECTION 1 OF 6

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA COMMONWEALTH ASSESSMENT 046-98/26 MAY 98

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USC 424

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INDONESIA: MILITARY ENTERING THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA (U)

FRY: MILOSEVIC'S POWER PLAY IN MONTENEGRO (U)

LIBYA: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL RADARS FOR AIR DEFENSE (S)

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INDONESIA: MILITARY ENTERING THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA (U)

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(b)(1), 1.4 (c)

3. ~~(C)~~ WIRANTO AND OTHER REFORM-MINDED OFFICERS SEEMINGLY ARE WELL PLACED TO LAUNCH MAJOR CHANGES TO THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL SYSTEM. THEY APPEAR INTENT ON REVISING LEGAL AND POLITICAL LAWS AND CONTINUING INFORMAL MILITARY DISCUSSIONS WITH STUDENTS AND OTHER GROUPS. EVEN SO, THE MILITARY HAS HAD MIXED SUCCESS CONVINCING CRITICS OF ITS FIRM COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC REFORM, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF ITS REFUSAL TO RENOUNCE SOEHARTO. MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ALSO TRADITIONALLY HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT TOO-RAPID DEMOCRATIC

REFORM, WHICH THEY FEAR COULD DESTABILIZE THE NATION.

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4. ~~(C)~~ WIRANTO'S DELICATE BALANCING TASK. GEN WIRANTO'S ACTIONS THUS

FAR UNDERSCORE A STRONG AND ABIDING INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM AND INTERNAL STABILITY, WHILE ACCOMMODATING STRONG POPULAR DEMANDS FOR CHANGE. FORMING A STUDY GROUP LAST YEAR TO LOOK AT DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA, HE RECOGNIZED

EARLY ON HIS IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE TRANSITION OF POWER. HOWEVER, HE STILL FACES MULTIPLE CHALLENGES. WITH RIVALS LIKE PRABOWO SEEKING TO

UNDERMINE HIS POSITION, HE HAS SURVIVED THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD BY CAREFULLY NURTURING MILITARY CONSENSUS AND LOYALTY TO THE PRESIDENCY AND THE CONSTITUTION; HIS STRONG EXPRESSIONS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HABIBIE UNDOUBTEDLY ARE PART OF THIS CALCULATED EFFORT. WIRANTO AND HIS MILITARY BACKERS MOST LIKELY WANT TO REPLACE HABIBIE SOON. ALTHOUGH HE IS VULNERABLE TO REPLACEMENT UNDER HABIBIE, WIRANTO COULD

SUCCEED THE NEW PRESIDENT THROUGH A FORTHCOMING ASSEMBLY VOTE.

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5. ~~(C)~~ PROBLEMS WITH HABIBIE. THE MILITARY ALSO CONFRONTS THE PROBLEM OF AN UNPOPULAR HABIBIE PRESIDENCY. WHILE PLEDGING SUPPORT, GEN WIRANTO DID NOT FAVOR HABIBIE'S VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION AND PROBABLY SEES HIM AS A HINDRANCE TO REFORM AND STABILITY. AT LEAST


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SOME SENIOR OFFICERS ARE INCLINED TO CONVENE A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY TO CHOOSE A MORE VIABLE SUCCESSOR, ESPECIALLY IF HABIBIE SEEKS TO STAY ON TO FINISH SOEHARTO'S CURRENT 5-YEAR TERM IN 2003.

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9. ~~(S)~~ KEY MILITARY PLAYERS.

-- PRABOWO: RECENT EVENTS HAVE CLEARLY PLACED A STRAIN ON PRABOWO. ALTHOUGH HE HAS PLEDGED LOYALTY TO THE ARMED FORCES COMMANDER, RUMORS

HAVE SURFACED THAT HE SEEKS TO UNDERMINE WIRANTO'S EFFORTS AT THE PALACE. PRABOWO APPEARS VULNERABLE TO ACCUSATIONS OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE EARLIER EXTRA-LEGAL DETENTION OF DISSIDENTS. MORE RECENT RUMORS LINK HIM TO EFFORTS TO SPARK VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE THE MODERATE OPPOSITION AND POSSIBLY JUSTIFY A CRACKDOWN.

-- BAMBANG: THE LEADING REFORMER AND INTELLECT OF THE MILITARY, CHIEF

OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL STAFF LT GEN BAMBANG YUDHOWONO HAS BEEN HEAVILY INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING THE MILITARY'S REFORM AGENDA. HE ALSO DISCOURAGES MILITARY INCIDENTS THAT MIGHT ONLY FURTHER INFLAME THE SITUATION. MANY BELIEVE HE COULD BECOME A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.

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10. ~~(S)~~ FURTHER POPULAR RESTIVENESS. UNREST IS LIKELY TO ABATE TEMPORARILY WITH SOEHARTO'S DEPARTURE, BUT MORE MAJOR PROTESTS APPEAR

INEVITABLE UNDER HABIBIE'S TENURE. SECURITY AUTHORITIES FEAR THAT DISRUPTIVE FORCES MAY TRY TO EXPLOIT PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS TO SPARK

RENEWED RIOTING. AS A RESULT, THE MILITARY PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE MANEUVERING TO KEEP STUDENTS FROM MARCHING OFF CAMPUS. WITH SERIOUS VIOLENCE BREAKING OUT RECENTLY IN MEDAN AND JAKARTA, COMMANDERS

MIGHT EVEN CONSIDER FIRING ON RIOTERS AS A LAST OPTION TO QUELL DISTURBANCES.

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12. (C) MILITARY EMBRACING REFORM. THE MILITARY IS DEVELOPING A DETAILED REFORM AGENDA, BASED ON INPUT FROM THE UNIVERSITIES, WHICH COVERS ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL MATTERS. INDONESIA MILITARY PLANNERS HAVE FURTHER BROKEN DOWN THE AGENDA INTO SHORT, MEDIUM, AND LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES.

-- SHORT TERM: MILITARY LEADERS WILL ENCOURAGE THE PARLIAMENT TO TAKE THE LEAD IN INSTALLING CHECKS AND BALANCES TO AVOID AN UNDUE CONCENTRATION OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY. THE PARLIAMENT WOULD PLAY A LARGER ROLE, BECOMING THE VEHICLE FOR REFORM. MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD IN PROMOTING A WIDE-RANGING REFORM AGENDA; THEIR GOAL REPORTEDLY IS TO MAKE THE INDONESIA PARLIAMENT AS DEMOCRATIC AND AS POWERFUL AS ITS WESTERN COUNTERPARTS.

-- MEDIUM TERM: A KEY OBJECTIVE IS REVISING THE CONTROVERSIAL FIVE POLITICAL LAWS THAT IN THE PAST HAD SERIOUSLY CIRCUMSCRIBED THE ACTIVITIES OF OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES. THE MILITARY HOPES TO HAVE THE NEW RULES IN PLACE BY 2001, IN TIME FOR THE NEXT SCHEDULED PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.

-- LONG TERM: THE MILITARY FORESEES THE NEED TO MAKE CORRECTIONS ON ISSUES SUCH AS LIMITING THE NUMBER OF PRESIDENTIAL TERMS.

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13. (C) CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT MILITARY ACTIONS.

-- 14 MAY. ARMED FORCES COMMANDER WIRANTO CONVENED A MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICERS TO GAIN CONSENSUS ON HOW TO REACT TO THE GROWING CRISIS; THE POSSIBILITY OF DISSENSION LOOMED BETWEEN PRO-WIRANTO AND PRO-PRABOWO FACTIONS.

-- 15 MAY. WIRANTO BRIEFED SOEHARTO ON THE SITUATION UPON THE PRESIDENT'S RETURN FROM THE MIDDLE EAST BUT APPARENTLY DID NOT SUGGEST THAT HE STEP DOWN.

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-- 16 MAY. WITH WIRANTO'S CONCURRENCE, SPEAKER OF THE PARLIAMENT HARMOKO EXPLAINED THE PEOPLE'S IDEAS--INCLUDING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY AND A CABINET RESHUFFLE--TO THE PRESIDENT. SOEHARTO AGREED TO CABINET CHANGES BUT GAVE NO INDICATION

HE WOULD STEP DOWN.

-- 16 MAY. A RUMOR SURFACED THAT SOME SENIOR OFFICERS WERE PLOTTING BEHIND SOEHARTO'S BACK TO UNDERMINE WIRANTO'S POSITION.

-- 17 MAY. A MEETING WAS CALLED TO RESOLVE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE FACTIONS LED BY WIRANTO AND PRABOWO. THE CHOICE WAS TO BROADEN WIRANTO'S MANDATE OR TO FIND ANOTHER CANDIDATE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. ULTIMATELY, WIRANTO REMAINED ARMED FORCES COMMANDER AND PRABOWO CLAIMED THAT NO DIVISION OF LOYALTY OCCURRED WITHIN THE MILITARY.

-- 18 MAY. WIRANTO SURPRISED SOME BY MAKING PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT CRITICIZING HARMOKO'S CALL FOR SOEHARTO'S RESIGNATION.

-- 19 MAY. SOEHARTO MADE A SPEECH INDICATING HIS INTENTION TO RESIGN

BUT LEAVING UNSTATED THE EXACT TIMING AND DETAILS OF SUCCESSION.

-- 20 MAY. A STRONG SHOW OF FORCE BY THE MILITARY CAUSED OPPOSITION GROUPS TO CALL OFF A PLANNED DAY OF PROTEST AGAINST SOEHARTO. WIRANTO WAS RUMORED TO HAVE ENCOURAGED SOEHARTO TO DEFINE THE ELECTION PROCESS.

-- 21 MAY. SOEHARTO STEPPED DOWN AND VICE PRESIDENT HABIBIE BECAME PRESIDENT. WIRANTO AND PRABOWO BOTH PLEDGED SUPPORT TO HABIBIE.

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14. (C) FUTURE DIRECTIONS. FURTHER DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN MILITARY LEADERS AND STUDENTS APPEAR INEVITABLE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES AND LINGERING SUSPICIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. ALTHOUGH THE STUDENTS AND OTHER OPPOSITION FACTIONS INCREASINGLY CHALLENGE THE MILITARY'S TRADITIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS, ARMY LEADERS--CONCERNED ABOUT MAINTAINING STABILITY--ARE UNLIKELY TO SOON RELINQUISH THEIR GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT ROLE. NONETHELESS, MILITARY LEADERS REALIZE THAT RESTORING ORDER AND STABILITY WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THE TACIT ACQUIESCENCE OF THE MAJOR PRODEMOCRACY STUDENT GROUPS. WIRANTO AND HIS GENERALS ACKNOWLEDGE THE IMPERATIVE TO ACCOMMODATE WIDE-RANGING DEMOCRATIC REFORMS, INCLUDING OPEN ELECTIONS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

EXPRESSION. ULTIMATELY, THE MILITARY IS LIKELY TO PUSH FOR A BROAD CONSENSUS ON THE NEXT NATIONAL LEADERSHIP, BUT IT WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN GOVERNING THE NATION.

Pgs. 8-12 are non responsive.

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