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ACTION: Amembassy PARIS TOPOL 596

RE: POLTO 498 and 487 — 700.5611/10-1661

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On next occasion Irish res is discussed in NAC you should emphasize that US has always been of opinion that para 3 of Irish res is not rpt not inconsistent with participation of NATO's non-nuclear nations in either present stockpile arrangements or any multilateral arrangements that might be envisaged. We have felt NATO is protected on two counts in Irish res language: (1) Irish res is directed at preventing increase in number of states independently disposing of nuclear weapons, not at multilateral arrangements; (2) Irish res uses word QTE accept UNQTE in para 3 in ambiguous sense; we have understood it to mean QTE acquire ownership UNQTE rather than QTE accept the stationing of nuclear weapons in one's national territory UNQTE. Latter interpretation is what seems to be giving NATO countries difficulties. We have not felt that amendment of Irish res is necessary to give NATO additional protection on this point.

While UK suggestion to add QTE control of UNQTE after QTE accept UNQTE in para 3 would be consistent with US disarmament plan [Section I.C.(e)], we fail to see how this would give NATO more protection than it now has. ~~The~~ Only concern it would alleviate

(Continued by RMB)

Drafted by: ACDA/P:JEGoodby:bgo 10/20/61

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ACDA/P - Vincent Baker

Clearances:
UNP - Mr. Jones (in draft)
RA - Mr. Fessenden (in draft)
S/P - Mr. Owens (in draft)

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...nterpreting QTE accept UNQTE in para 3 in ...che physical presence of nuclear weapons. We ...e could successfully resist that interpretation, ...rly since Irish themselves do not seem to accept it. Accordingly, US would be prepared vote for Irish res even if UK amendment not effected.

We would, of course, agree that what we mean by QTE control UNQTE in US plan is QTE full national control UNQTE. There is, therefore, no difference in substance between US and others in NATO, only difference is how this question should be handled in GA.

Because of problem of discussing in UN forum meaning of QTE accepting control UNQTE, we favored more ambiguous language of the Irish res. Problem can be more easily handled in negotiating forum where we expect details of US disarmament plan will be discussed. Hence, the difference between language we deem appropriate for negotiations (as in US plan) and language acceptable in UNGA (as in Irish res).

However, in view your assessment that UK amendment will increase NATO support for Irish res we would not object to British approaching Irish to see if Irish will accept it. Before doing this, however, we want to have in hand the comments of NATO governments which apparently will be forthcoming shortly as result your request at special NAC meeting October 16.

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We do not wish go beyond UK ~~XX~~ amendment as Stikker suggests. To do so would probably be unacceptable to Irish and, in any case, it would hand the Soviets a convenient peg on which to make a case against NATO nuclear arrangements.

Presume suggestion you made in POLTO 487 now superseded by discussions reported POLTO 498. Believe intent your suggestion would be handled in subsequent negotiation called for by Irish res. States voting for res would, of course, not be bound to accept agreement eventually negotiated unless they convinced their security adequately protected. This would presumably include right of determining whether all parties essential to the agreement were going to adhere and whether prohibitions of proposed accord ran counter to intent of states who voted for Irish res.

In further discussions on Irish res we think it would be desirable for you to indicate U.S. will not be overly precise in what we might say in an interpretative statement in UNGA regarding multilateral NATO MRBM forces, since this subject is under consideration by Alliance. Should also be remembered we have not yet decided whether such interpretative statement should be made (TOPOL 565). In this connection our inclination would be make less specific statement of interpretation than contained your memorandum and then only if tactical situation seemed require. Otherwise we merely invite UNGA debate contemplated arrangements.

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Believe useful state forcefully that where language Irish
res may appear vague, important point is that NATO group agree
among themselves on XXXXXXXXXX interpretation. In final analysis
it is this interpretation that counts as practical matter in an
issue which touches closely on our vital security arrangements.

Rusk
(9/13)

RUSK