

INCOMING TELEGRAM

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Action Taken	<i>W. L.</i>
Initials	<i>N</i>
Date	<i>10/27</i>
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COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

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RFP.

ACTION:
BROWN/PEDERSEN

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TO : USUN

NO : GADEL 67, October 24, 8 P.M.

PRIORITY

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Re DELGA 250.

In dealing with Irish proposals, USDEL may draw on following points:

1. US shares basic objectives Irish proposals. We are opposed uncontrolled spread nuclear weapons for very reasons Irish cite, and this remains cardinal objective US disarmament policy. US laws are expression this policy in that they prohibit transfer custody nuclear weapons to others.
2. US disarmament proposals which contemplate world-wide cessation production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes would lead to direct achievement results Irish seek. This is a measure which we believe is fully controllable, and only Soviet position has prevented progress toward this objective.
3. Basic question for US is context in which this objective should be achieved, and how control such measures would be ensured. US cannot accept any obligations observance of which cannot be verified, and Irish proposals partake of this defect.
4. Equally important consideration is that restrictions on ability to develop and deploy nuclear weapons must be part of integrated attack on entire armament problem. Unless causes which impell states take steps improve their defenses are mitigated, they must be left free to develop arrangements they consider necessary for their own security. A GA action forbidding transfer weapons absolutely before any other disarmament measures agreed, and as isolated step, would not be observed by states when facing overwhelming considerations

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national security. Our objective is to provide context in which states can make this undertaking, and know that its observance can be assured without jeopardizing their own safety. This can be accomplished as part of concerted action which limits power of aggressor to enforce his will on others and not simply ability of defender to take steps he deems necessary for his protection.

5. If these principles correct, creation of ad hoc committee to study problem would be in effect to examine entire disarmament problem. This properly function of DC.

6. Department believes that language authorized last paragraph GADEL 39* on subject matter of Irish resolution may prove useful particularly in the light of the foregoing.

FYI: Following for your background is further reason (which cannot of course be used publicly) why US cannot subscribe to Irish resolution. We are working out arrangements with our NATO allies for storage of nuclear weapons in NATO area for use by forces of other NATO countries in time of war. This program is in implementation of publicly announced NATO heads of government decision December 1957 to establish stocks of nuclear warheads which will be readily available for defense of Atlantic alliance in case of need. US retains custody of nuclear warheads under this program, as required by US law, and hence we are not contributing to spread of nuclear weapons. However, we would be vulnerable to attacks that we are in fact contributing to spread of nuclear weapons through NATO atomic stockpile program. Such attacks would ignore fact that US retains custody. End FYI.

DULLES

*GADEL 39 1s USUN 5581

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