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October 26, 1961  
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FROM: Paris

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: POLTO circular 34, October 25, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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**NAC Meeting, October 25--Irish resolution on dissemination  
nuclear weapons.**

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**Summary.** Despite strong US appeal for support Irish resolution as amended by US (TOPOL 519), majority NATO members, including all NATO non-nuclear countries with nuclear delivery capable forces, firmly rejected support for resolution in its present form. They made clear that acceptance resolution with present ambiguity re Peba three would constitute mental reservation to what would be interpreted as moral commitment and would cause difficulties in UNGA, in relations with non-NATO countries and especially in public opinion at home where NATO defense efforts run serious risk of being impaired by favorable vote. On other hand, all NATO members appeared ready albeit reluctantly to accept Irish resolution with insertion of "control of" after "accept" in paragraph three as proposed by UK with exception of Portugal and France, who indicated their intention to abstain in UNGA vote on Irish resolution in any form and of US which entered reservation pending referral to Washington. Stikker expressed his agreement with majority in strongest terms. With due note US reservation, chairman indicated agreement to UK approaching Irish re introducing proposed amendment

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U.S. ARMS CONTROL  
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*375/10-23-61*

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amendment in paragraph three and further consideration in Council if this approach failed. End Summary.

US Permanent Representative opened discussion by indicating revisions in paragraph three proposed by UK and Stikker (POLTO 498) had been considered by his authorities who continued to feel that even without these changes Irish resolution is not inconsistent with participation in present stockpile arrangements or other multilateral arrangements that might be envisaged. US Government believed that important point in this matter is what NATO members think is proper interpretation. Suggested Council might agree on internal resolution which would state its interpretation that Irish resolution is consistent with any agreements re stockpiling or any future developments as regards a multilateral NATO force. Felt this would be sufficient for NATO purposes and any member would be free to make public views in this resolution if it deemed necessary. Drew on TOPOL 596 to emphasize US view no amendment of Irish resolution necessary to give added protection NATO interests which appeared to be object of UK and Stikker proposed changes. Emphasized again important thing as Council's interpretation of resolution and that would be sufficient to permit support for Irish resolution.

UK took flexible position, indicating it did not have difficulties which other NATO governments seemed to feel with Irish resolution and was prepared to vote for it as it stands. Felt, however, its proposed revision so paragraph three might be desirable to point up distinction between stationing

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stationing of weapons on national territory and "button pressing procedure", thereby quieting apprehensions that had been voiced in Council. Considered Stikker proposal for insertion of "full national control" went too far and would be resisted by Irish as well as unfriendly states in UNGA.

Belgium, which with Stikker led opposition to Irish resolution in present form, stated US presentation, while admirably subtle, still did not present good argument. Felt acceptance of Irish resolution would give rise to serious difficulties, particularly in Belgian Parliament and in any event would be dangerous path for West to follow. Belgium could agree with proposed UK change but was compelled firmly to say "no" to US proposal for acceptance of resolution as is.

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After Turkey had expressed position midway between US and Belgian positions, but with obvious preference for latter, Netherlands made strong statement advising NATO members to look at Irish resolution more closely from point of view what Irish attempting to achieve. Felt that Irish resolution constituted form of arms limitation with propaganda basis and would be interpreted by large number of non-NATO countries as divergent even with collective arrangements existing or envisaged for NATO. In these circumstances Council could either accept Irish resolution with mental reservation suggested by US or have some courage to propose amendment to the resolution. Even if amendment defeated, would have effect of clarifying issue in public opinion and would make it possible for NATO government to defend position in Parliament. Recalling last year's US statement in UNGA re Irish resolution that it undersirable to take implied moral commitments of this kind, stated this continued be true since others would interpret vote for Irish resolution as moral commitment from which we might be able to extricate ourselves to our own satisfaction but not to satisfaction of others.

Greece, Italy, Iceland, Luxembourg and FEDREP strongly supported Belgian

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Belgian and Netherlands point of view with indication they were prepared to support resolution with UK amendment.

France, although stating it would abstain on Irish resolution in any circumstance, expressed firm agreement with general line taken by Belgium and the Netherlands. Felt Irish resolution could serve no useful purpose and was prepared, however, to accept limitations on dissemination of nuclear weapons within framework of disarmament agreement.

Denmark stated that although without instructions it could go along with Irish resolution in spirit expressed by US. Pointed out, however, that if UK amendment were offered in UNGA and voted down by majority, it would be difficult stick with interpretation placed on resolution by US. Urged UK therefore to try to get Irish acceptance of revised paragraph three before resolution tabled. UK explained this was its intention and according to word from their delegation in New York, would not be difficult to get Irish to accept it. Canada commented it generally agreed with substance of Irish resolution as it stood but could also support UK change. Did not believe Council resolution on interpretation would be useful. Norway took position similar to Denmark, stating it did not believe resolution would interfere with NATO policy and that Norwegian delegation at New York had been instructed to vote in favor.

Stikker said he thought supporting Irish resolution in its present form would be very bad from NATO point of view. It was not right to force a decision in UN with moral implications that would

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that would have effect among out peoples and at same time have mental reservation. Accepting ambiguity in Irish resolution would be worst of all policies. Summing up, he said consensus was UK should approach Irish to secure proposed amendment to paragraph three, but, said Stikker, given great importance of this issue to alliance, Council must give matter further consideration if approach to Irish unsuccessful. US reserved position pending further consultation with Washington.

Comment: I am sincerely disturbed at implications this consultation. We have now been officially put on warning by representatives of our allies that voting for Irish resolution in its present form could result in public opinion in important NATO countries which would seriously impair contribution to NATO defense effort.

In view thereof, I recommend that before instructions are sent to USUN or to us approving Irish text as is matter be brought to Secretary personal attention.

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