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Origin

Info:

Irish resolution along lines outlined reftel potentially dangerous, and GADEL should attempt dissuade Irish its introduction and urge French, British to do likewise. Main points to be made:

1. US unable accept any provision calling upon nuclear powers not to make nuclear weapons available to other countries, since US must reserve right to do so to maintain defense arrangements in absence comprehensive disarmament agreement. Moreover such provision could no doubt relatively easily be evaded by Soviets, whereas West would have to abide by it.

2. In absence limitations on conventional forces of Soviet bloc, undesirable for West accept limitations on its freedom maintain and deploy strong nuclear defense.

3. US in sympathy objective preventing spread nuclear weapons production capability to other countries. Statutory policy presently forbids US transfer of custody over weapons we make available our allies, but US believes control of spread of nuclear weapons can only be realistically accomplished in framework of disarmament agreement that provides for thorough inspection and restrictions

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restrictions on other elements, i.e., armed forces as well as nuclear elements. GADEL should point out that logical consequence implementation principles embodied 12th GA disarmament resolution would be to prevent, in safeguarded manner, such spread.

4. We must be cautious in singling out nuclear weapons for separate treatment, since it would strengthen Soviet campaign for prohibition use these weapons and inhibits West's reliance on them for deterrance as well as de-emphasizing conventional forces and arms, which are also at center of problems with which balanced disarmament agreement must deal.

5. Re Aiken support action "limiting possession nuclear weapons to US, UK, France and USSR" note impossibility enforcing any such agreement in view inability detect existing nuclear weapons stockpiles.

6. Note introduction substantive disarmament resolution at this time in GA likely have disruptive effects with possibility poisoning atmosphere for Geneva negotiations about to begin. Disarmament cause best served at this time by having non-contentious treatment of problem in GA.



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